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Revamp Telecom Sector & Revive The Economy
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-september-8-2017-revamp-telecom-sector-and-revive-the-economy
<b>Share infrastructure and spectrum, and adopt revenue-sharing for growth. There’s little doubt our economy is facing a slough of problems, including misdirection and loss of momentum. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Op-ed was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/revamp-telecom-sector-revive-the-economy-117090700011_1.html">published in the Business Standard</a> on September 7, 2017 and <a class="external-link" href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2017/09/">re-posted in Organizing India Blogspot</a> the following day.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Apart from the present government’s doings or omissions, other legacies have also contributed to this, such as the complacency of previous governments, the scams, the obduracy of the then Opposition, resulting in the attrition of parliamentary processes, and so on. This, followed by the persistently divisive approach of the incumbent government has effectively scuppered any possibility of convergent societal efforts. There’s no point attributing blame for the purposes of redeeming the situation. Instead, we must try to pick up the pieces.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some things need doing, and urgently, but we (and especially our governments) seem to be avoiding them. Basic infrastructure is our most urgent need, apart from unifying leadership and social institutions. Certain systemic bases simply must be built and made available to organise and channel energies into constructive, productive activities and well-being, although it will be time-consuming and far from easy on our continental scale.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In infrastructure, broadband can yield the quickest and highest rewards (e.g., <i><a href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2010/10/broadband-for-education-training.html">http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2010/10/broadband-for-education-training.html</a></i>) by adopting policies that enable responsible access to existing resources, instead of continuing with self-imposed administrative restrictions. Everything else — energy, water and sewerage, and transportation — is more complex, and needs far more capital investment and organisation. What’s more, with good communications support, other infrastructure becomes easier to build and manage. On the face of it, the government seems to be addressing this. For example, an Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG) was formed three months ago to recommend solutions for the debt-laden telecom<a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=telecom" target="_blank"> </a>sector. Interim reports did not augur well, though, suggesting there was no need for major policy changes because of signs of recovery. Unfortunately, the IMG’s final recommendations are on the same lines: Deferring spectrum and licence fee payments from 10 years to 16 years, and reducing interest charges by about 2 per cent. However, there is no reduction in licence fees or spectrum charges nor easing of spectrum limits on consolidation; interconnection charges will be decided by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, and spectrum auctions will be after April 2018. But for an overleveraged, hypercompetitive sector, deferring the massive capital requirements for auctions by some months and other proposed measures doesn’t really change the game.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Will this enable the telecom sector to recover? Many operators and observers think not, including yours truly. The reasons below leave one wondering whether the IMG made their recommendations with full knowledge, or were not fully cognizant of the realities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Why major changes are necessary </b> <b><br /></b> There are compelling reasons for radical policy interventions. A report by Strategy& (formerly Booz and Company, now part of PwC) suggests that telecom operators in developing countries have negative margins on data services (<i>see chart</i>). <br /> Source: <a href="https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/connecting-the-world-media-report">https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/connecting-the-world-media-report</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is significant for India (<b>a</b>) because we need considerable growth in networks and delivery, (<b>b</b>) that is affordable, (<b>c</b>) yet sustainable, i.e., generates positive cash flows.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The reality is that the already troubled sector’s revenues fell steeply after Reliance Jio’s entry in 2016, and so did government revenues from licence and spectrum charges. Yet, having upended the sector’s finances, Jio paid only Rs 47.81 crore as licence fees and spectrum charges for the six months ending June 2017, or less than 1 per cent of total operator payments, since it had minimal revenues. By contrast, Bharti Airtel paid Rs 2,902.75 crore, Vodafone Rs 2,005.25 crore, and Idea Cellular Rs 1,677.67 crore. The sector is being severely weakened by this strategy as revenues and government collections collapse, resulting in deficient infrastructure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While high government revenues alone are the wrong criterion for telecom<a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=telecom" target="_blank"> </a>policies, this shows how the sector’s finances were gutted, and the likely reality going forward. A recent report by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) expects revenues to fall up to 10 per cent for the year, with the sector settling down over 12-24 months. But that is merely one surmise; the certainty is of continuing damage to the market’s ability to sustain itself, as well as the reality of reduced operating revenues and government collections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These disruptive practices are hollowing out industry capacity, whereas the country’s need is for more capacity to be built for broader and better access, given under 300 million data subscribers. Adequate network access needs to be built up in underserved areas, and appropriate content and linkages have to be built for the full range of user needs covering education, health, and entertainment through government and commercial services. <br /> Only the government can develop appropriate policies and regulations, including levying no more than reasonable charges (high government charges have constrained India’s communications development). After the sector stalled in 1997-98, there was a partial remedy by the National Democratic Alliance through NTP-99, substituting a revenue-sharing arrangement for fees owed through auctions. The government’s share was initially too high, but as it was gradually reduced and as competition increased, mobile telephony grew explosively, as did government revenues (<i>see: <a href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2017/04/facts-not-beliefs-should-drive-policies.html">http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2017/04/facts-not-beliefs-should-drive-policies.html</a></i>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For a similar explosive surge in broadband economic revival, we need policy decisions urgently that: <b><br /></b> <b>a</b>) Adopt infrastructure sharing fully to reduce costs. Do this through two or three consortiums to have competition, with government entities anchoring each. For instance, 70 per cent of Sweden is covered by a shared network between Telenor and Hi3G, which is shared outside the major cities. For shared networks, equipment is readily available to support multiple operators; we need the enabling policies. <br /> <b>b</b>) Approach spectrum as a shared public resource. For assigned spectrum, allow licensed operators and manufacturers/developers secondary access (primary holder retains priority), at reasonable revenue-sharing charges, without up-front fees. Start with unused or under-used frequencies such as TV White Space. <br /> <b>c</b>) Allocate spectrum for Wi-Fi conforming to global standards to benefit from ecosystems, e.g., 5 GHz and 60 GHz. <br /> This will enable maximum utilisation of spectrum and networks for the common good, instead of artificially restricting access as is the practice today. We will all benefit greatly from better networks and services, and government revenues will exceed any conceivable auction fees.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Shyam (no-space) Ponappa at gmail dot com</i></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-september-8-2017-revamp-telecom-sector-and-revive-the-economy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-september-8-2017-revamp-telecom-sector-and-revive-the-economy</a>
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No publisherShyam PonappaTelecom2017-10-11T02:53:51ZBlog EntryResponse to TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top (OTT) Services
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) sent a joint response to the TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-top (OTT) Services with scholars from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The response was sent on March 27, 2015.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Executive Summary</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The principle objective of net neutrality is that “all the Internet traffic has to be treated equally without any discrimination”; but this has had different interpretations over varied contexts. While the discourse in India has often treated net neutrality as a singular policy construct, we break down net neutrality to its various components. We then individually contextualise each component to the unique characteristics of the Indian telecommunications industry such as dependence on wireless internet access, the fragmented and non-contiguous distribution of spectrum, high competition between TEL-SPs and low digital literacy. The evolving nature of markets and networks are also considered while taking into account various public policy perspectives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this submission, we also argue for the need to introduce reasonable regulatory parity between functionally equivalent communications services provided by OTT-SPs and TEL-SPs. We compare the regulations for OTT-SPs under the Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended) with the regulations for TEL-SPs under the Telegraph Act 1885 (as amended), the license agreements (UL, UASL, ISP-L) and TRAI Regulations. Based on an analysis of the current laws and regulations, we suggest how TRAI needs to intervene to create this regulatory parity (for example in areas such as privacy, spam/UCC, interception etc.).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Through the above analysis, we recommend an overall regulatory framework that should be adopted by the Government. The framework takes a nuanced approach to various components of net neutrality, contextualised to India, and also attempts to bring reasonable regulatory parity. Instead of compartmentalising TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs as two distinct actors, the recommended framework considers a two-layered approach which recognises that there is an overlap between TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs. The first layer comprises of network and infrastructure (collectively called the network layer) and the second layer comprises of services and applications (collectively called the service layer).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The framework further divides the service layer into “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. The concept of “Specialised Services”, which is borrowed from the European Union, refers to traditional services that have migrated to an IP architecture such as facilities-based VoIP calls to PSTN and IPTV, and are either logically distinct from the Internet or have special needs which the “best efforts” delivery of the general Internet cannot satisfy. This concept helps in applying different evaluation criteria to functionally equivalent “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. In the framework, “Specialised Services” are also recognised as an exception to net neutrality. The concept of “Specialised Services” also helps to create an incentive for continued investment in underlying infrastructure by TEL-SPs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This framework has helped us to bring a more balanced approach from the perspective of both TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs, while also taking into account technological convergence. It has also helped us to bring a more nuanced approach to various issues comprising net neutrality such as zero rating, paid prioritisation etc. We have considered best practices from different international regimes and the pros and cons during implementation in order to determine the exceptions and boundaries of net neutrality that should be adopted in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/trai-response-paper.pdf" class="internal-link">Download the full text of the Response</a></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services</a>
