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‘Techplomacy’ and the negotiation of AI standards for the Indo-Pacific
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/techplomacy-and-negotiation-of-ai-standards-for-indo-pacific
<b>Researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have partnered with the Centre for Internet and Society (Bengaluru) to produce a ‘techplomacy guide’ on negotiating AI standards for stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.</b>
<p>This is a modified version of the post that appeared in<strong> </strong><a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/high-time-for-australia-and-india-to-step-up-their-tech-diplomacy/"><strong>The Strategist</strong></a><strong><span> </span></strong></p>
<p><strong>By Arindrajit Basu with inputs from and review by Amrita Sengupta and Isha Suri</strong></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Later this month, UN member states elected American candidate Doreen Bogdan-Martin "</span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/08/12/the-most-important-election-you-never-heard-of/">the most important election you have never heard off</a><span>" to elect the next secretary-general of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). While this technical body's work may be esoteric, the election was fiercely contested with Russian candidate (and former Huawei executive; aptly reflecting the geopolitical competition that is underway in determining the “</span><a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/election-future-internet">future of the internet”</a><span> through the technical standards that underpin it. The “Internet Protocol” (IP) that is the set of rules governing the communication and exchange of data over the internet itself is being subjected to political contestation between a Sino-Russian vision that would see the standard give way to greater government control and a US vision ostensibly rooted in more inclusive multi-stakeholder participation.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As critical and emerging technologies take the geopolitical centre-stage, the global tug of war over the development, utilisation, and deployment is playing out most ferociously at standard-setting organisations, an arms’ length away from the media limelight. Powerful state and non-state actors alike are already seeking to shape standards in ways that suit their economic, political, and normative priorities. It is time for emerging economies, middle powers and a wider array of private actors and members from the civil society to play a more meaningful and tangible role in the process.</p>
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<h3><strong>What are standards and why do they matter</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Simply put, standards are blueprints or protocols with requirements which ‘standardise’ products and related processes around the world, thus ensuring that they are interoperable, safe and sustainable. For example, USB, WiFi or a QWERTY keyboard can be used around the world because they are built on technical standards that enable equipment produced adopting these standards to be used around the world.Standards are negotiated both domestically-at domestic standard-setting bodies such as the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) or Standards Australia (SA) or global standard-development organisations such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) or the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO). While standards are not legally binding unless they are explicitly imposed as requirements in a legislation, they have immense coercive value. Not adhering to recognised standards means that certain products may not reach markets as they are not compatible with consumer requirements or cannot claim to meet health or safety expectations. The harmonisation of internationally recognised standards serves as the bedrock for global trade and commerce. Complying with a global standard is particularly critical because of its applicability across several markets. Further, international trade law proclaims that World Trade Organisation (WTO) members can impose trade restrictive domestic measures only on the basis of published or soon to be published international standards.(Article 2.4 of the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm">Technical Barriers to Trade</a> Agreement)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Shaping global standards is of immense geopolitical and economic value to states and the private sector alike. States that are able to ‘export’ their domestic technological standards internationally enable their companies to reap a significant economic advantage because it is cheaper for them to adopt global standards. Further, companies draw huge revenue by holding patents to technologies that are essential to comply with a certain standard popularly known as Standard Essential Patents or SEPs and licensing them to other players who want to enter the market. For context, IPlytics <a href="https://www.lightreading.com/5g/nokia-boasts-of-essential-5g-patents-milestone/d/d-id/773445">estimated</a> that cumulative global royalty income from licensing SEPs was USD 20 billion in 2020, anticipated to increase significantly in the coming years due to massive technological upgradation currently underway.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">China’s push for dominance to influence the 5G standard at the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) illustrates how prioritising standards-setting both through domestic industrial policy and foreign policy could provide rich economic and geopolitical dividends. After failing to meaningfully influence the setting of the 3G and 4G standards,the Chinese government commenced a national effort that sought to harmonise domestic standards, improve government coordination of standard-setting efforts, and obtain a first movers advantage over other nations developing their own domestic 5G standards. This was combined with a diplomatic push that saw vigorous private sector <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-leads-the-way-on-global-standards-for-5G-and-beyond">participation </a>(Huawei put in 20 5G related proposals whereas Ericsson and Nokia put in just 16 and 10 respectively);</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">packing key leadership positions in Working Groups with representatives from Chinese companies and institutions; and ensuring that all Chinese participants vote in unison for any proposal. It is no surprise therefore that Chinese companies now lead the way on 5G with Huawei <a href="https://insights.greyb.com/company-with-most-5g-patents/">owning</a> the most number of 5G patents and has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-huawei-5g">finalised</a> more 5G contracts than any other company despite restrictions placed on Huawei’s gear by some countries. As detailed in its “Make in China”strategy, China will now activelyapply its winning strategy to other standard-setting avenues as well</p>
