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Smart Cities in India: An Overview
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/smart-cities-in-india-an-overview
<b>The Government of India is in the process of developing 100 smart cities in India which it sees as the key to the country's economic and social growth. This blog post gives an overview of the Smart Cities project currently underway in India. The smart cities mission in India is at a nascent stage and an evolving area for research. The Centre for Internet and Society will continue work in this area.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Overview of the 100 Smart Cities Mission</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Government of India announced its flagship programme- the 100 Smart Cities mission in the year 2014 and was launched in June 2015 to achieve urban transformation, drive economic growth and improve the quality of life of people by enabling local area development and harnessing technology. Initially, the Mission aims to cover 100 cities across the countries (which have been shortlisted on the basis of a Smart Cities Proposal prepared by every city) and its duration will be five years (FY 2015-16 to FY 2019-20). The Mission may be continued thereafter in the light of an evaluation to be done by the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) and incorporation of the learnings into the Mission. The Mission aims to focus on area-based development in the form of redevelopment of existing spaces, or the development of new areas (Greenfield) to accommodate the growing urban population and ensure comprehensive planning to improve quality of life, create employment and enhance incomes for all - especially the poor and the disadvantaged. <a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> On 27th August 2015 the Centre unveiled 98 smart cities across India which were selected for this Project. Across the selected cities, 13 crore population ( 35% of the urban population will be included in the development plans. <a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> The mission has been developed for the purpose of achieving urban transformation. The vision is to preserve India's traditional architecture, culture & ethnicity while implementing modern technology to make cities livable, use resources in a sustainable manner and create an inclusive environment. <a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The promises of the Smart City mission include reduction of carbon footprint, adequate water and electricity supply, proper sanitation, including solid waste management, efficient urban mobility and public transport, affordable housing, robust IT connectivity and digitalization, good governance, citizen participation, security of citizens, health and education.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Questions unanswered</span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Why and How was the Smart Cities project conceptualized in India? What was the need for such a project in India?</li>
<li>What was the role of the public/citizens at the ideation and conceptualization stage of the project?</li>
<li>Which actors from the Government, Private industry and the civil society are involved in this mission? Though the smart cities mission has been initiated by the Government of India under the Ministry of Urban Development, there is no clarity about the involvement of the associated offices and departments of the Ministry.</li>
</ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>How are the Smart Cities being selected?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 100 cities were supposed to be selected on the basis of Smart cities challenge<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> involving two stages. Stage I of the challenge involved Intra-State city selection on objective criteria to identify cities to compete in stage-II. In August 2015, The Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India announced 100 smart cities <a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> evaluated on parameters such as service levels, financial and institutional capacity, past track record, called as the 'shortlisted cities' for this purpose. The selected cities are now competing for selection in the Second stage of the challenge, which is an All India competition. For this crucial stage, the potential 100 smart cities are required to prepare a Smart City Proposal (SCP) stating the model chosen (retrofitting, redevelopment, Greenfield development or a mix), along with a Pan-City dimension with Smart Solutions. The proposal must also include suggestions collected by way of consultations held with city residents and other stakeholders, along with the proposal for financing of the smart city plan including the revenue model to attract private participation. The country saw wide participation from the citizens to voice their aspirations and concerns regarding the smart city. 15th December 2015 has been declared as the deadline for submission of the SCP, which must be in consonance with evaluation criteria set by The MoUD, set on the basis of professional advice. <a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> On the basis of this, 20 cities will be selected for the first year. According to the latest reports, the Centre is planning to fund only 10 cities for the first phase in case the proposals sent by the states do not match the expected quality standards and are unable to submit complete area-development plans by the deadline, i.e. 15th December, 2015. <a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Questions unanswered</span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Who would be undertaking the task of evaluating and selecting the cities for this project?</li>
<li>What are the criteria for selection of a city to qualify in the first 20 (or 10, depending on the Central Government) for the first phase of implementation?</li>
</ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>How are the smart cities going to be Funded?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Smart City Mission will be operated as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) and the Central Government proposes to give financial support to the Mission to the extent of Rs. 48,000 crores over five years i.e. on an average Rs. 100 crore per city per year. <a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> The additional resources will have to be mobilized by the State/ ULBs from external/internal sources. According to the scheme, once list of shortlisted Smart Cities is finalized, Rs. 2 crore would have been disbursed to each city for proposal preparation.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to estimates of the Central Government, around Rs 4 lakh crore of funds will be infused mainly through private investments and loans from multilateral institutions among other sources, which accounts to 80% of the total spending on the mission. <a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> For this purpose, the Government will approach the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a loan costing £500 million and £1 billion each for 2015-20. If ADB approves the loan, it would be it will be the bank's highest funding to India's urban sector so far.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> Foreign Direct Investment regulations have been relaxed to invite foreign capital and help into the Smart City Mission. <a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Questions unanswered</span></b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The Government notes on Financing of the project mentions PPPs for private funding and leveraging of resources from internal and external resources. There is lack of clarity on the external resources the Government has/will approach and the varied PPP agreements the Government is or is planning to enter into for the purpose of private investment in the smart cities.</li>
</ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>How is the scheme being implemented?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under this scheme, each city is required to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) having flexibility regarding planning, implementation, management and operations. The body will be headed by a full-time CEO, with nominees of Central Government, State Government and ULB on its Board. The SPV will be a limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 at the city-level, in which the State/UT and the Urban Local Body (ULB) will be the promoters having equity shareholding in the ratio 50:50. The private sector or financial institutions could be considered for taking equity stake in the SPV, provided the shareholding pattern of 50:50 of the State/UT and the ULB is maintained and the State/UT and the ULB together have majority shareholding and control of the SPV. Funds provided by the Government of India in the Smart Cities Mission to the SPV will be in the form of tied grant and kept in a separate Grant Fund.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For the purpose of implementation and monitoring of the projects, the MoUD has also established an Apex Committee and National Mission Directorate for National Level Monitoring<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a>, a State Level High Powered Steering Committee (HPSC) for State Level Monitoring<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> and a Smart City Advisory Forum at the City Level <a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Also, several consulting firms<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> have been assigned to the 100 cities to help them prepare action plans.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><sup>[18]</sup></sup></a> Some of them include CRISIL, KPMG, McKinsey, etc. <a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><sup>[19]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Questions unanswered</span></b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What policies and regulations have been put in place to account for the smart cities, apart from policies looking at issues of security, privacy, etc.?</li>
<li>What international/national standards will be adopted while development of the smart cities? Though the Bureau of Indian Standards is in the process of formulating standardized guidelines for the smart cities in India<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><sup>[20]</sup></sup></a>, yet there is lack of clarity on adoption of these national standards, along with the role of international standards like the ones formulated by ISO.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>What is the role of Foreign Governments and bodies in the Smart cities mission?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ever since the government's ambitious project has been announced and cities have been shortlisted, many countries across the globe have shown keen interest to help specific shortlisted cities in building the smart cities and are willing to invest financially. Countries like Sweden, Malaysia, UAE, USA, etc. have agreed to partner with India for the mission.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><sup>[21]</sup></sup></a> For example, UK has partnered with the Government to develop three India cities-Pune, Amravati and Indore.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><sup>[22]</sup></sup></a> Israel's start-up city Tel Aviv also entered into an agreement to help with urban transformation in the Indian cities of Pune, Nagpur and Nashik to foster innovation and share its technical know-how.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><sup>[23]</sup></sup></a> France has piqued interest for Nagpur and Puducherry, while the United States is interested in Ajmer, Vizag and Allahabad. Also, Spain's Barcelona Regional Agency has expressed interest in exchanging technology with the Delhi. Apart from foreign government, many organizations and multilateral agencies are also keen to partner with the Indian government and have offered financial assistance by way of loans. Some of them include the UK government-owned Department for International Development, German government KfW development bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency, the US Trade and Development Agency, United Nations Industrial Development Organization and United Nations Human Settlements Programme. <a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><sup>[24]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Questions unanswered</span></b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Do these governments or organization have influence on any other component of the Smart cities?</li>
<li>How much are the foreign governments and multilateral bodies spending on the respective cities?</li>
<li>What kind of technical know-how is being shared with the Indian government and cities?</li>
</ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>What is the way ahead?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the basis of the SCP, the MoUD will evaluate, assess the credibility and select 20 smart cities out of the short-listed ones for execution of the plan in the first phase. The selected city will set up a SPV and receive funding from the Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Questions unanswered</span></b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Will the deadline of submission of the Smart Cities Proposal be pushed back?</li>
<li>After the SCP is submitted on the basis of consultation with the citizens and public, will they be further involved in the implementation of the project and what will be their role?</li>
<li>How will the MoUD and other associated organizations as well as actors consider the implementation realities of the project, like consideration of land displacement, rehabilitation of the slum people, etc.</li>
<li>How are ICT based systems going to be utilized to make the cities and the infrastructure "smart"?</li>
<li>How is the MoUD going to respond to the concerns and criticism emerging from various sections of the society, as being reflected in the news items?</li>
<li>How will the smart cities impact and integrate the existing laws, regulations and policies? Does the Government intend to use the existing legislations in entirety, or update and amend the laws for implementation of the Smart Cities Mission?</li>
</ul>
<div style="text-align: justify; "><br clear="all" />
<hr />
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> Smart Cities, Mission Statement and Guidelines, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, June 2015, Available at : http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/SmartCityGuidelines.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-08-27/news/65929187_1_jammu-and-kashmir-12-cities-urban-development-venkaiah-naidu</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> http://india.gov.in/spotlight/smart-cities-mission-step-towards-smart-india</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Process%20of%20Selection.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> Full list : http://www.scribd.com/doc/276467963/Smart-Cities-Full-List</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Process%20of%20Selection.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> http://www.ibtimes.co.in/modi-govt-select-only-10-cities-under-smart-city-project-this-year-report-658888</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Financing%20of%20Smart%20Cities.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> Smart Cities presentation by MoUD : http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/Presentation%20on%20Smart%20Cities%20Mission.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/smart-cities-projectfrom-france-to-us-a-rush-to-offer-assistance-funds/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/funding-for-smart-cities-key-to-coffer-lies-outside-india/#sthash.5lnW9Jsq.dpuf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> http://india.gov.in/spotlight/smart-cities-mission-step-towards-smart-india</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/SPVs.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/National%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/State%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/City%20Level%20Monitoring.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/List_of_Consulting_Firms.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><sup>[18]</sup></sup></a> http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=128457</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><sup>[19]</sup></sup></a> <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/49242050.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst"> http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/49242050.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><sup>[20]</sup></sup></a> http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/in-a-first-bis-to-come-up-with-standards-for-smart-cities-115060400931_1.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><sup>[21]</sup></sup></a> http://accommodationtimes.com/foreign-countries-have-keen-interest-in-development-of-smart-cities/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><sup>[22]</sup></sup></a> http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-11-20/news/68440402_1_uk-trade-three-smart-cities-british-deputy-high-commissioner</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><sup>[23]</sup></sup></a> http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Tech/Tel-Aviv-to-help-India-build-smart-cities-435161?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><sup>[24]</sup></sup></a> http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/smart-cities-projectfrom-france-to-us-a-rush-to-offer-assistance-funds/#sthash.nCMxEKkc.dpuf</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/smart-cities-in-india-an-overview'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/smart-cities-in-india-an-overview</a>
</p>
No publishervanyaFeaturedHomepageInternet Governance2016-01-11T01:30:07ZBlog EntryNational Compendium of Laws, Policies, Programmes for Persons with Disabilities
http://editors.cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/national-compendium-of-laws-policies-programmes-for-persons-with-disabilities
<b>This compendium was compiled by the Centre for Internet & Society in collaboration with the Office of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, Department of Disability Affairs, Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Government of India. Prasanna Kumar Pincha, Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, has written the Foreword. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Preface</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India, one of the longest continuous civilizations in the world is also home to one of the largest populations of persons with disabilities. According to the 2011 census, around 2.21% of its population or around 26.8 million people have disabilities of some form or the other. While the country is developing rapidly, persons with disabilities are often left out of the process. Sometimes they are completely neglected from consideration and measures do not take into account their needs by virtue of being non inclusive. On other occasions, there may be special measures for some disadvantaged groups, but persons with disabilities may not be recognised as a separate group, with distinctive needs. <br /><br />Overall, there is a clichéd understanding about the needs and abilities of persons with disabilities, limiting efforts made towards their progress. Even in cases where some effort has been made, information about these measures is not available to persons with disabilities and their family members, who are consequently unable to avail of them. Additionally, the insensitivity of rules/ schemes/ procedures/ persons makes it difficult for persons with disabilities to benefit from them. However, regardless of the reason, the fact remains that there is a huge gap in the communication of information from policy makers, administrators and law makers to persons with disabilities as well as their family members, organisations and other concerned groups and institutions. <br /><br />It is extremely important to bridge this information gap in order to enable persons with disabilities to participate equally in development. Better access to information will enable them to avail of schemes/provisions for their benefit and will consequently enable governments to assess whether they have made adequate provision in various domains as well as identify gaps which need to be addressed.<br />Finally, accessibility of information will also facilitate the participation of government and persons with disabilities in implementation of measures and increase transparency and accountability<br /><br />With this aim in mind, The Hans Foundation decided to engage with Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) to put together a comprehensive resource on disability related policies across India. It gives us great pleasure to publish this resource and we hope that it be of great help to the community.<br /><br />Ms. Sweta Rawat<br />Chairperson<br />The Hans Foundation</p>
<hr />
<p>Click to download the PDF version of the book <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/national-compendium-book" class="internal-link"><b>here</b></a>. (File size 1.72 Mb approx.)</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/national-compendium-of-laws-policies-programmes-for-persons-with-disabilities'>http://editors.cis-india.org/accessibility/blog/national-compendium-of-laws-policies-programmes-for-persons-with-disabilities</a>
</p>
No publishernirmitaFeaturedAccessibility2016-02-05T02:16:36ZBlog EntryMaking in the Humanities – Some Questions and Conflicts
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/making-in-the-humanities-2013-some-questions-and-conflicts
<b>The following is an abstract for a proposed chapter on 'making' in the humanities, which has been accepted for publication in a volume titled 'Making Humanities Matter'. This is part of a new book series titled 'Debates in the Digital Humanities 2015' to be published by University of Minnesota Press (http://dhdebates.gc.cuny.edu/cfps/cfp_2015_mhm). The first draft of the chapter will be shared by mid-August 2015.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>The object of enquiry in the humanities has traditionally been defined in the form of text, audio-visual or other kinds of ‘objects’ or cultural artifacts. With the growth of information and communication technologies, and the advent of the digital, the emergence of a ‘digital object’, as ambiguous as the term may sound, in the last couple of decades, has led to a rethinking of the conventional notion of research objects as well as modes of questioning, with larger consequences for the production and dissemination of knowledge. The rise of fields like ‘humanities computing’, ‘digital humanities’ and ‘cultural analytics’, suggest a combining of two separate domains, or polarized binaries (such as old and new media), and point to the availability of new objects of study, and therefore the need for new methods to study them. A large part of the discourse around these objects however, in trying to read them closely, obfuscates the processes by which they are constituted, which are often as novel and innovative as the artifacts themselves.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>This paper will attempt to explore the processes of ‘making’ of these digital objects in the context of several sites of recent humanities scholarship in India that mobilise digital techniques as key methods. These will include two online video archival initiatives (Indiancine.ma and Pad.ma), a digital variorum of Rabindranath Tagore's literary works (Bichitra) developed at the University of Jadavpur, Kolkata, and curatorial work undertaken by the Centre for Public History, Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology, Bengaluru. Film, text and archival objects acquire several nuances as they are ‘made’ into digital objects, which are also reflected in the methods of working with and studying them. At the same time, problems of authorship, authenticity, accessibility, and a lack of adequate methods to study these objects are some challenges faced across disciplines. The objective of the study is to outline some of the questions related to form and methods that emerge with the digital object, and in the process undertake a critical reading of the politics of making in the humanities. What is the role of ‘making’ in the humanities? Where does humanities research using digital technologies intersect with art and creative practices? How is this research manifested in new forms or objects and methods, and to what effects on the humanities? The paper will aim to respond to some of these questions through a discussion of the initiatives mentioned above.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/making-in-the-humanities-2013-some-questions-and-conflicts'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/making-in-the-humanities-2013-some-questions-and-conflicts</a>
</p>
No publishersneha-ppDigital KnowledgeMapping Digital Humanities in IndiaResearchFeaturedDigital HumanitiesResearchers at Work2015-11-13T05:46:32ZBlog EntryJoining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone Patent Litigation (Updated)
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation
<b>An analysis of the significant commonalities and differences in various big-ticket lawsuits in India over the alleged infringement of mobile device patents. </b>
<p>This blog post has been merged with <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india">another on the same topic</a> and published as a paper. The paper was last updated in October 2017.</p>
<h3><strong><a class="external-link" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3120364">View paper on SSRN.</a></strong></h3>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation</a>
</p>
No publisherrohiniFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2018-05-06T03:51:49ZBlog EntryStudying the Emerging Database State in India: Notes for Critical Data Studies (Accepted Abstract)
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract
<b>"Critical Data Studies (CDS) is a growing field of research that focuses on the unique theoretical, ethical, and epistemological challenges posed by 'Big Data.' Rather than treat Big Data as a scientifically empirical, and therefore largely neutral phenomena, CDS advocates the view that data should be seen as always-already constituted within wider data assemblages." The Big Data and Society journal has provisionally accepted a paper abstract of mine for its upcoming special issue on Critical Data Studies.</b>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Through the last decade, the Government of India has given shape to an digital identification infrastructure, developed and operated by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The infrastructure combines the task of assigning unique identification numbers, called Aadhaar numbers, to individuals submitting their biometric and demographic details, and the task of authenticating their identity when provided with an Aadhaar number and associated data (biometric data, One Time Pin sent to the pre-declared mobile number, etc.). The aim of UIDAI is to provide universal authentication-as-a-service for all residents of India who approach any public or private agencies for any kind of service or transaction. Simultaneously, the Aadhaar numbers will function as unique identifiers for joining up databases of different government agencies, and hence allow the Indian government to undertake big data analytics at a governmental scale, and not only at a departmental one.</p>
<p>In this paper, I am primarily motivated by the challenge of finding points and objects to enter into a critical study of such an in-progress data infrastructure. As I proceed with an understanding that data is produced within its specific social and material context, the question then is to read through the data to reflect on its possible social and material context. This is complicated when approaching a big data infrastructure that is meant to produce data for explicitly intra-governmental consumption and circulation. The problem then is not one of reading through available big data, but one of reading through the assemblage and imaginaries of big data to reflect on the kind of data it will give rise to, and thus on the politics of the data assemblage and the database state it enables.</p>
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<h2>Logic of the Database State</h2>
