The Centre for Internet and Society
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Submission by the Centre for Internet and Society on Draft New ICANN By-laws
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-new-icann-bylaws
<b>The Centre for Internet & Society sent its comments on the Draft New ICANN Bylaws. The submission was prepared by Pranesh Prakash, Vidushi Marda, Udbhav Tiwari and Swati Muthukumar. Special thanks to Sunil Abraham for his input and feedback.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We at the Centre for Internet and Society are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the draft new ICANN by-laws. Before we comment on specific aspects of the Draft by-laws, we would like to make a few general observations:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Broadly, there are significant differences between the final form of the by-laws and that which has been recommended by the participants in the IANA transition process through the ICG and the CCWG. They have been shown to be unnecessarily complicated, lopsided, and skewed towards U.S.-based businesses in their past form, which continues to reflect in the current form of the draft by-laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The draft by-laws are overwrought, but some of that is not the fault of the by-laws, but of the CCWG process itself. Instead of producing a broad constitutional document for ICANN, the by-laws read like the worst of governmental regulations that go into unnecessary minutiae and create more problems than they solve. Things that ought not to be part of fundamental by-laws — such as the incorporating jurisdiction of PTI, on which no substantive agreement emerged in the ICG — have been included as such.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Simplicity has been seen as a sin and has made participation in this complicated endeavour an even more difficult proposition for those who don’t choose to participate in the dozens of calls held every month. On specific substantive issues, we have the following comments:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Jurisdiction of ICANN’s Principal Office</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Maintaining by-law Article XVIII, which states that ICANN has its principal office in Los Angeles, California, USA, these Draft by-laws make an assumption that ICANN’s jurisdiction will not change post transition, even though the jurisdiction of ICANN and its subsidiary bodies is one of the key aspects of post transition discussion to be carried out in Work Stream 2 (WS2). Despite repeated calls to establish ICANN as an international community based organisation (such as the International Red Cross or International Monetary Fund), the question of ICANN's future jurisdiction was deferred to WS2 of the CCWG-Accountability process. All of the new proposed by-laws have been drafted with certainty upon ICANN's jurisdiction remaining in California. Examples of this include the various references to the California Civil Code in the by-laws and repeated references to entities and structures (such as public benefit corporations) in the fundamental by-laws of the ICANN that can only be found in California.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This would make redundant any discussion in WS2 regarding jurisdiction, since they cannot be implemented without upending the decisions relating to accountability structures made in WS1, and embedded in the by-laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS suggests an provision expressly be inserted in the by-laws to allow changes to the by-laws in WS2 insofar as matters relating to jurisdiction and other WS2 issues are concerned, to make it clear that there is a shared understanding that WS2 decisions on jurisdiction are not meant to be redundant.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA Authority (PTI)</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The structure of the by-laws and the nature of the PTI in Article 16 make its Californian jurisdiction integral to the very organisation as a whole and control all its operations, rights and obligations. This is so despite this issue not having been included in the CWG report (except for footnote 59 in the CWG report, and as a requirement proposed by ICANN’s lawyers, to be negotiated with PTI’s lawyers, in Annex S of the CWG report). The U.S. government’s requirement that the IANA Functions Operator be a U.S.-based body is a requirement that has historically been a cause for concern amongst civil society and governments. Keeping this requirement in the form of a fundamental by-law is antithetical to the very idea of internationalizing ICANN, and is not something that can be addressed in Work Stream 2.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS expressed its disagreement with the inclusion of the U.S-jurisdiction requirement in Annex S in its comments to the ICG. Nothing in the main text of the CWG or ICG recommendations actually necessitate Californian jurisdiction for the PTI. Thus, clearly the draft by-laws include this as a fundamental by-law despite it not having achieved any form of documented consensus in any prior process. This being a fundamental by-law would make shifting the PTI’s registered and principal office almost impossible once the by-laws are passed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No reasoning or discussion has been provided to justify the structure, location and legal nature of the PTI. The fact that the revenue structure, by-laws and other details have not even been hinted at in the current document, indicate that the true rights and obligations of PTI have been left at the sole discretion of the ICANN while simultaneously granting it fundamental by-law protection. This is not only deeply problematic on front of delegation of excessive responsibility for a key ICANN function without due oversight but also leads to situation where the community is agreeing to be bound to a body whose fundamental details have not even been created yet, and yet is a fundamental by-law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS would therefore suggest that the PTI related clauses in the by-laws be solely those on which existing global Internet community consensus can be shown, and the PTI’s jurisdiction is not something on which such consensus can be shown to exist. Therefore the by-laws should be rewritten to make them agnostic to PTI’s jurisdiction. Further, CIS suggests that the law firm appointed for PTI be non-American, since U.S.-based law firms capable law firms in Brazil, France, and India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We would also like to note that we have previously proposed that PTI’s registered office and ICANN’s registered office be in different jurisdictions to increase jurisdictional resilience against governmental and court-based actions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Grandfathering Agreements Clause</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A fair amount of discussion has taken place both in the CCWG mailing list about Section 1.1 (d)(ii), which concerns the inclusion of certain agreements into the scope of protection granted to ICANN from its Mission and Objective statement goals. CIS largely agrees with the positions taken by the IAB and CCWG in their comments of demanding the removal of parts B, C, D E and F of Section 1.1(d)(ii) as all of these are agreements that were not included in the scope of the CCWG Proposal and a fair few of these agreements (such as the PTI agreement) have not even been created yet. This leads to practical and legal issues for the ICANN as well as the community as it restricts possible accountability and transparency measures that may be taken in the future.<br />CIS as its suggestion therefore agrees with the IAB and CCWG in this regard and supports the request by them that demand by these grandfathering provisions be removed.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Inspection Rights</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 22.7 severely limits the transparency of ICANN’s functioning, and we believe it should be amended.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(a) It limits Inspection Requests to Decisional Participants and does not allow for any other interested party to make a request for inspection. While the argument has been made that Californian law requires inspection rights for decisional participants, neither the law nor CCWG’s recommendations require restricting the inspection rights to decisional participants. CIS’s suggestion is to allow for any person in the public to make a request for examination, but to have to declare the nature of the public interest behind requests for non-decisional participants, so that an undue number of requests are not made for the purpose of impairing the operations of the organisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(b) The unclear but extremely limited definition of ‘permitted scope’, which does not allow one to question any ‘small or isolated aspect’ of ICANN’s functioning, where there is no explicit definition of what constitutes the scope of matters relevant to operation of ICANN as a whole, leaving a loophole for potential exploitation. CIS suggests the removal of this statement and to allow only for limitations listed in Section 22.7 (b) for Inspection Requests.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(3) There is no hard deadline provided for the information to be made available to the querying body, thus allowing for inordinate delays on the part of the ICANN, which is open to abuse. CIS suggests the removal of the clause ‘or as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter’ in this section.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(4) The need for insisting that the material be used only for restricted purposes. CIS suggests that as a step towards ICANN’s transparency, it is essential that they allow the use of the information for any reason deemed necessary by the person demanding inspection. There is no clear reason to require restriction to EC proceedings for non-confidential material. This requirement should be removed.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Work Stream 2 Topics</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 27.2, which covers necessary topics for WS2, currently does not include key aspects such as PTI documents, jurisdictional issues, etc. In this light, we suggest that they be included and a clause be inserted to indicate that this list of topics is indicative and the CCWG can expand the scope of items to be worked on in WS2 as well as make changes to work completed in WS1 (such as these by-laws) to meet WS2 needs as well.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">FOI-HR</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 27.3 (a) requires the FOI-HR to be approved by "(ii) each of the CCWG-Accountability’s chartering organizations..” which is inconsistent with the CCWG proposal that forms the basis for these by-laws. The requirement of formal approval from every Chartering Organisation in the current draft is inconsistent with Annex 6 of the CCWG proposal, that has no such requirement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS strongly advocates for a change in the bylaw text to align with the intent of the CCWG Accountability report, and to reflect that the process of developing the FOI-HR shall follow the same procedure as Work Stream 1.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Contracts with ICANN</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 27.5 currently states that “Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New by-laws, all agreements, including employment and consulting agreements, entered by ICANN shall continue in effect according to their terms.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the section currently stands, there is a possibility that prior to the creation of by-laws, agreements that may be in contravention of the by-laws may be brought forth intentionally before the commencement of the operation of ICANN’s Mission statement in the said by-laws. The clause may be updated as follows to avoid this —</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Notwithstanding the adoption or effectiveness of the New by-laws, all agreements, including employment and consulting agreements, entered by ICANN shall continue in effect according to their terms, provided that they are in accordance with ICANN’s Mission Statement.”</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-new-icann-bylaws'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-new-icann-bylaws</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNInternet Governance2016-05-31T02:49:45ZBlog EntryWoman Alleges Harassment at Major International Conference
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference
<b>A prospective lawyer's name tag was flipped, and she was asked rude questions by a CEO at a conference, where, ironically enough, she was invited to devise sexual harassment policies.
