Centre for Internet and Society

TRAI Consultation Paper on Spectrum

Shyam Ponappa and A.B. Beliappa — 2013-09-18T06:36:11Z

Shyam Ponappa and A.B.Beliappa worked on this submission to Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) on their spectrum consultation paper. The submission was made on August 21, 2013.

Q.1. What method should be adopted for refarming of the 900 MHz band so that the TSPs whose licences are expiring in 2014 onwards get adequate spectrum in 900/1800 MHz band for continuity of services provided by them?

Comments on Spectrum Refarming

1. Arbitrary Policies & Their Consequences
The proposed manner of refarming the 900 MHz spectrum is perceived to be as arbitrary as, for instance, the tax claims against Vodafone after the courts upheld its refutation of these claims. Such actions contribute to India’s very low rating on contracts (184 out of 185 countries in enforcing contracts in 2013: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india/), and for being a very difficult place to do business.

2. Legitimacy Of Terminating 900 MHz Holdings Starting 2014
One question is whether a refusal to renew existing spectrum holdings in the ordinary course is legitimate, or if it needs to be tested for breach of contract in the courts. This proposed manner of withholding access to assigned spectrum is also contrary to prevalent practice, as well as to the logic of spectrum being essential to the delivery of services of a wireless operator as a going concern.

3. Must All Spectrum Be Auctioned?
a) Another question is whether the Supreme Court order requires that all spectrum must in fact be auctioned. If this is so, the auction of all spectrum is necessary when it becomes available.

b) This is so damaging to the public interest, however, that all reasonable efforts must be made once again to inform the Supreme Court of the facts, i.e., the technological reasons against splintering bandwidth, and the financial reasons against extracting payments that would otherwise be invested in the essential infrastructure of broadband. If the facts are presented clearly and persuasively, there may be a reconsideration of the ruling to auction all spectrum in the light of these facts, as against continuing with this ruling based on miscommunication or misinformation.

c) If there is no alternative to auctions, to succeed, the reserve price needs to be relatively low, and bidders in difficult financial circumstances must be convinced they have no better option. Perhaps one way of ensuring this is to auction for a shorter period, e.g., five years, while simultaneously laying out the path for transitioning to shared spectrum. This is because parallel developments in spectrum sharing for Authorized Shared Access and Licensed Shared Access that are being pursued in the US and the EU are likely to be deployed by then.

4. Net Benefits of Refarming
Given the stage of evolution and coverage of networks in India, their technological level and usage, refarming should be held in abeyance until our markets are in a position to benefit from them. This is because the detrimental effects if the 900 MHz band is cleared in the proposed manner are likely to far outweigh the benefits, as explained below.

5. Purpose of Refarming
What is the purpose of refarming? If the answer is the potential benefits of services from 4G technologies and products, consider the likely nature of these benefits in India. The purpose of refarming in OECD countries is to use 900 MHz for 3G and LTE for high-speed data. This is appropriate for developed economies that have large numbers of data users. In India, high-end users comprise only a niche segment (15.09 million broadband users in April 2013, despite over 725 million active wireless subscribers). Developed economies have refarmed the 900 MHz band because 3G and 4G assume widespread use of data services in the entire network. In other words, if India had a large base of high-data users, 4G networks would be required to deliver high-speed traffic. Also, such users would presumably be (a) willing and (b) able to pay [for the expensive equipment required] for these services.

6. No Economic Basis for Refarming in India
a) The reality is that there are insufficient data users with the willingness and ability to pay for the higher level of throughput. The present state of the economy and its trajectory pose additional constraints. More important, existing technologies are capable of delivering data services at lower cost. The priority is for access networks at lower cost, e.g., wireless middle-mile and last-mile that will enable large numbers of users to access data services at a reasonable price (“reasonable” in the cost structure of India comparable to TV services, and not in cents/minute comparable with OECD countries).

b) That said, a possible consideration is whether and how certain advanced technologies, such as “supplemental downlink” or “carrier aggregation” for augmenting capacity, may be made usable in our circumstances, and whether if certain bands are earmarked for them, such solutions can be introduced here.

7. Need: Low-Cost Last-Mile & Aggregation/Backhaul Capacity
How can networks be built at reasonable cost that have the capacity to deliver data services more comprehensively in India? By providing much more wireless access for the last-mile, and more middle-mile capacity (in combination with existing wired networks). This is where policies can facilitate network build-out and service delivery at lower cost. The nature of required reforms are: reduced front-end charges for wireless last mile access; reduced microwave charges (administered prices) for aggregation and backhaul; incentives for broadband delivery, and perhaps higher incentives for rural broadband delivery. Also, a whole host of initiatives can be orchestrated, as in South Korea, for instance, or Sweden, which contribute to the development of broadband services and usage.

a) South Korea*
South Korea’s digital economy resulted from a combination of macroeconomic, supply-side and demand-side policies and programs, with the government stimulating broadband adoption, particularly in the early years. For example, Korea’s response to the financial crisis of 1997-1998 was to increase the export strength of key sectors such as electronics. There was also a thrust on consumer credit, facilitating the purchase of consumer goods and electronics-related services such as broadband. The initiatives to push broadband deployment and adoption included tax incentives, rural deployment and R&D grants, building certification incentives, and applications support. There were also mistakes, as in the government’s choice of WiBro technology.

By way of illustration, a set of Korean initiatives are detailed below:

Table 5: Selected Korean Supply-Side Broadband Subsidy Programs

Infrastructure Deployment

Tax benefits (credits, accelerated depreciation, exemptions, etc.) for broadband deployment

Backbone provision or subsidy for broadband deployment (KII-Government program providing funding for operators to reach 40,000 govt. locations as well as rural districts)

Technology Support

R&D grants and tax credits
Applications support (KOREN—Korean Advanced Research Network or KII-Testbed) Building Certification & Codes
Requiring or encouraging the pre-equipping of new buildings with fibre and/or broadband access points (e.g. DSLAM)
Institution of certification programs for broadband readiness of MDUs (multi-dwelling units, based on three classes of transmission speed)

Source: Kalba International, Inc., 2012. Ovum Consulting, Broadband Policy and Development in the Republic of Korea

b) Sweden*
Sweden's regulator demonstrated a strong commitment to cover low-density areas, and one of the ways was to foster network sharing. The government promotes a broadband strategy with incentives for all stakeholders. State authorities are actively involved in the Digital Agenda for Sweden, a national initiative. In education, for instance, about 25% of all students rely to some extent on distance education. Open access policies and competition have had a significant impact on the development of broadband.

* Source: Digital Scotland 2020

Achieving World-Class Digital Infrastructure
21st December 2012
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00414982.pdf

8. Shared Facilities
One way that delivery costs can be reduced is if operators share networks, so that all operators can access these networks where they are licensed to do so. This would be feasible if there were practical ways of structuring “common-carrier” or network-neutral access (as in roads, rail, flight paths and airports, ports, oil pipelines, etc.). This would require a buy-in by service providers for radical changes in approach and policies, followed by radical changes in operating networks. It is possible that open consultation with TSPs, other stakeholders, and specialists, done with the help of one or more expert facilitator/s, could yield such a solution. If this were to happen, the process of organizing structures at (a) the wholesale (network services) level, and (b) the retail (user access level) could be addressed collectively.

9. Extend Voluntary Infrastructure Sharing to Mandatory Sharing
We already have consortiums for passive sharing of wireless towers. This needs to be extended from voluntary commercial associations to mandatory, “common-carrier” access, after putting in place suitable commercial arrangements through negotiation. Such commercial arrangements exist for oil pipelines and for oil exploration and production, and can be structured in like manner for facilities and spectrum. They need the appropriate financial structuring with the help of financial specialists, in addition to the engineering solutions.

10. Shared Spectrum: Pool New Spectrum

a) An evolutionary step in this direction is to pool all available, unallocated [unassigned] spectrum, so that it can be shared by [existing] service providers. This is being pioneered in the so-called TV White Space bands in the USA, the EU, the UK, and Singapore. It can be extended to other bands here. This could be a transitional step in evolving a shared facilities model. Provided the stakeholders agree, and an equitable structure and process is devised, this will relieve the present constraints on spectrum availability by providing a common pool of spectrum.

b) Shared spectrum is an alternative that is technically feasible and economically far more viable than fragmenting available spectrum for the exclusive use of our many operators. This also provides for complete transparency, as well as much lower capital and operating costs for society as a whole. The implication is that broadband could be made available more widely at lower cost, leading to much better productivity and payoffs.

c) Many of the questions and associated problems would be resolved. For instance, open access would allow for each operator to choose any technology that is compatible and that does not create interference. Fees could be determined in the same manner as for taxes in inducing investment for manufacturing, as was done in South Korea. It would need a whole range of supportive measures as in the case of South Korea, and if done right, could result in tremendous gains as an organizing force in society.

11. Some 900 MHz Access (Common-Carrier) For All TSPs
If a portion of the 900 MHz band is set aside for shared access, it may resolve one of the most contentious problems between the GSM and CDMA operators, of access to the highly advantageous 900 MHz for its low-cost equipment and ability to penetrate buildings, i.e., better delivery. This step may create conditions that allow for stakeholder engagement for an overall resolution, including ultimately, shared infrastructure.

12. Revenue-Sharing & Consumer Surplus From Shared Spectrum/Networks
India’s experience with revenue-sharing after NTP-99 has shown that collections are far in excess of up-front revenues forgone. Building a sound broadband service with a combination of incentives and forbearance will lead to much greater economic benefits overall, as well as much higher collections by the government over time. The sector can once again prosper and be an engine of productivity.

Shyam Ponappa
Centre for Internet and Society
August 21, 2013

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/trai-consultation-paper-on-spectrum

TRAI Consultation on Differential Pricing for Data Services - Post-Open House Discussion Submission

sumandro — 2016-03-30T13:13:30Z

The Centre for Internet and Society sent this submission to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) following the Open House Discussion on Differential Pricing of Data Services, held in Delhi on February 21, 2016.

Download the submission document: PDF.