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No publisherpraneshTelecomFeatured2015-05-09T11:27:15ZBlog EntryResponse to TRAI Consultation Paper on Broadband Connectivity and Speed
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-broadband-connectivity-and-speed
<b>CIS comments on Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s Consultation Paper on Roadmap to Promote Broadband Connectivity and Enhanced Broadband Speed</b>
<p id="docs-internal-guid-0fc8ed5b-7fff-6775-3415-d08d4d378b68" dir="ltr">This submission presents a response by individuals working at the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India’s Consultation Paper on Roadmap to Promote Broadband Connectivity and Enhanced Broadband Speed (hereinafter, the “TRAI Consultation Paper”) released on 20 August, 2020 for comments.</p>
<p dir="ltr">CIS appreciates the continual efforts of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to have consultations, and is grateful for the opportunity to put forth its views and comments.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Read the response <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/telecom/cis-trai-consultation-response-broadband">here</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-broadband-connectivity-and-speed'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-broadband-connectivity-and-speed</a>
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No publisherShyam PonappaBroadbandTelecomTRAI2020-12-20T08:43:20ZBlog EntryResponse to TRAI Consultation paper No. 6/2009
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper
<b>CIS Distinguished Fellow, Shyam Ponappa, provides a detailed response to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India's Consultation paper No. 6/2009 "Overall Spectrum Management and review of license terms and conditions". Shyam Ponappa is suggesting that, the TRAI approach the telecom policy in a manner which will facilitate greater user access and, more generally, be designed to serve the public interest in the long-term. </b>
<p>Shyam Ponappa November 12, 2009<br />Distinguished Fellow<br />Centre for Internet & Society<br />Bangalore/New Delhi<br />cis-india.org</p>
<p><a href="mailto:shyamponappa@gmail.com">shyamponappa@gmail.com</a></p>
<p>Telecom Regulatory Authority of India<br />Attn: Sh. Sudhir Gupta, Advisor (MN)<br />Mahanagar Doorsanchar Bhawan<br />Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, New Delhi-110 002<br />Tel. No.011-23220018 , Fax No.011-23212014</p>
<p>E-mail : <a href="mailto:advmn@trai.gov.in">advmn@trai.gov.in</a> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><u><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/TRAI%20CP%20Response-Nov%2012%202009.pdf" class="internal-link" title="TRAI response">TRAI Consultation paper No. 6/2009- October 16, 2009</a></u></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><u>"Overall Spectrum Management and review of license terms and conditions"</u></h2>
<p><br />Sir,</p>
<p>It would help to have a logical framework that defines overall objectives, prioritizes issues, and structures and organizes issues and questions. This would facilitate analysis and response, as we have attempted below.</p>
<p>We begin by responding to Question 57 as a preamble to all the questions:</p>
<p>57. What in your opinion is the desired structure for efficient management of spectrum?<br />[This question addresses only one of two essential criteria, efficiency. The other criterion is effectiveness; both need equal emphasis.]</p>
<p>Please see separate attachment for answers to Questions 1-56.</p>
<h3>Status</h3>
<p>Currently, communications services in India comprising Internet, voice and SMS have the following attributes:</p>
<ol start="1"><li>Low broadband usage, with relatively high prices: eg, direct satellite TV subscriptions at Rs. 200/month, compared with 512 kbps Internet at Rs. 1,000/month.</li><li>Fragmented spectrum allocation for exclusive use by each operator in a service area.</li><li>Very high intensity of spectrum use by operators compared with international norms because of constrained availability.</li><li>Too many operators per service area (11-14 or more [15-16 with all potential operators with GSM and CDMA counted separately], versus the global average of 4-5).</li></ol>
<p>[For details on (2), (3) and (4), please see: 'An assessment of spectrum management policy in India', David Lewin, Val Jervis, Chris Davis, Ken Pearson, Plum Consulting, December 2008<br /><a href="http://www.plumconsulting.co.uk/pdfs/GSMA%20spectrum%20management%20policy%20in%20India.pdf"><u>http://www.plumconsulting.co.uk/pdfs/GSMA%20spectrum%20management%20policy%20in%20India.pdf</u></a>]</p>
<h3>Needs</h3>
<p> Our needs are:</p>
<ul><li>good services for Internet, voice and SMS,</li><li>at reasonable prices, eg, comparable pricing for TV and broadband,</li><li>accessible from/to most households across the country.</li></ul>
<p>The need is especially great in rural areas, as broadband can be the medium for delivery of essential services like education (from basic to advanced to vocational training and Continuing Education at all levels, including high-level professional CE), health (again, from basic diagnostics and monitoring at home, to advanced care at adequately equipped centres), and security and law-and-order services at significantly higher levels than is possible without excellent communications infrastructure.</p>
<p>In view of the above, we suggest that the Government of India consider adopting the following policy goals in the public interest ( and therefore, that where appropriate, the TRAI set these objectives/make appropriate recommendations to the GOI).</p>
<h3>Suggested Policy Goals/Objectives [based on needs]</h3>
<ol start="1"><li>Adopt the criteria of long-term net benefits in the public interest for decisions, eschewing short-term cash collections from auctions and fees.</li><li>An approach to policies for telecommunications services (not for broadcasting) that limits the number of operators per service area in line with international experience, because of the economics of networks.<br />[This implies an explicit reversal of prior policies to maximize competition, and requires allowing for consolidation through mergers and acquisitions.]</li><li>Access to broadband (to be defined as at least 512 kbps in keeping with international norms) at all feasible locations in the country for all users.</li><li>Develop incentives and penalties favouring good rural service provision, with the emphasis on broadband: an Administered Incentive Pricing mechanism.</li><li>Explore ways to structure policies to reduce costs/maximize utility through facilities and resource sharing, so that prices can be reduced while maintaining good scope for investment from growth and profits.<br /><br />This implies two areas of exploration:<br />a) Shared use of facilities and equipment/networks;<br />b) Shared use of spectrum.<br /><br />(i) This is best done by collaborative consultations between experts (from the GOI, private sector and academia), operators, equipment providers, and government. Without the requisite interdisciplinary skills combined with operating expertise and investment capability, the effort is too complex for an iterative, serial consultation process.<br />(ii) Even within the GOI, this requires interdisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional convergence, both to develop solutions as well as to implement them.<br />(iii) This also needs GOI initiatives to invite companies like Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola and Qualcomm as well as Google and Intel, possibly cable companies like Liberty Global, and electricity companies that deliver Internet through their networks.<br />(iv) The GOI also needs to depute experienced representatives from various ministries and departments including the WPC, the Defence Services, and specialist agencies such as the DRDO/NTRO.<br />[Please see ‘Managing Spectrum’ in the <em>Business Standard</em> November 5, 2009, and related references: <a href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2009/11/managing-spectrum.html"><u>http://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2009/11/managing-spectrum.html</u></a>]</li><li>Monitor operations online and intervene actively where revenues (the totality of rates/tariffs) are far above total costs, i.e., profits are unreasonable. This is a necessary adjunct to accepting a monopolistic/oligopolistic market structures.</li></ol>
<h3>Suggested Approach</h3>
<p>The use of a decision tree as in the ‘Issue Map for Spectrum & Broadband’ below (please see Exhibit) facilitates a logical sequence and prioritization in exploring alternatives. (Please note that this is for broadband, voice and SMS, and not for broadcasting.) A similar exploration process for networks and facilities (sharing versus exclusive use for delivery) could follow. However, stakeholders should be free to use any analytical process to improve on this in the common interest.</p>
<p>Once decisions are taken on these two issues (spectrum and network/ facilities sharing), other issues like pricing and consolidation can be logically addressed based on these decisions, probably within the scope of existing laws and regulations.</p>
<p>New regulations or laws should be considered only after comprehensive analysis on the lines of Project LARGE (Legal Adjustments and Reforms for Globalising the Economy by Sh. Bibek Debroy).</p>
<p align="center"> <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/TRAI%20consultation.jpg" class="internal-link" title="TRAI">Exhibit: Issue Map on Spectrum & Broadband </a></p>
<p align="center"><img class="image-inline image-inline" src="../../igov/others/uploads/copy_of_shayamzoom.jpg/image_preview" alt="Issue Map on Spectrum & Broadband" height="251" width="400" /></p>
<p> </p>
<p>Shyam Ponappa<br />Centre for Internet & Society<br />cis-india.org</p>
<p><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/TRAI%20CP-Q%201-57-Nov%2012%202009.pdf" class="internal-link" title="TRAI - consultation Q 1- 57">Attachment – Question 1-57</a></p>
<p><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/TRAI%20CP%20Response-Nov%2012%202009.pdf" class="internal-link" title="TRAI response">TRAI Consultation paper</a> No. 6/2009 – October 16, 2009</p>
<p>Overall Spectrum Management and review of license terms and conditions</p>
<p align="left"><strong>Chapter 1<br /></strong><strong>Spectrum requirement and availability</strong></p>