<h3><span>Standards for Artificial Intelligence</span></h3>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A number of institutions, including private actors such as Huawei and Cloud Walk have contributed to China’s 2018 <a href="https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/artificial-intelligence-standardization-white-paper-2021-edition/">AI standardisation white paper</a> that was revised and updated in 2021.The white paper maps the work of SDOs in the field of AI standards and outlines a number of recommendations on how Chinese actors can use global SDOs to boost industrial competitiveness and globally promote “Chinese wisdom.” While there are cursory references to the role of standards in furthering “ethics” and “privacy,” the document does not outline how China will look to promote these values at SDOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a general purpose technology that has various outcomes and use-cases.Top down regulation of AI by governments is emerging across jurisdictions but this may not keep pace with the rapidly evolving technology being developed by the private sector or adequately check the diversity of use-cases. On the other hand, private sector driven self-regulatory initiatives focussing on ‘ethical AI’ are very broad and provide too much leeway to technology companies to evade the law. Technical standards offer a middle ground where multiple stakeholders can come together to devise uniform requirements on various stages of the AI development lifecycle. Of course, technical standards must co-exist with government driven regulation as well as self regulatory codes to holistically govern the deployment of AI globally. However, while the first two modes of regulation has received plenty of attention from policy-makers and scholars alike, AI standard-setting is an emerging field that has yet to be concretely evaluated from a strategic and diplomatic perspective.</span></p>
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<h3><strong>Introducing a new CIS-ASPI project</strong></h3>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is why researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have partnered with the Centre for Internet and Society (Bengaluru) to produce a ‘techplomacy guide’ on negotiating AI standards for stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. Given the immense economic value of shaping global technical standards, it is imperative that SDOs not be dominated only by the likes of the US, Europe or China. The standards likely to impact a majority of nations, devised only from the purview of a few countries may be context agnostic to the needs of emerging economies. Further, there are values at stake here. An excessive focus on security, accuracy or quality of AI-driven products may make some technology palatable across the world even if the technology undermines core democratic values such as privacy, and anti-discrimination. China’s<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c3555a3c-0d3e-11ea-b2d6-9bf4d1957a67"> efforts</a> at shaping Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) standards at the ITU have been criticised for moving beyond mere technical specifications into the domain of policy recommendations despite there being a lack of representation of experts on human rights, consumer protection or data protection at the ITU. Accordingly, diversity of representation in terms of expertise, gender, and nationality at SDOs, including in leadership positions, are aspects our project will explore with an eye towards creating more inclusive participation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Through this project ,we hope to identify how key stakeholders drive these initiatives and how technological standards can be devised in line both with core democratic values and strategic priorities. Through extensive consultations with several stakeholder groups, we plan to offer learning products to policy makers and technical delegates alike to enable Australian and Indian delegates to serve as ambassadors for our respective nations.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>For more information on this new and exciting project funded by the Australian Departmentfor Foreign Affairs and Trade as part of the Australia India Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership grants, visit </span><a href="http://www.aspi.org.au/techdiplomacy">www.aspi.org.au/techdiplomacy</a><span> and https://www.internationalcybertech.gov.au/AICCTP-grant-round-two</span></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/techplomacy-and-negotiation-of-ai-standards-for-indo-pacific'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/techplomacy-and-negotiation-of-ai-standards-for-indo-pacific</a>
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No publisherarindrajitInternet GovernanceArtificial Intelligence2022-10-21T17:16:10ZBlog EntryGetting the (Digital) Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Right
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/directions-cyber-digital-europe-arindrajit-basu-september-16-2022-getting-the-digital-indo-pacific-economic-framework-right
<b>On the eve of the Tokyo Quad Summit in May 2022, President Biden unveiled the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), visualising cooperation across the Indo-Pacific based on four pillars: trade; supply chains; clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure; and tax and anti-corruption. Galvanised by the US, the other 13 founding members of the IPEF are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The first official in-person Ministerial meeting was held in Los Angeles on 9 September 2022.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="https://directionsblog.eu/getting-the-digital-indo-pacific-economic-framework-right/">originally published in Directions</a> on 16 September 2022.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is still early days. Given the broad and noncommittal scope of the <a href="http://indiamediamonitor.in/ViewImg.aspx?rfW3mQFhdxZsqXnJzK5Xi5+XYlnW6zXnPDF3Ad56Y/KdgI1zvICzrodtLI85MPKdVO1fIh79GUlPfyXY2/bE2g==" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">economic arrangement</a>, it is unlikely that the IPEF will lead to a trade deal among members in the short run. Instead, experts believe that this new arrangement is designed to serve as a ‘<a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/building-on-common-ground-7963518/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">framework or starting point</a>’ for members to cooperate on geo-economic issues relevant to the Indo-Pacific, buoyed in no small part by the United States’ desire to make up lost ground and counter Chinese economic influence in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">United States Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai has underscored the relevance of the Indo-Pacific digital economy to the US agenda with the IPEF. She has emphasized the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/05/23/on-the-record-press-call-on-the-launch-of-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">importance of</a> collaboratively addressing key connectivity and technology challenges, including standards on cross-border data flows, data localisation and online privacy, as well as the discriminatory and unethical use of artificial intelligence. This is an ambitious agenda given the divergence among members in terms of technological advancement, domestic policy preferences and international negotiating stances at digital trade forums. There is a significant risk that imposing external standards or values on this evolving and politically-contested digital economy landscape will not work, and may even undermine the core potential of the IPEF in the Indo-Pacific. This post evaluates the domestic policy preferences and strategic interests of the Framework’s member states, and how the IPEF can navigate key points of divergence in order to achieve meaningful outcomes.</p>