Post-Open House Discussion Submission to TRAI

Dear Ms. Kotwal,

This is to heartily congratulate TRAI once again for taking several steps, including the Open House Discussion, to ensure that various opinions about the topic of ‘differential pricing for data services’ are presented and are responded to - and are all in full public view.

This brief note is to a) add to the positions and arguments submitted previously by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India, b) put in writing our comments during the Open House Discussion (January 21, 2016), and c) respond to other comments shared at the same event. We have six points to share in this note:

Forbearance is not an option: We are of the opinion that though the data services market has thus far been kept un-monitored and unregulated, and there are several reasons why this situation should not continue any more. Although the reality of differential pricing (that is data packets originating from different sources being priced differently by ISPs) was highlighted with the recent offering of zero rated packs, it is a general practice in the sector, as illustrated by widely available special/curated content packs for the user to consume data from a specified web-based source. It is not surprising that most such special/curated content packs involve an arrangement between the ISP and a prominent leader in the web-content/platform sector, such as Facebook and Twitter. Serious market distorting impacts of such arrangements are imminent if they are allowed to continue without any monitoring, enforced public disclosure, and regulatory actions by a public authority.
Address differential treatment of data, and not only differential pricing: Pricing is only of the three ways in which data services can be treated differently by the ISPs depending upon the source of the data packets concerned. The other two ways are: a) differential speed, or throttling of some data packets and prioritisation of the others, and b) differential treatment of data protocols, for example, the blocking of peer-to-peer or voice-over-IP traffic by an ISP. If the public authority decides to only regulate differential pricing of data service, it is highly probable that ISPs may shift to other forms of discrimination between data packets - either in terms of prioritising some data packets over others based upon their origin, or blocking of specific protocols such as voice-over-IP to prevent the functioning of certain web-based services - and continue the market distorting impacts through these other means.
Allow and define reasonable network management practices: Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to users in the name of reasonable network management. Below is a set of potential guidelines to identify cases when discrimination against classes of data traffic in the name of reasonable network management can be considered justified and permissible:
- there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently,
- there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation,
- the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP, and
- the network management practice is the least harmful technical means that is reasonably available to achieve the aim.
Establish an effective enforcement mechanism: TRAI must establish an enforcement mechanism that is open to users [and groups of users] and private sector actors as current forums are insufficient. Clear and simple rules must be established ex-ante, if they are violated - ex-post regulation must be undertaken on the basis of principles listed in the TRAI consultation paper, that is “non-discrimination, transparency, affordable internet access, competition and market entry, and innovation” [1]
Take regulatory decisions now, but also conduct and commission further research to review and refine the decisions over a defined period of time
Need for better collection and proactive disclosure of statistics: TRAI publishes quarterly performance indicators statistics collected from the telecom companies about telephone, mobile, and internet sectors in India [2]. It will be very useful for researchers and analysts, and allow for a much more informed public debate on the matter, if the content and form of such data are improved in the following ways:

Content:
- Please start collection (unless already done) and publication of not only data of average incoming and outgoing MOUs, average of total outgoing SMSs, Average Revenue Per User, and average data usage per GSM and CDMA subscriber, but distributions of the same in terms of user deciles (that is in terms of representative figures for each 10% section of users in ascending order of usage),
- Provide granular data about data usage across service areas and service providers (the numbers on ‘average data usage’ and total ‘revenue from data usage’ provided at present are very insufficient for the state of public debate),
- Provide data about internet subscriber base according to network technologies (for both wired and wireless) and the service providers concerned,
- Provide data about IP-based telephony across service areas and service providers,
- Provide data separately for the North Eastern states, and
- Provide granular data (separated from the corresponding state data) for all tier-1 cities.
Form:
- Please do not publish the data only as part of the quarterly reports available in PDF format, but also as independent machine-readable spreadsheet file (preferably in CSV format),
- Do not only publish quarterly data in separate files, but also provide a combined (all quarters together) dataset that would make it much easier for researchers and analysts to use the data,
- In some exceptional cases, the data is not provided in the report directly but a diagram containing the data is published [3], which should be kindly avoided, and
- Please publish these statistics as open data, that is in open standards and under open licenses.

Further, we request TRAI to explore possibilities of distributed sourcing of data, perhaps from the users themselves, about the actual network usage experiences, including but not limited to signal strength, data transfer speed (incoming and outgoing), frequency of switches between mobile (GSM and CDMA) and wi-fi connectivity, etc.

References

[1]. http://trai.gov.in/WriteReaddata/ConsultationPaper/Document/CP-Differential-Pricing-09122015.pdf.

[2]. http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/PerformanceIndicatorsReports/1_1_PerformanceIndicatorsReports.aspx.

[3]. http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PIRReport/Documents/Performance_Indicator_Report_Jun_2015.pdf , sections 1.43 and 1.44 (pp. 31-32).

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/trai-consultation-on-differential-pricing-for-data-services

TRAI and the Disclosure of Personal Information

Nehaa Chaudhari and Vidushi Marda — 2015-05-10T09:16:28Z

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), in March 2015 invited comments on its Consultation Paper for the regulation of over-the-top (OTT) services. In an unprecedented wave of public participation, TRAI received over a million e-mails in support of net neutrality.

This note sets out the law in relation to the unauthorized disclosure of personal information. Many thanks to Bhairav Acharya for his inputs on this.

Subsequently, on April 27, 2015, TRAI made all responses received by it public, including personal information like email addresses along with any information contained in email signatures, which invariably include a phone number or address. While disclosure of names was needed to ensure transparency in the consultation process, disclosure of personal information gave rise to criticism and questions around the legality of such disclosure.

This note sets out the law in relation to the unauthorized disclosure of personal information:
Section 43A of the IT Act provides for subordinate legislation to govern the manner in which sensitive personal data is collected and processed. The governance of personal information is dealt with under the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 (“2011 Rules”). The 2011 Rules are made to give effect to Section 43A of the IT Act.

TRAI is a body corporate as per Section 3(2) of the TRAI Act. Hence, TRAI’s collection, storage, and disclosure of personal information is governed by the 2011 Rules. Rule 5(8) requires personal information collected to be held securely. TRAIs publishing of email addresses is a violation of Rule 5(8).

Rule 4 of the 2011 rules requires a body corporate to have a privacy policy. On its website, TRAI publishes a Privacy Policy. However, the Policy speaks of information gathered from the TRAI- Website. Even the wording on the Home Page of the TRAI website (that links to these policies) says “Website Policies”. It is unclear therefore, whether the Privacy Policy applies ONLY to the collection of information over the TRAI- Website or whether the Privacy Policy applies to TRAI overall.

Either way there is an argument to be made. TRAI has failed to draft and publicize a privacy policy for the personal information it collects directly. Without prejudice to the above, if the privacy policy on the TRAI website governs this collection of email addresses, then its unauthorized disclosure is a contravention of its own Privacy Policy, specifically paragraph 2.

Since the IT Act does not enact a specific penalty for contravention of section 43A in respect of personal information, TRAI’s unauthorized disclosure will be penalized through the residuary penalty contained in section 45 of the IT Act.

Hence TRAI is liable under Section 45 of the IT Act read with Rules 4 and 5(8) of the 2011 Rules. Section 45 provides a “residuary penalty”; for those provisions under the IT Act or Rules for whose contravention no other penalty has been prescribed. For this contravention, TRAI would have to pay a compensation of 25,000/- to the affected persons or a penalty of 25,000/- rupees.

TRAI may argue that it disclosed that personal information would be disclosed/published. However, the Call for Comments Press Release says that Comments will be published. Email addresses are not comments, and therefore TRAI did not issue a prior disclaimer for the publication of this personal information – hence the disclosure of e-mail addresses is still a violation.

The remedy for violation of Section 43A of the IT Act is the Adjudicating Authority appointed under Section 46(1), which requires a person not below the rank of Director in the appropriate government to receive complaints. Since TRAI is a body corporate as per the Act, it is unclear as to who the adjudicating officer in the present case should be; and is the matter of a separate research question.

The Appellate authority is the Cyber Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the IT Act . It is not known if the tribunal has been constituted, and if it has; it is unknown whether it is staffed.

In the absence of clarity with regard to statutory authorities, a citizen whose personal information has been disclosed by TRAI without authorization may file a writ petition in the Delhi High Court under Article 226, or in the Supreme Court under Article 32 for issue of a writ of mandamus or prohibition, for appointment of the first adjudicating officer and also for issuance of directions in lieu of such an officer.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/trai-and-the-disclosure-of-personal-information

TRAI - consultation Q 1- 57

radha — 2009-11-23T08:53:00Z

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/publications/TRAI%20CP-Q%201-57-Nov%2012%202009.pdf

TRAI

radha — 2009-11-23T08:51:35Z

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/publications/TRAI%20consultation.jpg

Traffic Rules, Mindset and On-Time Payments

Shyam Ponappa — 2019-09-26T15:05:29Z

There's no alternative to following the rules and working together with discipline for our common interests.

The article was published in the Business Standard on September 4, 2019 and carried in Organizing India Blogspot on September 5, 2019.

Payments have gained currency, pun unintended, with the sharp focus on consumer spending and the economy. The following anecdote from newspaper reports begins with a payment problem for a traffic infraction, which leads on to existential questions on behaviour and governance.

A motorcycle rider in Uttar Pradesh was booked for not wearing a helmet. Events spiralled quickly to arrive at the heart of the matter: The state of governance and our utter disregard for due process and the law. But let’s not get ahead of the story.

The rider was an electrician on contract with the UP State Electricity Board. He pleaded with the police to be let off on the Rs 500 fine, saying he earned only Rs 6,000 a month, and hadn’t been paid for four months. The police said it was the law, and issued a ticket. The electrician’s superior interceded at his request, but couldn’t convince the police to waive the fine. (It turned out that tickets had been issued to 70 policemen for traffic violations.)

The electrician checked on the electricity dues owed by the police station. Finding that they amounted to Rs 662,463 over several years, he disconnected their power supply. When questioned, he said that this was as required by the law.

The power supply to the police station was soon restored, with the customary, vague assurance that the bill “would be paid soon”. A positive outcome, however, was that the state electricity board then paid Rs 17 crore of arrears for the month of May to 9,627 contract workers, including the electrician. The remaining amount, they said, “would be paid soon”.