<p>Application of data to inform governmental acts have taken place at least since government has been understood as responsible for the welfare of the population and the territory. The measurement of the population and the territory – the number of people, their demographic features, amounts and locations of natural resources, and so on – have always been integral to the functioning of the modern nation-state. Database state is used in this paper to identify a particular mode of mobilisation of data within governmental acts, which is fundamentally shaped by the possibilities of big data extraction, appropriation, and analytics pioneered by a range of companies since late 1990s. The reason for not using big data state but database dtate is that big data refers to a body of technologies emerging in response to a set of data management and analysis challenges situated in a certain moment of development of information technologies, whereas database refers to a symbolic form (Manovich 1999): a form in which not only the population is made visible to the government (as a collection of visual, textual, numeric, and other forms of records), but also how the acts of government are made visible to the population (as a collection of performance indicators, budget allocation and utilisation tables, and other data visualised through dashboards, analog and digital).</p>
<p>The data production and management logic of this database state is specifically inspired by the notion of platform introduced by the so-called Web 2.0 companies: providing a common service layer upon which various other applications may also run, but under specific arrangements (including distribution of generated user data) with the original common layer provider. Data assemblages of the database state are expected to enable the government to function as a platform, as an intensely data-driven layer that widely gathers data about population individuals and feeds it back selectively to various providers of public and private services. This transforms the data assemblage from one vertical of governmental activities to a horizontal critical infrastructure for modularisation of governmental activities.</p>
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<h2>Studying the Emerging Database State in India</h2>
<p>Government of India is presently debating the legal and technical validity of the digital identity infrastructure programme in the Supreme Court, while simultaneously carrying out the enrollment drive for the same, linking up assignment of unique identity numbers with a national drive for population registration, and rolling out citizen-facing services and applications that implement the Aadhaar number as a necessary key to access them. With the enrollment process going on and the integration with various governmental processes (termed seeding by Aadhaar policy literature) just beginning, I enter this study through two key sets of objects reflecting the imaginaries and the technical specifications of the emerging database state in India. The first entry point is through the various official documents of vision, intentions, plans, and reconsiderations, and the second entry point is through the Application Programming Interface (API) documentations published by UIDAI to specify how its identity authentication platform will collaborate with various public and private services.</p>
<p>The first section of the paper provides a brief survey of pre-UIDAI attempts by the Government of India to deploy unique identification numbers and Smart Cards for specific population groups, so as to understand the initial conceptualisation of this data assemblage of a digital identification platform. The second section foregrounds how this platform undertakes a transformation of the components and relations of the pre-existing data assemblage of the Government of India, as articulated in various official documents of promised utility and proposed collaborations. The third section studies the API documentations to track how such imaginaries are materially interpreted and operationalised through the design of protocols of data interactions with various public and private agencies offering services utilising the identity authentication platform.</p>
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<h2>Notes for Critical Data Studies</h2>
<p>Expanding the early agenda note on Critical Data Studies by Craig Dalton and Jim Thatcher (2014), Rob Kitchin and Tracey P. Lauriault have taken steps towards emphasising the responsibility of this nebulous research strategy to chart and unpack the data assemblages (2014). This is exactly what I propose to do in this paper. While Kitchin and Lauriault provide a detailed list of the components of the apparatus of a data assemblage (2014: 7), I find the concepts of infrastructural components and infrastructural relations very useful in thinking through the emerging infrastructure of authentication. Thus, my approach to these tasks of charting and unpacking is focused on the infrastructural relations that the digital identity infrastructure re-configures, instead of the infrastructural components it mobilises (Bowker et al 2010). This tactical choice of focusing on the infrastructural relations is also necessitated by the practical difficulty in having comprehensive access to the individual components of the data assemblage concerned. Addressing questions of causality and quality becomes difficult when studying the assemblage sans the produced data, and rigorously analysing concerns of security and uncertainty pre-requires an actually existing data assemblage, with a public interface to investigating its leakages, breakages, and internal functioning. In the absence of such points of entry into the data assemblage, which I fear may not be an exceptional case, I attempt an inverted reading. Turning the data infrastructure inside out, in this paper I describe how the digital identity platform is critically reshaping the basis of governmental acts in India, through a specific model of production, extraction and application of big data.</p>
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<h2>Bibliography</h2>
<p>Bowker, Geoffrey C., Karen Baker, Florence Millerand, & David Ribes. 2010. Toward Information Infrastructure Studies: Ways of Knowing in a Networked Environment. Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, & Matthew Allen (Eds.) International Handbook of Internet Research. Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York. Pp. 97-117.</p>
<p>Dalton, Craig, & Jim Thatcher. 2014. What does a Critical Data Studies Look Like, and Why do We Care? Seven Points for a Critical Approach to ‘Big Data.’ Society and Space. May 19. Accessed on July 08, 2015, from <a href="http://societyandspace.com/material/commentaries/craig-dalton-and-jim-thatcher-what-does-a-critical-data-studies-look-like-and-why-do-we-care-seven-points-for-a-critical-approach-to-big-data/" target="_blank">http://societyandspace.com/material/commentaries/craig-dalton-and-jim-thatcher-what-does-a-critical-data-studies-look-like-and-why-do-we-care-seven-points-for-a-critical-approach-to-big-data/</a>.</p>
<p>Kitchin, Rob, & Tracey P. Lauriault. 2014. Towards Critical Data Studies: Charting and Unpacking Data Assemblages and their Work. The Programmable City Working Paper 2. July 29. National University of Ireland Maynooth, Ireland. Accessed on July 08, 2015 from <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474112" target="_blank">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474112</a>.</p>
<p>Manovich, Lev. 1999. Database as Symbolic Form. Convergence. Volume 5, Number 2. Pp. 80-99.</p>
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<p><em>Note: Call for Papers for the special issue can found here: <a href="http://bigdatasoc.blogspot.in/2015/06/call-for-proposals-special-theme-on.html" target="_blank">http://bigdatasoc.blogspot.in/2015/06/call-for-proposals-special-theme-on.html</a>.</em></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract</a>
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No publishersumandroBig DataData SystemsResearchFeaturedAadhaarResearchers at WorkE-Governance2015-11-13T05:54:53ZBlog EntrySecurity: Privacy, Transparency and Technology
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-privacy-transparency-and-technology
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has been involved in privacy and data protection research for the last five years. It has participated as a member of the Justice A.P. Shah Committee, which has influenced the draft Privacy Bill being authored by the Department of Personnel and Training. It has organised 11 multistakeholder roundtables across India over the last two years to discuss a shadow Privacy Bill drafted by CIS with the participation of privacy commissioners and data protection authorities from Europe and Canada.</b>
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<p>The article was co-authored by Sunil Abraham, Elonnai Hickok and Tarun Krishnakumar. It was published by Observer Research Foundation, <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-privacy-transparency-technology.pdf" class="internal-link">Digital Debates 2015: CyFy Journal Volume 2</a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify;">Our centre’s work on privacy was considered incomplete by some stakeholders because of a lack of focus in the area of cyber security and therefore we have initiated research on it from this year onwards. In this article, we have undertaken a preliminary examination of the theoretical relationships between the national security imperative and privacy, transparency and technology.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Security and Privacy</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Daniel J. Solove has identified the tension between security and privacy as a false dichotomy: "Security and privacy often clash, but there need not be a zero-sum tradeoff." <a name="fr1" href="#fn1">[1]</a> Further unpacking this false dichotomy, Bruce Schneier says, "There is no security without privacy. And liberty requires both security and privacy." <a name="fr2" href="#fn2">[2]</a> Effectively, it could be said that privacy is a precondition for security, just as security is a precondition for privacy. A secure information system cannot be designed without guaranteeing the privacy of its authentication factors, and it is not possible to guarantee privacy of authentication factors without having confidence in the security of the system. Often policymakers talk about a balance between the privacy and security imperatives—in other words a zero-sum game. Balancing these imperatives is a foolhardy approach, as it simultaneously undermines both imperatives. Balancing privacy and security should instead be framed as an optimisation problem. Indeed, during a time when oversight mechanisms have failed even in so-called democratic states, the regulatory power of technology <a name="fr3" href="#fn3">[3]</a> should be seen as an increasingly key ingredient to the solution of that optimisation problem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Data retention is required in most jurisdictions for law enforcement, intelligence and military purposes. Here are three examples of how security and privacy can be optimised when it comes to Internet Service Provider (ISP) or telecom operator logs:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Data Retention</strong>: We propose that the office of the Privacy Commissioner generate a cryptographic key pair for each internet user and give one key to the ISP / telecom operator. This key would be used to encrypt logs, thereby preventing unauthorised access. Once there is executive or judicial authorisation, the Privacy Commissioner could hand over the second key to the authorised agency. There could even be an emergency procedure and the keys could be automatically collected by concerned agencies from the Privacy Commissioner. This will need to be accompanied by a policy that criminalises the possession of unencrypted logs by ISP and telecom operators.<br /><br /></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Privacy-Protective Surveillance</strong>: Ann Cavoukian and Khaled El Emam <a name="fr4" href="#fn4">[4]</a> have proposed combining intelligent agents, homomorphic encryption and probabilistic graphical models to provide “a positive-sum, ‘win–win’ alternative to current counter-terrorism surveillance systems.” They propose limiting collection of data to “significant” transactions or events that could be associated with terrorist-related activities, limiting analysis to wholly encrypted data, which then does not just result in “discovering more patterns and relationships without an understanding of their context” but rather “intelligent information—information selectively gathered and placed into an appropriate context to produce actual knowledge.” Since fully homomorphic encryption may be unfeasible in real-world systems, they have proposed use of partially homomorphic encryption. But experts such as Prof. John Mallery from MIT are also working on solutions based on fully homomorphic encryption.<br /><br /></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Fishing Expedition Design</strong>: Madan Oberoi, Pramod Jagtap, Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin and Lalana Kagal have proposed a standard <a name="fr5" href="#fn5">[5]</a> that could be adopted by authorised agencies, telecom operators and ISPs. Instead of giving authorised agencies complete access to logs, they propose a format for database queries, which could be sent to the telecom operator or ISP by authorised agencies. The telecom operator or ISP would then process the query, and anonymise/obfuscate the result-set in an automated fashion based on applicable privacypolicies/regulation. Authorised agencies would then hone in on a subset of the result-set that they would like with personal identifiers intact; this smaller result set would then be shared with the authorised agencies.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">An optimisation approach to resolving the false dichotomy between privacy and security will not allow for a total surveillance regime as pursued by the US administration. Total surveillance brings with it the ‘honey pot’ problem: If all the meta-data and payload data of citizens is being harvested and stored, then the data store will become a single point of failure and will become another target for attack. The next Snowden may not have honourable intentions and might decamp with this ‘honey pot’ itself, which would have disastrous consequences.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If total surveillance will completely undermine the national security imperative, what then should be the optimal level of surveillance in a population? The answer depends upon the existing security situation. If this is represented on a graph with security on the y-axis and the proportion of the population under surveillance on the x-axis, the benefits of surveillance could be represented by an inverted hockey-stick curve. To begin with, there would already be some degree of security. As a small subset of the population is brought under surveillance, security would increase till an optimum level is reached, after which, enhancing the number of people under surveillance would not result in any security pay-off. Instead, unnecessary surveillance would diminish security as it would introduce all sorts of new vulnerabilities. Depending on the existing security situation, the head of the hockey-stick curve might be bigger or smaller. To use a gastronomic analogy, optimal surveillance is like salt in cooking—necessary in small quantities but counter-productive even if slightly in excess.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In India the designers of surveillance projects have fortunately rejected the total surveillance paradigm. For example, the objective of the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is to streamline and automate targeted surveillance; it is introducing technological safeguards that will allow express combinations of result-sets from 22 databases to be made available to 12 authorised agencies. This is not to say that the design of the NATGRID cannot be improved.</p>
<h3>Security and Transparency</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are two views on security and transparency: One, security via obscurity as advocated by vendors of proprietary software, and two, security via transparency as advocated by free/open source software (FOSS) advocates and entrepreneurs. Over the last two decades, public and industry opinion has swung towards security via transparency. This is based on the Linus rule that “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” But does this mean that transparency is a necessary and sufficient condition? Unfortunately not, and therefore it is not necessarily true that FOSS and open standards will be more secure than proprietary software and proprietary standards.</p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify;" class="pullquote">Optimal surveillance is like salt in cooking—necessary in small quantities but counter-productive even if slightly in excess.</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The recent detection of the Heartbleed <a name="fr6" href="#fn6">[6]</a> security bug in Open SSL, <a name="fr7" href="#fn7">[7]</a> causing situations where more data can be read than should be allowed, and Snowden’s revelations about the compromise of some open cryptographic standards (which depend on elliptic curves), developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, are stark examples. <a name="fr8" href="#fn8">[8]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the same time, however, open standards and FOSS are crucial to maintaining the balance of power in information societies, as civil society and the general public are able to resist the powers of authoritarian governments and rogue corporations using cryptographic technology. These technologies allow for anonymous speech, pseudonymous speech, private communication, online anonymity and circumvention of surveillance and censorship. For the media, these technologies enable anonymity of sources and the protection of whistle-blowers—all phenomena that are critical to the functioning of a robust and open democratic society. But these very same technologies are also required by states and by the private sector for a variety of purposes—national security, e-commerce, e-banking, protection of all forms of intellectual property, and services that depend on confidentiality, such as legal or medical services.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In order words, all governments, with the exception of the US government, have common cause with civil society, media and the general public when it comes to increasing the security of open standards and FOSS. Unfortunately, this can be quite an expensive task because the re-securing of open cryptographic standards depends on mathematicians. Of late, mathematical research outputs that can be militarised are no longer available in the public domain because the biggest employers of mathematicians worldwide today are the US military and intelligence agencies. If other governments invest a few billion dollars through mechanisms like Knowledge Ecology International’s proposed World Trade Organization agreement on the supply of knowledge as a public good, we would be able to internationalise participation in standard-setting organisations and provide market incentives for greater scrutiny of cryptographic standards and patching of vulnerabilities of FOSS. This would go a long way in addressing the trust deficit that exists on the internet today.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Security and Technology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A techno-utopian understanding of security assumes that more technology, more recent technology and more complex technology will necessarily lead to better security outcomes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is because the security discourse is dominated by vendors with sales targets who do not present a balanced or accurate picture of the technologies that they are selling. This has resulted in state agencies and the general public having an exaggerated understanding of the capabilities of surveillance technologies that is more aligned with Hollywood movies than everyday reality.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">More Technology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Increasing the number of x-ray machines or full-body scanners at airports by a factor of ten or hundred will make the airport less secure unless human oversight is similarly increased. Even with increased human oversight, all that has been accomplished is an increase in the potential locations that can be compromised. The process of hardening a server usually involves stopping non-essential services and removing non-essential software. This reduces the software that should be subject to audit, continuously monitored for vulnerabilities and patched as soon as possible. Audits, ongoing monitoring and patching all cost time and money and therefore, for governments with limited budgets, any additional unnecessary technology should be seen as a drain on the security budget. Like with the airport example, even when it comes to a single server on the internet, it is clear that, from a security perspective, more technology without a proper functionality and security justification is counter-productive. To reiterate, throwing increasingly more technology at a problem does not make things more secure; rather, it results in a proliferation of vulnerabilities.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Latest Technology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Reports that a number of state security agencies are contemplating returning to typewriters for sensitive communications in the wake of Snowden’s revelations makes it clear that some older technologies are harder to compromise in comparison to modern technology. <a name="fr9" href="#fn9">[9]</a> Between iris- and fingerprint-based biometric authentication, logically, it would be easier for a criminal to harvest images of irises or authentication factors in bulk fashion using a high resolution camera fitted with a zoom lens in a public location, in comparison to mass lifting of fingerprints.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Complex Technology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Fifteen years ago, Bruce Schneier said, "The worst enemy of security is complexity. This has been true since the beginning of computers, and it’s likely to be true for the foreseeable future." <a name="fr10" href="#fn10">[10]</a> This is because complexity increases fragility; every feature is also a potential source of vulnerabilities and failures. The simpler Indian electronic machines used until the 2014 elections are far more secure than the Diebold voting machines used in the 2004 US presidential elections. Similarly when it comes to authentication, a pin number is harder to beat without user-conscious cooperation in comparison to iris- or fingerprint-based biometric authentication.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the following section of the paper we have identified five threat scenarios <a name="fr11" href="#fn11">[11]</a> relevant to India and identified solutions based on our theoretical framing above.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Threat Scenarios and Possible Solutions</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Hacking the NIC Certifying Authority</strong><br />One of the critical functions served by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) is as a Certifying Authority (CA). <a name="fr12" href="#fn12">[12]</a> In this capacity, the NIC issues digital certificates that authenticate web services and allow for the secure exchange of information online. <a name="fr13" href="#fn13">[13]</a> Operating systems and browsers maintain lists of trusted CA root certificates as a means of easily verifying authentic certificates. India’s Controller of Certifying Authority’s certificates issued are included in the Microsoft Root list and recognised by the majority of programmes running on Windows, including Internet Explorer and Chrome. <a name="fr14" href="#fn14">[14]</a> In 2014, the NIC CA’s infrastructure was compromised, and digital certificates were issued in NIC’s name without its knowledge. <a name="fr15" href="#fn15">[15]</a> Reports indicate that NIC did not "have an appropriate monitoring and tracking system in place to detect such intrusions immediately." <a name="fr16" href="#fn16">[16]</a> The implication is that websites could masquerade as another domain using the fake certificates. Personal data of users can be intercepted or accessed by third parties by the masquerading website. The breach also rendered web servers and websites of government bodies vulnerable to attack, and end users were no longer sure that data on these websites was accurate and had not been tampered with. <a name="fr17" href="#fn17">[17]</a> The NIC CA was forced to revoke all 250,000 SSL Server Certificates issued until that date <a name="fr18" href="#fn18">[18]</a> and is no longer issuing digital certificates for the time being. <a name="fr19" href="#fn19">[19]</a>Public key pinning is a means through which websites can specify which certifying authorities have issued certificates for that site. Public key pinning can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks due to fake digital certificates. <a name="fr20" href="#fn20">[20]</a> Certificate Transparency allows anyone to check whether a certificate has been properly issued, seeing as certifying authorities must publicly publish information about the digital certificates that they have issued. Though this approach does not prevent fake digital certificates from being issued, it can allow for quick detection of misuse. <a name="fr21" href="#fn21">[21]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>‘Logic Bomb’ against Airports</strong><br />Passenger operations in New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport depend on a centralised operating system known as the Common User Passenger Processing System (CUPPS). The system integrates numerous critical functions such as the arrival and departure times of flights, and manages the reservation system and check-in schedules. <a name="fr22" href="#fn22">[22]</a> In 2011, a logic bomb attack was remotely launched against the system to introduce malicious code into the CUPPS software. The attack disabled the CUPPS operating system, forcing a number of check-in counters to shut down completely, while others reverted to manual check-in, resulting in over 50 delayed flights. Investigations revealed that the attack was launched by three disgruntled employees who had assisted in the installation of the CUPPS system at the New Delhi Airport. <a name="fr23" href="#fn23">[23]</a> Although in this case the impact of the attack was limited to flight delay, experts speculate that the attack was meant to take down the entire system. The disruption and damage resulting from the shutdown of an entire airport would be extensive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Adoption of open hardware and FOSS is one strategy to avoid and mitigate the risk of such vulnerabilities. The use of devices that embrace the concept of open hardware and software specifications must be encouraged, as this helps the FOSS community to be vigilant in detecting and reporting design deviations and investigate into probable vulnerabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Attack on Critical Infrastructure</strong><br />The Nuclear Power Corporation of India encounters and prevents numerous cyber attacks every day. <a name="fr24" href="#fn24">[24]</a> The best known example of a successful nuclear plant hack is the Stuxnet worm that thwarted the operation of an Iranian nuclear enrichment complex and set back the country’s nuclear programme. <a name="fr25" href="#fn25">[25] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The worm had the ability to spread over the network and would activate when a specific configuration of systems was encountered <a name="fr26" href="#fn26">[26]</a> and connected to one or more Siemens programmable logic controllers. <a name="fr27" href="#fn27">[27]</a> The worm was suspected to have been initially introduced through an infected USB drive into one of the controller computers by an insider, thus crossing the air gap. <a name="fr28" href="#fn28">[28]</a> The worm used information that it gathered to take control of normal industrial processes (to discreetly speed up centrifuges, in the present case), leaving the operators of the plant unaware that they were being attacked. This incident demonstrates how an attack vector introduced into the general internet can be used to target specific system configurations. When the target of a successful attack is a sector as critical and secured as a nuclear complex, the implications for a country’s security and infrastructure are potentially grave.