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Kavita Patil was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.bangaloremirror.com/bangalore/others/Woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference/articleshow/51605662.cms">published in Bangalore Mirror</a> on March 30, 2016.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Padmini Baruah, 22, a National Law School of India University (NLSIU) student representing Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), at the ICANN55 (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) held at Marrakech, alleged that she was sexually harassed by Khaled Fattal, the chairman and CEO of The Multilingual Internet Group.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On March 2, Baruah had reached out to the conference ombudsman and expressed her concerns about the lack of a specific sexual harassment policy. She was directed to the ICANN55's Standards of Behavior, who invited her for a discussion at the conference in Marrakech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">About three hours before her meeting with the ombudsman on March 6, she had a shock. "I was, unfortunately, subjected to sexual harassment in the nature of verbal remarks and infringement of my personal space by the perpetrator in question, a man I eventually came to know was called Khaled Fattal," she recalled. "Fattal approached me, pulled at my name tag, examined it and dropped it. A little later, he lifted my name tag and flipped it back and forth asking me, "Where are you from?"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He then leaned in, lecherously looked at me and asked, "Do you know how to make a cheese sandwich?" I was taken aback and responded angrily saying, "Yes, that is why I came here, to make you cheese sandwiches." He went on to throw another lecherous look my way and said, "Well, I love veg sandwiches."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham, executive director of the CIS, said, "ICANN doesn't have a special cell where complaints can be raised but they have an ombudsman. The ombudsman is investigating the case and is in touch with both Baruah and also the perpetrator." He said after she raised the sexual harassment complaint, he received many mails from women who had faced harassment at the event but never made an attempt to raise their voice. "Through CIS we have issued a public statement of support for Baruah and we are waiting for the result of the investigation," he said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Fattal and the ombudsman were not available for comment despite repeated attempts made by BM to get a response. Baruah, meanwhile, was informed by the ombudsman that her's was the first harassment case reported in the history of ICANN.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bangalore-mirror-march-30-2016-kavita-patil-woman-alleges-harassment-at-major-international-conference</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet GovernanceSexual Harassment2016-03-30T17:06:10ZNews ItemICANN 55
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-55
<b>Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held its 55th meeting in Marrakech, Morocco from March 5 to 10, 2016. Padmini Baruah and Vidushi Marda attended the event organized by Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Consular and Social Affairs. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Centre for Internet & Society's (CIS) work during this meeting revolved mainly around ICANN's accountability (DIDP and Reconsideration requests), transparency, its commitment to human rights, diversity, and questions surrounding the IANA transition. CIS research was circulated via a submission booklet to different people that we met through the course of the conference. A session-wise account of our work at ICANN55 can be <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/ICANN55WorkSummary.pdf" class="internal-link">accessed here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-55'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-55</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2016-03-30T14:41:34ZNews ItemICANN Sexual Harassment Case Highlights Lack of Procedure at Global Internet Body
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-march-24-2016-icann-sexual-harassment-case-highlights-lack-of-procedure-at-global-internet-body
<b>Alleged perpetrator files counter-complaint with ombudsman’s office after being publicly identified.</b>
<p>The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://thewire.in/2016/03/24/icann-sexual-harassment-case-highlights-lack-of-procedure-at-global-internet-body-25728/">published in the Wire</a> on March 24, 2016.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">A female researcher associated with the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society has alleged that she was sexually harassed at an ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) public meeting held in Morocco earlier this month, in an incident that highlights a lack of established procedure at the global body responsible for maintaining the technical backbone of the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to the woman, who is currently a law student but was representing CIS at the meeting, she was sexually harassed by a participant from the private sector constituency on March 6th at a working session.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I felt like my space and safety as a young woman in the ICANN community was at stake,” she said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN-organised events currently do not have a formal redressal system for these type of complaints nor does it have a specific anti-sexual harassment committee to which community members can file an official complaint.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CIS representative, therefore, has taken up her case with ICANN’s ombudsman office, an office that does not have an explicit mandate to deal with incidents of sexual harassment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I currently am unclear as to the exact status of my complaint. The ombudsman office does not have a clear sexual harassment procedure, it has only a standards of behaviour. When I first went to them, they told me nobody has officially complained of sexual harassment since 1998,” she told <i>The Wire</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I understand the evidential burden that needs to be fulfilled for this [allegation] to be proven. I know it’s difficult to prove this. I just want an enquiry conducted properly and impartially.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Centre for Internet and Society released a sharp statement on Monday, pointing out that since the woman was “given no immediate remedy or formal recourse”, she had no choice but to make “the incident publicly known in the interim.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Executive Director Sunil Abraham pointed out that while the ombudsman office has been in touch with the organisation’s representative, “this administrative process is simply inadequate for rights-violation”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To that end, CIS has called upon ICANN to “institute a formal redressal system with regard to sexual harassment and institute an anti-sexual harassment committee that is neutral and approachable”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Merely having an ombudsman who is a white male, however well intentioned, is inadequate and completely unhelpful to the complainant. The present situation is one where the ombudsman has no effective power and only advises the board ,” the CIS’s statement reads.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong>ICANN perspective</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When asked for a comment, ICANN media representatives pointed <em>The Wire</em> to the written transcript of a public session in which this particular issue of sexual harassment was raised. In that meeting, ICANN board member Markus Kummer specifically condemns “improper conduct of any kind such as harassment” while calling for zero tolerance on such issues within the larger ICANN community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the issue of whether ICANN could adopt a broader policy on sexual harassment, Kummer acknowledges that while the organisation’s expected standards of behaviour “could be a bit more specific as regards harassment”, the standards are applicable to “staff and board members and we have to undergo training”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Now, we could also make this also available to the community but the board thought it might not be the appropriate way to go about and impose something on the community. It might be more appropriate for the community to come up with these standards…Let me once again assure the community that the board is fully cognizant of the importance of this issue and supports the community in developing standards that may be more explicit in regard of these issues,” Kummer is quoted as saying in the transcript.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Complaint, Counter-Complaint</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The incident, however, took a different turn on Tuesday after the ICANN ombudsman wrote to the CIS representative informing her that the investigation had become “very difficult” because she had identified and named the alleged perpetrator in a public social media posting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“By naming [the alleged perpetrator] before the process was completed, this has meant that the confidentiality of my office has been compromised and his privacy has been compromised. Leaving aside the issue of whether he actually made the comments and behaved as you describe [sic], he is entitled to a fair and impartial investigation,” the ombudsman office’s letter says.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The alleged perpetrator now, according to the letter, has filed a counter-complaint with the ombudsman and has asked the office to undertake an investigation into the female student’s actions in this regard.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I remind you that his [the perpetrator] initial response on the initial discussion was that he could not recall making the remark. So I sought your comments. I would have liked to take your comments back to him and had some form of conversation. This may still be possible but the force of your complaint is diluted by the problem of procedural fairness by the premature publication of his name,” the letter adds.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Cleaning up</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the CIS representative’s complaint may be the first officially recorded incident at an ICANN meeting, sexual harassment and inappropriate gender bias at numerous technical conferences across the world (ICANN or not) has been a <a href="http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Timeline_of_incidents" target="_blank"><span>well-documented phenomenon</span></a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2012, ICANN ombudsman Chris LaHette was forced to step in after a complaint was lodged regarding the <a href="http://domainincite.com/8146-hot-girls-land-cz-nic-in-hot-water" target="_blank"><span>insensitive advertising and promotion </span></a>surrounding the ICANN 44 meeting in Prague.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN’s “expected standards of behaviour” – basically a code of conduct – explicitly states that all “members of the ICANN community be treated equally irrespective of nationality or gender..”, there is no official policy that states what aggrieved parties should do after an incident occurs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Such a policy must be created, CIS points out, and must be “displayed on the ICANN website, at the venue of meetings, and made available in delegate kits”.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-march-24-2016-icann-sexual-harassment-case-highlights-lack-of-procedure-at-global-internet-body'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-march-24-2016-icann-sexual-harassment-case-highlights-lack-of-procedure-at-global-internet-body</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet GovernanceSexual Harassment2016-04-01T15:42:49ZNews ItemSexual Harassment at ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann
<b>Padmini Baruah represented the Centre for Internet & Society at ICANN in the month of March 2016. In a submission to ICANN she is calling upon the ICANN board for implementing a system for investigating cases related to sexual harassments. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the 6th of March, 2016, Sunday, at about 10 am in the gNSO working session being conducted at the room Diamant, I was sexually harassed by someone from the private sector constituency named Khaled Fattal. He approached me, pulled at my name tag, and passed inappropriate remarks. I felt like my space and safety as a young woman in the ICANN community was at stake.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I had incidentally been in discussion with the ICANN Ombudsman on developing a clear and coherent sexual harassment policy and procedure for the specific purposes of ICANN’s public meetings. Needless to say, this incident pushed me to take forward what had hitherto been a mere academic interest with increased vigour. I was amazed, firstly that the office of the ombudsman only had two white male members manning it. I was initially inhibited by that very fact, but made two points before them:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to action on my individual case.</div>
</li>
<li>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to the development of policy in general.</div>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I would like to put on record that the ombudsman office was extremely sympathetic and gave me a thorough hearing. They assured me that my individual complaint would be recorded, and sought to discuss the possibility of me raising a public statement with respect to policy, as they believed that the Board would be likely to take this suggestion up from a member of the community. I was also informed, astoundingly, <strong>that this was the first harassment case reported in the history of ICANN</strong>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I then, as a newcomer to the community, ran this idea of making a public statement by no means an easy task at all, given the attached stigma that comes with being branded a victim of a sexual crime by certain senior people within ICANN who had assured me that they would take my side in this regard. To my dismay, there were two strong stands of victim blaming and intimidation that I faced I was told, in some cases by extremely senior and well respected, prominent women in the ICANN community, that raising this issue up would demean my credibility, status and legitimacy in ICANN, and that my work would lose importance, and I would “...forever be branded as THAT woman.” My incident was also trivialised in offhand casual remarks such as “This happened because you are so pretty”, “Oh you filed a complaint, not against me I hope, ha ha” which all came from people who are very high up in the ICANN heirarchy. I was also asked if I was looking for money out of this. <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment.pdf" class="internal-link">Click to read the full statement made to ICANN here</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sexual-harassment-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherpadminiSexual HarassmentICANNInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-04-06T14:40:55ZBlog EntryCIS's Comments on the CCWG-Accountability Draft Proposal
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal
<b>The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) gave its comments on the failures of the CCWG-Accountability draft proposal as well as the processes that it has followed. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We from the Centre for Internet and Society wishes to express our dismay at the consistent way in which CCWG-Accountability has completely failed to take critical inputs from organizations like ours (and others, some instances of which have been highlighted in Richard Hill’s submission) into account, and has failed to even capture our concerns and misgivings about the process — as expressed in our submission to the CCWG-Accountability’s 2nd Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations — in any document prepared by the CCWG. We cannot support the proposal in its current form.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Time for Comments</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We believe firstly that the 21 day comment period itself was too short and is going to result effectively in many groups or categories of people from not being able to meaningfully participate in the process, which flies in the face of the values that ICANN claims to uphold. This extremely short period amounts to procedural unsoundness, and restrains educated discussion on the way forward, especially given that the draft has altered quite drastically in the aftermath to ICANN55.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Capture of ICANN and CCWG Process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The participation in the accountability-cross-community mailing list clearly shows that the process is dominated by developed countries (of the top 30 non-staff posters to the list, 26 were from the ‘WEOG’ UN grouping, with 14 being from the USA, with only 1 from Asia Pacific, 2 from Africa, and 1 from Latin America), by males (27 of the 30 non-staff posters), and by industry/commercial interests (17 of the top 30 non-staff posters). If this isn’t “capture”, what is? There is no stress test that overcomes this reality of capture of ICANN by Western industry interests. The global community is only nominally multistakeholder, while actually being grossly under-representative of the developing nations, women and minority genders, and communities that are not business communities or technical communities. For instance, of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Culling statistics from the accountability-cross-community mailing list, we find that of the top 30 posters (excluding ICANN staff):</p>
<ul>
<li>57% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, from a single country: the United States of America. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">87% were, as far as one could ascertain from public records, participants from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand), which only has developed countries. None of those who participated substantively were from the EEC (Eastern European) group and only 1 was from Asia-Pacific and only 1 was from GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).</li>
<li>90% were male and 3 were female, as far as one could ascertain from public records. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">57% were identifiable as primarily being from industry or the technical community, as far as one could ascertain from public records, with only 2 (7%) being readily identifiable as representing governments.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This lack of global multistakeholder representation greatly damages the credibility of the entire process, since it gains its legitimacy by claiming to represent the global multistakeholder Internet community.</p>
<h3>Bogey of Governmental Capture</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to Stress Test 18, dealing with the GAC, the report proposes that the ICANN Bylaws, specifically Article XI, Section 2, be amended to create a provision where if two-thirds of the Board so votes, they can reject a full GAC consensus advice. This amendment is not connected to the fear of government capture or the fear that ICANN will become a government-led body; given that the advice given by the GAC is non-binding that is not a possibility. Given the state of affairs described in the submission made above, it is clear that for much of the world, their governments are the only way in which they can effectively engage within the ICANN ecosystem. Therefore, nullifying the effectiveness of GAC advice is harmful to the interests of fostering a multistakeholder ecosystem, and contributes to the strengthening of the kind of industry capture described above.</p>
<h3>Jurisdiction</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All discussions on the Sole Designator Model seem predicated on the unflinching certainty of ICANN’s jurisdiction continuing to remain in California, as the legal basis of that model is drawn from Californian corporate law. To quote the draft report itself, in Annexe 12, it is stated that:</p>
<p class="callout" style="text-align: justify; ">"Jurisdiction directly influences the way ICANN’s accountability processes are structured and operationalized. The fact that ICANN today operates under the legislation of the U.S. state of California grants the corporation certain rights and implies the existence of certain accountability mechanisms. It also imposes some limits with respect to the accountability mechanisms it can adopt. The topic of jurisdiction is, as a consequence, very relevant for the CCWG-Accountability. ICANN is a public benefit corporation incorporated in California and subject to California state laws, applicable U.S. federal laws and both state and federal court jurisdiction."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Jurisdiction has been placed within the mandate of WS2, to be dealt with post the transition. However, there is no analysis in the 3rd Draft on how the Sole Designator Model would continue to be upheld if future Work Stream 2 discussions led to a consensus that there needed to be a shift in the jurisdiction of ICANN. In the event that ICANN shifts to, say, Delaware or Geneva, would there be a basis to the Sole Designator Model in the law? Therefore this is an issue that needs to be addressed before this model is adopted, else there is a risk of either this model being rendered infructuous in the future, or this model foreclosing open debate and discussion in Work Stream 2.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Right of Inspection</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We strongly support the incorporation of the rights of Inspection under this model as per Section 6333 of the California Corporations Code as a fundamental bylaw. As there is a severe gap between the claims that ICANN raises about its own transparency and the actual amount of transparency that it upholds, we opine that the right of inspection needs to be provided to each member of the ICANN community.</p>
<h3>Timeline for WS2 Reforms</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We support the CCWG’s commitment to the review of the DIDP Process, which they have committed to enhancing in WS2. Our research on this matter indicates that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide. Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. See "<a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii">Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)</a>".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the present format, there has been little analysis on the timeline of WS2; the report itself merely states that:</p>
<p class="callout" style="text-align: justify; ">"The CCWG-Accountability expects to begin refining the scope of Work Stream 2 during the upcoming ICANN 55 Meeting in March 2016. It is intended that Work Stream 2 will be completed by the end of 2016."</p>
<p>Without further clarity and specification of the WS2 timeline, meaningful reform cannot be initiated. Therefore we urge the CCWG to come up with a clear timeline for transparency processes.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ciss-comments-on-the-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshICANNInternet Governance2016-01-29T15:17:48ZBlog EntryComments on the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (WSIS+10)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10
<b>Following the comment-period on the Zero Draft, the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly's Overall Review of implementation of WSIS Outcomes was released on 4 November 2015. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document from diverse stakeholders. The Centre for Internet & Society's response to the call for comments is below.</b>
<p class="Normal1" style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p class="Normal1" style="text-align: justify; ">The WSIS+10 Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, scheduled for December 2015, comes as a review of the WSIS process initiated in 2003-05. At the December summit of the UN General Assembly, the WSIS vision and mandate of the IGF are to be discussed. The Draft Outcome Document, released on 4 November 2015, is towards an outcome document for the summit. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document. Our comments are below.</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (“<i>the current Draft</i>”) stands considerably altered from the Zero Draft. With references to development-related challenges, the Zero Draft covered areas of growth and challenges of the WSIS. It noted the persisting digital divide, the importance of innovation and investment, and of conducive legal and regulatory environments, and the inadequacy of financial mechanisms. Issues crucial to Internet governance such as net neutrality, privacy and the mandate of the IGF found mention in the Zero Draft.</li>
<li>The current Draft retains these, and adds to them. Some previously-omitted issues such as surveillance, the centrality of human rights and the intricate relationship of ICTs to the Sustainable Development Goals, now stand incorporated in the current Draft. This is most commendable. However, the current Draft still lacks teeth with regard to some of these issues, and fails to address several others. </li>
<li>In our comments to the Zero Draft, CIS had called for these issues to be addressed. We reiterate our call in the following paragraphs.</li>
</ol>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(1) </strong><strong>ICT for Development</strong></h2>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>In the current Draft, paragraphs 14-36 deal with ICTs for development. While the draft contains rubrics like ‘Bridging the digital divide’, ‘Enabling environment’, and ‘Financial mechanisms’, the following issues are unaddressed:</li>
<li>Equitable development for all;</li>
<li>Accessibility to ICTs for persons with disabilities;</li>
<li>Access to knowledge and open data.</li>
</ol>
<h3><i><span>Equitable development</span></i></h3>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>In the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html">Geneva Declaration of Principles</a> (2003), two goals are set forth as the Declaration’s “ambitious goal”: (a) the bridging of the digital divide; and (b) equitable development for all (¶ 17). The current Draft speaks in detail about the bridging of the digital divide, but the goal of equitable development is conspicuously absent. At WSIS+10, when the WSIS vision evolves to the creation of inclusive ‘knowledge societies’, equitable development should be both a key principle and a goal to stand by.</li>
<li>Indeed, inequitable development underscores the persistence of the digital divide. The current Draft itself refers to several instances of inequitable development; for ex., the uneven production capabilities and deployment of ICT infrastructure and technology in developing countries, landlocked countries, small island developing states, countries under occupation or suffering natural disasters, and other vulnerable states; lack of adequate financial mechanisms in vulnerable parts of the world; variably affordable (or in many cases, unaffordable) spread of ICT devices, technology and connectivity, etc. </li>
<li>What underscores these challenges is the inequitable and uneven spread of ICTs across states and communities, including in their production, capacity-building, technology transfers, gender-concentrated adoption of technology, and inclusiveness. </li>
<li>As such, it is essential that the WSIS+10 Draft Outcome Document reaffirm our commitment to equitable development for all peoples, communities and states.</li>
<li>We suggest the following inclusion to <strong>paragraph 5 of the current Draft</strong>:</li>
</ol>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; ">“5. We reaffirm our common desire and commitment to the WSIS vision to build </span><i style="text-align: justify; "><span>an equitable,</span></i><span style="text-align: justify; "> people-centred, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society…”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Accessibility for persons with disabilities</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">10. Paragraph 13 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003) pledges to “pay particular attention to the special needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups of society” in the forging of an Information Society. Particularly, ¶ 13 recognises the special needs of older persons and persons with disabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">11. Moreover, ¶ 31 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles calls for the special needs of persons with disabilities, and also of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, to be taken into account while promoting the use of ICTs for capacity-building. Accessibility for persons with disabilities is thus core to bridging the digital divide – as important as bridging the gender divide in access to ICTs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">12. Not only this, but the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/inc/doc/outcome/362828V2E.pdf">WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes</a> (June 2014) also reaffirms the commitment to “provide equitable access to information and knowledge for all… including… people with disabilities”, recognizing that it is “crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of Information Society…” (¶8).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">13. In our previous submission, CIS had suggested language drawing attention to this. Now, the current Draft only acknowledges that “particular attention should be paid to the specific ICT challenges facing… persons with disabilities…” (paragraph 11). It acknowledges also that now, accessibility for persons with disabilities constitutes one of the core elements of quality (paragraph 22). However, there is a glaring omission of a call to action, or a reaffirmation of our commitment to bridging the divide experienced by persons with disabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">14. We suggest, therefore, the addition of the following language the addition of <strong>paragraph 24A to the current Draft</strong>. Sections of this suggestion are drawn from ¶8, WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes.</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"24A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">Recalling the UN Convention on the rights of people with disabilities, the Geneva principles paragraph 11, 13, 14 and 15, Tunis Commitment paras 20, 22 and 24, and reaffirming the commitment to providing equitable access to information and knowledge for all, building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use of ICTs by all, including youth, older persons, women, indigenous and nomadic peoples, people with disabilities, the unemployed, the poor, migrants, refugees and internally displaced people and remote and rural communities, it is crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of information Society and to make their voice heard by stakeholders and policy-makers at different levels. It can allow the most fragile groups of citizens worldwide to become an integrated part of their economies and also raise awareness of the target actors on the existing ICTs solution (such as tolls as e- participation, e-government, e-learning applications, etc.) designed to make their everyday life better. We recognise need for continued extension of access for people with disabilities and vulnerable people to ICTs, especially in developing countries and among marginalized communities, and reaffirm our commitment to promoting and ensuring accessibility for persons with disabilities. In particular, we call upon all stakeholders to honour and meet the targets set out in Target 2.5.B of the Connect 2020 Agenda that enabling environments ensuring accessible telecommunication/ICT for persons with disabilities should be established in all countries by 2020.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Access to knowledge and open data</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">15. The Geneva Declaration of Principles dedicates a section to access to information and knowledge (B.3). It notes, in ¶26, that a “rich public domain” is essential to the growth of Information Society. It urges that public institutions be strengthened to ensure free and equitable access to information (¶26), and also that assistive technologies and universal design can remove barriers to access to information and knowledge (¶25). Particularly, the Geneva Declaration advocates the use of free and open source software, in addition to proprietary software, to meet these ends (¶27).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">16. It was also recognized in the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (‘Challenges-during implementation of Action Lines and new challenges that have emerged’) that there is a need to promote access to all information and knowledge, and to encourage open access to publications and information (C, ¶¶9 and 12).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">17. In our previous submission, CIS had highlighted the importance of open access to knowledge thus: “…the implications of open access to data and knowledge (including open government data), and responsible collection and dissemination of data are much larger in light of the importance of ICTs in today’s world. As Para 7 of the Zero Draft indicates, ICTs are now becoming an indicator of development itself, as well as being a key facilitator for achieving other developmental goals. As Para 56 of the Zero Draft recognizes, in order to measure the impact of ICTs on the ground – undoubtedly within the mandate of WSIS – it is necessary that there be an enabling environment to collect and analyse reliable data. Efforts towards the same have already been undertaken by the United Nations in the form of ‘Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’. In this light, the Zero Draft rightly calls for enhancement of regional, national and local capacity to collect and conduct analyses of development and ICT statistics (Para 56). Achieving the central goals of the WSIS process requires that such data is collected and disseminated under open standards and open licenses, leading to creation of global open data on the ICT indicators concerned.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">18. This crucial element is missing from the current Draft of the WSIS+10 Outcome Document. Of course, the current Draft notes the importance of access to information and free flow of data. But it stops short of endorsing and advocating the importance of access to knowledge and free and open source software, which are essential to fostering competition and innovation, diversity of consumer/ user choice and ensuring universal access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">19. We suggest the following addition – of <strong>paragraph 23A to the current Draft</strong>:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"23A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We recognize the need to promote access for all to information and knowledge, open data, and open, affordable, and reliable technologies and services, while respecting individual privacy, and to encourage open access to publications and information, including scientific information and in the research sector, and particularly in developing and least developed countries.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(2) </strong><strong>Human Rights in Information Society</strong></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">20. The current Draft recognizes that human rights have been central to the WSIS vision, and reaffirms that rights offline must be protected online as well. However, the current Draft omits to recognise the role played by corporations and intermediaries in facilitating access to and use of the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">21. In our previous submission, CIS had noted that “the Internet is led largely by the private sector in the development and distribution of devices, protocols and content-platforms, corporations play a major role in facilitating – and sometimes, in restricting – human rights online”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">22. We reiterate our suggestion for the inclusion of <strong>paragraph 43A to the current Draft</strong>:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"43A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We recognize the critical role played by corporations and the private sector in facilitating human rights online. We affirm, in this regard, the responsibilities of the private sector set out in the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), and encourage policies and commitments towards respect and remedies for human rights.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(3) </strong><strong>Internet</strong> <strong>Governance</strong></h2>
<h3><i><span>The support for multilateral governance of the Internet</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">23. While the section on Internet governance is not considerably altered from the zero draft, there is a large substantive change in the current Draft. The current Draft states that the governance of the Internet should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with full involvement of all stakeholders” (¶50). Previously, the zero draft recognized the “the general agreement that the governance of the Internet should be open, inclusive, and transparent”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">24. A return to purely ‘multilateral’ Internet governance would be regressive. Governments are, without doubt, crucial in Internet governance. As scholarship and experience have both shown, governments have played a substantial role in shaping the Internet as it is today: whether this concerns the availability of content, spread of infrastructure, licensing and regulation, etc. However, these were and continue to remain contentious spaces.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">25. As such, it is essential to recognize that a plurality of governance models serve the Internet, in which the private sector, civil society, the technical community and academia play important roles. <strong>We recommend returning to the language of the zero draft in ¶32: “open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet”.</strong></p>
<h3><i><span>Governance of Critical Internet Resources</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">26. It is curious that the section on Internet governance<strong> </strong>in both the zero and the current Draft makes no reference to ICANN, and in particular, to the ongoing transition of IANA stewardship and the discussions surrounding the accountability of ICANN and the IANA operator. The stewardship of critical Internet resources, such as the root, is crucial to the evolution and functioning of the Internet. Today, ICANN and a few other institutions have a monopoly over the management and policy-formulation of several critical Internet resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">27. While the WSIS in 2003-05 considered this a troubling issue, this focus seems to have shifted entirely. Open, inclusive, transparent and <i>global</i> Internet are misnomer-principles when ICANN – and in effect, the United States – continues to have monopoly over critical Internet resources. The allocation and administration of these resources should be decentralized and distributed, and should not be within the disproportionate control of any one jurisdiction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">28. Therefore, we reiterate our suggestion to add <strong><span>paragraph 53A</span></strong> after Para 53:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"53A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We affirm that the allocation, administration and policy involving critical Internet resources must be inclusive and decentralized, and call upon all stakeholders and in particular, states and organizations responsible for essential tasks associated with the Internet, to take immediate measures to create an environment that facilitates this development.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Inclusiveness and Diversity in Internet Governance</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">29. The current Draft, in ¶52, recognizes that there is a need to “promote greater participation and engagement in Internet governance of all stakeholders…”, and calls for “stable, transparent and voluntary funding mechanisms to this end.” This is most commendable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">30. The issue of inclusiveness and diversity in Internet governance is crucial: today, Internet governance organisations and platforms suffer from a lack of inclusiveness and diversity, extending across representation, participation and operations of these organisations. As CIS submitted previously, the mention of inclusiveness and diversity becomes tokenism or formal (but not operational) principle in many cases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">31. As we submitted before, the developing world is pitifully represented in standards organisations and in ICANN, and policy discussions in organisations like ISOC occur largely in cities like Geneva and New York. For ex., 307 out of 672 registries listed in ICANN’s registry directory are based in the United States, while 624 of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars are US-based.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">32. Not only this, but 80% of the responses received by ICANN during the ICG’s call for proposals were male. A truly global and open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet must not be so skewed. Representation must include not only those from developing countries, but must also extend across gender and communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">33. We propose, therefore, the addition of a <strong><span>paragraph 51A</span></strong> after Para 51:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"51A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We draw attention to the challenges surrounding diversity and inclusiveness in organisations involved in Internet governance, including in their representation, participation and operations. We note with concern that the representation of developing countries, of women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, is far from equitable and adequate. We call upon organisations involved in Internet governance to take immediate measures to ensure diversity and inclusiveness in a substantive manner.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prepared by Geetha Hariharan, with inputs from Sunil Abraham and Japreet Grewal. All comments submitted towards the Draft Outcome Document may be found <a class="external-link" href="http://unpan3.un.org/wsis10/Preparatory-Process-Roadmap/Comments-on-Draft-Outcome-Document">at this link</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICT4DCall for CommentsWSIS+10Access to KnowledgeAccessibilityHuman Rights OnlineInternet GovernanceICANNIANA TransitionOpen SourceOpen Access2015-11-18T06:33:13ZBlog EntryBreaking Down ICANN Accountability: What It Is and What the Internet Community Wants
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants
<b>At the recent ICANN conference held in Dublin (ICANN54), one issue that was rehashed and extensively deliberated was ICANN's accountability and means to enhance the same. In light of the impending IANA stewardship transition from the NTIA to the internet's multi-stakeholder community, accountability of ICANN to the internet community becomes that much more important. In this blog post, some aspects of the various proposals to enhance ICANN's accountability have been deconstructed and explained.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, known as ICANN, is a private not-for-profit organization, registered in California. Among other functions, it is tasked with carrying out the IANA function<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a>, pursuant to a contract between the US Government (through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration – NTIA) and itself. Which means, as of now, there exists legal oversight by the USG over ICANN with regard to the discharge of these IANA functions.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in 2014, the NTIA, decided to completely handover stewardship of the IANA functions to the internet’s ‘global multistakeholder community’. But the USG put down certain conditions before this transition could be effected, one of which was to ensure that there exists proper accountability within the ICANN.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The reason for this, was that the internet community feared a shift of ICANN to a FIFA-esque organization with no one to keep it in check, post the IANA transition if these accountability concerns weren’t addressed.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And thus, to answer these concerns, the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG-Accountability) has come up with reports that propose certain changes to the structure and functioning of ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of the discussions that took place at ICANN54 in Dublin, this blog post is directed towards summarizing some of these proposals - those pertaining to the Independent Review Process or IRP (explained below) as well the various accountability models that are the subject of extensive debate both on and off the internet.</p>
<h3><b>Building Blocks Identified by the CCWG-Accountability <br /></b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability put down four “building blocks”, as they call it, on which all their work is based. One of these is what is known as the Independent Review Process (or IRP). This is a mechanism by which internal complaints, either by individuals or by SOs/ACs<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a>, are addressed. However, the current version of the IRP is criticized for being an inefficient mechanism of dispute resolution.<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6] </a></p>