Why were wages delayed? Apparently because consumers delayed payments, and the electricity board didn’t have the money to pay. Employees were still owed back pay for three months. Meanwhile, a formal enquiry reportedly began on the episode.

Such incidents are not unusual. In August, there was an instance in Agra of unpaid sanitation workers responsible for the toilets at the Taj Mahal going on strike. In Noida near New Delhi, two major shopping malls, a hospital, and a school had their water and sewer lines shut off because of unpaid dues. There were apparently 107 defaulters who owed over Rs 10 lakh each, with the highest being Rs 46.35 crore.

It isn’t as though citizens and the private sector are the sole culprits, with only stray government entities defaulting. A former Confederation of Indian Industry chairperson said in an interview on television recently that while hard data on government dues to the private sector are unavailable, informal estimates of the dues from central and state governments, state-owned companies such as electricity boards, and arbitration awards, ranged from Rs 2 trillion to Rs 5 trillion. Her observation was that if these dues were paid, it would provide the biggest boost for the economy, because it would result in much-needed capital formation and economic rejuvenation. As to where the funding could be found, given the government’s finances, she replied that the same sources (for example, bonds) could be used that would fund whatever waivers or incentives the central and state governments were promising. Those funds could be channelled for productive use in capital formation by their rightful claimants.

Stepping back for perspective, the problems appear to stem from slack implementation of protocols (defined, sequential steps), whether it is the discipline of timely payments, or rules and regulations. The same malady afflicting payments shows in the disregard for traffic rules, and the confusion in disallowing tyre shredders to discourage driving the wrong way, which is even more dangerous to the public.

In some cases, the design itself is flawed. For instance, resources for infrastructure such as coal and spectrum need to be priced low to facilitate productivity. If auctioned at a premium, instead of abundant supply of good quality at reasonable prices, the supply is constrained in quantity or quality, or priced high. Other instances are of processes not thought through in terms of design (e.g, stranded power generation. A requirement of Letters of Credit (LC) for purchasing power has been around, but has not been enforced. Will a new directive enforce this, when banks acting prudently can issue LCs only to distribution companies with strong finances?) The design shortcomings could result from fragmented and episodic attention, disaggregated responsibilities, lack of professional capacity, or simply winging it.

These failings have existed over decades, regardless of the governments in office. Some initial successes, as in mobile telephony from 2003 to around 2011, or in road construction or electricity supply, have not been consistent, nor have they been convergent to yield all-round, sustainable growth of the sort that could result from well-organised orchestration across the board. They have not even been able to sustain their performance, and now comprise the troubled sectors for banking and non-performing assets.

The root causes may be in underlying contradictions in our attitudes. These include feudal and post-colonial (exploitative) notions, with the trappings of a Westminster system, without the requisite culture and preparation of policies, practices and training. The result is either government and citizens facing off in an “Us vs Them”, with citizens often being viewed in the way colonials regarded “the natives”, or episodic “schemes” that fizzle out. Our political leadership and we have to realise that we are in the same boat, and that there is no substitute for working together with discipline for our common interests.

There are no colonial masters here, only their mindsets that we adhere to, without refashioning them for our purposes. This is what we must change over time from a total-solutions perspective, from on-time payments, to law and order including traffic, to waste management,¹ all infrastructure, finance, industry, farming, the arts and daily living.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-september-4-2019-shyam-ponappa-traffic-rules-mindset-and-on-time-payments

Times Group wants TRAI to save the Internet from greedy telcos via Net Neutrality

praskrishna — 2014-12-05T00:52:23Z

In an especially strong attack against perceived threats to its Internet-based business, the Times of India group has sought regulatory intervention to ensure what is popularly called Net Neutrality, or the concept that internet service providers must charge only from the end consumer.

The article was published in Real Time News on November 10, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

In other words, the Times of India group wants TRAI to ensure that internet service providers and telecom companies do not take payments from certain websites to give favorable treatment to those websites on their networks.

Such a situation already exists in India’s cable business, where channels who do not pay cable operators are often simply blocked out by the cable operator and the consumer is not able to watch those channels.

The Times Group, which operates a host of websites under its Times Internet subsidiary, believes that rules should be put in place so that telecom operators and other Internet companies do not block out websites who do not pay money to them as has happened in the cable industry. This will prevent small websites and blogs from reaching their customers without paying money to telecom operators, it warned.

In a letter to the TRAI, the Times Group said there are certain trends in the Indian market in which some operators are already giving favorable treatment to certain websites.

“Given the lack of formal rules, the danger is that ISPs in India will violate the principal of Net Neutrality,” it said in a letter.

“There have already been some incidents where Indian ISPs have ignored net neutrality. This sets a precedent that broadband providers can choose the content you want to access, by making it easier or harder to get that content. On the Net, ISPs can use differential bandwidth caps, speed limits and pricing on broadband consumption.”

In recent months, operators like telecom operators have been pushing the regulator to allow them to charge websites and Internet-based services like WhatsApp. They argue that these services take up bandwidth on their networks and that they must be compensated for the bandwidth used by consumers for services like WhatsApp, Facebook etc..

“Telecom Operators in India are gearing up to push for a regulation to get websites to pay to allow consumers to access them. The telecom industry’s lobbying arm, the Cellular Operators Association of India, has listed “revenue sharing agreements” with telecom operators one of the five items on their wishlist for the new government,” Times Group said.

The debate around net neutrality started in the US where internet service providers started promoting their own websites and services by giving lower rates for accessing them.

“Services like Netflix and Hulu have revolutionized digital content consumption and given users enormous flexibility, but they are coming under pressure by copycat services developed by cable companies, such as Comcast Xfinity. These services take advantage of owning the cable connection by offering better, unlimited connectivity when using their service, while offering limited or capped connectivity when accessing Hulu or Netflix. This is an anti-competitive move that stifles innovation and competition,” Times Group said.

Other excerpts from Times Group’s submissions follow –

“Net Neutrality is the principle that the internet users should be able to access web content, download or upload files and communicate in methods of their choice without restrictions or limitations imposed by their Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Net Neutrality means an Internet that enables and protects free speech1 and equal opportunities. This means that Internet service providers should not block or discriminate against any applications or content that ride over those networks, and should treat all data on the Internet equally, not discriminating or charging differentially by user, content, site, platform, application, type of attached equipment, and modes of communication or different speeds for different kinds of content.

“Underlying this, is the principle of whether or not India has enough safeguards to ensure that the ecosystem for content is a healthy and thriving one, and is not abused by distributors or last-mile operators aiming to create anti-competitive practices. This is a very real threat indeed, because while content may be king, distribution is God – and thousands of content owners are at the mercy of a few last mile owners who have become far more powerful than any media conglomerate could ever dream to be.

“It is hence critical that the government and regulators wake up to the fact that the only way to ensure a competitive media landscape with equal opportunities for all content-owners and their customers on Net and Mobile, is to ensure there are enough rules whereby customer connectivity is neutral to the content that rides on it. How net neutrality has shaped the internet : Net neutrality has shaped the internet in two fundamental ways: One, web users are free to connect to whatever website or service they want. ISPs do not bother with what kind of content is flowing from their servers.

“This has allowed the internet to grow into a truly global network and has allowed people to freely express themselves. For example, you can criticize your ISP on a blog post and the ISP will not restrict access to that post for its other subscribers, even though the post may harm its business. But more importantly, net neutrality has enabled a level playing field on the internet. To start a website, you don’t need lot of money or connections. Just host your website and you are good to go. If your service is good, it will find favour with web users.

“Unlike the cable TV where you have to forge alliances with cable connection providers to make sure that your channel reaches viewers, on the internet you don’t have to talk to ISPs to put your website online. This has led to the creation of Google, Facebook, Twitter and countless other services, all of which had very humble beginnings. They started as basic websites with modest resources. But they succeeded because net neutrality allowed web users to access these websites in an easy and unhindered manner. What will happen if there is no net neutrality : If there is no net neutrality, ISPs will have the power (and inclination) to shape internet traffic so that they can derive extra benefit from it.

“For example, several ISPs believe that they should be allowed to charge companies for services like YouTube and Netflix because these services consume more bandwidth compared to a normal website. Basically, these ISPs want a share in the money that YouTube or Netflix make. Without net neutrality, the internet as we know it, will not exist. Instead of free access, there could be “package plans” for consumers.

“For example, if you pay Rs 500, you will only be able to access websites based in India. To access international websites, you may have to pay more. Or there could be different connection speeds for different types of content, depending on how much you are paying for the service and what “add-on package” you have bought. This would clearly be a discriminatory practice between different websites and different kinds of content –and would men abuse of near-monopolistic powers of ISPs. Lack of net neutrality, would also spell doom for innovation on the web.

“It is possible that ISPs will charge web companies to enable faster access to their websites. Those who don’t pay, may see that their websites opening slowly. This means bigger companies like Google would be able to pay more to make access to Youtube or Google+ faster for web users but a startup that wants to create a different and better video hosting site, may not be able to do that and lose its business. Instead of an open and free internet, without net neutrality we are likely to get a web that has silos in it and to enter each silo, you will have to pay some “tax” to ISPs.

“The bottom line is that lack of net neutrality is an anti-consumer practice that will stifle competition and innovation in the digital economy, leaving power in the hands of telecom operators and broadband providers, rather than the thousands of emerging entrepreneurs in India. How Internet Neutrality may be jeopardized by ISPs, Telecom providers or other players in collusion: The case of Net and Mobile ISPs or Telecom players offering internet may try to get Internet companies to pay tolls and threaten to block or delay them if they don’t. They may do exclusive deals or other arrangements which may result in Internet blackouts or smaller websites being caught in the crossfire –, or websites, tweets, emails and texts may be mysteriously delayed or dropped, Videos would load slowly, if at all or the websites may end up working fine one minute, and time out another.