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Security audits and other transparency measures to identify vulnerabilities are critical in sensitive sectors. Incentive schemes such as prizes, contracts and grants may be evolved for the private sector and academia to identify vulnerabilities in the infrastructure of critical resources to enable/promote security auditing of infrastructure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Micro Level: Chip Attacks</strong><br />Semiconductor devices are ubiquitous in electronic devices. The US, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and China are the primary countries hosting manufacturing hubs of these devices. India currently does not produce semiconductors, and depends on imported chips. This dependence on foreign semiconductor technology can result in the import and use of compromised or fraudulent chips by critical sectors in India. For example, hardware Trojans, which may be used to access personal information and content on a device, may be inserted into the chip. Such breaches/transgressions can render equipment in critical sectors vulnerable to attack and threaten national security. <a name="fr29" href="#fn29">[29]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Indigenous production of critical technologies and the development of manpower and infrastructure to support these activities are needed. The Government of India has taken a number of steps towards this. For example, in 2013, the Government of India approved the building of two Semiconductor Wafer Fabrication (FAB) manufacturing facilities <a name="fr30" href="#fn30">[30]</a> and as of January 2014, India was seeking to establish its first semiconductor characterisation lab in Bangalore. <a name="fr31" href="#fn31">[31]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Macro Level: Telecom and Network Switches</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The possibility of foreign equipment containing vulnerabilities and backdoors that are built into its software and hardware gives rise to concerns that India’s telecom and network infrastructure is vulnerable to being hacked and accessed by foreign governments (or non-state actors) through the use of spyware and malware that exploit such vulnerabilities. In 2013, some firms, including ZTE and Huawei, were barred by the Indian government from participating in a bid to supply technology for the development of its National Optic Network project due to security concerns. <a name="fr32" href="#fn32">[32]</a> Similar concerns have resulted in the Indian government holding back the conferment of ‘domestic manufacturer’ status on both these firms. <a name="fr33" href="#fn33">[33]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Following reports that Chinese firms were responsible for transnational cyber attacks designed to steal confidential data from overseas targets, there have been moves to establish laboratories to test imported telecom equipment in India. <a name="fr34" href="#fn34">[34]</a> Despite these steps, in a February 2014 incident the state-owned telecommunication company Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd’s network was hacked, allegedly by Huawei. <a name="fr35" href="#fn35">[35]</a></p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify;" class="pullquote">Security practitioners and policymakers need to avoid the zero-sum framing prevalent in popular discourse regarding security VIS-A-VIS privacy, transparency and technology.</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A successful hack of the telecom infrastructure could result in massive disruption in internet and telecommunications services. Large-scale surveillance and espionage by foreign actors would also become possible, placing, among others, both governmental secrets and individuals personal information at risk.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While India cannot afford to impose a general ban on the import of foreign telecommunications equipment, a number of steps can be taken to address the risk of inbuilt security vulnerabilities. Common International Criteria for security audits could be evolved by states to ensure compliance of products with international norms and practices. While India has already established common criteria evaluation centres, <a name="fr36" href="#fn36">[36]</a> the government monopoly over the testing function has resulted in only three products being tested so far. A Code Escrow Regime could be set up where manufacturers would be asked to deposit source code with the Government of India for security audits and verification. The source code could be compared with the shipped software to detect inbuilt vulnerabilities.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cyber security cannot be enhanced without a proper understanding of the relationship between security and other national imperatives such as privacy, transparency and technology. This paper has provided an initial sketch of those relationships, but sustained theoretical and empirical research is required in India so that security practitioners and policymakers avoid the zero-sum framing prevalent in popular discourse and take on the hard task of solving the optimisation problem by shifting policy, market and technological levers simultaneously. These solutions must then be applied in multiple contexts or scenarios to determine how they should be customised to provide maximum security bang for the buck.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn1" href="#fr1">1</a>]. Daniel J. Solove, Chapter 1 in Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (Yale University Press: 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1827982.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn2" href="#fr2">2</a>]. Bruce Schneier, “What our Top Spy doesn’t get: Security and Privacy aren’t Opposites,” Wired, January 24, 2008, http://archive.wired.com/politics/security commentary/security matters/2008/01/securitymatters_0124 and Bruce Schneier, “Security vs. Privacy,” Schneier on Security, January 29, 2008, https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/security_vs_pri.html.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn3" href="#fr3">3</a>]. There are four sources of power in internet governance: Market power exerted by private sector organisations; regulatory power exerted by states; technical power exerted by anyone who has access to certain categories of technology, such as cryptography; and finally, the power of public pressure sporadically mobilised by civil society. A technically sound encryption standard, if employed by an ordinary citizen, cannot be compromised using the power of the market or the regulatory power of states or public pressure by civil society. In that sense, technology can be used to regulate state and market behaviour.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn4" href="#fr4">4</a>]. Ann Cavoukian and Khaled El Emam, “Introducing Privacy-Protective Surveillance: Achieving Privacy and Effective Counter-Terrorism,” Information & Privacy Commisioner, September 2013, Ontario, Canada, http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2013/12/pps.pdf.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn5" href="#fr5">5</a>]. Madan Oberoi, Pramod Jagtap, Anupam Joshi, Tim Finin and Lalana Kagal, “Information Integration and Analysis: A Semantic Approach to Privacy”(presented at the third IEEE International Conference on Information Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust, Boston, USA, October 2011), ebiquity.umbc.edu/_file_directory_/papers/578.pdf.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn6" href="#fr6">6</a>]. Bruce Byfield, “Does Heartbleed disprove ‘Open Source is Safer’?,” Datamation, April 14, 2014, http://www.datamation.com/open-source/does-heartbleed-disprove-open-source-is-safer-1.html.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn7" href="#fr7">7</a>]. “Cybersecurity Program should be more transparent, protect privacy,” Centre for Democracy and Technology Insights, March 20, 2009, https://cdt.org/insight/cybersecurity-program-should-be-more-transparent-protect-privacy/#1.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn8" href="#fr8">8</a>]. “Cracked Credibility,” The Economist, September 14, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21586296-be-safe-internet-needs-reliable-encryption-standards-software-and.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn9" href="#fr9">9</a>]. Miriam Elder, “Russian guard service reverts to typewriters after NSA leaks,” The Guardian, July 11, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks and Philip Oltermann, “Germany ‘may revert to typewriters’ to counter hi-tech espionage,” The Guardian, July 15, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/germany-typewriters-espionage-nsa-spying-surveillance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn10" href="#fr10">10</a>]. Bruce Schneier, “A Plea for Simplicity,” Schneier on Security, November 19, 1999, https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/1999/11/a_plea_for_simplicit.html.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn11" href="#fr11">11</a>]. With inputs from Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society and Sharathchandra Ramakrishnan of Srishti School of Art, Technology and Design.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn12" href="#fr12">12</a>]. “Frequently Asked Questions,” Controller of Certifying Authorities, Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, http://cca.gov.in/cca/index.php?q=faq-page#n41.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn13" href="#fr13">13</a>]. National Informatics Centre Homepage, Government of India, http://www.nic.in/node/41.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn14" href="#fr14">14</a>]. Adam Langley, “Maintaining Digital Certificate Security,” Google Security Blog, July 8, 2014, http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.in/2014/07/maintaining-digital-certificate-security.html.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn15" href="#fr15">15</a>]. This is similar to the kind of attack carried out against DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate authority. See: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=jss.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn16" href="#fr16">16</a>]. R. Ramachandran, “Digital Disaster,” Frontline, August 22, 2014, http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/digital-disaster/article6275366.ece.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn17" href="#fr17">17</a>]. Ibid.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn18" href="#fr18">18</a>]. “NIC’s digital certification unit hacked,” Deccan Herald, July 16, 2014, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/420148/archives.php.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn19" href="#fr19">19</a>]. National Informatics Centre Certifying Authority Homepage, Government of India, http://nicca.nic.in//.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn20" href="#fr20">20</a>]. Mozilla Wiki, “Public Key Pinning,” https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinning.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn21" href="#fr21">21</a>]. “Certificate Transparency - The quick detection of fraudulent digital certificates,” Ascertia, August 11, 2014, http://www.ascertiaIndira.com/blogs/pki/2014/08/11/certificate-transparency-the-quick-detection-of-fraudulent-digital-certificates.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn22" href="#fr22">22</a>]. “Indira Gandhi International Airport (DEL/VIDP) Terminal 3, India,” Airport Technology.com, http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/indira-gandhi-international-airport-terminal -3/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn23" href="#fr23">23</a>]. “How techies used logic bomb to cripple Delhi Airport,” Rediff, November 21, 2011, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/how-techies-used-logic-bomb-to-cripple-delhi-airport/20111121 htm.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn24" href="#fr24">24</a>]. Manu Kaushik and Pierre Mario Fitter, “Beware of the bugs,” Business Today, February 17, 2013, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/india-cyber-security-at-risk/1/191786.html.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn25" href="#fr25">25</a>]. “Stuxnet ‘hit’ Iran nuclear plants,” BBC, November 22, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11809827.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn26" href="#fr26">26</a>]. In this case, systems using Microsoft Windows and running Siemens Step7 software were targeted.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn27" href="#fr27">27</a>]. Jonathan Fildes, “Stuxnet worm ‘targeted high-value Iranian assets’,” BBC, September 23, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11388018.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn28" href="#fr28">28</a>]. Farhad Manjoo, “Don’t Stick it in: The dangers of USB drives,” Slate, October 5, 2010, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2010/10/dont_stick_it_in.html.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn29" href="#fr29">29</a>]. Ibid.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn30" href="#fr30">30</a>]. “IBM invests in new $5bn chip fab in India, so is chip sale off?,” ElectronicsWeekly, February 14, 2014, http://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/ibm-invests-new-5bn-chip-fab-india-chip-sale-2014-02/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn31" href="#fr31">31</a>]. NT Balanarayan, “Cabinet Approves Creation of Two Semiconductor Fabrication Units,” Medianama, February 17, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-04/news/47004737_1_indian-electronics-special-incentive-package-scheme-semiconductor-association.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn32" href="#fr32">32</a>]. Jamie Yap, “India bars foreign vendors from national broadband initiative,” ZD Net, January 21, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/india-bars-foreign-vendors-from-national-broadband-initiative-7000010055/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn33" href="#fr33">33</a>]. Kevin Kwang, “India holds back domestic-maker status for Huawei, ZTE,” ZD Net, February 6, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/india-holds-back-domestic-maker-status-for-huawei-zte-70 00010887/. Also see “Huawei, ZTE await domestic-maker tag,” The Hindu, February 5, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/business/companies/huawei-zte-await-domesticmaker-tag/article4382888.ece.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn34" href="#fr34">34</a>]. Ellyne Phneah, “Huawei, ZTE under probe by Indian government,” ZD Net, May 10, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/in/huawei-zte-under-probe-by-indian-government-7000015185/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">[<a name="fn35" href="#fr35">35</a>]. Devidutta Tripathy, “India investigates report of Huawei hacking state carrier network,” Reuters, February 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/us-india-huawei-hacking-idUSBREA150QK20140206.</p>
<p>[<a name="fn36" href="#fr36">36</a>]. “Products Certified,” Common Criteria Portal of India, http://www.commoncriteria-india.gov.in/Pages/ProductsCertified.aspx.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-privacy-transparency-and-technology'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-privacy-transparency-and-technology</a>
</p>
No publishersunilBig DataPrivacyInternet GovernanceFeaturedHomepage2015-09-15T10:53:52ZBlog Entry Call for Essays: Studying Internet in India
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/call-for-essays-studying-internet-in-india-2016
<b>As Internet makes itself comfortable amidst everyday lives in India, it becomes everywhere and everyware, it comes in 40 MBPS Unlimited and in chhota recharges – though no longer in zero flavour – the Researchers at Work (RAW) programme at the Centre for Internet and Society invites abstracts for essays that explore how do we study internet in India today. </b>
<p> </p>
<h3>Submission deadline extended to <strong>Sunday, July 03</strong>.</h3>
<hr />
<img src="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/img/RAW_Morpheus-Meme-Digital-Genre.png" alt="What if I told you memes are a new digital genre?" />
<p> </p>
<h6>Source: <a href="http://leonardoflores.net/blog/new-digital-genres-writing-for-social-media/">Leonardo Flores</a>.</h6>
<p> </p>
<p>How do we move beyond a fascination with new digital things and interfaces that we engage with on the internet, which are increasingly becoming the objects and sites of our research and creative practices? How do we engage with these on their own terms, and perhaps also against the grain? What "new" is being brought in, performed, and afforded by these digital artefacts in our daily lives? How can our concerns and practices benefit from developing an awareness of their aesthetics, functions, and politics?</p>
<p>This call is for researchers, workers, and others interested in closely – or from a distance – commenting on these topics and questions.</p>
<p>Please send abstracts (200 words) to <a href="mailto:raw@cis-india.org">raw@cis-india.org</a> by <strong>Sunday, July 03, 2016</strong>. The subject of the email should be 'Studying Internet in India.'</p>
<p>We will select up to 10 abstracts and announce them on <strong>Tuesday, July 05, 2016</strong>.</p>
<p>The selected authors will be asked to submit the final longform essay (3,000-4,000 words) by <strong>Sunday, July 31, 2016</strong>. The final essays will be published on the RAW Blog. The authors will be offered an honourarium of Rs. 6,000.</p>
<p>We understand that not all essays can be measured in words. The authors are very much welcome to work with text, images, sounds, videos, code, and other mediatic forms that the internet offers. We will not be running a Word Count on the final 'essay.' The basic requirement is that the 'essay' must offer an <em>argument</em> – through text, or otherwise.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/call-for-essays-studying-internet-in-india-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/call-for-essays-studying-internet-in-india-2016</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroInternet StudiesRAW BlogFeaturedNoticesResearchers at Work2016-07-04T12:48:15ZBlog EntryComments on the National Geospatial Policy (Draft, V.1.0), 2016
http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/comments-on-the-national-geospatial-policy-draft-v-1-0-2016
<b>The Department of Science and Technology published the first public draft of the National Geospatial Policy (v.1.0) on May 05, 2016, and invited comments from the public. CIS submitted the following comments in response. The comments were authored by Adya Garg, Anubha Sinha, and Sumandro Chattapadhyay.</b>
<p> </p>
<h2>1. Preliminary</h2>
<p><strong>1.1.</strong> This submission presents comments and recommendations by the Centre for Internet and Society (<strong>"CIS"</strong>) on the proposed draft of the National Geospatial Policy 2016 (<strong>"the draft Policy / the draft NGP"</strong>) <strong>[1]</strong>. This submission is based on Version 1.0 of the draft Policy released by the Department of Science and Technology (<strong>"DST"</strong>) on May 5, 2016.</p>
<p><strong>1.2.</strong> CIS commends the DST under the aegis of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders to draft a National Geospatial Policy. CIS is thankful for this opportunity to provide a clause-by-clause submission.</p>
<h2>2. The Centre for Internet and Society</h2>
<p><strong>2.1.</strong> The Centre for Internet and Society, CIS, <strong>[2]</strong> is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa.</p>
<p><strong>2.2.</strong> This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved. The comments in this submission aim to further the principle of citizens’ right to information, instituting openness-by-default in governmental activities, and the various kinds of public goods that can emerge from greater availability of open (geospatial) data created by both public and private agencies and crucially, by the citizens. The submission is limited to those clauses that most directly have an impact on these principles.</p>
<h2>3. Comments and Recommendations</h2>
<p><em>This section presents comments and recommendations directed at the draft policy as a whole, and in certain places, directed at specific clauses of the draft policy.</em></p>
<p><strong>3.1.</strong> The draft policy should make references to five policies applicable to geospatial data, products, services, and solutions</p>
<p><strong>3.1.1.</strong> CIS observes that the draft policy lists the key policies related to geospatial information and sharing of government data, namely the National Map Policy 2005, the Civil Aviation Requirement 2012, the Remote Sensing Data Policy 2011 and 2012, and the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy 2012 (“NDSAP”).</p>
<p><strong>3.1.2.</strong> CIS submits that apart from the policies mentioned above, Geospatial Data,Products, Services and Solutions (“GDPSS”) are also intricately linked to concepts of “open standards,” “open source software,” “open API,” “right to information,” and prohibited places” These concepts are governed by specific acts and policies, and are applicable to geospatial data, as follows:</p>
<ul><li>Adoption of Open Standards: CIS observes that the draft policy captures the importance of open standards in the section 1.4 of the draft policy. It states that “A very high resolution and highly accurate framework to function as a national geospatial standard for all geo-referencing activity through periodically updated National Geospatial Frame [NGF] and National Image Frame [NIF] by ensuring open standards based seamless interoperable geospatial data.”<br /><br />CIS submits that the Policy on Open Standards for e-Governance <strong>[3]</strong> which establishes the Guidelines for usage of open standards to ensure seamless interoperability, and the Implementation Guidelines of the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy, 2012 <strong>[4]</strong> listing two key open standards for geospatial data - KML and GML, should be mentioned in the draft policy.<br /><br />CIS recommends that the final version of the NGP embrace open standards as a key principle of all software projects and infrastructures within the purview of the Policy. This is essential for easier sharing and reuse of open (geospatial) data.<br /><br /></li>
<li>Adoption of Open Source Software: The Policy on Adoption of Open Source Software for Government of India states that the “Government of India shall endeavour to adopt Open Source Software in all e-Governance systems implemented by various Government organisations, as a preferred option in comparison to Closed Source Software” <strong>[5]</strong>. As the draft policy proposed to guide the development of GDPSS being developed and implemented both by the Government of India and by other agencies (academic, commercial, and otherwise), it must include an explicit reference and embracing of this mandate for adoption of Open Source Software, for reasons of reducing expenses, avoiding vendor lock-ins, re-usability of software components, enabling public accountability, and greater security of software systems.<br /><br /></li>
<li>Implementation of Open APIs: To actualise the stated principle to “[e]nable promotion, adoption and implementation of emerging / state of the art technologies” as well as to ensure the “[a]vailability of all geospatial data collected through public funded mechanism to all users,” CIS suggests that final version of the NGP must refer to and operationalise the Policy on Open Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for Government of India <strong>[6]</strong>. This will ensure that the openly available geospatial data is available to the public, as well as to all the government agencies, in a structured digital format that is easy to consume and use on one hand, and is available for various forms of value addition and innovation on the other.<br /><br /></li>
<li>Right to Information Act 2005: The framework for reactive disclosure of information and data collected and held by the Government of India, as well as the basis for proactive disclosure of the same, is enshrined in the Right to Information Act 2005 <strong>[7]</strong>. The draft NGP, CIS proposes, should refer to this Act, and ensure that whenever an Indian citizen request for such government data and/or information that is of geospatial in nature, and the requested data and/or information is both shareable and non-sensitive, the citizen must be provided with the geospatial data and/or information in an open standard and under open license, as applicable.<br /><br /></li>
<li>Refer to Official Secrets Act, 1923: The Official Secrets Act defines “Prohibited Places” and prohibits all activities involving “sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly; or indirectly, useful to an enemy or (c) obtains collects, records or publishes or communicates to any other person any secret official code or password, or any sketch, plan, model, article or note or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be, directly or indirectly, useful to an enemy” <strong>[8]</strong>. This provides the fundamental legal basis for regulation, expunging, and stopping circulation of geospatial data containing information about Vulnerable Points and Vulnerable Areas. CIS submits that this Act should be referred to in this context of ensuring non-publication of sensitive geospatial data (that is geospatial data related to Prohibited Places).<br /><br /></li></ul>
<h3>3.2. Grant adequate permissions to the public to re-use geospatial data</h3>
<p><strong>3.2.1.</strong> CIS observes that section 1.4 of the draft policy states that, “Geospatial data of any resolution being disseminated through agencies and service providers, both internationally and nationally be treated as unclassified and made available and accessible by Indian Mapping and imaging agencies.”</p>
<p><strong>3.2.2.</strong> CIS recommends the abovementioned section be broadened to include not only availability and accessibility of geospatial data, but also its re-use. Further, such accessibility, availability and re-use should not be only limited to public and private entities such as Indian mapping and imaging agencies, but as well as to Indian people in general.</p>
<p><strong>3.2.3.</strong> CIS further submits that section 1.4 be revised as “[g]eospatial data of any resolution being disseminated through agencies and service providers, both internationally and nationally be treated as unclassified and made available, accessible, and reusable by Indian mapping and imaging agencies in particular, and by the people of India in general.”</p>
<h3>3.3. Ensure Open Access to shareable and non-sensitive geospatial data</h3>
<p><strong>3.3.1.</strong> CIS observes that the draft policy directs all “geospatial data generating agencies” to classify their data into “open access,” “registered access,” and “restricted access.” The document, however, neither defines “geospatial data generating agencies”, nor does it clarify what conditions the data must satisfy to be classified as one of the three types. Without a listing of such conditions (at least necessary, and not sufficient, conditions), nothing restricts the agencies from classifying all generated geospatial data as “restricted.”</p>
<p><strong>3.3.2.</strong> Further, CIS observes that the draft policy aims to provide geospatial data acquired through public funded mechanism to be made available to the public at free of cost. It is submitted that the policy should not only be made available for free of cost, but it should also be made available in open standard format under an open license.</p>
<p><strong>3.3.3.</strong> As defined in the section 1.3, the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (“NDSAP”) applies to “all shareable non-sensitive data available either in digital or analog forms but generated using public funds” <strong>[9]</strong>. Clearly all shareable <strong>[10]</strong> and non-sensitive <strong>[11]</strong> geospatial data, either in digital or analog forms, and generated using public funds should be proactively disclosed by the government agency concerns in accordance to the NDSAP. CIS recommends that the draft policy makes an explicit reference to NDSAP when discussing the topic of Open Access geospatial data, and re-iterates the mandate of proactive publication of shareable and non-sensitive government data.</p>
<p><strong>3.3.4.</strong> Further, the process for defining an open government data license to be applied to all open government data sets being published under the NDSAP, and through the Open Government Data Platform India, is in progress. Given this, it is absolutely crucial important that the draft NGP takes this into consideration, and mandates that Open Access geospatial data must be published using the open government data license to be defined by the Implementation Guidelines of the NDSAP, when applicable.</p>
<h3>3.4. Lack of clarity regarding the clearances and permits required for data acquisition and dissemination, and the procedures thereof</h3>
<p><strong>3.4.1.</strong> Section 1.8 of the draft policy states that “[a]ll clearances / permits, as necessary, for data acquisition and dissemination be through a single window, online portal. These clearances be provided within a time span of 30 days of filing the online request.” CIS observes that the draft policy does not specify the kind of clearances/permits needed before a public or private entity, or an individual, can undertake acquisition and dissemination of geospatial data. It neither clarifies under what circumstances and conditions application for such clearance / permits would be required for users.</p>