<ol type="1" start="1"><li>Do you agree with the subscriber base projections? If not, please provide the reasons for disagreement and your projection estimates along with their basis?<br /><strong>Do not disagree.</strong></li><li>Do you agree with the spectrum requirement projected in ¶ 1.7 to ¶1.12? Please give your assessment (service-area wise).<br /><strong>Agree if exclusive bands of spectrum are used by different operators, and the spectrum requirement is linked to subscribers. Disagree if common use of spectrum is adopted. Please see preamble (reply to Question 57) for details of shared/pooled spectrum approach.</strong></li><li>How can the spectrum required for Telecommunication purposes and currently available with the Government agencies be re-farmed?<br /><strong>(a) By rationalizing usage, as advocated in the preamble for commercial operators, by pooling spectrum for common use where possible.<br />(b) By inducting equipment that allows more efficient usage and usage of other bands.</strong></li><li>In view of the policy of technology and service neutrality licences, should any restriction be placed on these bands (800,900 and 1800 MHz) for providing a specific service and secondly, after the expiry of present licences, how will the spectrum in the 800/900 MHz band be assigned to the operators?<br /><strong>(a) Please see suggestions on shared/pooled spectrum as above.<br />(b) In the event that common use of spectrum is infeasible/not accepted by the Government of India, and exclusive bands of spectrum are assigned to operators as is the practice now, work out ways to consolidate fragmented bands (other than through M&A) for operators, to enable operators to hold contiguous bands for greater efficiency, and explore shared use of pooled spectrum.</strong></li><li>How and when should spectrum in 700 MHz band be allocated between competitive services?<br /><strong>Preferred method: for common use (can be pooled or shared even if assigned for exclusive use, immediately).</strong></li><li>
<p align="left">What is the impact of digital dividend on 3G and BWA?<br /><strong>Should extend its reach and access because of lower costs.<br /></strong><br /><strong>Chapter 2<br />Licensing Issues</strong></p>
</li><li>Should the spectrum be delinked from the UAS Licence? Please provide the reasons for your response.<br /><strong>If spectrum is treated as a common resource, the logical requirement is for a linkage that is not dependent on ownership, but to access for service delivery, i.e., common access.</strong></li><li>In case it is decided not to delink spectrum from UAS license, then should there be a limit on minimum and maximum number of access service providers in a service area? If yes, what should be the number of operators?<br /><strong>Follow global practice: do not exceed five operators in any service area unless there are compelling reasons to do so.</strong></li><li>What should be the considerations to determine maximum spectrum per entity?<br /><strong>Minimum contiguous band for effective rollout and efficient delivery, i.e., inexpensive capital outlay for equipment and towers/network while maintaining Quality of Service.</strong></li><li>Is there a need to put a limit on the maximum spectrum one licensee can hold? If yes, then what should be the limit? Should operators having more than the maximum limit, if determined, be assigned any more spectrum?<br /><strong>This depends on the overall approach to spectrum management, i.e., common use, or exclusive use. The logic for a limit is effective delivery capability at ‘normal’ cost. There is no logic for assigning more than this. However, if spectrum is for common/shared use, the only criterion is throughput/capacity.</strong></li><li>If an existing licensee has more spectrum than the specified limit, then how should this spectrum be treated? Should such spectrum be taken back or should it be subjected to higher charging regime?<br /><strong>As in No. 10. If common/shared spectrum use is adopted, there needs to be a transition worked out, as in the transition to revenue sharing.</strong></li><li>In the event fresh licences are to be granted, what should be the Entry fee for the license?<br /><strong>The principles followed should be:<br />(a) Low license fees to minimize access costs.<br />(b) Provided licenses are delinked from spectrum and few in number, there need to be strict rollout requirements.<br />(c) Incentives for broadband and rural coverage in the form of a structured Administrative Incentive Pricing mechanism.<br />(d) Penalties for failure.</strong></li><li>In case it is decided that the spectrum is to be delinked from the license then what should be the entry fee for such a Licence and should there be any roll out condition?<br /><strong>As in No. 12.</strong></li><li>Is there a need to do spectrum audit? If it is found in the audit that an operator is not using the spectrum efficiently what is the suggested course of action? Can penalties be imposed?<br /><strong>(a) Operating attributes should be monitored online on a continuous basis.<br />(b) Spectrum use probably needs to be monitored as an operating attribute.<br />(c) Penalties and incentives are needed, including forfeiture for continued transgression.</strong></li><li>Can spectrum be assigned based on metro, urban and rural areas separately? If yes, what issues do you foresee in this method?<br /><strong>This needs to be considered only if common/pooled usage is decided against. With common use or sufficiently large blocks/bands of spectrum, no problems are likely to arise.</strong></li><li>Since the amount of spectrum and the investment required for its utilisation in metro and large cities is higher than in rural areas, can asymmetric pricing of telecom services be a feasible proposition?<br /><strong>Yes. <br /><br />M&A issues</strong><br /><strong>If the common/shared use approach is adopted, M&A can be under existing laws and regulations.</strong></li><li>Whether the existing licence conditions and guidelines related to M&A restrict consolidation in the telecom sector? If yes, what should be the alternative framework for M&A in the telecom sector?</li><li>Whether lock-in clause in UASL agreement is a barrier to consolidation in telecom sector? If yes, what modifications may be considered in the clause to facilitate consolidation?</li><li>Whether market share in terms of subscriber base/AGR should continue to regulate M&A activity in addition to the restriction on spectrum holding?</li><li>Whether there should be a transfer charge on spectrum upon merger and acquisition? If yes, whether such charges should be same in case of M&A/transfer/sharing of spectrum?</li><li>Whether the transfer charges should be one-time only for first such M&A or should they be levied each time an M&A takes place?</li><li>Whether transfer charges should be levied on the lesser or higher of the 2G spectrum holdings of the merging entities?</li><li>Whether the spectrum held consequent upon M&A be subjected to a maximum limit?<br /><br /><strong>Spectrum Trading</strong></li><li>Is spectrum trading required to encourage spectrum consolidation and improve spectrum utilization efficiency?<br /><br /><strong>At present, trading is required to allow consolidation. However, if a comprehensive approach is taken to spectrum use, and especially if common use through common access is established, this set of problems will no longer exist after a transition period. Nor will there be any shortage of spectrum.</strong></li><li>Who all should be permitted to trade the spectrum ?<br /><strong>As in No. 24.</strong></li><li>Should the original allottee who has failed to fulfill “Roll out obligations” be allowed to do spectrum trading?<br /><strong>There should be penalties and forfeiture for failure to meet rollout obligations, and clawbacks as an interim measure during the transition.</strong></li><li>Should transfer charges be levied in case of spectrum trading?</li><li>What should be the parameters and methodology to determine first time spectrum transfer charges payable to Government for trading of the spectrum? How should these charges be determined year after year?</li><li>Should such capping be limited to 2G spectrum only or consider other bands of spectrum also? Give your suggestions with justification.<br /><br /><strong>This question assumes there is a difference in “2G spectrum” and other spectrum, which is incorrect. The difference is in equipment that has evolved in different phases along different bands. Spectrum should be treated as technology-neutral for the purposes of service delivery. Any service should be deliverable on any band, subject to interference limitations.</strong></li><li>Should size of minimum tradable block of spectrum be defined or left to the market forces?</li><li>Should the cost of spectrum trading be more than the spectrum assignment cost?<br /><br /><strong>Spectrum sharing<br /><br />These questions are addressed in the preamble in the cover note.</strong></li><li>Should Spectrum sharing be allowed? If yes, what should be the regulatory framework for allowing spectrum sharing among the service providers?</li><li>What should be criteria to permit spectrum sharing?</li><li>Should spectrum sharing charges be regulated? If yes then what parameters should be considered to derive spectrum sharing charges? Should such charges be prescribed per MHz or for total allocated spectrum to the entity in LSA?</li><li>Should there be any preconditions that rollout obligation be fulfilled by one or both service provider before allowing the sharing of spectrum?</li><li>In case of spectrum sharing, who will have the rollout obligations? Giver or receiver?<br /><br /><strong>Perpetuity of licences</strong></li><li>Should there be a time limit on licence or should it be perpetual?</li><li>What should be the validity period of assigned spectrum in case it is delinked from the licence? 20 years, as it exists, or any other period</li><li>What should be the validity period of spectrum if spectrum is allocated for a different technology under the same license midway during the life of the license?</li><li>If the spectrum assignment is for a defined period, then for what period and at what price should the extension of assigned spectrum be done?</li><li>If the spectrum assignment is for a defined period, then after the expiry of the period should the same holder/licensee be given the first priority?<br /><br /><strong>Uniform License Fee</strong></li><li>What are the advantages and disadvantages of a uniform license fee?</li><li>Whether there should be a uniform License Fee across all telecom licenses and service areas including services covered under registrations?</li><li>If introduced, what should be the rate of uniform License Fee?<br /><br /><strong>License fees should be treated as part of the overall scheme of Administered Incentive Pricing.<br /><br />Chapter 3<br />Spectrum assignment</strong></li><li>If the initial spectrum is de-linked from the licence, then what should be the method for subsequent assignment?<br /><strong>Please see comments on common/shared use in the preamble in the cover note.</strong></li><li>If the initial spectrum continues to be linked with licence then is there any need to change from SLC based assignment?<br /><strong>The SLC basis for spectrum assignment gives rise to many distortions and is not in line with international practices.</strong></li><li>In case a two-tier mechanism is adopted, then what should be the alternate method and the threshold beyond which it will be implemented?</li><li>Should the spectrum be assigned in tranches of 1 MHz for GSM technology? What is the optimum tranche for assignment?</li><li>In case a market based mechanism (i.e. auction) is decided to be adopted, would there be the issue of level playing field amongst licensees who have different amount of spectrum holding? How should this be addressed?</li><li>In case continuation of SLC criteria is considered appropriate then, what should be the subscriber numbers for assignment of additional spectrum?</li><li>In your opinion, what should be the method of assigning spectrum in bands other than 800, 900 and 1800 MHz for use other than commercial?<br /><br /><strong>Spectrum pricing</strong></li><li>Should the service providers having spectrum above the committed threshold be charged a one time charge for the additional spectrum?</li><li>In case it is decided to levy one time charge beyond a certain amount then what in your opinion should be the date from which the charge should be calculated and why?</li><li>On what basis, this upfront charge be decided? Should it be benchmarked to the auction price of 3G spectrum or some other benchmark?</li><li>Should the annual spectrum charges be uniform irrespective of quantum of spectrum and technology?</li><li>Should there be regular review of spectrum charges? If so, at what interval and what should be the methodology?<br /><br /><strong>Structure for spectrum management</strong></li><li>What in your opinion is the desired structure for efficient management of spectrum?<br /><br /><strong>Please see the preamble in the cover note.</strong></li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Shyam Ponappa<br />Centre for Internet & Society<br />cis-india.org</p>
<p>November 12, 2009</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-to-trai-consultation-paper</a>
</p>
