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PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES: DOCUMENT 1 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR A PAPER ON COMPETITION LAW + IPR + ACCESS TO < $100 MOBILE DEVICES
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law
<b>This blog post is the research methodology for my research paper under the Pervasive Technologies Project. This is a work in progress and is likely to be modified from time to time.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">See a subsequent version titled <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory">Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory</a></p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Preliminary</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent <i>inter alia </i>on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the 'developmental effects' of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper under the <i>Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place</i> Project (<b>"PT Project"</b>) examines one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: <i>first, </i>that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; <i>second, </i>that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; <i>third</i>, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a 'stable, open and future- proof environment' (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and <i>fourth,</i> that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.</p>
<h3><b>Research Questions</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper will examine whether there is a role to be played by one regulator, that is, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First, what is the relationship between intellectual property and competition law? Second, what are the competition law/antitrust concerns that arise around the licensing of intellectual property (standard essential patents)? Third, can existing mechanisms in competition law address concerns around the licensing of standard essential patents on sub hundred dollar devices, and is competition law a viable solution to address this issue? If so, which ones? Fourth, given the frequency of these litigations, is there a role to be played by an <i>ex-post</i> regulator, such as the CCI, or is there a need for <i>ex-ante</i> regulation?</p>
<h3><b>Research Objects</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an attempt to address these research questions, this paper will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. This paper will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper will also examine select tools and sites sought to be used to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to these sub hundred dollar mobile devices: first, principles, legal frameworks and provisions of competition law/antitrust law; second, all relevant judicial decisions.</p>
<h3><b>Research Method</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First , this research paper will begin with establishing the case for the intervention of the regulator and/or the judiciary in the sub hundred dollar mobile device market by undertaking a review of primary and secondary literature<a name="_ftnref1"></a><a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>("literature"). Second, also through a literature review, the research will be contextualized to India in terms of the market, the actors involved and the legal framework. Third, a cross jurisdictional comparative legal search will be undertaken to understand the potential areas of intervention for the judiciary and the Competition Commission of India based on existing legal disputes in other jurisdictions; and the possible challenges that might ensue. Fourth, in a scenario building exercise, an attempt will be made to outline the role that the judiciary and the regulator might play in India, in order to ensure access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is not impeded by litigation around standard essential patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Generally, in the writing of this paper, inputs will be sought from experts including MHRD Chair Professors, legal practitioners in India, academics in India and abroad and members of relevant departments of the Indian Government.</p>
<h3><b>Research Communication</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research will be communicated through a series of blog posts- one every month from December, 2014 to December, 2015. A preliminary draft of a research paper will be produced by December, 2015, tentatively to be presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, New Delhi. The final output will be a research paper.</p>
<h3><b>References</b></h3>
<ol>
<li>Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in Robert Schware (ed.), E-development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005, World Bank Publications).</li>
<li>Jyoti Saraswati, Dot. Compradors- Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry (2012, Pluto Press)</li>
</ol>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
</div>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn1"></a><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of this document, primary and secondary literature includes academic articles and books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, blog posts, case law and other legal provisions.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaIntellectual Property RightsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-10-04T02:51:06ZBlog EntryMethodology: Access to Music through the Mobile
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-access-to-music-through-mobile
<b>Like its predecessors the vinyl, the cassette tape, the CD, and the MP3 player, the mobile phone as the most recent musical carrier have been well documented to be a disruptive technology, one which has made earlier carrier technologies virtually obsolete. The mobile phone has transformed the music industry and its supporting infrastructure — dramatically altering the roles of various intermediaries and stakeholders who enable the creation, distribution, and consumption of musical content. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Context</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For the first time in 13 years, the music business is growing again, with consumption of musical content at an all time high due to innovations which have provided more affordable and convenient platforms for accessing music than ever before. These include web-based and mobile-based applications which have arisen to compete with piracy through "free", "feels-like-free" and "fermium" business models.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given the pervasiveness of the mobile phone, especially in India where it is the only mode of access for over 50% of the population <a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>, these innovations along with expanding broadband and data services seems to be a mark of success in bringing access to music and other media content to those formerly priced out, and geographically excluded from the legal market.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, Indian web and mobile-based applications such as Gaana and Saavn, and its U.S. counterparts like Spotify and Pandora have continuously operated at a loss, often sustained by venture capitalist funding or a larger corporate backing.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> Although many online platforms, such as the recently shut down Flyte (funded by Flipkart) cite piracy as the official reason for its closure, industry insiders have allegedly noted exorbitant licensing fees demanded by rights holders as the case.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Research Problems</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>1. It is uncertain whether legal access to affordable music through the mobile will remain. </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As an access issue, this is problematic due to the potential disappearances of these platforms, which have with varying success provided an alternative to unauthorized file sharing while increasing the ease of consumers' access to a larger volume and variety of legal content. Some of these applications provide a "direct-to-fan" platform for musicians to upload their own music online without having to 'break in' to a relatively closed entertainment industry, particularly in the Indian market where the mass majority of music is dominated by the film industry. Access to increased volume and variety is also not a guarantee, particularly in light of some musicians' indignation over the intermediaries' profits from their content, and the little revenue received in return.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> 2. Numerous stakeholders are entering the technologically advancing, digital music industry resulting in uncertainty of optimal business models and increased complexity of revenue and royalty distribution. <br /> </b>Thus, given evolving business models<b> </b>due to the transitioning physical to digital music industry, no consensus has yet been found on which platforms or revenue models offer an optimal solution for access to, and production of music. The potential for monetization in all levels of the value chain - from production, to content aggregation, to content distribution, and consumption -- has resulted in an increase in the number of intermediaries, further complicating the ecosystem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All stakeholders fulfill different roles in the industry while expressing the common challenge of 'monetization'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Web and mobile based<b> content distributors</b> are attempting to find the right price points at which Indian consumers are willing to pay, particularly in a market whose billing model is largely based on mobile credits and cash-on-delivery since only 1% of the population have access to credit. <a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> Globally, criticisms for streaming distributors like Spotify are highly publicized, not paying enough royalty to artists despite claims that 70% of their revenue is spent on content licensing.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> Content aggregators </b> are attempting to monetize services such as music fingerprinting, meta-data tagging, and other analytics tracking to identify and capitalize on consumer behavior and consumption trends. Meanwhile, telecom companies and mobile phone manufacturers are attempting to provide integrated services and music bundle packages to increase the interoperability of these platforms for a more frictionless experience for consumers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> Content owners</b> - vast majority being music labels -- are attempting to maintain their relevance in the industry through its powerful artist and repertoire marketing role, amidst criticisms that stakeholders like multi-channel networks and self-publishing content distributors (i.e. SoundCloud, Youtube, etc.) will deem it irrelevant. Many distributors globally note the vast ownership of content leading to the potential abuse of bargaining power, as exemplified by the Competition Commission of India's recent ruling that Super Cassette Industries' (or T-Series, who own 70% of Hindi film music) practiced unfair and discriminatory charging practices for a radio broadcasters due to their demand for minimum guarantees.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <b>content producers</b> -- lyricists, composers, performers, and more are struggling to monetize and finance the production of their music. Down the valuation stream, the contractual agreements between content owners and distributors affect the livelihoods of these artists. India's music industry is particularly unique in that the vast majority of content are film music, which means the common financier of music production are the film industry, rather than music labels or publishing houses. Additionally, given a one-time, work-for-hire agreement was commonplace in the Indian film industry during music production, a contractual agreement stipulating royalty division was slow to materialize.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>3. Continued violation of law due to lack of legitimacy of Copyright Board, Copyright societies, and 2012 Copyright Amendment.</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The entire music ecosystem is governed by the framework of copyright, which necessitates <b>legal mechanisms </b>to ensure proper regulation and balance between the protection of rights holders and access to content for consumers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 2012 Copyright Amendment attempted to address the imbalance of bargaining power through preventing the first author's transfer of right to royalty, amongst others. This amendment was also passed in response to alleged corruption and collusion between the content owners (music labels), various judiciaries, and the former copyright societies (Indian Performing Rights Societies ("IPRS") and the Indian Phonographic Publishing Limited ("PPL")), resulting in an absence of royalty payments to lyricists and composers for many years.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite this, the Copyright Amendment have not been as effective in correcting the issues on the ground, and are still allegedly being circumvented via advanced royalties, backdated agreements, and waiver of performance royalty rights.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a><b> </b>Other inefficiencies cited have been poor transparency of royalty payments, lack of publicly available analytics on web and mobile-based platforms, and untimely responses by the Copyright Board to conduct investigations into the allegations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Amidst these allegations, some industry analysts also claim the Copyright framework itself needs to catch up with the technological potential that the internet, and these new services provide. This may be an alternative perspective to be explored.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">*(Tentative) Research Questions and Methodology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b>Thus, given uncertainty of the sustainability of affordable, legal access; the increasing complexity of business models and royalty distribution, and the continued violation of Copyright law due to lack of legitimacy, the policy question is: <b><br /> </b><b>How can legal and institutional mechanisms ensure an enabling environment for access to, and production of music for all mobile phone users in India? </b> <b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>"Legal mechanisms" - Copyright Act, Copyright Board, licensing mechanisms </li>
<li>"Institutional mechanisms" - Copyright societies, music industry norms, corporate policies </li>
<li>"Access" - equitable, fair, easy access to quality and quantity of music
<ul>
<li type="circle">Potential barriers to access (to music, through mobile): </li>
<li type="square">Political: Legal constraints (Goonda Act?), intermediaries prevent copying, licensing bodies </li>
<li type="square">Economic: Lack of availability of older repertoire, access to mobile device </li>
<li type="square">Social: Use or access of materials involving loss of privacy, lack of quality production </li>
<li type="square">Technological: TPMs, compatibility, broadband/data access, payment gateways, geographic barriers, lack of net neutrality </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Access necessitates "production"</b> - ability to create content with little entry barriers; balance right of artists to earn, and consumer access</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Barriers to production and distribution:</li>
<li type="circle">Uncertainty of business models in age of digital music </li>
<li type="circle">Ineffectiveness of Copyright regulation: Copyright societies, Copyright board </li>
<li type="circle">Controversy surrounding Copyright Act </li>
<li type="circle">Lack of finance/income -- intermediaries taking share of pie ?? Inefficiencies in music industry? </li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>"Mobile phone users in India" - smartphone users able to access web and mobile based platforms</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">How do the stakeholders in the Indian music industry work together to facilitate access to music via the mobile phone?</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Who are the stakeholders of the music industry in India? </li>
<li>What are their roles and their objectives? </li>
<li>How have their roles changed given the digital transition of the music industry?</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Method: Conduct a stakeholder analysis mapping the physical to digital transition. Secure information via literature review (academic and grey) and expert interviews secured via snowball sampling.</i></p>
<p><b>Content Creation </b></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li type="circle">Lyricists/composers (film, non-film) </li>
<li type="circle">Performers (film, nom-film) </li>
<li type="circle">Film Producer </li>
<li type="circle">Sound Producer </li>
<li type="circle">Publisher </li>
<li type="circle">Self-production (Remix artists, DJs, independents) </li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Content Aggregation and Distribution
<ul>
<li type="circle">Content Aggregation: </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li type="square">Music labels (International/film/indie) </li>
<li type="square"> Mobile aggregators (VAS companies) </li>
<li type="square"> Tech aggregators (back-end for digital platforms: meta-data tagging, analytics, etc.) </li>
</ul>
<li style="text-align: justify; " type="circle">Content distribution (digital)</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; " type="square"> Online stores (e.g. iTunes) </li>
<li style="text-align: justify; " type="square"> Mobile/Web-based</li>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Webcast/Radio (e.g. MumbaiOne Radio) </li>
<li>Digital Stores (e.g. Amazon, iTunes, eMusic, Google Play, Flyte, OKListen, etc.) </li>
<li>Interactive streaming (e.g. 8tracks, Gaana, Hungama, Raaga, Rdio, Spotify, etc.) </li>
<li>Bundled telco-music stores (formerly Nokia MixMusic) </li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li type="square">Copyright Board </li>
<li type="square">Copyright societies (e.g. IPRS (Indian Performing Rights Society), PPL (Phonographics Performance Limited, ISRA (Indian Singers Rights Association)) </li>
<li type="square">Associations (e.g. MCAI (Music Composers Association of India), SIMCA (South Indian Music Companies Association), IMI (Indian Music Industry - ass. of producers), etc.) </li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Financiers:
<ul>
<li type="square">Venture capitalists </li>
<li type="square">Brands/advertisers </li>
<li type="square">Corporate backing </li>
<li type="square">Multi-channel networks
<ul>
<li type="circle">Technical intermediaries
<ul>
<li type="square">Telecom operators </li>
<li type="square">Internet service providers </li>
<li type="square">Data providers </li>
<li type="square">Payment gateway providers</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<ul>
<ul>
<li type="circle">Mobile phone manufacturers </li>
</ul>
</ul>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Consumers</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li type="circle">Types of music listeners (Ovum research taxonomy)
<ul>
<li type="square">Active fans (lean forward/niche) </li>
<li type="square">Core enthusiasts (lean forward/mainstream) </li>
<li type="square">Indie followers (lean back/niche) </li>
<li type="square">Lean-back listeners (lean back/mainstream) </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li type="circle">
<p>Class distinction / price sensitivity?</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What are the current business models for web and mobile-based content distributors? How does this impact each stakeholder in the music industry?</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What are the new business models of the digital music industry in India?
<ul>
<li type="circle">How are the new intermediaries/stakeholders in the web/mobile targeted music industry impacting business models? </li>
<li type="circle">Literature review (media, industry reports) and expert interviews </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What is the revenue distribution in the music production value chain for the web/mobile-based platforms in India?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: International comparison of new digital music business models worldwide: </li>
<li type="square">Online MOOC Course & lectures (Coursera - West Virginia University ; YouTube - Future of Music Coalition<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11] </a>) </li>
<li type="square">Literature review (academic, white, grey, media, industry repots, etc.) </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Replicate FMC's study for Indian context: Music and How Money Flows<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12]</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Who are the consumers that access music via mobile/web-based platforms in India?</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Is there a socio-cultural-economic dimension distinguishing those willing and able to pay? Who actually pays and how much?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Literature review, expert interviews, surveys?? </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are there different levels of musical engagement which translate to consumer behavior (active fans, core enthusiasts, indie follower, lean back listeners) and subsequent willingness to pay? What percentage of listeners fall in each category in India?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Questionnaire to current users of web/mobile-based music distributors supplemented by expert interviews </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>What kind of economic good is digital music in India? Inferior, luxury, normal? Complementary, substitute? Public, merit, private, free?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Literature review, theoretical economic analysis supplemented by user survey and expert interviews</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Considering the stakeholders in the digital music industry, consumer behavior in India, how should music copyrights be regulated to provide optimal access of music through the mobile to consumers and fair renumeration to first authors?</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What role do legal mechanisms currently play in the distribution of royalty revenue in the music industry (on the ground)?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Mapping of copyright processes and agreements (oral, contractual, or otherwise) between stakeholders in the music industry, noting specifically role of Copyright Board, and (former) Copyright societies; expert interviews </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What role do codified laws (2012 Copyright Amendment, case law) stipulate should be the legal mechanisms to distribute royalty in the music industry?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Legal literature review, expert interviews </li>
<li>How have the 2012 Copyright Amendment impacted the stakeholders in the music industry? Are the laws effectively enforced? Has the Copyright Amendment been designed/defined/articulated in an optimal way for all stakeholders? Why or why not? </li>
<li type="circle">Method: Literature review </li>
<li>How should copyright be organized? Who should distribute royalty revenues? What process?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: Consider stakeholder analysis, context of India music/film industry, consumer demand and price-sensitivity, and conduct cross-jurisdictional comparison </li>
<li>What industry norms should be set for a more transparent, efficient supply chain to ensure rights holders receive fair compensation?
<ul>
<li type="circle">Method: International comparison of industry norms for copyright organization and distribution </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>].Amba Kak, Fighting Free with Free - The Legal Music Market in India as a Response to the Digital Age (Centre for Internet and Society, to be published.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>].Avendus Capital, India’s Mobile Internet: The Revolution Has Begun: An Overview of How Mobile Internet Is Touching the Lives of Millions, Industry (Avendus Capital Private Limited, September 2013), http://www.avendus.com/Files/Fund%20Performance%20PDF/Avendus_Report-India’s_Mobile_Internet-2013.pdf.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>].Amba Kak, Fighting Free with Free - The Legal Music Market in India as a Response to the Digital Age (Centre for Internet and Society, to be published.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>].Nikhil Pahwa, “Why Flipkart Shut Down Flyte Music,” News and Analysis of Digital Media in India, MediaNama, (May 29, 2013), http://www.medianama.com/2013/05/223-why-flipkart-shut-flyte-music/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>].Reserve Bank of India, as cited in IFPI, India: Nearing an all-time high http://www.ifpi.org/india.php</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>].James Duffett-Smith, Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment (United States Copyright Office 2014).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>].Ashok Chawla, M.L. Tayal, and S.L. Bunker, HT Media Limited v. Super Cassettes Industries Limited (Competition Commission of India 2014).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>].Prashant Reddy, “Did the Big Music Companies on IPRS & PPL Collude to Deny Lyricists and Composers Crores of Rupees in ‘ringtone Royalties’ – An Investigation,” http://spicyip.com/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html, SpicyIP, (February 14, 2011)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>].Anonymous, “Ghost Post: The myriad ways in which the Copyright Amendment Act, 2012 is being circumvented” http://spicyip.com/2014/01/ghost-post-the-myriad-ways-in-which-the-copyright-amendment-act-2012-is-being-circumvented.html, SpicyIP, (January 18, 2014)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>].https://www.coursera.org/course/gpsmusic</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL471E012D03E9BA03</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2013/06/18/music-and-how-money-flows</p>
<div id="_mcePaste"><span><a href="https://www.coursera.org/course/gpsmusic"><i><span><span> </span></span></i></a></span> </div>
<hr />
<p>Click to download the <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pt-project-access-to-knowledge-through-music.pdf" class="external-link">PDF</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-access-to-music-through-mobile'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-access-to-music-through-mobile</a>
</p>
No publishermaggieAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-12-08T16:22:41ZBlog EntryIntellectual Property in Mobile Application Development in India
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intellectual-property-in-mobile-application-development-in-india-1
<b>A steady rise in smart phone penetration in India has led to a corresponding growth of the mobile application development industry. Mobile application development like all technological implementations is subject to intellectual property issues. However, very little is understood about the effect of existing patent and copyright law on this niche industry. I aim to develop an understanding of the mobile applications industry, and how it is governed by current Indian patent and copyright regime. I will also use this research to inform the optimal ways in which policymakers may ensure the continual emergence of the mobile applications industry. This blog post lays down a document delineating the research methodology and research questions within the Intellectual Property in Mobile Application Development in India chapter under the Pervasive Technologies Project. The document is a work in progress. </b>
<p align="CENTER"><strong><u><br /></u></strong></p>
<p align="CENTER"><strong><u>Introduction
to the “Intellectual Property in Mobile Application Development”
chapte</u>r</strong></p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"> </p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">
Software
companies in India were traditionally operating on the software as a
service (SAAS model). Service contracts signed within this industry
ensured that all IPR developed during a project was owned by the
client. With the advent of the smart-phone, many software developers
left SAAS enterprises in pursuit of developing their own mobile
application products (“mobile apps”). Several developers began to
aggressively acquire or create patent portfolios around their
products.<a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a>
However, it has been observed that mobile apps continue to be
increasingly produced in imitation of other products or services or
by more discrete means of copying source code or content without the
right to do so.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"> </p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">
The
overall objective of this chapter is to develop a holistic picture of
the mobile apps development ecosystem in India in order to portray
the decisions developers are making within their practice as a
function of how India's intellectual property regime operates within
this ecosystem. I will also examine whether
existing regimes of intellectual property interact inhibit or
accelerate the growth of the mobile applications development
ecosystem in India, especially in conjunction with market and
cultural forces arising as a result.</p>
<p> </p>
<p align="CENTER"><u><strong>Research
Questions and Methodology</strong></u></p>
<p align="CENTER"> </p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>1.
What are the decisions developers are making within their practice in
terms of location of their enterprise and clients, scale of audience,
funding, business models and mobile apps marketplace (app stores) ? </strong></p>
<ol>
<p><strong>1.1.
Who is the primary actor in the mobile applications development
cycle in India?</strong><em><strong> <br /></strong></em></p>
<p><em><strong>Method:</strong></em><em>
Analysis of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar
across 267 mobile applications developers.<a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a></em><em><br /></em></p>
<p><em> Create
a new survey instrument and supplement with relevant external
expert interviews obtained from Samantha Cassar's qualitative
research.</em></p>
<ul>
<ul><li>
<p><em>The interviews shall be conducted with respondents based
out of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad</em></p>
</li><li>
<p><em>The exercise targets 10 developers in each city</em></p>
</li></ul>
</ul>
</ol>
<p><br /><em><strong>The analysis of the interviews and results of
Samantha's web survey shall be verified by an expert well-versed
with the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data</strong></em></p>
<ol></ol>
<p><em> </em><strong>1.2
Is the mobile apps marketplace organically developing into a Bazaar
model, or a Cathedral model? </strong></p>
<ul><em><strong> Method: </strong>Literature review<br /><strong><br /></strong></em></ul>
<strong>1.3. What are the contractual terms between the enterprise and the employee? What is the typical nature of agreements in the mobile apps development industry between enterprise-employee and enterprise- client?</strong>
<p> </p>
<strong><em>Method</em>: </strong>Analysis of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar and supplement with relevent external expert interviews obtained from her qualitative research.
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li>
<p>
<strong>What
is the nature of innovation emerging from the mobile app industry?</strong>
<strong>What is the awareness of the mobile applications developer
and its enterprise of rules concerning code, content and design? How
does re-use and sharing of code, content and design occur in the
mobile application developer ecosystem ? What is the perceived
impact of the Indian IPR regime on the aforementioned aspects?
Finally, do the emerging trends in re-use and sharing of code run
afoul of Indian IP law?</strong></p>
<p> <em><strong>Method:</strong> Analysis
of Indian Patent and Copyright regime to assess the legality of
prevailing practices in the ecosystem. <br /></em></p>
</li></ol>
<p><em> Analysis
of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar and
supplement it with relevant external expert interviews obtained
from Samantha's qualitative research.</em></p>
<p><em><br /></em></p>
<ol start="4">
<p>
<strong>3.
The apps marketplace is extremely important since they are the
gatekeepers enabling access to apps. What is the nature of the apps
marketplace? What are the limitations associated with it ? How do
the existing regulatory models intersect with this relatively new
marketplace? What is the enforcement carried out by these app stores
in terms of IP?</strong></p>
</ol>
<strong><em>Method:</em></strong>
<em>Literature review and analysis of the new survey instrument.</em>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p class="sdfootnote"> </p>
<strong> 4. How does Indian Copyright law and patent law apply to the mobile applications development ecosystem, in respect of the various business models operating in the industry?<br /> <br /> <em>Method: </em></strong><em>Literature review</em><br /> </div>
<ul>
<p><strong>4.1.
The patent regime is grounded on a laboratory model of innovation.
What does the niche mobile applications development industry
(working on a micro-creativity model of innovation) require
differently from the patent regime to foster growth? </strong></p>
<em><strong>Method: </strong>Literature review</em><br />
<p> </p>
<p>
<strong>4.2.
Similarly, copyright law has a distinct design for digital objects.