<h3><strong>State of domestic digital policy among IPEF members</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Data localisation is a core point of divergence in global digital policymaking. It continues to dominate discourse and trigger dissent at all <a href="https://www.ikigailaw.com/the-data-localization-debate-in-international-trade-law/#acceptLicense" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">international trade forums</a>, including the World Trade Organization. IPEF members have a range of domestic mandates restricting cross-border flows, which vary in scope, format and rigidity (see table below)<strong>. </strong>Most countries only have a conditional data localisation requirement, meaning data can only be transferred to countries where it is accorded an equivalent level of protection – unless the individual whose data is being transferred consents to said transfer. <a href="https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ee977f2e-ecfb-45cf-9f63-186a78a49512#:~:text=Australia%20has%20no%20broad%20data,transferred%20or%20processed%20outside%20Australia." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Australia </a>and the <a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/docs/FAQs_Network_Penetration_Reporting_and_Contracting_for_Cloud_Services_(01-27-2017).pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">United States</a> have sectoral localisation requirements for health and defence data respectively. India presently has multiple sectoral data localisation requirements. In particular, a 2018 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11244&Mode=0" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">directive</a> imposed strict local storage requirements along with a 24-hour window for foreign processing of payments data generated in India. The RBI imposed a <a href="https://theprint.in/economy/what-is-data-localisation-why-mastercard-amex-diners-club-cant-add-more-customers-in-india/703790/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">moratorium</a> on the issuance of new cards by several US-based card companies until compliance issues with the data localisation directive were resolved. Furthermore, several iterations of India’s recently <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/explained-why-has-the-government-withdrawn-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2019/article65736155.ece" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">withdrawn </a>Personal Data Protection Bill contained localisation requirements for some categories of personal data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Indonesia and Vietnam have <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-retreat-of-the-data-localization-brigade-india-indonesia-and-vietnam/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">diluted</a> the scopes of their data localisation mandates to apply, respectively, only to companies providing public services and to companies not complying with other local laws. These dilutions may have occurred in response to concerted pushback from foreign technology companies operating in these countries. In addition to sectoral restrictions on the transfer of geospatial data, South Korea<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/17/korean-approach-to-data-localization-pub-85165" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank"> retains </a>several procedural checks on cross-border flows, including formalities regarding providing notice to individual users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moving onto another issue flagged by USTR Tai, while all IPEF members recognise the right to information privacy at an overarching or constitutional level, the legal and policy contours of data protection are at different stages of evolution in different countries. <a href="https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=JP#:~:text=Personal%20Information%20Protection%20Commission,-Kasumigaseki%20Common%20Gate&text=Japan%20does%20not%20have%20a%20central%20registration%20system.&text=There%20is%20no%20specific%20legal,(eg%20Chief%20Privacy%20Officer)." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Japan</a>, <a href="https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=KR" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">South Korea</a>, <a href="https://www.pdp.gov.my/jpdpv2/assets/2020/01/Introduction-to-Personal-Data-Protection-in-Malaysia.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Malaysia</a>, <a href="https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/data-protected/data-protected---new-zealand#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20data%20portability%20right%20in%20New%20Zealand.&text=While%20there%20is%20no%20%22right,a%20correction%20to%20that%20information." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">New Zealand,</a> <a href="https://www.privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/#:~:text=%E2%80%93%20(a)%20The%20personal%20information,against%20any%20other%20unlawful%20processing." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Philippines</a>, <a href="https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/Overview-of-PDPA/The-Legislation/Personal-Data-Protection-Act#:~:text=What%20is%20the%20PDPA%3F,Banking%20Act%20and%20Insurance%20Act." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Singapore</a> and <a href="https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/thailand-personal-data-protection-act#:~:text=The%20legislation%20mandates%20that%20data,1%20million%20in%20criminal%20fines." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Thailand </a>have data protection frameworks in place. Data protection frameworks in India and Brunei are under consultation. Notably, the US does not have a comprehensive federal framework on data privacy, although there are patchworks of data privacy regulations at both the federal and state levels.