<p><strong>3.4.2.</strong> Since the recently published draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill (“GIRB”) 2016, directly addresses this topic of clearance / permit required to acquire and share geospatial information <strong>[12]</strong>, it will be effective if the NGP can refer to this Bill and provide an overall governance framework for the same. Further, CIS noted that the time span of 30 days mentioned in the draft policy is inconsistent with the time period specified in the GIRB (which is 90 days).</p>
<p><strong>3.4.3.</strong> CIS recommends that the draft policy also be amended suitably to include the circumstances and conditions under which required permissions shall be issued. Accordingly, the draft policy should reference the standardised and time bound security vetting process envisaged in the GIRB.</p>
<h3>3.5. Clarification Needed regarding “Cybersecurity is to be ensured through … use of Digital Watermarks for authentication of GDPSS”</h3>
<p><strong>3.5.1.</strong> CIS submits that the draft policy does not elaborate on the use of “Digital Watermarks” to ensure cybersecurity, neither it is explained who will authenticate GDPSS, under what conditions, and for what reasons. CIS recommends that the draft policy be amended suitably to specify the same.</p>
<h3>3.6. Remove Classification of Non-Public (at Present) Satellite / Aerial Imagery as Restricted by Default</h3>
<p><strong>3.6.1.</strong> CIS observes that the draft policy recommends that “[s]atellite/aerial images of resolution other than those currently made available on websites” should all be “classified for restricted access.”</p>
<p><strong>3.6.2.</strong> CIS submits that blanket categorisation of all satellite / aerial imagery of resolution that is not currently available through a public website (for whatever reason it might be) as “restricted access” should be re-evaluated, given the immense importance of such imagery to mapping agencies and industry participants using GDPSS.</p>
<p><strong>3.6.3.</strong> CIS recommends that the section be revised to define clear principles for defining satellite /aerial imagery as “open,” “registered,” and “restricted.”</p>
<h3>3.7. Governance of User-contributed Geospatial Data</h3>
<p><strong>3.7.1.</strong> A key resource and feature of contemporary geospatial industry in particular, and the digital economy in general, is the proliferation of user-contributed and user-generated geospatial data and information. CIS observes that this crucial topic, as well as the unique governance concerns that it raises, has not been addressed in the draft policy at all. CIS requests the DST to consider this matter with due attention to the specific nature and values of such user-contributed and user-generated in the digital economy on one hand, and in emergency contexts such as natural disasters on the other, and prepare a framework for its appropriate governance as part of the NGP itself.</p>
<h3>3.8. Protect Geospatial Privacy of Citizens by Defining Sensitive Personal Geospatial Data and Information</h3>
<p><strong>3.8.1.</strong> CIS observes that the draft policy lacks rules for collection, use, storage, and distribution of geospatial data from an individual’s privacy standpoint. Further, neither does the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 address these concerns <strong>[13]</strong>. Section 3 of the Rules define “Sensitive personal data or information”, which do not include geospatial information.</p>
<p><strong>3.8.2.</strong> The argument of violation of constitutional right to privacy was pleaded in a case against Google and other private mapping agencies in 2008 <strong>[14]</strong>. In the judgment, Madras HIgh Court noted that there existed no legislation/guidelines to prohibit mapping programmes from conducting their activities indiscriminately, and the lack of one thereof prevented the Court from injuncting such activities. Thus, there exists a judicial ambiguity on the aspect of collection and use of geospatial data.</p>
<p><strong>3.8.3.</strong> CIS submits that the draft policy may be suitably amended to ensure that collection, processing and dissemination of geospatial information is in consonance with the constitutionally protection of an individual’s privacy.</p>
<h3>3.9. Clarification Needed regarding “Mechanisms to be put in place to evaluate / audit GDPSS creation, consumption and distribution”</h3>
<p><strong>3.9.1.</strong> The draft policy suggests that “mechanisms to be put in place to evaluate/audit GDPSS creation, consumption and distribution” without clarifying the scope, purpose, and purview of this mechanism, and most crucially it does not describe what exactly will be evaluated / audited. CIS submits that this section is revised and expanded.</p>
<p><strong>3.9.2.</strong> The same section also identifies the need for a “framework to be put in place to assess the data collection versus its utilization towards government program and socio-economic development.” CIS observes that this is a very promising and much welcome gesture by the DST, but this section must be developed as a separate and detailed mandate. At the least, the NGP may suggest that a more detailed guideline document regarding this framework will be developed in near future.</p>
<h3>3.10. Data Taxation and Geospatial Cess</h3>
<p><strong>3.10.1.</strong> The draft policy refers to imposition of “data taxation (geospatial cess)” and use of “licensing” of geospatial data to raise money for geospatial activities of the Government of India. CIS is of the opinion will severely affect the geospatial industry in the country in particular, and will raise the monetary barrier to public use of geospatial data and maps in general; and hence must be strictly avoided.</p>
<h3>3.11. Data Dissemination Cell</h3>
<p><strong>3.11.1.</strong> CIS submits that instead of development of a separate Data Dissemination Cell within all government agencies to operationalise the mandate of the NGP, the Chief Data Officers within all government agencies identified under the implementation process of the NDSAP be given this complementary responsibility. This would ensure effective channelisation of human and financial resources to take forward the joint mandate of NGP and NDSAP towards greater public availability and use of (shareable and non-sensitive) government data.</p>
<h3>3.12. Special Infrastructure for Governance, Management, and Publication of Real-time Geospatial Data</h3>
<p><strong>3.12.1.</strong> A key term that the draft policy does not talk about is “big data.” The static or much-slowly-changing geospatial data such as national boundaries and details of Vulnerable Points and Vulnerable Areas are really a very small part of of the global geospatial information. The much larger and crucial part is the real-time (that is continuously produced, stored, analysed, and used in almost real-time) big geospatial data – from geo-referenced tweets, to GPS systems of cars, to mobile phones moving through the cities and regions. Addressing such networked data systems, where all data collected by digital devices can quite easily be born-georeferenced, and the security and privacy concerns that are engendered by them, should be the ultimate purpose of, and challenge for, a future-looking NGP.</p>
<p><strong>3.12.2.</strong> Further, with increasing number of government assets being geo-referenced for the purpose of more effective and real-time management, especially in the transportation sector, the corresponding agencies (which are often not mapping agencies) are acquiring a vast amount of high-velocity geospatial data, which needs to be analysed and (sometimes) published in the real-time. CIS submits a sincere request to DST to highlight the crucial need for special infrastructure for such data, as well as its governance, and identify the key principles concerned in the next version of the draft NGP.</p>
<h3>3.13. Sincere Request for Preparation and Circulation of a Second Public Draft of the National Geospatial Policy</h3>
<p><strong>3.13.1.</strong> CIS commends the DST for publishing the draft policy, and facilitating a consultation process inviting stakeholders and civil society to submit feedback. The NGP envisages to address crucial concepts of privacy, licensing, intellectual property rights, liability, national security, open data, which cut across and impact various technology platforms, industries and the citizens.</p>
<p><strong>3.13.2.</strong> In view of the multifarious issues highlighted that arise at the intersection of various legal and ethical concepts, CIS respectfully requests the DST to conduct another round of consultation after the publication of the second draft of the NGP. Multiple rounds of consultation and feedback would contribute to the robustness of the lawmaking process and ensure that the final policy safeguards the general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved.</p>
<p><strong>3.13.3.</strong> CIS is thankful to DST for the opportunity to provide comments, and would be privileged to provide further assistance on the matter to DST.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Endnotes</h2>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> See: <a href="http://www.dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft-NGP-Ver%201%20ammended_05May2016.pdf">http://www.dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft-NGP-Ver%201%20ammended_05May2016.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[2]</strong> See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/">http://cis-india.org/</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[3]</strong> See: <a href="https://egovstandards.gov.in/sites/default/files/Published%20Documents/Policy_on_Open_Standards_for_e-Governance.pdf">https://egovstandards.gov.in/sites/default/files/Published%20Documents/Policy_on_Open_Standards_for_e-Governance.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[4]</strong> See: <a href="http://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf">http://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[5]</strong> See: <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/policy_on_adoption_of_oss.pdf">http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/policy_on_adoption_of_oss.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[6]</strong> See: <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Open_APIs_19May2015.pdf">http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Open_APIs_19May2015.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[7]</strong> See: <a href="http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm">http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[8]</strong> See: <a href="http://www.archive.india.gov.in/allimpfrms/allacts/3314.pdf">http://www.archive.india.gov.in/allimpfrms/allacts/3314.pdf</a>, sections 2(d) and 3(b).</p>
<p><strong>[9]</strong> See: <a href="https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf">https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[10]</strong> See section 2.11 of NDSAP.</p>
<p><strong>[11]</strong> See section 2.10 of NDSAP.</p>
<p><strong>[12]</strong> See: <a href="http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/GeospatialBill_05052016_eve.pdf">http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/GeospatialBill_05052016_eve.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[13]</strong> See: <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf">http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[14]</strong> J. Mohanraj v (1) Secretary To Government, Delhi; (2) Indian Space Research Organisation, Bangalore; (3) Google India Private Limited, Bangalore, 2008 Indlaw MAD 3562.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/comments-on-the-national-geospatial-policy-draft-v-1-0-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/comments-on-the-national-geospatial-policy-draft-v-1-0-2016</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroOpen StandardsOpen DataOpen Government DataFeaturedGeospatial DataNational Geospatial PolicyOpenness2016-06-30T09:40:59ZBlog EntrySmart City Policies and Standards: Overview of Projects, Data Policies, and Standards across Five International Smart Cities
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policies-and-standards-overview-of-five-international-smart-cities
<b>This blog post aims to review five Smart Cities across the globe, namely Singapore, Dubai, New York City, London and Seoul, the Data Policies and Standards adopted. Also, the research seeks to point the similarities, differences and best practices in the development of smart cities across jurisdictions.</b>
<p> </p>
<h4>Download the brief: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/SmartCitiesPoliciesStandards-20160608/at_download/file">PDF</a>.</h4>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Introduction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Smart City as a concept is evolutionary in nature, and the key elements like Information and Communication Technology (ICT), digitization of services, Internet of Things (IoT), open data, big data, social innovation, knowledge, etc., would be intrinsic to defining a Smart City <a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A Smart City, as a “system of systems”, can potentially generate vast amounts of data, especially as cities install more sensors, gain access to data from sources such as mobile devices, and government and other agencies make more data accessible. Consequently, Big Data techniques and concepts are highly relevant to the future of Smart Cities. It was noted by Kenneth Cukier, Senior Editor of Digital Products at The Economist, that Big Data techniques can be used to enhance a number of processes essential to cities - for example, big data can be used to spot business trends, determine quality of research, prevent diseases, tack legal citations, combat crime, and determine real-time roadway traffic conditions <a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. Having said this, data is deemed to be the lifeblood of a Smart City and its availability, use, cost, quality, analysis, associated business models and governance are all areas of interest for a range of actors within a smart city <a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This blog reviews five Smart Cities namely Singapore, Dubai, New York City, London and Seoul. In doing so, the research seeks to point the similarities, differences and best practices in the development of smart cities across jurisdictions. To achieve this, the research reviews:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>The definition of a Smart City in a given context or project (if any).</li>
<li>Existing policy/regulations around data or notes the lack thereof.</li>
<li>The cities adherence to the International standards and providing an update on the current status of the Smart City programme.</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Singapore</h2>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Smart Nation programme in Singapore was launched on 24th November, 2014. The programme is being driven by the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore, through which Singapore seeks to harness ICT, networks and data to support improved livelihoods, stronger communities and creation of new opportunities for its residents <a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> According to the IDA, a Smart Nation is a city where <em>“people and businesses are empowered through increased access to data, more participatory through the contribution of innovative ideas and solutions, and a more anticipatory government that utilises technology to better serve citizens’ needs”</em> <a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>. The Smart Nation programme is driven by a designated Office in the Prime Minister’s Office <a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a>. As a core component to the Smart Nation Programme, the Smart Nation Platform has been developed as the technical architecture to support the Programme. This Platform enables greater pervasive connectivity, better situational awareness through data collection, and efficient sharing and access to collected sensor data, allowing public bodies to use such data to develop policy and practical interventions <a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> Such access would allow for anticipatory governance - a goal of the Smart Nation Programme as noted by Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for Communications and Information stating “Insights gained from this data would enable us to better anticipate citizens’ needs and help in better delivery of services” <a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of the Project</strong></h3>
<div style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Smart Nation Programme is an ongoing initiative, being built on the past programme Intelligent Nation 2015 (iN2015 masterplan). The plan involves putting in place the infrastructure, policies, ecosystem and capabilities to enable a Smart Nation, by adopting a people-centric approach <a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a>. A number of co-creating solutions adopted by the Government include:</div>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Development of Mobile Apps to facilitate communication between the public and the providers of public services.</li>
<li>Organization of Hackathons by government agencies or corporations in collaboration with schools and industry partners to ideate and develop solutions to tackle real-world challenges.</li>
<li>Adopt measure for smart mobility to create a more seamless transport experience and providing greater access to real-time transport information so that citizens can better plan their journeys.</li>
<li>Smart technologies are also being introduced to the housing estates <a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a>.</li></ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Policies and Regulations</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Smart Nation plan derives its legitimacy from the constitution of Singapore, holding the Prime Minister responsible to take charge of the subject ‘Smart Nation’ blueprint under the Statutory body of ‘Smart Nation’ Programme Office <a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a>. Singapore has a comprehensive data protection law – the Personal Data Protection Act 2012, rules governing the collection, use, disclosure and care of personal data. The Personal Data Protection Commission of Singapore has committed to work closely with the private sector, and also to support the Smart Nation vision on data privacy and cyber security ecosystem <a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> <a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Towards achieving the Smart Nation vision the government has also promoted the use of open data. In 2015 the Department of Statistics has made a vast amount of data available (across multiple themes say transport, infocomm, population, etc.) for free to the public in order to encourage innovation and facilitate the Smart Nation <a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a>. Prior to this initiative, the government had adopted the Open Data Policy in 2011, enabling public data for analysis, research and application development <a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a>. The concept of Virtual Singapore, which is a part of the Smart Nation Initiative, has been developed to adopt and simulate solutions on a virtual platform using big data analytics <a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Adoption of International Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Smart Nation initiative follows the standards laid under the purview of the Singapore Standards Council (SSC). It specifies three types of Internet of Things (IoT) Standards – sensor network standards (TR38 - for public areas & TR40 - for homes), IoT foundational standards (common set of guidelines for IoT requirements and architecture, information and service interoperability, security and data integrity) and domain-specific standards (healthcare, mobility, urban living, etc.) <a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Singapore is part of ISO/IEC JTC 1/WG7 Sensor Networks and ISO/IEC JTC 1/WG10 Internet of Things (IoT) <a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a>. <a href="https://www.itsc.org.sg/standards/singapore-it-standards">Singapore IT standards</a> abides to the international standards as defined by ISO, ITU, etc.Singapore is a member of many international standards forums (see <a href="https://www.itsc.org.sg/international-participation/memberships-in-iso-iec-jtc1">Singapore International Standards Committee</a>) which includes JTC1/WG9 - Big Data; JTC1/WG10 - Internet of Things; JTC1/WG11 - Smart Cities.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Dubai, United Arab Emirates</h2>
<h3><strong> </strong><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Dubai Smart City strategy was launched as part of the Dubai Plan 2021 vision, in the year 2015 <a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a>. Dubai Plan 2021 describes the future of Dubai evolving through holistic and complementary perspectives, starting with the people and the society and places the government as the custodian of the city’s development. Within the Plan, the smart city theme envisions a platform that is fully connected and integrated infrastructure that enables easy mobility for all residents and tourists, and provides easy access to all economic centers and social services, in line with the world’s best cities <a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a>. Center to the smart city platform is data and data analytics, particularly cross functional data and big data techniques to give a complete view of the city <a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> As envisioned, the Dubai Data portal would provide a gateway to empower relevant stakeholders to understand the nuances of the city and pursue questions that will result in the greatest impact from the city’s data <a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a>. The platform will be based on current data and existing services, initiatives, and networks to identify opportunities for a smart city <a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a>. The Smart City Plan also includes a framework for aligning districts of Dubai with the Smart City vision and dimensions <a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Smart Dubai roadmap 2015 provides a consolidated report and planned smart city services, its status and the stage of its implementation, for e.g. Smart Grid, Mobile Payment, Smart Water, Health applications, Public Wi-Fi, Municipality, E-Traffic solutions, etc <a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of the Project</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> </strong>The Smart Dubai strategy is envisioned to be completed by the year 2020, and currently it’s ongoing. The first phase of Smart Dubai masterplan is expected to end by 2016. Between 2017 and 2019, the plan aims to deliver new initiatives and services. The second phase of the masterplan is expected to be completed by the year 2020 <a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Policies and Regulations</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Smart City Plan is being driven by the <strong>Dubai Smart City Office</strong> – which has been established under Law No. (29) of 2015 on the establishment of Dubai Smart City Office; Law No. (30) of 2015 on the establishment of Dubai Smart City Establishment; Decree No. (37) of 2015 on the formation of the Board of the Dubai Smart City Office; and Decree No (38) of 2015- appointing a Director General for the Office, which will develop overall policies and strategic plans, supervise the smart transformation process and approve joint initiatives, projects and services <a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a>. Also, an open data law called <strong>Dubai Open Data Law</strong> was issued to complete the legislative framework for transforming Dubai into a Smart City <a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a>. This law will enable the sharing of non-confidential data between public entities and other stakeholders.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Adoption of International Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 2015 the Smart Dubai Executive Committee has collaborated through an agreement with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) adopt the performance indicators by the ITU Focus Group on Smart Sustainable Cities to evaluate the feasibility of the indicators <a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a>. The Focus Group is working towards identifying global best practices for the development of smart cities <a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">New York City, United States of America</h2>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The ‘One New York Plan’ announced in the year 2015 is a comprehensive plan for a sustainable and resilient city. It includes the adoption of digital technology and considers the importance of the role of data in transforming every aspect of the economy, communications, politics, and individual and family life <a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a>. Furthermore, through a publication on '<a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/site/forward/innovations/smartnyc.page">Building a Smart+Equitable City</a>', the Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation (MOTI) describes efforts to leverage new technologies to build Smart city.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Accordingly, the plan seeks to establish better lives through establishing principles and strategic frameworks to guide connected device and Internet of Things (IoT) implementation; MOTI serving as the coordinating entity for new technology and IoT deployments across all City agencies; collaborating with academia and the private sector on innovative pilot projects, and partnering with municipal governments and organizations around the world to share best practices and leverage the impact of technological advancements <a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of the Project</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">OneNYC represents a unified vision for a sustainable, resilient, and equitable city developed with cross-cutting interagency collaboration, public engagement, and consultation with leading experts in their respective fields. The Mayor’s Office of Sustainability oversees the development of OneNYC and now shares responsibility with the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency for ensuring its implementation <a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Policies and Regulations</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As per the Local Law 11 of 2012, each City entity must identify and ultimately publish all of its digital public data for citywide aggregation and publication by 2018. In adherence to this law, there exists a NYC Open Data Plan which requires annual data updation <a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The LinkNYC initiative, one of the key projects to make New York a ‘smart’ city, aims to connect everyone through a city wide wi-fi network. The LinkNYC initiative will retrofit payphones with kiosks to provide high-speed WiFi hotspots and charging stations for increased connectivity <a href="#_ftn35">[35]</a>. Data Privacy in the initiative is addressed through the customer first privacy policy, which considers user’s privacy on priority and will not sell any personal information or share with third parties for their own use. LinkNYC will use anonymized, aggregate data to make the system more efficient and to develop insights to improve your Link experience <a href="#_ftn36">[36]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Adoption of International Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The ANSI Network on Smart and Sustainable Cities (ANSSC) is a forum for information sharing and coordination on voluntary standards, conformity assessment and related activities for smart and sustainable cities in the US <a href="#_ftn37">[37]</a>. The US is a signatory of the ISO/ITU defined standards on smart cities <a href="#_ftn38">[38]</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">London, United Kingdom</h2>