No publisherradhaTelecomSubmissions2011-08-24T08:06:46ZBlog EntryResponse Submission on TRAI's Consultation Paper on Privacy, Security and Ownership of Data in Telecom Sector
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-submission-on-trais-consultation-paper-on-privacy-security-and-ownership-of-data-in-telecom-sector
<b>CIS submitted its comments on the consultation paper on privacy, security and ownership of data in telecom sector which was published by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India on August 9, 2017.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The submission is divided in four parts. The first part introduces the document, the second part gives an overview of CIS and its work, the third part contains general comments on the consultation paper and the fourth part contains specific comments on questions posed in the consultation paper. Click to read the <strong><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/telecom/files/submission-to-trai-november-6-2017">full submission</a></strong> made to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India on November 6, 2017.<br /><br /><br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-submission-on-trais-consultation-paper-on-privacy-security-and-ownership-of-data-in-telecom-sector'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/response-submission-on-trais-consultation-paper-on-privacy-security-and-ownership-of-data-in-telecom-sector</a>
</p>
No publisherAmber Sinha, Elonnai Hickok and Udbhav TiwariTelecomData ProtectionData ManagementPrivacy2019-03-13T00:27:30ZBlog EntryReport on the 3rd IJLT-CIS Lecture Series on Telecom Laws and Regulation
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/ijlt-cis-lecture-series-on-telecom-laws
<b>Mr. Samarajiva, by his own admission, is a ‘jack of all trades’. His breadth of regulatory and teaching experience is only matched by his ability to turn a potentially complex topic like ‘Tariff Regulation’ into a beautifully weaved story punctuated with generous doses of wit and humour.</b>
<h2>Lecture by Rohan Samarajiva<a name="fr1" href="#fn1">[1]</a></h2>
<h2><a name="fr1" href="#fn1"></a></h2>
<p>Mr. Samarajiva’s lecture was divided into two sessions. In the first session, he introduced the ICT policy and regulation think tank, LIRNEasia, which was founded by him and also described the various capacity-building measures that it regularly undertakes. He went on to discuss various aspects of the policy-making process with the participants, including how they could engage with the same. He also introduced the CPRSouth conference – a capacity building initiative to develop young ICT scholars in the Asia-Pacific region. With the 2013 edition of conference scheduled to take place in Mysore, Karnataka, Mr. Samarajiva invited <br />all present to participate and contribute towards making it a success. Towards the end of the session, Mr. Samarajiva also fielded questions from students on different aspects of engagement with the policy making process in areas of telecom, infrastructure and egovernance projects.</p>
<p>A short break for tea followed, during which students got the opportunity to interact with Mr.Samarajiva in a more informal setting. The range of topics discussed during the break stretched from nuclear power and its pitfalls to diverse aspects of intellectual property and environmental law.</p>
<p>The second session of Mr. Samarajiva’s lecture dealt with ‘Tariff Regulation in India and Abroad’. The lecture began with Mr. Samarajiva showing students some astonishing facts regarding levels of awareness about internet penetration into the lives of those living in the Asia-Pacific. The statistics showed fundamental misconceptions regarding the internet and a need for greater awareness programs to ensure knowledge-parity across different strata of society.</p>
<p>The discussion about ‘Tariff Regulation’ itself began with an introduction to the theory of regulation itself. Delving into his rich experience, Mr. Samarajiva spoke about the differing approaches to regulation that exists across the Asia-Pacific region. Citing examples from Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bhutan and India, he explained how a tariff regulator’s success is typically measured and remarked that the Indian regulator’s approach of forbearance has been linked to its low tariff rates - one of the cheapest mobile call and broadband rates in the world. In this regard, he stressed on the characteristics a regulator should seek to ensure the following attributes in a market: information symmetry, lack of barriers to entry/exit, the multiplicity of buyers and sellers, the presence of substitutable products and rational market players. Explaining how concentration of market power can lead to consumer exploitation, he proceeded to address the various regulatory tools used to ensure a more equitable distribution of market power. These include: rate of return regulation, price cap regulation and benchmark regulation.</p>
<p>Taking India’s situation specifically, Mr. Samarajiva showed students various statistics including data from the Nokia Total Cost of Ownership Study 2011, data concerning fixed and mobile broadband prices in South East Asia and South Asia as well the Tariff Regulation scores from the 2011 Telecom Policy and Regulatory Environment Survey. Furthermore, he introduced students to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) – a mathematical tool that serves as an indicator of prevailing levels of competition in a particular market. Using these inputs, he showed how the extremely high levels of circle-level as well as overall competition in the Indian telecom segment coupled with a policy of regulatory forbearance had ensured India’s mobile call and broadband rates were the one of the lowest in the region as well as the world. This, he posited, was the primary reason for the policy of forbearance being such a success in India. This peculiar market structure is also the reason why a similar approach might not work in every country that is similar demographically and location-wise.</p>
<p>Drawing upon his personal experience as a consultant on the regulatory policy for the Maldives, which has a duopoly in the telecom market, Mr. Samarajiva outlined the relevant factors in formation of a regulatory policy in such a market. The regulator should be interested in incentivising efficiency, while also keeping tariffs at a level that allows operators to make sufficient returns. The critical factor in the computation of tariffs is the cost incurred by the telecom company in providing these services. The ease of regulation and procuring licenses and approvals often proves to be a decisive factor, and a potential entry barrier to the market. After highlighting these issues, Mr. Samarajiva explained how the optimal solution for the regulator was to take a slightly hands-off approach and provide for a band, within which service providers would fix the tariff. This form of asymmetric regulation would serve the dual purposes of regulating unfair competition as well as protecting consumer interests. The benchmark for banded forbearance would be fixed on a comparison of the tariffs and market conditions. Mr. Samarajiva discussed the different relevant factors for setting the benchmark, including selection of mobile services basket and comparison with neighbouring countries, or demographic peers. For any tariff to be fixed outside the bounds of the band, approval would have to be taken from the regulator, and in the resulting inquiry the regulator would rely upon the commonly used economic indicators and justifications to determine if the same should be permitted.</p>
<p align="center"><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/class.jpg/image_preview" alt="ijlt-cis lecture" class="image-inline image-inline" title="ijlt-cis lecture" /></p>
<p>With the vote of thanks, the inaugural lecture of the 3rd IJLT-CIS Lecture Series 2012 on Telecom Law and Regulation in India drew to a close. The slide set used during the presentation may be accessed <a class="external-link" href="http://lirneasia.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Samarajiva_NLSI_May121.pdf">here</a>.</p>
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<p>[<a name="fn1" href="#fr1">1</a>].Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair and CEO of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across 12 emerging Asian economies. He has served in numerous roles including as the Director General of Telecommunications in Sri Lanka (1998-99), a founder director of the ICT Agency of Sri Lanka (2003-05), Honorary Professor at the University of Moratuwa in Sri Lanka (2003-04), Visiting Professor of Economics of Infrastructures at the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands (2000-03) and Associate Professor of Communication and Public Policy at the Ohio State University in the US (1987-2000). Samarajiva was Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Post and Telecom in Bangladesh (2007-09).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/ijlt-cis-lecture-series-on-telecom-laws'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/ijlt-cis-lecture-series-on-telecom-laws</a>
</p>
No publisherRohan SamarajivaTelecom2012-06-05T09:30:11ZBlog EntryRegulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality
<b>In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.</b>
<p>With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). <i>I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.</i></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". <a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. <a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.</p>
<h1><a name="h.49zh04wwxm9l"></a> <b>1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector? </b></h1>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; <a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.</p>
<h1 style="text-align: justify; "><a name="h.psqblglrgt68"></a> <b>2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?</b></h1>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "<b>gatekeepers</b>" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.</p>
<p>This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.</p>
<p>Thus, <b> net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic. </b></p>
<h1><a name="h.79auvw7dxb9s"></a> <b>3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?</b></h1>
<h2><a name="h.288fq19cym4p"></a> 3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?</h2>
<p>Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:</p>
<p>1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.</p>
<p>2. Harm to effective competition</p>
<p>a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.</p>
<p>b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.</p>
<p>c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.</p>
<p>3. Harm to consumers</p>
<p>a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.</p>
<p>b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.</p>
<p>4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)</p>
<p>a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques </b> . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.</p>
<h3><a name="h.y84hsu73ibky"></a> 3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. in<i>Bennett Coleman v. Union of India</i><a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a><i> </i>and of the majority <i>Sakal Papers v. Union of India</i><a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> which rejected the approach.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. <a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a></p>
<h2><a name="h.yjyiwnikxizu"></a> 3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:</p>
<p>● last-mile market</p>
<p>○ switching costs between equivalent service providers</p>
<p>○ availability of an open-access last-mile</p>
<p>○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP</p>
<p>○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.</p>
<p>● interconnection market</p>
<p>○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges</p>
<p>○ availability of low-cost transit</p>
<p>● technology and available bandwidth</p>
<p>○ spectrum efficiency</p>
<p>○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth</p>
<p>● conflicting interests of ISPs</p>
<p>○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)</p>
<h2><a name="h.1yozvmhaur7z"></a> 3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.</p>