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Regulation and strategic thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) are also at varying levels of development among IPEF members. India has produced a slew of policy papers on Responsible Artificial Intelligence. The most recent <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-08/Part2-Responsible-AI-12082021.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">policy paper</a> published by NITI AAYOG (the Indian government’s think tank) refers to constitutional values and endorses a risk-based approach to AI regulation, much like that adopted by the EU. The US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), chaired by Google CEO Eric Schmidt, expressed concerns about the US ceding AI leadership ground to China. The NSCAI’s final <a href="https://www.nscai.gov/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">report </a>emphasised the need for US leadership of a ‘coalition of democracies’ as an alternative to China’s autocratic and control-oriented model. Singapore has also made key strides on trusted AI, launching <a href="https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/news-and-events/announcements/2022/05/launch-of-ai-verify---an-ai-governance-testing-framework-and-toolkit" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">A.I. verify</a> – the world’s first AI Governance Testing Framework for companies that wish to demonstrate their use of responsible AI through a minimum verifiable product.</p>
<h3><strong>IPEF and pipe dreams of digital trade</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some members of the IPEF are signatories to other regional trade agreements. With the exception of Fiji, India and the US, all the IPEF countries are members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/rcep#:~:text=RCEP%20entered%20into%20force%20on,Australia%20as%20an%20original%20party." rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">(RCEP)</a>, which also includes China. Five IPEF member countries are also members of the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)</a> that President Trump backed out of in 2017. Several IPEF members also have bilateral or trilateral trading agreements among themselves, an example being the <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement-depa/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA)</a> between Singapore, New Zealand and Chile.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Pie.png" alt="Pie" class="image-inline" title="Pie" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All these ‘mega-regional’ trading agreements contain provisions on data flows, including prohibitions on domestic legal provisions that mandate local computing facilities or restrict cross-border data transfers. Notably, these agreements also incorporate <a href="https://publications.clpr.org.in/the-philosophy-and-law-of-information-regulation-in-india/chapter/indias-engagement-with-global-trade-regimes-on-cross-border-data-flows/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">exceptions</a> to these rules. The CPTPP includes within its ambit an exception on the grounds of ‘legitimate public policy objectives’ of the member, while the RCEP incorporates an additional exception for ‘essential security interests’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">IPEF members are also spearheading <a href="https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/wto/can-the-wto-build-consensus-on-digital-trade/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">multilateral efforts </a>related to the digital economy: Australia, Japan and Singapore are working as convenors of the plurilateral Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) at the World Trade Organization (WTO), which counts 86 WTO members as parties. India (along with South Africa) vehemently <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W819.pdf&Open=True" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">opposes</a> this plurilateral push on the grounds that the WTO is a multilateral forum functioning on consensus and a plurilateral trade agreement should not be negotiated within the aegis of the WTO. They fear, rightly, that such gambits close out the domestic policy space, especially for evolving digital economy regimes where keen debate and contestation exist among domestic stakeholders. While wary of the implications of the JSI, other IPEF members, such as Indonesia, have cautiously joined the initiative to ensure that they have a voice at the table.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is unlikely that the IPEF will lead to a digital trade arrangement in the short run. Policymaking on issues as complex as the digital economy that must respond to specific social, economic and (geo)political realities cannot be steamrolled through external trade agreements. For instance, after the Los Angeles Ministerial India <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-opts-out-of-joining-ipef-trade-pillar-to-wait-for-final-contours-122091000344_1.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">opted out</a> of the IPEF trade pillar citing both India’s evolving domestic legislative framework on data and privacy as well as a broader lack of consensus among IPEF members on several issues, including digital trade. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal explained that India would wait for the “<a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1858243" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">final contours</a>” of the digital trade track to emerge before making any commitments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Besides, brokering a trade agreement through the IPEF runs a risk of redundancy. Already, there exists a ‘<a href="https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0193.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">spaghetti bowl’</a> of regional trading agreements that IPEF members can choose from, in addition to forming bilateral trade ties with each other.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is why Washington has been clear about calling the IPEF an ‘<a href="https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-set-to-join-us-led-indo-pacific-economic-arrangement-next-week-with-aim-to-counter-china/963795/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">economic arrangement</a>’ and not a trade agreement. Membership does not imply any legal obligations. Rather than duplicating ongoing efforts or setting unrealistic targets, the IPEF is an opportunity for all players to shape conversations, share best practices and reach compromises, which could feed back into ongoing efforts to negotiate trade deals. For example, several members of RCEP have domestic data localisation mandates that do not violate trade deals because the agreement carves out exceptions that legitimise domestic policy decisions. Exchanges on how these exceptions work in future trade agreements could be a part of the IPEF arrangement and nudge states towards framing digital trade negotiations through other channels, including at the WTO. Furthermore, states like Singapore that have launched AI self-governance mechanisms could share best practices on how these mechanisms were developed as well as evaluations of how they have helped policy goals be met. And these exchanges shouldn’t be limited to existing IPEF members. If the forum works well, countries that share strategic interests in the region with IPEF members, including, most notably, the European Union, may also want to get involved and further develop partnerships in the region.</p>