“More dangerously, this would enable a company to slow down its competitors or block political opinions it disagrees with. ISP would claim it is not their fault, and users would have no idea whom to blame –especially as there are currently no protections for Internet users. Further there is no competition in broadband, and even if there is, all ISPs may end up playing this game. On the Net, ISPs can use differential bandwidth caps, speed limits and pricing on broadband consumption. But on mobile, telecom operators can offer further favouritism towards preferred services, with additional benefits like selective billing integration and marketing/promotion.

“And since bandwidth on mobile is more limited than over broadband, restrictions or favouritism in bandwidth consumption offer telecom operators an even stronger, anti-competitive advantage. Worse, it sets a precedent that broadband providers can choose the content you want to access, by making it easier or harder to get that content. Further if freed from any legal restraints, ISPs can monitor everything users do and say online — and sell the information to the highest bidder. ISPs will have something that companies like Facebook and Google don’t: direct control over users’ connections to the Internet and the devices user use to connect to it. What is at stake is innovation and creativity, market competition, information availability and freedom of expression –and it is essential to protect thews ehard won freedoms only via Net Neutrality. International Scenario: Net neutrality has become a very heated issue in US and Europe, with significant momentum across civic groups, regulators and governments….

“While the internet only has 50-60 million users, its users can access vast amounts of content even as industries like e- commerce and travel have blossomed, creating economic value and real utility to consumers. Compare it to the MVAS world, where despite over 900 million users, the most common consumer sentiment is that they are being unfairly billed for irrelevant services. So what is the difference? On the internet, anyone can start a company and compete fairly for the consumers’ attention, spurring innovation and value. But in the mobile VAS world, only five major telecom operators control the services and choose the MVAS companies they want to patronize –even as they pay them rock bottom rates in revenue shares. The result is much less competition, and operators selling the same services (like caller ringback tones) increasingly aggressively to their customers, but with little or no innovation…

“As connectivity grows across the internet and mobiles, it is crucial that the government allows the same flourishing, open liberal ecosystem that has currently existed on the Web to continue across devices. India’s huge population and strong technical talent have the potential for global scale entrepreneurship and innovation, and can create a new dynamic India in the way IT had done in the 1990s. But it requires an infrastructure and atmosphere that is not controlled by last-mile connectivity providers who abuse their dominance.

“One should not confuse this with cross-media ownership –which is a non-issue, prompted by political motivations that fear a strong media. The real issue is whether or not we have enough safeguards to ensure that the ecosystem for content is a healthy and thriving one, and is not abused by distributors or last-mile operators aiming to create anti-competitive practices by expanding into content. This is a very real threat indeed, because while content may be king, distribution is God – and the thousands of content owners are at the mercy of a few last mile owners who have become far more powerful than any media conglomerate could ever be.

“It is high time, then, that the government and regulators wake up to the fact that the only way to ensure a competitive media landscape with equal voice for all content, is to ensure there are enough rules whereby customer connectivity is neutral to the content that rides on it. Survival of Net Neutrality : Net neutrality was earlier being implemented as a sort of a gentlemen’s agreement. It has survived so far because few people realized the potential of internet when it took off around 30 years ago. But now when the internet is not just an integral part of the society but an incredibly powerful –and disruptive— force as well,, ISPs across the world are trying to get the power to shape and control the traffic.

“But there are ways to keep net neutrality alive. Consumers should demand that ISPs continue their hands-off approach from the internet traffic. If consumers see a violation of net neutrality, they ought to take a proactive approach and register their displeasure with the ISP. They should also reward ISPs that uphold the net neutrality. At the same time, it is crucial to ensure that TRAI comes out with a set of clear and precise rules that protect the net neutrality.

“‘We have started seeing ISPs trying to take control of the traffic that flows from their servers but TRAI can regulate them. It can keep the internet open and consumer-friendly by forming rules that protect net neutrality. These are early days so it is easy to do. If ISPs manage to change the system, it may become too late,’ Sunil Abraham, director of Centre for internet and Society in Bangalore says.

“Conclusion: Internet has thrived because of its freedom of competition and ability for anyone with an internet connection to change the world. It is necessary to have safeguards – laws and checks and balances on the last mile of the consumer – to ensure last mile neutrality, which has now become the global movement across mediums. Taking advantage of last mile ownership throttles such innovation and competition.”

RTN's Take

We believe telecom operators and internet service providers should be allowed to offer ‘special offerings’ such as ‘Free Facebook’ by tying up with Facebook if companies like Facebook want to pay the internet access charges on behalf of the consumer.

However, such services should not be marketed as ‘Internet’ or ‘Web Access’ and must be clearly marketed as ‘Facebook Access’ or ‘Walled Garden Access’. Conversely, any consumer who pays for ‘Internet’ access should get neutral and unmanipulated access to all websites on an equal footing. There should be no behind-the-scenes tinkering with the traffic in such cases.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/news/rtn-asia-november-10-2014-times-group-wants-trai-to-save-internet-from-greedy-telcos-via-net-neutrality

Those Dropped Calls

Shyam Ponappa — 2015-09-04T14:59:22Z

And what could be done to fix them...Why do we have so many dropped calls on our mobile phones? Operators say it's because of the closure and shortage of cell towers, and too little spectrum.

The Op-ed was first published in the Business Standard on August 5 and mirrored in Organizing India Blogspot on August 6, 2015.

Public opinion is conflicted, wanting better services at low prices, fearful of the hazard of more towers, while also wanting operators to pay dearly for spectrum through auctions. The government asserts there's enough spectrum and operators need only to invest and deliver. Can these be resolved to get better services?

There are several elements in this situation relating to technology, to the regulatory aspects of administration (policies and regulations), or to management aspects (structure, organisation and processes). Understanding these and managing them will be crucial in devising solutions.

First, an overview from a lay perspective. An operator runs a number of "cell towers" connected together, as well as to other operators' towers (mobile networks) and fixed networks. A cell tower in its simple form - for one operator, covering one cell/area - comprises a base transceiver station (radio), antenna (mast), and other equipment. Radios need spectrum for wireless communication between towers, and subscribers linked to towers.

Apart from spectrum and licensing costs, the number of towers in an area drives the capital and operating costs, materials and energy used, and the environmental impact. As each tower covers a number of subscribers and spectrum is used for wireless connections, more subscribers need more spectrum. So, a given set of towers provides greater traffic-carrying capacity if there is more spectrum. Conversely, less spectrum requires more towers and equipment, which means higher costs and environmental impact. In other words, for a given frequency range (spectrum band) and set of towers and subscribers, a small set of broader bands can carry more traffic than can a large set of narrower bands.[1]

Calls get dropped or blocked if there is too little spectrum for the number of subscribers, because the calls exceed the spectrum's carrying capacity. Users get good reception if they are near towers, but if other towers are too close, interference from signals from those towers can reduce the capacity of available spectrum, and reception may also be noisy. A weak connection with a distant tower results in poor reception. Distance cuts both ways: a short distance from tower-to-user yields a good connection (strong signal), but other towers must be far enough to avoid interference (i.e., have weak signals for the user). For 900 MHz with a mast height of 10 metres, this tradeoff results in distances between towers of under 100 metres in Delhi because of the scarcity of spectrum, compared with 200 metres in Istanbul, 300 metres in Munich, or 350 metres in Berlin.[2]

An additional benefit of more spectrum is that peak-hour capacity increases, so that more traffic can be carried without calls being dropped or blocked over the same network configuration. Our problem is that we have many operators with narrow, non-contiguous slivers of spectrum. This further reduces the efficiency of the available spectrum.

A reduction of towers because of closure on account of public pressure or for environmental reasons creates genuine problems, but simply adding towers is only a partial solution, as it doesn't remedy the shortage of spectrum. One reason is interference resulting in the reduced capacity of available spectrum - because cells in our urban centres are less than 100 metres apart, much less than in other countries, because sufficient commercial spectrum hasn't been made available. Therefore, more towers alone will cause spectrum to be used less efficiently, but won't reduce dropped calls arising from insufficient, fragmented spectrum. Also, adding towers is expensive, and is detrimental to the environment.

Operators deal with scarce spectrum by deploying more base stations per unit area, and also by using advanced technologies such as adaptive multi-rate codecs and synthesised frequency-hopping. In 2008, Indian operators were among the few worldwide to adopt such techniques, while having the smallest outdoor sites and heaviest traffic densities per MHz.[3] This results in higher costs relative to revenues.

Contrast with China

Comparing the approaches taken by China and India, there's little doubt of the need for a change in our approach. China provided operators with low-priced spectrum to scale up and drive economic growth, among other forms of support. Despite foreign holdings, it hasn't imposed substantial fees. India brought in more operators than other markets, didn't provide as much commercial spectrum, fragmented what it had, and priced it out of sight. Consequently, substantial spectrum is idle with the government, while large operators with very little spectrum and the legacy of underdeveloped fixed networks have over 100 million customers each, with high voice and growing data usage. This situation is likely to worsen as more spectrum holdings come up for renewal.

Efficient data transmission requires even broader bands. The charts below show how capacity increases per MHz with broader bands, and the bandwidth in terms of megabits per second (Mbps) needed for services.

Capacity Increases with Broader Bands

Possible solutions

One possibility is to adopt policies and regulations that facilitate spectral efficiency, e.g., allowing roaming and spectrum trading. This wouldn't mitigate the problem of excessive capital expenditure on spectrum auctions that exceeds investment in networks (according to an industry estimate), but would probably improve spectrum utilisation.

Another is to share all spectrum through pooling, allowing common-carrier access on payment to Radio Access Networks including spectrum. If charged only a reasonable revenue share with incentives such as reductions for rural services, there is likely to be explosive growth in broadband delivery with an increase in government revenue, if the organisation and coordination is done right. The government needs to bring together operators and other stakeholders, including the Ministries of Communications & Information Technology and of Information & Broadcasting, and with expert help, work out how to organise and deliver the promise of Digital India.

[1]. An assessment of spectrum management policy in India, 2008; p 10: http://www.aegis-systems.co.uk

[2]. For GSM, there is a 50 per cent increase in the capacity per MHz using two channels of 12 MHz each instead of two channels of 6 MHz each. Ibid., 15.

[3]. Ibid.,28.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-august-6-2015-shyam-ponappa-those-dropped-calls

The tragedy of the unused commons

Shyam Ponappa — 2018-01-05T14:50:56Z

Hope for the good sense and guts to handle it.