<h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Smart London Plan was unveiled in the year 2013 by the Mayor of London. The plan is being driven through the Greater London Authority, with the advice of the Smart London Board. The Smart London Plan envisions <em>‘Using the creative power of new technologies to serve London and improve Londoner’s lives</em>’ <a href="#_ftn39">[39]</a>. ‘Smart London’ is about harnessing new technology and data so that businesses, Londoners and visitors experience the city in a better way, and do not face bureaucratic hassle and congestion. Smart London seeks to improve the city as a whole and focuses on city macro functions that result from the interplay between city subsystems - such as local labour markets to financial markets, from local government to education, healthcare, transportation and utilities. According to strategy documents, a smarter London recognises and employs data as a service and will leverage data to enable informed decision making and the design of new activities.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of the Project</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This project is currently ongoing. Since its formation in March 2013, the Smart London Board has been advising the Greater London Authority.The Plan sits within the overarching framework of the Mayor’s Vision 2020 <a href="#_ftn40">[40]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Policies and Regulations</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Smart London Plan incorporates the existing open data platform called ‘London DataStore’. The rules and guidelines for this platform are defined by the Greater London Authority, which includes working with public and private sector organisations to create, maintain and utilise it, enabling common data standards, identify and prioritise which data are needed to address London’s growth challenges, establish a Smart London Borough Partnership to encourage boroughs to free up London’s local level data. Also, privacy is protected and there is transparent use of data - to ensure data use is managed in the best interests of the public rather than private enterprise.<sup>42</sup> The Smart London Plan aims to build on this existing datastore to identify and publish data that addresses specific growth challenges, with an emphasis on working with companies and communities to create, maintain, and use this data <a href="#_ftn41">[41]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Open Data White Paper, issued by the Office of Paymaster General, seeks to build a transparent society by releasing public data through open data platforms and leveraging the potential of emerging technologies <a href="#_ftn42">[42]</a>. The Greater London Authority processes personal data in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 <a href="#_ftn43">[43]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Adoption of International Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The British Standards Institution (BSI) has already established Smart City standards and has associated with the ISO Advisory Group on smart city standards. The UK subscribes to the BSI standards for smart cities and has adopted the same <a href="#_ftn44">[44]</a>. The following standards and publications help address various issues for a city to become a smart city:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>The development of a standard on <a href="http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-Standards-and-Publication/PAS-180-smart-cities-terminology/">Smart city terminology (PAS 180)</a></li>
<li>The development of a <a href="http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-Standards-and-Publication/PAS-181-smart-cities-framework/">Smart city framework standard (PAS 181)</a></li>
<li>The development of a <a href="http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-Standards-and-Publication/PAS-182-smart-cities-data-concept-model/">Data concept model for smart cities (PAS 182)</a></li>
<li>A <a href="http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-Standards-and-Publication/PD-8100-smart-cities-overview/">Smart city overview document (PD 8100)</a></li>
<li>A <a href="http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/smart-cities/Smart-Cities-Standards-and-Publication/PD-8101-smart-cities-planning-guidelines/">Smart city planning guidelines document (PD 8101)</a></li>
<li>BS 8904 Guidance for community sustainable development provides a decision-making framework that will help setting objectives in response to the needs and aspirations of city stakeholders</li>
<li>BS 11000 Collaborative relationship management</li>
<li>BSI BIP 2228:2013 Inclusive urban design - A guide to creating accessible public spaces.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further, the Smart London Plan incorporates open data standards in accordance with London DataStore <a href="#_ftn45">[45]</a>. Various government reports – Smart Cities background paper, Open Data White Paper, etc., have suggested the use of standards related to Internet of Things (IoT), open data standards, etc <a href="#_ftn46">[46]</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Seoul, Korea</h2>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Introduction</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong></strong>Smart Seoul 2015 was announced in June 2011 by the Seoul Metropolitan Government, which envisions integrating IT services into every field, including administration, welfare, industry and living. Through this, the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to create a Seoul that uses smart technologies by 2015 <a href="#_ftn47">[47]</a>. Towards this, the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to make use of Big Data in policy development, and through scientific analytics, will provide customized administrative services and reduce wasteful spending. Also, the government is utilising Big Data to analyse trends emerging from existing services <a href="#_ftn48">[48]</a>. Examples of projects that leverage big data that the government has undertaken include the Taxi Matchmaking Project – analyzes the data related to taxi stands and passengers, the Owl Bus <a href="#_ftn49">[49]</a> - maps the bus routes, etc.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Status of the Project</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong></strong>Building on the Smart Seoul 2015, the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to establish 'Global Digital Seoul 2020 – New Connections, Different Experiences' vision in next five-years. In this multi-objective plan, it aims to establish a ’Big Data campus’ providing win-win cooperation among public, private, industry and university <a href="#_ftn50">[50]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Policies and Regulations </strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong></strong>The Smart Seoul 2015 aims to create a ‘Seoul Data Mart’, which will be an open platform that makes public information available for data processing <a href="#_ftn51">[51]</a>. Furthermore, Seoul has opened the Seoul Open Data Plaza <a href="#_ftn52">[52]</a>, an online channel to share and provide citizens with all of Seoul’s public data, such as real-time bus operation schedules, subway schedules, non-smoking areas, locations of public Wi-Fi services, shoeshine shops, and facilities for disabled people, and the information registered in Seoul Open Data Plaza is provided in the open API format.<sup>45</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">South Korea has a comprehensive law governing data privacy – Personal Information Protection Act, 2011. The law includes data protection rules and principles, including obligations on the data controller and the consent of data subjects, rights to access personal data or object to its collection, and security requirements. It also covers cookies and spam, data processing by third parties and the international transfer of data <a href="#_ftn53">[53]</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>International Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong></strong>The smart city standards are adopted in the development of smart cities in Korea <a href="#_ftn54">[54]</a>. Korea has adopted the ISO/TC 268, which is focused on sustainable development in communities. Korea also has one working group developing city indicators and another working group developing metrics for smart community infrastructures <a href="#_ftn55">[55]</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The smart city projects studied are at different levels of implementation and have both similarities and differences. Below is an analysis of some of the key similarities and differences between smart city projects, a comparison of these points to India’s 100 Smart City Mission, and a summary of best practices around the development of smart city frameworks.</p>
<h3><strong>Nodal Agency</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">All cities studied have nodal agencies driving the smart city initiatives and many have policies in place backing these initiatives. For example, while the Smart Nation programme in Singapore is being driven by the Infocomm Development Authority, in London the smart city project is governed by the Great London Authority. The Smart Seoul Project in Korea is governed by the Seoul Metropolitan Government and New York has the Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation serving as the coordinating entity for new technology and IoT deployments across all City agencies. In India, the nodal agency driving the 100 Smart Cities Project is the Ministry of Urban Development under the Indian Government. In India, the implementation of the Mission at the City level will be done by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which will be a limited company and will plan, appraise, approve, release funds, implement, manage, operate, monitor and evaluate the Smart City development projects.</p>
<h3><strong>Policies</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Many of the cities had open data policies and data protection policies that pertain to the Smart City initiatives. In Dubai, an open data law called Dubai Open Data Law has been issued to complete the legislative framework for transforming Dubai into a Smart City and the Smart City Establishment will develop policies for the project. New York also has an Open Data Plan in place and LinkNYC will use anonymized, aggregate data to address data privacy of users. In London, the Smart London Plan incorporates the existing open data platform called ‘London DataStore’, the rules for which are defined by the Greater London Authority, which also ensures privacy and transparent use of data by processing personal data in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. For regulation of data in Seoul, a ‘Seoul Data Mart’ will be established to make public information available for data processing and the Seoul Open Data Plaza is an existing online channel to share and provide citizens with all of Seoul’s public data. South Korea has a comprehensive law governing data privacy in place as well. In Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Commission has committed to work and support the Smart Nation vision on data privacy and cyber security ecosystem. To achieve the vision of the project, the government has also promoted the use of open data. It can be said the these countries , with clearly laid out policies to support and guide the project, have well planned ecosystem for regulation and governance of systems, technologies and cities. All cities have incorporated open data into smart cities and many have developed guidelines for its use. All cities have similar goals of enhancing the lives of citizens and developing anticipatory regulation, however, there appears to be little discussion on the need to amend existing law or enable new law around privacy and data protection in light of data collection through smart cities. In India, no enabling legislation or policy has been formulated by the Government, apart from releasing “Mission Statement and Guidelines”, which provides details about the Project and vision, excluding a definition of a ‘smart city’ or the relevant applicable laws and policies. No information is publicly available regarding deployment of open data, use of specific technologies like cloud, big data, etc., the relevant policies and applicability of laws. Unlike India, all cities recognize the importance of big data techniques in enabling smart city visions, technology and policies. On the lines of these cities, India must work towards addressing the need for an open data framework in light of the 100 Smart Cities Mission to enable the sharing of non-confidential data between public entities and other stakeholders. This requires co-ordination to incorporate, enable and draw upon open data architecture in the cities by the Government with the existing open data framework in India, like the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy, 2012. Use of technology in the form of IoT and Big Data entails access to open data, bringing another policy area in its ambit which needs consideration. Also, identification and development of open standards for IoT must be looked at. Also, as data in smart cities will be generated, collected, used, and shared by both the public and private sector. It is essential that India’s existing data protection standards and regime must be amended to extend the data regulation beyond a body corporate and oversee the collection and use of data by the Government, and its agencies.</p>
<h3><strong>Standards</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In Singapore, the Smart Nation initiative follows the standards laid under the purview of the Singapore Standards Council (SSC)and the <a href="https://www.itsc.org.sg/standards/singapore-it-standards">Singapore IT standards</a> abides to the international standards as defined by ISO, ITU, etc. The Country is also a member of many international standards forums (see <a href="https://www.itsc.org.sg/international-participation/memberships-in-iso-iec-jtc1">Singapore International Standards Committee</a>) which includes JTC1/WG9- Big Data; JTC1/WG10 - Internet of Things; JTC1/WG11 - Smart Cities. In Dubai, the Smart Dubai Executive Committee with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to adopt the performance indicators by the ITU Focus Group on Smart Sustainable Cities to evaluate the feasibility of the indicators. For the purpose of standards, the ANSI Network on Smart and Sustainable Cities (ANSSC) in New York is a forum smart and sustainable cities, along with US being a signatory of the ISO/ITU defined standards on smart cities. Also, The British Standards Institution (BSI) has already established Smart City standards and has associated with the ISO Advisory Group on smart city standards. The UK subscribes to the BSI standards for smart cities and has adopted the same and the Smart London Plan incorporates open data standards in accordance with London DataStore. For development of smart cities, Korea has adopted the ISO/TC 268, which is focused on sustainable development in communities and also has one working group developing city indicators and another working group developing metrics for smart community infrastructures. However, in India, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) has undertaken the task to formulate standardised guidelines for central and state authorities in planning, design and construction of smart cities by setting up a technical committee under the Civil engineering department of the Bureau. However, adoption of the standards by implementing agencies would be voluntary and intends to complement internationally available documents in this area. Also, The Global Cities Institute (GCI) has undertaken a mission in the year 2015 to align with the Bureau of Indian Standards regarding development of standards of smart cities and also to forge relationships with Indian cities in light of ISO 37120. It can be said that India has currently not yet adopted international standards, but is in the process of developing national standards and adopting key international standards. Unlike other cities,which are adopting standards - national, ISO, or ITU, Indian cities are yet to adopt standards for regulation of the future smart cities.</p>
<h3><strong>Notes for India</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">India is in the nascent stages of developing smart cities across the country. Drawing from the practices adopted by cities across the world, smart cities in India should adopt strong regulatory and governance frameworks regarding technical standards, open data and data security and data protection policies. These policies will be essential in ensuring the sustainability and efficiency of smart cities while safeguarding individual rights. Some of these policies are already in place - such as India’s Open Data Policy and India’s data protection standards under section 43A of the ITA. It will be important to see how these policies are adopted and applied to the context of smart cities.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p><a name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Smart Cities and Transparent Evolution, <a href="http://www.posterheroes.org/Posterheroes3/_mat/PH3_eng.pdf">http://www.posterheroes.org/Posterheroes3/_mat/PH3_eng.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn2">[2]</a> "Data, Data Everywhere." The Economist, February 25, 2010. Accessed March 17, 2016, <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/15557443">http://www.economist.com/node/15557443</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn3">[3]</a> "Smart Cities." ISO. 2015. Accessed March 17, 2016, <a href="http://www.iso.org/iso/smart_cities_report-jtc1.pdf">http://www.iso.org/iso/smart_cities_report-jtc1.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's speech at Smart Nation launch on 24 November, <a href="http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/transcript-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-speech-smart-nation-launch-24-november">http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/transcript-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loongs-speech-smart-nation-launch-24-november</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Smart Nation Vision, <a href="https://www.ida.gov.sg/Tech-Scene-News/Smart-Nation-Vision">https://www.ida.gov.sg/Tech-Scene-News/Smart-Nation-Vision</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Smart Nation, <a href="http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation">http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Smart Nation Platform, <a href="https://www.ida.gov.sg/~/media/Files/About%20Us/Newsroom/Media%20Releases/2014/0617_smartnation/AnnexA_sn.pdf">https://www.ida.gov.sg/~/media/Files/About%20Us/Newsroom/Media%20Releases/2014/0617_smartnation/AnnexA_sn.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Transcript of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's speech at Smart Nation launch on 24 November, <a href="https://www.ida.gov.sg/blog/insg/featured/singapore-lays-groundwork-to-be-worlds-first-smart-nation/">https://www.ida.gov.sg/blog/insg/featured/singapore-lays-groundwork-to-be-worlds-first-smart-nation/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Prime Ministers’ Office Singapore-Smart Nation, <a href="http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation">http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Prime Ministers’ Office Singapore-Smart Nation, <a href="http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation">http://www.pmo.gov.sg/smartnation</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Responsibility of the Prime Minister) Notification 2015, <a href="http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=Status%3Acurinforce%20Type%3Aact,sl%20Content%3A%22smart%22;rec=4;resUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fstatutes.agc.gov.sg%2Faol%2Fsearch%2Fsummary%2Fresults.w3p%3Bquery%3DStatus%253Acurinforce%2520Type%253Aact,sl%2520Content%253A%2522smart%2522;whole=yes">http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=Status%3Acurinforce%20Type%3Aact,sl%20Content%3A%22smart%22;rec=4;resUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fstatutes.agc.gov.sg%2Faol%2Fsearch%2Fsummary%2Fresults.w3p%3Bquery%3DStatus%253Acurinforce%2520Type%253Aact,sl%2520Content%253A%2522smart%2522;whole=yes</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Personal Data Protection Singapore-Annual Report 2014-15, <a href="https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/Reports/pdpc-ar-fy14---online.pdf">https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/Reports/pdpc-ar-fy14---online.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Balancing Innovation and Personal Data Protection, <a href="https://www.ida.gov.sg/Tech-Scene-News/Tech-News/Digital-Government/2015/9/Balancing-innovation-and-personal-data-protection">https://www.ida.gov.sg/Tech-Scene-News/Tech-News/Digital-Government/2015/9/Balancing-innovation-and-personal-data-protection</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Department of Statistics Singapore- Free Access to More Data on the SingStat Website from 1 March 2015, <a href="http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/news/press_releases/press27022015.pdf">http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/news/press_releases/press27022015.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Singapore Marks 50th Birthday With Open Data Contest, <a href="https://blog.hootsuite.com/singapore-open-data/">https://blog.hootsuite.com/singapore-open-data/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn16">[16]</a> Virtual Singapore - a 3D city model platform for knowledge sharing and community collaboration, <a href="http://www.sla.gov.sg/News/tabid/142/articleid/572/category/Press%20Releases/parentId/97/year/2014/Default.aspx">http://www.sla.gov.sg/News/tabid/142/articleid/572/category/Press%20Releases/parentId/97/year/2014/Default.aspx</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn17">[17]</a> Internet of Things (IoT) Standards Outline to Support Smart Nation Initiative Unveiled, <a href="http://www.spring.gov.sg/NewsEvents/PR/Pages/Internet-of-Things-(IoT)-Standards-Outline-to-Support-Smart-Nation-Initiative-Unveiled-20150812.aspx">http://www.spring.gov.sg/NewsEvents/PR/Pages/Internet-of-Things-(IoT)-Standards-Outline-to-Support-Smart-Nation-Initiative-Unveiled-20150812.aspx</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Information Technology Standards Committee, <a href="https://www.itsc.org.sg/technical-committees/internet-of-things-technical-committee-iottc">https://www.itsc.org.sg/technical-committees/internet-of-things-technical-committee-iottc</a> and <a href="https://www.ida.gov.sg/~/media/Files/Infocomm%20Landscape/iN2015/Reports/realisingthevisionin2015.pdf">https://www.ida.gov.sg/~/media/Files/Infocomm%20Landscape/iN2015/Reports/realisingthevisionin2015.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Government of Dubai-2021 Dubai Plan-Purpose, <a href="http://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/the-purpose/">http://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/the-purpose/</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Government of Dubai-2021 Dubai Plan, <a href="http://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/dubai-plan-2021/">http://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/dubai-plan-2021/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn21">[21]</a> Smart Dubai, <a href="http://www.smartdubai.ae/foundation_layers.php">http://www.smartdubai.ae/foundation_layers.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn22">[22]</a> The Internet of Things: Connections for People’s happiness, <a href="http://www.smartdubai.ae/story021002.php">http://www.smartdubai.ae/story021002.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn23">[23]</a> Smart Dubai - Current State, <a href="http://www.smartdubai.ae/current_state.php">http://www.smartdubai.ae/current_state.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Smart Dubai - District Guidelines, <a href="http://smartdubai.ae/districtguidelines/Smart_Dubai_District_Guidelines_Public_Brief.pdf">http://smartdubai.ae/districtguidelines/Smart_Dubai_District_Guidelines_Public_Brief.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn25">[25]</a> See; <a href="http://roadmap.smartdubai.ae/search-services-public.php">http://roadmap.smartdubai.ae/search-services-public.php</a> and <a href="http://roadmap.smartdubai.ae/search-initiatives-public.php">http://roadmap.smartdubai.ae/search-initiatives-public.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn26">[26]</a> Smart Dubai-Smart District Guidelines, <a href="http://smartdubai.ae/districtguidelines/Smart_Dubai_District_Guidelines_Public_Brief.pdf">http://smartdubai.ae/districtguidelines/Smart_Dubai_District_Guidelines_Public_Brief.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Dubai Ruler issues new laws to further enhance the organisational structure and legal framework of Dubai Smart City, <a href="https://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395288828473.html">https://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395288828473.html</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn28">[28]</a> See: <a href="http://slc.dubai.gov.ae/en/AboutDepartment/News/Lists/NewsCentre/DispForm.aspx?ID=147&ContentTypeId=0x01001D47EB13C23E544893300E8367A23439">http://slc.dubai.gov.ae/en/AboutDepartment/News/Lists/NewsCentre/DispForm.aspx?ID=147&ContentTypeId=0x01001D47EB13C23E544893300E8367A23439</a> and <a href="http://www.smartdubai.ae/dubai_data.php">http://www.smartdubai.ae/dubai_data.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Dubai first city to trial ITU key performance indicators for smart sustainable cities, <a href="http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2015/12.aspx#.VtaYtlt97IU">http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2015/12.aspx#.VtaYtlt97IU</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn30">[30]</a> Smart Dubai Benchmark Report 2015 Executive Summary, <a href="http://smartdubai.ae/bmr2015/methodology-public.php">http://smartdubai.ae/bmr2015/methodology-public.php</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn31">[31]</a> Building a Smart + Equitable City, <a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/forward/documents/NYC-Smart-Equitable-City-Final.pdf">http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/forward/documents/NYC-Smart-Equitable-City-Final.pdf</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn32">[32]</a> Building a Smart + Equitable City, <a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/site/forward/innovations/smartnyc.page">http://www1.nyc.gov/site/forward/innovations/smartnyc.page</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn33">[33]</a> One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City, <a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/about.html">http://www1.nyc.gov/html/onenyc/about.html</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn34">[34]</a> Open Data for All, <a href="http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/reports/2015/NYC-Open-Data-Plan-2015.pdf">http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/reports/2015/NYC-Open-Data-Plan-2015.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn35">[35]</a> 7 public projects that are turning New York into a “smart city”, <a href="http://www.builtinnyc.com/2015/11/24/7-projects-are-turning-new-york-futuristic-technology-hub">http://www.builtinnyc.com/2015/11/24/7-projects-are-turning-new-york-futuristic-technology-hub</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn36">[36]</a> LinkNYC, <a href="https://www.link.nyc/faq.html#privacy">https://www.link.nyc/faq.html#privacy</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn37">[7]</a> ANSI Network on Smart and Sustainable Cities, <a href="http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/anssc/overview.aspx?menuid=3">http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/anssc/overview.aspx?menuid=3</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn38">[38]</a> IoT-Enabled Smart City Framework, <a href="http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Links%20Within%20Stories/IoT-EnabledSmartCityFrameworkWP20160213.pdf">http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Links%20Within%20Stories/IoT-EnabledSmartCityFrameworkWP20160213.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn39">[39]</a> Smart London (UK) Plan: Digital Technologies, London and Londoners, <a href="http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ipl/files/2015/03/KleinmanM_Smart-London-UK-v5_30AP2015.pdf">http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ipl/files/2015/03/KleinmanM_Smart-London-UK-v5_30AP2015.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn40">[40]</a> Smart London Plan, <a href="http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf">http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn41">[41]</a> Smart London Plan, <a href="http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf">http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn42">[42]</a> Open Data White Paper, <a href="https://data.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Open_data_White_Paper.pdf">https://data.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Open_data_White_Paper.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn43">[43]</a> London Datastore-Privacy, <a href="http://data.london.gov.uk/about/privacy/">http://data.london.gov.uk/about/privacy/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn44">[44]</a> Future Cities Standards Centre in London, <a href="https://eu-smartcities.eu/commitment/5937">https://eu-smartcities.eu/commitment/5937</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn45">[45]</a> Smart London Plan, <a href="http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf">http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/smart_london_plan.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn46">[46]</a> Smart Cities background paper, October 2013, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246019/bis-13-1209-smart-cities-background-paper-digital.pdf">https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246019/bis-13-1209-smart-cities-background-paper-digital.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn47">[47]</a> Presentation of 2015 Blueprint of Seoul as ‘State-of-the-art Smart City’, <a href="http://english.seoul.go.kr/presentation-of-2015-blueprint-of-seoul-as-%E2%80%98state-of-the-art-smart-city%E2%80%99/">http://english.seoul.go.kr/presentation-of-2015-blueprint-of-seoul-as-%E2%80%98state-of-the-art-smart-city%E2%80%99/</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn48">[48]</a> “Policy Where There is Demand,” Seoul Utilizes Big Data, <a href="http://english.seoul.go.kr/policy-demand-seoul-utilizes-big-data/">http://english.seoul.go.kr/policy-demand-seoul-utilizes-big-data/</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn49">[49]</a> Seoul’s “Owl Bus” Based on Big Data Technology, <a href="http://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/Seoul-Owl-Bus-11052014.pdf">http://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/Seoul-Owl-Bus-11052014.pdf</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn50">[50]</a> Seoul Launches “Global Digital Seoul 2020”, <a href="http://english.seoul.go.kr/seoul-launches-global-digital-seoul-2020/">http://english.seoul.go.kr/seoul-launches-global-digital-seoul-2020/</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn51">[51]</a> Smart Seoul 2015, <a href="http://english.seoul.go.kr/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/SMART_SEOUL_2015_41.pdf">http://english.seoul.go.kr/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/SMART_SEOUL_2015_41.pdf</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn52">[52]</a> Disclosing public data through the Seoul Open Data Plaza, <a href="http://english.seoul.go.kr/policy-information/key-policies/informatization/seoul-open-data-plaza/">http://english.seoul.go.kr/policy-information/key-policies/informatization/seoul-open-data-plaza/</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn53">[53]</a> Data protection in South Korea: overview, <a href="http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-579-7926">http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-579-7926</a>.</p>