<h3><strong>Countering China</strong></h3>
<p>Talking shop on digital trade should certainly not be the only objective of the IPEF. The US has made it clear that they want the message emanating from the IPEF ‘<a href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/biden-to-visit-japan-for-quad-summit-to-have-bilateral-meetings-with-modi-122051900128_1.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">to be heard in Beijing</a>’. Indeed, the IPEF offers an opportunity for the reassertion of US economic interests in a region where President Trump’s withdrawal from the CPTPP has left a vacuum for China to fill. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the IPEF has representation from several regions of the Indo-Pacific: South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.</p>
<p>This should be an urgent policy priority for all IPEF members. Since its initial announcement in 2015, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Digital Silk Road (DSR)</a>, the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has spearheaded <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/02/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">massive investments</a> by the Chinese private sector (allegedly under close control of the Chinese state) in e-commerce, fintech, smart cities, data centres, fibre optic cables and telecom networks. This expansion has also happened in the Indo-Pacific, unhampered by China’s aggressive geopolitical posturing in the region through maritime land grabs in the South China Sea. With the exception of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3024479/vietnam-shuns-huawei-it-seeks-build-aseans-first-5g" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Vietnam</a>, which remains wary of China’s economic expansionism, countries in Southeast Asia welcome Chinese investments, extolling their developmental benefits. Several IPEF members – <a href="https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_57.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">including</a> Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore – have associations with Chinese private sector companies, predominantly Huawei and ZTE. A <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/11/localization-and-china-s-tech-success-in-indonesia-pub-87477" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">study</a> evaluating Indonesia’s response to such investments indicates that while they are aware of the risks posed by Chinese infrastructure, their calculus remains unaltered: development and capacity building remain their primary focuses. Furthermore, on the specific question of surveillance, given evidence of other countries such as the US and Australia also using digital infrastructure for surveillance, the threat from China is not perceived as a unique risk.</p>
<h3><strong>Setting expectations and approaches</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Still, the risks of excessive dependence on one country for the development of digital infrastructure are well known. While the IPEF cannot realistically expect to displace the DSR, it can be utilised to provide countries with alternatives. This can only be done by issuing carrots rather than sticks. A US narrative extolling ‘digital democracy’ is unlikely to gain traction in a region characterised by a diversity of political systems that is focused on economic and development needs. At the same time, an excessive focus on thorny domestic policy issues – such as data localisation and the pipe dream of yet another mega-regional trade deal – could risk derailing the geo-economic benefits of the IPEF.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Instead, the IPEF must focus on capacity building, training and private sector investment in infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. The US must position itself as a geopolitically reliable ally, interested in the overall stability of the digital Indo-Pacific, beyond its own economic or policy preferences. This applies equally to other external actors, like the EU, who may be interested in engaging with or shaping the digital economic landscape in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Countering Chinese economic influence and complementing security agendas set through other fora – such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – should be the primary objective of the IPEF. It is crucial that unrealistic ambitions seeking convergence on values or domestic policy do not undermine strategic interests and dilute the immense potential of the IPEF in catalysing a more competitive and secure digital Indo-Pacific.</p>
<h3><strong>Table: Domestic policy positions on data localisation and data protection</strong></h3>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Table.png/@@images/8e9a5192-5f6c-4666-8d78-e0863111534a.png" alt="Table" class="image-inline" title="Table" /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/directions-cyber-digital-europe-arindrajit-basu-september-16-2022-getting-the-digital-indo-pacific-economic-framework-right'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/directions-cyber-digital-europe-arindrajit-basu-september-16-2022-getting-the-digital-indo-pacific-economic-framework-right</a>
</p>
No publisherarindrajitPrivacyInternet GovernanceDigital GovernanceDigital Economy2022-10-03T14:56:22ZBlog EntryThe Geopolitics of Cyberspace: A Compendium of CIS Research
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-september-24-2021-the-geopolitics-of-cyberspace-compendium-of-cis-research
<b>Cyberspace is undoubtedly shaping and disrupting commerce, defence and human relationships all over the world. Opportunities such as improved access to knowledge, connectivity, and innovative business models have been equally met with nefarious risks including cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, government driven digital repression, and rabid profit-making by ‘Big Tech.’ Governments have scrambled to create and update global rules that can regulate the fair and equitable uses of technology while preserving their own strategic interests.