The article was published by Business Standard on December 6, 2017 and in the Organizing India Blogspot on the same day.

“The tragedy of the commons” as you may recall, refers in economics to the overexploitation of shared resources because of unregulated access. The tragedy results from shared resources being depleted or degraded because users pursue their own interests, contrary to the common good. This leads to unsustainable depletion or degradation. The atmosphere and oceans are examples of such shared resources.

There are also reverse situations, in which resources that are available for the benefit of society are unused, to the detriment of the common good. In such cases, there are opportunity costs from disuse that result in detriments, because the benefits of use are foregone. India’s abundant sunlight is a good example. Given its abundance, a reasonable expectation might be that extensive innovation and market organisation would be focused on harvesting this potential energy. Alas, India is a laggard in innovation relating to solar power.

Another resource that is neither depleted nor degraded by usage but underused is radio frequency spectrum. The opportunity cost for unused spectrum is therefore even greater than for a degradable mineral resource such as coal, resulting in an extreme tragedy of unused commons.

Some Issues Need Resolution

The situation today is that swathes of spectrum are unused because of our inability, perhaps unwillingness, to develop the appropriate regulations and organisation to benefit from them. This is true of all unused and underused radio frequency spectrum, although some of it is the most useful means for broadband connectivity for the majority of our rural and semi-urban population. It would also give more urban users less expensive access. For both sets, judicious use would enhance productivity and improve living conditions.
The entire thrust of the Digital India initiative requires these enabling policies and procedures, that is, the administrative rules and regulations that would enable the use of presently unused and therefore wasted spectrum. There are, of course, many other steps required than merely putting in place the regulations. The market structures and organisation have to be created under government leadership with other stakeholders in industry and civil society that would permit sustainable use of “the commons” — namely, the spectrum, if it were a shared resource instead of being apportioned in silos.

At present, private operators in this sector, except one, have too much debt, very low profitability, and insufficient network coverage. Services can be good in some locations, but countrywide, are spotty and not universally accessible. Yet, operators apparently want auctions, not now but at some time in the future (perhaps next year), for the essential resource that is the prerequisite for building the coverage that they don’t have although sorely needed, as it has been for years. While clearly impractical because of how auctions soak up capital, limiting subsequent investment in networks because of the deprivation of capital, operators reportedly want this in order to reduce competitive threats.

Another baffling aspect of our reality is that the administration and regulator took no effective action to prevent the destruction of existing market structures in the telecom sector when there was a disruptive new entrant. With overwhelming resources from unrelated activities, unsustainable strategies and tactics could be construed as jeopardising India’s current and future productivity. Meanwhile, the administration and the regulator dithered, debating theoretical concepts of what constitutes anticompetitive or predatory activity, and the judiciary remained on the sidelines.

Yet another aspect of puzzling inactivity is that there have been no steps to test certain promising technologies for permitting their use through appropriate policies in India, such as TV White Space or the development of MIMO — Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output — using arrays of antennas, yielding (a) greater throughput (b) over longer distances (c) to more users, thereby improving spectrum capacity for broadband. While initial tests for TV White Space, conducted after a delay of several years, have been promising (disclosure: the author was associated with some), proposals for larger follow-up trials have stalled. Without these, policymakers can’t even consider policies that would enable the development and use of TV White Space devices for extending optical fibre from gram panchayats to hundreds of thousands of village users.

In the press, confusing articles short on facts make policy formulation even more difficult and risky in this already technically and financially complex space. One instance is an article about Maharashtra’s Village Social Transformation initiative avoiding TV White Space because this technology has problems with security clearance, in addition to Foreign Contribution Regulation Act clearance for Microsoft’s sponsorship of the pilot. The fact that the problem in India is in getting permission to use TV White Space for purposes other than for Doordarshan’s broadcasts finds no mention. The security risk in these frequencies is the same as in other frequencies, and transmission in any band can be monitored.

Another article suggests the government is considering allocating a high-speed wireless frequency band of unused spectrum (V band or 60 GHz, which is like short-range wireless optic fibre) on a first come, first served basis “which is a gross violation of the Supreme Court order”. Somewhere down the page is a surmise that since the Broadband India Forum is advocating de-licencing of this band and foreign companies support it, this “means that it should be allocated without auction on first come, first served basis”. The Broadband India Forum in its white paper clearly recommends aligning with an international standard, the Harmonised European Standard.1
According to this, low power equipment within specified emission limits in this band doesn’t need a licence. Wi-Fi is de-licenced spectrum that is open access and not allocated. Other de-licenced spectrum would not need to be allocated either, although in India, bands such as 60 GHz could be restricted to authorised operators.

It needs government intervention to cut the Gordian knot and initiate discussions on pooling spectrum for networks and working out practicable, sustainable options. Here’s hoping good sense and guts will help to make a start.

Shyam (no-space) Ponappa at gmail dot com
1: "V band - 60 GHz: The Key to Affordable Broadband in India"
White Paper by Broadband India Forum, November 9, 2016http://www.broadbandindiaforum.com/img/White%20Paper%20on%20V-BAND%20Revised%20Final.pdf

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-december-6-2017-shyam-ponappa-the-tragedy-of-the-unused-commons

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997

snehashish — 2013-03-15T06:21:43Z

The main objective of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (TRAI Act) was to establish the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT). The main purpose of these two institutions established under the TRAI Act is to regulate telecommunication services, adjudicate disputes, dispose appeals and protect the interest of the service providers as well as the consumers. The Act also aims at promoting and ensuring orderly growth of the telecom sector.

A bill to establish a non-statutory telecom regulator was proposed in the Parliament by the Government through an amendment to the Indian Telegraph Act, 1985. However, this proposal was dropped by the Parliament because several Members of the Parliament argued for a statutory telecom regulator. TRAI was then constituted under the presidential ordinance[1] issued in 1997, later it was ratified by the Parliament by enacting the TRAI Act. Subsequently, TRAI Act went through major amendments in the year 2000.

Amendment to the TRAI Act

The TRAI Act was amended through the TRAI (Amendment) Act, 2000 (“Amendment Act”). Before the amendment, TRAI exercised both regulatory and dispute resolution functions. The Amendment Act established the Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal to solely deal with relevant disputes. There was ambiguity in the Act as to whether TRAI recommendations are binding upon the Government; this was clarified by the Amendment Act.

Independent Telecom Regulatory Authority

In Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, the Supreme Court while deciding on the constitutionality of the National Telecom Policy, 1994 observed that it is necessary that the telecom regulator should be an independent body. National Telecom Policy, 1994 allowed for private participation in the telecommunication sector, and in the light of this policy change the Supreme Court also emphasized on the necessity of an independent statutory authority in a deregulated and competitive telecom market.

Government Control over TRAI

TRAI is not a completely independent telecom regulator. The Government exercises certain amount of control over TRAI. Under section 25 of the Act it has the power to issue directions which are binding on TRAI. The TRAI is also funded by the Central Government. Moreover, under section 35 of the TRAI Act, the Central Government has the power to make rules on various subjects and such rules are binding upon TRAI. Therefore, TRAI is not a completely independent telecom regulator as envisioned by the Supreme Court.

Scheme of the TRAI Act

The TRAI Act contains six chapters. Chapter 1 deals with applicability of the Act, key concepts and definitions. Chapter 2 contains provisions for constitution of the TRAI. Chapter 3 deals with the powers and functions of TRAI. Chapter 4 deals with establishment of appellate tribunal, TDSAT and the procedure of the appellate tribunal. Chapter V deals with finance, accounts and audit of the two institutions established under the Act. Chapter 6 consists of miscellaneous provisions for the purpose of smooth functioning of the two institutions created under the Act.

Constitution of TRAI

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was established as a corporation under Section 3 of the Act. The head office of TRAI is in New Delhi. TRAI constitutes of a chairperson and less than two, full time and part-time members. The chairperson and the members of TRAI are appointed by the Central Government and the duration for which they can hold their office is three years or until they attain the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. The persons who are appointed should have special knowledge and prior experience in the field of telecommunication, industry, finance, accountancy, law, management or consumer affairs. If someone, who has been in the service of the Government prior to appointment then he should have served the Government in the capacity of a Secretary or Additional Secretary for a period more than three years.

Section 8 deals with procedure to be followed with respect to meetings of TRAI. All questions before TRAI will be decided by a majority vote of the members, present and voting. The person who is presiding the meeting will entitled to a second or casting vote.

The TRAI may also appoint officers and employees in order to carry out its function under this Act. Currently the officers and employees of TRAI are divided into nine divisions. The divisions are:

Mobile network division;
Fixed network division;
Converged network division; (iv) quality of service division;
Broadcast and cable services division;
Economic division (vii) financial analysis and internal finance and accounts division;
Legal division and (ix) administration and personnel division.

Powers and Functions of TRAI

The functions of the TRAI are enumerated under section 11 of the TRAI Act. The function mentioned under the provision has an overriding effect on any provision of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

The 2000 Amendment classified the TRAI’s functions into four broad categories:

Making recommendations on various issues;
General administrative and regulatory functions;
Fixing tariffs and rates for telecom services; and
Any other functions entrusted by the Central Government.

The functions of the TRAI are:

The recommendations made by the TRAI are not binding on the Central Government. However, the Central Government has to mandatorily ask for recommendations from TRAI with respect to need and timing of new service provider and terms and conditions of the licence to be granted to the service provider. TRAI has the obligation to forward the recommendation to the Central Government within 60 days from the date of the request for recommendation. TRAI may also request for relevant information or documents from the Central Government to make such recommendations and the Central Government has to furnish such information within seven days from the date of the request.

The Central Government can issue licence to the service provider, if TRAI fails to give any recommendation within the stipulated period. Where the Central Government is of the opinion that the recommendations made by TRAI cannot be accepted or need modification, then it can send them back to TRAI for reconsideration. TRAI may reply within a period of 15 days from the date of reference.

TRAI also has the power to notify in the official gazette the rates at which telecommunication services are being provided in and outside India. TRAI shall ensure transparency while exercising its powers and discharging its functions.