<p><a name="_ftn54">[54]</a>Smart Cities Seoul: a case study, <a href="https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/23/01/T23010000190001PDFE.pdf">https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/23/01/T23010000190001PDFE.pdf</a></p>
<p><a name="_ftn55">[55]</a> Smart Cities-ISO, <a href="http://www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile-isocs?nodeid=16193764">http://www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile-isocs?nodeid=16193764</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policies-and-standards-overview-of-five-international-smart-cities'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policies-and-standards-overview-of-five-international-smart-cities</a>
</p>
No publisherKiran A. B., Elonnai Hickok and Vanya RakeshBig DataInternet GovernanceFeaturedSmart CitiesPoliciesHomepage2016-06-11T13:29:04ZBlog EntryJurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann
<b>The "IANA Transition" that is currently underway is a sham since it doesn't address the most important question: that of jurisdiction. This article explores why the issue of jurisdiction is the most important question, and why it remains unaddressed.</b>
<br />
<p>In March 2014, the <a href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced</a> that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN to run the <a href="https://www.iana.org/">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority</a> (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<h2 id="why-is-the-u.s.-government-removing-the-ntia-contract">Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?</h2>
<p>The main reason for the U.S. government's action is that it will get rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government's side: keeping the contract allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of Internet governance.</p>
<p>This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some demands made <a href="https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc">in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at WSIS, in 2005</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the global Internet user community. "ICANN's decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … "It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the progress made in this process through the proposed [Internet Governance] Forum."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short: the objective of the transition is political, <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/">not technical</a>. In an ideal world, we <em>should</em> aim at reducing U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system.<a href="#fn1" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref1"><sup>1</sup></a></p>
<p>It is our contention that <strong>U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system is <em>not</em> being removed</strong> by the transition that is currently underway.</p>
<h2 id="why-is-the-transition-happening-now">Why is the Transition Happening Now?</h2>
<p>Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that were going to finish the IANA transition by "September 30, 2000", (the <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en">White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses</a> states: "The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an 'outside' date.") and later by "fall of 2006",<a href="#fn2" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref2"><sup>2</sup></a> those turned out to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.</p>
<p>However, in order to answer the question of "why now?" fully, one has to look a bit at the past.</p>
<p>In 1998, through the <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en">White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses</a> the U.S. government <a href="http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governance.pdf">asserted it’s control over the root</a>, and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the 'A' Root (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).</p>
<p>Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government, domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.</p>
<p>As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences ... the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry." [footnotes omitted]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the transition in 2014, rather than earlier.</p>
<h3 id="icann-adjudged-mature-enough">ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough</h3>
<p>The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was announced 16 years after ICANN's creation, and complaints about ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council, which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike in the early days, there is <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus-wcit-part-1-historical-context/">no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN</a>. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or refused to participate.</p>
<h3 id="laffaire-snowden">L'affaire Snowden</h3>
<p>Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American companies — but that <em>it ought to</em> have an exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise 'oversight' over 'the Internet' (often coming from <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656">clueless commentators</a>), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_control_the_internet_netmundial_iana/">American IP lawyers</a> and <a href="http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-address-book-icann-ntia-and-iana/">American 'homeland' security hawks</a>, Jones Day, who are ICANN's lawyers, and other <a href="http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html">jingoists</a> and those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.</p>
<p>The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it allowed them a fig-leaf of <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-00144feabdc0.html">international</a> <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/">criticism</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528">with which</a> to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would "present proposals for the establishment of a <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf">civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet</a>", and as <a href="https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro">Diego Canabarro</a> points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the technical community into taking action.</p>
<p>Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the so-called <a href="https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs">I* organizations</a> met — seemingly with the blessing of the U.S. government<a href="#fn3" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref3"><sup>3</sup></a> — in Montevideo, and put out a <a href="https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-on-future-of-internet-cooperation">'Statement on the Future of Internet Governance'</a> that sought to link the Snowden revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together. Specifically, the I* organizations called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing."</p>
<p>One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.</p>
<p>Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps into office.</p>
<p>Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).</p>
<h2 id="why-jurisdiction-is-important">Why Jurisdiction is Important</h2>
<p>Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. <em>Inter alia</em>, these are:</p>
<ul>
<li>Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change to the root zone file?)</li>
<li>Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with registries, registrars, etc.</li>
<li>Law applicable to labour disputes.</li>
<li>Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN policies and regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.</li>
<li>Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.</li>
<li>Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.</li>
<li>Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including membership rights.</li>
<li>Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies & regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.</li>
</ul>
<p>Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN [the policy-making body], the IANA functions operator [the proposed "Post-Transition IANA"], and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary office, while others depend on the location of the office [for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul], while yet others depend on what's decided by ICANN in contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).</p>
<p>However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">Milton Mueller notes</a>, the current IANA contract "requires ICANN to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."</p>
<p>He further notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain into the root.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA's role in the IANA contract goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.</p>
<h2 id="u.s.-doublespeak-on-jurisdiction">U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction</h2>
<p>In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:</p>
<ul>
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and,</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
<li>Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or an inter-governmental organization.</li>
</ul>
<p>In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes, antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s) (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).</p>
<p>However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be">testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology</a>, made it clear that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Frankly, if [shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction] were being proposed, I don't think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and stability be maintained.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015, that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.<a href="#fn4" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref4"><sup>4</sup></a></p>
<p>Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn't necessarily depend on ICANN's jurisdiction being in the United States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it's shifting jurisdiction."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mr. Strickling's response was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question though, as I understand it having been raised from some other countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located. It's much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.</p>
<p>"And that I think is an open issue, and that's an appropriate one to be discussed. And it's one I think where ICANN has made some movement over time anyway.</p>
<p>"So I think you have to ... when people use the word jurisdiction, we need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes are resolved and under what law they're resolved, those are separate questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction of "resolution of disputes", but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be "incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."</p>
<p>In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI's incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening <em>after</em> the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still come within the U.S. Congress's jurisdiction.</p>
<h2 id="why-has-the-icg-failed-to-consider-jurisdiction">Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?</h2>
<p>Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing U.S. control? No, they won't. (In fact, as we will argue below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal by the names community ("the CWG proposal") still has a requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote. Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI's incorporation.</p>
<p>Why wasn't there greater discussion and consideration of this issue? Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since the incorporation of ICANN itself.</p>
<p>While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security, stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition is, as has been argued above, political.</p>
<p>It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone Management function have a considerable political implication. It is imperative that the political nature of the function is duly acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition. There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG's lawyers, Sidley Austin, recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having been debated by the "global multistakeholder community", and subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.</p>
<h2 id="why-the-by-laws-make-things-worse-why-work-stream-2-cant-address-most-jurisdiction-issues">Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues</h2>
<p>The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit corporation part of the <em>fundamental by-laws</em>, which are close to impossible to amend.</p>
<p>While "Work Stream 2" (the post-transition work related to improving ICANN's accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration, the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the work done as part of CCWG Accountability's "Work Stream 1", which are now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian jurisdiction (including the legal model of the "Empowered Community"). Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then, the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.</p>
<p>Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws, all of which were rejected by CCWG's lawyers.</p>
<h2 id="the-transition-plan-fails-the-netmundial-statement">The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf">NETmundial Multistakeholder Document</a>, which was an outcome of the NETmundial process, states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community</p>
<p>[...]</p>
<p>It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.</p>
<p>The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder">were neither global nor multistakeholder</a>. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa. Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not change until the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse, reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a non-American entity.</p>
<h2 id="what-we-need-jurisdictional-resilience">What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience</h2>
<p>It is no one's case that the United States is less fit than any other country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even as the headquarters for 9 of the world's 12 root zone operators (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.</p>
<p>Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of "jurisdictional resilience", encompassing three crucial points:</p>
<ul>
<li>Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.</li>
<li>Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions</li>
<li>Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions</li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently investigating which of these options would be the best option.</p>
<p>And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in September 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) [or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having been killed by the United States government.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government exercises over the core of the Internet's operations in the form of the DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN's by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks of "globalization" of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the transition proposals speaks of "privatization" of ICANN, and not "globalization".</p>
<p>All in all, the "independence" that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is akin to the "independence" that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a treaty in 1825). Even after this "independence", Dom Pedro continued to rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was provided the title of "Emperor of Brazil", aside from being King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The "indepedence" didn't make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal continued to be its largest trading partner. The "independence" didn't change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as "free". It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.</p>
<p>Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a result hold the reins at ICANN.<a href="#fnref1">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book <em>Who Controls the Internet</em>: "Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file.”<a href="#fnref2">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting "at the White House" about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke about that when <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet">he visited India in October 2013</a> making the timing of his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.<a href="#fnref3">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn4"><p>As an example, <a href="https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/">NSD</a>, software that is used on multiple root servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and written mostly by European coders.<a href="#fnref4">↩</a></p></li>
</ol>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIANAInternet GovernanceFeaturedICANNIANA Transition2016-06-29T07:51:05ZBlog EntrySubmission by the Centre for Internet and Society on Revisions to ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior
<b>Prepared by Vidushi Marda, with inputs from Dr. Nirmita Narasimhan and Sunil Abraham.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>We at the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions to ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior (“Standards”).</p>
<p>Before providing specific comments on the proposed revisions, CIS would like to state for the record our extreme disappointment while noting that there is no indication of the intention to draft and adopt a dedicated anti - harassment policy. We are of the firm opinion that harassment, and particularly sexual harassment, is not only a sensitive topic, but also a deeply complex one. Such a policy should consider scope, procedural questions, redressal and remedies in cases of harassment in general and sexual harassment in particular. A mere change in language to these Standards, however well intentioned, cannot go too far in preventing and dealing with cases of harassment in the absence of a framework within which such instances can be addressed.</p>
<p>Some of the issues that arose at ICANN55 were confusion surrounding the powers and limits of the Ombudsman’s office in dealing with cases of harassment, the exact procedure to be followed for redressal surrounding such incidents, and the appropriate conduct of parties to the matter. There will be no clarity in these respects, even if these proposed changes are to be adopted.</p>
<p>Specifically, the proposed language is problematic and completely inadequate for the following reasons:</p>
<ol><li>
<p><strong>Vague</strong></p>
<p>Terms like “professional conduct” and “appropriate behavior” mean little in the absence of a definition that entails such conduct. These terms could mean vastly different things to each community member and such language will only encourage a misalignment of expectation of conduct between community members. The “general” definition of harassment is at best, an ineffective placeholder, as it does not encompass exactly what kind of behavior would fall under its definition.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Fails to consider important scenarios</strong></p>
<p>The proposed language fails to consider situations where some attempts or advances at communication, sexual or otherwise, occur. For example, consider a situation in which one community member stalks another online, and catalogues his/her every move. This is most certainly foreseeable, but will not be adequately covered by the proposed language. Further, terms like “speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates” could or could not include types of speech such as art, music, photography etc, depending on who you ask. It also does not explain the use of the word behavior - physical, emotional, professional, online behavior are all possible, but the scope of this term would depend on the interpretation one chooses to apply. In part 4 below, we will demonstrate how ICANN has applied a far more detailed framework for harassment elsewhere.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Ignores complexity</strong></p>
<p>In discussions surrounding the incident at ICANN55, a number of issues of arose. These included, inter alia, the definition of harassment and sexual harassment, what constituted such conduct, the procedure to be followed in such cases, the appropriate forum to deal with such incidents and the conduct that both parties are expected to maintain. These questions cannot, and have not been answered or addressed in the proposed change to the Standards. CIS emphasizes the need to understand this issue as one that must imbibe differences in culture, expectation, power dynamics, and options for redressal. If ICANN is to truly be a safe space, such issues must be substantively and procedurally fair for both the accused and the victim. This proposed definition is woefully inadequate in this regard.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Superficial understanding of harassment, sexual harassment</strong></p>
<p>The proposed changes do not define harassment, and sexual harassment in an adequate fashion. The change currently reads, “Generally, harassment is considered unwelcome hostile or intimidating behavior -- in particular, speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates based on attributes such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, color, national origin, ancestry, disability or medical condition, sexual orientation, or gender identity.” These are subject to broad interpretation, and we have already highlighted the issues that may arise due to this in 1, above. Here, we would like to point to a far more comprehensive definition.</p>
</li></ol>
<p>ICANN’s own Employment Policy includes within the scope of sexual harassment “verbal, physical and visual conduct that creates an intimidating, offensive or hostile working environment, or interferes with work performance.” The policy also states:</p>
<blockquote>Harassing conduct can take many forms and includes, but is not limited to, the following:<br />
<ol><li>Slurs, jokes, epithets, derogatory comments, statements or gestures;</li>
<li>Assault, impeding or blocking another’s movement or otherwise physically interfering with normal work;</li>
<li>Pictures, posters, drawings or cartoons based upon the characteristics mentioned in the first paragraph of this policy.</li></ol>
Sexually harassing conduct includes all of the above prohibited actions, as well as other unwelcome conduct, such as requests for sexual favors, conversation containing sexual comments, and unwelcome sexual advances.”</blockquote>
<p>This definition is not perfect, it does not comprehensively consider advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise, which are unwelcome by the target. Nonetheless, CIS believes that this is a far more appropriate definition that does not include vague metrics that the proposed changes do. Since it is one ICANN has already adopted, it can act as an important stepping stone towards a comprehensive framework.</p>
<p>Like ICANN, UNESCO’s organisational approach has been to adopt a comprehensive <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/UN_system_policies/(UNESCO)Anti-harassment_Policy.pdf">Anti-Harassment Policy</a> which lays down details of definition, prevention, complaint procedure, investigations, sanctions, managerial responsibility, etc. Acknowledging the cultural sensitivity of harassment particularly in international situations, the policy also recognizes advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise. Most importantly, it states that for conduct to come within the definition of sexual harassment, it “must be unwelcome, i.e. unsolicited and regarded as offensive or undesirable by the victim.”</p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the importance of adopting and drafting a dedicated anti-harassment policy and framework. The benefits of safety, certainty and formal redressal mechanisms in cases of harassment cannot be over emphasized.</p>
<p>Importantly, such measures have already been taken elsewhere. The IETF has adopted an <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7776">instrument</a> to address issues of harassment that occur at meetings, mailing lists and social events. This instrument contemplates in detail, problematic behavior, unacceptable conduct, the scope of the term harassment, etc. It further envisages a framework for redressal of complaints, remediation, and even contemplates issues that may arise with such remediation. It is particularly important to note that while it provides a definition of harassment, it also states that "[a]ny definition of harassment prohibited by an applicable law can be subject to this set of procedures, recognising harassment as a deeply personal and subjective experience, and thus encouraging members to take up issues of harassment as per their cultural norms and national laws, which are then considered as per procedures laid down."</p>
<p>A similar effort within the ICANN community is critical.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiPublic AccountabilityInternet GovernanceFeaturedICANNIANA TransitionHomepage2016-06-30T06:07:37ZBlog EntryPublic Consultation for the First Draft of 'Government Open Data Use License - India' Announced
http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/public-consultation-for-the-first-draft-of-government-open-data-use-license-india-announced
<b>The first public draft of the open data license to be used by Government of India was released by the Department of Legal Affairs earlier this week. Comments are invited from general public and stakeholders. These are to be submitted via the MyGov portal by July 25, 2016. CIS was a member of the committee constituted to develop the license concerned, and we contributed substantially to the drafting process.
