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WSIS+10 High Level Event: A Bird's Eye Report
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report
<b>The WSIS+10 High Level was organised by the ITU and collaborative UN entities on June 9-13, 2014. It aimed to evaluate the progress on implementation of WSIS Outcomes from Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005, and to envision a post-2015 Development Agenda. Geetha Hariharan attended the event on CIS' behalf.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) +10 </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/">High Level Event</a><span> (HLE) was hosted at the ITU Headquarters in Geneva, from June 9-13, 2014. The HLE aimed to review the implementation and progress made on information and communication technology (ICT) across the globe, in light of WSIS outcomes (</span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/index-p1.html">Geneva 2003</a><span> and </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/index-p2.html">Tunis 2005</a><span>). Organised in three parallel tracks, the HLE sought to take stock of progress in ICTs in the last decade (High Level track), initiate High Level Dialogues to formulate the post-2015 development agenda, as well as host thematic workshops for participants (Forum track).</span><span> </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Track:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/copy2_of_HighLevelTrack.jpg/@@images/be5f993c-3553-4d63-bb66-7cd16f8407dc.jpeg" alt="High Level Track" class="image-inline" title="High Level Track" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Opening Ceremony, WSIS+10 High Level Event </i>(<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/ITU/status/334587247556960256/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level track opened officially on June 10, 2014, and culminated with the endorsement by acclamation (as is ITU tradition) of two <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/inc/doc/outcome/362828V2E.pdf">Outcome Documents</a>. These were: (1) WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, taking stock of ICT developments since the WSIS summits, (2) WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, aiming to develop a vision for the post-2015 global information society. These documents were the result of the WSIS+10 <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/review/mpp/">Multi-stakeholder Preparatory Platform</a> (MPP), which involved WSIS stakeholders (governments, private sector, civil society, international organizations and relevant regional organizations).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>MPP</strong> met in six phases, convened as an open, inclusive consultation among WSIS stakeholders. It was not without its misadventures. While ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré consistently lauded the multi-stakeholder process, and Ambassador Janis Karklins urged all parties, especially governments, to “<i>let the UN General Assembly know that the multi-stakeholder model works for Internet governance at all levels</i>”, participants in the process shared stories of discomfort, disagreement and discord amongst stakeholders on various IG issues, not least human rights on the Internet, surveillance and privacy, and multi-stakeholderism. Richard Hill of the Association for Proper Internet Governance (<a href="http://www.apig.ch/">APIG</a>) and the Just Net Coalition writes that like NETmundial, the MPP was rich in a diversity of views and knowledge exchange, but stakeholders <a href="http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/06/16/what-questions-did-the-wsis10-high-level-event-answer/">failed to reach consensus</a> on crucial issues. Indeed, Prof. Vlamidir Minkin, Chairman of the MPP, expressed his dismay at the lack of consensus over action line C9. A compromise was agreed upon in relation to C9 later.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some members of civil society expressed their satisfaction with the extensive references to human rights and rights-centred development in the Outcome Documents. While governmental opposition was seen as frustrating, they felt that the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">MPP had sought and achieved a common understanding</span></strong>, a sentiment <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748168051580928">echoed</a> by the ITU Secretary General. Indeed, even Iran, a state that had expressed major reservations during the MPP and felt itself unable to agree with the text, <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748723750711297">agreed</a> that the MPP had worked hard to draft a document beneficial to all.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Concerns around the MPP did not affect the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">review of ICT developments</span></strong> over the last decade. High Level Panels with Ministers of ICT from states such as Uganda, Bangladesh, Sweden, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and others, heads of the UN Development Programme, UNCTAD, Food and Agriculture Organisation, UN-WOMEN and others spoke at length of rapid advances in ICTs. The focus was largely on ICT access and affordability in developing states. John E. Davies of Intel repeatedly drew attention to innovative uses of ICTs in Africa and Asia, which have helped bridge divides of affordability, gender, education and capacity-building. Public-private partnerships were the best solution, he said, to affordability and access. At a ceremony evaluating implementation of WSIS action-lines, the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), India, <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748723750711297">won an award</a> for its e-health application MOTHER.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Outcome Documents themselves shall be analysed in a separate post. But in sum, the dialogue around Internet governance at the HLE centred around the success of the MPP. Most participants on panels and in the audience felt this was a crucial achievement within the realm of the UN, where the Tunis Summit had delineated strict roles for stakeholders in paragraph 35 of the </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html">Tunis Agenda</a><span>. Indeed, there was palpable relief in Conference Room 1 at the </span><a href="http://www.cicg.ch/en/">CICG</a><span>, Geneva, when on June 11, Dr. Touré announced that the Outcome Documents would be adopted without a vote, in keeping with ITU tradition, even if consensus was achieved by compromise.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Dialogues:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/HighLevelDialogues.jpg/@@images/3c30d94f-7a65-4912-bb42-2ccd3b85a18d.jpeg" alt="High Level Dialogues" class="image-inline" title="High Level Dialogues" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Prof. Vladimir Minkin delivers a statement.</i> (<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/JaroslawPONDER/status/476288845013843968/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Dialogues on developing a post-2015 Development Agenda, based on WSIS action lines, were active on June 12. Introducing the Dialogue, Dr. Touré lamented the Millennium Development Goals as a “<i>lost opportunity</i>”, emphasizing the need to alert the UN General Assembly and its committees as to the importance of ICTs for development.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As on previous panels, there was <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">intense focus on access, affordability and reach in developing countries</span></strong>, with Rwanda and Bangladesh expounding upon their successes in implementing ICT innovations domestically. The world is more connected than it was in 2005, and the ITU in 2014 is no longer what it was in 2003, said speakers. But we lack data on ICT deployment across the globe, said Minister Knutssen of Sweden, recalling the gathering to the need to engage all stakeholders in this task. Speakers on multiple panels, including the Rwandan Minister for CIT, Marilyn Cade of ICANN and Petra Lantz of the UNDP, emphasized the need for ‘smart engagement’ and capacity-building for ICT development and deployment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A crucial session on cybersecurity saw Dr. Touré envision a global peace treaty accommodating multiple stakeholders. On the panel were Minister Omobola Johnson of Nigeria, Prof. Udo Helmbrecht of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Prof. A.A. Wahab of Cybersecurity Malaysia and Simon Muller of Facebook. The focus was primarily on building laws and regulations for secure communication and business, while child protection was equally considered.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The lack of laws/regulations for cybersecurity (child pornography and jurisdictional issues, for instance), or other legal protections (privacy, data protection, freedom of speech) in rapidly connecting developing states was noted. But the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">question of cross-border surveillance and wanton violations of privacy went unaddressed</span></strong> except for the customary, unavoidable mention. This was expected. Debates in Internet governance have, in the past year, been silently and invisibly driven by the Snowden revelations. So too, at WSIS+10 Cybersecurity, speakers emphasized open data, information exchange, data ownership and control (the <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ecj-rules-internet-search-engine-operator-responsible-for-processing-personal-data-published-by-third-parties">right to be forgotten</a>), but did not openly address surveillance. Indeed, Simon Muller of Facebook called upon governments to publish their own transparency reports: A laudable suggestion, even accounting for Facebook’s own undetailed and truncated reports.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a nutshell, the post-2015 Development Agenda dialogues repeatedly emphasized the importance of ICTs in global connectivity, and their impact on GDP growth and socio-cultural change and progress. The focus was on taking this message to the UN General Assembly, engaging all stakeholders and creating an achievable set of action lines post-2015.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Forum Track:</h3>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/copy_of_ForumTrack.jpg/@@images/dfcce68a-18d7-4f1e-897b-7208bb60abc9.jpeg" alt="Forum Track" class="image-inline" title="Forum Track" /></p>
<p><i>Participants at the UNESCO session on its Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues</i> (<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/leakaspar/status/476690921644646400/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The HLE was organized as an extended version of the WSIS Forum, which hosts thematic workshops and networking opportunities, much like any other conference. Running in parallel sessions over 5 days, the WSIS Forum hosted sessions by the ITU, UNESCO, UNDP, ICANN, ISOC, APIG, etc., on issues as diverse as the WSIS Action Lines, the future of Internet governance, the successes and failures of <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/">WCIT-2012</a>, UNESCO’s <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/internetstudy">Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues</a>, spam and a taxonomy of Internet governance.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Detailed explanation of each session I attended is beyond the scope of this report, so I will limit myself to the interesting issues raised.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At ICANN’s session on its own future (June 9), Ms. Marilyn Cade emphasized the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">importance of national and regional IGFs</span></strong> for both issue-awareness and capacity-building. Mr. Nigel Hickson spoke of engagement at multiple Internet governance fora: “<i>Internet governance is not shaped by individual events</i>”. In light of <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/">criticism</a> of ICANN’s apparent monopoly over IANA stewardship transition, this has been ICANN’s continual <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en">response</a> (often repeated at the HLE itself). Also widely discussed was the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">role of stakeholders in Internet governance</span></strong>, given the delineation of roles and responsibilities in the Tunis Agenda, and governments’ preference for policy-monopoly (At WSIS+10, Indian Ambassador Dilip Sinha seemed wistful that multilateralism is a “<i>distant dream</i>”).