TRAI under section 12 has the power to call for information and conduct investigation. It also has got powers to issue directions under section 13.

Telecom Disputes Settlement Appellate Tribunal

The Telecom Dispute Settlement Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) is established under section 14 of the Act. It is the sole dispute resolution body in the communication sector. It can adjudicate upon any dispute between:

Licensor (Central Government) and a licensee.
Two or more service providers.
Between a service provider and a group of consumers.

However, the Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to try any matter which deals with anti-competitive trade practices or any consumer complaint.

Grounds and Procedures for Appeal to the Tribunal (Section 14A)

The Central Government, State Government, any local authority or any person can approach the Tribunal for adjudication on matters related to dispute between parties mentioned above.

It can make recommendation either on its own accord or on the request of the Government on the following matters:
- Need and timing of new service provider.
- Terms and conditions of the licence which may be granted to the service provider.
- Revocation of licence for not following the term and conditions of the licence.
- Measures to facilitate competition in the market and promote efficiency and growth in the telecom sector.
- Type of equipment to be used by service provider.
- Technological improvements in the services.
- Measure for development of telecommunication technology.
- Spectrum management.
The TRAI also has to discharge certain functions apart from making recommendations to the Government:
- Ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the licence.
- Fix the terms and conditions of inter-connectivity between service providers.
- Ensure technical compatibility and effective inter-connection between different service providers.
- Regulate any arrangement between service providers for sharing of revenue derived from providing telecommunication services.
- Lay down standards for quality of service and also ensure and conduct periodal survey as to implementation of standards for quality of service.
- Lay down and ensure the time period for implementing local and long distance circuits of telecommunication between different service providers.
- Maintain register of interconnect agreements between service providers and such register should be made available to any member of the public for inspection on payment of a fee.
- Ensure effective compliance with the universal service obligations.
- Levy fees and charges at such rate and for services as determined by regulations.[2]

TRAI under section 12 has the power to call for information and conduct investigation. It also has got powers to issue directions under section 13.

Telecom Disputes Settlement Appellate Tribunal

Licensor (Central Government) and a licensee.
Two or more service providers.
Between a service provider and a group of consumers.

However, the Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to try any matter which deals with anti-competitive trade practices or any consumer complaint.

Grounds and Procedures for Appeal to the Tribunal (Section 14A)

The Central Government, State Government, any local authority or any person can approach the Tribunal for adjudication on matters related to dispute between parties mentioned above.
An appeal can be referred to the Tribunal in case any party [3] is aggrieved by the decision of TRAI. However, such appeal has to be made to the Tribunal within 30 days from the date on which the party receives a copy of the decision or direction given by TRAI. However, the Telecom Tribunal may condone the delay provided that there is a reasonable ground justifying the delay.[4]
The Tribunal will pass an order after giving an opportunity to be heard, to the parties to the dispute.
The Tribunal is also obligated to send a copy of the order passed by it to TRAI.
In case of appeal from the decision of TRAI, the Tribunal should try to dispose of the case at the earliest and try to give a decision within 90 days from the date of appeal.

Composition of the Tribunal (Section 14B)

The Tribunal consists of a chairperson and two other members, appointed by the Central Government. Selection of chairperson and the two members is done in consultation with Chief Justice of India.

Qualification and term of office of the Chairperson and Members

The minimum qualification for a Chairperson is that he is or has been a judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief Justice of a High Court and the minimum qualification for a member is that he should have been at the post of a secretary to the Central Government or at any equivalent post in the Central Government. A person can also be qualified as a member of the Tribunal if he has held the position of Secretary under the State Government for a period more than two years and has knowledge and experience in technology, telecommunication, industry, commerce or administration.

Term of Office

The Chairperson can hold office till he attains the age of 75 or completes three years, whichever is earlier. The members of the Tribunal can hold office till they attain the age of 65 years or complete three years, whichever is earlier.

Procedure of the Tribunal

Procedure and powers of the Tribunal is laid down under section 16 of the TRAI Act. The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which lays down the procedure of the conventional courts is not applicable to the Tribunal.

An appeal from the Tribunal’s final order in a matter can be directly referred to the Supreme Court under section 18 of the TRAI Act. However, in the circumstance where the Tribunal has passed an order with the consent of the parties to the dispute, no appeal can be made to any court or tribunal.

Within five years of its creation the Tribunal has already decided 400 cases consisting of complex questions of law.

[1].Presidential ordinance is TRAI Ordinance (No. 11 of 1997).
[2].Regulation means regulations made by the TRAI under this Act.
[3].Any party includes the Central Government, State Government, any local authority or any person.
[4].Bharati Telnet v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 72.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/resources/trai-act-1997

The Telecom Crisis is an NPA Problem

Shyam Ponappa — 2019-12-15T07:26:50Z

After interim relief for telecom, structural reforms must follow.

The article originally published in Business Standard on November 7, 2019 was also mirrored on Organizing India Blogspot

The Committee of Secretaries to mitigate financial stress in telecom must act quickly on interim measures for the sector to survive. But is its mere survival sufficient for India’s development and growth? Is it possible to fix telecom in isolation?Our communications needs are very poorly served, although at rock-bottom prices. Is it even possible for our hapless citizens and enterprises to get past shoddy services and productivity foregone, to trade with other countries on a more even footing?

Yes, if we succeed at major structural changes, starting with telecom. But to transform telecom, the government and all of us have to come to the stark realisation that just as finance drives the economy, digitisation and communications have to be at the heart of production and delivery. Telecom and digitisation are strategic enablers for all infrastructure and in all sectors. Leading countries are so far ahead and functioning so effectively that it is difficult for us to imagine. We must want that path, plan for it, and put in the requisite effort.

Simply tweaking overdue payments, tinkering to reduce charges, and plugging along as before isn’t going to get us there. In this sense, the Committee’s charter is too limited. All it can do is assuage the pain, whereas our need is for a revitalised industry to serve our purposes.If the Committee’s scope were broader, could we actually adopt digitisation as our core strategy for development and growth? A study on China, “Telecommunications reforms in China”, about the transformation in policies to make digitisation its development priority, is instructive.1

Their approach to reforms was to balance the government’s aims of universal coverage, governance and control, and efficiency; industry’s profit-seeking; and the people and enterprises’ needs for freer, more rapid communications. This is what we need to do, in a way that works for us.Also, the government, the judiciary, the press and users need to understand and accept that the telecom crisis is part of the larger non-performing assets (NPAs) problem. It has systemic links to NPAs and banking, which links to real estate and construction, electricity and roads, and stable and predictable taxes. Government payment delays and tax terrorism must stop. Business as usual will not resolve NPAs soon to enable growth. These two articles explain why and deserve attention.2

Essentially, entities that take deposits need Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulation. In a crisis, people with domain expertise and capacity must be appointed to take immediate steps to protect assets and operations, as with Satyam or IL&FS, because seizing/freezing assets often hurts depositors and creditors. A bureaucratic process as with the Punjab & Maharashtra Co-operative bank is likely to result in yet another zombie bank, burning depositors’ money just to stay alive.The Committee’s focus should be on cash flows, modelling cash flows and their timing, not just the present value of discounted flows, or other extraneous emotional, political, or judicial/administrative reasons.

Employment is a legitimate consideration, but has to be sustainable, with timely cash generation. Else, other sources of timely cash support must be arranged, because without sustained cash flows, no gambit or subsidy can succeed (and maintaining unproductive employment will not be possible). Some fixes need major legislative changes to policies.

BSNL & MTNL

On BSNL and MTNL, a recent article sets the context and explains why the revival plan is unrealistic.3 In short, these poorly supported and much-abused enterprises have so much debt that earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation would have to be at least 35 per cent. Governments have used them as market spoilers as with Air India, precipitating unsustainable price wars that gutted the industry.An alternative is to downsize, re-skill as needed, and retain the public sector entities (as one or both) in the role of security-and-public-interest-anchors in infrastructure consortiums. These must be run by the private sector (and in strategic areas, by defence). This will facilitate policies such as assigning spectrum for payment on usage without auctions, and extending Wi-Fi to 60 GHz and 6 GHz (details at: https://organizing-india .blogspot.com/2019/10/extend-tax-cut-logic-to-infrastructure .html, and https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2018/11/a-great-start-on-wi-fi-reforms.html).

Weak Financial Systems

The Committee needs to apprehend and convey the need to strengthen financial institutions. Financial systems provide second-order infrastructure for productive activity and wellbeing. They need an adequate underlay of first-order, basic infrastructure, comprising communications, energy, water, waste, sewerage, and transport, leaving aside housing and the basics of security, and law and order. While most of us take these for granted, there should be no doubt about how critical these attributes are, and that they are being eroded and increasingly at risk because of social disorder and economic inadequacies. In addition, basic health care and education are essential adjuncts for the supply of trainable people to operate these sectors.

Until some years ago, despite weak infrastructure, financial systems were among India’s real strengths, although eroded periodically by disruptions resulting in NPAs. However, there was strength in the professional capacity of this sector that held up in spite of the pressures. Over time, these institutions have been severely degraded, through laxity, complicity, pressures for evergreening, the abrupt imposition of credit quality and NPAs, the extent of frauds because of lax or complicit supervision and the reputational damage, the buffeting from demonetisation and pressures to cross-sell products such as insurance. Governments need to understand this and support building professionalism, avoiding melas and waivers.

The scope of the Committee could be expanded to set the objectives of telecom and digitisation in the interests of governance, industry, and users, and to outline next steps. They could consider the experience of China and others such as Sweden for this vast effort, while addressing linkages and NPA issues. Perhaps, they could be exemplars by setting the tone for a national approach that is not departmental and becomes bipartisan, and helps to move away from our abrasive, confrontational politics that leads to deadlocks.