Examine the design and its suitability to regulate a mobile
application.</strong></p>
<p><em><strong>Method: </strong></em>Literature
review to trace the development of copyright law. Copyright was
designed to regulate a physical book publishing industry. By
extending its application to myriad objects, the design has gone
through significant changes. Also, conduct
expert interviews in the field to understand the practice and
gather qualitative data.</p>
</ul>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p class="sdfootnote"><a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a>
See La<em>va aims for 100 mobile apps</em>, available at
http://spicyip.com/2013/01/guest-post-lava-aims-for-100-mobile-app.html</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote2">
<p>
<em><a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a>
</em>Out of 267 respondents, 93
responded in full and 164 responded partially</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote3">
<p class="sdfootnote"><a class="sdfootnotesym" name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a>See
Question 1.2 of this document</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intellectual-property-in-mobile-application-development-in-india-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intellectual-property-in-mobile-application-development-in-india-1</a>
</p>
No publishersinhaAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-08-31T14:33:06ZBlog EntryMethodology: Patent Landscaping in the Indian Mobile Device Market
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-landscaping-in-the-indian-mobile-device-market
<b>Through the patent landscaping exercise, we have identified patents pertaining to Internet-enabled mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less. The findings from this exercise are being used to develop legal strategies to reduce patent-based impediments to the widespread and rapid proliferation of this beneficial technology throughout India. The research methodology adopted for the patent landscaping exercise has been delineated here. This document is a work in progress.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">1. Research Questions</h3>
<div style="text-align: justify; "><ol>
<li><span>Are there indications of increasing patent filing <span>over time </span>by the mobile device industry in India?</span></li>
<li><span>What patents pertain to capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less?</span></li>
<li><span>What are the existing patent pools for each of the capabilities identified in question 2? What do we know about these patent pools?</span></li>
<li><span>Would the existing patent pools be sufficient to ensure that:</span></li>
<ol>
<li><span> consumers continue to have access to inexpensive devices?</span></li>
<li><span>manufacturers operating in the budget segment are not snuffed out by patent litigation or do not pass on losses caused by patent litigation to their consumers?</span></li>
<li><span>the rights of patent holders are not infringed upon? If not, why?</span></li>
</ol>
<li><span>Which of these patent pools could go into an India-based mobile device patent "pool of pools" formed possibly through government intervention and having a royalty level supportable by the domestic Indian consumer market for mobile devices?</span></li>
<li><span>What is the design and manufacturing flow of a finished Internet-enabled low-cost mobile phone sold in India? <br /></span></li>
</ol></div>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">2. Objective</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The objective of the chapter is to exhaustively determine the number of patents that apply to an Internet-enabled mobile device that costs the equivalent of USD 100 or less in the Indian retail market. The set of patents is restricted to those that apply to technologies which are commonly found in such a device. This set of patents could be included in a patent pool for Indian manufacturers of mobile phones.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">3. Object</h3>
<p><i>[2. What patents pertain to capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less?]</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Eight mobile phones [Annexure 1 (<a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/annexure-1-mobile-phones-to-study.pdf/view">PDF</a>)] have been procured for identifying the technical standards implemented in them. These are phones manufactured in China and sold in the white or grey market in India either by Indian brands or by Chinese ones. <span>The research object also includes the Indian patent database, documentation published by standard setting organisations, and the practices of Indian manufacturers of Internet-enabled mobile devices in the sub-USD-100 segment.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>3.1.</b> The phones were used to determine “capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less” as described in research question 2. These capabilities were identified by (a) examining the physical components of the phone, (b) by running emulators which identified details about the hardware, (c) verifying the findings from (a) and (b) with the users' manual, packaging box, or any other documentation published by the manufacturer.</p>
<div style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>3.2. Criteria for Choosing the Mobile Phones</span></b></div>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><span>The handsets cost less than USD 100 (INR 6,000 approximately), connect to the Internet, and are sold in physical Indian markets.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-align: justify; ">Every handset has at least one feature that differentiates it from the rest of the set. For example, in-built support for multiple Indian languages; 50 kilowatt battery (as published on the carton and battery label); camera with CMOS sensor.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-align: justify; ">The universal set for the mobile phones of interest for this research can not be defined as the phones are sold in grey or black markets. Catalogues, online listings, company websites, and other documentation for this universal set are not available. Hence, it is not possible to definitively identify mobile phones that are 'representative' of the handsets of interest. Handsets that help one get a richer sense of the population of the sub-USD-100 mobile phone market in India have been chosen.</span></li>
</ul>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "></h3>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">4. Rationale</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Though India has not yet witnessed patent litigation of the same scale as developed countries, litigation over standard essential patents in India has already led to injunctions against nine homegrown and Chinese manufacturers<sup><a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a></sup>. The mobile device landscape in India uncovered through this research will be applied to the development of policy recommendations that aim to ensure that consumers continue to have access to inexpensive devices, that manufacturers operating in the budget segment do not end up shutting shop due to patent litigation, and the rights of patent holders are not infringed upon.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">5. Research Method</h3>
<p><i><i>[1. Are there measurable indications of increasing patent filing by the mobile device industry in India?</i></i></p>
<p><i><i> </i>2. What patents pertain to capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less?]</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span><span style="text-align: justify; ">Fifty Indian and non-Indian companies most likely to hold telecom-related patents in India were identified by CIS. [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/fifty-companies.pdf" class="external-link">Annexure 4</a>]. Two patent searchs firm were contracted the task of searching the database of the Indian Patent Office by the names of the fifty companies for patents granted and applied for. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; "> </span><span style="text-align: justify; "><b>5.1. Procedure for selecting law firms/ patent attorneys</b></span><span style="text-align: justify; "><b>:</b></span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><span>Ten law firms and patent search agencies from different parts of India were identified as potential contractors after preliminary meetings with several patent attorneys and representatives of law firms.</span></li>
<li><span>Price quotations were invited from the ten organisations after holding one or more meetings with each.</span></li>
<li><span>On the basis of the quotation, deliverable time, scope and nature of the results delivered, and quality assurance, the contract was awarded to one firm of patent attorneys (Hourglass Research, Mumbai) and one law firm. The firms offered the best price for a commensurate deliverable time and assured quality of results.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>5.2. Patent Firm 1 (Hourglass Research) Search Strategy:</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 1</i>: A taxonomy that comprehensively covers different technologies implemented in an Internet-enabled mobile phone was drawn up [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/annexure-5.pdf" class="internal-link">Annexure 5</a>]. The taxonomy was split into categories (Level 1) and sub-categories (Level 2).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 2</i>: The Derwent World Patents Index (DWPI) assigns one or more manual codes (MC) to each patent depending on the technology described by the patent. The patent firm matched manual codes pertaining to mobile technology with categories in the taxonomy. Thus, each manual code corresponded to one or more categories in the taxonomy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 3</i>: Subsequently, search strings [<a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/annexure-6.pdf">listed in Annexure 6</a>] were used to find published applications as well as granted patents from the Thomson Innovation (TI) database. The search strings comprise permutations and combinations of the manual codes [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/annexure-7.xls" class="internal-link">Annexure 7</a>], fifty assignees<span style="text-align: justify; "> </span>, keywords, and IPC classes and sub-classes. The search results were extracted on February 23, 2015. Hence, the patents granted or published till then have been included in the landscape. The start date is January 1, 2000 as the Thomson Innovation Database does not contain earlier records from the Indian Patent Office database.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 4</i>: Then, manual codes for each patent in the results were extracted. Each patent was assigned a category corresponding to its manual codes. This automated categorisation was manually reviewed and validated by reading the claims, abstract, DWPI use, and DWPI novelty. In instances where the patent could not be categorised based on the information contained in the claims, abstract, DWPI use, and DWPI novelty, the detailed description associated with the patents (i.e., the column entitled "Description" in the dataset) was read.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 5</i>: The TI database yields International Patent Documentation (INPADOC) families. In instances where one or more patents from the same family appeared in the search results, granted patents were chosen over non-granted ones as "representative" of the family.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Step 6</i>: The results were deduplicated first on the basis of the publication number and then on the basis of the application number. In five instances, two or more different patents were assigned the same application number. This was resolved by manually reading the patent and determining the most relevant patent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">4,052 patents and 19,517 patent applications relevant to the mobile phone were found at the end of the patent landscaping exercise.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>5.3. Schema for identified patents and patent applications</b>: Name of Assignee -- Patent Number -- Application Number -- Status of application (Granted/ Published) -- Application Date -- Publication Date -- Grant Date -- Database Searched -- Title -- Abstract -- Category (Level 1) -- Sub-category (Level 2) -- Infrastructure/ User Equipment/ both -- Title (DWPI) -- Abstract (DWPI) -- Abstract DWPI Novelty -- Abstract DWPI Use -- Comments/ Remarks</p>
<p><b>5.4. List of IPC classes and sub-classes and DWPI Manual Codes excluded from the patent search:</b> [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/annexure-8.pdf" class="internal-link">Annexure 8</a>], [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rejoinder-to-annexure-8" class="internal-link">Rejoinder to Annexure 8</a>]</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These classes, sub-classes and manual codes were excluded as they were very overarching for the research question. Class H04, for instance, pertains to "electric communication techniques". It is likely to comprise a comparatively large number of patents not pertaining to mobile device technology. Instead, certain sub-classes of H04 that are the most relevant to mobile device have been considered. As another example, the sub-classes of G01 pertain to measurements of physical quantities (length, area, thickness, et al). The number of patents pertaining to mobile technology in these sub-classes will be small compared with the number of patents in the sub-class.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>5.5 Patent Search Firm 2</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Search Firm 2 used Questel and Questel Orbit databases to search for patents and patent applications filed in India from January 1, 2005 to January 1, 2015. The results delivered by this firm did not fulfill our quality standards. Hence, they were dropped from the research. We intended to compare the results of the two search firms to determine the difference.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p><b>5.6. Identifying telecom standards implemented in mobile phones:</b></p>
<p><i>[2. What patents pertain to capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less?]</i></p>
<p>Using documentation available from standards-setting organisations and industry consortia, and from the nine handsets, 322 technical standards [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/mobile-phone-standards.ods" class="external-link">Annexure 2</a>] implemented in a networked mobile device have been identified by CIS. These technical standards support commonly found capabilities in a networked mobile handset. By dismantling the phones, their components were identified [<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/mobile-phone-hardware.ods" class="external-link">Annexure 3</a>]. The list of components and standards was used to determine the patent pools, standard-setting organisations and standard development organisations of interest for research questions 3 and 4 as well as for the literature survey.</p>
<h3>6. Validation of Results</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The results of the patent landscaping exercise turned in by the patent search firm were validated by performing the following steps:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><span>Checking for duplicate application numbers via MySql</span></li>
<li><span>Checking for duplicate publication numbers via MySql</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No duplicates were found.</p>
<h3>7. Analysis of Results</h3>
<p><i>[2. What patents pertain to capabilities commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India for USD 100 or less?]</i></p>
<p><b>7.1. Data Analysis</b>: Breakdown of 23,569 patents and patent applications</p>
<p>Number of patents and patent applications combined in the different Level 1 categories,</p>
<p>Number of patents and patent applications combined in Level 2 categories (i.e., sub-categories).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>7.2. Visualisations: </b>Graphical representations of the patent landscape</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">1. Number of patents in each Level 1 category<br />2. Number of published patent applications versus granted patents in each Level 1 category <br />3. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Communication”<br />4. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Operational Blocks”<br />5. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Sensors”<br />6. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Energy Storage”<br />7. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Sound, image, and video”<br />8. Number of patents in each sub-category of “Display”<br />9. Number of user equipment patents, infrastructure patents and infrastructure and user equipment patents.<br />10. Number of patents held by each of the fifty assignees<br />11. Number of patent filings by the fifty assignees from the year 2000 to the year 2014 <br />12. Number of patents in each Level 1 category filed over the years (time intervals: 2000-2003, 2004-2007, 2008-2011, 2012-2014) <br />13. Number of patents filed annually from the year 2000 to 2014 for all Level 1 categories combined<br />14. Top 10 assignees in Communication<br />15. Top 10 assignees in Operational Blocks<br />16. Top 10 assignees in Software<br />17. Top 10 assignees in Sensors<br />18. Top 10 assignees in Sound, Image, and Video<br />19. Top 10 assignees in Display<br />20. Number of patents in each Level 1 category held by each assignee in the top 10. (The ten assignees with the most number of patents in the overall dataset of 23,569.)<br />21. Number of patents filed from the year 2000 to 2014 in each sub-category of Communication<br />22. Number of patents filed from the year 2000 to 2014 in each sub-category of Operational Blocks<br />23. Sub-categories (Level 2 categories) with the highest number of filings [Baseband; Bandwidth; Call and data management; Signalling, routing and switching]<br />24. Top 10 assignees in Baseband<br />25. Top 10 assignees in Bandwidth<br />26. Top 10 assignees in Call and data management<br />27. Top 10 assignees in Signalling, routing and switching</p>
<h3>8. Confidential Research and Anonymised Interviews</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>[6. What is the design and manufacturing flow of a finished Internet-enabled low-cost mobile phone sold in India?]</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS conducted and published anonymised <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-1">interviews with semiconductor chip manufacturers in Taiwan</a> in September 2014. A confidential research exercise was conducted with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and white-label assembly lines in China in 2014. The two research exercises have contributed to the mapping of the downstream flow of manufacturing a finished, Internet-enabled, low-cost mobile device.</p>
<h3>9. Literature Survey</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>[3. What are the existing patent pools for each of the capabilities found in a low-cost networked mobile device? What do we know about these patent pools? </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>4. Would the existing patent pools be sufficient to ensure that consumers continue to have access to inexpensive devices, that manufacturers operating in the budget segment are not snuffed out by patent litigation (or pass on losses caused by patent litigation to their consumers), and the rights of patent holders are not infringed upon. If not, why?]</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Research questions 3 and 4 will be answered via a comprehensive<a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/literature-survey-patent-landscaping-in-the-indian-marketplace"> literature survey</a>.<sup><br /></sup></p>
<h3>10. Prior Art</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of 2,300 patents from different jurisdictions (US, Japan, India, Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Europe, China, Finland, France, Norway, UK, Germany, Singapore) searched by keyword/ keystring was compiled in 2013 <sup><a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a></sup>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Clairvolex, a market research firm based in Gurgaon conducted a patent landscaping exercise of mobil technologies in India in 2010. The search was based on IPC classes: http://www.clairvolex.com/pdf/communication.pdf</p>
<h3>11. Narrative:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The chapter for the book takes the form of a story of an Indian businessperson travelling to Shenzhen in China to procure a consignment of mobile phones for selling them in India. The businessperson puts together a configuration of hardware and software for the mobile phone and sets out to find the royalties he would need to pay for it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Numerical data has been presented using visualisations.</p>
<h3>12. Assumptions:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The chapter assumes a direct link between the patent regime and the availability of inexpensive Internet-enabled mobile devices, whereas the latter is affected by several other factors outside the scope of this research, for example, trademark infringement litigation.</p>
<h3>13. Limitations:</h3>
<ul>
<li>The patent landscape only encompasses the patents and patent applications filed by 50 major brands in India. It does not take into account patents held by other vendors, universities, and educational institutions. </li>
<li>The patent landscaping exercise was conducted for patents granted and applications filed between January 1, 2000 and February 23, 2015 as earlier data for Indian patents was not available in the Thomson Reuters database. As the lifespan of a patent is 20 years, live patents granted between 1995 and 2000 in India are not present in the landscape.</li>
<li>IPC classes, sub-classes and DWPI manual codes listed in Annexure 8 were not included in the patent landscape as they were very overarching for the research question. Class H04, for instance, pertains to "electric communication techniques". It is likely to comprise a comparatively large number of patents not pertaining to mobile device technology. Instead, certain sub-classes of H04 that are the most relevant to mobile device have been considered. As another example, the sub-classes of G01 pertain to measurements of physical quantities (length, area, thickness, et al). The number of patents pertaining to mobile technology in these sub-classes will be small compared with the number of patents in the sub-class. Owing to the presence of a relatively large number of patents superfluous to the research, these classes were not included in the interest of time, effort, and monetary cost.</li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<ul>
</ul>
<ul>
</ul>
<ul>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited, April 8, 2015</b>: To add -- Procedure for selecting law firms/ patent attorneys for this task, Patent database searching by company name, List of companies</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited April 27, 2015</b>: To update -- <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/mobile-phone-standards.ods" class="external-link">Annexure 2</a>, List of standards and specifications found in sub-USD-100 Internet-enabled mobile phones sold in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited, May 23, 2015</b>: To remove "Scope: Software patents will not be considered" as software patents granted in India have been found.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited, July 25, 2015</b>: To remove steps "Patent database searching by standard" and "patent database searching by keyword" as they would have increased the time and costs needed for the landscaping without adding significant value. Hence, removed the research question, "What degree of standards implemented in the mobile device technology sold within India compared with that in the US is currently covered by patents?"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited, November 7, 2015:</b> To edit – Research question 1. Are there measurable indications of increasing patenting activity in the mobile device industry in India?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">2. What patents are absolutely necessary to keep a networked mobile device which costs less than USD 100 in India running?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">3. What are the existing patent pools for each of the standards identified and what do we know about them?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">4. Question trifurcated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">5. <span>Which of these patent pools could go into an India-based mobile device patent "pool of pools" formed possibly through government intervention and having a royalty level supportable by the domestic Indian mobile device market?</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Research Objective: The set of patents is restricted to those that apply to technologies that are absolutely necessary for the functioning of such a device. <br /><br />To add in “Research Object”: The research object was used to determine “ features commonly found in networked mobile devices sold in India that cost less than USD 100” as described in research question 2.<br /><br />To add sections on Analysis of Results, Confidential Research and Anonymised Interviews, and Literature Survey.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Edited, November 17, 2015: </b>To add section on Limitations.<b> <br /></b></p>
<hr />
<h3>Footnotes:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, Rohini Lakshané, March 15, 2015, http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india, Last accessed November 7, 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Mobile Phone Patents: Prior Art Survey, Nehaa Chaudhari, October 23, 2013, http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/mobile-phone-patents, Last accessed November 7, 2015.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-landscaping-in-the-indian-mobile-device-market'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-landscaping-in-the-indian-mobile-device-market</a>
</p>
No publisherrohiniAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2017-02-15T14:05:38ZBlog EntryUbiquity, Mobility, Globality: Charting Directions in Mobile Phone Studies
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/center-for-global-communication-studies-november-6-2014-ubiquity-mobility-globality-charting-directions-in-mobile-phone-studies
<b>Nehaa Chaudhari made a presentation at the Ubiquity, Mobility, Globality : Charting Directions in Mobile Phone Studies Conference. This was organized by the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia on November 6 and 7, 2014. Nehaa was on a panel titled Mobile and its Effects on Global Markets and made a presentation on Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Workplace.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nehaa Chaudhari's presentation can be <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-a2k-workplace.pdf" class="external-link">downloaded here </a>(PDF, 518 KB). <a class="external-link" href="http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2014/11/Program_final.pdf">Click here</a> for the full programme. Download the <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ubiquity-mobility-globality.pdf/view" class="external-link">agenda here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mobile phones are tools for activism and civic participation, surveillance and repression, market making and market disruption. In Ithiel de Sola Pool’s memorable phrase, there have been few “technologies of freedom” that match the consequences of these new instruments and the infrastructure that supports them. This conference examines dimensions of the social, political, and economic effects of the global ubiquity of mobile phones:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>What are the affordances and limitations of mobile phones in development?</li>
<li>What is the impact of mobile phones on socio-political change?</li>
<li>How do mobile phones continue to shape our civil liberties?</li>
<li>What are the geo-political consequences of these mobilities?</li>
<li>How does mobile phone adoption challenge and support market innovation?</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To tackle these questions, this conference brings together voices from the academy, civil society, and industry—all to examine the heterogeneous sources and consequences of mobility’s diffusion. The goal of this conference is to further interdisciplinary and comparative approaches to the understanding of the mobile phenomenon and to chart directions in mobile phone studies. The conference is funded by the Provost’s Global Engagement Fund, the Center for Global Communication Studies, and the Project for Advanced Research in Global Communication and the program reflects the input of several Schools at Penn, including the Annenberg School for Communication, Wharton, Law, and the School of Arts and Sciences.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/center-for-global-communication-studies-november-6-2014-ubiquity-mobility-globality-charting-directions-in-mobile-phone-studies'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/center-for-global-communication-studies-november-6-2014-ubiquity-mobility-globality-charting-directions-in-mobile-phone-studies</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-12-04T16:27:26ZNews ItemFab to Fabless: Understanding the Process of Chip Manufacturing (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 2)
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-2
<b>This is the second of a four-part blog series highlighting findings from a small sample of interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. These industry insiders was approached for the intent of understanding expert knowledge on the process of integrated circuit design. This post explores the process of chip manufacturing and the foundry business model. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">See <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan" class="external-link">the first blog post here</a>.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Studies have shown that Taiwan's integrated circuit manufacturing sector have shown spatial and industrial knowledge spillover, resulting in "increased information diffusion, interaction and communication, innovation, and intellectual capital.".<a name="_ftnref1"></a> Market research company IC Insights found that Taiwanese and Chinese companies represented five of the eight fastest-growing fabless integrated circuit ("IC") suppliers in 2013.<a name="_ftnref2"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace project is looking at the accessibility of networked communication technologies in the mass market within the sub-100 dollar range. This has resulted in a narrowing of the research scope to the mobile phone due to the pervasiveness of the mobile for accessing Internet, as understood by exploring the trends in technology usage models as explored in Part I of this blog post series: <strong>Trends and Changes in Technology (Part I of IV)</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The need to understand the full story of the mobile phone production led CIS to Taiwan to understand the beginnings of the manufacturing process - the development of an integrated chip. The interviewed professionals all represented fabless IC semiconductor design companies which operated via a foundry business model where the actual fabrication is outsourced.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to one expert whose company earned 50% of its revenue from mobile chipsets alone, the process of the mobile phone manufacturing begins at the fabless design stage, where fabless IC design companies design a chip following consultation with the fabricators to specify the mechanical constraints of the process (the size of the die, the minimum size of the wiring line, etc.) to ensure design requirements are met, and to negotiate the costs of production. Another interviewee highlighted that during this design phase, there are three clear goals: 1) Upgrade performance, 2) Reduce cost by integrating features, and 3) Reduce power consumption.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These particular companies provided insight to some of the commonly licensed technology that went into a smartphone chipset. This included the central processing unit (CPU) from ARM Holdings, who in 2010 held 95% of the CPU marketshare in smartphone technology, <a name="_ftnref3"></a> and have only increased since then. One of the interviewed companies also uses the graphics processing unit (GPU) intellectual property from Imagination Technologies, which after Qualcomm had the 2nd largest market share of IP for personal devices in 2013. Qualcomm who owns the most patents to the 3G standard with over 250 licenses in its CDMA portfolio has made considerable revenue gains thus far, but some analysts predict due to a transition into 4G technology without the same dominant 3G portfolio, they will lose their dominant market position. <a name="_ftnref4"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Having taken into account these IP into the design process, the design is then sent to fabricators such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry (TSMC) who in 2013 owned at least 50% of the world's global maker share in fabrication,<a name="_ftnref5"></a> and others like the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and Global Foundries). According to the interviewee, the fabrication process requires about 2-3 months.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This foundry business model is a result of increased efficiency and division of labour. Fabrication plants require large amounts of investments into manufacturing facilities. According to interviewees, one would have to spend an average of 5-10 billion USD to built a fabrication plant now. Since plants like TSMC exists, semiconductor industries can now focus on their area of expertise, which is design and customer relationship, and optimize their synergistic relationship for gains for all.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the recent revolutionary developments which have contributed to low-cost smartphone manufacturing has been the turnkey solution chipset, which includes the hardware reference design, the printed circuit board, the software, and instructions for how to create a mobile phone. This turnkey solution, amongst other electronic parts, are sent for white box packaging, then shipped to a distributor like WPG Holdings who are the largest electronics distributor in Asia.<a name="_ftnref6"></a> WPG and others will then distribute these chips and other related products to their customers, the smartphone manufacturers. This entire production cue takes about 3-4 months.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The turnkey solution as mentioned before vastly contrasts the traditional manufacturing process of a mobile phone, where a chip could be designed, given to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who would then design all the remaining parts. There used to be a very clear division of labour. Now, one interviewee explained, manufacturers will "buy a turnkey solution, open a factory, take a chassis (case), screw it all together, and sell it. This is what's driven the demand, and that's what created this low cost-market."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><br /> According to our interviewees, the low-cost production of this turnkey chip solution is the reason how so many of the phones in the sub-$100 dollar market exist today.</p>
<div style="text-align: justify; "><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a name="_ftn1"></a> P.127 of Tsai, Diana H. A. “Knowledge Spillovers and High-Technology Clustering: Evidence from Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park.” <i>Contemporary Economic Policy</i> 23.1 (2005): 116–128. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a name="_ftn2"></a> IC Insights. “Taiwanese and Chinese Companies Represented Five of Eight Fastest Growing Top-25 Fabless IC Suppliers in 2013.” <i>IC Insights</i>. N.p., 7 May 2014. Web. 3 Sept. 2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a name="_ftn3"></a> Morgan, Timothy Prickett. “ARM Holdings Eager for PC and Server Expansion.” <i>The Register</i>, Feb. 2011. Web.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a name="_ftn4"></a> Trefis Team. “Why Qualcomm’s Royalty Rate Will Continue To Decline.” <i>Forbes</i>, 10 June 2014. Web.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a name="_ftn5"></a> Wang, Lisa. “TSMC Eyes 50% Global Market Share.” 26 Mar. 2014: 13. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a name="_ftn6"></a></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-2'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-2</a>
</p>
No publishermaggieAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-12-26T12:06:48ZBlog EntryChanging Usage Models: Desktops to Ubiquitous Cloud-Based Mobile Computing (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 1)
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-1
<b>This is the first of a four-part blog series highlighting findings from a small sample of interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. These industry insiders was approached for the intent of understanding expert knowledge on the process of integrated circuit design. However, the conversations resulted in leanings far beyond that scope. This post explores the trends of personal computing technology, which provides the pretext for the narrowing of the Pervasive Technologies project scope to a focus on the mobile phone. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since the mid-1990s, the dissemination of information communications technologies (ICTs) has been hailed as the solution to bridging the digital divide. This rationale led to a multitude of programs, including One Laptop per Child, the Aakash tablet, and most recently, Modi's 'Digital India' campaign, to ensure all Indians have a mobile phone by the year 2019.<a name="_ftnref1"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Pervasive Technologies project looking at Access to Knowledge has come to understand that mobile phone technology have become ubiquitous<a name="_ftnref2"></a>, with 79% of internet users accessing the internet through mobiles in 2014. <a name="_ftnref3"></a> Particularly for low-income consumers, those who do not have access to computing rely on their mobile phones for accessing tools ranging from the common email, text messaging, calling; and the more advanced and revolutionary - mobile banking (e.g. m-PESA), crowd-sourced environmental protection (e.g. SpillMap), and more.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The evolution to the ubiquity of mobile technology was a valuable learning gained from recent interviews in Taiwan with professionals from the fabless semiconductor chip design industry. A senior executive with over 20 years experience in the field provided some insight to trends/changes in personal computing technology upon inquiring about the recent trends and changes within the industry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One significant change that has been occurring is the usage model of consumers. Desktops and even laptops are not fully mobile since they cannot be used in one's hands. As broadband have become more pervasive, smartphones and tablets have resulted in new usage models where computing can be done virtually anywhere. People now tend to vale this more than the desktop experience.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 'cloud' has also changed computing because the performance requirements for PC processors and other technologies no longer have to be as advanced. In addition, there has been a big shift from desktop content creation to mobile computing. This has mostly been catered towards content consumption (e.g. accessing email, viewing photos, using social media, etc.).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a result of changing usage models and cloud competing, there has been a general industry shift away from computers. The PC market has slowed down, and the smartphone and tablet markets have exploded. They are generally cheeper, don't have as many bugs, and are much more convenient. Previously, the big names were desktop providers HP, and Dell; but now <strong>"there's less sex appeal around it… we're not excited by it.. it's the smartphone that's very exciting"</strong>. The tech revolution has brought to light exciting smartphone brands like HTC, Samsung, Google and Apple.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to big name smartphone brands, smaller, low-cost manufacturers like Xiaomi are developing a new business model through service, or application shopping. Prices of smartphones are continuing to decrease, so manufacturers using this model are looking to sell their hardware with smaller margins, and profit mainly through software. According to Digi-Capital, an investment bank for mobile apps and games, by 2017, mobile apps could reach $70 billion in annual revenue.<a name="_ftnref4"></a> Thus, greater affordability for the physical devices are naturally occurring within the market due to changing business models.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Accessibility of mobile phones through decreased costs are also supplemented by the trend of technology becoming much more open in the past 10-20 years. "One of the biggest challenges in the last 10 years is that you've got open source, you've got open hardware…things like the maker movement….", including Arduino, Linux, and others. There is a general market trend of consumers wanting to know more about their products.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, one interviewee believed it was still much too closed, likening today's lack of openness to selling a vacuum cleaner without the user guide explaining how it works. <strong> "It's basically the same as buying a Hoover for home, and you don't get the user manual. How am I supposed to change the bag inside? They're not going to tell you." </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When asked if this demand for more openness will change the industry, he responded: <strong> "There is a demand, there is a lot of demand, but very little supply. There is demand from the outside, and those within the company. We have to convince our departments to be more open. We have to convince the engineers. It's a lot like convincing politicians, there is no immediate reward." </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given these trends, it was of one interviewees' belief that increased accessibility of technology through both decreased cost and increased availability may not necessarily lie in the legal environment or the policy sphere, but rather requires patience for the industry to adapt to a changing marketplace. <a name="_ftnref5"></a> <br /> <br /> Understanding the modes and mediums which information, culture, and ultimately <i>knowledge </i>is accessed is fundamental to the Pervasive Technologies research as an Access to Knowledge issue. Thus, getting a grasp on technological trends, and being able to predict upcoming business models was a very valuable learning.</p>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a name="_ftn1"></a> Guha, Romit, and Anandita Mankotia Mankotia. “PM Modi’s Digital India Project: Government to Ensure That Every Indian Has Smartphone by 2019.” <i>The Economic Times</i> 25 Aug. 2014. Web. 2 Sept. 2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a name="_ftn2"></a> See the research proposal for the Pervasive Technologies project here: http://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a name="_ftn3"></a> “Smartphone Users Worldwide Will Total 1.75 Billion in 2014.” <i>eMarketer</i>. N.p., 16 Jan. 2014. Web. 3 Sept. 2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a name="_ftn4"></a> Takahashi, Dean. “Mobile Apps Could Hit $70B in Revenues by 2017.” <i>VentureBeat</i>. N.p., 29 Apr. 2014. Web. 7 Sept. 2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a name="_ftn5"></a> This will be further explored in the last blog post of this series.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-1</a>