</b>
<p> </p>
<h4>Please read the call for comments <a class="external-link" href="https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/public-consultation-government-open-data-use-license-india/">here</a>.</h4>
<h4>The PDF version of the draft license document can be accessed <a class="external-link" href="https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/mygov_1466767582190667.pdf">here</a>.</h4>
<h4><em>Comments are to be submitted by July 25, 2016.</em></h4>
<hr />
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Government Open Data Use License - India</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy</strong></h4>
<h4 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Government of India</strong></h4>
<h2>1. Preamble</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Structured data available in open format and open license for public access and use, usually termed as “Open Data,” is of prime importance in the contemporary world. Data also is one of the most valuable resources of modern governance, sharing of which enables various and non-exclusive usages for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. Licenses, however, are crucial to ensure that such data is not misused or misinterpreted (for example, by insisting on proper attribution), and that all users have the same and permanent right to use the data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The open government data initiative started in India with the notification of the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP), submitted to the Union Cabinet by the Department of Science and Technology, on 17th March 2012 <strong>[1]</strong>. The NDSAP identified the Department of Electronics & Information Technology (DeitY) as the nodal department for the implementation of the policy through National Informatics Centre, while the Department of Science and Technology continues to be the nodal department on policy matters. In pursuance of the Policy, the Open Government Data Platform India <strong>[2]</strong> was launched in 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While, the appropriate open formats and related aspects for implementation of the Policy has been defined in the “NDSAP Implementation Guidelines” prepared by an inter- ministerial Task Force constituted by the National Informatics Centre <strong>[3]</strong>, the open license for data sets published under NDSAP and through the OGD Platform remained unspecified till now.</p>
<h2>2. Definitions</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a. <strong>“Data”</strong> means a representation of Information, numerical compilations and observations, documents, facts, maps, images, charts, tables and figures, concepts in digital and/or analog form, and includes metadata <strong>[4]</strong>, that is all information about data, and/or clarificatory notes provided by data provider(s), without which the data concerned cannot be interpreted or used <strong>[5]</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">b. <strong>“Information”</strong> means processed data <strong>[6]</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">c. <strong>“Data Provider(s)”</strong> means person(s) publishing and providing the data under this license.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">d. <strong>“License”</strong> means this document.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">e. <strong>“Licensor”</strong>means any data provider(s) that has the authority to offer the data concerned under the terms of this licence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">f. <strong>“User”</strong> means natural or legal persons, or body of persons corporate or incorporate, acquiring rights in the data (whether the data is obtained directly from the licensor or otherwise) under this licence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">g. <strong>“Use”</strong> includes lawful distribution, making copies, adaptation, and all modification and representation of the data, subject to the provisions of this License.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">h. <strong>“Adapt”</strong> means to transform, build upon, or to make any use of the data by itsre-arrangement or alteration <strong>[7]</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">i. <strong>“Redistribute”</strong> means sharing of the data by the user, either in original or in adapted form (including a subset of the original data), accompanied by appropriate attribute statement, under the same or other suitable license.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">j. <strong>“Attribution Statement”</strong> means a standard notice to be published by all users of data published under this license, that contains the details of the provider, source, and license of the data concerned <strong>[8]</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">k. <strong>“Personal Information”</strong> means any Information that relates to a natural person,which, either directly or indirectly, in combination with other Information available or likely to be available with a body corporate, is capable of identifying such person <strong>[9]</strong>.</p>
<h2>3. Permissible Use of Data</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Subject to the conditions listed under section 7, the user may:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a. Access, use, adapt, and redistribute data published under this license for all lawful and non-exclusive purposes, without payment of any royalty or fee;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">b. Apply this license worldwide, and in perpetuity;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">c. Access, study, copy, share, adapt, publish, redistribute and transmit the data in any medium or format; and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">d. Use, adapt, and redistribute the data, either in itself, or by combining it with other data, or by including it within a product/application/service, for all commercial and/or non-commercial purposes.</p>
<h2>4. Terms and Conditions of Use of Data</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a. <strong>Attribution:</strong> The user must acknowledge the provider, source, and license of data by explicitly publishing the attribution statement, including the DOI (Digital Object Identifier), or the URL (Uniform Resource Locator), or the URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) of the data concerned.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">b. <strong>Attribution of Multiple Data:</strong> If the user is using multiple data together and/or listing of sources of multiple data is not possible, the user may provide a link to a separate page/list that includes the attribution statements and specific URL/URI of all data used.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> c. <strong>Non-endorsement:</strong> The User must not indicate or suggest in any manner that the data provider(s) endorses their use and/or the user.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">d. <strong>No Warranty:</strong> The data provider(s) are not liable for any errors or omissions, and will not under any circumstances be liable for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, consequential, or other loss, injury or damage caused by its use or otherwise arising in connection with this license or the data, even if specifically advised of the possibility of such loss, injury or damage. Under any circumstances, the user may not hold the data provider(s) responsible for: i) any error, omission or loss of data, and/or ii) any undesirable consequences due to the use of the data as part of an application/product/service (including violation of any prevalent law).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">e. <strong>Permanent Disclosure and Versioning:</strong> The data provider(s) will ensure that a data package once published under this license will always remain publicly available for reference and use. If an already published data is updated by the provider, then the earlier appropriate version(s) must also be kept publicly available with accordance with the archival policy of the National Informatics Centre.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">f. <strong>Continuity of Provision:</strong>The data provider(s) will strive for continuously updating the data concerned, as new data regarding the same becomes available. However, the data provider(s) do not guarantee the continued supply of updated or up-to-date versions of the data, and will not be held liable in case the continued supply of updated data is not provided.</p>
<h2>5. Template for Attribution Statement</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Unless the user is citing the data using an internationally accepted data citation format <strong>[10]</strong>, an attribution notice in the following format must be explicitly included:</p>
<p>“Data has been published by [Name of Data Provider] and sourced from Open Government Data (OGD) Platform of India: [Name of Data]. ([date of Publication: dd/mm/yyyy]) .[DOI / URL / URI]. Published under Open Government Data License - India: [URL of Open Data License – India].”</p>
<p>For example, “Data has been published by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation and sourced from Open Government Data (OGD) Platform of India: Overall Balance of Payments. (08/09/2015). <a href="https://data.gov.in/catalog/overall-balance-payments">https://data.gov.in/catalog/overall-balance-payments</a>. Published under Open Government Data License - India: [URL of Open Data License - India].”</p>
<h2>6. Exemptions</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The license does not grant the right to access, use, adapt, and redistribute the following kinds of data:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a. Personal information;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">b. Data that the data provider(s) is not authorised to licence;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">c. Names, crests, logos and other official symbols of the data provider(s);</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">d. Data subject to other intellectual property rights, including patents, trade-marks and official marks;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">e. Military insignia;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">f. Identity documents; and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">g. Any data publication of which may violate section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 <strong>11</strong>.</p>
<h2>7. Termination</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a. Failure to comply with stipulated terms and conditions will cause the user’s rights under this license to end automatically.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">b. Where the user’s rights to use data have terminated under the aforementioned clauses or any other Indian law, it reinstates:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">i. automatically, as of the date the violation is cured, provided it is cured within 30 days of the discovery of the violation; or</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ii. upon express reinstatement by the Licensor.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">c. For avoidance of doubt, this section does not affect any rights the licensor may have to seek remedies for violation of this license.</p>
<h2>8. Dispute Redressal Mechanism</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This license is governed by Indian law, and the copyright of any data shared under this license vests with the licensor, under the Indian Copyright Act.</p>
<h2>9. Endnotes</h2>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> Ministry of Science and Technology. 2012. National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) 2012. Gazette of India. March 17. <a href="http://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf">http://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[2]</strong> See: <a href="https://data.gov.in/">https://data.gov.in/</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[3]</strong> See section 3.2 of the Implementation Guidelines for National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) Version 2.2. <a href="https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP_Implementation_Guidelines_2.2.pdf">https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/NDSAP_Implementation_Guidelines_2.2.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[4]</strong> See section 2.1 of NDSAP 2012.</p>
<p><strong>[5]</strong> See section 2.6 of NDSAP 2012.</p>
<p><strong>[6]</strong> See section 2.7 of NDSAP 2012.</p>
<p><strong>[7]</strong> See section 2 (a) of Indian Copyright Act 1957. <a href="http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1957.pdf">http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1957.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[8]</strong> The template of the attribution statement is given in section 5 of the license.</p>
<p><strong>[9]</strong> See section 2 (i) of Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011. <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf">http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[10]</strong>For example, those listed in the DOI Citation Formatter tool developed by DataCite, CrossRef and others: <a href="http://crosscite.org/citeproc/">http://crosscite.org/citeproc/</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[11]</strong> See: <a href="http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm">http://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm</a>.</p>
<div> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/public-consultation-for-the-first-draft-of-government-open-data-use-license-india-announced'>http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/public-consultation-for-the-first-draft-of-government-open-data-use-license-india-announced</a>
</p>
No publishersinhaOpen Government DataOpen LicenseOpen DataNDSAPFeaturedOpenness2016-06-30T09:41:07ZBlog EntryCIS Submission to TRAI Consultation on Free Data
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data
<b>The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) held a consultation on Free Data, for which CIS sent in the following comments.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) asked for <a href="http://trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/ConsultationPaper/Document/CP_07_free_data_consultation.pdf">public comments on free data</a>. Below are the comments that CIS submitted to the four questions that it posed.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="question-1">Question 1
<p><em>Is there a need to have TSP agnostic platform to provide free data or suitable reimbursement to users, without violating the principles of Differential Pricing for Data laid down in TRAI Regulation? Please suggest the most suitable model to achieve the objective.</em></p>
</h2>
<h3 id="is-there-a-need-for-free-data">Is There a Need for Free Data?</h3>
<p>No, there is no <em>need</em> for free data, just as there is no <em>need</em> for telephony or Internet. However, making provisions for free data would increase the amount of innovation in the Internet and telecom sector, and there is a good probability that it would lead to faster adoption of the Internet, and thus be beneficial in terms of commerce, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and many other ways.</p>
<p>Thus the question that a telecom regulator should ask is not whether there is a <em>need</em> for TSP agnostic platforms, but whether such platforms are harmful for competition, for consumers, and for innovation. The telecom regulator ought not undertake regulation unless there is evidence to show that harm has been caused or that harm is likely to be caused. In short, TRAI should not follow the precautionary principle, since the telecom and Internet sectors are greatly divergent from environmental protection: the burden of proof for showing that something ought to be prohibited ought to be on those calling for prohibition.</p>
<h3 id="goal-regulating-gatekeeping">Goal: Regulating Gatekeeping</h3>
<p>TRAI wouldn’t need to regulate price discrimination or Net neutrality if ISPs were not “gatekeepers” for last-mile access. “Gatekeeping” occurs when a single entity establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach their end customers without passing through ISPs (generally telecom networks). The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in “transit agreements”, a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is generally not possible in the last mile.<a id="fnref1" class="footnoteRef" href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></a> This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice.</p>
<p>However, the aim of regulation by TRAI cannot be to prevent gatekeeping, since that is not possible as long as there are a limited number of ISPs. For instance, even by the very act of charging money for access to the Internet, ISPs are guilty of “gatekeeping” since they are controlling who can and cannot access an Internet service that way. Instead, the aim of regulation by TRAI should be to “regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their gatekeeping power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic”, as we proposed in our submission to TRAI (on OTTs) last year.</p>
<h3 id="models-for-free-data">Models for Free Data</h3>
<p>There are multiple models possible for free data, none of which TRAI should prohibit unless it would enable OTTs to abuse their gatekeeping powers.</p>
<h4 id="government-incentives-for-non-differentiated-free-data">Government Incentives For Non-Differentiated Free Data</h4>
<p>The government may opt to require all ISPs to provide free Internet to all at a minimum QoS in exchange for exemption from paying part of their USO contributions, or the government may pay ISPs for such access using their USO contributions.</p>
<p>TRAI should recommend to DoT that it set up a committee to study the feasibility of this model.</p>
<h4 id="isp-subsidies">ISP subsidies</h4>
<p>ISP subsidies of Internet access only make economic sense for the ISP under the following ‘Goldilocks’ condition is met: the experience with the subsidised service is ‘good enough’ for the consumers to want to continue to use such services, but ‘bad enough’ for a large number of them to want to move to unsubsidised, paid access.</p>
<ol style="list-style-type: decimal;">
<li>Providing free Internet to all at a low speed.