<p>And thus the CCWG-Accountability proposed a variety of amendments to the same.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another building block that the CCWG-Accountability identified is the need for an “empowered internet community”, which means more engagement between the ICANN Board and the internet community, as well as increased oversight by the community over the Board. As of now, the USG acts as the oversight-entity. Post the IANA transition however, the community feels they should step in and have an increased say with regard to decisions taken by the ICANN Board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As part of empowering the community, the CCWG-Accountability identified five core areas in which the community needs to possess some kind of powers or rights. These areas are – review and rejection of the ICANN budget, strategic plans and operating plans; review, rejection and/or approval of standard bylaws as well fundamental bylaws; review and rejection of Board decisions pertaining to IANA functions; appointment and removal of individual directors on the Board; and recall of the entire Board itself. And it is with regard to what kind of powers and rights are to be vested with the community that a variety of accountability models have been proposed, both by the CCWG-Accountability as well as the ICANN Board. However, of all these models, discussion is now primarily centered on three of them – the Sole Member Model (SMM), the Sole Designator Model (SDM) and the Multistakeholder Empowerment Model (MEM).</p>
<h3><b>What is the IRP?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Independent Review Process or IRP is the dispute resolution mechanism, by which complaints and/or oppositions by individuals with regard to Board resolutions are addressed. Article 4 of the ICANN bylaws lay down the specifics of the IRP. As of now, a standing panel of six to nine arbitrators is constituted, from which a panel is selected for hearing every complaint. However, the primary criticism of the current version of the IRP is the restricted scope of issues that the panel passes decisions on.<a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The bylaws explicitly state that the panel needs to focus on a set on procedural questions while hearing a complaint – such as whether the Board acted in good faith or exercised due diligence in passing the disputed resolution.</p>
<h3><b>Changes Proposed by the Internet Community to Enhance the IRP <br /></b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To tackle this and other concerns with the existing version of the IRP, the CCWG-Accountability proposed a slew of changes in the <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-draft-2-proposal-work-stream-1-recs-03aug15-en.pdf">second draft proposal</a> that they released in August this year. What they proposed is to make the IRP arbitral panel hear complaints and decide the matter on both procedural (as they do now) and substantive grounds. In addition, they also propose a broadening of who all have locus to initiate an IRP, to include individuals, groups and other entities. Further, they also propose a more precedent-based method of dispute resolution, wherein a panel refers to and uses decisions passed by past panels in arriving at a decision.</p>
<p>At the 19<sup>th</sup> October “Enhancing ICANN-Accountability Engagement Session” that took place in Dublin as part of ICANN54, the mechanism to initiate an IRP was explained by Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair.<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8] </a></p>
<p>Briefly, the modified process is as follows -</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>An objection may be raised by any individual, even a non-member. </li>
<li>This individual needs to find an SO or an AC that shares the objection. </li>
<li>A “pre-call” or remote meeting between all the SOs and ACs is scheduled, to see if objection receives prescribed threshold of approval from the community. </li>
<li>If this threshold is met, dialogue is undertaken with the Board, to see if the objection is sustained by the Board. </li>
<li>If this dialogue also fails, then IRP can be initiated. </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The question of which “enforcement model” empowers the community arises post the initiation of this IRP, and in the event that the community receives an unfavourable decision through the IRP or that the ICANN Board refuses to implement the IRP decision. Thus, all the “enforcement models” retain the IRP as the primary method of internal dispute resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The direction that the CCWG-Accountability has taken with regard to enhancement of the IRP is heartening. And these proposals have received large support from the community. What is to be seen now is whether these proposals will be fully implemented by the Board or not, in addition to all the other proposals made by the CCWG.</p>
<h3><b>Enforcement – An Overview of the Different Models </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to trying to enhance the existing dispute resolution mechanism, the CCWG-Accountability also came up with a variety of “enforcement models”, by which the internet community would be vested with certain powers. And in response to the models proposed by the CCWG-Accountability, the ICANN Board came up with a counter proposal, called the MEM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Below is a tabular representation of what kinds of powers are vested with the community under the SMM, the SDM and the MEM.</p>
<table class="grid listing" style="text-align: justify; ">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Power</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>SMM</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>SDM</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>MEM</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Reject/Review Budget, Strategies and OPs.</p>
<p>+</p>
<p>Review/Reject Board decisions with regard to IANA functions.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member has the reserved power to reject the budget up to 2 times.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Member also has standing to enforce bylaw restrictions on the budget, etc.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Designator can only trigger Board consultations if opposition to budget, etc exists. Further, bylaws specify how many times such a consultation can be triggered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Designator only possesses standing to enforce this consultation.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Community can reject Budget up to two times. Board is required by bylaws to reconsider budget post such rejection, by consulting with the community. If still no change is made, then community can initiate process to recall the Board.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Reject/Review amendments to Standard bylaws and Fundamental bylaws</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member has right to veto these changes. Further, member also standing to enforce this right under the relevant Californian law.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Designator can also veto these changes. However, ambiguity regarding standing of designator to enforce this right.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No veto power granted to any SO or AC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each SO and AC evaluate if they want to voice the said objection. If certain threshold of agreement reached, then as per the bylaws, the Board cannot go ahead with the amendment.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Appointment and Removal of individual ICANN directors</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.</p>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>The SOs/ACs cannot appoint individual directors. But they can initiate process for their removal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, directors can only be removed for breach of or on the basis of certain clauses in a “pre-service letter” that they sign.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Recall of ICANN Board</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Sole Member has the power to recall Board.</p>
<p>Further, it has standing to enforce this right in Californian courts.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Sole Designator also has the power to recall the Board.</p>
<p>However, ambiguity regarding standing to enforce this right.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Community is not vested with power to recall the Board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, if simultaneous trigger of pre-service letters occurs, in some scenarios, only then can something similar to a recall of the Board occur.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><b>A Critique of these Models </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">SMM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Sole Member Model (or SMM) was discussed and adopted in the <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-draft-2-proposal-work-stream-1-recs-03aug15-en.pdf">second draft proposal</a>, released in August 2015. This model is in fact the simplest and most feasible variant of all the other membership-based models, and has received substantial support from the internet community. The SMM proposes only one amendment to the ICANN bylaws - a move from having no members to one member, while ICANN itself retains its character as a non-profit mutual-benefit corporation under Californian laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This “sole member” will be the community as a whole, represented by the various SOs and ACs. The SOs and ACs require no separate legal personhood to be a part of this “sole member”, but can directly participate. This participation is to be effected by a voting system, explained in the second draft, which allocates the maximum number of votes each SO and AC can cast. This ensures that each SO/AC doesn’t have to cast a unanimous vote, but each differing opinion within an SO/AC is given equal weight.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">SDM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A slightly modified and watered down version of the SMM, proposed by the CCWG-Accountability as an alternative to the same, is the “Sole Designator Model” or the SDM. Such a model requires an amendment to the ICANN bylaws, by which certain SOs/ACs are assigned “designator” status. By virtue of this status, they may then exercise certain rights - the right to recall the Board in certain scenarios and the right to veto budgets and strategic plans.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, there is some uncertainty in Californian law regarding who can be a designator - an individual or an entity as well. So whether unincorporated associations, such as the SOs and ACs, can be a “designator” as per the law is a question that doesn’t have a clear answer yet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Where most discussion with respect to the SDM has occurred has been in the area of the designator being vested with the power to “spill” or remove all the members of the ICANN Board. The designator is vested with this power as a sort of last-resort mechanism for the community’s voice to be heard. However, an interesting point raised in one of the Accountability sessions at ICANN54 was the almost negligible probability of this course of action ever being taken, i.e. the Board being “spilled”. So while in theory this model seems to vest the community with massive power, in reality, because the right to “spill” the Board may never be invoked, the SDM is actually a weak enforceability model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Other Variants of the Designator Model:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability, in both its first and second report, discussed variants of the designator model as well. A generic SO/AC Designator model was discussed in the first draft. The Enhanced SO/AC Designator model, discussed in the second draft, also functions along similar lines. However, only those SOs and ACs that wanted to be made designators apply to become so, as opposed to the requirement of a mandatory designator under the SDM model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After the second draft released by the CCWG-Accountability and the counter-proposal released by the ICANN Board (see below for the ICANN Board’s proposal), discussion was mostly directed towards the SMM and the MEM. However, the discussion with regard to the designator model has recently been revived by members of the ALAC at ICANN54 in Dublin, who unanimously issued a statement supporting the SDM.<sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup> And following this, many more in the community have expressed their support towards adopting the designator model.<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">MEM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Multi-stakeholder Enforcement Model or MEM was the ICANN Board’s counter-model to all the models put forth by the CCWG-Accountability, specifically the SMM. However, there is no clarity with regard to the specifics of this model. In fact, the vagueness surrounding the model is one of the biggest criticisms of the model itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability accounts for possible consequences of implementation every model by a mechanism known as “stress-tests”. The Board’s proposal, on the other hand, rejects the SMM due to its “unintended consequences”, but does not provide any clarity on what these consequences are or what in fact the problems with the SMM itself are.<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11] </a></p>
<p>In addition, many are opposed to the Board proposal in general because it wasn’t created by the community, and therefore not reflective of the community’s views, as opposed to the SMM.<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12] </a></p>
<p>Instead, the Board’s solution is to propose a counter-model that doesn’t in fact fix the existing problems of accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What is known of the MEM though, gathered primarily from an <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-03aug15/pdfgD8eDsxAn8.pdf">FAQ</a> published on the ICANN community forum, is this: The community, through the various SOs and ACs, can challenge any action of the Board that is CONTRADICTORY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS only, through a binding arbitration. The arbitration panel will be decided by the Board and the arbitration itself will be financed by ICANN. Further, this process will not replace the existing Independent Review Process or IRP, but will run parallely.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even this small snippet of the MEM is filled with problems. Concerns of neutrality with regard to the arbitral panel and challenge of the award itself have been raised.<a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, the MEM seems to be in direct opposition to the ‘gold standard’ multi-stakeholder model of ICANN. Essentially, there is no increased accountability of the ICANN under the MEM, thus eliciting severe opposition from the community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What is interesting to note about all these models, is that they are all premised on ICANN continuing to remain within the jurisdiction of the United States. And even more surprising is that hardly anyone questions this premise. However, at ICANN54 this issue received a small amount of traction, enough for the setting up of an ad-hoc committee to address these jurisdictional concerns. But even this isn’t enough traction. The only option now though is to wait and see what this ad-hoc committee, as well as the CCWG-Accountability through its third draft proposal to be released later this year, comes up with.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. The IANA functions or the technical functions are the name, number and protocol functions with regard to the administration of the Domain Name System or the DNS.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government">http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/19/congress_tells_icann_quit_escaping_accountability/?page=1">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/19/congress_tells_icann_quit_escaping_accountability/?page=1</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government">http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. SOs are Supporting Organizations and ACs are Advisory Committees. They form part of ICANN’s operational structure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Thomas Rickert (GNSO-appointed CCWG co-chair) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 15,16) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. <a href="http://www.brandregistrygroup.org/alac-throws-spanner-in-icann-accountability-discussions">http://www.brandregistrygroup.org/alac-throws-spanner-in-icann-accountability-discussions</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/internet_community_icann_accountability/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/internet_community_icann_accountability/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/07/icann_accountability_latest/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/07/icann_accountability_latest/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150923_empire_strikes_back_icann_accountability_at_the_inflection_point/">http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150923_empire_strikes_back_icann_accountability_at_the_inflection_point/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/09/06/icann-accountability-a-three-hour-call-trashes-a-year-of-work/">http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/09/06/icann-accountability-a-three-hour-call-trashes-a-year-of-work/</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants</a>