</p>
No publishermaggieAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-12-26T12:08:34ZBlog EntryInterviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii
<b>The following is a second post within a series reporting on interviews conducted with 10 of Bangalore's mobile app developers and other industry stakeholders. Within this research, CIS attempts to understand how they engage with the law within their practice, particularly with respect to IP. Here we examine how these developers responded to a question on legal protection for their works.</b>
<p align="justify">Before one can identify the solution, one must first identify the problem. Yet, in order to understand the problem, we must first understand the individuals involved and the how the problem affects these individuals. We hope that the findings of this preliminary research initiative will provide sufficient groundwork to understand the problems that exist and the different ways of approaching them before determining the most suitable prospective option in changes at the policy level. In this case, the individuals under study are the key contributors to the mobile app space within India; and the problem, being those faced by them as they attempt to navigate an emerging and ambiguous ecosystem.</p>
<p align="justify">Previously, we looked at responses that were given across these mobile app developers interviewed which revealed how they orient notions of intellectual property within their practice and own products, specifically. Findings that were made included deductions that the majority of those interviewed developed mobile app products for clients, and in turn assigned ownership of their products to their clients. Just as well, they commonly shared an interest in leaving the services sector to create products of their own, with some of them already having made the transition within their business model.</p>
<h3><b>Question 2: “How is your IP protected?”</b></h3>
<p align="justify">Next, we asked how they go about protecting their intellectual property to get a feel of who is protecting their apps and who is not. In asking this question, we hoped to learn how they go about protecting their work via legal means. Across their various responses, we observed many patterns and contradictions which are conveyed here with reference to comments made across interviews. It is important to note, however, that no causal relations intend for be argued for, only suggested correlations.</p>
<p><b>How they responded</b></p>
<p align="justify">When asked, those interviewed responded with a variance in answers. Some simply stated that their work is not protected, while a few mentioned that they acquired trademark or intend to apply for trademark protection. One interviewee had a patent pending in India and the US, as well. In many of our conversations, developers mentioned that their code for their apps is under open source licenses, and a couple others entailed sharing that the content is under creative commons licenses, “individual licenses,” or joint copyright. Additionally, within one interview, one mentioned the use of encryption tools as a technical means of protection for their work.</p>
<div class="pullquote" style="text-align: justify; ">“The concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context... it becomes a question of priority between innovation and protection" — Aravind Krishnaswamy, Levitum</div>
<p align="justify">Of the developers interviewed, many exhibited some sort of confusion or misunderstanding related to the protection of their works by means of intellectual property rights (IPR). Those interviewed seemed to either express an interest to acquire IPR in the future for their products in the forms of patent or trademark protection, or expressed their appreciation for openness source licensing—or both! Beneath these immediate responses, however, many repeated patterns, as well as contradictions, are revealed. Conversations that followed within these interviewed entailed the opportunity to hear from personal experiences and opinions on different areas within their practice intersecting IPR.</p>
<p><b>Reasons for IPR protection</b></p>
<p align="justify">If a startup or SME is bootstrapped with very little cash flow to begin with, what would provoke or inspire one to pursue the process of acquiring patent protection then? Aravind Krishnaswamy of startup, <a class="external-link" href="http://levitum.in/">Levitum</a>, considers “the concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context.” So if this is the case, why did so many developers interviewed express an interest in IPR?</p>
<p align="justify">For those who did express interest in acquiring IPR as protection for their mobile app products, most seemed to express an interest in proving ownership over their work, or preventing problems in the future. One developer's commented on how the mobile app market is a “new and potentially volatile area for software development.” For this reason, it was imperative that he and his team attempted to avoid trouble in the future, and ensure that they going about mobile app development the right and moral way.</p>
<p align="justify">Within another interview, developer, John Paul of mobile app SME, Plackal, explains his motives for seeking to acquire patent protection, the application for which is currently pending in India and the US: "For us, applying for a patent is primarily defensive. And if it does get infringed upon, it would give us a good opportunity to generate revenue from it." For the company's trademark, they sought to be able to enforce their ownership over their product's brand: “As a precautionary, we've trademarked the app so that should there be a situation where the app is pirated, we can claim ownership for that app.”</p>
<p><b>Security not so easily attainable</b></p>
<div class="pullquote">“To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase."—John Paul, Plackal</div>
<p align="justify">However, for the startup especially, such protection does not come without a cost. For this reason, IPR is generally perceived as a gamble or tradeoff. It becomes a “question of priority between innovation and protection,” says Krishnaswamy. He continues in saying that, "I feel like even if it’s a great idea if someone else copies it, that’s some level of validation, but as a small company I’d rather be nimble in terms of how we build it up and get it to a certain point. We're trying to move fast and get something going, and then figure it out.” For Krishnaswamy and his team, securing a patent on an area where they feel they feel they have unique work is on their list of things to do, “It's something for us to revisit in the future.”</p>
<p align="justify">Paul explains that he and his team didn't always have IPR within reach: “To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase.” So what discourages startups from acquiring IPR, or simply seeking it out?</p>
<p align="justify">Patent attorney and IP consultant, Arjun Bala explains that “there is a lot to figure out. One aspect is filling it out, the other is how you write it so that it is easily granted and gives you the right sort of patent protection you are looking for. It is a very complex process that requires a lot of technical and legal expertise.” But even if one successfully manoeuvres the IPR system, is protection guaranteed?</p>
<p align="justify">Business Financial Strategist of Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services, Jayant Tewari, illustrates the lack of security for the SME in the patent system, specifically, in saying, “Since a patent becomes public domain on filing, it can be effectively infringed based on the filing, even before it is granted.” Tewari continues in stressing the irrelevance of patents for SMEs due to the difficulty of enforcement: “the infringement will be adjudicated after 2 years at an immense cost to the SME patent-holder, who will go commercially belly-up due to the infringement. The regime does not protect the SME at all.”</p>
<div class="pullquote" style="text-align: justify; ">“It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.” <br />—Samuel Mani, Mani Chengappa & Mathur</div>
<p><b>Nevermind enforcement...</b></p>
<p align="justify">Not only did our interviews shed light on the difficulty for a startup developer to apply for and be granted protection for their intellectual property, but also for the enforcement of such. Partnering Lawyer, Samuel Mani, of technology-focused law firm, <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/www.mcmlaw.in" class="external-link">Mani Chengappa & Mathur</a>, speaks to us about the extensive procedure required to prove one's ownership over their IP: “To demonstrate copyright infringement, it requires going into millions of lines of code—unless it is the interface that is copied, which is easily visible.” Mani continues on the enforcement of patent protection by saying, “For a patent, the scope is even wider. It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.”</p>
<p><b>Planting the initial seed</b></p>
<p align="justify">If there is arguably so much risk associated with applying for IPR protection, as well with enforcement, what specifically gets startups thinking about IPR initially within their practice? What experiences help them formulate their opinions on the matter, and which forms of IPR do they seek out?</p>
<p align="justify">Across interviews conducted, one particular observation entailed the tendency for developers to have worked in the past for corporate employers that have dealt with cases of infringement or have acquired IP protection. Almost half of those interviewed shared the fact that they worked for a corporate employer and became better familiar with different notions of intellectual property through that experience. It may not be too farfetched to suggest, then, that for the developer the idea of acquiring IPR protection is one that may be reinforced from previous employers or other successful development companies with IPR of their own.</p>
<p align="justify">Cofounder and developer for a medium-sized software development enterprise, Anoop[1] explained that it wasn't until after the success of his enterprise's first application with $1 million in sales, that they started thinking about intellectual property and began to understand the value of it. This newly attained understanding, however, had not been enough to sufficiently equip his team with the knowledge to properly secure protection. For them, going after patent protection turned out to be a pursuit in vain.</p>
<p><b>Loss of faith in patents for SMEs</b></p>
<p align="justify">Anoop shares his disappointing experience after attempting to secure a patent for one of their mobile apps:</p>
<p class="callout"><i>“We burned our fingers with patents. We spent a lot of money for a game we invented about 3 years ago. We had a law firm in the US to help us. We applied for it, and it went through 3-4 revisions, costing us $25-30,000. We finally closed the file when we could not get it due to an existing patent. We were really surprised." </i></p>
<p>After much disappointment from not being successful in their attempts to acquire patent protection, however, Anoop came out of the experience with a new outlook on patents and their role for SMEs:</p>
<p class="callout"><i>“They're meant for large companies as means to bully your competitor. Only big players with the capacity to file for a patent as soon as it takes off benefit. The existing system doesn’t really work for startup companies. In India and anywhere. It’s an expensive process. If you’re a startup who’s just bootstrapping, there’s no guarantee that you will get it. It’s going to take you years.”</i></p>
<p align="justify"><b>Patent hype</b><br />Anoop is a prime example of developers in the startup space that fall victim to the promises of the patent system—only to be spat back out having exhausted their time and earnings. Already being aware of the probability for failure, Mani strongly discourages going after patent protection as a means of staying in the race. “With people spending millions on litigation, it is a recipe for disaster, especially considering the inherent delay of the Indian system.” For this reason, Mani stresses the importance of applying for the <i>right </i>protection.</p>
<p align="justify">Mani also suggests that the patent debate is driven by self-interest—people who simply make money off of application filing, regardless of whether or not the case succeeds. As a lawyer in the IT space, Mani claims to have turned away several prospective clients looking to patent their products when he insisted that such means of protection was not suitable for their product and interests...which brings us to an additional area of heated debate: the patentability of mobile apps.</p>
<p><b>Can mobile apps be patented?</b>[2]</p>
<p align="justify">One concept that seemed to receive contested responses across interviews is that of the patentability of mobile apps in the first place. When asked if mobile apps could be patented, former lawyer and startup founder, Vivek Durai, of HumblePaper, put it blatantly in responding, “absolutely not.” Others offered explanations of the Indian Patent Law nuances regarding when a mobile app is patentable and when one is not.</p>
<p align="justify">While consulting a SME with their own patent application, Bala explains their approach to ensure the mobile app's eligibility for patent protection, while providing some insight into the Indian patent system:</p>
<p class="callout"><i>“One approach that we've taken to getting a patent in India is it's not just a pure software, but a software plus a hardware—as in it requires a specific hardware to function. If [the software] makes the hardware perform better, then it has a technical effect... In which case, we have a better chance of getting a patent in India. If your software is agnostic to hardware, however, it is much more difficult to receive a patent in India.” </i></p>
<p align="justify"><b>To patent or not to patent? (or any IPR for that matter)</b><br />To Tewari, on the other hand, the question of whether a mobile app can be patented is one entirely irrelevant. The question Tewari introduces into the developer's market strategy is not 'can I patent my app?' but instead, '<i>should </i>I do so?' In response to which; he would predominantly reply: <i>No</i>.</p>
<p align="justify">“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake,” argues Tewari. Alternatively, he suggests developers learn how to maneuver the laws, to prevent themselves from arriving at any sticky situations after unknowingly using another's code. To his clients who have mobile apps of their own, he advises to use an open source equivalent of a piece of code if they do not have the rights to it. Doing so will help keep infringement upon others at a minimal and prevent litigation against oneself.</p>
<div class="pullquote" style="text-align: justify; ">“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake."—Jayant Tewari, Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services</div>
<p align="justify">Not all developers interviewed, however, aspired to acquiring patent protection. In fact, some strongly opposed software patents, while expressing their appreciation for openness across the developer community. The other side to the IPR-Open Source dichotomy will be examined in the blog post to follow, after which, we will then look at accounts of infringement and threats of litigation across mobile app developers interviewed.</p>
<p><b>To recap<br /></b></p>
<p align="justify">By looking closely at the individual experiences across mobile app developers interviewed, we hope to begin to map out the mobile app ecosystem and the ways in which industry players engage with each other regarding their IPR. We also hope to begin to shed light on the different attitudes towards the law within one's practice, and how they shape their decisions related to their work. Only after doing so, may we be able to sufficiently assess how India's current IP laws govern this landscape.</p>
<p align="justify">Stay tuned for the next in this blog series! We hope that you may benefit from our findings in your own practice as a mobile app industry player or enthusiast, as well.</p>
<p align="justify"><b>Notes:</b><br />[1] <i>Name changed to protect the interviewee's identity</i></p>
<p align="justify">[2] In conducting interviews, our goal was not to test the legitimacy of responses, but instead, to map them out across various industry stakeholders. For this reason, this blog series will not be able to sufficiently respond to legal question, such as whether or not mobile apps are patentable to begin with. We intend to, however, undergo legal analysis of the Indian IPR system at its intersection with the mobile app space in India at a later stage in this project.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii</a>
</p>
No publishersamanthaAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightPervasive TechnologiesResearchPatents2014-08-19T03:51:39ZBlog EntryGrounds for Compulsory Patent Licensing in United States, Canada, China, and India
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/grounds-for-compulsory-patent-licensing-in-us-canada-china-and-india
<b>The research paper seeks to answer questions about the grounds of compulsory licensing in international treaties with specific examples from America and Asia. The grounds for granting compulsory licenses, jurisdictional comparison of compulsory licensing, etc., are examined. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Holding ownership to a patented invention means one has certain exclusive rights: a) the right to decide who may use the invention during the time of protection; b) the right to give licenses to other parties to use the invention on mutually agreed terms; and, c) the right to sell and transfer ownership of the patent to someone else<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a>. Once this patent expires, the invention would enter the public domain to be shared freely<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, given certain conditions, a <i>compulsory license </i>can be granted, in which “authorization [is] given by national authority to a person without or against the consent of the titleholder, for the exploitation of a subject matter protected by a patent or other intellectual property rights” <a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Compulsory licensing has been most contentiously applied for patented pharmaceutical companies who are often looking to recoup research and development costs. Proponents of this instrument are now also growing amongst advocates for climate change mitigation technologies <a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a>. The Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace project is broadly assessing access to knowledge through sub-100 dollar devices. The accessibility of these critical technologies, and subsequent access to knowledge, information, and culture through these devices may be implicated by this policy lever<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a></p>
<p>Thus, this paper seeks to answer the following questions:</p>
<ol>
<li> What are the grounds for compulsory licensing set in international treaties?</li>
<li>How does Canada, United States (i.e. North America), India, and China (i.e. Asia) provide for compulsory licensing within its national laws? </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This will be done through first providing an overview of the relevant international treaties to understand the compulsory licensing framework which signatory nations must follow. Then, utilizing Correa (1999)'s study as a foundation, an analysis of the text within the four aforementioned's codified laws will be assessed to understand all the possible grounds compulsory licensing can be provided. This paper will conclude by summarizing any significant distinctions across the four jurisdictions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Compulsory Patent Licensing in International Law and Regional Trade Agreements</b><br /><span>Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883)</span> <a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a><br />Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention provides each country with the right to "grant compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result form the exercise of exclusive rights conferred by the patent… " United States, Canada, China, and India are four of the 175 contracting parties to this convention <a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a>. This can only be done after 4 years of applying for the patent, or 3 years from the date in which the patent was granted. This means, a sufficient amount of time must have elapsed to allow the rights holder to exploit the invention.</p>
<p><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>North American Free Trade Agreement (1994)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><span>[8]</span></a></span><br />Article 1704 in NAFTA provides that "appropriate measures" can be taken to control abusive or anticompetitive practices. The United States and Canada have utilized this ground of anti-competition to grant numerous compulsory licenses. <br /> <br /> Article 1709 notes that there must not be a discrimination of technology – patents may only be revoked when the grant has not remedied lack of exploitation, and that the use of the patent adheres to certain criteria.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 1993, Canada repealed the compulsory licensing regulations from its Patent Law to comply with the international TRIPS and NAFTA treaties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994)</span> <a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a><br />All members of the World Trade Organization is provided the right to use compulsory licenses via Article 31 <i>Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder </i>within the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement<i>. </i> This Article stipulates 12 procedural provisions: compulsory licensing should be granted on 'individual merits'<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a>, must have shown prior effort to obtain authorization under reasonable commercial terms <a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a>, must be non-exclusive<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a>, adequate renumeration must be provided<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a>, and the license must be terminated as soon as the circumstances for which it was granted cease to exist<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Suggested, but not obligatory grounds for which compulsory licensing could be granted under the TRIPs agreement are a) emergency and extreme urgency, b) anticompetitive practices, c) public non-commercial use, and the d) use of dependent patents<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001)</span><br />The Doha Declaration is a clarification of the earlier TRIPS agreement in response to some countries' public health concerns due to obstacles to accessing patented medicines.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration expressly allows Members to take measures to protect public health, while paragraph 5b states that "each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted". Freedom of each country to define the terms of their intellectual property rights is also further reiterated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Grounds for granting compulsory licenses</b><br />Correa (1999) in his paper <i>Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory License: Options for Developing Countries</i> outlines eight common grounds which provided the framework for this comparative analysis between the jurisdictions of the United States, Canada, India, and China. Through analyzing the codified law on compulsory licensing, a few other grounds were added to the list.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Refusal to deal</span><br />In principle, the patent owner has an exclusive right to determine whether or not to issue a license to a third party. However, if under reasonable terms, one still refuses to issue a license, national courts may interpret this as an abuse of patent rights, resulting in lack of availability of the product and commercial development. In the United States, this is often raised as an anticompetitive issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Non-working and inadequate supply</span><br />The "working obligation" was initially understood as the industrial use of an invention, which according to Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement required working 'predominantly' for local markets. However, many countries have defined 'working' to include <b>commercial use </b>of the invention, in which importation of a product would suffice<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Public interest</span><br />The public interest needs to be balanced with individuals' rights, and it is the responsibility of the courts or administration in each respective country to determine this. Thus, what actually constitutes as "public interest" varies depending on time and jurisdiction. For example, countries with limited industrial development could consider a compulsory patent to develop its national industries as for public interest <a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a>. Accessibility of a product at the lowest price have been argued to be in public interest, but some courts have ruled this to be invalid<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Anticompetitive practices</span><br />A patent is essentially a temporary monopoly meant to provide an economic reward for the inventor's work, as well as additional incentive to continue producing<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a>. However, excessive monopolization through unlawful or unfair practices, such as when a patent is overly broad, acquiring and accumulating patent portfolios, and subsequent patent trolling are some acts that be considered anticompetitive patent practices<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a>. Compulsory licenses have also been granted through this ground under anti-monopoly, antitrust, and competition laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Governmental use</span><br />Each country's government decides what is to be considered as governmental use. Occasionally synonymous to government use has also been <i>public, non-commercial use</i>, or as suggested by the TRIPs agreement, for the purposes of national emergency or urgency. This is assuming the government is acting on behalf of public interest; given its lack of an international standardized definition, this ground can be utilized and interpreted in other ways.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Facilitate use of dependent patents</span><br />When a new invention (dependent invention) cannot be developed without infringing on the license of an existing patented invention, (principle invention) a compulsory licensing can be granted to facilitate innovation. This ensures the patents of principle inventions would not block technical progress. The TRIPs agreement expressly allows this, provided reasonable compensation is articulated. In some jurisdictions, cross-licensing, (which involves a licensing agreement between two parties to exploit each other's intellectual property<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a>) can be negotiated to resolve this issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Compulsory licenses for medicines</span><br />Numerous countries have issued licenses for increased accessibility to food and medicine. Prior to the Doha Round, TRIPs prohibited this, as Article 27 states "national laws cannot discriminate in exercise of patent rights on the basis of field of technology". However, the Doha Declaration addressed this, allowing pharmaceuticals to have increased accessibility (via pricing, production, and importation) for the sake of public health.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Exclusive Grant Back or Coercive Package Licensing</span><br />A grant back can be agreed upon when there is an expectation of an improvement on the licensed technology through increased superiority or method <a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>. This allows the licensee to commercialize an improved product without having to file for another patent<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a>. Exclusive grant back provides the licensor the exclusive right to use or sublicense improvements, while licensee retains non-exclusive right to practice the improvements.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> Grant-backs, particularly exclusive ones are sometimes deemed as anticompetitive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A package license, otherwise known as patent pools is used when the licensing of more than one patent is necessary to commercialize an invention <a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a> Coercive package licensing can occur when the licensing of other patents within the package is forceful and unnecessary. The defining and interpretation of 'coercion' ultimately depends on each country's respective authorities. <span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Hindrance from Importation of Abroad<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><span>[27]</span></a></span><br />This ground may fall under non-working, but is unique in that it notes a state's ability to grant compulsory license on behalf of a foreign-owned patent. Yang (2012) cites that this as one of the most controversial aspects of compulsory patent licensing, as countries may feel undermined when another state can grant compulsory licenses that are against their own interests<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Jurisdictional comparison of Compulsory Licensing</b><br />The following table was developed as an exercise to review compulsory licensing within the jurisdictions of the United States, Canada, India, and China. Utilizing Correa (1999)'s findings as a skeletal framework, the four aforementioned countries' codified patent laws were used to determine the grounds for compulsory licensing. The main compairson was done through analyzing the specific text within the laws of the four jurisdiction – one approach to treaty and law interpretation<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a> However, for those countries that were lacking general provisions on compulsory licensing (i.e. United States, and eventually Canada in 1993<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a>), there was a need to expand to a more comprehensive approach and look through other codified laws beyond patents and intellectual property, as well as through case law to see if the mentioned grounds have been used to provide for compulsory licenses<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a>.</p>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<p><b>Grounds</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>Countries</b></p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p><b>Law</b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="4">
<p>Refusal to deal and/or abuses of patentees' exclusive rights</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">n/a in codified law…refusal to deal is an essential element of intellectual property rights…but can lead to anti-competition in which Antitrust laws can be used</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law - Abuse of Rights 65.2(d): <i>"<b>if by reason of refusal of patentee to grant</b> a license or licenses on reasonable terms…</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 S.4(d) <b><i>"Refusal to deal"</i></b> <i> includes any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or from whom goods are bought </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(a) " <i> If by reason of refusal…ii) demand for the patented article <b>has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms</b>; or iii) </i> <i> a market for the patented article manufactured in India is n<b>ot being supplied or developed</b>; or iv) the establishment or <b>development of commercial activities in India is not prejudiced</b> </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 S.84 (6) " <i> …Controller shall take into account, - i) nature of invention, the time which has elapsed since the sealing of the patent and the measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee to make full use of the invention; iv) ..whether applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms conditions, and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period <b>*period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months*</b> as the Controller may deem fit </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law of the People's Republic of China - Article 48 (1): " <i> When it has been 3 years since the date the patent right is granted, and four years since the date the patent application is submitted, the patentee, <b>without legitimate reasons,</b> fails to have the patent exploited or fully exploited" </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="4">
<p>Non-working and inadequate supply</p>
<p><b> </b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S.</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p>n/a</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1935: s.65 a): "… <i> is <b>capable of being worked within Canada</b> <b>but is not being worked within Canada on a commercial scale</b>, and no satisfactory reason can be given for that <b>non-working</b>…" </i></p>
<p><b>REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS </b></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patents Act, 1970 S. 84 (1): " <i> At any time after expiration of 3 years from the date of the grant of a patent, any person interested may make an application… b)…not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or c) that the patented invention is <b>not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price</b> </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 S.84(2): "…<i>reasonable requirements of the public</i>.. <i>not satisfied or that the patented invention <b>is not worked in the territory of India</b>, </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i> Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(a) "If by reason of refusal…ii) demand for the patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms; or iii) a market for the patented article manufactured in India is <b>not being supplied or developed</b>; or iv) the <b>establishment or development of commercial activities in India is not prejudiced</b> </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 S. 84.7(d): " <i> If the patented invention is <b> not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent, or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable </b> </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Measures for Compulsory licensing of Patent Implementation (2012) - Ch 2 Art. 5: <i> "<b>If without good reason not implemented or fully implemented</b>, their licensing patent within 3 years from the date of grant of patent right..and 4 years from the date of filing patent" </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<p>Public interest:</p>
<p><b> </b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S.</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"...no general provision allowing authorities to override patents in the larger public interest” <a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 - allow government to exercise "march in" rights with regard to government funded research results that universities might otherwise patent</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But US has granted compulsory licenses when felt public interest was at stake (Atomic Energy Act and Clean Air Act 1970, Federal Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act 1973)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law - Abuse of Rights 65.2(d): <i> "if by reason of refusal of patentee to grant a license or licenses on reasonable terms… <b>in public interest that license/licenses should be granted</b>" </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
<p>Patent Act S. 39. (3) License under patent relating to food: " <i> I<b>n the case of any patent…of food</b>…shall grant to any person applying…Commissioner shall have regard to the desirability of <b>making the food available to the public</b> at the lowest possible price consistent with giving to the inventor due reward for the research leading to the invention" <br /> </i> <b>REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS</b></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970, S. 84<i> (2)…<b>not available to the public </b>at a reasonably affordable price</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 S. 84 (6) " <i> …Controller shall take into account, ii) the ability of the applicant to work the invention<b> to the public advantage </b> </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 - S. 92 Special provision for compulsory licenses on notifications by Central Government-(1): " <i> If Central Government is satisfied… <b>circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of extreme urgency, or in case of public non commercial use</b>... </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law - Article 49: " <i>Where a <b>national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs occurs, or public interests so require…"</b></i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation - Article 6: <i>If <b>emergency or irregular event of the state</b>…<b>or for purposes of public interest</b></i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2">
<p>Anti-competitive practices</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S.</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Antitrust & Trade Law: Sherman Act 15 U.S. C.S. 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty: " <i> Every person who shall monopolize, or <b>a</b>t<b>tempt to monopolize…any part of trade or commerce </b>among several States, or with foreign nations…<b>deemed guilty of a felony, and conviction</b>.." </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Competition Act (S. 32 RSC 1985): " <i> …where use has been made of exclusive rights and privileges conferred by one or more patents for invention…(a) <b> limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying</b>…may be a subject of trade or commerce, (b) <b>restrain or injure, unduly, trade or commerce</b>…(c) <b>prevent, limit, or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production</b>…or <b>unreasonably enhance the price</b> thereof, or (d) <b>prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in</b>… </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India Patent Law Chapter 90 (1.ix) <i> Terms and Conditions of compulsory licenses… granted to <b>remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive</b>… </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation, 2012 - Article 11: " <i>…that actions of patent holder in exercising patent right…deemed to be <b>monopolistic actions"</b></i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law of the People's Republic of China - Article 48 (2): " <i> …patentee's exercise of the patent right is in accordance with law, confirmed as <b>monopoly and its negative impact on competition needs to be eliminated or reduced"</b> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="3">
<p>Governmental use</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>United States</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">28 United States Code 1498: " <i> …<b>when used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner</b>…remedy shall be..Claims for recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture…" ie. </i> Government does not have to seek license or negotiate for use, and the only appeal for patent owner is compensation <i> </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under the 1993 and 1994 amendments to the Patent Act of 1985, section 19.1: <i> "the Commissioner may, <b> on application by the Government of Canada or the government of a province, authorize the use of a patented invention by that government </b> ." </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 - S.<i> </i>100 Power of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government (1): <i> "…at any time…the Central Government and any person authorized in writing… <b>may use the invention for the purposes of Government</b> in accordance with provisions of this chapter" </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 S. 100 Power of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government (2): " <i> Where an invention has, before priority date of relevant claim, been duly recorded in a document, or tested or tried, by or on behalf of the Government or Government undertaking… <b> any use of the invention by the Central Government or any person authorized in writing by it for the purposes of Government may be made free of any royalty or other renumeration to the patentee </b> " </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 S. 100 P<b>ower of Central Government to use inventions for purposes of Government</b> (6): " <i> The right to make, use, exercise, and vend an invention for<b> the purposes of Government </b>under sub-section (1) shall include the right to sell on noncommercial basis, and person c <b>laiming through..as if Central Government or authorized were the patentee of the invention </b> </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law of PRC Art. 14: <i> "If an invention<b> patent of a State-owned enterprise or institution is o</b>f <b>great significance to national or public interests</b>, upon approval by State Council.. </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law PRC Article 49: " <i> Where a <b>national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs occurs…</b>patent administration department <b>under the State council may grant a compulsory license</b> for exploitation of an inanition patent or utility model patent" </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law PRC Article 14: “ <i> If an invention patent of a State-owned enterprise or institution is o <b>f great significance to national or public interests, upon approval by the State Council, </b>the relevant competent department under the State Council ...<b>may decide to have the patent widely applied within an approved scope </b>and allow the designated units to exploit the patent, and the <b>said units shall pay royalties to the patentee in accordance with the regulations of the State.</b> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="4">
<p>Facilitate use of dependent patents</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>United States</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p>N/A - U.S. Does has not formally codified a general provision for Compulsory licensing of Dependent Patents <a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p>N/A</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 - Section 88 Power of Controller in Granting Compulsory licenses (3): <i> …if Controller satisfied that the applicant cannot efficiently or satisfactorily work the license granted to him <b> under those patents without infringing the other patents held by the patentee, and if those patents involve important technical advancement of considerable economic significance </b> …may direct grant of a license… </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law - Ch 6 Art 51: " <i> If an invention/utility model…<b>represents major technological advancement of remarkable economic significance</b>, compared with an earlier invention or utility model for which the patent right has already been obtained, and <b> exploitation of former relies on exploitation of latter</b>…may grant it a compulsory license to exploit..." </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2">