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With a rapidly digitizing economy and clear interests in shaping global rules that favour its strategic interests, India stands at a crucial juncture on various facets of this debate. How India governs and harnesses technology, coupled with how India translates these values and negotiates its interests globally, will surely have an impact on how similarly placed emerging economies devise their own strategies. The challenge here is to ensure that domestic technology governance as well as global engagements genuinely uphold and further India’s democratic fibre and constitutional vision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since 2018, researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society have produced a body of research including academic writing, at the intersection of geopolitics and technology covering global governance regimes on trade and cybersecurity, including their attendant international law concerns, the digital factor in bilateral relationships (with a focus on the Indo-US and Sino-Indian relationships). We have paid close focus to the role of emerging technologies in this debate, including AI and 5G as well as how private actors in the technology domain, operating across national jurisdictions, are challenging and upending traditionally accepted norms of international law, global governance, and geopolitics.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The global fissures in this space matter fundamentally for individuals who increasingly use digital spaces to carry out day to day activities: from being unwitting victims of state surveillance to harnessing social media for causes of empowerment to falling prey to state-sponsored cyber attacks, the rules of cyber governance, and its underlying politics. Yet, the rules are set by a limited set of public officials and technology lawyers within restricted corridors of power. Better global governance needs more to be participatory and accessible. CIS’s research and writing has been cognizant of this, and attempted to merge questions of global governance with constitutional and technical questions that put individuals and communities centre-stage.</p>
<p>Research and writing produced by CIS researchers and external collaborators from 2018 onward is detailed in the appended compendium.</p>
<h2>Compendium</h2>
<h3>Global cybersecurity governance and cyber norms</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Two decades since a treaty governing state behaviour in cyberspace was mooted by Russia, global governance processes have meandered along. The security debate has often been polarised along “Cold War” lines but the recent amplification of cyberspace governance as developmental, social and economic has seen several new vectors added to this debate. This past year two parallel processes at the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security-United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN-GGE) and the United Nations Open Ended Working Group managed to produce consensus reports but several questions on international law, norms and geopolitical co-operation remain. India has been a participant at these crucial governance debates. Both the substance of the contribution, along with its implications remain a key focus area for our research.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Edited Volumes</em></p>
<ul>
<li>Karthik Nachiappan and Arindrajit Basu <a href="https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/731.htm">India and Digital World-Making</a>, <em>Seminar </em>731, 1 July 2020 <em>(featuring contributions from Manoj Kewalramani, Gunjan Chawla, Torsha Sarkar, Trisha Ray, Sameer Patil, Arun Vishwanathan, Vidushi Marda, Divij Joshi, Asoke Mukerji, Pallavi Raghavan, Karishma Mehrotra, Malavika Raghavan, Constantino Xavier, Rajen Harshe' and Suman Bery</em>)</li></ul>
<p><em><br />Long-Form Articles</em></p>
<ol>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-and-elonnai-hickok-november-30-2018-cyberspace-and-external-affairs"><em>Cyberspace and External Affairs: A Memorandum for India</em></a> (Memorandum, Centre for Internet and Society, 30 Nov 2018) </li>
<li><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-potential-for-the-normative-regulation-of-cyberspace-implications-for-india"><em>The Potential for the Normative Regulation of Cyberspace</em></a><em> </em>(White Paper, Centre for Internet and Society, 30 July 2018) </li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/conceptualizing-an-international-security-regime-for-cyberspace"><em>Conceptualizing an International Security Architecture for cyberspace</em></a><em> </em>(Briefings of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, Bratislava, Slovakia, May 2018)</li>
<li>Sunil Abraham, Mukta Batra, Geetha Hariharan, Swaraj Barooah, and Akriti Bopanna,<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates"> India's contribution to internet governance debates</a> (NLUD Student Law Journal, 2018)</li></ol>
<p><em><br />Blog Posts and Op-eds</em></p>
<ul>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, Irene Poetranto, and Justin Lau, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/19/un-struggles-to-make-progress-on-securing-cyberspace-pub-84491">The UN struggles to make progress in cyberspace</a><em>, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</em>, May 19th, 2021</li>
<li>Andre’ Barrinha and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://directionsblog.eu/could-cyber-diplomacy-learn-from-outer-space/">Could cyber diplomacy learn from outer space</a>, <em>EU Cyber Direct</em>, 20th April 2021</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Pranesh Prakash<strong>, </strong><a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/patching-the-gaps-in-indias-cybersecurity/article34000336.ece">Patching the gaps in India’s cybersecurity</a>, <em>The Hindu, </em>6th March 2021</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Karthik Nachiappan, <a href="https://www.leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/will-india-negotiate-in-cyberspace">Will India negotiate in cyberspace?</a>, Leiden Security and Global Affairs blog,December 16, 2020</li>
<li>Elizabeth Dominic, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-debate-over-internet-governance-and-cyber-crimes-west-vs-the-rest">The debate over internet governance and cybercrimes: West vs the rest?</a>,<em> Centre for Internet and Society, </em>June 08, 2020</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/indias-role-global-cyber-policy-formulation"><em>India’s role in Global Cyber Policy Formulation</em></a><em>, Lawfare, Nov 7, 2019</em></li>
<li>Pukhraj Singh, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/guest-post-before-cyber-norms-let2019s-talk-about-disanalogy-and-disintermediation">Before cyber norms,let's talk about disanalogy and disintermediation</a>, <em>Centre for Internet and Society, </em>Nov 15th, 2019</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Karan Saini, <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/setting-international-norms-cyber-conflict-hard-doesnt-mean-stop-trying/">Setting International Norms of Cyber Conflict is Hard, But that Doesn’t Mean that We Should Stop Trying</a><em>, Modern War Institute, </em>30th Sept, 2019</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/"><em>Politics by other means: Fostering positive contestation and charting red lines through global governance in cyberspace</em></a><em> (Digital Debates, </em>Volume 6, 2019<em>)</em></li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu<em>, </em><a href="https://thewire.in/trade/will-the-wto-finally-tackle-the-trump-card-of-national-security">Will the WTO Finally Tackle the ‘Trump’ Card of National Security?</a><em> (The Wire, </em>8th May 2019<em>)</em></li></ul>
