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ICANN Masterclass
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-masterclass
<b>ICANN organized a masterclass in Bangalore on June 19, 2019.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was ICANN's first-ever such initiative within civil society to inform and spread awareness about their functioning. The workshop was conducted by Mary Wong who is the Vice President for Strategic Comunications Operations, Planning and Engagement and is a member of the Policy Team performing global policy development work. She was joined by Samiran Gupta who is the Head of India for ICANN. He is the primary representative of ICANN in the country and responsible for all stakeholder engagements here.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Agenda</h3>
<div id="_mcePaste">
<ul>
<li>10.00 a.m. - 11.45 a.m.: Introduction to ICANN and the role of ICANN Org to facilitate the community’s work </li>
<li>10.45 a.m. - 12.00: Tea break</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">12.00 - 1.30 p.m.: ICANN’s Policy Development Process (will be conducted in an interactive mode to simulate a Policy Development Process working group meeting). </li>
<li>1.30 p.m - 2.30 p.m.: Lunch</li>
<li>2.30 p.m - 3.30 p.m.: The role of Governmental Advisory Committee (India’s GAC-related engagement in specific terms). </li>
<li>3.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m.: Tea break</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">3.45 p.m - 4.30 p.m.: Open Q&A session.(Also open so that in case prior segments over-run, we still have some time on hand to complete the agenda comfortably). </li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-masterclass'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-masterclass</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminICANNInternet Governance2019-06-22T03:57:07ZNews ItemIANA Transition Stewardship & ICANN Accountability (I)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1
<b>This paper is the first in a multi-part series, in which we provide a background to the IANA transition and updates on the ensuing processes. An attempt to familiarise people with the issues at stake, this paper will be followed by a second piece that provides an overview of submitted proposals and areas of concern that will need attention moving forward. The series is a work in progress and will be updated as the processes move forward. It is up for public comments and we welcome your feedback.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In developing these papers we have been guided by Kieren McCarthy's writings in The Register, Milton Mueller writings on the Internet Governance Project, Rafik Dammak emails on the mailings lists, the constitutional undertaking argument made in the policy paper authored by Danielle Kehl & David Post for New America Foundation.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Introduction</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The 53rd ICANN</b> conference in Buenos Aires was pivotal as it marked the last general meeting before the IANA transition deadline on 30th September, 2015. The multistakeholder process initiated seeks communities to develop transition proposals to be consolidated and reviewed by the the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG). The names, number and protocol communities convened at the conference to finalize the components of the transition proposal and to determine the way forward on the transition proposals. The Protocol Parameters (IANA PLAN Working Group) submitted to ICG on 6 January 2015, while the Numbering Resources (CRISP Team) submitted on 15 January 2015. The Domain Names (CWG-Stewardship) submitted its second draft to ICG on 25 June 2015. The ICG had a face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires and their proposal to transition the stewardship of the IANA functions is expected to be out for public comment July 31 to September 8, 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Parallelly, the CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015 and organised two working sessions at ICANN'53. More recently, the CCWG met in Paris focusing on the proposed community empowerment mechanisms, emerging concerns and progress on issues so far. <b><i>CIS reserves its comments to the CCWG till the second round of comments expected in July.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This working paper explains the IANA Transition, its history and relevance to management of the Internet. It provides an update on the processes so far, including the submissions by the Indian government and highlights areas of concern that need attention going forward.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is IANA Transition linked to DNS Management?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA transition presents a significant opportunity for stakeholders to influence the management and governance of the global network. The Domain Name System (DNS), which allows users to locate websites by translating the domain name with corresponding Internet Protocol address, is critical to the functioning of the Internet. The DNS rests on the effective coordination of three critical functions—the allocation of IP Addresses (the numbers function), domain name allocation (the naming function), and protocol parameters standardisation (the protocols function).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">History of the ICANN-IANA Functions contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Initially, these key functions were performed by individuals and public and private institutions. They either came together voluntarily or through a series of agreements and contracts brokered by the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and funded by the US government. With the Internet's rapid expansion and in response to concerns raised about its increasing commercialization as a resource, a need was felt for the creation of a formal institution that would take over DNS management. This is how ICANN, a California-based private, non-profit technical coordination body, came at the helm of DNS and related issues. Since then, ICANN has been performing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions under a contract with the NTIA, and is commonly referred to as the IANA Functions Operator.