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This discussion bore greater fruit in a session on Internet governance ‘taxonomy’. The session saw <a href="https://www.icann.org/profiles/george-sadowsky">Mr. George Sadowsky</a>, <a href="http://www.diplomacy.edu/courses/faculty/kurbalija">Dr. Jovan Kurbalija</a>, <a href="http://www.williamdrake.org/">Mr. William Drake</a> and <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/agenda/session_docs/170/ThoughtsOnIG.pdf">Mr. Eliot Lear</a> (there is surprisingly no official profile-page on Mr. Lear) expound on dense structures of Internet governance, involving multiple methods of classification of Internet infrastructure, CIRs, public policy issues, etc. across a spectrum of ‘baskets’ – socio-cultural, economic, legal, technical. Such studies, though each attempting clarity in Internet governance studies, indicate that the closer you get to IG, the more diverse and interconnected the eco-system gets. David Souter’s diagrams almost capture the flux of dynamic debate in this area (please see pages 9 and 22 of <a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC%20framework%20for%20IG%20assessments%20-%20D%20Souter%20-%20final_0.pdf">this ISOC study</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There were, for most part, insightful interventions from session participants. Mr. Sadowsky questioned the effectiveness of the Tunis Agenda delineation of stakeholder-roles, while Mr. Lear pleaded that techies be let to do their jobs without interference. <a href="http://internetdemocracy.in/">Ms. Anja Kovacs</a> raised pertinent concerns about <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">including voiceless minorities in a ‘rough consensus’ model</span></strong>. Across sessions, <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">questions of mass surveillance, privacy and data ownership rose</span></strong> from participants. The protection of human rights on the Internet – especially freedom of expression and privacy – made continual appearance, across issues like spam (<a href="http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/CDS/sg/rgqlist.asp?lg=1&sp=2010&rgq=D10-RGQ22.1.1&stg=1">Question 22-1/1</a> of ITU-D Study Group 1) and cybersecurity.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Conclusion:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The HLE was widely attended by participants across WSIS stakeholder-groups. At the event, a great many relevant questions such as the future of ICTs, inclusions in the post-2015 Development Agenda, the value of muti-stakeholder models, and human rights such as free speech and privacy were raised across the board. Not only were these raised, but cognizance was taken of them by Ministers, members of the ITU and other collaborative UN bodies, private sector entities such as ICANN, technical community such as the ISOC and IETF, as well as (obviously) civil society.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Substantively, the HLE did not address mass surveillance and privacy, nor of expanding roles of WSIS stakeholders and beyond. Processually, the MPP failed to reach consensus on several issues comfortably, and a compromise had to be brokered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>But perhaps a big change at the HLE was the positive attitude to multi-stakeholder models from many quarters, not least the ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun Touré. His repeated calls for acceptance of multi-stakeholderism left many members of civil society surprised and tentatively pleased. Going forward, it will be interesting to track the ITU and the rest of UN’s (and of course, member states’) stances on multi-stakeholderism at the ITU Plenipot, the WSIS+10 Review and the UN General Assembly session, at the least.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaWSIS+10PrivacyCybersecurityHuman Rights OnlineSurveillanceFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceFacebookData ProtectionMulti-stakeholderICANNInternet AccessITUInternet StudiesE-GovernanceICT2014-06-20T15:57:32ZBlog EntryWoman Alleges Harassment at Major International Conference
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference
<b>A prospective lawyer's name tag was flipped, and she was asked rude questions by a CEO at a conference, where, ironically enough, she was invited to devise sexual harassment policies.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Kavita Patil was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.bangaloremirror.com/bangalore/others/Woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference/articleshow/51605662.cms">published in Bangalore Mirror</a> on March 30, 2016.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Padmini Baruah, 22, a National Law School of India University (NLSIU) student representing Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), at the ICANN55 (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) held at Marrakech, alleged that she was sexually harassed by Khaled Fattal, the chairman and CEO of The Multilingual Internet Group.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On March 2, Baruah had reached out to the conference ombudsman and expressed her concerns about the lack of a specific sexual harassment policy. She was directed to the ICANN55's Standards of Behavior, who invited her for a discussion at the conference in Marrakech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">About three hours before her meeting with the ombudsman on March 6, she had a shock. "I was, unfortunately, subjected to sexual harassment in the nature of verbal remarks and infringement of my personal space by the perpetrator in question, a man I eventually came to know was called Khaled Fattal," she recalled. "Fattal approached me, pulled at my name tag, examined it and dropped it. A little later, he lifted my name tag and flipped it back and forth asking me, "Where are you from?"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He then leaned in, lecherously looked at me and asked, "Do you know how to make a cheese sandwich?" I was taken aback and responded angrily saying, "Yes, that is why I came here, to make you cheese sandwiches." He went on to throw another lecherous look my way and said, "Well, I love veg sandwiches."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham, executive director of the CIS, said, "ICANN doesn't have a special cell where complaints can be raised but they have an ombudsman. The ombudsman is investigating the case and is in touch with both Baruah and also the perpetrator." He said after she raised the sexual harassment complaint, he received many mails from women who had faced harassment at the event but never made an attempt to raise their voice. "Through CIS we have issued a public statement of support for Baruah and we are waiting for the result of the investigation," he said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Fattal and the ombudsman were not available for comment despite repeated attempts made by BM to get a response. Baruah, meanwhile, was informed by the ombudsman that her's was the first harassment case reported in the history of ICANN.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet GovernanceSexual Harassment2016-03-30T17:06:10ZNews ItemWhy Presumption of Renewal is Unsuitable for the Current Registry Market Structure
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure
<b>With the recent and much protested renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal has again come to the forefront. While this seems relatively uncontroversial to most, Padma Venkataraman, a law student and intern at CIS looks at presumptive renewal through a critical lens. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the recent renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal is worth reconsidering. When we talk about presumption of renewal for registry agreements, it means that the agreement has a reasonable renewal expectancy at the end of its contractual term. According to the current base registry agreement, it shall be renewed for 10-year periods, upon expiry of the initial (and successive) term, unless the operator commits a fundamental and material breach of the operator’s covenants or breach of its payment obligations to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure">Download the entire blog post here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-31T02:53:26ZBlog EntryWhere Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know
<b>Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond. </b>
<p> </p>
<h3>Why Is ICANN Here?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann.org">ICANN</a>) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a result of <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order">an agreement</a> with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-factsheet-24mar14-en.pdf">IANA functions</a>, which include making changes to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_root_zone">root zone file</a> (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite">the TCP/IP suite</a>. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is the <i>de facto</i> policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en">the UDRP</a> for domain name disputes), maintaining the <a href="http://whois.icann.org/">WHOIS database</a>, etc. for domain names.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/bharti/bharti-agmt-pdf-09jan14-en.pdf">the <strong>.bharti </strong>Registry Agreement</a>, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, <strong>.bharti</strong>) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals <span>X</span> US $0.25). <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-en">TLD Registries</a> “own” TLDs like <strong>.com</strong>, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-agreements-en">816 such Registry Agreements</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like <a href="https://in.godaddy.com/">Go Daddy</a> and <a href="http://www.bigrock.in/">Big Rock</a>, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en#raa">yearly accreditation fee</a> of US $4000 to ICANN (see <span>Clause 3.9</span>). Each Registrar also <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/financials-55-2012-02-25-en">pays to ICANN</a> fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are <a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html">over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (<a href="http://www.nixi.in/en/contact-us/103-irinn">NIXI as IRINN</a>), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [<i>see, ex.</i>:<i> </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun09-en.pdf">FY09 Financial Statements, page 3</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>And this isn’t all of it! With its </span><a href="http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/">new gTLD program</a><span>, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for </span><a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20141129_icann_new_gtld_auction_proceeds_approaching_30_million/">as high as US $6 million</a><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering <i>status quo </i>(for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions">As we have written before</a>, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 17</a>). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 11</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To its credit, ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en">makes public</a> its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if <a href="https://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#six41">IP addresses are not property to be sold</a>? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. <span>To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</a><span> (DIDP), </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en">Ombudsman</a><span>, </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review">Reconsideration and Independent Review</a><span> and the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf">Accountability and Transparency Review</a><span> (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV">Article IV, Section 2</a><span>), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (</span><i>nemo debet esse judex in propria causa</i><span>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A">ICANN Open Forum</a> in Istanbul (IGF 2014).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door">revolving door study</a> by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But ICANN is <i>intended </i>to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. <a href="http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/sun-iana-stewardship-accountability">As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52</a>, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is <a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/564269949237985280">still asking that question</a>. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS <a href="http://openup2014.org/privacy-vs-transparency-attempt-resolving-dichotomy/">has advocated</a> transparency as a check-and-balance for power.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. <b>We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file">please go here</a></b>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-netmundial-2015-01-28-en">NETmundial Request</a></b>, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they <i>already implement</i> the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that <i>permeate through the work of any entity </i>– particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en">Ombudsman Request</a></b>, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V">Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws</a>. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en">Annual Reports</a>; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>CIS' Annual Reports are <a href="http://cis-india.org/about/reports">here</a>. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. <i>Pranav Bidare (<i style="text-align: justify; ">3rd year)</i> of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.</i></i></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaAccountabilityICANNIANA TransitionTransparencyDIDP2015-03-05T07:43:45ZBlog EntryWhat’s In a Name? — DNS Singularity of ICANN and The Gold Rush