Becky P.Y. Loo, October 2004: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227426547_Telecommunications_reforms_in_China_Towards_an_analytical_framework
Debashis Basu, October 27, 2019: https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/how-to-fix-the-pmc-bank-crisis-119101400006_1.html October 13, 2019: https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/lessons-from-pmc-why-govt-is-responsible-for-co-operative-bank-crises-119102700620_1.html
Rahul Khullar, October 31, 2019: https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/don-t-bet-on-bsnl-mtnl-s-revival-119103100040_1.html

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/shyam-ponappa-business-standard-and-organizing-india-blogspot-november-7-2019-telecom-crisis-is-an-npa-problem

The Supreme Court Delivers

Shyam Ponappa — 2012-12-21T09:57:57Z

Now, the spectrum and licence issues need resolution. On September 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of India delivered the opinion of a bench comprising five Judges on the Presidential Reference regarding the auction of 2G spectrum.

Published in Organizing India Blogspot on October 11, 2012 and in Business Standard on October 4, 2012.

The Supreme Court’s opinion on the Presidential reference[*]dismissed two preposterous claims. One is that it is beyond the ambit of Parliament and the government to formulate economic policies. The second is that the government must allocate resources only through auctions. It’s like the end of a self-destructive nightmare. True, our heedless kleptocracy as a society of rogue politicians, bureaucrats, defence personnel, and complicit citizens, led to this pass. Even so, the anarchic “destructionism” of these claims is as reprehensible as the kleptocracy they seek to tear down. Fortunately, the Supreme Court opinion rose above the populist clamour.

There’s still a mess to clear. The big picture is that the Supreme Court left its decision on spectrum auctions unaddressed. In matters of detail, some points need resolution based on facts. These are discussed below to dispel prevalent myths.

Myth 1: Auctions maximise govt revenues

"Auctions may be the best way of maximising revenue…": paragraph 116 of the opinion. This contravenes the evidence after the National Telecom Policy -99, that revenue-sharing maximises government revenues as well as public benefits. It also ignores the many auction failures.

Consider the evidence: auction revenues foregone were estimated at under Rs 20,000 crore for 1999-2007, because the sector was mired in losses and was unable to provide services effectively or pay those dues. By comparison, actual collections from revenue-sharing by March 2007 were more than double, at Rs 40,000 crore. Collections by March 2010 were Rs 80,000 crore. Current annual contributions to government revenues may be about Rs 18,000 crore on Adjusted Gross Revenues estimated at Rs 1,40,000 crore, plus taxes, amounting to perhaps Rs 36,000 crore.

Re public benefits, access to telephony grew from a few million users in 1999 to about 700 million today (excluding around 250 million shadow subscriptions).

An ameliorating caveat in paragraph 12 states: "…if the State arrives at the conclusion … that maximum revenue would be earned by auction of the natural resource in question, then that alone would be the process", and this is expanded in paragraph 119:

"Where revenue maximisation is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations."

This has not prevented erroneous conclusions in the press that auctions are the only valid process, notwithstanding that the conditions stipulated in the order, eg, that government’s actions be “fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory”, were always operative, if not adhered to in instances of abuse, as in the 2G scam.

Myth 2: Maximum govt collections are in the public interest

Government collections as the public interest criterion may work for colonial powers extorting revenues from subject states, or possibly for utopias whose political economy is so balanced that such cross-subsidisation works. Developing economies like India presumably can and should seek the welfare of their people. The same populists crusading for maximum government collections accuse governments of corruption and waste. This doesn’t provide a coherent approach to infrastructure, where each capital-intensive sector is configured to deliver a specific service. For instance, the energy sector has to deliver power, while telecommunications must deliver communications services. Neither can be expected to deliver toilets or water. Yet, many well-intentioned people seem to nurture such irrational expectations.

The spectrum and broadband link

The first prerequisite for broadband is high-speed connectivity. The second is reasonably priced services. Our objectives are, therefore: (a) a broadband network, (b) available anywhere (c) at reasonable prices. Our networks are deficient, however, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. A host of factors are responsible, ranging from limited public sector network rollout, combined with a private sector focus on the most lucrative urban centres, with incentives skewed to voice telephony. Applications need connectivity based on networks that require spectrum.

Problems and solutions

Consider an application like distance education. The need is for networks and services of high quality (followed by the additional requirement of content). What is apparent is that such applications cannot be effective without the connectivity. So we’re back to the need for networks, of fibre where feasible, and wireless elsewhere. This brings us back to the need for spectrum.

Reviewing facts

As regards the facts relating to the 2G judgment deserving review:
The solution the Supreme Court has not considered is that operators need only to use spectrum, for which they can be charged a fee. The evidence of widely available Wi-fi shows that innovation and usage thrive if spectrum is available. The Supreme Court, the government, and the public need to recognise that allocating spectrum to operators is only one way to use spectrum.

There need be no alienation of spectrum at all, if policies allow open access and charge fees. Then, spectrum could be used like any infrastructure network, eg, airports, highways, or rail, on payment of usage charges. The sharing could be in at least two ways. Operators could pool spectrum for collective use. For this, (i) regulations must allow pooling/active facilities sharing, and (ii) operators must agree on terms and procedures. Another way is for mandatory spectrum sharing using the database-driven systems being implemented in the US by Spectrum Bridge and Telcordia. Similar deployments are planned in the UK, the European Union, and in Singapore. The TV white space is shared because this range is available for sharing, and not because other bands cannot be shared.

There are immense societal costs of duplication in capital investments in multiple networks, including the last-mile spectrum access, of operators using dedicated networks with limited passive facilities sharing (such as towers), compared with the benefits of open-access to common networks, if policies changed. These would employ active facilities sharing (equipment, and not just construction) to reduce capital equipment, construction costs, energy for towers, carbon emissions from a more limited physical network, possibly reduced radiation from a rationalised network with small cells with lower-powered equipment, and the multiplier effect on the finite available spectrum.

Enormous productivity benefits could accrue through ICT applications in infrastructure such as smart grids for energy, transportation, education, healthcare, and government services, as well as many commercial applications.

The Supreme Court could also uphold contractual obligations, by discriminating against actual transgressors in the 2G spectrum allocation, while rehabilitating those who operated within the law.

[*].http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/op27092012.pdf

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-october-11-2012-shyam-ponappa-the-supreme-court-delivers

The Supreme Court & Spectrum Management

Shyam Ponappa — 2013-03-04T08:28:23Z

Only the Supreme Court can rectify spectrum management in line with other resources, but all stakeholders can contribute.

Shyam Ponappa's column was published in Organizing India Blogspot on February 14, 2013. Originally published in the Business Standard on February 6, 2013.

Last week, the department of telecommunications initiated another spectrum auction, as directed by the Supreme Court. The auction of 800, 900, and 1800 MHz is to end in March. The winners, if any, must pay in 10 days a third of the amount bid for 1800 MHz, and a quarter for 800 and 900 MHz.

If there are high bids, why should it bode ill for communications services for education, training, health care, commerce, and for future productivity? Because many years must pass for the results to show.

Fallout of auctions: many years away

The expiry of 900 MHz rights starts from December 2014 in Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata; others will do so only from 2016-2024. The table shows the assignments in each circle, and the market share of revenues in July 2012. The colour of each cell indicates the expiry period.

The first assignments of 900 MHz spectrum to private operators in Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata expire in November 2014. The second will take up to five years longer, ie, from 2015-2019, eg, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Vodafone in Tamil Nadu, etc. The third will take even longer. Hence, forcing auctions does not provide a near-term solution.

Technical inputs to judges

Operators with more spectrum or access to more bandwidth can offer higher capacity and data rates at lower cost. Operators try to get as much spectrum as their competitors, because having less spectrum means deploying more cell sites for the same capacity, which means greater capital cost. Hence, in India, pooling and sharing spectrum among operators – providing greater bandwidth dynamically to each operator on demand – will result in better coverage and higher capacity at lower cost. If operators pay only for using the spectrum on demand and do not incur high costs to acquire spectrum rights, they can invest more capital in the “superstructure” of their services, while maintaining lower tariffs. Acting in the public interest, the government should, therefore, keep spectrum costs low for better coverage and services at lower prices. If informed by knowledgeable, unbiased experts, the Supreme Court is likely to accept this conclusion.

The Supreme Court upheld these principles for natural resource allocation on the Presidential Reference. The reference excluded how spectrum should be assigned. A logical extension of these principles requires that spectrum assignment, as for other resources, is for governments to decide.

Spectrum sharing

Developments in spectrum sharing augur a new, collaborative approach, and a change from exclusive rights apart from unlicensed spectrum for Wi-fi. While spectrum sharing was pioneered by the US and the UK, it is being pursued widely, as in trials in Finland for the European Union, and in Singapore, Japan and Korea in Asia. Shared spectrum standards under development for years are now coming to a head. Standards can lead to large volumes resulting in low prices, as for Wi-fi.

A standard has already been established for long-range TV white space (TVWS) for rural broadband (802.22). This year, another is expected for short-range TVWS (802.11 af). Finland is conducting a commercial trial covering some 300,000 people. Another Finnish trial will address dynamic access to pooled spectrum, or authorised shared access.

Large-scale deployments of TVWS are beginning in America, with two commercially licensed TVWS administrators, Spectrum Bridge and Telcordia, about to deploy networks. In the UK, the regulator is likely to issue rules shortly, after the extensive Cambridge White Spaces Consortium trials of 2011¹.

In America last August, the Federal Communi- cations Commission (FCC) allowed T-Mobile to test spectrum sharing in the 1755-1780 MHz band with federal agencies using this band. Also, the US Congress directed the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), responsible for government and defence spectrum, and the FCC to examine whether additional spectrum could be opened to sharing by unlicensed devices. Last week, the NTIA proposed that unlicensed devices be allowed to operate from 5150 MHz to 5925 MHz. This wide band will facilitate gigabit throughput on a new wireless standard, 802.11 ac. Routers are available for this draft standard, although they are expensive at around $200 (Rs 10,600), because of the low starting volumes.

While it may take a year or more to get lower priced spectrum-sharing devices, the fallout of the auctions and their impact will take very much longer to settle. Further, the “eviction” from 900 MHz of GSM service providers like Bharti and Vodafone through refarming may result in chaos and service deprivation for millions of GSM users, unless they win bids to keep their spectrum. In other words, while trials will take some time to conduct in India to prove that pooling spectrum to share among operators is practicable, they are likely to converge far quicker than the disruption by forcing auctions and the likely litigation, apart from being much more beneficial and orderly.