</p>
No publisherramyaICANNInternet Governance2015-11-05T15:29:26ZBlog EntryCIS Participation at ICANN 54
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-54
<b>Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the 54th meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) held at the Convention Center in Dublin from 17 October 2015 to 22 October 2015. Pranesh Prakash, Jyoti Panday and Padmini Baruah attended the meeting. </b>
<p>
CIS
representation was possible at the meeting due to the generous
support of MacArthur grant, NCUC ICANN Travel Grant and financial
support from the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI). The
issue-wise detail of CIS engagement is set out below.</p>
<p>
At
the Public Forum, Jyoti Panday asked the ICANN Board to clarify its
role and the role of the community in the development of the proposal
with Verisign on its role as the Root Zone Maintainer. ICANN CEO
confirmed what many feared, that there will be no community
involvement on this proposal as ICANN's relationship with Verisign is
an "implementation" detail. He added the assurance that
post transition, on the decision of renewal of the contract and
whether it will be awarded to Verisign, ICANN will seek inputs from
the community. Jyoti's
statement is replicated below:</p>
<p>
"I
want to ask the Board why when asked by the NTIA to develop a draft
proposal for the with Verisign on its Root Zone Maintainer role, did
you not pass on that mandate to the community, to the CWG which
already exists, and ask the community to draft out the proposal with
VeriSign? Will the ICANN Board seek public comments on the final
proposal before it is approved? After all, ICANN cannot claim that it
is an inverted pyramid where all decisions start from the community
and flow up to the Board when on a crucial issue like this, the ICANN
Board and staff have not taken the community in confidence nor
invited its participation."</p>
<p>Padmini
Baruah reiterated CIS message at the Public Forum on the lack of
diversity observed through the transition and presented new data.
Padmini's statement is replicated below: <br />Today, more than 50%
of Internet users are in the Asia-Pacific region, and less than 10%
are in North America. Yet, when one studies diversity within the
ICANN community and in ICANN processes, one finds that diversity is
sorely lacking, and it is dominated by people from the United States
of America. Take the IANA transition, for instance. CIS studied
participant data from ICANN, NRO, and IETF's lists related to the
IANA transition. Of the substantive contributors, of which there were
98, we found:<br />* 1 in 4 (39 of 98) were from a single country:
the United States of America.<br />* 4 in 5 (77 of 98) were from
countries which are part of the WEOG grouping, which only has
developed countries.<br />* None were from readily identifiable as
being based in Eastern European and Russia, and only 5 of 98 from all
of Latin American and the Caribbean.<br />* 4 in 5 (77 of 98) were male
and 21 were female.<br />* 4 in 5 (76 of 98) were from industry or the
technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as
primarily speaking on behalf of governments.<br />It would be a
travesty of language to call this the "global multistakeholder
community". <br />Further this problem is pervasive in the ICANN
community:<br />* 66% (34 of 51) of the Business Constituency at ICANN,
as per their own data, are from a single country: the United States
of America.<br />* 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of
America (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's
accredited registrars list), with only 0.6% being from the 54
countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).<br />* 45% of all the registries
are from the United States of America! (307 out of 672 registries
listed in ICANN’s registry directory in August 2015.)<br />Please
take this as your top priority, since ICANN's legitimacy depends on
being able to call itself globally representative.</p>
<p>CIS
attended also raised a series of concerns at the following sessions:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>
Enhancing
ICANN Accountability Open Engagement: CIS intervened with its stance
on jurisdiction and their enforcement models, and our concerns about
transparency.</p>
</li><li>
<p>
GAC
sessions</p>
</li><li>
<p>
NCSG
meeting</p>
</li><li>
<p>
IANA
Transition Stewardship Transition Engagement Session</p>
</li><li>
<p>
CCWG
Accountability Working Session</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Illicit
Internet Pharmacies</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
NCUC
Meeting+engagement with Larry Strickling: Jyoti Panday asked about
the dual role of Verisign as a Root zone maintainer and TLD
operator. Padmini Baruah asked him about jurisdiction. He said the
US Congress will not support a shift in ICANN's jurisdiction.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
NCSG/gNSO
(CIS work on DIDP got public mention)</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Contractual
Compliance Programme Update</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
CWG
Stewardship working session</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Role
of Voluntary Practices in Combating Abuse and Illegal Activity</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Joint
meeting of the ICANN Board and NCSG</p>
</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-54'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-54</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2016-01-18T12:47:19ZNews ItemThe 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
<b>CIS research shows how Western, male, and industry-driven the IANA transition process actually is.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN</a> to run something called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Analysis of the process since then shows how flawed the “global multistakeholder community” that converges at ICANN has not actually represented the disparate interests and concerns of different stakeholders. CIS research has found that the discussions around IANA transition have not been driven by the “global multistakeholder community”, but mostly by males from industry in North America and Western Europe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">CIS analysed the five main mailing lists where the IANA transition plan was formulated: ICANN’s <a href="http://mm.ianacg.org/pipermail/icg-forum_ianacg.org/">ICG</a> <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/">Stewardship</a> and <a href="https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/">CCWG Accountability</a> lists; IETF’s <a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ianaplan/">IANAPLAN</a> list; and the NRO’s <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/">IANAXFER</a> list and <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/crisp/">CRISP</a> lists. What we found was quite disheartening.</p>
<ul>
<li>A total of <em>239 individuals</em> participated cumulatively, across all five lists.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><em>Only 98 substantively contributed to the final shape of the ICG proposal</em>, if one takes a count of 20 mails (admittedly, an arbitrary cut-off) as a substantive contribution, with 12 of these 98 being ICANN staff some of whom were largely performing an administrative function.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We decided to look at the diversity within these substantive contributors using gender, stakeholder grouping, and region. We relied on public records, including <a href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/">GNSO SOI statements</a>, and extensive searches on the Web. Given that, there may be inadvertent errors, but the findings are so stark that even a few errors wouldn’t affect them much.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>2 in 5</strong> (39 of 98, or 40%) were from a single country: the <strong>United States of America</strong>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes <em>Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand</em>), which only has developed countries.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>None</strong> were from the EEC (Eastern European and Russia) group, and only <strong>5 of 98</strong> from all of GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).</li>
<li><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were <em>male</em> and 21 were female.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.</li></ul>
<p>This shows also that the process has utterly failed in achieving the recommendation of Paragraph 6 of the <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>NETMundial outcome document</a>, which states:
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders <b>extending beyond the ICANN community</b>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beyond the IANA transition, one notes that even the communities within ICANN are not very diverse. For instance:</p>
<ul>
<li style="><strong>3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America</strong> (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's </a><a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accreditation-qualified-list.html">accredited registrars list</a>), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).</p>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>45% of all the registries are from the United States of America</strong>! (307 out of 672 registries listed in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/listing-2012-02-25-en">ICANN’s registry directory</a> in August 2015.)</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>66% (34 of 51) of <a href="http://www.bizconst.org/members/">the Business Constituency</a> at ICANN are from a single country: the United States of America</strong>. (N.B.: This page doesn’t seem to be up-to-date.)</li>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This shows that businesses from the United States of America continues to dominate ICANN to a very significant degree, and this is also reflected in the nature of the dialogue within ICANN, including the fact that the proposal that came out of the ICANN ‘global multistakeholder community’ on IANA transition proposes a clause that requires the ‘IANA Functions Operator’ to be a US-based entity. For more on that issue, see this post on the jurisdiction issue at ICANN (or rather, on the lack of a jurisdiction issue at ICANN).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshMulti-stakeholderICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2016-11-03T10:42:53ZBlog EntryPeering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii
<b>In a previous blog post, I had introduced the concept of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) and their extremely vast grounds for non-disclosure. In this short post, I have made an analysis of every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to, to point out the flaws in their policy that need to be urgently remedied.</b>
<p>Read the previous blog post <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a>. Every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to can be <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/transparency-en">accessed here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The table <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M1gWBpa7tlxGPMWyB6xJryddahyZzjVIarSz0RJswDM/edit?usp=sharing">here</a> is a comprehensive breakdown of all the different DIDP requests that ICANN has responded to. This table is to be read with <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x1vG23FdIAzo4ro80eEieaokBpAeNVtYXjds6mHt2DE/edit?usp=sharing">this document</a>, which has a numbered list of the different non-disclosure exceptions <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">outlined in ICANN’s policy</a>. What I sought to scrutinize was the number of times ICANN has provided satisfactory information, the number of times it has denied information, and the grounds for the same. What we found was alarming:</p>
<ol>
<li>Of a total of 91 requests (as of 13/10/2015), <b>ICANN has fully and positively responded to only 11.</b></li>
<li>It has responded <b>partially</b> <b>to 47 of 91 requests, </b>with some amount of information (usually that which is available as public records).</li>
<li>It has <b>not responded at all to 33 of 91 requests</b>.</li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (1)<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>17 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (2)<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>39 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (3)<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>31 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (4)<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>5 times.</b></li>
<li><b>T</b>he Non-Disclosure Clause (5)<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>34 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (6)<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>35 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (7)<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>once.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (8)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>22 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (9)<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>30 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (10)<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>10 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (11)<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>12 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (12)<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>18 times.</b></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This data is disturbing because it reveals that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. Therefore, it is clear that there is a failure on part of ICANN to uphold the transparency it claims to stand for, and this needs to be remedied at the earliest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Pie1.png" title="Pie Chart 1" height="342" width="327" alt="Pie Chart 1" class="image-inline" /></p>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_Pie1.png" alt="Pie Chart 2" class="image-inline" title="Pie Chart 2" /></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Internal information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications, including internal documents, memoranda, and other similar communications to or from ICANN Directors, ICANN Directors' Advisors, ICANN staff, ICANN consultants, ICANN contractors, and ICANN agents</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information exchanged, prepared for, or derived from the deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process between and among ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to endanger the life, health, or safety of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information subject to the attorney– client, attorney work product privilege, or any other applicable privilege, or disclosure of which might prejudice any internal, governmental, or legal investigation</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that relates in any way to the security and stability of the Internet, including the operation of the L Root or any changes, modifications, or additions to the root zone</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Trade secrets and commercial and financial information not publicly disclosed by ICANN</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual</i>”</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini BaruahICANNInternet Governance2015-10-15T03:14:18ZBlog EntryDo you agree with our fee hike? Press 1 to answer Yes; or 2 for Yes