<h3><a name="h.smm9g46xsi3q"></a> 3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● <b>Contractual or transactional lock-in</b>. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● <b>Number of competitors</b>. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● <b>Interconnection and mandatory carriage</b>. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. <a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that <b> no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence <i>all</i> negative discrimination should be prohibited. </b> This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of <i>transit charges</i> (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● <b>Number Portability</b>. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. <a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a> While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● <b>Multi-SIM phones</b>. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by <i>n</i> telecom players every subscriber had a phone with <i>n </i>SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a>), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). <a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><sup>[18]</sup></sup></a> Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><sup>[19]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "<b>gatekeeper effect</b>", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that <b> <i> despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs. </i> </b></p>
<h3><a name="h.glaa2bev2dhk"></a> 3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, <a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><sup>[20]</sup></sup></a> or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the <b>principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers</b>. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, <b> we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance </b> . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1153878/">section 3 of the Competition Act</a>. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).</p>
<h3><a name="h.yd0ptbr561l8"></a> 3.3.3 Zero-rating</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The <b> zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer </b> . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." <b> Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") </b> . <b> Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized </b> .</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation. </b></p>
<h4><a name="h.3j3bch9mpwr2"></a> 3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating</h4>
<h5><a name="h.pxa0ovwqncfy"></a> 3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the <i>search and discovery costs</i> of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="h.gzz6numa7y24"></a> In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.</p>
<h5><a name="h.2xvaoc7t0zmu"></a> 3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. <a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><sup>[21]</sup></sup></a> However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><sup>[22]</sup></sup></a> or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. <a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><sup>[23]</sup></sup></a> These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="h.fpfvyrxp6pif"></a> This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.</p>
<h5><a name="h.uc9je2dcrwpx"></a> 3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.</p>
<p>For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, <b>there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit</b>. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.</p>
<h5><a name="h.f0rfoerqprro"></a> 3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><sup>[24]</sup></sup></a> This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. <a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup><sup>[25]</sup></sup></a> However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, <i>should not</i> be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.</p>
<h5><a name="h.pyn97x5b6nfq"></a> 3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. <b> These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field </b> . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.</p>
<h5><a name="h.huy1gfie05he"></a> 3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup><sup>[26]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':</p>
<p>○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.</p>
<p>○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup><sup>[27]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>● Zero-rating of all Web traffic</p>
<p>○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements</p>
<p>○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser</p>
<p>○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.</p>
<h4><a name="h.ncpm1d9hru2b"></a> 3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:</p>
<p>1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup><sup>[28]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. <a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup><sup>[29]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. <a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup><sup>[30]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p>4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup><sup>[31]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. <a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup><sup>[32]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.</p>
<p>7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.</p>
<p>8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.</p>
<p>9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.</p>
<p>10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.</p>
<h3><a name="h.f8vwrsnhu1fj"></a> 3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.</p>
<h1><a name="h.1ckcvcwez55d"></a> <b>3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles</b></h1>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.</p>
<p>● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:</p>
<p>○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and</p>
<p>○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and</p>
<p>○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup><sup>[33]</sup></sup></a>, and</p>
<p>○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.</p>
<p>● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that</p>
<p>○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and</p>
<p>○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or</p>
<p>○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.</p>
<p>These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either <i>suo motu</i> or upon complaint by customers.</p>
<div>
<hr />
<div id="ftn1">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> Report of the <i>Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, </i>(19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> IAMAI, <i>India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, </i>(19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> World Economic Forum, <i>The Global Information Technology Report 2015, </i>http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> <i>See</i> R.U.S. Prasad, <i>The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India</i> (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> 1973 AIR 106</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> 1962 AIR 305</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, <i>How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? </i>http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, <i>The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality</i>, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See <a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html"> http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html </a> . Accessed on April 24, 2015.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a> See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a> Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a> The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><sup>[18]</sup></sup></a> <i>TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, </i> REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><sup>[19]</sup></sup></a> An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><sup>[20]</sup></sup></a> Aparna Ghosh, <i>Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, </i>LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><sup>[21]</sup></sup></a> Mike Masnick, <i>Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't</i>, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><sup>[22]</sup></sup></a> Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><sup>[23]</sup></sup></a> Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, <i>South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks</i>, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><sup>[24]</sup></sup></a> DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><sup><sup>[25]</sup></sup></a> The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><sup><sup>[26]</sup></sup></a> These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p align="left"><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><sup><sup>[27]</sup></sup></a> This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: <a href="http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/"> http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/ </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><sup><sup>[28]</sup></sup></a> Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><sup><sup>[29]</sup></sup></a> Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><sup><sup>[30]</sup></sup></a> Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><sup><sup>[31]</sup></sup></a> Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><sup><sup>[32]</sup></sup></a> Example: Wikipedia Zero.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><sup><sup>[33]</sup></sup></a> A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshTelecomNet NeutralityInternet GovernanceICT2015-07-18T02:46:30ZBlog EntryRegrouping for Growth - Interest Rates - III
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-shyam-ponappa-september-6-2013-regrouping-for-growth
<b>Aside from muddling along, the choices are to try to grow and retain capital to staunch the gap temporarily, or to settle for low growth and capital flight.</b>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This article by Shyam Ponappa was originally published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-ponappa-regrouping-for-growth-113090401149_1.html">Business Standard</a> on September 4, 2013 and mirrored in <a class="external-link" href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2013/09/regrouping-for-growth-interest-rates-iii.html">Organizing India Blogspot</a> on September 6, 2013.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What are possible ameliorative steps for India's economy? Taking stock, are we overreacting to our economic woes? Second, do our problems have global origins? To the extent they are home-grown, what were the missteps? How can they be corrected?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The answers to the first and third (overreaction, policy errors) depend on whether one takes a "static" or "dynamic" view. Static views compare measures at points in time to arrive at an assessment of better or worse. Dynamic views, by contrast, emphasise system-wide flows and consequences, as in financial simulation models, with the focus on outcomes. The real question is whether we can grow sufficiently so that foreign and domestic funds cover imports and build manufacturing, or shrink and risk a deluge.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Risk assessment</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From a static perspective, the present situation is nowhere near the dangers of 1991. Flows, however, highlight the potential for danger of slow growth: a demographic bulge with high aspirations and low opportunities; and a large, low-skilled population. What's worse is that foreign investment-fuelled growth rode a wave of imports without sufficient development in direct manufacturing. This imbalance is heightened by the stoppage of iron ore exports and the slump in coal production because of mining scandals, aggravated by high coal and gold imports. The problems - in telecom, mining, aggressive environmentalism, retrograde tax impositions, inadequate manufacturing - are all self-generated except for oil prices and the Syrian crisis. They stem from abdication of governance, overreach, or greed, compounded by judicial and citizen backlash. Only the triggers are external - from capital flowing in to the signal of a cutback.