<p><em>Policy Submissions</em></p>
<ol>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-on-pre-draft-of-the-report-of-the-un-open-ended-working-group">CIS Submission to OEWG </a>(Centre for Internet and Society, Policy Submission, 2020)</li>
<li>Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Elonnai Hickok, and Arindrajit Basu. “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperation">CIS Submission to UN High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation</a>.” Policy submission. Centre for Internet and Society, January 2019.</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu,Gurshabad Grover, and Elonnai Hickok. “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-gurshabad-grover-elonnai-hickok-january-22-2019-response-to-gcsc-on-request-for-consultation">Response to GCSC on Request for Consultation: Norm Package Singapore</a>.” Centre for Internet and Society, January 17, 2019.</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok. <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/gcsc-response.">Submission of Comments to the GCSC Definition of ‘Stability of Cyberspace</a> (Centre for Internet and Society, September 6, 2019)</li></ol>
<ol></ol>
<h3>Digital Trade and India's Political Economy</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The modern trading regime and its institutions were born largely into a world bereft of the internet and its implications for cross-border flow and commerce. Therefore, regulatory ambitions at the WTO have played catch up with the technological innovation that has underpinned the modern global digital economy. Driven by tech giants, the “developed” world has sought to restrict the policy space available to the emerging world to impose mandates regarding data localisation, source code disclosure, and taxation - among other initiatives central to development. At the same time emerging economies have pushed back, making for a tussle that continues to this day. Our research has focussed both on issues of domestic political economy and data governance,and the implications these domestic issues have on how India and other emerging economies negotiate at the world stage.</em></p>
<p><em>Long-Form articles and essays</em></p>
<ol>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok and Aditya Chawla,<em> </em><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-localisation-gambit-unpacking-policy-moves-for-the-sovereign-control-of-data-in-india"><strong>T</strong></a><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-localisation-gambit-unpacking-policy-moves-for-the-sovereign-control-of-data-in-india">he Localisation Gambit: Unpacking policy moves for the sovereign control of data in India</a><em> (</em>Centre for Internet and Society<em>, </em>March 19, 2019)<strong><em> </em></strong></li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu,<a href="about:blank">Sovereignty in a datafied world: A framework for Indian diplomacy</a> in Navdeep Suri and Malancha Chakrabarty (eds) <em>A 2030 Vision for India’s Economic Diplomacy </em>(Observer Research Foundation 2021) </li>
<li>Amber Sinha, Elonnai Hickok, Udbhav Tiwari and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/mlat-report">Cross Border Data-Sharing and India </a>(Centre for Internet and Society, 2018)</li></ol>
<p><em>Blog posts and op-eds </em></p>
<ul>
<li>Arindrajit Basu,<a class="external-link" href="http://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/wto/can-the-wto-build-consensus-on-digital-trade/"> Can the WTO build consensus on digital trade,</a> Hinrich Foundation,October 05,2021<br /></li><li>Amber Sinha, <a href="https://thewire.in/tech/twitter-modi-government-big-tech-new-it-rules">The power politics behind Twitter versus Government of India</a>, <em>The Wire</em>, June 03, 2021</li>
<li>Karthik Nachiappan and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/shaping-the-digital-world/article32224942.ece?homepage=true">Shaping the Digital World</a>, <em>The Hindu</em>, 30th July 2020</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Karthik Nachiappan, <a href="https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/731/731_arindrajit_and_karthik.htm"><em>India and the global battle for data governance</em></a>, Seminar 731, 1st July 2020</li>
<li>Amber Sinha and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://scroll.in/article/960676/analysis-reliance-jio-facebook-deal-highlights-indias-need-to-revisit-competition-regulations">Reliance Jio-Facebook deal highlights India’s need to revisit competition regulations</a>, <em>Scroll</em>, 30th April 2020</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Amber Sinha, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/the-realpolitik-of-the-reliance-jio-facebook-deal/">The realpolitik of the Reliance-Jio Facebook deal</a>, <em>The Diplomat</em>, 29th April 2020</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-retreat-of-the-data-localization-brigade-india-indonesia-and-vietnam/"><em>The Retreat of the Data Localization Brigade: India, Indonesia, Vietnam</em></a><em>, The Diplomat</em>, Jan 10, 2020</li>
<li>Amber Sinha and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://www.epw.in/engage/article/politics-indias-data-protection-ecosystem"><em>The Politics of India’s Data Protection Ecosystem</em></a>, <em>EPW Engage</em>, 27 Dec 2019</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Justin Sherman, <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/key-global-takeaways-indias-revised-personal-data-protection-bill">Key Global Takeaways from India’s Revised Personal Data Protection Bill</a>, <em>Lawfare</em>, Jan 23, 2020</li>
<li>Nikhil Dave,“<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/geo-economic-impacts-of-the-coronavirus-global-supply-chains-part-i">Geo-Economic Impacts of the Coronavirus: Global Supply Chains</a>.” <em>Centre for Internet and Society</em> , June 16, 2020.</li></ul>
<h3>International Law and Human Rights</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>International law and human rights are ostensibly technology neutral, and should lay the edifice for digital governance and cybersecurity today. Our research on international human rights has focussed on global surveillance practices and other internet restrictions employed by a variety of nations, and the implications this has for citizens and communities in India and similarly placed emerging economies. CIS researchers have also contributed to, and commented on World Intellectual Property Organization negotiations at the intersection of international Intellectual Property (IP) rules and the human rights.</em></p>
<p><em>Long-form article</em></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<ol>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/extra-territorial-surveillance-and-the-incapacitation-of-human-rights">Extra Territorial Surveillance and the incapacitation of international human rights law</a>, 12 NUJS LAW REVIEW 2 (2019)</li>