<p>Compulsory licenses for medicines</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>United States</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p>N/A but has threatened Bayer for compulsory licensing of Ciproflaxin medicine who subsequently dropped their prices drastically <a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34">[34]</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bill C-9 Amendment to Food and Drugs Act, 2004: "…pharmaceutical products intended for export in accordance with that WTO General Council decision…to comply with…sold on domestic market"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act (4) License under patent relating to medicine - " <i>..intended or capable of being <b>used for the preparation of production of medicine</b>…Commissioner shall grant..</i></p>
<p><b>REPEALED in 1993 due to NAFTA and TRIPS</b></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act 1970 Section 92.A Compulsory license for export of patent pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances: " <i> …shall be <b> available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products <a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><b>[35]</b></a> </b> to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health problems…" </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 Section 83.(d): <i> "General principles applicable to working of patented inventions… <b>do not impede protection of public health and nutrition… </b> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Law of PRC: Article 50: " <i> For the benefit of <b>public health…</b>grant compulsory license for <b>manufacture of the drug, </b>for which a patent right has been obtained, and for its <b>export to the countries or regions that conform to the provisions…" </b> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation, 2012 - Ch 2 Art 7: " <i> For <b>purposes of public health</b>…able to implement petition for compulsory licensing…for <b>manufacture of patented medicines..and expor</b>t of, to following countries/regions: </i></p>
<p><i>1) The most underdeveloped countries/regions; </i></p>
<p><i>2) Developed/developing members of the WTO </i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="4">
<p>Exclusive grant-back and Coercive package licensing<span> </span></p>
<p><span> </span></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S.</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Legal in the past – granted in Transparent Wrap Machine Corp v Stokes & Smith Co. but discouraged... interpreted by Rule of Reason doctrine which is an interpretation of Sherman Antitrust (Anti-competition) Act<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36">[36]</a></p>
<p>Now Department Of Justice from 2007 has said must be non-exclusive under its Antitrust laws <a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37">[37]</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p>N/A</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 Section 84 (7.c): <i> …Reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied <a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><b>[38]</b></a> - c) if the patentee imposes a condition upon the grant of license under the patent to provide <b>exclusive grant back</b>, prevention to challenges to validity of patent, or <b>coercive package licensing </b> </i></p>
<p><b><i> </i></b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p><i> </i></p>
<p><i>N/A</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" rowspan="3">
<p>Hindered by importation from abroad</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>U.S.</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p><i> </i></p>
<p><i>N/A</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Canada</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p><i> </i></p>
<p><i>N/A</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>India</p>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent Act, 1970 Section 84 (7.e): " <i> if the working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale is <b>being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented article by</b>…i) patentee..ii) persons purchasing…iii) other persons not taking proceedings for infringement </i></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>China</p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p><i> </i></p>
<p><i>N/A</i></p>
<p><i> </i></p>
</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><br /></td>
<td><br /></td>
<td><br /></td>
<td><br /></td>
<td><br /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Summary of Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison</b><br />As mentioned previously, this comparison necessitated an expansion into codified law outside of compulsory licensing and patent law into case law, since the United States had never written a general provision for compulsory licensing, and Canada had repealed theirs in 1993 upon the signing of the NAFTA and TRIPS agreement. For Canada, compulsory licenses (CLs) continued to be granted following the repeal through the Foods and Drugs Act, as well as the Competition Act. Despite United States' lack of general provisions, Knowledge Ecology International claims it is the world's leader in the use of CLs, yet hypocritical to developing countries' requests for affordable patented pharmaceuticals.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39">[39]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In general, India and China both have very extensive compulsory licensing laws. China's State Intellectual Property Office even developed additional Measures to account for the execution of compulsory licensing. Despite comprehensive CL provisions, India has had only one compulsory license ever granted in the case of Natco Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Corporation, for the domestic production of cancer-drug Nexavar. <a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40">[40]</a> China has yet to grant any compulsory license, but the new Measures may signify an increasing willingness to do so, or even to be used as a bargaining tool. However, given its goal of developing domestic intellectual property (i.e. China's 5-year plan), it is unlikely that China will grant compulsory licenses in the masses.<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41">[41]</a> <br /> <br /> In regards to the specific grounds themselves, some grounds noted particular differences per country.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, <b>refusal to deal</b> is actually is considered a right, thus does not provide for compulsory licensing; depending on the degree however, it could lead to anti-competition<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42">[42]</a>. According to the Paris Convention, one can only request consideration for a CLs 3 years from the granting of a patent, or 4 years from application, allowing said time for provision of dealing. However, India seems to have a more stringent period of not exceeding a period of six months, while China noted specifically not 'without legitimate reasons'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <b>non-working and inadequate supply </b>was again not present in U.S. Law, yet Canada did include it in its former compulsory licensing provision prior to repeal. Canada had defined 'working' specifically referring to a commercial scale when compulsory licensing was in effect. India's 'working' means being available at a reasonably affordable price, and supplied or developed, through the establishment of commercial activities, worked to the fullest extent that is fully practicable, while China mentioned non-working 'if without good reason, it is not implemented or fully implemented'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The United States does not have any provision providing explicitly for <b>public interest. </b>However, under the Bayh-Dole Act, government-funding for research during the economic crisis in the 1970s was granted as long as the inventors agreed to allow petition for 'march-in rights', in which the government or a third party “shall have the right...to require the contractor...to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license” (35 U.S. Code S203(a)) if it meets one of four requirements - one being to “...alleviate health and safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied...” (35 U.S. Code Section 203). Canada's public interest clause had existed, but was repealed. India now states that CLs can be granted to make available to the public “at a reasonably affordable price, to public advantage, and for public non-commercial use”. In China, public interest is provided in conditions of 'national emergency or extraordinary state of affairs, for the purpose of public interest'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The United States does however strongly uphold and value competition, and have granted CLs to remedy <b>anticompetitive practices </b>under its Antitrust laws, prohibiting any 'attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce'. China also uses the language of 'monopolistic actions' and allows compulsory licensing if its “negative impact on competition needs to be eliminated or reduced.” Canada's Competition Act allows for compulsory licensing if one 'limits unduly, the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing... restrain or injure unduly, trade or commercial etc..' .preventing fair competition. India also notes the remedying of anticompetitive acts in its patent laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Governmental use </b> in the United States have been granted for use by the Department of Defense and as mentioned previously for the Bayh-Dole Act. However, unlike the other countries of focus, there is no way to appeal a CL for the purposes of government-use. The only way to remedy this as a patent owner is compensation. In Canada, the Commissioner may on application by the Government of Canada or province authorize a CL. Indian patent law also allows CLs for the purposes of the Government, with the explicit possibility of being made free of any royalty or renumeration. It also expressly notes within S103 that one can petition to the Government if this occurs. The Chinese Patent Law notes governmental use through the language of 'great significance to national or public interests', and 'national emergency or extraordinary state of affairs. The possibility of appeal is also expressly noted in Article 58.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Neither United States or Canada have formally codified any mention of compulsory licensing for the use of <b>dependent patents</b>, though it does exist in the TRIPs agreement they both comply to. In India patent law, CLs is granted through this ground “only if it involves important technical advancement of considerable economic significance, and... only if it cannot be accomplished without infringing other patents.” In China, the law states that if an “invention/utility model represents major technological advancement...compared with earlier invention or utility model...and the exploitation of former relies on exploitation of the latter...”, a compulsory license may be granted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Compulsory licensing for medicine </b> in the United States again have never been codified, but have been used to encourage Bayer to reduce their prices under the possibility of being issued compulsory liceninsg. Home to many of the pharmaceutical industries who own patents to medicines, the United States has been called hypocritical due to its common lack of providing affordable pharmaceuticals. Canada allows for CLs under the Food and Drugs Act which points to the World Trade Organization guidelines. Prior to the repeal of its compulsory licensing act, Canada also had specific provisions relating to medicines, and was actually the first country to authorize the compulsory licensing of an AIDS drug for Rwanda for export.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43">[43]</a> In India, the only compulsory license that has ever been granted was for cancer drug Nexavar. In its compulsory licensing provision, it states that CLs are “available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products...to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing” abilities. Similar to the TRIPs agreement, it also states that none of the principles should impede the protection of public health and nutrition. China's patent laws state that CLs can be used for the benefit of public health. The Measures for Implementation specifies more specifically which countries and regions are allowed, which includes WTO members, or the 'underdeveloped' nations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Only in the Indian Patent Law does it explicitly allow for CL in the event of <b>exclusive grant backs </b>due to anti-competition and/or not being reasonable to the public<b>. </b>On the contrary, the United States actually had allowed exclusive grant back in the Transparent Wrap Machine Corp v Stokes & Smith Co. case<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44">[44]</a>. However, the FTC now strongly recommends against it as it is considered anticompetitive when a grant-back is exclusive<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45">[45]</a>. Canada and China does not seem to have this condition in their laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similarly, only in the Indian patent law does <b>coercive package licensing </b>provide for compulsory licensing. This clause may have implications on standard-essential patent pools when attempting to determine which patents are indeed 'essential', and if they comply with fair, reasonable, and non discriminatory regulations<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46">[46]</a>. <br /> <br /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Indian Patent Law also expressly allows for compulsory licensing on the ground that a product is <b>hindered by importation from abroad</b>. It must be proven the lack of accessibility is soley due to the process of it being imported, perhaps affected by natural disasters, socioeconomic reasons, political instability, sanctions, or more – ultimately affecting the cost and availability of this product. <a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47">[47]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Conclusion and Further Reflections on Compulsory Licensing</b><br />Ultimately, there seems to be no correlation between the detail and scope of compulsory licensing (and other codified) law, and the number of compulsory licenses granted. However, it must be noted that the Eastern countries of focus in this review have had much less time developing its intellectual property landscape. In addition, the comprehensiveness of India and China's patent laws also reflect the incorporation of valuable lessons learned from poor implementation of other countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The prevalence of broadly defined patents, patent trolling, and the increasing need to navigate patent thickets all act as barriers to innovation and production to a commercial scale in which these technologies can actually be disseminated. The Pervasive Technologies project looks ultimately at bridging the digital divide through providing access to low-cost technology, and subsequently access to information, culture, and knowledge.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Compulsory licenses can be used to decrease the cost burden of production, and reduce barriers to innovation, ultimately providing greater accessibility to these tools for all of society. The Centre for Internet and Society has proposed and continues to advocate the establishment of patent pools for low-access devices through the use of compulsory licenses to achieve this goal<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48">[48]</a>.</p>
<div>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
<div id="ftn1">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> WIPO. <i>What Is Intellectual Property</i>. World Intellectual Property Organization, 2012. Print. 5</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> WIPO, 6</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Correa, Carlos M. “Intellectual Property Rights and the.” <i>Trade Related Agenda Development and Equity</i> (1999): 3</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Contreras, Jorge L., and Charles R. McManis. “Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access to Critical Technologies?” <i> TRIPS and Developing Countries – Towards a New World Order? (Gustavo Ghidini, Rudolph J.R. Peritz & Marco Ricolfi, eds., 2014 (Edward Elgar)) </i> (2014): 112 Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Abraham, Sunil. Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses. 27 June 2013. Accessed: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices"> http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> The Paris Convention is an intellectual property treaty covering industrial property: patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models, service marks, trade names, and geographical indicators. <br /> <br /> WIPO. “Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883).” <i>World Intellectual Property Organization</i>. Website. <a href="http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html">http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> WIPO. “WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties.” <i>World Intellectual Property Organization</i>. Website. <a href="http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2">http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the largest free trade agreement in the world, with members Canada, United States, and Mexico. <br /> USTR. “North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).” <i>Office of the United States Representative</i>. Website. <a href="http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta"> http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RIghts (TRIPS) agreement is a treaty which provides basic intellectual property provisions for international law, and stipulates that members shall be free to determine methods of implementing the provisions, in addition to enact more specific measures provided it coincides with the rest of the agreement. <br /> World Trade Organization. “Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods.”<i>WTO Legal Texts - A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round</i>. Website. <a href="http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement">http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> TRIPS - Article 31.a)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> TRIPS - Article 31.b)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> TRIPS - Article 31.b)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> TRIPS – Article 31.h)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> TRIPS – Article 31.c)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> TRIPS – Article 31</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> fWHO. “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.” <i>World Health Organization</i>. <a href="http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/">http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> Correa, 11-12.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Fauver, Cole M. “Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come.” <i>Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business</i> 8.3 (1988): 666–685. Print. p671</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Correa, 13</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Ferrell, John. <i>Patent Pro Se: The Entrepreneur’s Guide to Provisional Patent Applications</i>. BayWater Publishing, 2010. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> Milchenko, Oleg. “Contemporary Anti-Competetive Practices of Patents Usage.” <i>Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology</i> 8.3 (2013): 1-13. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Shapiro, Carl. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licneses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting.” <i>Innovation Policy and the Economy</i> 1 (2001): 119–150. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> McGurk, Thomas B. “The Grant-Back Clause in Your Technology License.” <i>Biodiesel Magazine</i> 17 Jan. 2013.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Origin IP Academy. “Exclusive Grant Back License.” <i>Origiin IP Academy</i> 15 Nov. 2009. Blog. Accessed: <a href="http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/exclusive-grant-back-license.html"> http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/exclusive-grant-back-license.html </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Dykeman, David J. “When Licensing out Patents, Make Sure Improvements Are Granted Back.” <i>Boston Business Journal</i> 8 Mar. 2006. Blog retrieved from: <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2006/03/when-licensing-out-patents-make-sure.html?page=all"> http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2006/03/when-licensing-out-patents-make-sure.html?page=all </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> Origiin IP Academy. “Coercive Package Licensing.” <i>Origiin IP Academy</i> 11 Nov. 2009. Accessed: <a href="http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/coercive-package-licensing.html"> http://origiinipae.blogspot.in/2009/11/coercive-package-licensing.html </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Reddy, Prashant. “‘Working’ a Patent under the Indian Patent Act, 970 - Does Importation of a Patented Invention Count?” <i>Spicy IP - Decoding Indian Intellectual Property Law</i>. 22 Apr. 2010. Retrieved: <a href="http://spicyip.com/2010/04/working-patent-under-indian-patent-act.html"> http://spicyip.com/2010/04/working-patent-under-indian-patent-act.html </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Yang, Deli. “Compulsory Licesning: For Better or for Worse, the Done Deal Lies in the Balance.” <i>Journal of Intellectual Property Rights</i> 17 (2012): 76–81; p80 Print. Global IP Debates</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Shaw, Malcom N. <i>International Law 7th Edition</i>. 5th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> Canada had repealed its section on Compulsory Licensing in order to comply with the TRIPS and NAFTA agreements</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> A more comprehensive approach could be to assess broadly ALL the compulsory licensing cases rather than just a select few ….particularly for United States and Canada...</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> <a href="http://www.aals.org/documents/2006intprop/JeromeReichmanOutline.pdf"> http://www.aals.org/documents/2006intprop/JeromeReichmanOutline.pdf </a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Reichman, Jerome. “Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing United States Law and Practice with Options under the TRIPS Agreement.” Vancouver, Canada: Duke University School of Law, 2006.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn34">
<p><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34">[34]</a> Reichman, Jerome H. “Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options.” <i>The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics</i> 37.2 (2009): 247–263. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn35">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35">[35]</a> Pharmaceutical products' means any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use"</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn36">
<p><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36">[36]</a> Dratler, Jay. <i>Licensing of Intellectual Property</i>. New York: Law Journal Press, 2005: 7.89 Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn37">
<p><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37">[37]</a> Miller, Mark E., and David S. Almeling. “DOJ, FTC Redefine Antitrust Rules on Patent Pools.” <i>National Law Journal</i>. 29 Oct. 2007.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn38">
<p><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38">[38]</a> Therefore compulsory licensing can be granted given Controller agrees</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn39">
<p><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39">[39]</a> Raja, Kanaga. “US Leads the World in Use of Compulsory Licenses, Says KEI.” <i>Third World Network</i>. N.p., 18 Mar. 2014.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn40">
<p><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40">[40]</a> Bakhru, Rachna. “India Grants First Compulsory Licence under Patents Act.” <i>Intellectual Property Magazine</i> June 2012: 46–47. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn41">
<p><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41">[41]</a> Miller Canfield. “China Allows Compulsory Licensing.” <i>Law FIrm of Miller Canfield</i>. Dec. 2012. Retreived: http://www.millercanfield.com/resources-321.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn42">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42">[42]</a> Genevaz, Simon. “Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusal to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distingusih between IP and Other Property Rights.” <i>Berkeley Technology Law Journal</i> 19.2 (2014): 742–784. Print.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn43">
<p><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43">[43]</a> World Trade Organization. “Canada Is First to Notify Compulsory License to Export Generic Drug.” <i>WTO | 2007 News Items</i>. N.p., 4 Oct. 2007.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn44">
<p><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44">[44]</a> sSchmalbeck, Richard L. “The Validity of Grant-Back Clauses in Patent Licensing Agreements.” <i>University of Chicago Law Review</i> 42 (1975): 733–748.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn45">
<p><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45">[45]</a> Miller & Ameling, 2007: 3</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn46">
<p><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46">[46]</a> Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. “Standard-Essential Patents.” <i>Working Paper</i> 43.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn47">
<p><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47">[47]</a> Reddy, 2010</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn48">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48">[48]</a> See Executive Director of CIS' letter to the government here: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices"> http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices </a></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/grounds-for-compulsory-patent-licensing-in-us-canada-china-and-india'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/grounds-for-compulsory-patent-licensing-in-us-canada-china-and-india</a>
</p>
No publishermaggieFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-07-29T08:45:25ZBlog EntryPatent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools
<b>The focus of this research paper is on an extremely limited though important aspect of patent pools — that of patent valuation and license fee determination. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of patent valuation and license fee determination as it exists independently is modified when it is applied in context of patent pools. </b>
<h2 class="WordSection1">I. Introduction</h2>
<p class="WordSection1" style="text-align: justify; ">A patent pool is essentially “An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or third parties. Pools usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees and allocate a portion of the licensing fees (royalties) to patent owners according to a pre-set formula or procedure.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">A patent pool particularly faces intense scrutiny by way of competition/ antitrust law and each step of structuring of a patent pool has to be done keeping the prevalent norms of antitrust law in context. This article merely brushes with the antitrust aspect, as a discussion on that topic is beyond the scope of this particular article. However, suffice is to say that like other aspects of structuring of a patent pool, patent valuation and licensing fee determination is also subject to antitrust law concerns.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Part II of this research paper is a discussion as regards factors which determine patent value in context of a patent pool. Similarly, Part III is a discussion as regards factors that determine license fee in context of a patent pool. Thereafter, Part IV discusses the methods which are applied for patent valuation and license fee determination. A number of these methods are independent evaluation methods and hence their dynamics when applied in context of patent pools may need to be altered in light of the discussion in Parts II and III. Part V discusses certain aspects of actual patent pools in the technological field to better understand the principles which have been discussed in Parts II-IV. Finally, Part VI concludes this research paper.</p>
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">II. Determination of Patent Value in a Patent Pool</h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">One of the prominent pillars of a patent pool is an appropriate patent valuation process. Patent valuation is a difficult and subjective task.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[2]</span></span></span></a> Moreover, the result of a patent valuation independently outside of a pool might be quite different from when it is part of a pool transaction. A “pool regularizes the valuation of individual patents - making, as the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘a division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims’”.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[3]</span></span></span></a> However, this value attribution process is not an arbitrary one but incredibly dynamic, and constantly evolving. This difficulty is furthered by the fact that the term “patent value” itself is subject to interpretation. Patent value essentially comprises of the economic benefit that the patent can bestow.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[4]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">A number of factors as discuss hereinafter determine the value of a patent. It is not necessary though that all the factors would come into play in context of every exercise of valuation of a patent in a pool. The factors determining patent value can be largely classified into a discussion as regards the types of patents in a patent pool in context of their relative importance and other complementary factors which further affect such importance.</p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Categories of Patents in a Patent Pool</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Patents in a pool can be classified based on their necessity and quality. Thus, arises the concept of essential and non-essential patents and strong and weak patents.<i><span> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><i><span><span> </span></span></i>Essential and Non-Essential Patents<br /></b>As the terms indicate, essential patents are those which are imperative for the success of pool creation and thus naturally have considerably more value. Non-essential patents on the other hand are patents which though not imperative may bring efficiency advantages to the pool. However, what exactly comprises an essential patent is a subjective and constantly evolving definition determined by each patent pool according to its commercial needs and capabilities. For example, the number of patents in the MPEG-2 pool, all of which are declared to be essential to the MPEG-2 standard, increased from 27 in 1997 to more than 900 in 2010.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[5]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Essential patents naturally have more economic value than non-essential patents.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[6]</span></span></span></a> “A pool that includes non-essential patents can increase prices for some consumers, while decreasing prices for other consumers.”<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[7]</span></span></span></a> Also, inclusion of inessential patents can raise potential concerns about foreclosure of alternative technologies and higher royalties for some licenses than would have occurred if these patents were excluded from the pool.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[8]</span></span></span></a> These concerns though should be balanced against the costs of excluding potentially essential patents from the pool.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[9]</span></span></span></a> Such concerns were raised in context of the DVD 3C patent pool.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[10]</span></span></span></a> Thus, it has to be decided on a case by case scenario as to whether the patent pool will include only essential patents or both essential as well as non-essential patents.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">“<span>Whether a patent pool improves a market’s transactional efficiency depends on the competitive characteristics of the patents included within the pool’s offering.”<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[11]</span></span></span></a> Properly demarcating all required patents for a technology is important during patent pool formation. Otherwise it may create a “hold out” problem where a patent owner will “hold out” for higher royalties, “knowing that the manufacturer has individually negotiated for and already acquired the rest of the necessary … patent licenses, and that the value of all those licenses depends on obtaining a license to its own patent.”<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[12]</span></span></span></a> </span>Essentiality of a patent can be determined based on certain characteristics of patents:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">a. Blocking Patents<br />Blocking patents comprise of improvement patents on an existing technology. Thus, the improvement patent is deemed to be “subservient” to the earlier, “dominant’ patent”<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[13]</span></span></span></a> and the subservient and dominant patents are said to block one another.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[14]</span></span></span></a> This is so because, the subservient patent cannot be exploited without infringing upon the dominant patent.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[15]</span></span></span></a> Likewise, the dominant patent cannot be developed in the improved embodiment without permission from the subservient patentee.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[16]</span></span></span></a> For example, the Wright brothers patents for aeroplane wings were improved upon by Glenn Curtiss and Alexander Graham Bell by using a set of wing flaps, or ailerons. The Curtiss patent, however, was found to infringe upon the Wright patent. As a result, Curtiss had no legal right to make, use, or sell his ailerons without a license from the Wright brothers, and the Wright brothers had no legal right to make, use, or sell Curtiss's commercially successful form of the stabilizing device. Their patents mutually infringed and blocked one another and they had to form a patent pool.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[17]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, public key encryption method was devised and patented at Stanford University, and licensed to Cylink. Soon thereafter, a team of scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed and patented an algorithm, and licensed its use to RSA. The RSA algorithm was successfully commercialized and became an industry standard. Cylink and RSA constituted blocking rival patents and the issue was resolved by formation of a patent pool.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[18]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">b. Complementary Patents<br />Complementary patents cover technologies that are largely lacking or inefficient absent a license to a separate patented product.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[19]</span></span></span></a> They occur as a consequence of independent invention. Thus, value of <span>complementary patents increases when combined with a separate patented invention;</span> they act synergistically, each increasing the value of the other.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[20]</span></span></span></a> “Two products or technologies are complements if an increase in the price of one of them reduces the demand for the other.”<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[21]</span></span></span></a> For example, production of a light bulb requires patent rights to both the vacuum bulb as well as the filament.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[22]</span></span></span></a> A patent pool that only contains complementary patents may have substantial market power if the pool does not face competition from alternative or substitutable technology.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[23]</span></span></span></a> This though, could lead to the occurrence of royally stacking i.e. double-marginalization, which can occur when firms sell or license complementary products or technologies and demand is sensitive to price.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[24]</span></span></span></a> It refers to the addition of successive mark-ups by suppliers in a vertical relationship.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[25]</span></span></span></a></p>
<div class="WordSection1">c. Competing Patents</div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Competing patents result when there exist totally novel products or processes that provide market substitutes for patented goods, or when inventors sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the original patent is deemed “invented around” and not infringed.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[26]</span></span></span></a> “Two products or technologies are substitutes if an increase in the price of one of them increases the demand for the other.”<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[27]</span></span></span></a> A patent pool may obtain market power by obtaining control over substitutable patents too.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[28]</span></span></span></a> An individual who acquires the rights to a competing patent eliminates or significantly lessens his need for competing patents within or outside of the pool.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[29]</span></span></span></a> Thus, the value of a pool consisting of competing patents increases with acquisition of substitute patents.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[30]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Strong and Weak Patents<br /></b>A patent pool can comprise of strong as well as weak patents. The value accorded to the patents would naturally be in accordance with its “strength.” “‘Low patent quality’ is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions.”<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[31]</span></span></span></a> Patents are “probabilistic rights”<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[32]</span></span></span></a> Their scope and extent often remains probabilistic until their claim determination which may often be done only upon adjudication. Similarly in situations of a patent flood,<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[33]</span></span></span></a> the overall quality of patents may become lower.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[34]</span></span></span></a> The additional protection of the pool affords a weak patent enforcement rights that it may not have secured standing alone.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[35]</span></span></span></a> Thus, even weak and invalid patents become important and can be used to exclude competitors, for example for litigation threats.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[36]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Some patent pools contain explicit agreements to support weak patents, such as covenants not to challenge patents, joint defense agreements, and allocation of patent rights to parties who are best able to defend them.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[37]</span></span></span></a> Some patent pools achieve a similar effect not by explicit agreements, but by creating an institutional environment where patentees find that it is mutually advantageous to recognize each other’s patents.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[38]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3>B. Other Factors Determining Patent Value in Context of Patent Pool</h3>
<p>Besides the patents themselves, other complementary criteria impact on patent value. These comprise of the holistic environment in which the patents subsist, as discussed hereinafter.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Subject matter of Invention<br /></b>“Value is highly dependent upon the subject matter of the invention.”<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[39]</span></span></span></a> Certain subject matter fields or innovations do not have sufficient commercial importance or market demand to warrant investments.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Scope of Invention<br /></b>A particular subject where there is extensive minefield of patents already in existence is less likely to have considerable patent value due to the limited patent scope as opposed to a field where patents are relatively lacking and there is possibility of a broader patent scope.<b> </b>Analogously, “value of a patent is derived from an ability to preclude others from practicing the unique innovation described by the words of the patent’s claims.”<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[40]</span></span></span></a> “Generalizing, a patent employing broad claim language is typically more valuable than a patent of narrowly written claims in the same technology arena.”<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[41]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Size of Patent Pool<br /></b>The size of a patent pool i.e. the number of its members and their patents is an important facet in determining the value of patents involved. Greater the number more are the governance issues as well as royalty determination issues, which in turn affect the valuation of the patents. This though does not imply that pools should be of a specific size, only that their size should meet efficiency demands.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Value of Patent Pool<br /></b>The patents under the purview of a patent pool determine the pool’s value which in turn determines the value of the patents within as well as out of the pool. Value of a patent pool may be limited if certain holders of essential patents are not members.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[42]</span></span></span></a> This may occur due to various reasons such as if it was perceived that the patent may have more value as an independent entity, or due to strategic interests, or choice of joining different pools.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[43]</span></span></span></a> Correspondingly, if the patent pool does not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[44]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">While it is evident that collecting all necessary patents where the end product or standards is determined is extremely difficult, it becomes considerably more difficult where there is no predetermined or identifiable end-product.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[45]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>Patent Portfolio</span></span></span><br /></b>Certain academic studies are of the opinion that “the real value of patents lies not in their individual significance, but instead in their aggregation into a patent portfolio: a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual patents that, when combined, confer an array of important advantages upon the portfolio holder.”<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[46]</span></span></span></a> This theory has been applied to explain the patent paradox where the patent intensity, i.e. patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[47]</span></span></span></a> Thus, greater the control of an entity over a portfolio of patents, more would be its negotiation power in context of valuation.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Signaling<br /></b>It has been opined that the value of patents inheres not so much in the exclusivity they confer upon inventors, but rather in their ability to serve as credible signals.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[48]</span></span></span></a> Firms use patents to credibly convey information about the invention to the market who otherwise might not be willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[49]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><i> </i>Defensive Aspect<br /></b>Patent value is also ascertained based on its use to serve as an insurance, whereby competing firms use them as “bargaining chips” to negotiate and secure certain niches in the marketplace.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[50]</span></span></span></a> This is so especially from the negotiation as well as the litigation viewpoint.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Valuation Dynamics<br /></b>In context of certain subject matters, inability of the patents to be valued or possibility of dynamic changes in value creates problems in structuring the patent pool, or it might lead to issues of according over-value or under-value. For example, in the process of biological research, where hypotheses are often adjusted and experimentation continually refined, it is impossible to anticipate the particular value of a given research tool for an investigative procedure.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[51]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, in context of the Human Genome Sciences, the patent for the gene that encodes CCR5 protein, was likely not valued very highly, because of unsurity of its utility, which changed when independent research established its importance in the fight against HIV.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[52]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. Role of Independent Evaluator</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Often, independent experts in the relevant technology are employed for patent valuation purposes. Their role includes the responsibility of providing a mechanism for determining the market value of each participating patent for the purpose of setting appropriate royalty rates within the patent pool.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[53]</span></span></span></a> Also, they would evaluate the current state of the art and determine which patents are essential and which aren’t.<a href="#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[54]</span></span></span></a> An evaluator’s is a continuing responsibility throughout the existence of the duration of the patent pool to monitor developments in the field so as to ensure each patent’s essentiality and incorporate additional patents if necessary.<a href="#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[55]</span></span></span></a> Concerns though have been expressed as regards the expert’s ability and impartiality<span>.</span><a href="#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[56]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>III. Determination of License Fee for a Patent Pool</span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>Theorists, have suggested criteria to gauge viability of patent pools.<a href="#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[57]</span></span></span></a> The various elements involved in structuring of a patent pool do not function in a vacuum. Each has an impact on the other and ultimately they determine in totum, the licensing fees.</span></p>