An approach to corrective action

There is an inspiring example from Bihar of how such issues can be addressed through concerted action by stakeholders. The example is from the districts where the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation works on mother and child care. Something amazing has apparently happened: the various agencies are collaborating, whereas they worked in silos before. Auxiliary nurse midwives, anganwadi workers and accredited social health activists (ASHA) are co-ordinating their activities to achieve better results. There’s a communications angle, too: five major operators (Airtel, Idea, Tata, Reliance and Vodafone) have partnered with the Foundation and reduced tariffs to make their services affordable.

There is something that stakeholders can do for spectrum (the honourable judges, DoT, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, other agencies, operators, and independent experts): they can bring their expertise and discretion to bear for beneficial solutions. These may include short-term steps, like more 2.1 GHz to create a pan-India 3G network instead of the CDMA 19003 MHz, apart from exploring possibilities for more unlicensed bands, and other forms of spectrum sharing.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-shyam-ponappa-feb-14-2013-the-supreme-court-and-spectrum-management

The South African Telecommunications Sector: Poised for Change

radha — 2011-10-21T09:59:51Z

CIS in collaboration with the LINK Centre, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa and in association with different institutions across India is organizing a Lecture Tour on:
“The South African Telecommunications Sector: Poised for Change” By Sagie Chetty, Senior Manager, Eskom, South Africa.
It will be our pleasure to have you join us for the talks.

The Co-hosts, Dates and the Venues for the Talk are given below –

Co-Host: Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
Date: 19th October, 2009 at 3.30pm
Venue – IIT-M, Chennai

Co-Host: Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
Date: 20th October, 2009 at 4.00pm
Venue – IIT-B, Mumbai

Co-Host: International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore
Date: 23rd October, 2009 at 4.00pm
Venue – IIIT-B, Bangalore

Co-Host: Indira Gandhi National Open University, Delhi
Date: 26th October, 2009 at 3.00pm
Venue – IGNOU, Delhi

Co-Host: National Institute of Science Technology and Development Studies, Delhi
Date: 27th October, 2009 at 3.00pm
Venue – NISTADS, Delhi

Co-Host: CCMG - Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi
Date: 29th October, 2009 at 2.00pm
Venue – CCMG - Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

About the Speaker:

Sagie Chetty is a Senior Manager in Eskom, South Africa’s largest electricity utility. Sagie spent the first part of his career at Eskom as Information Manager in the Generation Division. In that time he was responsible for information systems strategy development and implementation. Some of the key projects he has been involved in are the implementation of SAP Plant Maintenance, Business Intelligence systems and other bespoke Information Systems for Generation Power Stations.

Abstract of the Lecture: The South African Telecommunications Sector: Poised for Change

With a gross domestic product of over $506 billion (PPP, 2008) South Africa is one of the leading economies on the African continent. Only Nigeria with a GDP of $328 billion and Egypt with a GDP of $453 billion currently rival the South African economy. The economy is strong in manufacturing and agriculture, but is still based significantly on mining of gold, diamonds, platinum, coal and iron ore. Its main trading partner is the European Union. Bilateral trade with India amounts to $6, 2 billion (2008) with the balance of trade in South Africa’s favour to the value of about $1 billion.
Although one of the leading economies in Africa, South Africa’s Information and Communications (ICT) sector has not shown the concomitant level of development that reflects its economic position in Africa. ICT usage – telephony and Internet – has historically been low, and electronic transactions are utilised largely by business. There are a number of reasons for this; however the high cost of telecommunications is certainly a contributing factor. The high cost is attributed largely to policy and regulatory failure in the telecommunications sector. The sector is characterized by powerful incumbent telecoms operators that thwart competition and further entrench their dominant market positions. The consequence is that the high telecommunications costs impact access, affordability and the cost of doing business for the region.
Recent developments in the telecommunications sector, however could spell the end to high costs if policy and regulatory actions do not hinder competition. South African consumers can in the very near future look forward to lower telecommunications prices with the laying of new undersea cables, a new national backbone to compete with the existing one, new satellite ventures to provide the backhaul between cellular and broadband towers, a landmark court decision allowing value added network service providers (VANS) to build their own networks and the imminent entry of the incumbent telecommunications fixed line operator into the mobile arena. It is an opportune time for policy makers and regulators to take bold steps to free up the sector and open it up for true competition.
Lines that historically demarcated fixed, mobile, voice, data are blurring, causing shifts in market structures. However, currently the market is structured around the incumbent Telkom for fixed lines services and Vodacom and MTN for mobile services. A second PSTN, Neotel has been licensed but is only offering limited services. A third mobile operator, Cell C is operating but has yet to gain any significant market share.

The talk is open to all and there are no registration or entry fees.
Please let us know if you require any further details.

VIDEOS

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/events/lecture-tour-by-sagie-chetty

The Right Ring Tone

Shyam Ponappa — 2012-05-10T10:39:51Z

Focus on improving service quality with a strong partner, and not on one-shot stake sales, says Shyam Ponappa in his article published in the Business Standard on April 1, 2010.

Just five years ago, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL) was India’s second most profitable company, with net profit of nearly Rs 6,000 crore — nearly equal to Hindustan Unilever’s revenues — with over Rs 36,000 crore in revenues. By March 31, 2010, BSNL expects a big loss, while a competitor, Bharti, with revenues of only Rs 8,000 crore then, has caught up in revenues and is far more profitable. Mahaganar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL), too, is struggling to stay profitable.

While these public sector giants are in a graveyard spiral, they still have valuable assets in their reach and their networks of hundreds of thousands of kilometres. They also have a corps of technical professionals, with unmet user needs burgeoning in cities, towns, and all over India’s hinterland.

How can BSNL/MTNL be extricated from their predicament, and built up to become more like a State Bank of India, instead of a moribund Air India and the once-dominant Indian Airlines? Consider the present and future possibilities.

The pertinent facts are:

The network and capacity are valuable assets for operations, provided services are rationalised and extended in commercially sound ways.
Neither BSNL nor MTNL has been able to successfully capitalise on its headstart in WiMAX and 3G.
Given present trends, both will run up mounting losses.

All management and employees, including the Indian Telecom Service (ITS) officers, will have to engage in radical changes voluntarily. This is why all stakeholders, including the government, have to seek collaborative solutions, to resolve anachronistic legacy situations that cannot continue on terms as fair as possible, including a VRS, and possibly pay cuts for deferred profit-sharing. The alternative is losing a strategic backbone network-operating capability, something India needs, with the associated hardship for so many employees.

Dire prospects

The outlook for both BSNL and MTNL shows in their performance (Figures 1 and 2).

For BSNL and MTNL, increased employee costs after the Pay Commission recommendations, together with declining fixed-line revenues, led to deteriorating profits. Meanwhile, years of stalled procurement, decreasing earnings and a recommendation to divest 30 per cent have all led to a stand-off at BSNL, with a threatened strike. Whether in public or private sector, there have to be good services with good profits; otherwise, competitors will devour them.

Doing the unthinkable

Are there ways out? Can these investments in equipment and people be resuscitated by some miracle of management and IT engineering to be at the heart of the country’s expanding communications services? Can their personnel pull together?

That magic could come about if individuals and interest groups rise above themselves, avoiding opportunistic self-enrichment, and approach problems collaboratively instead of antagonistically, and if the government can abjure misguided fiscal zeal.

Instead of divesting a stake as a one-shot, revenue-raising deal, induct a strong partner to build services and revenues.
Serve user needs, instead of offering “products” with some internal geographic or technological definitions that are not easily understood.
Rationalise services like EVDO cards (broadband data cards) that are not customer-centric, because if they work in the rest of the country, they don’t in Delhi and Mumbai, and vice versa.
BSNL and MTNL could go for collaborative data-streaming with 2.4 Mbps EVDO cards usable everywhere, offered with a service level and style that can only come with a hands-on partner changing the off-putting way BSNL and MTNL treat customers.
Get politicians out of procurement, and induct technology like wireless corDECT at 512 Kbps for rural areas if appropriate, even if it is “old” and not state-of-the-art, instead of waiting for years for alternatives that aren’t there of 3G or LTE (Long-Term Evolution or 4G), and will cost much more.
Move up to 3G/LTE after some years of generating profits.
Work with India’s technology companies to build local equivalents of Huwaei and ZTE, with India’s assured markets. (This requires policies far beyond the ambit of the DOT, as in the way China has nurtured Huawei/ZTE for years.)

Put the whole package together, end-to-end, and BSNL/MTNL could be winners, as would the public.* Private operators will face competition if this happens, but they can gain from the rise in business levels. These are big issues for immediate consideration and action. Such challenges are best addressed collaboratively.

Although collaboration seems far removed, notable exceptions like Amul, Operation Flood, the Sirmour farmers’ cooperatives for irrigation, SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association) and Infosys prove that it is feasible.

Problem-solving vs confrontation and attrition

Thinking and acting in our collective interests require making hard choices after cost-benefit analyses. From this perspective, we should address BSNL and MTNL from an assessment of India’s needs and available alternatives, rather than only as a historical mess. True, the mess has to be dealt with, but with forward-looking considerations of public benefits for the common good. Employees need to recognise this, juxtaposed with the consequences of unyielding self-interest. We need problem-solving, not battles of attrition from hardened, silo positions of unions, government, and management, or ITS versus the rest, or any entrenched interest group. These legacy positions are “dug in”, and perpetual confrontation leads to desecration: of service capability, of competitive staying power, productivity and of sheer employability. There is so much more they could do for a potential one billion users.

It isn’t that self-improvement is not being attempted, like the Sanchar Nigam Executives Association (SNEA) addressing processes such as Call Detail Record (CDR) systems for customer care and billing, or Managed Services and Managed Capacity, Bharti’s innovations in outsourcing not only development and maintenance, but even procurement to Ericsson, as recommended by the Pitroda committee.** The change that is required is for all groups to pull together, however simplistic it may sound. Then, these national assets — the networks and human resources — can be leveraged to compete effectively with private operators.

Read the original article in Business Standard

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/ring-tone