<li>Gurshabad Grover and Arindrajit Basu, ”<a href="https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_24:_Internet_blockage">Internet Blockage</a>”(Scenario contribution to NATO CCDCOE Cyber Law Toolkit,2021)</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok, <a href="https://www.ijlt.in/journal/conceptualizing-an-international-framework-for-active-private-cyber-defence">Conceptualizing an international framework for active private cyber defence </a>(Indian Journal of Law and Technology, 2020)</li><li>Arindrajit Basu,<a class="external-link" href="http://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Digital-Debates__CyFy2021.pdf">Challenging the dogmatic inevitability of extraterritorial state surveillance </a>in Trisha Ray and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (eds) Digital Debates: CyFy Journal 2021 (New Delhi:ORF and Global Policy Journal,2021)<br /></li></ol>
<p><em>Blog Posts and op-eds</em></p>
<ul>
<li>Arindrajit Basu, “<a href="https://www.medianama.com/2020/08/223-american-law-on-mass-surveillance-post-schrems-ii/">Unpacking US Law And Practice On Extraterritorial Mass Surveillance In Light Of Schrems II</a>”, <em>Medianama</em>, 24th August 2020</li>
<li>Anubha Sinha, “World Intellectual Property Organisation: Notes from the Standing Committee on Copyright Negotiations (<a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-41-notes-from-day-1">Day 1</a>, <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-41-notes-from-day-2">Day 2</a>, <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/wipo-sccr-41-notes-from-day-3-and-day-4-1">Day 3 and 4</a>)”, July 2021</li><li>Raghav Ahooja and Torsha Sarkar,<a class="external-link" href="http://www.lawfareblog.com/how-not-regulate-internet-lessons-indian-subcontinent">How (not) to regulate the internet:Lessons from the Indian Subcontinent</a>,Lawfare,September 23,2021,<br /></li></ul>
<h3>Bilateral Relationships</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Technology has become a crucial factor in shaping bilateral and plurilateral co-operation and competition. Given the geopolitical fissures and opportunities since 2020, our research has focussed on how technology governance and cybersecurity could impact the larger ecosystem of Indo-China and India-US relations. Going forward, we hope to undertake more research on technology in plurilateral arrangements, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. </em></p>
<ul>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Justin Sherman, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-huawei-factor-in-us-india-relations/">The Huawei Factor in US-India Relations</a>,<em>The Diplomat</em>, 22 March 2021</li>
<li>Aman Nair, “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tiktok-it2019s-time-for-biden-to-make-a-decision-on-his-digital-policy-with-china">TIkTok: It’s Time for Biden to Make a Decision on His Digital Policy with China</a>,” <em>Centre for Internet and Society</em>, January 22, 2021,</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Gurshabad Grover, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/india-needs-a-digital-lawfare-strategy-to-counter-china/">India Needs a Digital Lawfare Strategy to Counter China</a>, <em>The Diplomat</em>, 8th October 2020</li>
<li>Anam Ajmal, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/the-app-ban-will-have-an-impact-on-the-holding-companies-global-power-projection-begins-at-home/">The app ban will have an impact on the holding companies...global power projection begins at home</a>, <em>Times of India</em>, July 7th, 2020 (Interview with Arindrajit Basu)</li>
<li>Justin Sherman and Arindrajit Basu, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/trump-and-modi-embrace-but-remain-digitally-divided/">Trump and Modi embrace, but remain digitally divided</a>, <em>The Diplomat</em>, March 05th, 2020</li></ul>
<h3>Emerging Technologies</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Governance needs to keep pace with the technological challenges posed by emerging technologies, including 5G and AI. To do so an interdisciplinary approach that evaluates these scientific advances in line with the regimes that govern them is of utmost importance. While each country will need to regulate technology through the lens of their strategic interests and public policy priorities, it is clear that geopolitical tensions on standard-setting and governance models compels a more global outlook.</em></p>
<p><em>Long-Form reports</em></p>
<ol>
<li>Anoushka Soni and Elizabeth Dominic,<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems"> Legal and Policy implications of Autonomous weapons systems</a> (Centre for Internet and Society, 2020)</li>
<li>Aayush Rathi, Gurshabad Grover, and Sunil Abraham,<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulating-the-internet-the-government-of-india-standards-development-at-the-ietf"> Regulating the internet: The Government of India & Standards Development at the IETF</a> (Centre for Internet and Society, 2018)</li></ol>
<p><em>Blog posts and op-eds</em></p>
<ul>
<li>Aman Nair, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/would-banning-chinese-telecom-companies-make-5g-secure-in-india">Would banning Chinese telecom companies make India 5G secure in India?</a> <em>Centre for Internet and Society</em>, 22nd December 2020</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Justin Sherman<strong>, </strong><a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/two-new-democratic-coalitions-5g-and-ai-technologies">Two New Democratic Coalitions on 5G and AI Technologies</a>, <em>Lawfare</em>, 6th August 2020</li>
<li>Nikhil Dave, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-5g-factor.">The 5G Factor: A Primer</a>, <em>Centre for Internet and Society,</em> July 20, 2020.</li>
<li>Gurshabad Grover, <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/huawei-ban-india-united-states-china-5755232/">The Huawei bogey</a> <em>Indian Express</em>, May 30th, 2019</li>
<li>Arindrajit Basu and Pranav MB, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/what-is-the-problem-with-2018ethical-ai2019-an-indian-perspective">What is the problem with 'Ethical AI'?:An Indian perspective</a>, Centre for Internet and Society, July 21, 2019</li></ul>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>(This compendium was drafted by Arindrajit Basu with contributions from Anubha Sinha. Aman Nair, Gurshabad Grover, and Pranav MB reviewed the draft and provided vital insight towards its conceptualization and compilation</em>. Dishani Mondal and Anand Badola provided important inputs at earlier stages of the process towards creating this compendium)</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-september-24-2021-the-geopolitics-of-cyberspace-compendium-of-cis-research'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-september-24-2021-the-geopolitics-of-cyberspace-compendium-of-cis-research</a>
</p>
No publisherarindrajitCyber SecurityInternet GovernanceCyberspace2021-11-15T14:48:49ZBlog Entry