<h3><span>A. Pool Dynamics</span></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The factors catalyzing pool creation impact on the licensing fee that is set. A patent pool may primarily be structured due to government influence,<a href="#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[58]</span></span></span></a> court influence,<a href="#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[59]</span></span></span></a> commercial and business perspective,<a href="#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[60]</span></span></span></a> to achieve or pursuant to standard setting,<a href="#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[61]</span></span></span></a> and social objectives.<a href="#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[62]</span></span></span></a> Accordingly, riders may be placed on creation of the pool and setting of licensing fees.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Analogously, members comprising the patent pool affect royalty determinations. Different perspectives can be observed in commercial entities as opposed to research entities or voluntary organizations. Similarly, the negotiation capabilities are different for established commercial conglomerates as opposed to entrepreneurs, or smaller entities.<a href="#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[63]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, patent pools may distinguish between patent contributing licensees and mere licensees in fixing royalty rates.<a href="#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[64]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Furthermore, pool governance as well as nature of the pool would have an impact on royalty determination. Pools can essentially be of two types based on regulation of members or licensing- open and closed.<a href="#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[65]</span></span></span></a> Correspondingly, the patent holders themselves may have different perspectives or expectations of their rights.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The negotiating entity too has an impact on royalty determination. “Agreements between the members of the patent pool and third parties can be established directly through patentees and licensees or indirectly through an entity specifically created to administer the pool.”<a href="#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[66]</span></span></span></a> There are a considerable number of business models involved in context of a patent pool that define the parameters of the relationship between what are primarily classified as IP creators and IP consumers.<a href="#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[67]</span></span></span></a> These dynamics have considerably altered with the strong and prolific emergence of IP intermediaries; they in turn affect the royalty rate negotiations.<a href="#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[68]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">B. Negotiation Dynamics</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">License negotiations involve complicated factors, such as uncertain outcomes, asymmetric information about the values of technologies and the contributions of licensees to a technology's value, the credibility of disagreements, differential bargaining power and skill, and the individual circumstances of licensors and licensees.<a href="#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[69]</span></span></span></a> Royalty determination depends on “the bargaining skills of patentees, their licensing objectives, the qualities of their patents, opportunity costs that patentees may have if they choose not to license their patents, the likelihood of injunctions, and the methods that courts apply to calculate infringement damages.”<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"> <a href="#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[70]</span></span></a></span> Pool members act strategically to maximize their share of the pool’s revenues.<a href="#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[71]</span></span></span></a> “The defining characteristic of patent ownership has been described as the right to extract royalties ‘as high as [one] can negotiate with the leverage’ of exclusivity.”<a href="#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[72]</span></span></span></a> <span>“The patent holder can ask for a high starting price; the potential infringer can counter by pointing to potential substitute technologies; and ultimately the process should yield a price that accurately reflects the marginal advantages of the patented technology.”<a href="#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[73]</span></span></span></a> </span>Again, negotiation strategies include deploying a number of tactics by corporates to whittle down an independent inventor’s patience and his price, thus reducing the licensing fee from the desired amount.<a href="#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[74]</span></span></span></a> <span>Correspondingly, there is no average length of time or amount of money needed for successfully creating a patent pool; it depends on the number of members involved in the negotiations and their commitment and willingness to negotiate an appropriate price.<a href="#_ftn76" name="_ftnref76"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[75]</span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Timing of the license negotiation too has an impact on determination of the royalty scheme. Licensing can occur in two primary settings: ex ante licensing, i.e. prior to pool formation; and ex post, i.e. post pool formation. In ex ante licensing, the manufacturer has a choice to alter existing products to incorporate the patented features, and can thus perform a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to making any product alterations.<a href="#_ftn77" name="_ftnref77"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[76]</span></span></span></a> Analogously, a holdout who demands royalties prior to the final organization of the pool can only demand a royalty that reflects the additional value that his new patent adds to the collection.<a href="#_ftn78" name="_ftnref78"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[77]</span></span></span></a> If he demands more than this value, the pool will work around the holdout’s patent by adopting a different standard, adjusting the patent pool to cover slightly different technology, or dissolving itself.<a href="#_ftn79" name="_ftnref79"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[78]</span></span></span></a> In ex post licensing, on the other hand, a holdout is in a stronger negotiating position, and can demand not only the marginal value of his patent, but also the switching costs that would be incurred if the established standard or licensing regime were limited by a court injunction.<a href="#_ftn80" name="_ftnref80"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[79]</span></span></span></a> Complicating this situation are <span>licenses that are granted ex ante but negotiated ex post.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Furthermore, patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations; however, it is also possible to compel parties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the industry.<a href="#_ftn81" name="_ftnref81"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[80]</span></span></span></a> Depending on the situation, the negotiation dynamics and hence the royalty scheme would be affected.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Rules governing damages for patent infringement also affect patentees’ decision to join a pool or to license independently, as the threat of injunctive relief can provide a patentee with bargaining power that can be disproportional to the number of patents he owns.<a href="#_ftn82" name="_ftnref82"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[81]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. Terms of License</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The terms of the license considerably influence royalty determination. These include, nature of licensed products,<a href="#_ftn83" name="_ftnref83"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[82]</span></span></span></a> character of license- whether exclusive or non-exclusive,<a href="#_ftn84" name="_ftnref84"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[83]</span></span></span></a> granting clause, geographic scope of the license, field of use governed by the license, provision of sublicensing, grantback provisions, future usage governance, non-assertion clauses, reach-through provisions, termination clause, and licensee’s ability to challenge patents in the pool.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Included herein too would be the treatment of after-acquired patents, which in turn can be classified into two types: (1) improvement patents based on a patented technology licensed by another member of the patent pool; and (2) patents unrelated to patented technologies licensed to the members of the patent pool.<a href="#_ftn85" name="_ftnref85"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[84]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">License governance in context of graduated and progressive licensing would also influence royalty determination. This would include “provisions for pool members to license their patents without licensing all the patents in a pool”<a href="#_ftn86" name="_ftnref86"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[85]</span></span></span></a> And the freedom “to license their patents bilaterally, i.e., outside of the pool structure.”<a href="#_ftn87" name="_ftnref87"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[86]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">IV. Methods for Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination</h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There are three basic methods of valuation: the cost method,<a href="#_ftn88" name="_ftnref88"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[87]</span></span></span></a> the market method,<a href="#_ftn89" name="_ftnref89"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[88]</span></span></span></a> and the income method.<a href="#_ftn90" name="_ftnref90"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[89]</span></span></span></a> In context of patent valuation, these methods find varied expressions. “A truly accurate assessment of patent value requires intensive legal and technical evaluation of individual patents.”<a href="#_ftn91" name="_ftnref91"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[90]</span></span></span></a> The economics literature, however, has also proposed several proxies for patent value based on objective and readily available information.<a href="#_ftn92" name="_ftnref92"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[91]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">In context of patent pools the dynamics of patent valuation methods is altered and they need to be viewed through the prism of factors discussed in Part II. This doesn’t imply that approaches to objective patent valuation are not relevant.<a href="#_ftn93" name="_ftnref93"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[92]</span></span></span></a> “However, such valuation approaches focus only on characteristics of patents at the time of issue and neglect to consider what happens afterwards.”<a href="#_ftn94" name="_ftnref94"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[93]</span></span></span></a> <span>“Technology developments or price fluctuations, among many factors, may alter the relationship between two patents … In turn, this may decrease the value of any static analysis conducted by experts.”</span><a href="#_ftn95" name="_ftnref95"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[94]</span></span></span></a><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Determination of the licensing fee of a patent pool is based on the joint affect of certain transactions. Again, as with patent valuation, so also with licensing fee determination, in context of patent pools, the factors discussed in Part III need to be given heed. The transactions influencing licensing fee determination essentially comprise of valuation of the patent, which in turn is used to set a royalty rate pertaining to allocation of various fees received by licensing of the pool patents. Thus, royalty payment is comprised of two components: a royalty rate and a royalty base, upon which the rate is applied.<a href="#_ftn96" name="_ftnref96"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[95]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Determining an Appropriate Royalty Base</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The scope of the royalty base can be determined in two principal ways- apportionment and entire market value rule.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The apportionment principle implies that when a patent reads on the entirety of an infringing product, the royalty base should be the total value of the sales (or use) of that product.<a href="#_ftn97" name="_ftnref97"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[96]</span></span></span></a> When the patent at issue covers only a component of the infringing product, the value of the sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented invention and the remaining unpatented components.<a href="#_ftn98" name="_ftnref98"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[97]</span></span></span></a> Thus, the principle aims at allocating awards in proportion to contribution, and is not based on any value attributable to the infringer’s or third parties’ inventions.<a href="#_ftn99" name="_ftnref99"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[98]</span></span></span></a> Thus, essentially, a licensor garners a royalty fee in proportion to the number of infringed patents owned by him.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The entire market value rule, recognizes that the economic value added to a product by a patented component may be greater than the value of the component alone.<a href="#_ftn100" name="_ftnref100"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[99]</span></span></span></a> Thus, this rule focuses on whether the patented component drives demand for the entire product, and if it is so, then the patentee may treat all revenue from the infringing product as an appropriate royalty base.<a href="#_ftn101" name="_ftnref101"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[100]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="WordSection1">B. Setting Royalty Rates</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Royalty rates are typically a percentage rate and thus reflects the proportion of the base value that the patented technology contributes.<a href="#_ftn102" name="_ftnref102"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[101]</span></span></span></a> Various approaches have emerged in determining royalty rates; these could be adapted in context of patent pools.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Rule of Thumb<br /></b>This approach suggests that the licensor should receive 25 percent of the licensee’s gross profit from the licensed technology.<a href="#_ftn103" name="_ftnref103"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[102]</span></span></span></a><sup> </sup>Thus, this rule’s purpose is not the valuation of a technology per se, but rather the apportionment of a technology’s value between the licensor and licensee.<a href="#_ftn104" name="_ftnref104"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[103]</span></span></span></a> The percentage split between the licensor and licensee should be adjusted upwards or downwards to take into account the parties’ respective investment and risk in the licensed technology.<a href="#_ftn105" name="_ftnref105"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[104]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Numerical Proportionality<br /></b>According to this approach, royalty entitlement of the holder of patents essential to a standard should be calculated in light of the proportional contribution of that patent owner’s essential patents compared to the total contribution of all other essential patents reading on the standard.<a href="#_ftn106" name="_ftnref106"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[105]</span></span></span></span></a> This method rests on the proposition that every patent is of equal value.<a href="#_ftn107" name="_ftnref107"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[106]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Industry Standards / Market or Comparable Technology Method<br /></b>Under this approach, the worth of a patent is determined by examining the royalty rates garnered in similar past transactions.<a href="#_ftn108" name="_ftnref108"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[107]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Discounted Cash Flow<br /></b>This approach proposes that patent price can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits derived from ownership, which includes projected sales of products (or components) based on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.<a href="#_ftn109" name="_ftnref109"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[108]</span></span></span></span></a> To implement it, one must determine (1) the future cash flows generated by the patent in question and (2) an appropriate discount rate.<a href="#_ftn110" name="_ftnref110"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[109]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Ranking<br /></b>This approach compares the intellectual property asset to be valued to comparable intellectual property assets on a subjective or objective scale.<a href="#_ftn111" name="_ftnref111"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[110]</span></span></span></a> There are five components to a ranking method: (i) scoring criteria; (ii) scoring system; (iii) scoring scale; (iv) weighting factors; and (v) decision table; these components are used to calculate a composite score for an asset, which is then compared to the average score for a comparable intellectual property asset to determine the relative value.<a href="#_ftn112" name="_ftnref112"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[111]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Cost-based Rate Setting<br /></b>This approach proposes that the patent holder’s cost of obtaining the invention and its patent forms the basis of the royalty rate; a profit margin is simply tacked onto the innovation cost.<a href="#_ftn113" name="_ftnref113"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[112]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Surrogate Measures<br /></b>Surrogate measures value patents by reference to the patents themselves.<a href="#_ftn114" name="_ftnref114"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[113]</span></span></span></a> They can be largely categorized into: (1) the number of patents issued to a company; (2) payment of patent maintenance fees i.e. patents which are regularly renewed are more valuable; (3) prior art citations i.e. more a patent is cited, more is its value; (4) characteristics of litigated patents i.e. patents which are the subject matter of litigation are more valuable.<a href="#_ftn115" name="_ftnref115"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[114]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Disaggregation Methods<br /></b>There are two basic types of disaggregation methods - value disaggregation and income disaggregation.<a href="#_ftn116" name="_ftnref116"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[115]</span></span></span></a> The former apportions some fraction of total value to intellectual property assets by setting the value of intangible assets equal to the value of a firm minus the firm’s monetary and tangible assets from to determine the value of the intangible assets.<a href="#_ftn117" name="_ftnref117"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[116]</span></span></span></a> The latter apportions some fraction of total earnings of a firm, based upon various factors, to intellectual property assets.<a href="#_ftn118" name="_ftnref118"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[117]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Option Methods<br /></b>This approach views an investment in intellectual property as an option to develop the intellectual property further, or to abandon the intellectual property, depending upon future technical and market information.<a href="#_ftn119" name="_ftnref119"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[118]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Competitive Advantage Valuation (R)<br /></b>The major premise of the CAV method is that intellectual property assets have no inherent value; the value of intellectual property assets resides entirely in the value of the tangible assets which incorporate them.<a href="#_ftn120" name="_ftnref120"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[119]</span></span></span></a> The minor premise of the CAV method is that the value of a given intellectual property asset can best be measured by the competitive advantage which that asset contributes to a product, process, or service.<a href="#_ftn121" name="_ftnref121"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[120]</span></span></span></a> In its most general form, CAV method consists of following six basic steps<a href="#_ftn122" name="_ftnref122"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[121]</span></span></span></a>:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The intellectual property asset to be valued (IPA) is associated with a product and the product’s net present value is calculated.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The product's net present value is apportioned among tangible assets, intangible advantages and intellectual property assets. (There are three groups of intellectual property assets: technical [utility patents, functional software copyrights and technical trade secrets]; reputational [trademarks, service marks and brand names]; and operational [business method patents and proprietary business processes].</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The product is associated with competition parameters which can be used to compare the product to substitute products and competition parameter weights are calculated. (There are three groups of competition parameters: technical [price and performance], reputational [recognition and impression], and operational [cost and efficiency]. Weights are calculated for each parameter group and for individual parameters within each group).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The IPA is associated with an individual competition parameter and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to substitute intellectual property assets is calculated. (Substitute intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in substitute products and associated with the same competition parameter as the IPA).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The IPA is associated with complementary intellectual property assets and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to complementary intellectual property assets is calculated. (Complementary intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in the same product and associated with the same parameter group as the IPA).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The value of the IPA is calculated by apportioning a share of the product's intellectual property asset value to the IPA based upon the IPA's competitive advantage contribution relative to substitute and complementary intellectual property assets. If the IPA is associated with multiple products, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution to each product is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA. If the IPA is associated with multiple parameters, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution for each parameter is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA.</li>
</ol>
<p><b>Georgia Pacific<br /></b>The fifteen factors enumerated in the Georgia Pacific case, several of which repeat approaches discussed above, are used in royalty rate determination:<a href="#_ftn123" name="_ftnref123"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[122]</span></span></span></a></p>
<ul>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The duration of the patent and the term of the license.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span> The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The opinion testimony of qualified experts.</li>
</ol>
<ul>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span> </span>The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-which desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Academics have prescribed modification to the approach towards these factors analyzing that the relevant questions in calculating a reasonable royalty fall into four basic categories: (1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).<a href="#_ftn124" name="_ftnref124"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[123]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>V. Patent Pool Examples<br /></span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The following discussion highlights certain aspects of patent pools from real world examples. These examples are restricted to the technological field. Study of these aspects is of value in understanding the concepts discussed hereinbefore.</p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The MAA was formed in 1917 in U.S.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Apart from the “foundational” patents of Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers, which had substantial royalty rates, most licensing was conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement suits as the real payment for the exchange.<a href="#_ftn125" name="_ftnref125"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[124]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The MAA was open to anyone who wished to use the Wright-Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation fee and a licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built; these funds were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.<a href="#_ftn126" name="_ftnref126"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[125]</span></span></span></a> </span>MAA retained $ 25 (12.5%) to cover its administrative expenses, $ 135 (67.5%) was paid to the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and $ 40 (20%) was paid to the Curtiss-Burgess Airplane & Motor Corporation.<a href="#_ftn127" name="_ftnref127"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[126]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Patents added to the pool after its formation were divided into two classes- normal patents were licensed into the pool for all to use, with no special royalty payout going to the inventor or firm; exceptional patents earned ongoing royalties, in an amount determined by a formal arbitration procedure.<a href="#_ftn128" name="_ftnref128"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[127]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The MAA also included a grant-back provision that applied to after-acquired patents.<a href="#_ftn129" name="_ftnref129"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[128]</span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MAA’s members could license their patents to non-members if the terms were no more favorable than to members and any MAA member could withdraw at any time, but its patents in the pool at the time of withdrawal would remain.<a href="#_ftn130" name="_ftnref130"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[129]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>B. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)</span></span></span></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MPEG technology allows for transmission and storage of digital video and audio signals.<span> It was formed by the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.C., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. in 1997. The patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard is administered by a common license administrator- MPEG-LA</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>MPEG-LA is required to grant licenses to any potential licensees, without discrimination and at a reasonable royalty rate.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MPEG LA offers a portfolio of MPEG-2 systems licenses with a fixed royalty for each licensed mobile MPEG-2 systems signal receiver and a different fixed royalty for all other MPEG-2 systems devices.<a href="#_ftn131" name="_ftnref131"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[130]</span></span></span></a> Additional patents, not included in the portfolio, are available for specific implementations.<a href="#_ftn132" name="_ftnref132"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[131]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The pool offers a standardized five-year license to all prospective licensees.<a href="#_ftn133" name="_ftnref133"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[132]</span></span></span></a> The licensing royalties do not change if patents are added to the portfolio during the five-year licensing period, although the royalty rate may increase by up to 25% in a license renewal.<a href="#_ftn134" name="_ftnref134"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[133]</span></span></span></a> Each patent in the pool is valued equally.<a href="#_ftn135" name="_ftnref135"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[134]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The license has a grant-back provision that requires the licensee to grant to the licensor and other portfolio licensees a nonexclusive license, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions, on any essential patent that the licensee has a right to license.<a href="#_ftn136" name="_ftnref136"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[135]</span></span></span></a> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There exists a partial termination right given to licensors, who may request that MPEG-LA terminate the license of that licensor’s IPR to a particular licensee, if that licensee has sued the licensor for infringement of an MPEG-2 essential or “related” patent or refused to license a related patent on fair and reasonable terms.<a href="#_ftn137" name="_ftnref137"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[136]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. DVD</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Sony, Philips and Pioneer organized the DVD3C patent pool in 1998 <span>for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Royalty payments are allocated under guidelines set by the Ground Rules for Royalty</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Allocation rather than on subjective analysis by an expert.<a href="#_ftn138" name="_ftnref138"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[137]</span></span></span></a> The royalty rate in standard licenses is not related to fluctuations in the market price of a licensed product; also, the royalty rate is not computed on a per-patent basis and does not fluctuate as patents are added or removed, therefore, the same royalty rate is payable when using one essential patent as when using several.<a href="#_ftn139" name="_ftnref139"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[138]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>Hitachi</span><span>, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor organized the DVD6C patent pool in 1999 again for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The DVD6C pool is also governed by the “Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation” guidelines.<a href="#_ftn140" name="_ftnref140"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[139]</span></span></span></a> The royalties are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $4.00 per product, whichever is higher. Royalties for DVD decoders are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $1.00 per product, whichever is higher.<a href="#_ftn141" name="_ftnref141"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[140]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The DVD6C agreement contains a grant-back clause, which, requires licensees to grant each of the licensing companies of DVD6C (and their licensees) a non-exclusive license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to use any of their patents that are deemed essential for the manufacture, use or sale of DVD Products; this grantback is restricted only to those DVD products actually licensed to the licensee.<a href="#_ftn142" name="_ftnref142"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[141]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">D. 3G Mobile Telephony</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">The 3G Patent Platform Partnership was formed in 1999. The purpose of the 3G Patent Platform Partnership is to allow for “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” access to rights essential for implementing the W-CDMA 3GPP standard.<a href="#_ftn143" name="_ftnref143"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[142]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There are three form contracts associated with the Platform: the Framework Agreement, the Standard License, and the Interim License.<a href="#_ftn144" name="_ftnref144"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[143]</span></span></span></a> The Framework Agreement gives each member the choice either to license its essential patents according to the Standard License or to negotiate terms directly with a licensee.<a href="#_ftn145" name="_ftnref145"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[144]</span></span></span></a> The Standard License prescribes standardized royalties for licenses, to be determined by an independent commission.<a href="#_ftn146" name="_ftnref146"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[145]</span></span></span></a> If the patent owner foregoes the Standard License and fails to come to terms in bilateral negotiations, the Interim License comes into effect which has the same royalty terms as the Standard License.<a href="#_ftn147" name="_ftnref147"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[146]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="WordSection1">E. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The Bluetooth SIG was formed in 1997 to provide a technology for interconnection of mobile phones, computers, laptops, printers, PDAs, and other devices via a short-range radio frequency band; SIG oversees the development of Bluetooth standards and its licensing.<a href="#_ftn148" name="_ftnref148"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[147]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">SIG’s member companies are divided into three different classes- (1) promoter company, which are intensely engaged in the strategic and technical development of Bluetooth wireless technology; they include Agere, Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Toshiba; (2) associate members, who are licensed to use Bluetooth specifications and trademarks; (3) adopted members, which use published specifications and trademarks, but do not influence the specification process, nor do they have early access to unpublished specifications.<a href="#_ftn149" name="_ftnref149"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[148]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">SIG licenses to member companies on a royalty-free basis, but, associate members pay an annual fee based on their company’s annual revenue, with “small” associates (less than $100 million USD/year) paying $7,500 USD/year and “large” associates (more than $100 million USD/year) paying $35,000 USD/year; adopted members are not required to pay an annual fee.<a href="#_ftn150" name="_ftnref150"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[149]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>VI. Conclusion<br /></span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">As is evident, patent valuation and license fee determination are extremely subjective and case based. Moreover, their dynamics alter according to the situation, as in the context of patent pools. This dynamism is furthered by the fact that there are no strict or universal formulas or procedures which can be applied in such determinations. Furthermore, such determinations cannot be made in a vacuum but are subject to the cascading effect of a multitude of factors comprised of the holistic technological environment that may not be just restricted to the innovation in question.</p>
<div>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