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Policy missteps 1: Interest and profits</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The left side of the chart below shows interest expenses and profits for several thousand listed companies over the last four quarters. In terms of flows, higher interest rates curtailed demand as intended, so lower revenues and higher costs reduced profits - all while supply-constrained inflation continued.</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy2_of_c1.png" alt="chart" class="image-inline" title="chart" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above: chart depicting the rising interest and declining profit. Picture by <a class="external-link" href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2013/09/regrouping-for-growth-interest-rates-iii.html">Organizing India Blogspot</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some experts maintain that rate cuts won't affect growth, citing the lack of a clear correlation; or the insignificant share of interest in total costs (reportedly three per cent); or that rates drive savings or consumption, but not investment. Clear correlations are unavailable because credible research must cover all major variables and interrelationships; simplifying them can distort conclusions. The research must also include how the effects of changes vary for rising or falling, large or small economies at different stages of development. The other reasons appear to ignore aspects of flows like momentum and turbulence - or even the data. And aggregates and averages can be misleading, as detailed below.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Interest costs in 850 non-financial companies went up by 40 per cent as a share of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation over three years. While Ebitda roughly doubled, interest costs nearly tripled(<a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-25/news/34729789_1_inflation-control-potential-growth-rate-capital-formation">http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-25/news/34729789_1_inflation-control-potential-growth-rate-capital-formation</a>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Interest costs in 2,242 companies reportedly doubled from 2.3 per cent to 4.2 per cent of revenues over two years. Costs two years earlier were 16 per cent of Ebitda, whereas in the quarter ending December 2012, costs were 34 per cent of Ebitda. Analysts attributed this to low demand, and expect worse in 2013-14 unless demand improves (<a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-18/news/37160258_1_interest-outgo-rise-in-interest-expenses-interest-cost">http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-18/news/37160258_1_interest-outgo-rise-in-interest-expenses-interest-cost</a>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In July 2013, earnings of 85 out of 600 listed non-financial companies did not cover interest payments, up from 61 the year before; another 43 were at risk compared with 36 a year earlier, and non-performing loans were increasing (<a href="http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/debt-traps-india-inc-as-profits-fail-to-cover-interest-outgo/article4889184.ece">http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/debt-traps-india-inc-as-profits-fail-to-cover-interest-outgo/article4889184.ece</a>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Aggregate costs and averages sometimes conceal problems. Credit Suisse reports that the aggregate interest cover for 10 large, overleveraged industrial groups has dropped from 1.6 last year (borderline) to 1.4 (inadequate). For four of these groups, interest costs exceed profits. Rejoicing in the woes of "profligates" is inadvisable, however, because a collapse affects everyone.</span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Policy missteps 2: Sustainable profits and stability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Profits are essential for savings, investment, stability and order. This is why sustained profitability is of paramount importance for India. Provided industrial relations are harmonious and demand is resilient, that is, momentum is positive, lower interest costs within reason can sustain positive sentiment, resulting in higher profits up to a point (<span>see chart - right</span></span><span>). This has been a matter of incomprehension or denial for government (central and states), the Reserve Bank of India, the judiciary, and many citizens.</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Instead, we have populist handouts to capture treasuries, and irresponsibility in replenishing them. What started with cheap rice in the 1980s has degenerated into a free-for-all, promising a distribution from the treasury contingent on capturing it for aspirants, or recapturing it for incumbents: vote us in, and you'll get these spoils.</span></span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Plausible remedies</h3>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: disc; text-align: justify; "><span>Lower rates: A number of experts in India and abroad recommend a reversal of monetary tightening and reduced interest rates. Some aver that the biggest risk is stifling growth by raising rates, eg, Paul Krugman and Ryan Avent (<a href="http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/generation-b-for-bubble/">http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/generation-b-for-bubble/</a>). Others, unfortunately, suggest confusing strategies, including raising rates to contain inflation, despite this not having worked and been shown to be detrimental.<br /> </span></li>
<li style="list-style-type: disc; text-align: justify; "><span>Fiscal responsibility: A second requirement is fiscal responsibility in trade-offs for resources, betrayed by all parties in the impractical Bills on food security and land acquisition. This is a crucial requirement from both the government and the Opposition. For example, an effective step would be to raise diesel prices by Rs 5 a month for three months (which the government could evaluate using simulations).<br /> </span></li>
<li style="list-style-type: disc; text-align: justify; "><span>Manufacturing: Another requirement is action supporting manufacturing. A National Manufacturing Plan has been mentioned for years, but only coherent action will change the perception of yet another plan on the shelf. For instance, the government has resiled on the preferential marketing access for telecom equipment, which will increase imports.<br /> </span></li>
<li style="list-style-type: disc; text-align: justify; "><span>Stalled projects: There have been future-oriented announcements, eg, on fuel supply for power projects, but no demonstrable actions and results.</span></li>
</ul>
<p><span><span>In sum, a </span>rate cut<span> combined with consistent actions on fiscal responsibility, disentangling projects, manufacturing, and stop-gap measures like swap facilities for oil companies and "stretching" imported coal may provide a breather. These could have a stabilising effect on the rupee, improve sentiment, and re-establish India's growth potential.</span></span></p>
<ul>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-shyam-ponappa-september-6-2013-regrouping-for-growth'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/organizing-india-blogspot-shyam-ponappa-september-6-2013-regrouping-for-growth</a>
</p>
No publisherShyam PonappaTelecom2013-10-03T05:13:17ZBlog EntryRecapturing the Commons
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-march-7-2019-recapturing-the-commons
<b>Regulations that facilitate infrastructure with appropriate public resource use will enhance productivity.</b>
<p>The article was published in <a class="external-link" href="https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/recapturing-the-commons-119030700042_1.html">Business Standard</a> on March 7, 2019 and in <a class="external-link" href="https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2019/03/recapturing-commons.html">Organizing India Blogspot</a> on March 8, 2019.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Growth in the third quarter was disappointing, but there are signs of a cyclical recovery, with a Purchasing Managers Index for manufacturing at a 14-month high. For a significant upward shift of our growth curve, however, apart from lower interest rates, policy-makers have to be constructive. What might we wish for? Here are some suggestions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Accept the reality that investible funds in India are insufficient for our needs. These include our stock and net inflow of capital, and profits available for investment. We can try to increase our productive capacity or choose business-as-usual, thereby staying below our potential. Why? Because our activities aren’t profitable enough to induce and sustain investment. We need investment —in hard infrastructure, such as transportation and logistics, electricity, water and sewerage, and communications, and in second-order infrastructure, such as security and law and order, health care, education and training, banking, finance and insurance. There’s also the need for reorganisation of markets and practices, e.g., in agriculture, infrastructure, and government procurement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There’s little doubt that <a class="storyTags" href="https://www.business-standard.com/topic/digital-connectivity" target="_blank">digital connectivity </a>is invaluable for all these. While the imperative is clear, the question is how to orchestrate achieving the desired results.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The telecom operators, alas, have low profitability, inadequate network coverage, and too much debt. Continuing as before means subpar access and productivity for all. We are all hamstrung, and even more so in rural areas. Because of the expanse an7d scattered users there, connectivity entails much higher costs with lower revenue potential.<br /><br /><strong>Self-Organising Infrastructure – A Conceptual Flaw Without Regulatory Support</strong><br />Meanwhile, there are conceptual flaws in our approach. The National Optical Fibre Network (Bharat Broadband Network Limited or BharatNet) was conceived as a countrywide fibre backbone. The plan was for optical fibre links to 250,000 gram panchayat villages covering India’s approximately 600,000 inhabited villages. A major assumption, however, was that private operators would build access networks to villages and to users. This was unrealistic for a number of reasons. First, there’s the cost of covering sparse users over large expanses with low revenue potential. Second, the supportive regulations for wireless technologies to build the access networks were/are not in place. For example, even for the established 5 GHz WiFi range used globally for WiFi hotspots, restrictive policies meant that 5 GHz equipment could not be used effectively in India in urban or rural installations. This changed with new regulations for 5 GHz, but only four months ago in October 2018 (for details see <a href="https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2018/11/a-great-start-on-wi-fi-reforms.html" target="_blank"><em>https://organizing-india.blogspot.com/2018/11/a-great-start-on-wi-fi-reforms.html</em></a>).<br /><br />Other wireless technologies for intermediate- and last-mile links are still blocked, and need enabling regulations.</p>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The 700 MHz band: No operators bid for this given its high price, although it is very useful for covering distances of 5-10 km, and can penetrate walls and foliage. This band together with the 500 and 600 MHz bands could be used to connect gram panchayats to nearby villages. A study of inter-site distances in 14 states shows that most villages would be covered with this range (see Chart below).<br />Study of Inter Site Distances - Gram Panchayats and Villages</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KlC7Dz6JJYs/XIKo143rHMI/AAAAAAAAGE4/lQvz3RYg5WAHdyw7FGtFq3bsZl9rM-0FQCEwYBhgL/s1600/Study%2Bof%2BInter%2BSite%2BDistances%2B%255BRev%2B2%255D-%2BGram%2BPanchayats%2Band%2BVillages.jpg"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><a class="external-link" href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KlC7Dz6JJYs/XIKo143rHMI/AAAAAAAAGE4/lQvz3RYg5WAHdyw7FGtFq3bsZl9rM-0FQCEwYBhgL/s1600/Study%2Bof%2BInter%2BSite%2BDistances%2B%255BRev%2B2%255D-%2BGram%2BPanchayats%2Band%2BVillages.jpg"><img src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KlC7Dz6JJYs/XIKo143rHMI/AAAAAAAAGE4/lQvz3RYg5WAHdyw7FGtFq3bsZl9rM-0FQCEwYBhgL/s320/Study%2Bof%2BInter%2BSite%2BDistances%2B%255BRev%2B2%255D-%2BGram%2BPanchayats%2Band%2BVillages.jpg" /></a></p>