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike
<b>It has long been a concern that domain-name overseer ICANN is largely funded by companies reliant on the organization to make money.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Kieren McCarthy was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/29/icann_fee_agreement_survey_only_yes_option/">published in the Register</a> on September 29, 2015.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Every biz that wishes to sell domain names – called a registrar – has to pay the organization $4,000 a year, plus 18 cents on every domain they sell.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition, they have to pay a variable fee that comprises the money ICANN says it spends on registrar-related activities divided by the number of companies that are accredited. This year that cost was $3.8m and with roughly 1,150 companies, that's $3,300 a head.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The pricing structure provides California-based ICANN with just under $40m a year, more than a third of its total budget. But in order to make sure the non-profit organization doesn't abuse its market control to hike up its fees, each year the registrars have to formally approve the fee structure that the ICANN Board has adopted. And they do that through an online vote.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This year, some registrars are wondering whether the $3.8m spent by ICANN is a good deal for them.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"What do your ICANN fees get you?" ICANN asks itself in an email sent to all registrars. "In addition to helping cover the expenses associated with ICANN meetings and ICANN's day-to-day operations, your fees have allowed us to conduct regular outreach with registrars through 'roadshow' type training seminars, webinars, in-person events, and site visits."</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Don't ask, don't tell</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It's not clear how that money is spent nor on what, since ICANN continues to provide only the vaguest details over its budget, providing annual sums for "travel" and for "meetings" across the entire organization.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is also actively refusing to hand that information over, telling one outfit that formally asked for additional financial data that for it to do so would be "extremely time consuming and overly burdensome." That organization – the Centre for Internet and Society – is <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration-15-15-cis-redacted-08sep15-en.pdf" target="_blank">appealing that decision</a> [PDF] to ICANN's Board with a decision made two days ago but still unpublished.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN expenditure is <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/24/icann_on_dangerous_path/?page=3">increasing</a>: in 2014 alone, its "travel" costs jumped by 85 per cent to $17m; its meetings budget nearly doubled from an average of $3.2m per public meeting in 2013 to $6m in 2014. But there is almost no information on where this money has been spent, and so far no explanation for why it spent $113m in 2014 with an income of just $84m.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What else is ICANN spending registrars' fees on? "We've recruited Registrar Services staff dedicated to serving Europe, the Middle East/Africa, and Asia and have already begun a series of (low-cost) micro-regional events in China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, with plans taking shape for events in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas in the near future," we're told.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But existing registrars are wondering whether all these new staff and events are needed. Are there hundreds of new registrars entering the market? Are they in Asia?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately, ICANN has stopped providing that kind of information. In 2009, under pressure to be more open about what was going on, the organization made big play of the fact it was going to produce statistics showing how many registrars there were, how big they were, and where they were based in a new "dashboard."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But those stats stopped being produced two years ago and the <a href="https://charts.icann.org/public/index-registrar-registration.html" target="_blank">most recent data provided</a> is from 2012.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Software and security</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Where else do the millions of dollars from the companies that support ICANN go? "We're building up the 'GDD Portal'," says a note from ICANN's staff, "which will become a one-stop destination for all registrar resources at ICANN, and transitioning our customer relationship management software from RADAR to salesforce.com."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is the same GDD Portal that ICANN had to shut down earlier this year because of a security breach. It had misconfigured out-the-box software and <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/03/02/icann_suffers_another_security_breach/">exposed every user's information</a>, including financial projections, launch plans, and confidential exchanges, to every other user. Having at first claimed there was "no indication" that confidential information was exposed, it later admitted that it <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/">had in fact happened 330 times</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As for RADAR, it was <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/24/icanns_technical_competence_questioned_by_verisign/">specifically named</a> in a report by Verisign as a security risk; this is one of the things on a "growing list of examples where ICANN's operational track record leaves much to be desired."</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">We're listening...</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, in explaining why the registrar fees are a good deal for the companies, ICANN's staff note: "Most importantly, we're doing our best to listen to you to ensure that our work is of real value to you."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately that listening does not extend to hearing any complaints about the fees, or what they are spent on.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All registrars receive an email during the annual approval of the fees levied against them with a link to an online survey. Incredibly enough, however, they are only allowed to agree to the fees – there is no option to disagree. Or in fact do anything other than sign up for another year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And what is ICANN's explanation for why the companies that provide it with over a third of its budget are not allowed to express anything but approval of the fees ICANN sets? Problems with the voting software:</p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify; ">The system is only able to accept affirmative expressions of approval. (A technical limitation in the voting software prevents us from knowing when we've reached the level of approval required if we offer both a 'yes, I approve,' and a 'no, I don't approve' option.) But if you have reservations about approving the budget or concerns you'd like addressed first, please let me know and I'll be happy to try to address those directly with you.</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So despite charging the companies $3,500 each a year to run the systems that they use, ICANN has been unable to find voting software that is capable of accepting more than one answer. Money well spent.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2015-10-01T15:28:37ZNews ItemPeering behind the veil of ICANN’s DIDP (I)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp
<b>One of the key elements of the process of enhancing democracy and furthering transparency in any institution which holds power is open access to information for all the stakeholders. This is critical to ensure that there is accountability for the actions of those in charge of a body which utilises public funds and carries out functions in the public interest. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the body which “<i>...coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS)</i>”<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>, the centrality of ICANN in regulating the Internet (a public good if there ever was one) makes it vital that ICANN’s decision-making processes, financial flows, and operations are open to public scrutiny. ICANN itself echoes the same belief, and upholds “...<i>a proven commitment to accountability and transparency in all of its practices</i>”<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a>, which is captured in their By-Laws and <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en">Affirmation of Commitments</a>. In furtherance of this, ICANN has created its own <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</a>, where it promises to “...<i>ensure that information contained in <b>documents concerning ICANN's operational activities</b>, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is <b>made available to the public </b>unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.</i>”<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has a vast array of documents that are already in the public domain, listed <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">here</a>. These include annual reports, budgets, registry reports, speeches, operating plans, correspondence, etc. However, their Documentary Information Disclosure Policy falls short of meeting international standards for information disclosure. In this piece, I have focused on an examination of their defined conditions for non-disclosure of information, which seem to undercut the entire process of transparency that the DIDP process aims towards upholding. The obvious comparison that comes to mind is with the right to information laws that governments the world over have enacted in furtherance of democracy. While ICANN cannot be equated to a democratically elected government, it nonetheless does exercise sufficient regulatory power of the functioning of the Internet for it to owe a similar degree of information to all the stakeholders in the internet community. In this piece, I have made an examination of ICANN’s conditions for non-disclosure, and compared it to the analogous exclusions in India’s Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>ICANN’ꜱ Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure versus Exclusions in Indian Law :</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN, in its DIDP policy identifies a lengthy list of conditions as being sufficient grounds for non-disclosure of information. One of the most important indicators of a strong transparency law is said to be <b><i>minimum exclusions</i></b>.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> However, as seen from the table below, ICANN’s exclusions are extensive and vast, and this has been a barrier in the way of free flow of information. An analysis of their responses to various DIDP requests (available <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/transparency-en">here</a>) shows that the conditions for non-disclosure have been invoked in over 50 of the 85 requests responded to (as of 11.09.2015); i.e., over two-thirds of the requests that ICANN receives are subjected to the non-disclosure policies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In contrast, an analysis of India’s Right to Information Act, considered to be among the better drafted transparency laws of the world, reveals a much narrower list of exclusions that come in the way of a citizen obtaining any kind of information sought. The table below compares the two lists:</p>
<table class="grid listing" style="text-align: justify; ">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p><b>No.</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>ICANN<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><b><sup>[5]</sup></b></sup></a></b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>India</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p><b>Analysis</b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>1.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Information provided by or to a government or international organization</b> which was to be kept confidential or would materially affect ICANN’s equation with the concerned body.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the <b>sovereignty and integrity of India</b>, the security, "strategic, scientific or economic" interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offense<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a>/ information <b>received in confidence from foreign government<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><b><sup>[7]</sup></b></sup></a></b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The threshold for both the bodies is fairly similar for this exclusion.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>2.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Internal (staff/Board) information </b>that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Cabinet papers including records of deliberations</b> of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers, provided that such decisions the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken <b>shall be made public after the decision has been taken</b>, and the matter is complete, or over (unless subject to these exemptions)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian law is far more transparent as it ultimately allows for the records of internal deliberation to be made public after the decision is taken.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>3.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information related to the <b>deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates </b>that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No similar provision in Indian Law.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is an additional restriction that ICANN introduces in addition to the one above, which in itself is quite broad.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>4.