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dns-singularity-of-icann-and-the-gold-rush
<b>March 2013 being the 28th birthday of the first ever registered Internet domain as well as the exigent launch of the Trademark Clearing House disguised as a milestone in rights protection by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) for it’s new gTLD program, Sharath Chandra Ram, dissects the transitory role of ICANN from being a technical outfit to the Boardroom Big Brother of Internet Governance.</b>
<hr />
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://trademark-clearinghouse.com/">Click to read</a> more about the <b>Trademark Clearing House</b>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a non-profit organization, established in agreement with the US Department of Commerce in 1998, the current arrangement of ICANN has come under serious questions in recent years, with the United Nations wanting the ITU to oversee Internet Governance while Europe seeking more public participation in the decision making process that currently comprises a majority of private stakeholders as ICANN board members with vested interests. In this post we shall look at a few instances that give room for thought about the regulatory powers and methods adopted by ICANN as well as reparatory measures taken to reaffirm it’s image as an able governing body amidst disputes over trademarks and fair competition that might actually call for a wider and objective inclusion in future. An outline of functional and structural arrangements of ICANN maybe found at the <a class="external-link" href="http://goo.gl/FijE7">CIS Knowledge Repository page</a>.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Business Model</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier this month, (March 15, 2013) was the 28<sup>th</sup> birthday of <a href="http://www.symbolics.com">symbolics.com</a>, the first ever domain name registered in 1985 through the formal ICANN process. (<a class="external-link" href="http://www.nordu.net/ndnweb/home.html">nordu.net</a> being the first domain name created by the registry on January 1, 1985 for the first root server, nic.nordu.net) Symbolics, that spun-off the MIT AI Lab and specialized in building workstations running LISP finally sold the domain for an undisclosed amount to XY.com, an Internet investment firm that has been proudly boasting about their acquired relic for over three years now. The golden days of fancy one word domain name resale at exorbitant prices are over, as Google’s page ranking crawler now really looks at unique content and backlinks. Nevertheless, those with the same archaic view of a real estate agent still believe that a good domain name does have a high ROI and have managed to find naïve takers who will offer ridiculous amounts. One of many such examples is the plain looking <a href="http://www.business.com">www.business.com</a> that was bought initially for $1,50,000 and changed hands twice from $7.5 million to an absurd $345 million of R.H. Donnelley Inc., that soon filed for bankruptcy!</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The top level domain market however, is consistently lucrative. A TLD registry on an average receives $5 - $7 per domain registered under it. So the .COM registry run by VeriSign which, as of 2013 has over a 100 million registered domains, receives a revenue of $500 to $700 million per year of which a fraction is paid to ICANN periodically on a per-registration or per-renewal basis. Competing registrars and registries across TLDs, their revenue generation practices as well as the application process for new TLDs gradually began to be regulated by ICANN in mysterious ways, as we will see in the following legal case studies.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">VeriSign vs. ICANN</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">VeriSign began to operate the .COM and .NET TLD after taking over Network Solutions Inc. and entering into a contractual agreement with ICANN in 2001. Let’s take a look at some methods used by VeriSign to garner internet traffic and registrant revenue, that were clamped down by the ICANN, which resulted in a lawsuit by plaintiff VeriSign claiming prevention of fair competition and revenue by impeding innovation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Clamping of Site Finder & WLS</i>: In September 2003, VeriSign introduced a Wild Card DNS Service called Site Finder for all .com and .net domains. This meant that any user trying to access a non-existent domain name no longer received the 404 Error but were instead redirected to the VeriSign website with adverts and links to affiliate registrars. Often a result of a misspelled domain, in ICANN’s view, the redirection by VeriSign amounted to typo squatting internet users as within a month VeriSign’s traffic rose dramatically moving it to the top 20 most visited websites on the web. As seen below in this archived image of Alexa’s 2003 traffic statistic (Courtesy: <a class="external-link" href="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/">cyber.law.harvard.edu</a>).</p>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_DailyTraffic.png" alt="Daily Traffic" class="image-inline" title="Daily Traffic" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Shortly, in October 2003, ICANN issued a suspension ultimatum pointing Site Finder in violation of the 2001 .Com agreement. This was not the first time ICANN clamped down on VeriSign’s ‘profiteering’ methods. In 2001, ICANN prevented VeriSign’s WLS (Wait Listing Service) that allowed a registrant (through selected participating affiliate registrars of VeriSign) to apply to register an already registered domain in the event that the registration is deleted – a nifty scheme considering the fact that about 25000 domains are deleted everyday!</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Remarks and Submissions</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The long drawn case of VeriSign Vs. ICANN ended on a reconciliatory note, with ICANN bringing the Site Finder service to a halt at the cost of VeriSign walking away happier with a free 5 year extension on the .COM domain (2007 extended to 2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the ingenious Site Finder service did pose a huge problem to spam filters, both the WLS and yet another service that VeriSign launched to allow registration of non-English language SLDs were also met with a cringe by ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>However looking closer, one may realize that the act of ICANN permitting a DNS root redirect service such as Site Finder for all TLD operators (with an acceptable template that also carried information about the 404 error besides other marketing options) meant the first step towards paving the way towards a plausible scenario of multiple competing DNS roots across TLDs being able to interact with each other — a system often argued by network theorists to be the most efficient and competitive model that would reduce the disjoint between the demand and supply of TLDs in a decentralized infrastructure, and that definitely was not in the best interest of ICANN’s monopolistic plan. Hence, this could be seen as a move by ICANN to nip the Site Finder bud while still young</b>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, as brought to public notice in more than one instance (name.Space Vs. ICANN, IOD Vs. ICANN), the vested interests of ICANN board members has come under glaring light. <b>Can the ICANN leadership consisting of members from the very same domain name business industry be able to objectively deal with competing registry services and legal issues?</b> Conspicuous targets have been chairperson Steve Crocker who owns a consulting firm Shinkuro, whose subtle investor is infact AFILIAS INC which runs the .INFO and .MOBI TLDs, provides backend services to numerous TLDs (.ORG, .ASIA, .AERO (aviation)), has applied for a further 31 new TLDs and has it’s CTO Ram Mohan on the Board of Directors of ICANN. Also ICANN Vice Chariman, Bruce Tonkin is Senior Executive at Australia’s largest domain name provider Melbourne IT, and Peter Thrush former chairman of the ICANN Board of Directors is Executive Chairman of Top Level Domain Holdings,Inc which filed 92 gTLD applications in 2012.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Trademark Protection and Domain Names</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Image Online Design (IOD) is a company that since 1996 has been providing Internet registry services using the trademark .WEB (trademark #3,177,334 including computer accessories) registered with the US Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It’s registry services however, were not through the primary DNS root server maintained by ICANN, but through an alternate DNS root that required prospective users to manually make changes in their browser settings in order to resolve .WEB domains registered through IOD. Despite not running the primary DNS root server for. WEB, by the year 2000 IOD had acquired about 20,000 registered .WEB customers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The beacon of ‘hope’ arrived upon IOD in mid-2000 as ICANN (on advise of supporting organization GNSO) opened a call for proposals for registrations of new TLDs, with a non-refundable deposit of $50,000 for an application to be considered. By then the importance of the .WEB TLD for e-commerce was well known amongst ICANN board members with Louis Touton lobbying for his preferred applicant AFILIAS INC to be given the .WEB TLD, with others raising concerns about IOD’s preregistration of .WEB domains. One of the founding fathers of the internet, Vinton Cerf, the then Chairman of ICANN took a benevolent stance-- <i>"I'm still interested in IOD," he repeated over Touton's objections. "They've worked with .WEB for some time. To assign that to someone else given that they're actually functioning makes me uneasy," he said, prompting board member Linda Wilson to chime in, "I agree with Vint."</i> (<a href="http://goo.gl/d1v6X">http://goo.gl/d1v6X</a> , <a href="http://goo.gl/eV9Jd">http://goo.gl/eV9Jd</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally amidst all the contention, no one was offered the .WEB domain and ICANN announced that all applications not selected will remain pending and those who submitted will have the option of being re-considered when additional TLD selections are made in future. And the future being, 2012, when ICANN invited a new round of TLD applicants, this time with the non-refundable deposit of whopping $185,000 for a single application (1 TLD/application as opposed to the $50,000 in the year 2000 that allowed multiple TLD requests within the same application) to be considered. While 7 new applicants for the .WEB TLD registered their interest, IOD considered their application to be still pending and did not join the new pool that included AFILIAS INC. and GOOGLE.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The litigation of IOD Vs ICANN ended in Feb 2013, with IOD claiming weak causes of action under “Trademark Infringement” and “Breach of Contract” &“Fair Dealing” hinging on the fact that the initial $50,000 application was still pending and never was officially rejected by ICANN. Further, there was not enough room to make a valid trademark infringement, as there was no substantial room for consumer confusion in the .WEB case.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Remarks and Submissions</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IOD Vs. ICANN case not only increased concerns globally, over the uncertainty associated with the ICANN application process for generic TLDs along with questions regarding the objectivity of its board members, but at the same time has alerted ICANN to take the necessary big sister steps to ensure that it’s well in the game.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The fact of the matter is that the USPTO does not provide trademark protection services for the Top level Domain industry citing the reason that TLDs trademarks do not provide a distinct service mark that can identify or differentiate the service of an applicant from others, and further cannot be used to ascertain the source of an applicant’s services. This view is flawed, as by looking at a TLD, say BBC.com, an informed person can easily say that VeriSign INC manages the service of directing a user to a correct location on the .COM registry. With introduction of new gTLDs, perhaps BBC would shift it’s content to BBC.news, where the source may be an abstracted Registrar and the nature of service being quite evident. And to those registered trademarks, especially those that shall result in substantial brand confusion to the customer if infringed, granting a TLD like .ibm or .bbc may well be granted to the owner of the trademark who may then outsource registry services to a service provider. This shall invert the current model by relegating the role of a TLD registry holder to that of a contracted service provider.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>So the question is, should have the US Department of Commerce, who contracted ICANN in the first place, mediated with USPTO to place the business of a registrar on par with other trades and businesses, and modify it’s trademark infringement policies? And more importantly, will ICANN view this as introducing yet another key stakeholder to the gTLD assignment process?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The answer to the latter is already clear as ICANN being in the top of it’s game decided to take matters into its own hands and on March 26, 2013) launched</b> <a href="http://trademark-clearinghouse.com/"><b>http://trademark-clearinghouse.com/</b></a><b> with a new set of guidelines for accepted trademarks and a mechanism that allows trademark holders to submit their application to a central repository.</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Accepted trademark holders shall be given priority to register gTLDs during the ‘sunrise’ period. Deloitte Enterprise Risk Services have been assigned the responsibility of evaluating submitted trademarks while IBM shall maintain the actual database of trademarks by the later half of 2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The tip of the iceberg is well in scope of view. ICANN46 is currently being hosted in Beijing, at the China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC) from April 7 to 11, 2013 while hopefully parallel discussions will happen on all other global forums to hopefully re-consider a future of multiple competing DNS root servers towards healthy competition that is decentralized.</p>