<ul>
<li>Source: <a href="https://tsdsi.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Krishna-Ganti-Day-1-5th-Session-1.pdf" target="_blank"><em>https://tsdsi.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Krishna-Ganti-Day-1-5th-Session-1.pdf</em></a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The 500 and 600 MHz bands are allocated for TV, and therefore are part of the “tragedy of the unused commons”. Only a small fraction is used for broadcasting in India because of limited free-to-air TV and better alternatives. As they are earmarked for broadcasting, they are not used for telephony either.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The 70-80 GHz band (E-band) is effective for short-range links covering more users at 3-4 km, but not permitted in India, although it is light-licensed in many countries with nominal fees, e.g., the USA, UK, Russia, and Australia. While ideally our regulations should align with global norms, there are exorbitant charges on operators (reportedly 37 per cent, plus corporate taxes), a debt overhang from spectrum auctions, huge investment needs, and relatively low revenue potential. Compelling arguments to let operators use the E-band with unlicensed access, with registry on a geo-location database to manage interference, to be reviewed after some years. The additional traffic will generate revenues from which government collections will increase.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The 60 GHz (V-band for distances up to 1.6 km): the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI) opposes making it licence-free as in most countries, and wants it assigned to operators for access and backhaul. For the same reasons as for E-band, operators could be allowed unlicensed access, with a review after some years.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><br /><strong>Market Structure and Organisation</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong>A larger problem is that legacy structural and organisational issues need concerted efforts to take requisite policy initiatives. This is perhaps a greater, more urgent need for ubiquitous connectivity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Successive governments have struggled with revival plans for BSNL and MTNL, somewhat analogous to Air India and Indian Airlines in aviation. Governments have not provided sustained support for ambitious connectivity objectives. There is sometimes inadequate understanding of fast-changing, technically complex enterprises, and episodic attention is given to large enterprises that need timely capital- and skill-intensive decisions (and decision-makers in place), and the upgrading of skills and operating practices. BSNL and MTNL are declining, with bailouts, market disruption through price-cutting, and inability to deliver profits. This is a huge opportunity cost on citizens. However, it is conceivable that with appropriate leadership, and organisational and capital backing, these enterprises could contribute effectively to ubiquitous connectivity, rather than being a drag and/or a disruptive factor. This could happen, for instance, if an alliance were possible with private sector operators providing leadership, organisation and capital, while state ownership concentrates on safeguarding the public interest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bharti Enterprises’ Chairman Sunil Mittal has suggested an alliance with Vodafone for an optical fibre network. Bharti and Vodafone already have a joint venture, Indus Towers, providing passive infrastructure services to operators. If regulations enabled active infrastructure from a consortium including BSNL and MTNL, it would leverage the infrastructure while reducing the capital requirements, and increase delivery capability. The entire thrust of regulations could be oriented to facilitating service delivery, leveraging capital, equipment and human resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The regulatory approach should aim to facilitate access equitably to public resources that belong to citizens, and not to create obstacles.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-march-7-2019-recapturing-the-commons'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-shyam-ponappa-march-7-2019-recapturing-the-commons</a>
</p>
No publisherShyam PonappaTelecom2019-04-03T01:44:54ZBlog EntryRailway Takeaways for Digital India
http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-opinion-article-shyam-ponappa-march-4-2015-railway-takeaways-for-digital-india
<b>Extending the approach of the Railway Budget to telecommunications and broadband. For the first time since the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) formed the government last year, we have something more than grand aspirational statements to go by.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Op-ed was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-ponappa-railway-takeaways-for-digital-india-115030401441_1.html">Business Standard</a> on March 4, 2015 and mirrored on <a class="external-link" href="http://organizing-india.blogspot.in/2015_03_01_archive.html">Organizing India Blogspot</a> on March 5, 2015.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Last week's Railway Budget is the first indicator of possibly better days, after all the rhetoric. Perhaps the reservations of some former railway ministers and excoriating comments such as "dreams without substance" have a basis. But in my reckoning, there's a sense of coming to grips with reality based on a rational evaluation, and a systematic approach through problem solving. This was backstopped by a finely balanced Union Budget that supports infrastructure and growth.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Going forward, we need more explicit articulation of detailed steps for execution and inter-sectoral linkages, which would be highly beneficial for the overall economy as well as for the Railways. For example, on how aspects of the Budget relate to stalled and stranded power generation, how these relate to electricity transmission and distribution, and the resolution of non-performing assets (NPAs) of banks. Additionally, the financial discipline of cash flows could be extended to substantially benefit other sectors. As for the financing relating to the Railways, the expectation that the details will be worked out needs to be met soon to establish credibility.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Setting aside all normative criticism, however, what's most important now is that the Railways delivers on this Budget. This will require more resolute coordination and emphasis on implementation than in the past, for example, in contrast to the poor implementation of the Electricity Act of 2003, a good piece of legislation that's unfulfilled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Extending the approach of realistic goals with explicit action plans and execution could benefit other areas of the economy and infrastructure. The elements include:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Toning down the rhetoric, avoiding grandiose statements and instead, defining realistic objectives. It may be argued that realism and understatement are difficult, even counterproductive, when political rivals indulge in a race to the bottom in terms of giveaways. This is true of state elections, as in Delhi, and at the national level, in the confusing if not irresponsible allocation of substantial funds to the debatable benefits of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The difficulty is that it needs responsible voters to act against opportunistic populism to discourage such gaming strategies in favour of better governance, but it will also need credible candidates with sound party positions and sustainable policies.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">A willingness to depart radically from past practices for better results. For instance, no new trains were announced in this year's Railway Budget, a major, responsible departure from an otherwise pernicious customary indulgence.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">An effort to develop a user-centric, outward-oriented strategy for improving services. This is the opposite of a department- or ministry-centric approach, emphasising the "scheme"-driven perspective of the department/agency for limited, piece-meal targets, as against an overall system in the interests of users.</li>
</ol>
<h3>Extending these principles to Digital India</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Consider how these might apply to another flagship concept - Digital India - in telecommunications and broadband. Networks and their elements, including projects like the National Optic Fibre Network, would be treated as integral components - stepping stones or links in a chain, and not the ends in themselves - of a systemic delivery process for what users need: a broadband connection to the internet, which becomes the goal. In addition to the access to general information, telecommuting, entertainment and e-commerce through the internet, additional content relating to government, educational and health services would also need to be made available over time. Viewed from this perspective, the requirement changes from achieving targets for the installation of "x" km of fibre or "y" pieces of customer equipment, or the auction of "z" megahertz of spectrum, some of which may be stranded or not working, to achieving targets for end-to-end connectivity with high-speed access to the internet at reasonable prices for the population of users. A classic example of dysfunctional targets was the subscriber-based spectrum allocation rule, which sought to cram the most users on the least spectrum - akin to stuffing a highway with vehicles, instead of getting them to their destination.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From this vantage, it becomes clear that policies should facilitate users' access and connectivity to the internet. Therefore, systems and methods for access through elements that provide connectivity - spectrum, fibre-optic cable, coaxial cable, or "twisted-pairs" for ADSL - must be devised in an integrated manner and made available at low cost.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Networks are useful only if they are accessible to end-users. Here's where the analogy of no new trains applies: for broadband, it could mean giving up spectrum auctions that fragment delivery capacity while draining away potential capital that could be invested instead in networks. Bundling spectrum and other last-mile access technologies with stranded backbone networks seems the obvious way to reach end-users. Where fibre can't be laid and maintained economically, the intermediate linkage over several kilometres could be through reasonably priced wireless, with technologies such as microwave links in the six-gigahertz, 11-GHz, 18-GHz bands and so on, local multipoint distribution systems in the 28-32-GHz bands, TV white space (unused broadcast spectrum, for example, in the 600-MHz band), satellites, or 4G (LTE). For India with its present state of infrastructure, governments must choose to favour delivery to end-users, collecting tolls and taxes at the back end, after the revenues and profits are made. This is how mobile telephony succeeded in India. Broadband can succeed in the same way.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another concept applicable from the Railways (and roads) is common-carrier access: all trains have access to common rail networks, just as all licensed vehicles have access to road networks, with additional tariffs for high-speed links like expressways or for captive rail. This is the way to achieve Digital India quickly, by adopting common-carrier principles on payment, whereby people in cities as well as the countryside can study, telecommute and conference for work anywhere, get health care, information and entertainment, sell their produce and artefacts, vote, and access government services.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The wisdom of the Railway Budget approach needs to extend to Digital India.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-opinion-article-shyam-ponappa-march-4-2015-railway-takeaways-for-digital-india'>http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/business-standard-opinion-article-shyam-ponappa-march-4-2015-railway-takeaways-for-digital-india</a>