<div id="ftn2">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 293 (Summer, 2012) citing <i>IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of Intellectual Property--The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical Technologies</i>, Knowledge Ecology International, (June 3, 2007) quoting Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[2]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v Gharda Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (Suit No.2932 of 2011; Decided On: 20.03.2012) Bombay H.C. (Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) including the patent right is valuable right for all the commercial purposes. These intangible assets play important role in any financial assessment of the trade/commercial or the market. It changes from time to time, market to market, person to person based upon the situations. If valuation is always a complex and flexible issue and a matter of discussion and debate in business strategies. The patent valuation involves many described and undescribed elements).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[3]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (October 1996) citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[4]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 463 (Spring, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[5]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools 77 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2010) MPEG LA Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf; MPEG LA, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License Briefing (Aug. 4, 2010).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[6]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Kramer, <i>supra</i> n.4 at 463 (essential patents of technical standards are more valuable, on average, than the general population of patents).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[7]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[8]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[9]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[10]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i>citing DVD 3C Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[11]</span></span></span></span></a><span>R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[12]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Daniel Lin, Research versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation And Standardization In The Software Industry 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 274 (2002).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[13]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma 16 Yale J. on Reg. 359 (Summer, 1999).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[14]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[15]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[16]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[17]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[18]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[19]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[20]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law And Patent Misconduct In The Proprietary Drug Industry 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1209 (1994). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[21]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[22]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[23]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment Of Current Law And Policy 38 Rutgers L. J. 539 (Winter, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[24]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[25]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[26]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[27]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[28]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Nelson, <i>supra</i> n.23.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[29]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David S. Taylor, The Sinking Of The United States Electronics Industry Within Japanese Patent Pools 26 GW J. Int'l L. & Econ. 181 (1992). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[30]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[31]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 309 (2002).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[32]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (June, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn34">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[33]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Meurer, <i>supra</i> n.31 (A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar inventions during an interval of a few years).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn35">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[34]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn36">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[35]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Robert P. Greenspoon and Catherine M. Cottle, Don't Assume A Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories With Licensing And Enforcement Reality 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 194 (2011). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn37">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[36]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Meurer, <i>supra</i> n.31. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn38">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[37]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert <i>supra</i> n.5 citing the cross-licensing arrangement between the Singer Manufacturing Company and Gegauf, contained provisions by which each of the parties agreed not to bring any infringement action against the other. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 178 (1963).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn39">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[38]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn40">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[39]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Kramer, <i>supra</i> n.4. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn41">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[40]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn42">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[41]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn43">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[42]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid 32 Pace L. Rev. 641 (Summer Issue, 2012). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn44">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[43]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 (To the extent that a patent pool successfully lowers total royalties relative to independent licensing, this leaves ‘headroom’ available for an independent licensor outside the pool to charge a high royalty for its patent).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn45">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[44]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i><i> </i>citing Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., et al., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn46">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[45]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012); Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763 (2010 / 2011) (the typical semiconductor chip likely involves hundreds, perhaps more, patents. In turn, that chip may be intended for use in a laptop computer, the other components of which involve hundreds, or more, patents. Without knowing how many patents actually read on a product, and how many have holders who will actively seek licensing fees, it can be exceedingly difficult to assign the contributed value to those that are known). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn47">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[46]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (November, 2005); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard and Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense Of “Apportionment” In Patent Damages 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255 (2011) (combining patented technologies typically creates value that is greater than the sum of the parts. For example, patent pools often bring together various technologies that are necessary to create the product in question. The stand-alone value of any one patent in the pool may be low or close to zero unless combined with the other patents in the pool). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn48">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[47]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Parchomovsky and Wagner, <i>supra</i> n.46.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn49">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[48]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn50">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[49]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn51">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[50]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn52">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[51]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Scott Iyama, The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1223 (March, 2005). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn53">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[52]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools For Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 229 (December, 2002). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn54">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[53]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump From Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1631 (July, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn55">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[54]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn56">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[55]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn57">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[56]</span></span></span></span></a><span> R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009) citing DVD-6 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn58">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[57]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket, 3 Nanotechnology L. & Bus. 317 (2006) suggests that to determine the viability of using a patent pool in a market, companies should ponder the following list of nine criteria: (1) product development driven by standards; (2) moderate fragmentation of patent landscape; (3) at least five pool members; (4) each member working on specific subcomponent of a product; (5) willingness of patent holders to negotiate; (6) commitment by members to create the pool; (7) an industry that is in the later stages of product development; (8) certainty of patent ownership; and (9) a patent pool clear of potential antitrust violations.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn59">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[58]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, where the U.S. government used the threat of compulsory licensing to compel the pioneers of the aircraft industry to form a patent pool in 1917. The industry was enmeshed in litigation over the scope and validity of patents, and some patentees, particularly the Wright-Martin Company, were demanding royalties that the government and other aircraft manufacturers deemed excessive. Creation of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association patent pool resolved the litigation chaos. The government negotiated a portfolio license from the pool with a royalty of $ 200 per aircraft, which was a fraction of the royalty that Wright-Martin was demanding for a single patent ($ 1,000 per aircraft). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn60">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[59]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13 discussing that pool agreements are frequently employed as a means of settling existing litigation, and citing examples including patent pools in the laser eye surgery, and the public key encryption industries;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>also see Lemley & Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property, <i>supra</i> n.32 discussing that the average royalty rate granted in all reasonable-royalty cases is 13.13% of the price of the infringing product, which is much higher than that of patent licenses negotiated without litigation.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn61">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[60]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Greenspoon and Cottle, <i>supra</i> n.35 discussing the value of patents as a form of currency that can be used to further goals unrelated to market creation or entry. Such goals can be to improve a firm's competitive position when trying to acquire start-up funds, to improve negotiating terms when licensing other patents, and to reduce the chance of paying excessive royalties to external patent owners;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>also see, Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing how different business strategies can cause firms to pool their patents with some firms, but not with others, citing the example of emergence of two pools to license DVD patents as a consequence of differing approaches to industry standards. One explanation offered for the existence of two separate pools is that the two groups could not reach an accord about their respective shares of joint royalty payments. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn62">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[61]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing how some pools license their patents royalty-free or at royalties that are deliberately held below profit-maximizing levels in an effort to promote adoption of new technologies covered by their patents, citing the example of the Bluetooth Special Interest Group and the Multimedia Home Platform. The article also discusses patent pools formed to license patents that are necessary to implement a defined standard, such as MPEG encoding, DVDs, or mobile telephony. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn63">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[62]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing pools that limit royalties to promote social objectives rather than to profit from new products citing examples of companies, universities, and research organizations such as Syngenta- an agricultural technology company, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture, the SARS IP Working Group, and the UNITAID pool for AIDS medications.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn64">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[63]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing And The Emergence Of A New Patent Market 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 445 (2009) (The current state of affairs shows that the patent licensing market strongly favors larger corporations over smaller ones, enabling the larger corporations to reap much of the market opportunities and benefits while limiting them to smaller patentees).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn65">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[64]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Roger B. Andewelt, Practical Problems In Counseling And Litigating: Analysis Of Patent Pools Under The Antitrust Laws 53 Antitrust L.J. 611 (October 11, 1984/October 12, 1984) (Pools typically contain restrictions on those who join the pool by contributing patents and/or those who take licenses under the pooled patents).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn66">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[65]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn67">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[66]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Ann Weilbaecher, PSY.D., Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation 18 Ann. Health L. 281 (Summer, 2009).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn68">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[67]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Greenspoon and Cottle, <i>supra</i> n.35 identify five general types of entities that license and enforce patents: (1) Individual inventors with a single patent; (2) Individual serial inventors; (3) Non-Practicing Entities; (4) Operating companies who practice inventions acquired from others; and (5) Operating companies who practice inventions developed in-house.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn69">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[68]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See, Raymond Millien and Ron Laurie, A Survey Of Established & Emerging IP Business Models 9 Sedona Conf. J. 77 (2008) discussing various models, viz. Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies, Institutional IP Aggregators/Acquisition Funds, IP/Technology Development Companies, Licensing Agents, Litigation Finance/Investment Firms, IP Brokers, IP-Based M&A Advisory Firms, IP Auction Houses, On-Line IP/Technology Exchanges, Clearinghouses, Bulletin Boards, and Innovation Portals, IP-Backed Lending, Royalty Stream Securitization Firms, Patent Rating Software and Valuation Services, University Technology Transfer Intermediaries, IP Transaction Exchanges & Trading Platforms/IP Transaction Best Practices Development Communities, Defensive Patent Pools, Funds and Alliances, Technology/IP Spinout Financing, and Patent-Based Public Stock Indexes.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn70">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[69]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations 77 Antitrust L.J. 855 (2011).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn71">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[70]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn72">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[71]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn73">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[72]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting And The Failure Of Price Competition 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 217 (2009) citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn74">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[73]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Doug Lichtman, Understanding The Rand Commitment 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1023 (2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn75">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[74]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Peter N. Detkin, Leveling The Patent Playing Field 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 636 (Summer, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn76">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref76" name="_ftn76"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[75]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Lee, <i>infra</i> n.57. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn77">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref77" name="_ftn77"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[76]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Kelce Wilson, The Four Phases of Patent Usage 40 Cap. U.L. Rev. 679 (Summer, 2012). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn78">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref78" name="_ftn78"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[77]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Gavin D. George, What is Hiding in the Bushes? eBay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 557 (2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn79">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref79" name="_ftn79"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[78]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn80">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref80" name="_ftn80"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[79]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn81">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref81" name="_ftn81"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[80]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Daniel R. Cahoy and Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy 36 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 415 (Spring, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn82">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref82" name="_ftn82"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[81]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5; See for example, Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3 describing how in the airplane cross-licensing agreement, it provides that a board of arbitrators may decide in any case what reward should be paid to individual patent owners and this is based not upon the official determination of patentability by the Patent Office, but upon the unofficial determination of the importance of the invention by a board of arbitrators.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn83">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref83" name="_ftn83"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[82]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Andewelt, <i>supra</i> n.64 (The scope and variety of patents included vary considerably from pool to pool. Some pools are limited to patents covering a single commercial device. Others contain numerous and diverse patents relating to different devices in different markets).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn84">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref84" name="_ftn84"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[83]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See, Scala, <i>supra</i> n.53 discussing how the non-exclusive character of a license is particularly important for those firms holding patents whose full utility is unascertainable at the time of the formation of the pool.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn85">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref85" name="_ftn85"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[84]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress In The Aircraft Industry And The Role Of Patent Pools And Cross-Licensing Agreements 2011 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1 (Spring 2011). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn86">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref86" name="_ftn86"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[85]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Ed Levy, et. al, Patent Pools And Genomics: Navigating A Course To Open Science? 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75 (Winter, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn87">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref87" name="_ftn87"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[86]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn88">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref88" name="_ftn88"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[87]</span></span></span></a> Ted Hagelin, Technology and Legal Practice Symposium Issue: Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133 (2002) (The cost method of valuation measures the value of an asset by the cost to replace the asset with an identical or equivalent asset. The assumption underlying the cost method of valuation is that the cost to purchase or develop a new asset is commensurate with the economic value that the asset can provide during its life).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn89">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref89" name="_ftn89"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[88]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i><i> </i>(The market method values an asset based upon comparable transactions between unrelated parties).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn90">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref90" name="_ftn90"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[89]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> (The income method values an asset based upon the present value of the net economic benefit (net future income stream) expected to be received over the life of the asset).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn91">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref91" name="_ftn91"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[90]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls Or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis Of Nonpracticing Entities 110 Colum. L. Rev. 114 (January, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn92">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref92" name="_ftn92"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[91]</span></span></span></span></a><i><span>Id.</span></i><span> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn93">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref93" name="_ftn93"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[92]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (December, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn94">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref94" name="_ftn94"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[93]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn95">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref95" name="_ftn95"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[94]</span></span></span></span></a><span>R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn96">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref96" name="_ftn96"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[95]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn97">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref97" name="_ftn97"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[96]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn98">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref98" name="_ftn98"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[97]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn99">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref99" name="_ftn99"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[98]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn100">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref100" name="_ftn100"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[99]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn101">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref101" name="_ftn101"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[100]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn102">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref102" name="_ftn102"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[101]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn103">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref103" name="_ftn103"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[102]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn104">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref104" name="_ftn104"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[103]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn105">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref105" name="_ftn105"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[104]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn106">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref106" name="_ftn106"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[105]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn107">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref107" name="_ftn107"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[106]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn108">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref108" name="_ftn108"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[107]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn109">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref109" name="_ftn109"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[108]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn110">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref110" name="_ftn110"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[109]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Malcolm T. "Ty" Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, PhD, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 194 (Fall, 2010).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn111">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref111" name="_ftn111"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[110]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn112">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref112" name="_ftn112"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[111]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn113">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref113" name="_ftn113"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[112]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn114">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref114" name="_ftn114"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[113]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn115">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref115" name="_ftn115"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[114]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i>; Meeks & Eldering, <i>supra</i> n.109.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn116">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref116" name="_ftn116"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[115]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn117">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref117" name="_ftn117"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[116]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn118">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref118" name="_ftn118"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[117]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn119">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref119" name="_ftn119"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[118]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn120">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref120" name="_ftn120"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[119]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn121">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref121" name="_ftn121"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[120]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn122">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref122" name="_ftn122"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[121]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref123" name="_ftn123"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[122]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn124">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref124" name="_ftn124"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[123]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach To Calculating Reasonable Royalties 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627 (Summer, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn125">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref125" name="_ftn125"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[124]</span></span></span></a> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn126">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref126" name="_ftn126"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[125]</span></span></span></a> Michael Mattioli, Communities Of Innovation 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 103 (Winter, 2012).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn127">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref127" name="_ftn127"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[126]</span></span></span></a> Szakalski, <i>supra</i> n.84.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn128">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref128" name="_ftn128"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[127]</span></span></span></a> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn129">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref129" name="_ftn129"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[128]</span></span></span></a> Mattioli, <i>supra</i> n.125.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn130">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref130" name="_ftn130"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[129]</span></span></span></a> Szakalski, <i>supra</i> n.84.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn131">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref131" name="_ftn131"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[130]</span></span></span></a> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn132">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref132" name="_ftn132"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[131]</span></span></span></a> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn133">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref133" name="_ftn133"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[132]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn134">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref134" name="_ftn134"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[133]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn135">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref135" name="_ftn135"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[134]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn136">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref136" name="_ftn136"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[135]</span></span></span></a> Lin, <i>supra</i> n.12.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn137">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref137" name="_ftn137"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[136]</span></span></span></a> Dorothy Gill Raymond, Benefits and Risks Of Patent Pooling For Standard-Setting Organizations 16 Antitrust ABA 41 (Summer, 2002).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn138">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref138" name="_ftn138"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[137]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn139">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref139" name="_ftn139"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[138]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn140">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref140" name="_ftn140"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[139]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn141">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref141" name="_ftn141"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[140]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn142">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref142" name="_ftn142"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[141]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn143">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref143" name="_ftn143"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[142]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn144">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref144" name="_ftn144"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[143]</span></span></span></a> Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European Commission's Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1693 (December, 2003).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn145">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref145" name="_ftn145"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[144]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn146">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref146" name="_ftn146"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[145]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn147">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref147" name="_ftn147"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[146]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn148">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref148" name="_ftn148"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[147]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn149">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref149" name="_ftn149"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[148]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn150">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref150" name="_ftn150"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[149]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools</a>
</p>
No publishervikrantFeaturedPatentsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-07-09T09:46:16ZBlog EntryIndia's Obligations under Bilateral Investment Treaties (Part A): “Bilateral Inhibiting Treaty?” — Investigating the Challenges that Bilateral Investment Treaties pose to the Compulsory Licensing of Pervasive Technology Patent Pools
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/bilateral-inhibiting-treaty-investigating-challenges-that-bilateral-investment-treaties-pose-to-compulsory-licensing-of-pervasive-technology-patent-pools
<b>In this blog post, the first of a series of three, Gavin Pereira attempts to address the challenges that India's obligations under Bilateral Investment Treaties may pose to the establishment of a patent pool in the country. The author thanks Puneeth Nagaraj for his guidance and inputs on this paper.</b>
<hr />
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; ">"And finally, many states, unfortunately, see investment treaties as a diplomatic photo opportunity without being fully aware of the actual legal implications."<br /><b>Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder</b><a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Introduction</b><br />Continuing from the Indian government’s Economic Reform Program, which had started in 1991,<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> are India’s Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. Generally referred to as Bilateral Investment Treaties or "BITs," these agreements seek to provide for conditions that are “favourable for greater investment by investors of one State in the territory of the other State”<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a> in hopes that this would lead to "stimulation of business initiatives and increase in prosperity."<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since 1996, India has signed a total of 82 BITs, of which 72 have come into force.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a> At the time of signing them, BITs were generally hailed as a means to increase foreign investor confidence during the liberalisation of India’s economy.<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Recently however, several notices of disputes were filed or threatened to be filed under these treaties by companies such as Vodafone B.V.<a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7]</a>, Telenor<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8]</a> and Sistema.<a href="#fn9" name="fr9">[9]</a> These filings lead to the review of all the BITs signed by India, a procedure that was called upon by the Indian government’s Department for Industrial Policy and Promotion,<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10]</a> as well as the composition of an amended model BIT by the Ministry of Finance to increase the threshold requirements for an investor to initiate arbitration.<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Such discord between thestate and investors protected under BITs is not unique to India. There has been a steady rise in the number of investment disputes brought to international arbitration with the highest number of known treaty-based disputes filed in 2012. This has been revealed through a review of the claims filed in the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and an inspection of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12]</a> In the history of investor-state dispute resolution, the highest reward to the tune of $1.77 billion in <i>Occidental v Ecuador</i><a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13]</a><i> </i>was awarded last year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In order to better contextualize this background of increasingly assertive investor claims, my essay will first attempt to ascertain the meaning of intellectual property (IP) rights as defined as investments within BITs and explore their effect on the compulsory licensing of information and communication technology patent pools. I will then discuss the relation between covenants that India is a signatory to, Indian copyright law and BITs with an aim to propose measures by which BITs should be suitably amended to allow for India’s burgeoning growth in the budget smartphone market.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>BIT Claims Against India</b><br />There are a total of 12 known and 17 estimated<a href="#fn14" name="fr14">[14]</a> treaty claims against India, the 11th highest number of claims in the world.<a href="#fn15" name="fr15">[15]</a> Given the strict confidentiality thatcovers these proceedings, this is merely the tip of the iceberg, as there may be several other claims against India that are not available in the public domain.<a href="#fn16" name="fr16">[16]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> <span>The tribunal in <i>White Industries v Republic of India </i><span><a href="#fn17" name="fr17">[17]</a> — the first investment treaty award against India </span></span><span><span>— held India liable for breaching its obligation to provide “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights” pursuant to 4(2) of the India-Australia BIT, read with 4(5) of the India-Kuwait BIT. India was ordered to compensate White Industries a total amount of approximately four million Australian dollars plus interest.<a href="#fn18" name="fr18">[18]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The tribunal attributed the inordinate delay by Indian courts, especially the Indian Supreme Court in enforcing an arbitral award in favour of White Industries as a denial of effective means to enforce their right to their investment.<a href="#fn19" name="fr19">[19]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>In 2012, Vodafone B.V. filed a notice of dispute, a prerequisite to commence arbitration under the India-Netherlands BIT, claiming that the Indian government’s decision to enact the Indian Finance Bill 2012 would be a failure to accord ‘fair and equitable treatment;’ the reason being that the amendment sought to retroactively tax the 2007 share-purchase agreement between Hutchinson Telecommunications International Ltd. and Vodafone<a href="#fn20" name="fr20">[20]</a></span><span> despite the Supreme Court ruling in favour of Vodafone on that issue.<a href="#fn21" name="fr21">[21]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Telenor and Sistema have filed or threatened to file notices of dispute under BITs Following the cancellation of 122 2G spectrum telecom licenses by the Supreme Court.<a href="#fn22" name="fr22">[22] </a>Within these filings was the alleging that the act of the Supreme Court undermined the license allocation process and was a form of indirect expropriation of their investments.<a href="#fn23" name="fr23">[23]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>In March 2012, the Children’s Investment Fund (CIF) filed a notice of dispute in a letter addressed to the Minister of Finance, invoking both the India-UK BIT and the India-Cyprus BIT in response to the “seriously impaired business activities and operations of the company” by virtue of their investment in Coal India.<a href="#fn24" name="fr24">[24] </a>They alleged that Coal India’s sale of assets to private companies at below-market price, on the directive of the Government, has caused a huge loss to the Coal India and in effect, to the company’s share value. This claim is unprecedented as CIF is a minority shareholder essentially suing Coal India for greater dividends.<a href="#fn25" name="fr25">[25] </a>CIF has since soldalmost 20% of their shareholding in Coal India.<a href="#fn26" name="fr26">[26]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span><span>Intellectual Property and BIT</span></span></b><span><span><br />The Indian model text of BIT’s, and therefore all 82 BITs that have been drafted based on the model text, define "investment" <i>inter alia</i> as "intellectual property rights, in accordance with the laws of the contracting party."<a href="#fn27" name="fr27">[27] </a>This enables investors protected to file BIT claims against India for any action that directly or indirectly adversely affects their IPR, subject to certain other conditions. It was only a matter of time before the full extent of the scope of claims that may be brought forward against India under the numerous BITs had begun to unravel. Two distinct but equally important IP-related court judgments have signaled the possibility of the intervention of investment treaties on India’s IP regime, and in the context of this paper, on affordable smartphones. </span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The first is the interim injunction passed by the Delhi High Court in <i>Ericsson v Micromax</i><a href="#fn28" name="fr28">[28]</a> that acknowledged that the plaintiff (Ericsson) has "made out a <i>prima facie</i> case in its favour and balance of convenience…also entirely in its favour." Accordingly, if interim compensation in accordance with a temporary Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) license between Micromax and Ericsson were not granted, "irreparable harm would be caused to the plaintiff."<a href="#fn29" name="fr29">[29]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The resulting interim arrangement included the execution of a FRAND license, based on FRAND terms, with Micromax agreeing to pay Ericsson between 1.25% and 2% of the sale price of their phone models to Ericsson.<a href="#fn30" name="fr30">[30]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The second of the two court judgments to be looked at is comprised of a series of pharmaceutical patent disputes between global pharmaceutical companies and Indian generic drug producers regarding the compulsory licensing of critical drugs related to cancer and HIV. In March 2012, the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks relied on the patentability clause of the Patents Act, 1970<a href="#fn31" name="fr31">[31]</a> to authorise an Indian generic drug producer, Natco Pharma,to manufacture and sell copies of Nexavar, a patented drug sold globally by Bayer.<a href="#fn32" name="fr32">[32]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>In April 2013, the Supreme Court allowed Indian generic drug manufacturers to manufacture a version of the cancer drug, Glivec (also known as “Gleevec”), referring to the same patentability clause of the Patents Act in coming to the conclusion that it did not have a feature that qualified it as a true invention.The court emphasised the importance of referring to the evolution of India’s patent regime, specifically the influence of what they term “important milestones,” such as the Justice Bakshi Tek Chand Committee Report, the Justice Ayyangar Committee Report, the growth of India’s domestic pharmaceutical industry after the enactment of the 1970 Patents Act, and the signing of the TRIPS agreement in determining whether a compulsory license should be granted.<a href="#fn33" name="fr33">[33]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Interestingly enough, an immediate reaction to these regulatory and court decisions in the area of pharmaceutical patents included press releases from large law firms discussing the benefits for multinational pharmaceutical companies in seeking dispute resolution under Bilateral Investment Treaties.<a href="#fn34" name="fr34">[34] </a>While there is a WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism under TRIPS, where contracting parties may request for consultation under Article XXII or initiate dispute resolution under Article XXIII of the GATT, there are a number of reasons why investors chose to file claims under BITs,<a href="#fn35" name="fr35">[35]</a> an aspect that will be discussed in the next post.</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Internationally as well, the intertwining of issues of Intellectual Property with BIT claimsis a new development, at the forefront of which is the Australian tobacco plain packaging international arbitration. Australia enacted the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act that increased the Graphic Health Warnings on the front of the packaging from 30% to 75%, and which prescribes every aspect of the appearance, size and shape of tobacco packaging and prohibits the use of trademarks, symbols or graphics other than the brand and variant name in plain font. Philip Morris Asia Limited (PMAL) filed a notice of arbitration under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT arguing that their intellectual property and goodwill were infringed by the Plain Packaging Act.<a href="#fn36" name="fr36">[36]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span><b>Pervasive Technology and India’s Growth</b><br />The Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression emphasised the importance of the internet, not only to enable individuals to exercise their right to freedom of expression but to promote the progress of society as a whole. The report called upon member states to make the internet widely available, accessible and affordable to all segments of society.The cutting off of users from Internet access, including on grounds of violation of IP,was described as disproportionate and in violation of the reasonable limitations to freedom of expression clause of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.<a href="#fn38" name="fr38">[38]</a></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>It is in light of these international developments and global arbitral awards in the area of IP that the compulsory licensing of budget smartphone patents in India needs to be evaluated.<br /></span></span></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. Latha Jishnu,<i> India’s many investment treaties make it vulnerable</i>, Down To Earth, Jan 31, 2012.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. For a commentary on the slew of FDI measures taken as part of India’s liberalisation, see M.S. Ahluwalia, <i>Economic Reforms in India since 1991: Has Gradualism worked?</i>,16(3) J. Econ. Perspectives 67, 73 (2002).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. See e.g. <i>Preamble</i> to, Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, India-Arg., Aug. 20, 1999, Ministry of Finance-Government of India, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Argentina.pdf; Preamble to Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, India-China, Nov. 21, 2006, Ministry of Finance-Government of India, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/China.pdf.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <i><span>Id.</span></i></p>