<hr />
<p><b> Key References</b></p>
<ol>
<li><a href="http://www.icann.org/en/news/litigation">http://www.icann.org/en/news/litigation</a></li>
<li><a href="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/tlds/">http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/tlds/</a></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Lynn, S. [2001] “Discussion Draft: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS” Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 28 May, 2001.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Internet Architecture Board [2000] “IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root.” RFC 2826, Internet Society, May 2000.</li>
</ol>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dns-singularity-of-icann-and-the-gold-rush'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dns-singularity-of-icann-and-the-gold-rush</a>
</p>
No publishersharathICANNInternet Governance2013-03-31T05:35:33ZBlog EntryUnderstanding IANA Stewardship Transition
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition
<b>Smarika Kumar describes the process of the IANA stewardship transition, and enumerates what the NTIA announcement does and does not do. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA Announcement and ICANN-convened Processes:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US Government <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced</a> “<i>its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community</i>”. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions. For this purpose, the NTIA <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">asked</a> the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to “<i>convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS)</i>”. This was welcome news for the global Internet community, which has been criticising unilateral US Government oversight of Critical Internet Resources for many years now. NTIA further announced that IANA transition proposal must have broad community support and should address the following four principles:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Subsequently, during ICANN49 in Singapore (March 23-27, 2014), ICANN held flurried discussions to gather initial community feedback from participants to come up with a Draft Proposal of the Principles, Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of the IANA Functions on 8 April 2014, which was open to public comments until 8 May 2014, which was further extended to 31 May 2014. Responses by various stakeholders were collected in this very short period and some of them were incorporated into a Revised Proposal issued by ICANN on 6th June 2014. ICANN also unilaterally issued a Scoping Document defining the scope of the process for developing the proposal and also specifying what was not part of the scope. This Scoping Document came under severe criticism by various commentators, but was not amended.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en">also initiated</a> a separate but parallel process to discuss enhancement of its accountability on 6 May 2014. This was launched upon widespread distress over the fact that ICANN had excluded its role as operator of IANA functions from the Scoping Document, as well as over questions of accountability raised by the community at ICANN49 in Singapore. In the absence of ICANN’s contractual relationship with NTIA to operate the IANA functions, it remains unclear how ICANN will stay accountable upon the transition. The accountability process looks to address the same through the ICANN community. The issue of ICANN accountability is then envisioned to be coordination within ICANN itself through an ICANN Accountability Working Group comprised of community members and a few subject matter experts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What are the IANA Functions?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, or IANA functions consist of <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf">three separate tasks</a>:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Maintaining a central repository for protocol name and number registries used in many Internet protocols.</li>
<li>Co-ordinating the allocation of Internet Protocol (IP) and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the Regional Internet Registries, who then distribute IP and AS numbers to ISPs and others within their geographic regions.</li>
<li>Processing root zone change requests for Top Level Domains (TLDs) and making the Root Zone WHOIS database consisting of publicly available information for all TLD registry operators.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The first two of the abovementioned functions are operated by ICANN in consonance with policy developed at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Address Supporting Organisation (ASO) respectively, both of which exist under the ICANN umbrella.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The performance of last of these functions is distributed between ICANN and Verisign. NTIA has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign to perform the related root zone management functions. The related root zone management functions are the management of the root zone “zone signing key” (ZSK), as well as implementation of changes to and distribution of the DNS authoritative root zone file, which is the authoritative registry containing the lists of names and addresses for all top level domains.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the US Government oversees this entire set of operations by contracting with ICANN as well as Verisign to execute the IANA functions. Though the US Government does not interfere generally in operations of either ICANN or Verisign in their role as operators of IANA functions, it cannot be denied that it exercises oversight on both the operators of IANA functions, through these contracts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Import of the NTIA Announcement:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement of 14th March intends to initiate the withdrawal of such oversight of IANA functions by the NTIA in order to move towards global multistakeholder governance. NTIA has asked ICANN to initiate a process to decide upon what such global multistakeholder governance of IANA functions may look like. The following diagram presents the current governance structure of IANA functions and the areas that the NTIA announcement seeks to change:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/Untitled.png/@@images/160cccd1-af49-43fe-aeb2-a60153b6a07c.png" alt="NTIA Announcement" class="image-inline" title="NTIA Announcement" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA Oversight Mechanism (<a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf">Source</a>)</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What does the NTIA Announcement NOT DO?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT frame a model for governance of IANA functions once it withdraws its oversight role. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene a process, which would figure the details of IANA transition and propose an administrative structure for IANA functions once the NTIA withdraws its oversight role. But what this new administrative structure would look like has not itself been addressed in the NTIA announcement. As per the NTIA announcement, the new administrative structure is yet to be decided by a global multistakeholder community in accordance with the four principles outlined by the NTIA through a process, which ICANN shall convene.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT limit discussions and participation in IANA transition process to within the ICANN community. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene “global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition” IANA functions. This means all global stakeholders participation, including that of Governments and Civil Society is sought for the IANA transition process. ICANN has been asked “to work collaboratively with the directly affected parties, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), top level domain name operators, VeriSign, and other interested global stakeholders”, in the NTIA announcement. This however does not signify that discussions and participation in development of proposal for IANA transition needs to be limited to the ICANN community or the technical community. In fact, ICANN has itself said that the list of events provided as “Timeline of Events” in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">its Draft Proposal</a> of 8 April 2014 for engagement in development of a proposal for IANA transition is <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en">non-exhaustive</a>. This means proposal for IANA transition can be developed by different stakeholders, including governments and civil society in different fora appropriate to their working, including at the IGF and WSIS+10.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT mean devolution of IANA functions administration upon ICANN. NTIA chooses ICANN and Verisign to operate the IANA functions. If NTIA withdraws from its role, the question whether ICANN or Verisign should operate the IANA functions at all becomes an open one, and should be subject to deliberation. By merely asking ICANN to convene the process, the NTIA announcement in no way assigns any administration of IANA functions to ICANN. It must be remembered that the NTIA announcement says that key Internet domain name functions shall transition to the global multistakeholder community, and not the ICANN community.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT prevent the possibility of removal of ICANN from its role as operator of IANA functions. While ICANN has tried to frame the Scoping Document in a language to prevent any discussions on its role as operator of IANA functions, the question whether ICANN should continue in its operator role remains an open one. There are at least 12 submissions made in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal by varied stakeholders, which in fact, call for the separation of ICANN’s role as policy maker (through IETF, ASO, gNSO, ccNSO), and ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions. Such calls for separation come from private sector, civil society, as well as the technical community, among others. Such separation was also <a href="http://netmundial.org/netmundial-multistakeholder-statement/">endorsed</a> in the final NETmundial outcome document (paragraph 27). Governments have, in general, expressed no opinion on such separation in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal. It is however urged that governments express their opinion in favour of such separation to prevent consolidation of both policy making and implementation within ICANN, which would lead to increased potential situations for the ICANN Board to abuse its powers.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><i>Smarika Kumar is a graduate of the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and a member of the Alternative Law Forum, a collective of lawyers aiming to <span> integrate alternative lawyering with critical research, alternative dispute resolution, pedagogic interventions and sustained legal interventions in social issues</span>. Her <span>areas of interest include interdisciplinary research on the Internet, issues affecting indigenous peoples, eminent domain, traditional knowledge and pedagogy. </span></i></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition</a>
</p>
No publisherSmarika KumarNTIA AnnouncementICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2014-06-22T03:23:37ZBlog EntryThe ICANN-US DOC 'Affirmation of Commitments' - A Step Forward?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-icann-us-doc-affirmation-of-commitments-a-step-forward
<b>On 30 September 2009, ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) signed an Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) with the US Government's Department of Commerce. For those of us who are concerned that the Internet should serve the global public good, is the new arrangement a step forward? An assessment. </b>
<p>On 30 September 2009, ICANN signed an Affirmation of
Commitments (AoC) with the US Government's Department of Commerce.
ICANN is the not-for-profit public-benefit corporation that
coordinates the Internet's naming system. The Affirmation has been
widely hailed for the loosening of US-ICANN ties that it implies.
The unilateral control that the US exercised over the organisation
had for long been criticised in various quarters as inappropriate for
a – by now - global resource such as the Internet. A central
instrument of this control was constituted by the reviews that the
US's NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information
Administration) would conduct of the organisation, based on which the
country's Department of Commerce would rework and renew its contract
with ICANN. With the signing of the AoC, reviews will henceforth be conducted by panels to
be appointed by the Chair of ICANN's Board of Directors, as well as
the Chair of the Government Advisory Committee (GAC) in consultation
with the other members of the GAC. Since the Affirmation of
Commitments is of long standing – unlike earlier Memoranda of
Understanding, which had a limited validity – and since the US has
demanded for itself a permanent seat on only one of the four panels
that the AoC institutes, the US has indeed given up significant
amounts of the control that it wielded over the organisation so far.</p>
<p>A clear step forward? Well, not
necessarily – and in many ways it is too early to tell. Because
while the denationalisation of ICANN was high on many stakeholders'
agenda, so was the strengthening of ICANN as an accountable tool for
global governance. And where the latter is concerned, the AoC falls
sorely short. Although ICANN likes to posit itself as an
organisation rooted in communities, where policy is developed from
the bottom up, this wonderfully democratic discourse stands in rather
ugly contrast to the quite questionable practices that are all too
frequently reported from the organisation (the rather stepsisterly
treatment meted out to noncommercial users in ICANN in recent times,
for example, immediately comes to mind [1]<a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"></a>).
At the root of this contradiction seems to lie the fact that, while
ICANN may be a public interest organisation on paper, in practice it
is heavily dominated by large businesses, in particular those
US-based, who seem to be willing to go to considerable lengths to
defend their interests. The AoC has done nothing to check these
tendencies. The review panels suggested are an internal affair,
where those who develop policy will get to appoint the people who
will assess the policy development processes, and most of those
appointed, too, will come from within the organisation. While the
suggested wider involvement of ICANN communities, including
governments, in reviewing the organisation is a welcome move, it
remains to be seen, then, to what extent these review panels will
have teeth – in any case their recommendations are not binding.
But some go even further and argue that the AoC has effectively
removed the one democratic control that existed over ICANN's Board:
that of the US Government. As the communities that supposedly make
up ICANN do not have the power to unseat the Board, the Board now is
effectively accountable... to none.</p>
<p>Since it does not directly address
accountability problems within ICANN, the AoC is not so much an
improvement, then, as simply a change: it has closed a few old doors,
and opened some new ones. Whether this is for good or for bad
remains to be seen: in the absence of clear structures of control and
oversight, the shape of things to come is never fixed.
For those within ICANN who genuinely want to work towards an
Internet in the service of the public good, rather than of big
business, there is, therefore, a tough task ahead of trying to ensure
that the most will be made of the opportunities that the new
arrangement does provide. Considering ICANN's institutional culture,
this will undoubtedly mean that much of their energy will need to be
invested in simply trying to shape new procedures and frameworks of
governance in more democratic and accountable directions, eating into
valuable time that could and should have been devoted to policy
development instead. Indeed, irrespective of the final
outcome of the AoC, the spectre of ICANN's lack of accountability and
its glaring democratic deficit, for now, remains. And for a forum
such as ICANN, that is unbecoming to say the least.</p>
<p>1] For
more information, please see
<a href="http://ncdnhc.org/profiles/blogs/ncuc-letter-to-icann-board-of">http://ncdnhc.org/profiles/blogs/ncuc-letter-to-icann-board-of</a>,
<a href="http://ncdnhc.org/profiles/blogs/top-10-myths-about-civil">http://ncdnhc.org/profiles/blogs/top-10-myths-about-civil</a>,
and
<a href="http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2009/10/2/4338930.html">http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2009/10/2/4338930.html</a>.</p>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p class="sdfootnote"><a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc"></a></p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-icann-us-doc-affirmation-of-commitments-a-step-forward'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-icann-us-doc-affirmation-of-commitments-a-step-forward</a>
</p>
No publisheranjaPublic AccountabilityICANNinternet governance2011-08-02T07:16:09ZBlog EntryThe 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
<b>CIS research shows how Western, male, and industry-driven the IANA transition process actually is.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN</a> to run something called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Analysis of the process since then shows how flawed the “global multistakeholder community” that converges at ICANN has not actually represented the disparate interests and concerns of different stakeholders. CIS research has found that the discussions around IANA transition have not been driven by the “global multistakeholder community”, but mostly by males from industry in North America and Western Europe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">CIS analysed the five main mailing lists where the IANA transition plan was formulated: ICANN’s <a href="http://mm.ianacg.org/pipermail/icg-forum_ianacg.org/">ICG</a> <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/">Stewardship</a> and <a href="https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/">CCWG Accountability</a> lists; IETF’s <a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ianaplan/">IANAPLAN</a> list; and the NRO’s <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/">IANAXFER</a> list and <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/crisp/">CRISP</a> lists. What we found was quite disheartening.</p>
<ul>
<li>A total of <em>239 individuals</em> participated cumulatively, across all five lists.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><em>Only 98 substantively contributed to the final shape of the ICG proposal</em>, if one takes a count of 20 mails (admittedly, an arbitrary cut-off) as a substantive contribution, with 12 of these 98 being ICANN staff some of whom were largely performing an administrative function.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We decided to look at the diversity within these substantive contributors using gender, stakeholder grouping, and region. We relied on public records, including <a href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/">GNSO SOI statements</a>, and extensive searches on the Web. Given that, there may be inadvertent errors, but the findings are so stark that even a few errors wouldn’t affect them much.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>2 in 5</strong> (39 of 98, or 40%) were from a single country: the <strong>United States of America</strong>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes <em>Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand</em>), which only has developed countries.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>None</strong> were from the EEC (Eastern European and Russia) group, and only <strong>5 of 98</strong> from all of GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).</li>
<li><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were <em>male</em> and 21 were female.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.</li></ul>
<p>This shows also that the process has utterly failed in achieving the recommendation of Paragraph 6 of the <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>NETMundial outcome document</a>, which states:
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders <b>extending beyond the ICANN community</b>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beyond the IANA transition, one notes that even the communities within ICANN are not very diverse. For instance:</p>
<ul>
<li style="><strong>3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America</strong> (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's </a><a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accreditation-qualified-list.html">accredited registrars list</a>), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).</p>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>45% of all the registries are from the United States of America</strong>! (307 out of 672 registries listed in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/listing-2012-02-25-en">ICANN’s registry directory</a> in August 2015.)</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>66% (34 of 51) of <a href="http://www.bizconst.org/members/">the Business Constituency</a> at ICANN are from a single country: the United States of America</strong>. (N.B.: This page doesn’t seem to be up-to-date.)</li>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This shows that businesses from the United States of America continues to dominate ICANN to a very significant degree, and this is also reflected in the nature of the dialogue within ICANN, including the fact that the proposal that came out of the ICANN ‘global multistakeholder community’ on IANA transition proposes a clause that requires the ‘IANA Functions Operator’ to be a US-based entity. For more on that issue, see this post on the jurisdiction issue at ICANN (or rather, on the lack of a jurisdiction issue at ICANN).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshMulti-stakeholderICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2016-11-03T10:42:53ZBlog EntrySubmission by the Centre for Internet and Society on Revisions to ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior
<b>Prepared by Vidushi Marda, with inputs from Dr. Nirmita Narasimhan and Sunil Abraham.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>We at the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions to ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior (“Standards”).</p>
<p>Before providing specific comments on the proposed revisions, CIS would like to state for the record our extreme disappointment while noting that there is no indication of the intention to draft and adopt a dedicated anti - harassment policy. We are of the firm opinion that harassment, and particularly sexual harassment, is not only a sensitive topic, but also a deeply complex one. Such a policy should consider scope, procedural questions, redressal and remedies in cases of harassment in general and sexual harassment in particular. A mere change in language to these Standards, however well intentioned, cannot go too far in preventing and dealing with cases of harassment in the absence of a framework within which such instances can be addressed.</p>
<p>Some of the issues that arose at ICANN55 were confusion surrounding the powers and limits of the Ombudsman’s office in dealing with cases of harassment, the exact procedure to be followed for redressal surrounding such incidents, and the appropriate conduct of parties to the matter. There will be no clarity in these respects, even if these proposed changes are to be adopted.</p>
<p>Specifically, the proposed language is problematic and completely inadequate for the following reasons:</p>
<ol><li>
<p><strong>Vague</strong></p>
<p>Terms like “professional conduct” and “appropriate behavior” mean little in the absence of a definition that entails such conduct. These terms could mean vastly different things to each community member and such language will only encourage a misalignment of expectation of conduct between community members. The “general” definition of harassment is at best, an ineffective placeholder, as it does not encompass exactly what kind of behavior would fall under its definition.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Fails to consider important scenarios</strong></p>
<p>The proposed language fails to consider situations where some attempts or advances at communication, sexual or otherwise, occur. For example, consider a situation in which one community member stalks another online, and catalogues his/her every move. This is most certainly foreseeable, but will not be adequately covered by the proposed language. Further, terms like “speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates” could or could not include types of speech such as art, music, photography etc, depending on who you ask. It also does not explain the use of the word behavior - physical, emotional, professional, online behavior are all possible, but the scope of this term would depend on the interpretation one chooses to apply. In part 4 below, we will demonstrate how ICANN has applied a far more detailed framework for harassment elsewhere.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Ignores complexity</strong></p>
<p>In discussions surrounding the incident at ICANN55, a number of issues of arose. These included, inter alia, the definition of harassment and sexual harassment, what constituted such conduct, the procedure to be followed in such cases, the appropriate forum to deal with such incidents and the conduct that both parties are expected to maintain. These questions cannot, and have not been answered or addressed in the proposed change to the Standards. CIS emphasizes the need to understand this issue as one that must imbibe differences in culture, expectation, power dynamics, and options for redressal. If ICANN is to truly be a safe space, such issues must be substantively and procedurally fair for both the accused and the victim. This proposed definition is woefully inadequate in this regard.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Superficial understanding of harassment, sexual harassment</strong></p>
<p>The proposed changes do not define harassment, and sexual harassment in an adequate fashion. The change currently reads, “Generally, harassment is considered unwelcome hostile or intimidating behavior -- in particular, speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates based on attributes such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, color, national origin, ancestry, disability or medical condition, sexual orientation, or gender identity.” These are subject to broad interpretation, and we have already highlighted the issues that may arise due to this in 1, above. Here, we would like to point to a far more comprehensive definition.</p>
</li></ol>
<p>ICANN’s own Employment Policy includes within the scope of sexual harassment “verbal, physical and visual conduct that creates an intimidating, offensive or hostile working environment, or interferes with work performance.” The policy also states:</p>
<blockquote>Harassing conduct can take many forms and includes, but is not limited to, the following:<br />
<ol><li>Slurs, jokes, epithets, derogatory comments, statements or gestures;</li>
<li>Assault, impeding or blocking another’s movement or otherwise physically interfering with normal work;</li>
<li>Pictures, posters, drawings or cartoons based upon the characteristics mentioned in the first paragraph of this policy.</li></ol>
Sexually harassing conduct includes all of the above prohibited actions, as well as other unwelcome conduct, such as requests for sexual favors, conversation containing sexual comments, and unwelcome sexual advances.”</blockquote>
<p>This definition is not perfect, it does not comprehensively consider advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise, which are unwelcome by the target. Nonetheless, CIS believes that this is a far more appropriate definition that does not include vague metrics that the proposed changes do. Since it is one ICANN has already adopted, it can act as an important stepping stone towards a comprehensive framework.</p>
<p>Like ICANN, UNESCO’s organisational approach has been to adopt a comprehensive <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/UN_system_policies/(UNESCO)Anti-harassment_Policy.pdf">Anti-Harassment Policy</a> which lays down details of definition, prevention, complaint procedure, investigations, sanctions, managerial responsibility, etc. Acknowledging the cultural sensitivity of harassment particularly in international situations, the policy also recognizes advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise. Most importantly, it states that for conduct to come within the definition of sexual harassment, it “must be unwelcome, i.e. unsolicited and regarded as offensive or undesirable by the victim.”</p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the importance of adopting and drafting a dedicated anti-harassment policy and framework. The benefits of safety, certainty and formal redressal mechanisms in cases of harassment cannot be over emphasized.</p>
<p>Importantly, such measures have already been taken elsewhere. The IETF has adopted an <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7776">instrument</a> to address issues of harassment that occur at meetings, mailing lists and social events. This instrument contemplates in detail, problematic behavior, unacceptable conduct, the scope of the term harassment, etc. It further envisages a framework for redressal of complaints, remediation, and even contemplates issues that may arise with such remediation. It is particularly important to note that while it provides a definition of harassment, it also states that "[a]ny definition of harassment prohibited by an applicable law can be subject to this set of procedures, recognising harassment as a deeply personal and subjective experience, and thus encouraging members to take up issues of harassment as per their cultural norms and national laws, which are then considered as per procedures laid down."</p>
<p>A similar effort within the ICANN community is critical.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiPublic AccountabilityInternet GovernanceFeaturedICANNIANA TransitionHomepage2016-06-30T06:07:37ZBlog EntrySexual Harassment at ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann
<b>Padmini Baruah represented the Centre for Internet & Society at ICANN in the month of March 2016. In a submission to ICANN she is calling upon the ICANN board for implementing a system for investigating cases related to sexual harassments. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the 6th of March, 2016, Sunday, at about 10 am in the gNSO working session being conducted at the room Diamant, I was sexually harassed by someone from the private sector constituency named Khaled Fattal. He approached me, pulled at my name tag, and passed inappropriate remarks. I felt like my space and safety as a young woman in the ICANN community was at stake.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I had incidentally been in discussion with the ICANN Ombudsman on developing a clear and coherent sexual harassment policy and procedure for the specific purposes of ICANN’s public meetings. Needless to say, this incident pushed me to take forward what had hitherto been a mere academic interest with increased vigour. I was amazed, firstly that the office of the ombudsman only had two white male members manning it. I was initially inhibited by that very fact, but made two points before them:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to action on my individual case.</div>
</li>
<li>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to the development of policy in general.</div>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I would like to put on record that the ombudsman office was extremely sympathetic and gave me a thorough hearing. They assured me that my individual complaint would be recorded, and sought to discuss the possibility of me raising a public statement with respect to policy, as they believed that the Board would be likely to take this suggestion up from a member of the community. I was also informed, astoundingly, <strong>that this was the first harassment case reported in the history of ICANN</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I then, as a newcomer to the community, ran this idea of making a public statement by no means an easy task at all, given the attached stigma that comes with being branded a victim of a sexual crime by certain senior people within ICANN who had assured me that they would take my side in this regard. To my dismay, there were two strong stands of victim blaming and intimidation that I faced I was told, in some cases by extremely senior and well respected, prominent women in the ICANN community, that raising this issue up would demean my credibility, status and legitimacy in ICANN, and that my work would lose importance, and I would “...forever be branded as THAT woman.” My incident was also trivialised in offhand casual remarks such as “This happened because you are so pretty”, “Oh you filed a complaint, not against me I hope, ha ha” which all came from people who are very high up in the ICANN heirarchy. I was also asked if I was looking for money out of this. <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment.pdf" class="internal-link">Click to read the full statement made to ICANN here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<ul>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherpadminiSexual HarassmentICANNInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-04-06T14:40:55ZBlog EntryRevolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door
<b>The IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) is the body that will accept and coordinate different proposals for IANA transition. It will make the global Internet community's final proposal for transition to the NTIA. Lakshmi Venkataraman finds that a majority of the ICG's membership have had longstanding affiliations with I-star organisations. What will this mean for IANA transition? </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">NTIA’s announcement</a> of its decision to not renew the IANA Functions contract, ICANN instituted a process in search of an alternative oversight mechanism. The <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/stewardship/coordination-group">IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG)</a>, comprising 30 individuals, is the body set up to accept and coordinate proposals for IANA transition, and after this, to make a final proposal to the NTIA. <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/coordination-group-2014-06-17-en">ICANN claims</a> that the ICG comprises individuals representing 13 different communities and the interests of different stakeholders (direct and indirect), including those of governments, technical community and non-commercial users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The communities represented in the ICG are as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><span>ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee to </span><strong>ICANN</strong></li>
<li><span>ASO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>ccNSO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. ccTLDs</span></li>
<li><span>GNSO – Makes recommendations on gTLDs to the </span><strong>ICANN </strong><span>Board</span></li>
<li><span>IAB – Deals with technical and engineering aspects of the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>IETF – Deals with the development of standards under the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>NRO – Policy Advisor to </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>SSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. security of naming systems</span></li>
<li><span>RSSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. operation, security and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System</span></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, the ICG has been set up to devise and present to the NTIA, an IANA transition proposal that incorporates views and concerns of diverse stakeholders of the global Internet community. The composition of the ICG is, for this purpose, an indicator of the <i>nature</i> of proposals that may find final favour.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we examined the affiliations of ICG members with this in mind. Our assumptions are two-fold: (1) greater the diversity in ICG membership, greater the chance of diverse views being heard and represented, including those departing from the <i>status quo</i>; (2) conversely, if the ICG members have histories of affiliations to existing centres of power in global Internet governance (say, the I* organisations), chances of <i>status quo</i> being maintained are greater.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our findings are presented in tabular format below:</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(X – Unknown number of years spent in the organization)</span></p>
<table class="grid listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; ">I-star Organisation</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">________________</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">Name of person</p>
</th><th style="text-align: center; ">ICANN</th><th style="text-align: center; ">IETF </th><th style="text-align: center; ">IAB </th><th>W3C </th><th>ISOC </th><th>AfriNIC</th><th>ARIN </th><th>APNIC</th><th>LACNIC</th><th>RIPE-NCC</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrik Faltstrom</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Wilson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn St. Amour</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">13</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari Arkko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: left; ">Keith Davidson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demi Getschko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Housley</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1.5</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaodong Lee</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elise Gerich</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmut Glaser</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">14</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Ulrich Knobben</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russ Mundy</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo-Wei Wu</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">15</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narelle Clark</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Karrenberg</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed el Bashir</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Boyle</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Drazek</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Jacques Subrenat</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">7</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bladel</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong><span>†</span></strong></p>
</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; "><b>(†</b> - To serve on the GNSO Council from November 2015.)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As you will have noticed, 20 out of 30 ICG members (66.67%) have occupied positions in seemingly</span><i> </i><span>different organizations, but in actuality, these are organisations with very close links to each other. We see not 13, but 2 organizations</span><strong> </strong><span>that all the communities seem to be affiliated to, i.e., ICANN and ISOC. It seems all too ironic that the body that has been allocated the task of the IANA functions’ transition, in line with the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, is itself representative of only 2 organizations.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A prodding into the histories of these 30 members from ‘varied’ backgrounds reveals that most of them have <i>rotationally</i> served in the I-Star organizations. A close reading of their bio-data (from their ICANN and LinkedIn pages) reveals our findings on the number of years several of the members of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cooperation Group, have spent at the I-Star organizations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is not rocket science to recognise the power the I* organisations have over Internet governance today. Indeed, ICANN tells us that the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/governance-06feb13-en.pdf">I* run the Internet</a>. They are the leaders of the <i>status quo</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the IANA transition is anything <i>but</i> an affirmation of the <i>status quo</i>. Stakeholders and participants in IANA transition (in the <a href="https://community.icann.org/x/37fhAg">CWG</a>, <a href="https://www.nro.net/nro-and-internet-governance/iana-oversight/consolidated-rir-iana-stewardship-proposal-team-crisp-team">CRISP</a> and <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06">IETF</a>) have raised serious concerns about the <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/">desirability of IANA continuing within ICANN</a>, and about ICANN’s (inadequate) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/10/19/cauldron-part-2-is-the-names-iana-compatible-with-the-others/">accountability</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability">transparency</a>. True, ICANN has instituted processes to enable discussion on these issues, and the ICG is part of the process. It is entrusted with the momentous task of shifting from the <i>status quo</i> of the IANA Functions contract to a new mechanism of oversight. Given its composition, an assumption that the ICG may have vested interests in maintaining <i>status quo</i> is not out-of-the-way. In fact, some members of the ICG have <a href="http://isoc-ny.org/919">previously made statements</a> to the effect that Internet is not broken, and it does not need fixing. This poses a real danger to the IANA transition process and the global Internet community must demand safeguards.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Lakshmi Venkataraman performed the revolving door analysis on the ICG. She is a IV year at NALSAR University of Law and an intern at CIS during December 2014. Geetha Hariharan assisted in writing this post. </i></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door</a>
</p>
No publisherLakshmi VenkataramanICANNIANA Transition2014-12-16T05:44:40ZBlog EntryReport on ICANN 50
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-icann-50
<b>Jyoti Panday attended ICANN 50 in London from 22-26 June. Below are some of the highlights from the meeting. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From 22- 26 June, ICANN hosted its 50<sup>th</sup> meeting in London, the largest congregation of participants, so far. In the wake of the IANA transition announcement, Internet governance was the flavor of the week. ICANN’s transparency and accountability measures emerged as much contested notions as did references to NETmundial. This ICANN meeting clearly demonstrated that questions as to the role of ICANN in internet governance need to be settled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>ATLAS II</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Coinciding with ICANN meeting was the 2<sup>nd</sup> At-Large Summit, or ATLAS II, bringing together a network of regionally self organized and self supporting At-Large structures, representing individual Internet users throughout the world. The goal of the meeting was to discuss, reach consensus and draft reports around five issues organized around five issues organized around thematic groups of issues of concerns to the At-Large Community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The subjects for the thematic groups were selected by the representatives of ALSes, each summit participant was allocated to thematic groups according to his/her preferences. The groups included were:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Future of Multistakeholder models </li>
<li>The Globalization of ICANN </li>
<li>Global Internet: The User perspective </li>
<li>ICANN Transparency and Accountability </li>
<li>At-Large Community Engagement in ICANN </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Fahad Chehade Five Point Agenda </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN President, Mr Chehade in his address to the ICANN community covered five points which he felt were important for ICANN in planning its future role. The first topic was the <a href="http://icannwiki.com/IANA" title="IANA">IANA</a> Stewardship and transition, and he stated that ICANN is committed to being a transparent organization and seeks to be more accountable to the community as the contract with the US government ends. Regarding the IANA transition, he remarked that ICANN had received thousands of comments and proposals regarding the transition of IANA stewardship and understood there would be much more discussion on this subject, and that a coordination group has been proposed of 27 members representing all different stakeholders in order to plot the course forward for IANA transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">His second topic was about ICANN globalization and hardening of operations. He said that ICANN has about 2-3 years to go before he is comfortable that ICANN operations are where they need to be. He applauded the new service channels which allows customer support in many different languages and time zones, and mentioned local language support that would add to the languages in which ICANN content is currently available. Chehade spent a few minutes discussing the future of WHOIS "Directory" technology and highlighted the initial report that a working group had put together, led by Jean-Francois Poussard.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Next he covered the GDD, the Global Domains Division of ICANN and an update from that division on the New gTLD program. He mentioned the ICANN Auction, the contracts that had been signed, and the number of New gTLDs that had already been delegated to the Root. Internet Governance was Chehade's 4th topic of discussion, he applauded the NETmundial efforts, though he stressed that internet governance is one of the things that ICANN does and it will not be a high priority. He ended his speech with his last point, calling for more harmony within the ICANN community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>High Level Government Meeting</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">During ICANN London, UK government hosted a high-level meeting, bringing together representatives from governments of the world to discuss Internet Governance and specifically the NTIA transition of the IANA contract. Government representatives recognized that the stewardship of IANA should be a shared responsibility between governments and private sector groups, while other representatives stressed giving governments a stronger voice than other stakeholders. The consensus at the meeting held that the transition should not leave specific governments or interest groups with more control over the Internet, but that governments should have a voice in political issues in Internet Governance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>GAC Communiqué</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>GAC Communique, is a report drafted by the </b>Governmental Advisory Committee, advising the ICANN board on decisions involving policy and implementation. Highlights from the communiqué include:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The GAC advises the Board regarding the .africa string, saying it would like to see an expedited process, especially once the Independent Review Panel comes to a decision regarding the two applicants for the string. They reaffirm their decision that DotConnectAfrica's application should not proceed.</li>
<li>The GAC mentioned the controversy surrounding .wine and .vin, where some European GAC representatives strongly felt that the applications for these strings should not proceed without proper safeguards for geographic names at the second level. However, the GAC was unable to reach consensus advice regarding this issue and thus did not relay any formal advice to the Board.</li>
<li>The GAC requested safeguards in the New gTLDs for IGO (Inter-Governmental Organization) names at the second level, and specifically related such advice for names relating to Red Cross and Red Crescent. </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Civil Society in ICANN and Internet Governance</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NCUC, or the Noncommercial Users Constituency www.ncuc.org, voice of civil society in ICANN’s policy processes on generic top level domain names and related matters, as well as other civil society actors from the ICANN community organized a workshop to provide an opportunity for open and vigorous dialogue between public interest advocates who are active both within and outside the ICANN community.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-icann-50'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-icann-50</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNInternet Governance2014-10-12T05:42:04ZBlog EntryPeering behind the veil of ICANN’s DIDP (I)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp
<b>One of the key elements of the process of enhancing democracy and furthering transparency in any institution which holds power is open access to information for all the stakeholders. This is critical to ensure that there is accountability for the actions of those in charge of a body which utilises public funds and carries out functions in the public interest. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the body which “<i>...coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS)</i>”<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>, the centrality of ICANN in regulating the Internet (a public good if there ever was one) makes it vital that ICANN’s decision-making processes, financial flows, and operations are open to public scrutiny. ICANN itself echoes the same belief, and upholds “...<i>a proven commitment to accountability and transparency in all of its practices</i>”<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a>, which is captured in their By-Laws and <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en">Affirmation of Commitments</a>. In furtherance of this, ICANN has created its own <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</a>, where it promises to “...<i>ensure that information contained in <b>documents concerning ICANN's operational activities</b>, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is <b>made available to the public </b>unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.</i>”<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has a vast array of documents that are already in the public domain, listed <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">here</a>. These include annual reports, budgets, registry reports, speeches, operating plans, correspondence, etc. However, their Documentary Information Disclosure Policy falls short of meeting international standards for information disclosure. In this piece, I have focused on an examination of their defined conditions for non-disclosure of information, which seem to undercut the entire process of transparency that the DIDP process aims towards upholding. The obvious comparison that comes to mind is with the right to information laws that governments the world over have enacted in furtherance of democracy. While ICANN cannot be equated to a democratically elected government, it nonetheless does exercise sufficient regulatory power of the functioning of the Internet for it to owe a similar degree of information to all the stakeholders in the internet community. In this piece, I have made an examination of ICANN’s conditions for non-disclosure, and compared it to the analogous exclusions in India’s Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>ICANN’ꜱ Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure versus Exclusions in Indian Law :</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN, in its DIDP policy identifies a lengthy list of conditions as being sufficient grounds for non-disclosure of information. One of the most important indicators of a strong transparency law is said to be <b><i>minimum exclusions</i></b>.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> However, as seen from the table below, ICANN’s exclusions are extensive and vast, and this has been a barrier in the way of free flow of information. An analysis of their responses to various DIDP requests (available <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/transparency-en">here</a>) shows that the conditions for non-disclosure have been invoked in over 50 of the 85 requests responded to (as of 11.09.2015); i.e., over two-thirds of the requests that ICANN receives are subjected to the non-disclosure policies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In contrast, an analysis of India’s Right to Information Act, considered to be among the better drafted transparency laws of the world, reveals a much narrower list of exclusions that come in the way of a citizen obtaining any kind of information sought. The table below compares the two lists:</p>
<table class="grid listing" style="text-align: justify; ">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p><b>No.</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>ICANN<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><b><sup>[5]</sup></b></sup></a></b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>India</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>Analysis</b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>1.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Information provided by or to a government or international organization</b> which was to be kept confidential or would materially affect ICANN’s equation with the concerned body.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the <b>sovereignty and integrity of India</b>, the security, "strategic, scientific or economic" interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offense<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a>/ information <b>received in confidence from foreign government<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><b><sup>[7]</sup></b></sup></a></b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The threshold for both the bodies is fairly similar for this exclusion.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>2.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Internal (staff/Board) information </b>that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Cabinet papers including records of deliberations</b> of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers, provided that such decisions the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken <b>shall be made public after the decision has been taken</b>, and the matter is complete, or over (unless subject to these exemptions)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian law is far more transparent as it ultimately allows for the records of internal deliberation to be made public after the decision is taken.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>3.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information related to the <b>deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates </b>that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No similar provision in Indian Law.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is an additional restriction that ICANN introduces in addition to the one above, which in itself is quite broad.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>4.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Records relating to an individual's personal information</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which relates to <b>personal information </b>the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual (but it is also provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied by this exemption);<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Again, the Indian law contains a proviso for information with “<i>relationship to any public activity or interest</i>”</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>5.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which has been <b>expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law </b>or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN prohibits the disclosure of all proceedings, in India, the exemption is only to the limited extent of information that the court prohibits from being made public.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>6.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to <b>materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position </b>of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information including <b>commercial confidence, trade secrets </b>or intellectual property, the <b>disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party</b>, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is fairly similar for both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>7.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Confidential business information </b>and/or internal policies and procedures.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No similar provision in Indian Law. This is encapsulated in the abovementioned provision</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is fairly similar in both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>8.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to <b>endanger the life, health, or safety </b>of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, the disclosure of which would <b>endanger the life or physical safety of any person </b>or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar for both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>9.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Information subject to any kind of privilege</b>, which might prejudice any investigation</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, the disclosure of which would cause a <b>breach of privilege of Parliament </b>or the State Legislature<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a>/Information which would <b>impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders</b>;<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar in both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>10.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This exclusion is not present in Indian law, and it is extremely broadly worded, coming in the way of full transparency.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>11.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Information that relates in any way to the <b>security and stability of the Internet</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is perhaps necessary to ICANN’s role as the IANA Functions Operator. However, given the large public interest in this matter, there should be some proviso to make information in this regard available to the public as well.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>12.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Trade secrets and commercial and financial information </b>not publicly disclosed by ICANN.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information including <b>commercial confidence, trade secrets </b>or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar in both cases.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>13.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Information requests:</p>
<p>● which are not reasonable;</p>
<p>● which are excessive or overly burdensome</p>
<p>● complying with which is not feasible</p>
<p>● which are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of all the DIDP exclusions, this is the one which is most loosely worded. The terms in this clause are not clearly defined, and it can effectively be used to deflect any request sought from ICANN because of its extreme subjectivity. What amounts to ‘reasonable’? Whom is the process going to ‘burden’? What lens does ICANN use to define a ‘vexatious’ purpose? Where do we look for answers?</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>14.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information available to a person in his <b>fiduciary relationship</b>, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>-</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>15.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which providing access to would involve an <b>infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State</b>.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>-</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus, the net cast by the DIDP exclusions policy is more vast than even than that of a democratic state’s transparency law. Clearly, the exclusions above have effectively allowed ICANN to dodge answers to most of the requests floating its way. One can only hope that ICANN realises that these exclusions come in the way of the transparency that they are so committed to, and does away with this unreasonably wide range on the road to the IANA Transition.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-2012-02-25-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/accountability</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> Shekhar Singh, <i>India: Grassroot Initiatives</i> in Tʜᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛ ᴛᴏ Kɴᴏᴡ 19, 44 (Ann Florin ed., 2007)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> In a proviso, ICANN’s DIDP states that all these exemptions can be overridden if the larger public interest is higher. However, this has not yet been reflected in their responses to any DIDP requests.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(a), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(f), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(i), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(j), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(b), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(g), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(c), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(h), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(e), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> Section 9, Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini BaruahICANNInternet Governance2015-10-15T02:42:14ZBlog EntryPeering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii
<b>In a previous blog post, I had introduced the concept of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) and their extremely vast grounds for non-disclosure. In this short post, I have made an analysis of every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to, to point out the flaws in their policy that need to be urgently remedied.</b>
<p>Read the previous blog post <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a>. Every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to can be <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/transparency-en">accessed here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The table <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M1gWBpa7tlxGPMWyB6xJryddahyZzjVIarSz0RJswDM/edit?usp=sharing">here</a> is a comprehensive breakdown of all the different DIDP requests that ICANN has responded to. This table is to be read with <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x1vG23FdIAzo4ro80eEieaokBpAeNVtYXjds6mHt2DE/edit?usp=sharing">this document</a>, which has a numbered list of the different non-disclosure exceptions <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">outlined in ICANN’s policy</a>. What I sought to scrutinize was the number of times ICANN has provided satisfactory information, the number of times it has denied information, and the grounds for the same. What we found was alarming:</p>
<ol>
<li>Of a total of 91 requests (as of 13/10/2015), <b>ICANN has fully and positively responded to only 11.</b></li>
<li>It has responded <b>partially</b> <b>to 47 of 91 requests, </b>with some amount of information (usually that which is available as public records).</li>
<li>It has <b>not responded at all to 33 of 91 requests</b>.</li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (1)<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>17 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (2)<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>39 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (3)<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>31 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (4)<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>5 times.</b></li>
<li><b>T</b>he Non-Disclosure Clause (5)<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>34 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (6)<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>35 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (7)<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>once.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (8)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>22 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (9)<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>30 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (10)<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>10 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (11)<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>12 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (12)<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>18 times.</b></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This data is disturbing because it reveals that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. Therefore, it is clear that there is a failure on part of ICANN to uphold the transparency it claims to stand for, and this needs to be remedied at the earliest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Pie1.png" title="Pie Chart 1" height="342" width="327" alt="Pie Chart 1" class="image-inline" /></p>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_Pie1.png" alt="Pie Chart 2" class="image-inline" title="Pie Chart 2" /></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Internal information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications, including internal documents, memoranda, and other similar communications to or from ICANN Directors, ICANN Directors' Advisors, ICANN staff, ICANN consultants, ICANN contractors, and ICANN agents</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information exchanged, prepared for, or derived from the deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process between and among ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to endanger the life, health, or safety of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information subject to the attorney– client, attorney work product privilege, or any other applicable privilege, or disclosure of which might prejudice any internal, governmental, or legal investigation</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that relates in any way to the security and stability of the Internet, including the operation of the L Root or any changes, modifications, or additions to the root zone</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Trade secrets and commercial and financial information not publicly disclosed by ICANN</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual</i>”</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini BaruahICANNInternet Governance2015-10-15T03:14:18ZBlog EntryNTIA to give up control of the Internet's root
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ntia-to-give-up-control-of-internets-root
<b>On Friday evening the U.S. government's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced that it was setting into motion a transition to give up a few powers that it holds over some core Internet functions, and that this would happen by September 2015. Pranesh Prakash provides a brief response to that announcement.</b>
<p>As it noted <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">in the NTIA's press release</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NTIA’s responsibility includes the procedural role of administering changes to the authoritative root zone file – the database containing the lists of names and addresses of all top-level domains – as well as serving as the historic steward of the [Domain Name System (DNS)]. NTIA currently contracts with [the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN] to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions and has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign under which it performs related root zone management functions. Transitioning NTIA out of its role marks the final phase of the privatization of the DNS as outlined by the U.S. Government in 1997.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This move was <a href="http://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence-reports-documents/2014-2/internet-technical-leaders-welcome-iana-globalization-progress/">welcomed by "Internet technical leaders"</a>.</p>
<p>While this announcement cannot be said to be unexpected, it is nonetheless an important one and is also a welcome one. The NTIA seems to have foreclosed any option of the US government's role being performed by any government-led organization by noting in their press release, "NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution," once again reaffirming their belief in American exceptionalism: the NTIA could fulfil its role despite being a government, but now even a body involving multiple stakeholders can't replace the NTIA's role if it is going to be government-led.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, this announcement to relax American "stewardship" or "oversight" over some aspects of the Internet's technical functioning cannot restore the trust that has been lost due to actions taken by the US government and US companies. This new announcement won't change the US government's ability to 'tap' the Internet, nor will it affect their ability to unilaterally seize .com/.net/.name/.org/.edu/.tv/.cc/.us and other US-based domain names. Nor will a shift away from NTIA oversight lead to any of the chilling visions that some believe might lie in our future: <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/us-to-relinquish-remaining-control-over-the-internet/2014/03/14/0c7472d0-abb5-11e3-adbc-888c8010c799_story.html">the fears of the Association of National Advertisers</a> and of <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/internet-transition-triggers-gop-backlash-104698.html">some politicians and members of the US Congress</a> is based on ignorance of what NTIA's role is.</p>
<p>The European Commission in a communiqué last month noted: "recent revelations of large-scale surveillance have called into question the stewardship of the U.S. when it comes to Internet governance". Unfortunately, the U.S. giving up that stewardship role will not prevent the continuation of their large-scale surveillance, just as the lack of such a stewardship role has not prevented other governments — U.K., India, Canada, Sweden, France, etc. — from engaging in large-scale surveillance.</p>
<p>There are three main benefits from the U.S. giving up this role.<br />
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<p>First, it will put an end to the political illegitimacy of the U.S. government having a core authority in a global system, somehow making it first among equals;</p>
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<p>Second, will focus light on ICANN, which under US oversight performs the IANA functions, and might, one hopes, lead to needed reform in ICANN's other functions;</p>
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<p>Third, it will allow us to collectively move on from this dreaded political issue at the heart of Internet governance, which nevertheless is of little practical consequence if ICANN's accountability mechanisms are strengthened. As difficult as it may be, ICANN has to be accountable not just to one government or another but to the world, and ensuring that accountability to all doesn't become accountability to none, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/us-to-relinquish-remaining-control-over-the-internet/2014/03/14/0c7472d0-abb5-11e3-adbc-888c8010c799_story.html">as NetChoice's Steve DelBianco put it</a>, is the formidable task ahead of us. <br />
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</ul>
<p>Yet, all the ICANN reform in the world will still not lead to a less spied-upon, more open, and more equitable Internet.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ntia-to-give-up-control-of-internets-root'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ntia-to-give-up-control-of-internets-root</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshICANNInternet Governance2014-03-18T18:21:40ZBlog Entry