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Records relating to an individual's personal information</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which relates to <b>personal information </b>the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual (but it is also provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied by this exemption);<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Again, the Indian law contains a proviso for information with “<i>relationship to any public activity or interest</i>”</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>5.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which has been <b>expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law </b>or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN prohibits the disclosure of all proceedings, in India, the exemption is only to the limited extent of information that the court prohibits from being made public.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>6.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to <b>materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position </b>of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information including <b>commercial confidence, trade secrets </b>or intellectual property, the <b>disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party</b>, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is fairly similar for both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>7.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Confidential business information </b>and/or internal policies and procedures.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No similar provision in Indian Law. This is encapsulated in the abovementioned provision</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is fairly similar in both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>8.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to <b>endanger the life, health, or safety </b>of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, the disclosure of which would <b>endanger the life or physical safety of any person </b>or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar for both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>9.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Information subject to any kind of privilege</b>, which might prejudice any investigation</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information, the disclosure of which would cause a <b>breach of privilege of Parliament </b>or the State Legislature<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a>/Information which would <b>impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders</b>;<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar in both lists.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>10.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This exclusion is not present in Indian law, and it is extremely broadly worded, coming in the way of full transparency.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>11.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Information that relates in any way to the <b>security and stability of the Internet</b></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is perhaps necessary to ICANN’s role as the IANA Functions Operator. However, given the large public interest in this matter, there should be some proviso to make information in this regard available to the public as well.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>12.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Trade secrets and commercial and financial information </b>not publicly disclosed by ICANN.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information including <b>commercial confidence, trade secrets </b>or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>This is fairly similar in both cases.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>13.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Information requests:</p>
<p>● which are not reasonable;</p>
<p>● which are excessive or overly burdensome</p>
<p>● complying with which is not feasible</p>
<p>● which are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in Indian Law</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of all the DIDP exclusions, this is the one which is most loosely worded. The terms in this clause are not clearly defined, and it can effectively be used to deflect any request sought from ICANN because of its extreme subjectivity. What amounts to ‘reasonable’? Whom is the process going to ‘burden’? What lens does ICANN use to define a ‘vexatious’ purpose? Where do we look for answers?</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>14.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information available to a person in his <b>fiduciary relationship</b>, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>-</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>15.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information which providing access to would involve an <b>infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State</b>.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p>-</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus, the net cast by the DIDP exclusions policy is more vast than even than that of a democratic state’s transparency law. Clearly, the exclusions above have effectively allowed ICANN to dodge answers to most of the requests floating its way. One can only hope that ICANN realises that these exclusions come in the way of the transparency that they are so committed to, and does away with this unreasonably wide range on the road to the IANA Transition.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-2012-02-25-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/accountability</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> Shekhar Singh, <i>India: Grassroot Initiatives</i> in Tʜᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛ ᴛᴏ Kɴᴏᴡ 19, 44 (Ann Florin ed., 2007)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> In a proviso, ICANN’s DIDP states that all these exemptions can be overridden if the larger public interest is higher. However, this has not yet been reflected in their responses to any DIDP requests.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(a), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(f), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(i), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(j), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(b), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(g), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><sup>[13]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(c), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><sup>[14]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(h), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><sup>[15]</sup></sup></a> Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><sup>[16]</sup></sup></a> Section 8(1)(e), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><sup>[17]</sup></sup></a> Section 9, Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini BaruahICANNInternet Governance2015-10-15T02:42:14ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #12: Revenues
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues
<b>The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) sought information from ICANN on their revenue streams by sending them a second request under their Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. This request and their response have been described in this blog post.</b>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">22 July 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Sub: Raw data with respect to granular income/revenue statements of ICANN from 1999-2011</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We would like to thank ICAN for their prompt response to our earlier requests. We appreciate that the granular Revenue Details for FY14 have been posted online.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a> We also appreciate that a similar document has been posted for FY13.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And we hope that one for FY12 would be posted soon, as noted by you in your Response to our Request No. 20141222-1.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As also noted by you in the same request, similar reports cannot be prepared for FY99 to FY11 since “[i]t would be extremely time consuming and overly burdensome to cull through the raw data in order to compile the reports for the prior years”.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, it was also mentioned that the “relevant information is available in other public available documents”.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Hence, we would like to request for the raw data for years FY99 to FY11, for our research on accountability and transparency mechanisms in Internet governance, specifically of ICANN. Additionally, we would also like to request for the links to such public documents where the information is available.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We look forward to the receipt of this information within the stipulated period of 30 days. Please feel free to contact us in the event of any doubts regarding our queries. <br />Thank you very much. <br />Warm regards, <br />Aditya Garg, <br />I Year, National Law University, Delhi <br />For Centre for Internet & Society <br />W: http://cis-india.org</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN referred to our earlier DIDP request (see <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141222-1-2015-01-22-en">here</a>) where we had sought for a detailed report of their granular income and revenue statements from 1999-2014. They refused to disclose the data on grounds that it would be ‘time consuming’ and ‘overly burdensome’, which is a ground for refusal as per their exceptions to disclosure.</p>
<p>Our request may be found <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-request-20150722-2-redacted-22jul15-en.pdf">here</a>, and their response is linked to <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf">here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. See <i>FY14 Revenue Detail By Source</i>, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/fy2014-revenue-source-01may15-en.pdf.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. See FY13 Revenue Detail By Source, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/fy2013-revenue-source-01may15-en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. See <i>Response to Documentary Information Disclosure Policy Request No. 20141222-1</i>, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <i>Id</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. See <i>Response to Documentary Information Disclosure Policy Request No. 20141222-1</i>, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues</a>
</p>
No publisherAditya GargICANNInternet Governance2015-09-14T15:32:37ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #11: NETmundial Principles
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles
<b>The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) followed up on the implementation of the NETmundial Principles that ICANN has been endorsing by sending them a second request under their Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. This request and their response have been described in this blog post. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">22 July 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Sub: Details of documents within ICANN regarding implementation of NETmundial Principles and documents modified within ICANN as a result of the same</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is our understanding that ICANN is one of the founding members of the NETmundial Initiative. And hence, it has been credited in the public forum for championing the Initiative.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President of ICANN, has maintained that it is time for the global community to act and implement the Principles set forth in the initiative.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN itself, in response to one of our earlier requests, has acknowledged that "NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the work of any entity –particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN."<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We, therefore, request for all existing documents within ICANN which represent its efforts to implement the NETmundial Principles within its working. Additionally, we would also want to request for all the documents which were modified as the result of ICANN’s support of the NETmundial Initiave, highlighting the modification so made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We look forward to the receipt of this information within the stipulated period of 30 days. Please feel free to contact us in the event of any doubts regarding our queries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,<br />Aditya Garg,<br />1st Year, National Law University, Delhi for Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN in their response pointed to an earlier DIDP request that we had sent in, and they replied along the same lines. They brought to our attention that ICANN was not responsible for the implementation of the NETMundial Principles, despite it being one of the founding members of the Initiative. They reiterated their earlier statement of ICANN not being the “…<i>home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles or the evolution of multistakeholder participation in Internet governance.</i>” They have failed to provide us with documentary proof of the implementation of these principles, and have only pointed to statements which indicate a potential prospective adoption of said the initiative <a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]; </a>the responses have been near identical to those for the earlier DIDP request, which you can find <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-netmundial-response-27jan15-en.pdf">here</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, ICANN claims that the information we seek falls within the scope of the exceptions to disclosure they lay down, as it is not within their operational activities, an explanation that fails to satisfy us. As always, they have used the wide scope of their non-disclosure policy to avoid providing us with the requisite information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The request can be found <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-request-20150722-1-redacted-22jul15-en.pdf">here</a>, and ICANN’s response has been linked <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-1-21aug15-en.pdf">here</a>.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. See McCarthy, I’m Begging You To Join, The Register (12 December 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/im_begging_you_to_join_netmundial_initiative_gets_desperate/</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. See NETmundial Initiative Goes Live, Gobal Internet Community Invited to Participate (Press Release), https://www.netmundial.org/press-release-1</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. See Response to Documentary Information Disclosure Policy Request No. 20141228-1-NETmundial, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-netmundial-response-27jan15-en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. Such as Objective 4.3 of their Strategic Five Year Plan. “<i>Demonstrate leadership by implementing best practices in multistakeholder mechanisms within the distributed Internet governance ecosystem while encouraging all stakeholders to implement the principles endorsed at NETmundial</i>” at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/strategic-plan-2016-2020-10oct14-en.pdf</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles</a>
</p>
No publisherAditya GargICANNInternet Governance2015-09-14T15:08:40ZBlog Entry