<ol style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<li>This naturally discriminates against services and applications such as video streaming, but does not technically bar access to them.</li></ol>
</li>
<li>Providing free access to the Internet with other restrictions on quality that aren’t discriminatory with respect to content, services, or applications.</li></ol>
<h4 id="rewards-model">Rewards model</h4>
<p>A TSP-agnostic rewards platform will only come within the scope of TRAI regulation if the platform has some form of agreement with the TSPs, even if it is collectively. If the rewards platform doesn’t have any agreement with any TSP, then TRAI does not have the power to regulate it. However, if the rewards platform has an agreement with any TSP, it is unclear whether it would be allowed under the Differential Data Tariff Regulation, since the clause 3(2) read with paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum might disallow such an agreement.</p>
<p>Assuming for the sake of argument that platforms with such agreements are not disallowed, such platforms can engage in either post-purchase credits or pre-purchase credits, or both. In other words, it could be a situation where a person has to purchase a data pack, engage in some activity relating to the platform (answer surveys, use particular apps, etc.) and thereupon get credit of some form transferred to one’s SIM, or it could be a situation where even without purchasing a data pack, a consumer can earn credits and thereupon use those credits towards data.</p>
<p>The former kind of rewards platform is not as useful when it comes to encouraging people to use the Internet, since only those who already see worth in using in the Internet (and can afford it) will purchase a data pack in the first place. The second form, on the other hand is quite useful, and could be encouraged. However, this second model is not as easily workable, economically, for fixed line connections, since there is a higher initial investment involved.</p>
<h4 id="recharge-api">Recharge API</h4>
<p>A recharge API could be fashioned in one of two ways: (1) via the operating system on the phone, allowing a TSP or third parties (whether OTTs or other intermediaries) to transfer credit to the SIM card on the phone which have been bought wholesale. Another model could be that of all TSPs providing a recharge API for the use of third parties. Only the second model is likely to result in a “toll-free” experience since in the first model, like in the case of a rewards platform that requires up-front purchase of data packs, there has to be a investment made first before that amount is recouped. This is likely to hamper the utility of such a model.</p>
<p>Further, in the first case, TRAI would probably not have the powers to regulate such transactions, as there would be no need for any involvement by the TSP. If anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position seems to be taking place, it would be up to the Competition Commission of India to investigate.</p>
<p>However, the second model would have to be overseen by TRAI to ensure that the recharge APIs don’t impose additional costs on OTTs, or unduly harm competition and innovation. For instance, there ought to be an open specification for such an API, which all the TSPs should use in order to reduce the costs on OTTs. Further, there should be no exclusivity, and no preferential treatment provided for the TSPs sister concerns or partners.</p>
<h4 id="example-sites">“0.example” sites</h4>
<p>Other forms of free data, for instance by TSPs choosing not to charge for low-bandwidth traffic should be allowed, as long as it is not discriminatory, nor does it impose increased barriers to entry for OTTs. For instance, if a website self-certifies that it is low-bandwidth and optimized for Internet-enabled feature phones and uses 0.example.tld to signal this (just as wap.* were used in for WAP sites and m.* are used for mobile-optimized versions of many sites), then there is no reason why TSPs should be prohibited from not charging for the data consumed by such websites, as long as the TSP does so uniformly without discrimination. In such cases, the TSP is not harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers.</p>
<h4 id="ott-agnostic-free-data">OTT-agnostic free data</h4>
<p>If a TSP decides not to charge for specific forms of traffic (for example, video, or for locally-peered traffic) regardless of the Internet service from which that traffic emanates, as as long as it does so with the end customer’s consent, then there is no question of the TSP harming competition, harming consumers, nor abusing its gatekeeping powers. There is no reason such schemes should be prohibited by TRAI unless they distort markets and harm innovation.</p>
<h4 id="unified-marketplace">Unified marketplace</h4>
<p>One other way to do what is proposed as the “recharge API” model is to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP’s ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.</p>
<p>A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.</p>
<p>At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.</p>
<p>Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn’t lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.</p>
<p>Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.</p>
<p>Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.</p>
<p>Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.</p>
<p>To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn’t there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.</p>
<h2 id="question-2">Question 2</h2>
<p><em>Whether such platforms need to be regulated by the TRAI or market be allowed to develop these platforms?</em></p>
<p>In many cases, TRAI would have no powers over such platforms, so the question of TRAI regulating does not arise. In all other cases, TRAI can allow the market to develop such platforms, and then see if any of them violates the Discriminatory Data Tariffs Regualation. For government-incentivised schemes that are proposed above, TRAI should take proactive measure in getting their feasibility evaluated.</p>
<h2 id="question-3">Question 3</h2>
<p><em>Whether free data or suitable reimbursement to users should be limited to mobile data users only or could it be extended through technical means to subscribers of fixed line broadband or leased line?</em></p>
<p>Spectrum is naturally a scarce resource, though technological advances (as dictated by Cooper’s Law) and more efficient management of spectrum make it less so. However, we have seen that fixed-line broadband has more or less stagnated for the past many years, while mobile access has increased. So the market distortionary power of fixed-line providers is far less than that of mobile providers. However, competition is far less in fixed-line Internet access services, while it is far higher in mobile Internet access. Switching costs in fixed-line Internet access services are also far higher than in mobile services. Given these differences, the regulation with regard to price discrimination might justifiably be different.</p>
<p>All in all, for this particular issue, it is unclear why different rules should apply to mobile users and fixed line users.</p>
<h2 id="question-4">Question 4</h2>
<p><em>Any other issue related to the matter of Consultation.</em></p>
<p>None.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1">
<p>In India’s mobile telecom sector, according to a Nielsen study, an estimated 15% of mobile users are multi-SIM users, meaning the “gatekeeping” effect is significantly reduced in both directions: Internet services can reach them via multiple ISPs, and conversely they can reach Internet services via multiple ISPs. <em>See</em> Nielsen, ‘Telecom Transitions: Tracking the Multi-SIM Phenomena in India’, http://www.nielsen.com/in/en/insights/reports/2015/telecom-transitions-tracking-the-multi-sim-phenomena-in-india.html<a href="#fnref1">↩</a></p>
</li></ol>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-trai-consultation-free-data</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshTelecomHomepageTRAINet NeutralityFeaturedInternet GovernanceSubmissions2016-07-01T16:04:27ZBlog Entry Studying Internet in India (2016): Selected Abstracts
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-internet-in-india-2016-selected-abstracts
<b>We received some great submissions and decided to select twelve abstracts, and not only ten as we planned earlier. Here are the abstracts.</b>
<p> </p>
<h3><strong>Abhimanyu Roy</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>The Curious Incidents on Matrimonial Websites in India</em></strong></p>
<p>What is love? Philosophers have argued over it, biologists have researched it and in the age of the internet, innovators have disrupted it. In the west, dating websites such as OKCupid and eHarmony use all manner of algorithms to find its users their optimal match. In India’s conservative society though, dating is fast-tracked or skipped altogether in favor of marriage. This gives rise to a plethora of matrimonial sites such as Jeevansathi.com and Shaadi.com. This is where things get tricky.</p>
<p>Matrimonial websites are different from other internet-enabled services. The gravity of the decision and the major impact that it has on the lives of users brings in pressure and a range of emotions that are not there on casual transactions such as an Uber ride or a foodpanda order. From outright fraud to online harassment newspaper back pages are filled with nightmare stories that begin on a matrimonial website. So much so, that in November of last year, the Indian government decided to set up a panel to regulate matrimonial sites in order to curb abuse. The essay will analyze India’s social stand on marriage, the role of matrimonial websites in modern day India, the problems this awkward amalgamation of the internet and love gives rise to and the steps authorities and matrimonial companies are taking to prevent these issues from occurring.</p>
<h3><strong>Anita Gurumurthy, Nandini Chami, and Deepti Bharthur</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Internet as Sutradhar: The Aesthetics and Politics of Digital Age Counter-power</em></strong></p>
<p>The open Internet is now a feeble, wannabe, digital age meme. The despots have grabbed it and capitalism has colonised it. But the network that engulfs its users is also a multi-headed organism; the predictables have to make peace with the unpredictables, both arising as they do with the unruly affordances of the network. The much celebrated public domain of open government data, usually meant for geeks and software gurus dedicated to the brave new 'codeful' future, has meant little for marginal subjects of India's development project. Data on government websites have been critiqued worldwide for often being too clunky to catalyse civic use or too obscure to pin down government efficacy. However, as an instrument of accountable governance, data in the public domain can help hold the line, fuelling vanguard action to foster democracy. Activists engaged in the right to food movement in India had reason to rejoice recently when the Supreme Court of India pulled up the central government for delay in release of funds under the MGNREGA scheme and violating the food security law. The series of actions leading to this victory enjoins deeper examination of the MGNREGS website, the design principles of the MIS that generates reports based on the data, and the truth claims that arose in the contingent context marking this struggle. <em>What were the ingredients of this happy irony; the deployment of the master's tools to disband the master's house? What aesthetics and principles made for a public data structure that allowed citizens to hack into state impunity? And what do such practices around the digital tell us about the performativity of the Internet - not as a grand, open, phenomenon for the network to access the multitude, but as the inane, local, Sutradhar (alchemist who produces the narrative), who allows truths to be told?</em></p>
<h3><strong>Aishwarya Panicker</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>How Green is the Internet? The Good, the Bad and the Ugly</em></strong></p>
<p>Groceries at your doorstep, data on your fingertips, an Uber at the tap of a button and information overload- human negotiations with the internet have definitely changed drastically in the past few decades. Research in the area, too, has transformed to not just the supply of internet to the masses, but has evolved to include innovative and revolutionary ideas in terms of internet infrastructure and governance. With over 3.2 Billion internet users in the world, and over 400 million of these from India, this is no surprise.</p>
<p>However, while environmental sustainability remains at the forefront of many-a-government, there is little data / debate / analysis / examination of the environmental impact of the internet. This is true especially for India. In 2011, Joel Gombiner wrote an academic paper on the problem of the Internets carbon footprint, with a premise based on the lesser known fact that the ICT industry has been ‘responsible for two to four percent of the global greenhouse gas emissions’- an area that the Climate Group’s Smart 2020 report had focused on back in 2008 as well. Clearly this is a war on the environment that is yet to receive large-scale attention.</p>
<p>How can we move beyond particular fascinations with the internet and engage holistically with the internet? By moving towards a dimension of internet infrastructure studies, that has large policy and implementation benefits. This paper, then, will seek to elucidate four central issue areas: first, as the third highest country in terms of internet use, what is the current environmental impact of internet usage in India? Second, are there any regulatory provisions that give prescriptive measures to data centres and providers? Third, do any global standards
exist in this regard and finally, what future steps can be taken (by the government, civil society
and individuals) to address this?</p>
<h3><strong>Deepak Prince</strong></h3>
<p>One of the most important effects of increasing internet connectivity coupled with universal electronic display screens, multimedia digital objects and supple graphic interfaces, is the proliferation of systems of enunciation. The business letter, typewriter, electric telegraph and radio, each in its own time, transformed how humans make sense in different forms of writing. Some of these survive to this day (forms of address from letters, the abbreviations and ‘cablese’ from telegraph operators etc). Now, we find new spaces of networked sociality emerging at rapid speeds, and everyday, we forget many others that are now outdated, no longer ‘supported’ or desired. How does one study this supple flow of discourse? Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of tracing collective assemblages of enunciation (the structuring structures of discourse) and Gilbert Simondon’s Law of relaxation (where technical elements created by complex ensembles are released into a path of technological evolution where they may or may not crystallize the formation of new ensembles) are two philosophical notions that seek to address this problem. The anthropologist Ilana Gershon suggests that new social media platforms like Facebook have a detrimental effect on sociality because they impose a neo-liberal notion of personhood on its users, through the interface. I take this as my point of departure, and based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted at a new media marketing agency, I attempt to draw out how ‘posting’ is modulated on facebook, about how subjectivity is configured within the complex matrix comprising a constant flow of posts, the economy of ‘liking’, algorithmic sorting and affects that do not cross the threshold of the screen.</p>
<h3><strong>Maitrayee Mukerji</strong></h3>
<p>By some latest estimates, around 35% of the population access the Internet in India using multiple devices. As Indians browse, search, transact and interact online, one can observe the increasing intertwining of the Internet in their everyday lives. But, how much do we know about the influence and impact of the Internet on Indian and in India? Advances in big data technologies provide an exciting opportunity for social science researchers to study the Internet. So, trends can be detected, opinions and sentiments can be calibrated, social networks can be discovered by using technologies for collecting and mining data on people online. But are social science researchers in India equipped enough to do a rigorous and detailed study of the India? Leaving aside debates on epistemology, ontology and methodology of researching Internet using big data analytics, the very first challenge is
limited access to data. A cursory scan of the available research would indicate that the data – tweets, trends, comments, memes etc. have generally been collected manually. The bulk of the data is collected by private companies and available either at a price or by writing programs to access them through APIs. The latter allows only limited extraction of data and more often than not has a learning curve. Access to raw data, through institutional repositories or special permission, if available is only to select few. Legal and ethical issues arise if one considers scrapping websites for data. The essay is an attempt to articulate the challenges in accessing data while making attempts to study the Internet using big data analytics.</p>
<h3><strong>Muhammed Afzal P</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Internet Memes as Effective Means of Social and Political Criticism</em></strong></p>
<p>By looking at the user-generated memes posted from the Malayalam Facebook pages “Troll Malayalam” and “International Chalu Union”, this essay argues that political memes function as effective means of social and political criticism in Kerala. In a society where conversations often tend to feature examples from popular films, memes from these pages use images from popular culture including television to respond to current affairs as well as contemporary social and political questions. Often described mistakenly as 'trolls' by the practitioners themselves, a major portion of the memes have a progressive content in terms of discussing questions related to religion, sexuality, nationalism, etc. It won’t be an exaggeration to state that many Malayalis see these memes as instant 'news analysis' of current affairs. The argument of this essay will be advanced through an analysis of the memes that were produced in relation to contemporary socio-political and cultural questions such as beef ban, the rise of right-wing politics in Kerala, the question of religious conservatism, etc. Through this the essay seeks to investigate how internet memes creatively contribute to social movements and also to see how critical questions in cultural criticism are translated into "the popular.'</p>
<h3><strong>Dr. Ravikant Kisana</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Archetyping the 'Launda' Humor on the Desi Internet</em></strong></p>
<p>Humor on the internet has proven a massive social unifying force for young, upper class Indian millennials. The humor is not just consumed via Western (mainly US) humor collectives such as 9GAG, Cracked, etc - the proliferation of 'Indian' humor pages on the Facebook and the countless YouTube comedy channels is testament to the localisation of this content. However, the humor which is seen as a unifying force is largely 'launda' aka. 'heteronormative-upper caste-male' in its sensibilities. Comedy collectives like TVF, with its popular channel 'Q-tiyapa' had to create a separate handle 'Girliyapa' to cater to feminist themes. The idea is that humor by default is male, and 'feminist humor' needs a separate space.</p>
<p>This essay seeks to study the 'launda'-cultural attributes of online Indian humor. It will seek to document and wean archetypes of comedy tropes which fit this mode. The area of the documentation will be YouTube comedy channels and Facebook humor pages—however, the same can be extended to Twitter handles and the suchlike.</p>
<h3><strong>Siddharth Rao and Kiran Kumar</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Chota Recharge and the Chota Internet</em></strong></p>
<p>Uniform and affordable Internet is emerging as one of the fundamental civil rights in developing countries. However in India, the connectivity is far from uniform across the regions, where the disparity is evident in the infrastructure, the cost of access and telecommunication services to provide Internet facilities among different economic classes. In spite of having a large mobile user base, the mobile Internet are still remarkably slower in some of the developing countries. Especially in India, it falls below 50% even in comparison with the performance of its developing counterparts!</p>
<p>This essay presents a study of connectivity and performance trends based on an exploratory analysis of mobile Internet measurement data from India. In order to assess the state of mobile networks and its readiness in adopting the different mobile standards (2G, 3G, and 4G) for commercial use, we discuss the spread, penetration, interoperability and the congestion trends.</p>
<p>Based on our analysis, we argue that the network operators have taken negligible measures to scale the mobile Internet. Affordable Internet is definitely for everyone. But, the affordability of the Internet in terms of cost
does not necessarily imply the rightful access to Internet services. Chota recharge is possibly leading us to chota (shrunken) Internet!</p>
<h3><strong>Smarika Kumar</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Why Mythologies are Crucial to Understand Governance on the Internet: The Case of Online Maps</em></strong></p>
<p>How does one study internet in India? This essay proposes to provide one possible answer to this question through its central argument that internet, like other technologies, is very much a part of a “mythological” or “fictional” narrative of the history of this country, and without an understanding of these mythologies, the development of internet governance in the country cannot be hoped to be understood. This central argument is traced in the essay through the debates and discussions on law and policymaking around online maps. The essay, in its first part, explores what a “mythological” account of the history of India might mean, and what role technological developments play in it. It does so by tracing the narrative of mapmaking in medieval India and its deep ties with magic, secrecy and mythical stories. It then surveys how modern mapping surveys in the colonial period interacted with the idea of the “native”, and argues that such interactions created a dichotomy between “native” sciences, folklore on the one hand, and colonial achievements, national security on the other. It argues that it is this latter strand of a certain “national security” vision of technology which found dominant voice in the regulation
of maps in India post-independence, yet the sense of the unknown, mystical, or “mythological” in such technological deployment as mapmaking requires, survived. The essay finally uses such evidence to trace how even in online
interactions, and internet governance design in India- this aspect of the mystical and the fear of it often sustains, driven by a (repressed?) memory of mythology, through the use of analogies. And it is within this twilight
zone, within this frontier between “mythology” and nation-building, that a governance design for online maps is being presently constructed in India. The essay then argues that it becomes crucial to understand such mythologies around technology generally and internet specifically and the manner they interact with law and policymaking in order to really get a sense of a 21st century India’s experience of the internet.</p>
<h3><strong>Sujeet George</strong></h3>
<p><strong><em>Understanding Reddit: The Indian Context</em></strong></p>
<p>Even as social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter seek to carve a niche within the Indian social media landscape, the presence and impact of news aggregator website reddit seems relatively unnoticed. Known for its excessive self-referentiality and inability to emerge from a restricted pool of informational flow, reddit nevertheless has come to be a major focal point of convergence of news and public opinion, especially in the United States. The web interface, which allows for users with overlapping interests to converge under a common platform namely the “subreddit,” allows the possibility of understanding questions of user taste and the directions in which information and user attention flow.</p>
<p>This paper seeks to offer a preliminary gesture towards understanding reddit’s usage and breadth in the Indian context. Through an analysis of the “India” subreddit and examining the manner and context in which information and ideas are shared, proposed, and debunked, the paper aspires to formulate a methodology for interrogating sites like reddit that offer the possibilities of social mediation, even as users maintain a limited amount of privacy. At the
same time, to what extent can such news aggregator sites direct the ways in which opinions and news flows change course as a true marker of information generation responding to user inputs.</p>
<h3><strong>Supratim Pal</strong></h3>
<p>India, being a multilingual country, owes a lot to the Internet for adding words to the vocabulary of everyday use in different languages.</p>
<p>This paper would critically examine how Net words like "selfie", "wall", "profile" and others have changed the way Indians write or talk. For example, a word like "nijaswi" was not there in Bengali language five years back but is used across several platforms as a translation of "selfie".</p>
<p>On one hand, computer-mediated communication (CMC) has helped us to express in short messages and on the other, we all have picked up use of punctuation marks like colon or a semicolon to express our emotion - which have got another name, "emoticons".</p>
<p>The paper would be more practical in approach than theoretical. For example, it would feature chat (another example of CMC) conversations 10 years ago when hardly an emoticon was used, and that of today's when we cannot think of a chat without a "smiley" or a "sticker". Even the linguist, David Crystal, probably could not have thought that in 15 years, the language (not just lingua franca, English) would change worldwide since he first tried to theorize Internet language in 2001.</p>
<p>Today, a linguist need not to have a proper publication to introduce a word in any language but Netizens can re-invent words like "troll" or "roast" to criticize one or "superlike" to celebrate an achievement or even "unfriend" someone to just relax.</p>
<h3><strong>Surfatial</strong></h3>
<p>Surfatial is a trans-local collective that operates through the internet. We use conversations to aid learning outside established structures. We are concerned with enabling disinhibition through the internet, for expressing
what may not be feasible in physical reality. What role does partial or complete anonymity play in this process of seeking “safe” zones of expression? Fake profiles on social media offer such zones, while perhaps also operating to propagate, mislead or troll.</p>
<p>Our essay would argue:</p>
<ol><li>That there is a desire to participate in speculative fora in the Indian cultural context and the internet has created space for philosophical questioning among contemporary Indian participants which can develop further, despite common assertions that online spaces are largely uncivil and abusive.</li>
<li>That anonymous and pseudonymous content production offers a method for exploring and expressing with a certain degree of freedom.</li>
<li>Spam-like methods used in sub-cultural outreach efforts on social media have proved effective in puncturing filter bubbles.</li></ol>
<p>Our essay would be drawn from experiments via Surfatial’s online engagement platforms (Surfatial’s Study groups and post_writer project) to examine:</p>
<ol><li>Extent of participation.</li>
<li>Disinhibition facilitation and dialoguing.</li>
<li>Reach.</li>
<li>Emergence and development of ideas.</li>
<li>Creating an archive of internet activity and re-processing it into new forms of presentation.</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-internet-in-india-2016-selected-abstracts'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-internet-in-india-2016-selected-abstracts</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroResearchers at WorkFeaturedInternet StudiesRAW Blog2016-07-06T06:24:42ZBlog Entry