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">IANA Functions</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In February 2000, the NTIA entered into the first stand-alone IANA Functions HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf"contract<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> with ICANN as the Operator. While the contractual obligations have evolved over time, these are largely administrative and technical in nature including:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(1) the coordination of the assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(2) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(3) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with the Internet DNS root zone management;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(4) other services related to the management of the ARPA and top-level domains.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been performing the IANA functions under this oversight, primarily as NTIA did not want to let go of complete control of DNS management. Another reason was to ensure NTIA's leverage in ensuring that ICANN’s commitments, conditional to its incorporation, were being met and that it was sticking to its administrative and technical role.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Root Zone Management—Entities and Functions Involved</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA' s involvement has been controversial particularly in reference to the Root Zone Management function, which allows allows for changes to the<a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The Internet Domain Name System Explained for Non-Experts (ENGLISH).pdf"</a>highest level of the DNS namespace<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> by updating the databases that represent that namespace. DNS namespace is defined to be the set of names known as top-level domain names or TLDs which may be at the country level (ccTLDs or generic (gTLDs). This<a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"> </a><a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf">HYPERLINK "https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"</a>function to maintain the Root was split into two parts<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>—with two separate procurements and two separate contracts. The operational contract for the Primary (“A”) Root Server was awarded to VeriSign, the IANA Functions Contract—was awarded to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These contracts created contractual obligations for ICANN as IANA Root Zone Management Function Operator, in co-operation with Verisign as the Root Zone Maintainer and NTIA as the Root Zone Administrator whose authorisation is explicitly required for any requests to be implemented in the root zone. Under this contract, ICANN had responsibility for the technical functions for all three communities under the IANA Functions contract.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN also had policy making functions for the names community such as developing<a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"> </a><a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>rules and procedures and policies under <a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>which any changes to the Root Zone File<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> were to be proposed, including the policies for adding new TLDs to the system. The policy making of numbers and protocols is with IETF and RIRs respectively.<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"</a>NTIA role in root zone management<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> is clerical and judgment free with regards to content. It authorizes implementation of requests after verifying whether procedures and policies are being followed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This contract was subject to extension by mutual agreement and failure of complying with predefined commitments could result in the re-opening of the contract to another entity through a Request For Proposal (RFP). In fact, in 2011<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">NTIA issued a RFP pursuant to ICANN</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">'</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a>s Conflict of Interest Policy.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Why is this oversight needed?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The role of the Administrator becomes critical for ensuring the security and operation of the Internet with the Root Zone serving as the directory of critical resources. In December 2014,<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"> </a><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/">HYPERLINK "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"</a>a report revealed 300 incidents of internal security breaches<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> some of which were related to the Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS) – where the internet core root zone files are mirrored and the WHOIS portal. In view of the IANA transition and given ICANN's critical role in maintaining the Internet infrastructure, the question which arises is if NTIA will let go of its Administrator role then which body should succeed it?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Transition announcement and launch of process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the NTIA <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>announced<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> “<i>its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community”</i>. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the IANA functions. For this purpose, the NTIA<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>asked<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene a global multistakeholder process to develop a transition proposal which has broad community support and addresses the following four principles:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The transition process has been split according to the three main communities naming, numbers and protocols.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Structure of the Transition Processes</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN performs both technical functions and policy-making functions. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and these are performed by ICANN are for all three communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>I.<i> Naming function:</i></b> ICANN performs <b><i>technical and policy-making</i></b> for the names community. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and the policy-making functions relates to their role in deciding whether .xxx or .sucks should be allowed amongst other issues. There are two parallel streams of work focusing on the naming community that are crucial to completing the transition. The first, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions </i></b>will enable NTIA to transition out of its role in the DNS. Therefore, accountability of IANA functions is the responsibility of the CWG and accountability of policy-making functions is outside its scope. CWG has submitted its second draft to the ICG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group on Accountability (CCWG-Accountability)</i></b> is identifying necessary reforms to ICANN’s bylaws and processes to enhance the organization’s accountability to the global community post-transition. Therefore accountability of IANA functions is outside the scope of the CCWG. The CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>II.<i> Numbers function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the numbers community. The policy-making functions for numbers are performed by RIRs. CRISP is focusing on the IANA functions for numbers and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>III.<i> Protocols function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the protocols community. The policy-making functions for protocols are performed by IETF. IETF-WG is focusing on the IANA functions for protocols and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Role of ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After receiving the proposals from all three communities the ICG must combine these proposals into a consolidated transition proposal and then seek public comment on all aspects of the plan. ICG’s role is crucial, because it must build a public record for the NTIA on how the three customer group submissions tie together in a manner that ensures NTIA’s<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>criteria<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> are met and institutionalized over the long term. Further, ICG's final submission to NTIA must include a plan to enhance ICANN’s accountability based on the CCWG-Accountability proposal.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA Leverage</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reprocurement of the IANA contract is <a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">essential for ICANN</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">'</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">s</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a> legitimacy<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> in the DNS ecosystem and the authority to reopen the contract and in keeping the policy and operational functions separate meant that, NTIA could simply direct VeriSign to follow policy directives being issued from the entity replacing ICANN if they were deemed to be not complying. This worked as an effective leverage for ICANN complying to their commitments even if it is difficult to determine how this oversight was exercised. Perceptually, this has been interpreted as a broad overreach particularly, in the context of issues of sovereignty associated with ccTLDs and the gTLDs in their influence in shaping markets. However, it is important to bear in mind that the NTIA authorization comes after the operator, ICANN—has validated the request and does not deal with the substance of the request rather focuses merely on compliance with outlined procedure.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA in its<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"</a>Second Quarterly Report to the Congress<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> for the period of February 1-March 31, 2015 has outlined some clarifications on the process ahead. It confirmed the flexibility of extending the contract or reducing the time period for renewal, based on community decision. The report also specified that the NTIA would consider a proposal only if it has been developed in consultation with the multi-stakeholder community. The transition proposal should have broad community support and does not seek replacement of NTIA's role with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution. Further the proposal should maintain security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, the openness of the Internet and must meet the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services. NTIA will only review a comprehensive plan that includes all these elements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Once the communities develop and ICG submits a consolidated proposal, NTIA will ensure that the proposal has been adequately “stress tested” to ensure the continued stability and security of the DNS. NTIA also added that any proposed processes or structures that have been tested to see if they work, prior to the submission—will be taken into consideration in NTIA's review. The report clarified that NTIA will review and assess the changes made or proposed to enhance ICANN’s accountability before initiating the transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prior to ICANN'53, Lawrence E. Strickling Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and NTIA Administrator HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina"has posed some questions for consideration<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> by the communities prior to the completion of the transition plan. The issues and questions related to CCWG-Accountability draft are outlined below:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Proposed <b><i>new or modified community empowerment tools—</i></b>how can the CCWG ensure that the creation of new organizations or tools will not interfere with the security and stability of the DNS during and after the transition? Do these new committees and structures <b><i>create a different set of accountability questions</i></b>?</li>