</p>
No publisherShyam PonappaTelecom2015-04-10T13:37:45ZBlog EntryPushing the buttons for social change
http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-the-buttons-for-social-change
<b>IMMENSE POTENTIAL: With its myriad applications, a mobile phone can be used as an instrument of social change. Meet on how mobile technology can be a power tool to this end - An article in The Hindu on 01st September 2009</b>
<p>BANGALORE: We have all seen the popular television advertisement that claims that mobile phone technology can be much more than a communication device and be used as a powerful tool for social change.</p>
<p>Here is a platform that brings together technology enthusiasts and non-governmental organisations, working in various social sectors, to drive this change.</p>
<p>The one-day camp, Mobile Tech 4 Social Change, to be held on September 4, aims at exploring the power of mobile technology to advance social change goals.</p>
<p>Organised by the Centre for Internet and Studies, in collaboration with Women’s Learning Partnership, Mobile Monday and Mobile Active, it will include informative and interactive sessions on the subject.</p>
<p>It will be held from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. at the Mother Tekla Auditorium on Brunton Road.</p>
<p>Participating NGOs will discuss problems and different ways to use, deploy, develop and promote mobile technology in health, advocacy, economic development, environment, human rights, and citizen media to name a few areas.</p>
<p>According to the Cellular Operators’ Association of India, there has been a growth in the number of subscribers by 1.86 per cent in July 2009 in the metros alone.</p>
<p>“A report on the impact of mobile phones in India reveals that Indian States with high mobile penetration can be expected to grow faster than those with lower mobile penetration rates, namely, 1.2 percentage points for every 10 per cent increase in the penetration rate.</p>
<p>This conference is a step in understanding how this can be taken forward,” says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Studies. Participants for Mobile Tech 4 Social Change bar camps will include nonprofits, mobile applications developers, researchers, donors, intermediary organisations, and mobile operators.</p>
<p>While NGOs can gain information on various mobile applications and collaborate with those working in the core field of mobile technologies, enterprises can align their social responsibilities and use this potentially powerful medium.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-the-buttons-for-social-change'>http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-the-buttons-for-social-change</a>
</p>
No publisherradhaTelecom2011-04-02T15:09:10ZNews ItemPushing Buttons
http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-buttons
<b>The coolest device of the decade – From brick-sized to size zero, the cell phone changed our lives forever – an article by Deepa Kurup, The Hindu, 1st Jan, 2010.</b>
<p>Bangalore: Today, it no longer makes news to see your neighbourhood vegetable vendor taking orders on his mobile phone, or for that matter a mason at work as he chatters away on his cellphone.</p>
<p>A decade ago this was unthinkable.</p>
<p>The 10 years which have gone by have found a great leveller in technology, the cell phone being the most ubiquitous of them all. Cellphones crossed over from overpriced, shoebox-sized, upper-class accessory to an affordable easy-to-use gadget for staying connected, getting entertained and, for many, even a way of life. The long queues outside the PCO booth and scrambling for those elusive one-rupee coins is now history. The cellphone is literally in every hand. As of November 2009, India, with the world’s second largest population, registered 506.4 million cellphone connections, (543 million, including landlines), second only to China. Which means half our population has the device.</p>
<h3>Tharoor’s take</h3>
<p>Twitter-politician Shashi Tharoor regaled the audience at a recent conference, TED India, about this story of a coconut vendor in his home state of Kerala. He wanted a tender coconut and called a vendor he knew, only to discover the man was high up on a coconut palm, still connected to his cellphone!</p>
<p>Old timers still talk about the miles of red tape and the years it took to get a basic landline connection.</p>
<p>So while globally the noughties were about crowdsourcing, micro and macro blogging, e-books, file sharing or the “cloud”, in India, even the internet is only barely there. With a staggeringly low penetration, pegged at around seven to eight percent (over 80 million), the web is not a patch on the omnipresent cellphone.</p>
<h3>The next decade</h3>
<p>Sunil Abraham, Director of Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, insists that the cellphone will also define the decade that begins today. And like that clever advertisement, text-to-voice and voice recognition can and will be big in providing access to the unlettered, disabled and forgotten sections, he explains.</p>
<p>“Data services and geographic positioning services (GPS) show great promise in connecting the poor to the state and the market,” he said.</p>
<p>On a more futuristic, and indulgent note, Mr. Abraham says micro-projection systems that will work on walls and mobiles will forefront projects in those rural areas with limited or no electricity. This may be the only way to reach the unbanked with mainstream or community currencies, he adds.</p>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/01/stories/2010010156490100.htm">Link to the original article</a><br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-buttons'>http://editors.cis-india.org/news/pushing-buttons</a>
</p>
No publisherradhaTelecom2011-04-02T13:56:28ZNews ItemPublic Debate on 'Differential Pricing': Series 3
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-3
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society, in association with ICRIER and the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai, is pleased to announce “A Series of Public Debates on Differential Pricing” in the cities of Bangalore, Mumbai and New Delhi. The third public debate will be held at India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road near Air Force Bal Bharti School, New Delhi on February 5, 2016.</b>
<div class="kssattr-target-parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a kssattr-macro-rich-field-view kssattr-templateId-widgets/rich kssattr-atfieldname-text " id="parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of the recent consultation paper released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the objective of these debates will be to deconstruct the issue of differential pricing through a discussion on the variety of views this subject has attracted. Speakers will also discuss possible implications of differential pricing policy on questions of access, diversity, competition and entrepreneurship.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each debate will comprise three rounds. In the first round, speakers will present the body of their arguments over 10 minutes each. The second round will be a rebuttal round, with each speaker being given 5 minutes. The third and final round will see the floor being opened to the audience who will engage the speakers with comments and questions.</p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/public-debates-on-differential-pricing" class="internal-link">Download the Invite</a></h2>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-3'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-3</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiFreedom of Speech and ExpressionTelecomEventInternet Governance2016-01-28T13:53:12ZEventPublic Debate on 'Differential Pricing': Series 2
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-2
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society, in association with ICRIER and the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai, is pleased to announce “A Series of Public Debates on Differential Pricing” in the cities of Bangalore, Mumbai and New Delhi. The second public debate will be held at Pherozeshah Mehta Bhavan, Vidyanagari, Kalina, Mumbai on February 3, 2016.
</b>
<div class="kssattr-target-parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a kssattr-macro-rich-field-view kssattr-templateId-widgets/rich kssattr-atfieldname-text " id="parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of the recent consultation paper released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the objective of these debates will be to deconstruct the issue of differential pricing through a discussion on the variety of views this subject has attracted. Speakers will also discuss possible implications of differential pricing policy on questions of access, diversity, competition and entrepreneurship.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each debate will comprise three rounds. In the first round, speakers will present the body of their arguments over 10 minutes each. The second round will be a rebuttal round, with each speaker being given 5 minutes. The third and final round will see the floor being opened to the audience who will engage the speakers with comments and questions.</p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/blog/public-debates-on-differential-pricing" class="internal-link">Download the Invite</a></h2>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-2'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/public-debate-on-differential-pricing-series-2</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiFreedom of Speech and ExpressionTelecomEventInternet Governance2016-01-28T13:51:06ZEventPublic Debate on 'Differential Pricing': Series 1
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/a-series-of-public-debates-on-differential-pricing-series-1
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society, in association with ICRIER and the Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai, is pleased to announce “A Series of Public Debates on Differential Pricing” in the cities of Bangalore, Mumbai and New Delhi. The first public debate will be held at the Centre for Internet & Society office in Bangalore on February 1, 2016. </b>
<div class="kssattr-target-parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a kssattr-macro-rich-field-view kssattr-templateId-widgets/rich kssattr-atfieldname-text " id="parent-fieldname-text-b0c8dac0221d45df8f2e6e8e3a8d7a4a">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of the recent consultation paper released by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the objective of these debates will be to deconstruct the issue of differential pricing through a discussion on the variety of views this subject has attracted. Speakers will also discuss possible implications of differential pricing policy on questions of access, diversity, competition and entrepreneurship.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each debate will comprise three rounds. In the first round, speakers will present the body of their arguments over 10 minutes each. The second round will be a rebuttal round, with each speaker being given 5 minutes. The third and final round will see the floor being opened to the audience who will engage the speakers with comments and questions.</p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><a href="resolveuid/a01978fec6244f86b178b26006f1b312" class="internal-link">Download the Invite</a></h2>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/a-series-of-public-debates-on-differential-pricing-series-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/a-series-of-public-debates-on-differential-pricing-series-1</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiFreedom of Speech and ExpressionTelecomEventInternet Governance2016-01-27T13:51:06ZEvent