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. Ministry of Finance-Government of India, Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp?pageid=1 (last visited July 17, 2013); ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited July 18, 2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. <i>Id;India-Germany sign bilateral investment pact</i>, INDIAN EXPRESS, July 16, 1998; YashwantSinha, Foreword to Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, India-Ger., July 10, 1995, Ministry of Finance-Government of India, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Germany.pdf.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>]. Vodafone.com, News Release: Vodafone serves Notice Against Indian Government Under International Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/group_press_releases/2012/bit.html (last visited July 23, 2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Siddharth, Telenor seeks arbitration, claims $14 bn from govt in 2G case, Times of India, Mar. 27, 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. ShauvikGhosh, Sistema asks why India wants to delay arbitration proceedings, Live Mint, Oct. 1, 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. S. Bhushan & Puneeth Nagaraj, <i>Need to align Bilateral Investment Treaty regime with Global Reality</i>, THE HINDU, Jan. 6, 2013; Surabhi, <i>Govt. to review bilateral ties to avoid legal battle with telcos</i>, Indian Express, Apr. 13, 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. Deepshikha Sikarwar, <i>Government to draft model treaty on MNC’s mediation rush</i>, Economic Times, Jul. 9, 2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION ISSUE NOTE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. UNCTAD, UNCTAD publishes its review of investor-state dispute settlement, http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=453&Sitemap_x0020_Taxonomy=Investment%20and%20Enterprise;#607;#International Investment Agreements (IIA);#20;#UNCTAD Home (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr14" name="fn14">14</a>]. Sikarwar, <i>supra note 11</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr15" name="fn15">15</a>]. <i>Id</i>. at 29.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr16" name="fn16">16</a>]. Latha Jishnu, A treaty too many, DOWN TO EARTH, May 15, 2013 (few details are available of the Enron-Dabhol Investment Arbitration under the India-Mauritius Bilateral Investment Treaty).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr17" name="fn17">17</a>]. White Industries Australia Ltd. v Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, Nov. 30, 2011.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr18" name="fn18">18</a>]. Id. at ¶ 16.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr19" name="fn19">19</a>]. <i>Id</i>. at ¶ 14.3.5. For an understanding of the implications that the White Industries case has for India’s Investment Treaty program, see Prabhash Ranjan, <i>The White Industries Arbitration: Implications for India’s Investment Treaty Program</i>, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2012 available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/the-white-industries-arbitration-implications-for-indias-investment-treaty-program/.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr20" name="fn20">20</a>]. Vodafone.com, supra note 7. For an analysis of Vodafone and India’s investment arbitration claims, see RAAG YADAVA ET. AL., VODAFONE AND INDIA: A REVIEW OF CLAIMS IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr21" name="fn21">21</a>]. Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 733 of 2012, arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26529 of 2010, Supreme Court of India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr22" name="fn22">22</a>]. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (Civil) No: 423 of 2010 with W.P. (Civil) No: 10 of 2011. <i>Supreme Court verdict on 2G spectrum allocation</i>, The Hindu, Feb. 2, 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr23" name="fn23">23</a>]. Siddarth, <i>supra note 8</i>; Ghosh, <i>supra note 9</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr24" name="fn24">24</a>]. Sam Jones, <i>TCI initiates legal action against India</i>, Financial Times, Mar. 27, 2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr25" name="fn25">25</a>]. Debjoy Sengupta, <i>UK-based The Children's Fund demands higher dividend from Coal India</i>, The Economic Times, Feb 19,2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr26" name="fn26">26</a>]. See, http://www.vccircle.com/news/commodities/2013/06/25/childrens-investment-fund-sells-fifth-its-holding-coal-india.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr27" name="fn27">27</a>]. Department of Economic Affairs – Ministry of Finance, Indian Model Text of Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPA), available at http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/icsection/ Indian%20Model%20Text%20BIPA.asp?pageid=1.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr28" name="fn28">28</a>]. <i>Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Mercury Electronics & Anr</i>, I.A. No. 3825/2013 in CS(OS) 442/2013, Delhi High Court.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr29" name="fn29">29</a>]. <i>Id</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr30" name="fn30">30</a>]. <i>Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Mercury Electronics & Anr</i>, I.A. No. 4694/2013 in CS(OS) 442/2013, Delhi High Court.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr31" name="fn31">31</a>]. Section 3(d) - the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr32" name="fn32">32</a>]. Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, <i>India orders Bayer to license a Patented Drug</i>, NYT, March 12, 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr33" name="fn33">33</a>]. <i>Novartis AG v Union of India &Ors</i>., CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2706-2716 OF 2013 with <i>Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors</i>. CIVIL APPEAL No. 2728 OF 2013 with <i>M/s. Cancer Patients Aid Association v. Union of India & Ors</i>. CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2717-2727 OF 2013, Supreme Court of India (2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr34" name="fn34">34</a>]. See e.g. TREATY PROTECTION FOR GLOBAL PATENTS: A RESPONSE TO A GROWING PROBLEM FOR MULTINATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, JONES DAY (October 2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr35" name="fn35">35</a>]. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND TARIFFS , XXII and XIII (1994).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr36" name="fn36">36</a>]. NOTICE OF ARBITRATION, BETWEEN PHILIP MORRIS ASIA LIMITED AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (2011).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr37" name="fn37">37</a>]. U.N.G.A. - Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc A/HRC/17/27.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr38" name="fn38">38</a>]. <i>Id</i>. at 21-22. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR - The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/bilateral-inhibiting-treaty-investigating-challenges-that-bilateral-investment-treaties-pose-to-compulsory-licensing-of-pervasive-technology-patent-pools'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/bilateral-inhibiting-treaty-investigating-challenges-that-bilateral-investment-treaties-pose-to-compulsory-licensing-of-pervasive-technology-patent-pools</a>
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No publishergavinAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2013-09-02T14:45:08ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies: Patent Pools
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools
<b>In this research paper, Nehaa Chaudhari gives an analysis of patent pools. She discusses the working of a patent pool, study patent pool in other areas of technology, and patenting in telecom and related technology.</b>
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<p><b><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-patent-pools.pdf" class="internal-link">Click to download the full research paper here</a></b> (PDF, 475 Kb)</p>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The network landscape over the past few years has been characterized by several battles of supremacy between two or more rival technologies. <a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a> These battles have included, <i>inter alia, </i>the constant efforts at besting rivals in the arena of patenting innovations in technology, often as a result characterised by the imposition of high royalties on rivals, for the use of one’s patents. However, having realised that such efforts at besting the other could prove detrimental for all parties concerned in the long run, and stall technological advancements which would in turn translate into lower business revenue, mechanisms were devised to ensure a relatively equitable utilization of patents in the market place. One such mechanism that has been developed is that of patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent pools have been developed around most areas of high end technology and research and development. Over the course of this paper, the author has confined herself to a study on patent pools in the area of telecommunications, and the issues to be addressed therein. Specifically, the author will be dealing with patent pools around 3G, 4G, LTE, TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE technologies. Within this framework, the author seeks to examine what are patent pools, whether and what kind of patent pools exist, their associated costs, their licensing arrangements and the structure of the payment of royalty, and the feasibility of these patent pools.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Understanding Patent Pools</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent pools are agreements among patent owners through which patent owners combine their patents, waiving their exclusive rights to the patent to enable others, or themselves, to obtain rights to license the pooled patents.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> Therefore, such pools may be focussed either on cross licensing, that is companies mutually making their patents available to each other, or on out licensing, that is, a group of companies making a collection of patents available to companies that do not or might not have patents of their own to contribute to the pool.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a> Typically, modern patent pools combine patents of various companies and are around inventions that are required to implement an established industry standard, are licensed as a whole (on an <i>all or nothing basis) </i>and not as individual licenses for patents owned by various companies within that pool, and are available to any non member for licensing.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a>Such licensing is done under a standard agreement and royalty rates, on a non discriminatory basis. The exception to this rule is that if certain members have contributed patents to the pool, they may receive more favourable terms, in recognition of their cross licensing relationship to the pool.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5] </a>When viewed from a law and economics perspective, patent pools are seen to be an efficient institutional solution to various problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights, and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed. <a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6] </a>However, this perspective also warns about the antitrust risks that may arise when competitors or potential competitors are involved in the coordination of their intellectual property. For instance, such pools may be used to allocate markets or otherwise chill competition. <a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">The Working of a Patent Pool</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Generally, a patent pool may be administered in one of two ways- it may either have an administrative entity, or may also just be a system of cross licensing between two firms.<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8]</a> In case of the former, the licensing agency may be one of the patent holders, <a href="#fn9" name="fr9">[9]</a> or may be an independent licensing company (e.g. MPEG).<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The ownership of patents within the pool is retained by the owners, who then license them to the operator/administrator on a non exclusive basis, with sub licensing rights. This means that the owners are free to continue to license their patents on an individual basis, and the administrator also has the right to further license the patents to any party who is interested in licensing from the patent pool.<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11]</a> The responsibility of managing licensing and licenses is vested in the operator/administrator of the patent pool. Licensees are required to report sales and pay royalties to the pool administrator, who in turn would enforce the conditions of the license.<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12] </a>The distribution of royalties between the members of the pool is on the basis of a formula which may, or may not be transparent to non member licensees, with the pool operator retaining a management fee.<a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13] </a>Typically, pool licenses are also structured in a manner so as to render difficult early termination by the licensee. The nature of the contract, once signed by a licensee, is typically binding in nature. Therefore, this would mean that the administrator of the patent pool could sue the licensee for non performance of the contract.<a href="#fn14" name="fr14">[14]</a> However, unless a pool operator is a member of the pool itself, it cannot sue for the infringement of patents. <a href="#fn15" name="fr15">[15]</a> Therefore, in the event that a patented technology were to be utilised without having taken a license, one or more of the individual patent owners would be required to take legal action. The involvement of the pool operator would be limited to being a part of any settlement discussions, if they were to occur, since one of the options for the alleged infringer could be to obtain a license for the patent pool.<a href="#fn16" name="fr16">[16]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Drawing Parallels with Other Patent Pools</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this section of the paper, the author seeks to study patent pools in other areas of technology in order to better understand the structure and pricing of patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The ‘3C DVD’ Patent Pool </b><br />Established in 1998, the <i>3C DVD Patent Pool</i> was the brainchild of <i>Philips</i>, <i>Sony</i> and <i>Pioneer</i>, and <i>L.G.</i> was subsequently inducted as a member. <i>Philips</i> acts as a licensing administrator for patents held by all the companies, which are over two hundred in number. These patents include those for the manufacture of the DVD players, and for the manufacture of the DVD disks themselves. <a href="#fn17" name="fr17">[17]</a> The player license per unit royalty was set as 3.5% of the net selling price of each player sold. This was subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which after January 1, 2000 became $5 per unit. The disc license royalty was set as $0.05 per disc sold.<a href="#fn18" name="fr18">[18]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The ‘DVD- 6C’ Patent Pool</b><br />Established in June 1999, the members of this pool at the time of its inception were <i>Hitachi</i>, <i>Matsushita</i>, <i>Mitsubishi</i>, <i>Time</i> <i>Warner</i>, <i>Toshiba</i>, and <i>JVC</i>. This pool was also for the DVD-ROM and the DVD- Video formats, with <i>Toshiba </i>acting as the administrator. <a href="#fn19" name="fr19">[19] </a>The royalties were set at $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder, which saw a substantial reduction in 2003.<a href="#fn20" name="fr20">[20]</a> Subsequently, there were various changes that were made to this group, including the inclusion of newer standards, the joining and subsequent departure of IBM and other organizations as a member etc. <i>Hitachi</i> and <i>Panasonic</i> also act as regional agents in certain regions of the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The MPEG LA pool<br /></b>The MPEG-2 is a standard for describing the coding of data <i>inter alia, </i>on DVD discs. For MPEG-2, a patent pool has been established, where the administrator is an independent, external organization known as the MPEG Licensing Authority, that set itself the aim to develop a patent pool for this standard.<b> </b> <a href="#fn21" name="fr21">[21]</a> The MPEG LA invited parties that thought they owned patents essential to this standard to join the program, which took off in 1997. At present, the pool has over a hundred patents and thousands of licensees.<a href="#fn22" name="fr22">[22]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Patenting in Telecom and Related Technology</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this section of the paper, the author examines the working of patenting and patent pools in the telecommunications sector and in areas of related technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Early Developments and the Emergence of GSM<br /></b>Patent pools are slowly developing into a key component of the telecommunications and the technological industry. The technology industry has been said to be an <i>ecosystem</i>, wherein there is a complex correlation between those who develop the technology and those who implement it in the creation and development of products.<a href="#fn23" name="fr23">[23]</a> In the telecommunications industry for instance, each handset manufacturer has declared only a small percentage of the various types of intellectual property assets that are necessary to implement a 3G compatible cellular phone. Therefore, the working in such a context is that various companies develop different technologies, and the same is shared by various manufacturers that seek to make use of this technology.<a href="#fn24" name="fr24">[24]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The revival of patenting in the sector of telecommunications, post a period of decline in the decades of the 19540s to the 1980s, is attributed to the advent of the GSM standard for mobile communications in Europe.<a href="#fn25" name="fr25">[25] </a>In 1988, the main European operators invited equipment suppliers and developed a procedure wherein manufacturers would have to give up their intellectual property rights and to provide free world wide licenses for essential patents.<a href="#fn26" name="fr26">[26]</a> After opposition from the manufacturers, the approach was modified to one wherein the operators required the suppliers to sign a declaration agreeing to serve all of the GSM community on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory conditions.<a href="#fn27" name="fr27">[27]</a> In the early 1990s, Motorola by refusing to grant non discriminatory licenses for its substantial portfolio of essential patents and only agreeing to enter into cross license agreements further intensified the debate over IPRs in telecommunications. The company only lifted these restrictions after various countries across the world expressed a preference for this standard. The experience in this standard has demonstrated that it would not be accurate to expect that all parties holding essential patents would be willing to license them to all interested parties.<a href="#fn28" name="fr28">[28]</a> Companies were only willing to relax their licensing conditions once revenue generating opportunities increased.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The 3G3P and the UMTS<br /></b>In July 2000 the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) and its 18 partners notified various agreements to the end of establishing a worldwide patent platform. The purpose behind this was disclosed to be that of providing a voluntary and cost effective mechanism to evaluate, verify and license patents that were essential for third generation (3G) mobile communication systems.<a href="#fn29" name="fr29">[29] </a>It was also claimed that the said agreements would have pro competitive effects and that the purpose behind this Platform was the facilitation of access to technology and consequent entry into the markets.<a href="#fn30" name="fr30">[30]</a> On the intellectual property front, the purpose was to reduce cost uncertainties and the delays that were accompaniments of licensing numerous essential patents for complex technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While it has often been considered to be a patent pool, this arrangement has been said to be only similar to a patent pool.<a href="#fn31" name="fr31">[31]</a> The 3G3P itself has argued that since it was a mere facilitator of transactions between patent holders and licensees, and that membership was open to both licensors and licensees as opposed to only licensors as in the case of patent pools, it would be fallacious to classify the Platform as a patent pool. Further, it has also been argued that licensing by members is not restricted to the Platform and that there was no bundling or real pooling of the patents <i>per</i> <i>se</i> and those licensees have the opportunity to pick and choose between patents with the licensing being carried out on a bilateral basis. Additionally, unlike in a patent pool, there is no single license between the patent holders as a collective and the licensee, and the parties have a choice between the Standard License of the Platform, and a negotiable individual license.<a href="#fn32" name="fr32">[32]</a> A Standard License provides for Standard Royalty Rate, a Maximum Cumulative Royalty Rate and a Cumulative Royalty Rate.<a href="#fn33" name="fr33">[33] </a>Bilateral transactions on the other hand, are negotiated between the parties where the consideration is to be determined on <i>fair and equitable</i> terms.<a href="#fn34" name="fr34">[34]</a> This Platform also provides for a price cap, which, instead of being absolute and set at a pre-determined royalty rate, is a <i>default five percent maximum (not minimum) cumulative royalty rate for potential licensees per product category.</i><a href="#fn35" name="fr35">[35]</a> The royalty rate for each individual patent will differ for each of the licensees and this depends on the patent portfolio under each product category that the licensee has chosen.<a href="#fn36" name="fr36">[36]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The concerns and challenges of the GSM experience were well perceived during the determination of the course of action for UMTS. European actors were especially wary of <i>Qualcomm</i> and expected the firm to demand high license fees, with some even fearing them to be in excess of 10%.<a href="#fn37" name="fr37">[37]</a> Subsequently, various attempts at developing licensing schemes failed, until 2004 and the establishment of the W-CDMA Patent Licensing Programme for UMTS FDD patents.<a href="#fn38" name="fr38">[38] </a>At the outset, seven licensors offered their patents as a bundle to prospective licensors, a number which decreased over time.<a href="#fn39" name="fr39">[39]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Development of LTE Patent Pools<br /></b>The next stage in the process of innovation in the realm of telecommunications was the development of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Standard, which while being essential to 4G technology has also seen application in the realm of 3G. Consequently, patent pools or similar structures have been developed in these areas. LTE patents are being viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property resource in the mobile telecommunications industry, with most operators around the world building LTE networks.<a href="#fn40" name="fr40">[40]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As per in a study conducted in 2011, 23% of the patents about this technology were owned by <i>L.G. Electronics</i>, with <i>Qualcomm</i> coming in second with 21%. <i>Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, Nokia</i> and <i>Samsung</i> each owned 9%, China’s <i>ZTE</i> owned about 6%<a href="#fn41" name="fr41">[41]</a> and <i>Nortel</i> owned 4%, which were later sold to a consortium of <i>Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM)</i> and <i>Sony</i>, after <i>Nortel</i> filed for bankruptcy in 2009.<a href="#fn42" name="fr42">[42]</a> <i>Ericsson</i> also independently owns 2% of the patent pool and <i>RIM</i> owns 1%.<a href="#fn43" name="fr43">[43]</a> However, another analysis<a href="#fn44" name="fr44">[44]</a> of IP databases conducted by <i>ZTE</i> in 2011 revealed differing results. As per this analysis, <i>InterDigital </i>was the leader, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and the Technology arm controlling 11% of LTE essential patents. <i>Qualcomm</i> controlled 13%, <i>Nokia</i> and <i>Samsung</i> 9% each, <i>Ericsson</i> controlled 8%, as did <i>Huawei</i>, <i>ZTE</i> controlled 7%, <i>L.G</i>. controlled 6% and <i>NTT</i> <i>DoCoMo</i> brought up the rear with 5%. The remaining 11% was held by various other firms.<a href="#fn45" name="fr45">[45]</a> It is to be realized that these studies have often come under criticism from different companies, with each of them eager to portray themselves as the market leader.<a href="#fn46" name="fr46">[46]</a> Setting aside criticism driven by corporate egos, the principle of it, that is, the difficulty in assessing and valuing patents cannot be disputed. Valuing patents is far from merely counting the number of patents owned by a company. The complications are especially evident when it comes to determining which of these patents are essential and which of them aren’t. Additionally, the worth of these patents varies depending on the existence or the absence of certain conditions, including transfer restrictions, cross licensing arrangements, ownership and market conditions.<a href="#fn47" name="fr47">[47]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The aforesaid discussion reveals the complexity and the fragmentation of the LTE environment, which further underscored the need to have patent pools in this field. Although the need for a patent pool was realized in 2009-2010, given that the WCDMA patent pool had been met with very limited success,<a href="#fn48" name="fr48">[48]</a> industry watchers were reluctant to be optimistic. This was in part fuelled by the understanding of the attitude of dominant players, wherein they continued to believe that they could derive more monetary, cross licensing and litigation defence value if they did not pool their patents.<a href="#fn49" name="fr49">[49]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The development of LTE patent pools can be traced back to 2009, and the response of <i>Via Licensing</i>¸<i> Sisvel</i> and <i>MPEG LA</i> to a Request for Information on forming such a patent pool by the <i>Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN).</i><a href="#fn50" name="fr50">[50]</a> <i>Sisvel’s</i> proposal, which it subsequently made at a public conference in 2010 sought to demonstrate that patent pools could prevent excessive costs from royalty stacking.<a href="#fn51" name="fr51">[51] </a>Among various other examples, <i>Roberto Dini</i>, the founder of <i>Sisvel</i> suggested that if patents were to be licensed individually, for instance, 85 patents for MPEG video at 50 cents apiece would cost $42.50. As opposed to this, the patent pool charged $2.50.<a href="#fn52" name="fr52">[52]</a> In 2011, the <i>NGMN</i> reiterated its recommendation to all stakeholders in the mobile industry that were interested in developing patent pools to hasten their development process to avoid further delays in LTE licensing.<a href="#fn53" name="fr53">[53]</a> The <i>NGMN</i> also went on to state that it would be ideal if all the parties were to agree on a single patent pool that promoted reasonable royalties, offered certainty on the availability of the licenses for patents and created a framework for evaluation of their essentiality, where the value of the patents essential to the pool would be established by the industry.<a href="#fn54" name="fr54">[54]</a> These recommendations were not without their fair share of criticism, both, from industry watchers<a href="#fn55" name="fr55">[55]</a> and from vendors.<a href="#fn56" name="fr56">[56]</a> Notwithstanding these reservations, both, <i>Sisvel</i><a href="#fn57" name="fr57">[57]</a> and <i>Via</i> <i>Licensing</i> have gone on to issue calls for patents for the purposes of creating patent pools in the LTE marketplace.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <i>Sisvel </i>LTE Patent Pool materialized in late 2012, wherein licenses were offered under a portfolio of patents essential to LTE.<a href="#fn58" name="fr58">[58]</a> The pool includes patents owned by <i>Cassidian</i>, the <i>China Academy of Telecommunication Technology, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, France Telecom, TDF</i>, and <i>KPN</i>, in addition to some patents that had been originally filed by <i>Nokia </i>but were acquired by <i>Sisvel </i>in 2011.<a href="#fn59" name="fr59">[59]</a> The pool is also open to other organizations that have patents essential to LTE. At present, the current portfolio of these patents is available under standard terms and conditions. The running royalty rate is 0.99 Euros per device.<a href="#fn60" name="fr60">[60]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Having promised a launch within a few months in June, 2012<a href="#fn61" name="fr61">[61]</a> <i>Via Licensing </i>has also developed its own LTE Patent Pool, with the initial companies in this pool being <i>AT&T, </i><i>Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing, HP, KDDI Corporation, MTT DoCoMo, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica</i> and <i>ZTE.</i><a href="#fn62" name="fr62">[62]</a> Like <i>Sisvel’s</i> Patent Pool, this pool is also open to other organizations that believe they possess essential LTE patents, and they are encouraged to submit the same for evaluation.<a href="#fn63" name="fr63">[63]</a> The patent pool floated by <i>Via</i> leans heavily towards service providers, but some of the big players in the industry including <i>Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei Technologies</i> and <i>Samsung</i> <i>Electronics</i> are conspicuous by their absence.<a href="#fn64" name="fr64">[64]</a> This absence is felt even in <i>Sisvel’s</i> patent pool, with the reasoning being proposed<a href="#fn65" name="fr65">[65]</a> that these key patent holders may prefer private licensing and subsequent litigation over pooled resources in patent pools.<a href="#fn66" name="fr66">[66]</a> Understandably, the launch of the LTE Patent Pools has been met with approval by the <i>NGMN</i><a href="#fn67" name="fr67">[67]</a> but given the nascent stages in which both of these pools find themselves, it would be premature to comment (without first observing for a few months) the likelihood of their success or failure and how they would play out against each other.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The TD-SCDMA and the TD-LTE<br /></b>Reportedly, China has spent several billion dollars on the import of analog and GSM technology,<a href="#fn68" name="fr68">[68]</a> and the country’s mobile communications industry continues to be dominated by foreign players.<a href="#fn69" name="fr69">[69]</a> Therefore, in continuation of a purportedly <i>growing trend</i><a href="#fn70" name="fr70">[70]</a> in the area of telecommunications as well, domestically developed systems are being preferred and developed over standardized technologies that enjoy strong patent protection outside China.<a href="#fn71" name="fr71">[71]</a> Besides the avoidance of paying royalties to foreigners, the idea is also to use China’s strong market presence and have more participants in China’s home grown technology.<a href="#fn72" name="fr72">[72]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Time Divisional- Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), developed by the <i>China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT)</i>, in collaboration with <i>Datang </i>and<i> Siemens</i><a href="#fn73" name="fr73">[73]</a> is a Chinese indigenously developed 3G technology standard developed by China to reduce its dependence on western standards.<a href="#fn74" name="fr74">[74]</a> Interestingly however, it has been reported that the Chinese hold core patent technology only about 7% whereas most of the rest of it is taken by other foreign organizations.<a href="#fn75" name="fr75">[75]</a> In 2000, an industry consortium, the TD-SCDMA forum was established. The participants were <i>China</i> <i>Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel, </i>and<i> Siemens</i>, with the objective of developing and supporting this technology. Government support was received in 2002, following which the <i>TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance </i>was founded by well known market players including <i>Datang</i>, <i>SOUTEC</i>, <i>Holley</i>, <i>Huawei</i>, <i>LENOVO, ZTE, CEC</i> and <i>China</i> <i>Putian</i>. There has also been the creation of various joint ventures with international giants such as <i>Alcatel</i>, <i>Ericsson</i>, <i>Nokia</i>, (erstwhile) <i>Nortel</i>, <i>Philips</i>, <i>Samsung</i> and <i>Siemens</i> have also been created.<a href="#fn76" name="fr76">[76]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information about the existence of patent pools in this technology has been hard to come by. One of the few to write about patent pools in his 2008 paper,<a href="#fn77" name="fr77">[77]</a> <i>Dazheng Wang</i> proposes patent pools as a solution to the problem of commercialization of TD-SCDMA. He suggests that the framework of this patent pool should be on the industry principles of fair, reasonable and non discriminatory licensing terms for essential patents, with the end result being one of increased innovation and competition and an overall increase in market presence. Interestingly, a few articles<a href="#fn78" name="fr78">[78]</a> on blog posts on the internet speak about the existence of patent pools and their apparent misuse<a href="#fn79" name="fr79">[79]</a> as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is submitted that these inconsistencies regarding the division of patents between various patent holders, where the percentage of patents held by each company have been pegged differently,<a href="#fn80" name="fr80">[80]</a> and about the existence of a patent pool or not raise pressing concerns about the payment of royalties and how licensing works in such a situation. On a very basic level, in order to be able to pay royalties and enter into licensing agreements, the existence of an identified, non disputed patent holder would be the <i>sine qua non, </i>which seems to be missing in the case of patents for TD-SCDMA. This problem is only further compounded by the lack of clarity on the very existence of patent pools. Had there been specified patent pools, the issues of determination of essential patents and the setting of royalties and licensing fees would have been standardized, a situation that cannot be invoked, without dispute, in the present Chinese context.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is further submitted that despite China being the world’s largest market for mobile communications, and its progress from a mere importer to a developer of some parts of technology,<a href="#fn81" name="fr81">[81]</a> the Chinese experiment with TD-SCDMA seems to have met with limited success, in comparison to what was envisaged. For instance, while an agency had forecast that the number of TD-SCDMA subscribers in 2010 would be 34 million, by April, 2010 there were only 8 million or (even lower) subscribers.<a href="#fn82" name="fr82">[82]</a> One of the reasons for preferring other standards, for instance, the W-CDMA is the number of handsets compatible with the same and the consequent variety that is available to the consumer. To illustrate, one could look at the figures from June, 2010. At this point of time <i>China Unicom</i> had 94 models for W-CDMA from twenty four manufacturers including nine foreign ones, whereas <i>China Mobile</i> had only twenty eight models that were compatible with TD-SCDMA.<a href="#fn83" name="fr83">[83]</a> Interestingly, if one were to measure popularity in terms of sheer numbers, TD-SCDMA would emerge the winner over W-CDMA by a couple of million subscribers, but if the growth rate were to be considered, W-CDMA would come out on top. While TD-SCDMA grew only by 24%, W-CDMA has grown at 32% monthly since the start of its service is October, 2009.<a href="#fn84" name="fr84">[84]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">China’s experiments with creating its home grown telecommunication standards have not stopped with the development of the TD-SCDMA, with the country being on track in the development of the TD-LTE. Reports suggest that although the systems are in ‘trial’ mode officially, the 4G spectrum situation remains uncertain.<a href="#fn85" name="fr85">[85]</a> It is submitted that although this is in the nascent stages as compared to the TD-SCDMA, the concerns expressed earlier about TD-SCDMA and the suggestions made therein for the technology to realise its full potential would be equally applicable in this scenario as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, in light of this discussion it would not be fallacious to conclude that while the TD-SCDMA, and now more recently the TD-LTE standard might still be in its nascent stages, on a fundamental level it seems to have not fulfilled the objectives with which it was developed, especially given that a sizeable portion of its patents continue to be owned by foreign corporations. In addition to the challenges of attracting subscribers, it would also need to streamline its system of patents, royalties and licensing, if it wants to have a truly global or even national presence. To this end perhaps patent pools structured along the lines of those being developed or in place for other mobile communication technologies might provide a viable solution meriting consideration.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Concluding Observations</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the fundamental concerns that plague most downstream organizations in the mobile communications sector is the prevalence of high licensing fees that need to be paid on essential patents, the cost of which often trickles down to the customers. A study on the licensing arrangements prevalent at the moment<a href="#fn86" name="fr86">[86]</a> reveals that as of the moment, the result of royalty rate caps is that they save money for downstream manufacturers, but this is at the expense of upstream licensors. The most significant savers are the ones downstream with no IP to trade, and vertically integrated companies while losing some revenue, are able to save significantly more in reduced expenses.<a href="#fn87" name="fr87">[87]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, it comes as no surprise that efforts at limiting aggregate licensing fees have been at the forefront over the past couple of years. It is in this scenario that patent pools have developed, with operators such as <i>Via Licensing</i> and <i>Sisvel</i> even promoting themselves as being able to put together patent pools that would greatly limit licensing fees.<a href="#fn88" name="fr88">[88] </a>However, some owners of intellectual property continue to find bilateral licensing and cross licensing to be more profitable as opposed to patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the key concerns when it comes to fore when dealing with how patent pools are structured is about the distribution of income received from royalties within the members of the pool, which ties in with the bigger question of classifying patents as essential and non essential. More often than not, patent pools also have to grapple with the problem of members having conflicting interests. For instance, manufacturers have the incentive to cap aggregate royalties of certain essential patents that they would use in manufacturing, in order to reduce their licensing costs. However, these manufacturers could have also brought their own essential patents to the pool, perhaps of a new way of doing things, and would certainly be averse of having caps imposed on these royalties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the key other considerations that patent pools need to take into account include the royalty rates affixed. In an interview some time ago, the founder of <i>Sisvel</i>, went on to state that while affixing these royalty rates, there could be no discrimination against licensees, since that would be a sure fire way of ensuring the collapse of the patent pool.<a href="#fn89" name="fr89">[89]</a> Additionally, patent pools also need to account for the difference in regulatory mechanism and their execution that exists across jurisdictions. For instance, customs officials in France pay a lot more attention to counterfeit goods than they would to patent infringing products, whereas those in Germany would have a keen eye on the latter.<a href="#fn90" name="fr90">[90]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Various other concerns have also been identified with regard to patent pools over time. One of these is that they could potentially eliminate competition that comes from outside of patent pools.<a href="#fn91" name="fr91">[91]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, patent pools are not all inclusive, since participation is entirely voluntary. Therefore, patent pools would not even be reasonably expected to cover all essential patents required to make a standardised product. This problem is rendered even more complex as a result of the presence of multiple patent pools around the same technology, as in the case of DVDs and more recently, LTE technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In sum, while portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets by reducing transaction costs for licensees, while preserving to a definitive extent financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing inventions and undertake new research, the significant shortcomings of these pools also need to be taken into account before they can be heralded as the solution to problems presented by complex patent landscapes. While voluntary patent pools might have proved to be beneficial in some respects, the imposition of patent pools would be a fallacious approach to undertake.</p>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. Hui Yan, <i>The 3G Standard Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship?, </i>DRUID Working Paper No 07-01, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1454&cf=9 (last accessed 07 12 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, <i>Efficient Patent Pools,</i> 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 691, 691 (2004)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. <i>Patent Pools- Some Not So Frequently Answered Questions, </i>available at <a href="http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html">http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. Philip B. Nelson, <i>Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, </i>Rutgers Law Journal, Volume 38:539, 559 (2007)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>].</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1984).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. Philips has been known to have been the licensing agency for patent pools where it was a member</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr14" name="fn14">14</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr15" name="fn15">15</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr16" name="fn16">16</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr17" name="fn17">17</a>]. Rudi Bekkers et. al., <i>Patent Pools and Non Assertion Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi Party IPR Holders in Standardization</i>, available at <a href="http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf">http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf</a> 22 (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr18" name="fn18">18</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr19" name="fn19">19</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr20" name="fn20">20</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr21" name="fn21">21</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr22" name="fn22">22</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr23" name="fn23">23</a>]. Keith Mallinson, <i>Fixing IP Prices with Royalty Rate Caps and Patent Pools, </i>available at <a href="http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html">http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr24" name="fn24">24</a>]. <i>Id.</i> See Appendix 1 for a graphical representation of declared intellectual property assets in 2009.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr25" name="fn25">25</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 25</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr26" name="fn26">26</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 27</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr27" name="fn27">27</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 27</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr28" name="fn28">28</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 28</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr29" name="fn29">29</a>]. Dessy Choumelova, <i>Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Agreements- the Particular Case of 3G3P, </i>available at <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf-">http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf-</a> 41 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr30" name="fn30">30</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr31" name="fn31">31</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr32" name="fn32">32</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr33" name="fn33">33</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr34" name="fn34">34</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr35" name="fn35">35</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42-43.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr36" name="fn36">36</a>]. <i>Id</i> at 43.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr37" name="fn37">37</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 29.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr38" name="fn38">38</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 39.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr39" name="fn39">39</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 39.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr40" name="fn40">40</a>]. Elizabeth Woyke,<i> Identifying the Tech Leaders in LTE Wireless Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/">http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr41" name="fn41">41</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr42" name="fn42">42</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr43" name="fn43">43</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr44" name="fn44">44</a>]. Caroline Gabriel, <i>ZTE Claims 7% of LTE Essential Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm">http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr45" name="fn45">45</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr46" name="fn46">46</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr47" name="fn47">47</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 40.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr48" name="fn48">48</a>]. Keith Mallinson, <i>Mallinson: Uncertain Futures in LTE Patent Pool Licensing, </i>available at <a href="http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25">http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr49" name="fn49">49</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr50" name="fn50">50</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr51" name="fn51">51</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr52" name="fn52">52</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: left; ">[<a href="#fr53" name="fn53">53</a>]. <i>NGMN Board Recommendation on LTE Patent Pool, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool">http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr54" name="fn54">54</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr55" name="fn55">55</a>]. Caroline Gabriel, <i>NGMN’s Calls for an LTE Patent Pool Will be Futile in the Current IPR Climate</i>, available at <a href="http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/">http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr56" name="fn56">56</a>]. Michelle Donegan, <i>Vendors Balk at LTE Patent Pool Proposal, </i>available at <a href="http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362">http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr57" name="fn57">57</a>]. <i>SISVEL: Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), </i>available at <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458">http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr58" name="fn58">58</a>]. <i>LTE Patent Pool from Sisvel</i>, available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel">http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr59" name="fn59">59</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr60" name="fn60">60</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr61" name="fn61">61</a>]. Mike Dano, <i>Via Promises LTE Patent Pool Launch Within Months, </i>available at <a href="http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15">http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15</a> (last accessed 07 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr62" name="fn62">62</a>]. <i>LTE Patent Pool Available Through Via’s Licensing Program, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program">http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr63" name="fn63">63</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr64" name="fn64">64</a>]. Stephen Lawson, <i>Lte Patent Pool Brings Together Technologies From At&T, Zte, Hp And Others, </i>available at <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others">http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr65" name="fn65">65</a>]. Peter White, <i>Sisvel LTE Patent Pool Emerges After All- Majors Still Hold Back from Committing, </i>available at <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm">http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr66" name="fn66">66</a>]. Shankar Pandiath, <i>Sisvel Launches Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), </i>available at <a href="http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm">http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr67" name="fn67">67</a>].<i>NGMN Board Welcomes Launch of LTE Patent Pool, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool">http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr68" name="fn68">68</a>]. ELSPETH THOMSON AND JON SIGURDSON (EDS.), CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 17 (2008, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr69" name="fn69">69</a>]. Cong Cao, <i>Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry, </i>available at <a href="http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924">http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr70" name="fn70">70</a>]. Peter Zura, <i>China Launches TD-SCDMA Telecom Standard</i>¸ available at <a href="http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html">http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr71" name="fn71">71</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr72" name="fn72">72</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr73" name="fn73">73</a>]. <i>TD-SCDMA (time division synchronous code division multiple access)</i>, available at <a href="http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA">http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA</a> (last accessed 07 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr74" name="fn74">74</a>]. SHAHD AKHTAR AND PATRICIA ARINTO (EDS.), DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC : 2009-2010 8 (2010, Sage Publications, New Delhi).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr75" name="fn75">75</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 1 at 2. See Appendix 2 for the breakup of patent holding. However, see details on <i>Infra</i> note 78 for a contradictory view, wherein China claims to own 30% of all TD-SCDMA patents.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr76" name="fn76">76</a>]. Pierre Vialle, <i>On the relevance of Indigenous Standard Setting Policy: the Case of TD-SCDMA in China, </i>2<sup>nd</sup> International Conference on Economics, Trade and Development, (2012) 36 IPEDR 184-185 (IACSIT Press, Singapore).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr77" name="fn77">77</a>]. Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: <i>A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA’s Commercialization</i>, <a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744">http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr78" name="fn78">78</a>]. <i>China Owns 30% of TD-SCDMA Related Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html">http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr79" name="fn79">79</a>]. <i>The Legal Regulation on Patent Pool Misuse, </i>available at <a href="http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html">http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr80" name="fn80">80</a>]. <i>Supra </i>notes 75 and 78.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr81" name="fn81">81</a>]. Tomoo Marukawa, <i>Chinese Innovations in Mobile Telecommunications: Third Generation vs. “Guerrilla Handsets”, </i>Paper presented at the IGCC Conference: Chinese Approaches to National Innovation, La Jolla, California, June 28-29, 2010 at 1.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr82" name="fn82">82</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 8.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr83" name="fn83">83</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 9.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr84" name="fn84">84</a>]. <i>Id</i> at 9.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr85" name="fn85">85</a>]. <i>China to Speed Up TD-LTE Process, </i>available at <a href="http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29">http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr86" name="fn86">86</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr87" name="fn87">87</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr88" name="fn88">88</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr89" name="fn89">89</a>]. <i>Sisvel’s Patent Strategy, </i>available at <a href="http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html">http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html</a> (last accessed 12 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr90" name="fn90">90</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr91" name="fn91">91</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaIntellectual Property RightsPublicationsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2013-07-03T06:57:59ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place — A Presentation by Sunil Abraham
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place
<b>The 2012 Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest was organized in Rio de Janeiro from December 15 to 17, 2012. The Centre for Internet & Society partnered FGV, Washington College of Law, the American Embassy, African Information Research and Training and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development in this event. Sunil Abraham made a presentation on Pervasive Technologies on the opening day, December 15, 2012.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham presented on 13 different smartphones from the Indian market such as: The Classroom in a Box, The Supercharger, The Networker, The Linguist, TV on the Go, The Spy, The Semi-Smartphone, The Trendy, The Boombox, 3D, The Mighty Mini, The Pianist, and the Indian Experience.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most of the above devices are manufactured in China and imported into India through local companies for domestic consumption and made available for its 900 million mobile subscribers.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies.pdf" class="internal-link">Download the presentation</a> [PDF, 4.61 Mb]</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place</a>
</p>
No publishersunilFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2013-02-13T07:05:15ZBlog EntryExploring the Internals of Mobile Devices — Report from a One-day Workshop at TERI
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exploring-the-internals-of-mobile-devices
<b>On October 27, 2012, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) organised a one-day workshop on exploring the internals of mobile technologies at the TERI Southern Regional Centre in Bangalore. The workshop received more than 140 registrants, of which approximately 40 attended. In this post, Jadine Lannon explores the discussions and the developments that took place at the workshop.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The event brought together professional and non-professional individuals and communities interested in exploring mobile technologies. The aim of the workshop was the provide participants with the knowledge and tools to better understand the internals of mobile technologies as well as familiarize the attendees with CIS's "Pervasive Technologies" research project.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Anil Kumar Pugalia, Sudar Muthu and Pankaj Bharadiya were the expert speakers. The event was supported by the well-established online security, hardware and software domain communities NULL, SecurityXploaded, Computer Club India and Bangalore Android User Group.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Sudar Muthu: Capabilities of Arduino</h3>
<table class="vertical listing">
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<p><iframe frameborder="0" height="356" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/14911204" width="427"> </iframe></p>
<div style="text-align: center; "><b><a href="http://www.slideshare.net/Sudar/capabilities-of-arduino-including-due" target="_blank" title="Capabilities of Arduino (including Due)">Capabilities of Arduino (including Due)</a> from <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/Sudar" target="_blank">Sudar Muthu</a></b></div>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>Sudar Muthu began the workshop with a talk on the capabilities of Arduino and the ways in which Arduino can be used to interface with different external devices.</p>
<p>He discussed with us different types of Arduino, the technical specifications of Arduino, the ways that Arduino can be used to interface with external boards and the interfacing that he has been able to accomplish using Arduino and various devices.</p>
<p>The slides from his Powerpoint presentation are viewable on the left.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Anil Kumar Pugalia: Mobile Hacking using Linux Drivers</h3>
<table class="vertical listing">
<tbody>
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<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p> </p>
<p>Anil Kumar Pugalia followed Sudar's presentation with an exploration of methods of mobile hacking using Linux drivers.</p>
<p>He discussed various Linux kernel hacking techniques as well as tools that can be used to perform reverse-engineering on a mobile device.</p>
<p>The slides from Anil's presentation can be accessed on the right.</p>
</td>
<th><iframe frameborder="0" height="356" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/14917053" width="427"> </iframe>
<div style="text-align: center; "><b><a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anil_pugalia/mobile-hacking" target="_blank" title="Mobile Hacking using Linux Drivers">Mobile Hacking using Linux Drivers</a> from <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/anil_pugalia" target="_blank">Anil Kumar Pugalia</a></b></div>
</th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The following two talks were delivered by Pankaj Bharadiya from Texas Instruments. In his first presentation, he explored hardware hacking and board/chips capabilities. His second talk was on porting open software on hardware. In addition to his discussions, he also covered porting Android on open hardware. The slides from his presentations will be posted shortly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After all the presentations, the participants were invited to handle and open up the 12 mobile devices that CIS purchased for our Pervasive Mobile Technologies research project. The participants worked in teams of two to five members to open up the mobile devices and observe their internals. We asked the participants to record any information about the internals of the mobiles that they were able to find, including the make, model, and serial numbers of the components. Pictures from this part of the workshop will be posted shortly.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All of the collected information was recorded and distributed among the participants so that the group could continue to work on identifying the mobile internals and the various data sheets associated with each component. This data will be added to the specifications of each mobile device as it is collected. CIS hopes to continue to collaborate with the individuals and communities who participated in this workshop as well as other interested individuals who may have been unable to attend the one-day workshop to proceed with this process of identification. We also hope to hold a second event, a one- to two-day hackathon, sometime in December to continue the exploration of our mobile devices.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS would like to thank Anil Kumar Pagalia, Sudar Muthu, Pankaj Bharadiya, Khasim Syed Mohammed, Akash Mahajan (NULL representative), Amit Malik (SecurityXploaded representative), the NULL, SecurityXploaded, Bangalore Android User Group and Computer Club India communities, and all of the participants for making the workshop a huge success and aiding us in our ongoing research project!</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">You can reach participating communities at following links:</p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/11uCKM">http://bit.ly/11uCKM</a></li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/dByU6N">http://bit.ly/dByU6N</a></li>
</ul>
<p>For any further information on the past workshop or future events, please connect with us:</p>
<ol>
<li>Jadine Lannon (<a href="mailto:jadine@cis-india.org">jadine@cis-india.org</a>), research intern for the A2K programme</li>
<li>Amarjit Singh (<a href="mailto:amarjitlife@gmail.com">amarjitlife@gmail.com</a>), the Workshop Manager.</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p><i>Click below for a slideshow of the pictures from the workshop</i>:</p>
<ol>
<hr />
<p>Photos<iframe frameborder="0" height="400" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/15437161" width="476"></iframe></p>
<hr />
</ol>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exploring-the-internals-of-mobile-devices'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exploring-the-internals-of-mobile-devices</a>
</p>
No publisherjdineAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2012-12-01T05:57:53ZBlog EntryPervasive Mobile Technologies: Meet Our Mobile Devices!
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices
<b>As a part of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research project, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is researching 12 mobile phone devices to generate a better understanding of the intellectual property (IP) implications of pervasive mobile technologies available in the Indian market. This post is an introduction to our 12 mobile phones.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As detailed in my introductory blog on <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place">Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace Research Initiative</a>, CIS will be conducting research on mobile technologies as a small off-shoot of the overall project. Pervasive technologies that can be purchased for less than USD 100 play an integral role in bringing access to knowledge to those that routinely face barriers to the consumption of information. However, their legality, particularly in terms of their use of IP, is unclear. In order to better understand the legal environment in which these technologies exist, CIS purchased 12 mobile phones to study the patent implications of their hardware, software and content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Through examination, research, interviews and consultancies, we hope to create an in-depth documentation of each device, an extensive database or account of the patents implicated, and a number of narrower research avenues on topics related to IP, patents, and mobile technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This blog post will serve as a brief introduction to our mobile devices. The information that I have compiled was discovered through shallow interaction with the phones — turning a device on and exploring the interface and content — which is why the documentation is not particularly extensive at this point. I have had difficulty identifying certain features of some of the phones, like which media formats they support or whether or not they are EDGE<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> — enable, but I am confident that I will be able to ascertain these specifications in the near future; however, certain features, like what OS (operating system) they run on and what chip set they are using, will require collaboration with experts to identify. The exploration is on-going, and more information will be posted as it is discovered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Aside from all of the usual functions of a mobile phone (making calls, receiving calls, saving numbers, etc.), each of our mobiles devices possess what I have termed the "basics": dual GSM SIM capabilities with dual standby, the ability to connect to 2G networks, GPRS, a WAP browser (except device 011), bluetooth capabilities, a microSD slot, a dual camera (a camera that takes still photos and records video), an FM radio receiver and the ability to play .mp3 audio files and .mp4 video files, record audio and view .jpg images. Each phone also has a handful of various "utilities" and "extras" applications (such as an alarm, a calculator, a calendar, etc.) as well as at least one game. The full specifications of each phone will be provided in the near future, along with further pictures of each device.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As much of the research in this project pertains to the IP implications of the devices, we have decided to withhold the make and model of each device to shield the producers from any negative repercussions that could be the result of our research inquiries. They have been assigned the numeric code names 001 to 012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Without further ado, I'd like to introduce you to our mobile phones:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">001 - The Classroom in a Box</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 6,300.00 / $113.00</p>
</div>
<p><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Pico-Projector</li>
<li>Analog TV Receiver</li>
<li>MS Office Document Viewer</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/001Front.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="001Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This bar-design feature phone has all of the basics with a few added bonuses: an analog TV receiver, viewer, and a built-in pico-projector that projects the mobile's screen onto any surface. Though this phone does not technically fall into our definition of pervasive technologies because of its price, it was the first mobile phone with a built-in pico-projector as well as an analog TV receiver available on the Indian market for less than Rs. 10,000 when it was purchased more than a year ago. Since then, other sub-USD100 pico-projector mobile devices have made an appearance on the Indian market, but each of those devices appear to have been discontinued and 001 continues to be the cheapest pico-projector mobile phone available for purchase.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">002 - The Supercharger</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,499.00 / $45.00</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
</div>
<ul>
<li>Solar Panel </li>
<li>Hindi Keyboard</li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/002Front.jpg" alt="null" style="float: left; " class="image-inline" title="002Front" /></p>
</th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">002 is a sleek candybar feature phone with a particularly interesting innovation. While it uses a standard lithium-ion battery that can be recharged via connection to a wall socket or electrical device (such as a laptop), it also has a built-in solar panel that can generate some charge as well. The solar panel technology is not yet very efficient—the panel would have to be placed in direct sunlight for multiple hours to fully charge the battery—but it represents an important step towards untethering mobile phones and mobile phone users from costly electricity infrastructure, a development that would have significant implications for rural populations who have unreliable access to electricity.</td>
<th>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/002Back.jpg" alt="null" style="float: right; " class="image-inline" title="002Back" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3></h3>
<h3>003 - The Networker</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,250.00 / $22.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Wi-Fi</li>
<li>Optical Trackpad</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
<li>Support for 8 Languages</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/003Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="003Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>With a boxy, QWERTY-keyboard design and relatively small screen, 003 does not appear, at first glance, to be anymore than an average feature phone — but appearances can be deceiving. With a highly responsive optical trackpad, an analog TV receiver, BlackBerry-esque interface and WiFi capabilities, this mobile device packs some sophisticated technologies and features. Further, it is the only phone in our collection that can connect to the internet using WLAN networks.</p>
<p>Considering that some of the other devices are much more complex — and expensive — than 003, the wide-spread exclusion of WiFi capabilities in our collection is intriguing. Is the choice to include or exclude mobile technology a matter of economics? Are cellular WiFi components expensive, and producers are choosing to exclude WiFi as a method of cutting costs? Is it simply a response to patterns of consumer demand? The WiFi questions will be explored in more depth in up-coming blog posts.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>004 - The Linguist</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,250.00 / $40.00</p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span class="s1"> </span>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Support for 14 Languages</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
<li>Large Number of Pre-loaded Apps</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/004Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="004Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it may be hard to believe at first glance, this mobile device was purchased for less than Rs. 2500. With its large internal memory, support for 14 different languages (including Tamil, Bengali and Hindi), and its large array of pre-loaded games and social media applications already set it apart from the less sophisticated mobiles in our collection, 004 also runs on a mysterious Android-like operating system similar to the popular MIUI Android ROM developed by the Chinese-based company Xiaomi Tech. This give it a very sophisticated interface with the look and feel of a smartphone, though the device itself lacks many of the capabilities that are often considered as smartphone criteria (GPS, high-speed internet access, push/pull email, Wi-Fi, an app store, etc.). Because this device, and others like it in our collection, have more sophisticated hardware, software and content than a generic feature phone, but are not as capable as a smartphone, I have taken to calling these devices "semi-smart". <br /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>005 - TV on the Go</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,450.00 / $26.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span class="s1"> </span>Analog TV receiver</li>
<li>Arabic Keyboard</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/005Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="005Front" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it doesn't have any particular innovation that sets it apart from the other devices, 005 is a hardy QWERTY-design feature phone with all of the basics as well as a good collection of social media applications and an analog TV receiver. Though its keyboard can be programmed to write in English, Tamil, Arabic and Hindi script, the buttons have the Arabic <i>abjad</i> on them, which brings up the question of which market this mobile was originally designed for. <br /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>006 - The Spy</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,680.00 / $30.00</p>
</div>
<p><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES:</b></span></p>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Secondary “Spy” Camera</li>
<li>Ability to behave as a modem via USB connection</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/006Camera.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="006Camera" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">006 is an interesting candy bar feature phone. On initial examination, this mobile appears to be a completely generic feature phones with all of the basics, but nothing auxiliary. However, a more careful inspection will reveal a secondary camera with an unusual placement — instead of being place at the top of the screen like all of the other secondary cameras found on our devices, this camera is situated on the right hand side of the phone. <br /></td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_006Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="006Front" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The manufacturer of this device actually refers to this secondary camera as a "spy" camera, and it is truly an appropriate name; from a distance, it looks more like a headphone jack than a camera, and its placement allows for photo and video to be taken without any suspicious movement or positioning by the user. The secondary camera has 1.3 megapixels and can take relatively high resolution photos and videos.</p>
<h3>007 - The Semi-Smartphone</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,150.00 / $39.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS (maybe MIUI)</li>
<li>USB Tethering</li>
<li>Push Email</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/007Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="007Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Device 007 is a semi-smart touchscreen phone, and by far the most sophisticated device in our collection. We believe that it uses MIUI OS, which gives it a very similar look to Android and a functionality that is reminiscent of iOSx. While it doesn't have an app store, 007 is jam-packed with pre-loaded applications and can support a wide variety of file formats. Further, while the phone cannot connect to WLAN networks on its own; it can connect to WiFi by tethering to a networked device via USB connection.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>008 - The Trendy</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,350.00 / $42.00</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Support for 9 languages</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/008Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="008Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Another mainstream look-alike, 008 runs the same unidentified OS as device 004 and has similar capabilities. Its plastic casing is a bit flimsy, but its "back", "home" and "list" buttons are touch sensitive. Its sophisticated OS and pre-loaded applications make it a semi-smart device.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>009 - The Boombox</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,420.00 / $26.00</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Huge built-in speaker</li>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
</ul>
<table class="vertical listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/009.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="009Front" /></p>
</th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it is less recognizable than some of the other devices, this mobile may have one of the significant smartphone qualifiers that our other devices lack: an app store — or what appears to be an app store. The app store icon itself is actually the icon for the Android app store, but the interface is completely different, and the only thing available for download is a handful of games. Interestingly enough, many of these games also make appearances on some of the other mobile devices (like fishing joy and tear clothes). Further, I would not call this phone semi-smart, as its interface is not particularly any more sophisticated than some of the other feature phones in our collection.</td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/009Back.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="009Back" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<table class="invisible">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>009 also features a large built-in speaker, the Opera Mini mobile browser and an Android-like OS, though this OS is less sophisticated than that of 004 and 008.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>010 - 3D</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,440.00 / $26.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Pre-loaded Stereoscopic (3D) videos</li>
<li>Support for 13 languages</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/0010Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="0010Front" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">This semi-smart touchscreen phone also has an Android-like operating system. Though it lacks an app store and push-email, it comes pre-loaded with a veritable smorgasbord of games and social media applications and supports 13 different languages. It also comes with a pair of 3D glasses and two short, very basic pre-loaded stereoscopic videos.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>011 - The Mighty Mini</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 750.00 / $14.00</p>
<p class="p1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Dual GSM SIM support</li>
<li>Best bang-for-your-buck for a basic mobile phone</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/011.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="011" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At Rs. 750, this little feature phone was the least expensive phone we could find that still had almost all of the basics. Even without any extra features, it is still almost Rs. 200 cheaper than the majority of the most basic GSM dual SIM mobiles available on the formal Indian market<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a>— and, in most cases, 011 has more capabilities than most of those devices. With .mp3 and .mp4 file playback, a dual camera, colour display, a WAP browser, MMS messaging support, two charging ports and Urdu and Hindi language support, this mobile phone personifies affordable accessibility to knowledge and media.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>012 - The Pianist</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,550.00 / $28.00</p>
<p class="p1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Touch piano</li>
<li>Two charging ports</li>
<li>Support for a multitude of audio, video and image formats</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/012.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="012" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p> </p>
<p>012 is a basic candy bar feature phone with a particularly novel innovation: a touch piano. It is quite sensitive to touch and has a one octave range.</p>
</td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/012Back.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="012Back" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr />
<h3></h3>
<h3>013 - The Indian Experience</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,100.00 / $38.00</p>
</div>
<p><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>India<b> </b>specific content</li>
<li>Proprietary App Store</li>
</ul>
<table class="vertical listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/013Front.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="013Front" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>This little touchscreen mobile is chockfull of “Indian-specific” content, including an application that links directly to an online portal where consumers can download “Hungama” videos, music and movies onto the phone—for a price. Many of the games also charge a monthly user fee, though interestingly enough, Angry Birds and Talking Tom Cat are pre-loaded and free to play. This phone also has a proprietary app store with a limited amount of mBounce<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">4]</a> applications and games available for purchase. I am not yet sure if this app store can be remotely updated with new apps, but the device can receive data vis USB connection, so it is possible that new applications can be added through direct file transfer.</p>
<p>It also has keyboard support for English, Hindi and Tamil, but the interface cannot be set it appear in anything other than English.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, also known as Enchanced GPRS (EGPRS) is a mobile phone technology that also improved data transmission on GSM networks. It is considered a pre-3G radio technology. Read more about it here: <a class="external-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution</a><br />[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. Information retrieved from <a href="http://www.flipkart.com/">www.flipkart.com</a>. The prices shown here have been verified as being the same or very similar (though never more expensive) to the prices offered by each brand's official distributors. See Flipkart search links:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mircomax: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/UW3q0U">http://bit.ly/UW3q0U</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Spice Mobility: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/V0DK9i">http://bit.ly/V0DK9i</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Karbonn: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/10DKKbz">http://bit.ly/10DKKbz</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lava: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ">http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ</a></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a> mBounce Ltd is a Hong Kong-based company that performs a variety of mobile phone application support services like proprietary in-house billing infrastructure for app stores, the pre-loading of applications and app stores, and application creation. They are MediaTek-nominated key partner in providing MRE (Maui Runtime Environment) App Store Solutions, but mBounce applications and software can also be placed on other mobile operating systems. You can read more about mBounce here: <a href="http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home">http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home</a> and here: http://developer.mediatek.com/mre/en/partner/335</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices</a>
</p>
No publisherjdineFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2012-12-21T07:48:40ZBlog Entry