<li>Proposed membership model for community empowerment—have <b><i>other possible models</i></b> been thoroughly examined, detailed, and documented? Has CCWG designed stress tests of the various models to address how the multistakeholder model is preserved <b><i>if individual ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees opt out</i></b>?</li>
<li>Has CCWG developed stress tests to address the <b><i>potential risk of capture and barriers to entry for new participants</i></b> of the various models? Further, have stress tests been considered to address <b><i>potential unintended consequences of “operationalizing” groups</i></b> that to date have been advisory in nature?</li>
<li>Suggestions on improvements to the current Independent Review Panel (IRP) that has been criticized for its lack of accountability—how does the CCWG proposal <b><i>analyze and remedy existing concerns with the IRP</i></b>?</li>
<li>In designing a plan for improved accountability, should the CCWG consider what exactly is the <b><i>role of the ICANN Board within the multistakeholder model</i></b>? Should the <b><i>standard for Board action</i></b> be to confirm that the community has reached consensus, and if so, what <b><i>accountability mechanisms are needed</i></b> to ensure the Board operates in accordance with that standard?</li>
<li>The proposal is primarily focused on the accountability of the ICANN Board—has the CCWG considered <b><i>accountability improvements</i></b> that would apply to <b><i>ICANN management and staff or to the various ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees</i></b>?</li>
<li>NTIA has also asked the CCWG to <b><i>build a public record and thoroughly document</i></b> how the NTIA criteria have been met and will be maintained in the future.</li>
<li>Has the CCWG identified and <b><i>addressed issues of implementation </i></b>so that the community and ICANN can implement the plan as expeditiously as possible once NTIA has reviewed and accepted it.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA has also sought community’s input on timing to finalize and implement the transition plan if it were approved. The Buenos Aires meeting became a crucial point in the transtion process as following the meeting, NTIA will need to make a determination on extending its current contract with ICANN. Keeping in mind that the community and ICANN will need to implement all work items identified by the ICG and the Working Group on Accountability as prerequisites for the transition before the contract can end, the community’s input is critical.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's legal standing</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 25th February, 2015 the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation on 'Preserving the Multi-stakeholder Model of Internet Governance'<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> heard from NTIA head Larry Strickling, Ambassador Gross and Fadi Chehade. The hearing sought to plug any existing legal loopholes, and tighten its administrative, technical, financial, public policy, and political oversight over the entire process no matter which entity takes up the NTIA function. The most important takeaway from this Congressional hearing came from Larry Strickling’s testimony<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> who stated that NTIA has no legal or statutory responsibility to manage the DNS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If <b><i>the NTIA does not have the legal responsibility to act, and its role was temporary; on what basis is the NTIA driving the current IANA Transition process without the requisite legal authority or Congressional mandate?</i></b> Historically, the NTIA oversight, effectively devised as a leverage for ICANN fulfilling its commitments have not been open to discussion.<a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"> </a><a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"</a>Concerns have also been raised<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> on the lack of engagement with non-US governments, organizations and persons prior to initiating or defining the scope and conditions of the transition. Therefore, any IANA transition plan must consider this lack of consultation, develop a multi-stakeholder process as the way forward—even if the NTIA wants to approve the final transition plan.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Need to strengthen Diversity Principle</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following submissions by various stakeholders raising concerns regarding developing world participation, representation and lack of multilingualism in the transition process—the Diversity Principle was included by ICANN in the Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014. Given that representatives from developing countries as well as from stakeholder communities outside of the ICANN community are unable to productively involve themselves in such processes because of lack of multilingualism or unfamiliarity with its way of functioning merely mentioning diversity as a principle is not adequate to ensure abundant participation. As CIS has pointed out<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> before issues have been raised about the domination by North American or European entities which results in undemocratic, unrepresentative and non-transparent decision-making in such processes. Accordingly, all the discussions in the process should be translated into multiple native languages of participants in situ, so that everyone participating in the process can understand what is going on. Adequate time must be given for the discussion issues to be translated and circulated widely amongst all stakeholders of the world, before a decision is taken or a proposal is framed. This was a concern raised in the recent CCWG proposal which was extended as many communities did not have translated texts or adequate time to participate.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Representation of the global multistakeholder community in ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the Co-ordination Group includes representatives from ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO, gTLD registries, GAC, ICC/BASIS, IAB, IETF, ISOC, NRO, RSSAC and SSAC. Most of these representatives belong to the ICANN community, and is not representative of the global multistakeholder community including governments. This is not representative of even a multistakeholder model which the US <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">g</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ov</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ernment </a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a>has announced<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> for the transition; nor in the multistakeholder participation spirit of NETmundial. Adequate number of seats on the Committee must be granted to each stakeholder so that they can each coordinate discussions within their own communities and ensure wider and more inclusive participation.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another issue of concern in the pre-transition process has been ICANN having been charged with facilitating this transition process. This decision calls to question the legitimacy of the process given that the suggestions from the proposals envision a more permanent role for ICANN in DNS management. As Kieren McCarthy has pointed out <a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a>ICANN has taken several steps to retain the balance of power in managing these functions which have seen considerable pushback from the community. These include an attempt to control the process by announcing two separate processes<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a> – one looking into the IANA transition, and a second at its own accountability improvements – while insisting the two were not related. That effort was beaten down<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> after an unprecedented letter by the leaders of every one of ICANN's supporting organizations and advisory committees that said the two processes must be connected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Next, ICANN was accused of stacking the deck<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a> by purposefully excluding groups skeptical of ICANN’s efforts, and by trying to give ICANN's chairman the right to personally select the members of the group that would decide the final proposal. That was also beaten back. ICANN staff also produced a "scoping document"<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>, that pre-empt any discussion of structural separation and once again community pushback forced a backtrack.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These concerns garner more urgency given recent developments with the community working <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>groups<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> and ICANN divisive view of the long-term role of ICANN in DNS management. Further, given HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"ICANNHYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164" HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"President Chehade’s comments that the CWG is not doing its job<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a>, is populated with people who do not know anything and the “IANA process needs to be left alone as much as possible”. Fadi also specified that ICANN had begun the formal process of initiating a direct contract with VeriSign to request and authorise changes to be implemented by VeriSign. <b><i>While ICANN may see itself without oversight in this relationship with VeriSign, it is imperative that proposals bear this plausible outcome in mind and put forth suggestions to counter this.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The<a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"> </a><a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>update from IETF on the ongoing negotiation with ICANN on their proposal<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a> related to protocol parameters has also flagged that ICANN is unwilling to cede to any text which would suggest ICANN relinquishing its role in the operations of protocol parameters to a subsequent operator, should the circumstances demand this. ICANN has stated that agreeing to such text now would possibly put them in breach of their existing agreement with the NTIA. Finally,<a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"> </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">ICANN </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a>Board Member, Markus Kummer<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a> stated that if ICANN was to not approve any aspect of the proposal this would hinder the consensus and therefore, the transition would not be able to move forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been designated the convenor role by the US government on basis of its unique position as the current IANA functions contractor and the global coordinator for the DNS. However it is this unique position itself which creates a conflict of interest as in the role of contractor of IANA functions, ICANN has an interest in the outcome of the process being conducive to ICANN. In other words, there exists a potential for abuse of the process by ICANN, which may tend to steer the process towards an outcome favourable to itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Therefore there exists a strong rationale for defining the limitations of the role of ICANN as convenor.</i></b> The community has suggested that ICANN should limit its role to merely facilitating discussions and not extend it to reviewing or commenting on emerging proposals from the process. Additional safeguards need to be put in place to avoid conflicts of interest or appearance of conflicts of interest. ICANN should further not compile comments on drafts to create a revised draft at any stage of the process. Additionally, ICANN staff must not be allowed to be a part of any group or committee which facilitates or co-ordinates the discussion regarding IANA transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is the Obama Administration and the US Congress playing this?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even as the issues of separation of ICANN's policy and administrative role remained unsettled, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, NTIA initiated the long due transition of the IANA contract oversight to a global, private, non-governmental multi-stakeholder institution on March 14, 2014. This announcement immediately raised questions from Congress on whether the transition decision was dictated by technical considerations or in response to political motives, and if the Obama Administration had the authority to commence such a transition unilaterally, without prior open stakeholder consultations. Republican<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"> </a><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602">HYPERLINK "http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"</a>lawmakers have raised concerns about the IANA transition plan <a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a>worried that it may allow other countries to capture control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More recently,<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"> </a><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251">HYPERLINK "https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"</a>Defending Internet Freedom Act<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a> has been re-introduced to US Congress. This bill seeks ICANN adopt the recommendations of three internet community groups, about the transition of power, before the US government relinquishes control of the IANA contract. The bill also seeks ownership of the .gov and .mil top-level domains be granted to US government and that ICANN submit itself to the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a legislation similar to the RTI in India, so that its records and other information gain some degree of public access.It has also been asserted by ICANN that neither NTIA nor the US Congress will approve any transition plan which leaves open the possibility of non-US IANA Functions Operator in the future.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Funding of the transition</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Obama administration is also<a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"> </a><a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>fighting a Republican-backed Commerce, Justice, Science, and <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2578)<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a> which seeks to block NTIA funding the IANA transition. One provision of this bill restricts NTIA from using appropriated dollars for IANA stewardship transition till the end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2015 also the base period of the contact in function. This peculiar proviso in the Omnibus spending bill actually implies that Congress believes that the IANA Transition should be delayed with proper deliberation, and not be rushed as ICANN and NTIA are inclined to.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA Transition cannot take place in violation of US Federal Law that has defunded it within a stipulated time-window. At the Congressional Internet Caucus in January 2015, NTIA head Lawrence Strickling clarified that NTIA will “not use appropriated funds to terminate the IANA functions...” or “to amend the cooperative agreement with Verisign to eliminate NTIA's role in approving changes to the authoritative root zone file...”. This implicitly establishes that the IANA contract will be extended, and Strickling confirmed that there was no hard deadline for the transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">DOTCOM Act</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Communications and Technology Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"> </a><a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act">HYPERLINK "http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"</a>amended the DOTCOM Act<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a>, a bill which, in earlier drafts, would have halted the IANA functions transition process for up to a year pending US Congressional approval. The bill in its earlier version represented unilateral governmental interference in the multistakeholder process. The new bill reflects a much deeper understanding of, and confidence in, the significant amount of work that the global multistakeholder community has undertaken in planning both for the transition of IANA functions oversight and for the increased accountability of ICANN. The amended DOTCOM Act would call for the NTIA to certify – as a part of a proposed GAO report on the transition – that <i>“the required changes to ICANN’s by-laws contained in the final report of ICANN’s Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and the changes to ICANN’s bylaws required by ICANN’s IANA have been implemented.” </i>The bill enjoys immense bipartisan support<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a>, and is being lauded as a prudent and necessary step for ensuring the success of the IANA transition.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> IANA Functions Contract <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf> accessed 15th June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Daniel Karrenberg, The Internet Domain Name System Explained For Nonexperts <http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf> accessed 15 June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Iana.org, 'IANA — Root Files' (2015) <https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files> accessed 11 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> 'NTIA's Role In Root Zone Management' (2014). <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> <i>Contract</i> ( 2011) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Confidential Information Exposed Over 300 Times In ICANN Security Snafu' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, <i>Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I</i> (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 'REPORT ON THE TRANSITION OF THE STEWARDSHIP OF THE INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY (IANA) FUNCTIONS' (NTIA 2015) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Lawrence Strickling, 'Stakeholder Proposals To Come Together At ICANN Meeting In Argentina' <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina> accessed 19 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Philip Corwin, 'NTIA Says Cromnibus Bars IANA Transition During Current Contract Term' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150127_ntia_cromnibus_bars_iana_transition_during_current_contract_term/> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Sophia Bekele, '"No Legal Basis For IANA Transition": A Post-Mortem Analysis Of Senate Committee Hearing' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150309_no_legal_basis_for_iana_transition_post_mortem_senate_hearing/> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a><i> Comments On The IANA Transition And ICANN Accountability Just Net Coalition</i> (2015) <http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Let It Go, Let It Go: How Global DNS Could Survive In The Frozen Lands Outside US Control Public Comments On Revised IANA Transition Plan' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/26/iana_icann_latest/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Icann.org, 'Resources - ICANN' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-08-14-en> accessed 13 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-chehade-to-soac-et-al-18sep14-en.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Richard Forno, '[Infowarrior] - Internet Power Grab: The Duplicity Of ICANN' (<i>Mail-archive.com</i>, 2015) <https://www.mail-archive.com/infowarrior@attrition.org/msg12578.html> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> ICANN, 'Scoping Document' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Milton Mueller, 'ICANN: Anything That Doesn’T Give IANA To Me Is Out Of Scope |' (<i>Internetgovernance.org</i>, 2014) <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> <i>DNA Member Breakfast With Fadi Chehadé (2015-02-11)</i> (The Domain Name Association 2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Mobile.twitter.com, 'Twitter' (2015) <https://mobile.twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Alina Selyukh, 'U.S. Plan To Cede Internet Domain Control On Track: ICANN Head' <i>Reuters</i> (2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> 114th Congress, 'H.R.2251 - Defending Internet Freedom Act Of 2015' (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> John Eggerton, 'House Bill Blocks Internet Naming Oversight Handoff: White House Opposes Legislation' <i>Broadcasting & Cable</i> (2015) <http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> <i>Communications And Technology Subcommittee Vote On The DOTCOM Act</i> (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Timothy Wilt, 'DOTCOM Act Breezes Through Committee' <i>Digital Liberty</i> (2015) <http://www.digitalliberty.net/dotcom-act-breezes-committee-a319> accessed 22 June 2015.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-07-31T14:56:26ZBlog EntryComments from the Centre for Internet and Society on Renewal of .NET Registry Agreement
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed renewal of the .NET Registry Agreement.</b>
<p>With inputs from Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS would like to express its strong opposition to the proposed renewal. This is for three primary reasons:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Inconsistency with ICANN’s core values</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is important to consider the proposed renewal in light of two Core Values which are meant to guide the decisions and actions of ICANN. <br /> <br />Section 1.2.(b)(iii) of the Bylaws contemplates ICANN’s responsibility to, “ Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment in the DNS market;” and S ection 1.2(b)(iv) envisages, “Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial to the public interest as identified through the bottom-up, multistakeholder policy development process;”. <br /> <br />The presumptive renewal of the .NET Registry agreement precludes an open tender, thereby significantly undermining competition in the DNS market. It ignores the public interest consideration, as the absence of competitive pressure on the contract also means the absence of pressure to lower user costs.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Historical accident</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Verisign’s operations over .NET is a historical accident; one that does not justify its collection of .NET revenues in perpetuity. <span></span><span>Policies for Contractual Compliance of</span> <span>Existing Registries</span> was approved in 2007 to include presumptive renewal. However, during the deliberations in that Policy Development Process, there was significant objection to presumption of renewal of registry contracts; with constituencies and individuals pointing out that such renewal was blatantly anti competitive, and allowed for presumption to prevail even in the case of material breaches.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The proposed agreement contemplates using a portion of Registry Level </b><br />Transaction Fees to create a “special restricted fund for developing country Internet communities to enable further participation in the ICANN mission for these stakeholders.” This form of tokenism to the global south will do little to achieve meaningful participation and diversity of civil society. .NET should instead, be opened to a competitive bid and open tender, in order to encourage innovators from around the world to benefit from it.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Irregularity of contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The argument that the proposed changes are to bring the contract in line with other gTLD registry agreements doesn't hold because this contract is in itself completely irregular: it was not entered into after a competitive process that other gTLD registry agreements are subject to; and it is not subject to the price sensitivity that other contracts are either.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNInternet Governance2017-06-06T13:35:53ZBlog EntryRevolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door
<b>The IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) is the body that will accept and coordinate different proposals for IANA transition. It will make the global Internet community's final proposal for transition to the NTIA. Lakshmi Venkataraman finds that a majority of the ICG's membership have had longstanding affiliations with I-star organisations. What will this mean for IANA transition? </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">NTIA’s announcement</a> of its decision to not renew the IANA Functions contract, ICANN instituted a process in search of an alternative oversight mechanism. The <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/stewardship/coordination-group">IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG)</a>, comprising 30 individuals, is the body set up to accept and coordinate proposals for IANA transition, and after this, to make a final proposal to the NTIA. <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/coordination-group-2014-06-17-en">ICANN claims</a> that the ICG comprises individuals representing 13 different communities and the interests of different stakeholders (direct and indirect), including those of governments, technical community and non-commercial users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The communities represented in the ICG are as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><span>ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee to </span><strong>ICANN</strong></li>
<li><span>ASO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>ccNSO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. ccTLDs</span></li>
<li><span>GNSO – Makes recommendations on gTLDs to the </span><strong>ICANN </strong><span>Board</span></li>
<li><span>IAB – Deals with technical and engineering aspects of the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>IETF – Deals with the development of standards under the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>NRO – Policy Advisor to </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>SSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. security of naming systems</span></li>
<li><span>RSSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. operation, security and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System</span></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, the ICG has been set up to devise and present to the NTIA, an IANA transition proposal that incorporates views and concerns of diverse stakeholders of the global Internet community. The composition of the ICG is, for this purpose, an indicator of the <i>nature</i> of proposals that may find final favour.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we examined the affiliations of ICG members with this in mind. Our assumptions are two-fold: (1) greater the diversity in ICG membership, greater the chance of diverse views being heard and represented, including those departing from the <i>status quo</i>; (2) conversely, if the ICG members have histories of affiliations to existing centres of power in global Internet governance (say, the I* organisations), chances of <i>status quo</i> being maintained are greater.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our findings are presented in tabular format below:</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(X – Unknown number of years spent in the organization)</span></p>
<table class="grid listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; ">I-star Organisation</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">________________</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">Name of person</p>
</th><th style="text-align: center; ">ICANN</th><th style="text-align: center; ">IETF </th><th style="text-align: center; ">IAB </th><th>W3C </th><th>ISOC </th><th>AfriNIC</th><th>ARIN </th><th>APNIC</th><th>LACNIC</th><th>RIPE-NCC</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrik Faltstrom</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Wilson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn St. Amour</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">13</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari Arkko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: left; ">Keith Davidson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demi Getschko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Housley</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1.5</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaodong Lee</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elise Gerich</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmut Glaser</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">14</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Ulrich Knobben</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russ Mundy</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo-Wei Wu</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">15</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narelle Clark</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Karrenberg</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed el Bashir</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Boyle</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Drazek</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Jacques Subrenat</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">7</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bladel</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong><span>†</span></strong></p>
</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; "><b>(†</b> - To serve on the GNSO Council from November 2015.)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As you will have noticed, 20 out of 30 ICG members (66.67%) have occupied positions in seemingly</span><i> </i><span>different organizations, but in actuality, these are organisations with very close links to each other. We see not 13, but 2 organizations</span><strong> </strong><span>that all the communities seem to be affiliated to, i.e., ICANN and ISOC. It seems all too ironic that the body that has been allocated the task of the IANA functions’ transition, in line with the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, is itself representative of only 2 organizations.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A prodding into the histories of these 30 members from ‘varied’ backgrounds reveals that most of them have <i>rotationally</i> served in the I-Star organizations. A close reading of their bio-data (from their ICANN and LinkedIn pages) reveals our findings on the number of years several of the members of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cooperation Group, have spent at the I-Star organizations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is not rocket science to recognise the power the I* organisations have over Internet governance today. