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The Legal Validity of Internet Bans: Part II
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii
<b>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in Indian states, for different reasons. The State governments have relied on Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to institute such bans. Despite a legal challenge, the Gujarat High Court found no infirmity in this exercise of power in a recent order. We argue that it is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000, and the Website Blocking Rules, which set out the legal provision and procedure empowering the State to block access to the Internet (if at all it is necessary), and not Section 144, CrPC.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As we saw earlier, the Gujarat High Court held that Section 144, CrPC empowers the State apparatus to order blocking of access to data services. According to the Court, Section 69A, IT Act can be used to block certain websites, while under Section 144, CrPC, the District Magistrate can direct telecom companies like Vodafone and Airtel, who</span><i> </i><span>extend the facility of Internet access. In effect, the High Court agreed with the State government’s argument that the scope of Section 69A, IT Act covers only blocking of </span><i>certain </i><span>websites, while Section 144, CrPC grants a wider power.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is what the Court said (para 9 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>):</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“<i>If the comparison of both the sections in the field of operations is made, barring certain minor overlapping more particularly for public order </i>[sic]<i>, one can say that the area of operation of Section 69A is not the same as that of Section 144 of the Code. <span>Section 69A may in a given case also be exercised for blocking certain websites</span>, whereas under <span>Section 144 of the Code, directions may be issued to certain persons who may be the source for extending the facility of internet access</span>. Under the circumstances, we do not find that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the resort to only Section 69A was available and exercise of power under Section 144 of the Code was unavailable, can be accepted.</i>” (emphases ours)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We submit that the High Court’s reasoning failed to examine the scope of Section 69A, IT Act thoroughly. Section 69A does, in fact, empower the government to order blocking of access to data services, and it is a special law. Importantly, it sets forth a procedure that State governments, union territories and the Central Governments must follow to order blocks on websites or data services.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">I. Special Law Prevails Over General Law</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IT Act, 2000 is a special law dealing with matters relating to the Internet, including offences and security measures. The CrPC is a general law of criminal procedure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When a special law and a general law cover the same subject, then the special law supersedes the general law. This is a settled legal principle. Several decisions of the Supreme Court attest to this fact. To take an example, in <a href="http://www.asianlii.org/in/cases/cen/INSC/2010/526.html"><i>Maya Mathew </i>v. <i>State of Kerala</i></a>, (2010) 3 SCR 16 (18 February 2010), when there was a contention between the Special Rules for Kerala State Homoeopathy Services and the general Rules governing state and subordinate services. The Supreme Court held that when a special law and a general law both govern a matter, the Court should try to interpret them harmoniously as far as possible. But if the intention of the legislature is that one law should prevail over another, and this intention is made clear expressly or impliedly, then the Court should give effect to this intention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the basis of this principle, let’s take a look at the IT Act, 2000. <a href="http://cybercrime.planetindia.net/ch13_2008.htm">Section 81, IT Act</a> expressly states that the provisions of the IT Act shall have overriding effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent with any other law in force. Moreover, in the <a href="http://cybercrime.planetindia.net/statement-objects-foritaa-2006.htm">Statement of Objects and Reasons</a> of the IT (Amendment) Bill, 2006, the legislature clearly notes that amendments inserting offences and security measures into the IT Act are necessary given the proliferation of the Internet and e-transactions, and the rising number of offences. These indicate expressly the legislature’s intention for the IT Act to prevail over general laws like the CrPC in matters relating to the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, we will examine whether the IT Act empowers the Central and State governments to carry out complete blocks on access to the Internet or data services, in the event of emergencies. If the IT Act does cover such a situation, then the CrPC should not be used to block data services. Instead, the IT Act and its Rules should be invoked.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>II. Section 69A, IT Act Allows Blocks on Internet Access</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A(1), IT Act says:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for <span>access</span> by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any<span> information </span>generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any <span>computer resource</span>.” (<i>emphasis ours</i>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Essentially, Section 69A says that the government can block (or cause to be blocked) for access by the public, any information<i> </i>generated, transmitted, etc. in any computer resource, if the government is satisfied that such a measure is in the interests of public order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Does this section allow the government to institute bans on Internet access in Gujarat? To determine this, we will examine each underlined term from above.</span></p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Access</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1890726/">Section 2(1)(a)</a>, IT Act defines access as “...<i><span>gaining entry into</span></i>, instructing or communicating with… resources of a <i><span>computer</span></i>, <i><span>computer system</span></i> or <i><span>computer network</span></i>”.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Computer resource</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1768009/">Section 2(1)(k)</a>, IT Act defines computer resource as “computer, computer system, computer network...”</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Information</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/146402352/">Section 2(1)(v)</a>, IT Act defines information as “includes… data, message, text, images, sound, voice...”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So ‘blocking for access’ under Section 69A includes preventing gaining entry or communicating with the resources of a computer, computer system or computer network, and it includes blocking communication of data, message, text, images, sound, etc. Now two questions arise:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(1) Do 2G and 3G services, broadband and Wifi fall within the definition of ‘computer network’?</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Computer network</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29924/">Section 2(1)(j)</a>, IT Act defines computer network as “inter-connection of one or more computers or computer systems <i><span>or communication device</span></i>…” by “...use of satellite, microwave, <i><span>terrestrial line, wire, wireless or other communication media</span></i>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(2) Do mobile phones that can connect to the Internet (we say smartphones for simplicity) qualify as fall within the definition of ‘computer resource’?</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Communication device</i></strong><span>: </span><a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/59759075/">Section 2(1)(ha)</a><span>, IT Act defines communication device as “</span><i>cell phones</i><span>, personal digital assistance or combination of both or any other device </span><i>used to communicate, send or transmit any text, video, audio or image</i><span>”.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So a cell phone is a communication device. A computer network is an inter-connection of communication devices by wire or wireless connections. A computer network is a computer resource also. Blocking of access under Section 69A, IT Act includes, therefore, gaining entry into or communicating with the resources of a computer network, which is an interconnection of communication devices, including smartphones. Add to this, the fact that <i>any information</i> (data, message, text, images, sound, voice) can be blocked, and the conclusion seems clear.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The power to block access to Internet services (including data services) can be found within Section 69A, IT Act itself, the special law enacted to cover matters relating to the Internet. Not only this, the IT Act envisages emergency situations when blocking powers may need to be invoked.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">III. Section 69A Permits Blocking in Emergency Situations</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A, IT Act doesn’t act in isolation. The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (“<strong>Blocking Rules</strong>”) operate together with Section 69A(1).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Rule 9 of the Blocking Rules deals with blocking of information in cases of emergency. It says that in cases of emergency, when “<i>no delay is acceptable</i>”, the Designated Officer (DO) shall examine the request for blocking. If it is within the scope of Section 69A(1) (i.e., within the grounds of public order, etc.), then the DO can submit the request to the Secretary, Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY). If the Secretary is satisfied of the need to block during the emergency, then he may issue a reasoned order for blocking, in writing as an interim measure. The intermediaries do not need to be heard in such a situation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After a blocking order is issued during an urgent situation, the DO must bring the blocking request to the Committee for Examination of Request constituted under Rule 7, Blocking Rules. There is also a review process, by a Review Committee that meets every two months to evaluate whether blocking directions are in compliance with Section 69A(1) [Rule 14].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We submit, therefore, that the Gujarat High Court erred in holding that Section 144, CrPC is the correct legal provision to enable Internet bans. Not only does Section 69A, IT Act cover blocking of access to Internet services, but it also envisages blocking in emergency situations. As a special law for matters surrounding the Internet, Section 69A should prevail over the general law provision of Section 144, CrPC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Acknowledgements</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">: We would like to thank Pranesh Prakash, Japreet Grewal, Sahana Manjesh and Sindhu Manjesh for their invaluable inputs in clarifying arguments and niggling details for these two posts.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan is a Programme Officer with Centre for Internet & Society. Padmini Baruah is in her final year of law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NLSIU) and is an intern at CIS.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii</a>
</p>
No publisherGeetha Hariharan and Padmini BaruahSocial MediaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Access69ASection 144Article 19(1)(a)Blocking2015-10-08T11:17:24ZBlog EntryThe Legal Validity of Internet Bans: Part I
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i
<b>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in Indian states, for different reasons. The State governments have relied on Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to institute such bans. Despite a legal challenge, the Gujarat High Court found no infirmity in this exercise of power in a recent order. We argue that it is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000, and the Website Blocking Rules, which set out the legal provision and procedure empowering the State to block access to the Internet (if at all it is necessary), and not Section 144, CrPC.</b>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; "><span>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in India states, for different reasons. In Gujarat, the State government banned access to mobile Internet (data services) citing breach of peace during the </span><a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-rioting-reported-several-parts-ahmedabad-patel-rally-event-turns-violent-644192">Hardik Patel agitation</a><span>. In Godhra in Gujarat, mobile Internet was banned as a precautionary measure </span><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/gujarat/gujarat-internet-services-in-godhra-suspended-for-24-hours/">during Ganesh <i>visarjan</i></a><span>. In Kashmir, mobile Internet was banned for three days or more because the government feared that people would share pictures of </span><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jk-govt-plans-three-day-mobile-internet-ban-in-valley/">slaughter of animals during Eid</a><span> on social media, which would spark unrest across the state.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Can State or Central governments impose a ban on Internet access? If the State or its officials anticipate disorder or a disturbance of ‘public tranquility’, can Internet access through mobiles be banned? According to a <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">recent order of the Gujarat High Court</a>: Yes; <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/930621/">Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973</a> (<strong>“CrPC”</strong>) empowers the State government machinery to impose a temporary ban.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the Gujarat High Court’s order neglects the scope of Section 69A, IT Act, and wrongly finds that the State government can exercise blocking powers under Section 144, CrPC. In this post and the next, we argue that it is <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/10190353/">Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000</a> (“<strong>IT Act</strong>”) which is the legal provision empowering the State to block access to the Internet (including data services), and not Section 144, CrPC. Section 69A covers blocks to Internet access, and since it is a special law dealing with the Internet, it prevails over the general Code of Criminal Procedure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, the blocking powers must stay within constitutional boundaries prescribed in, <i>inter alia</i>, Article 19 of the Constitution. Blocking powers are, therefore, subject to the widely-accepted tests of legality (foresight and non-arbitrariness), legitimacy of the grounds for restriction of fundamental rights and proportionality, calling for narrowly tailored restrictions causing minimum disruptions and/or damage.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In </span><strong>Section I </strong><span>of this post, we set out a brief record of the events that preceded the blocking of access to data services (mobile Internet) in several parts of Gujarat. Then in </span><strong>Section II</strong><span>, we summarise the order of the Gujarat High Court, dismissing the petition challenging the State government’s Internet-blocking notification under Section 144, CrPC. In the next post, </span><span>we examine the scope of Section 69A, IT Act to determine whether it empowers the State and Central government agencies to carry out blocks on Internet access through mobile phones (i.e., data services such as 2G, 3G and 4G) under certain circumstances. We submit that Section 69A does, and that Section 144, CrPC cannot be invoked for this purpose. </span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">I. The Patidar Agitation in Gujarat:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This question arose in the wake of agitation in Gujarat in the Patel community. The Patels or Patidars are <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-who-are-gujarats-patidars-and-why-are-they-angry/">politically and economically influential</a> in Gujarat, with several members of the community holding top political, bureaucratic and industrial positions. In the last couple of months, the Patidars have been agitating, demanding to be granted status as Other Backward Classes (OBC). OBC status would make the community eligible for reservations and quotas in educational institutions and for government jobs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Towards this demand, the Patidars organised <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/demand-for-obc-status-patidars-stir-spreads-to-saurashtra/">multiple rallies</a> across Gujarat in August 2015. The largest rally, called the <i>Kranti Rally</i>, <a href="http://m.ibnlive.com/news/politics/turmoil-brewing-in-gujarat-as-patel-community-demands-obc-status-hardik-patel-begins-indefinite-hunger-strike-1051104.html">was held</a> in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s capital city, on August 25, 2015. Hardik Patel, a leader of the agitation, reportedly went on hunger strike seeking that the Patidars’ demands be met by the government, and was arrested as he did not have permission to stay on the rally grounds after the rally. While media reports vary, it is certain that <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-rioting-reported-several-parts-ahmedabad-patel-rally-event-turns-violent-644192">violence and agitation broke out</a> after the rally. <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Patidar-agitation-Uneasy-calm-in-violence-hit-Gujarat-death-toll-rises-to-10/articleshow/48699151.cms">Many were injured</a>, some lost their lives, property was destroyed, businesses suffered; the army was deployed and curfew imposed for a few days across the State.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to other security measures, the State government also imposed a ban on mobile Internet services across different parts of Gujarat. Reportedly, Hardik Patel had called for a state-wide <i>bandh </i>over Whatsapp. <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/after-clashes-over-hardik-patels-detention-no-whatsapp-in-gujarat-1211058?pfrom=home-lateststories">The police cited</a> “<i>concerns of rumour-mongering and crowd mobilisation through Whatsapp</i>” as a reason for the ban, which was instituted under <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/930621/">Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973</a> (<strong>“CrPC”</strong>). In most of Gujarat, the ban lasted six days, from August 25 to 31, 2015, <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-patel-agitation-ban-mobile-internet-whatsapp-lifted-ahmedabad-644924">while it continued</a> in Ahmedabad and Surat for longer.<span> </span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">II. The Public Interest Litigation:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A public interest petition was filed before the Gujarat High Court, challenging the mobile Internet ban. Though the petition was dismissed at the preliminary stage by Acting Chief Justice Jayant Patel and Justice Anjaria by an <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">oral order</a> delivered on September 15, 2015, the legal issues surrounding the ban are important and the order calls for some reflection.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the PIL, the petitioner prayed that the Gujarat High Court declare that the notification under Section 144, CrPC, which blocked access to mobile Internet, is “void <i>ab initio</i>, <i>ultra vires </i>and unconstitutional” (para 1 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). The ban, argued the petitioner, violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution by being arbitrary and excessive, violating citizens’ right to free speech and causing businesses to suffer extensive economic damage. In any event, the power to block websites was specifically granted by Section 69A, IT Act, and so the government’s use of Section 144, CrPC to institute the mobile Internet block was legally impermissible. Not only this, but the government’s ban was excessive in that mobile Internet services were <i>completely blocked</i>; had the government’s concerns been about social media websites like Whatsapp or Facebook, the government could have suspended only those websites using Section 69A, IT Act. And so, the petitioner prayed that the Gujarat High Court issue a writ “<i>permanently restraining the State government from imposing a complete or partial ban on access to mobile Internet/broadband services</i>” in Gujarat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The State Government saw things differently, of course. At the outset, the government argued that there was “<i>sufficient valid ground for exercise of power</i>” under Section 144, CrPC, to institute a mobile Internet block (para 4 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). Had the blocking notification not been issued, “<i>peace could not have been restored with the other efforts made by the State for the maintenance of law and order</i>”. The government stressed that Section 144, CrPC notifications were generally issued as a “last resort”, and in any case, the Internet had not been shut down in Gujarat; broadband and WiFi services continued to be active throughout. Since the government was the competent authority to evaluate law-and-order situations and appropriate actions, the Court ought to dismiss the petition, the State prayed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Court agreed with the State government, and dismissed the petition without issuing notice (para 9 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). The Court examined two issues in its order (very briefly):</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The scope and distinction between Section 144, CrPC and Section 69A, IT Act, and whether the invocation of Section 144, CrPC to block mobile Internet services constituted an arbitrary exercise of power;</li>
<li>The proportionality of the blocking notification (though the Court doesn’t use the term ‘proportionality’).</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="text-align: justify; ">We will examine the Court’s reading of Section 69A, IT Act and Section 144, CrPC, to see whether their fields of operation are in fact different.</span></p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong style="text-align: justify; ">Acknowledgements</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">: We would like to thank Pranesh Prakash, Japreet Grewal, Sahana Manjesh and Sindhu Manjesh for their invaluable inputs in clarifying arguments and niggling details for these two posts.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Geetha Hariharan is a Programme Officer with Centre for Internet & Society. Padmini Baruah is in her final year of law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NLSIU) and is an intern at CIS.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i</a>
</p>
No publisherGeetha Hariharan and Padmini BaruahSocial MediaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Access69ASection 144Article 19(1)(a)Blocking2015-10-08T11:18:34ZBlog Entry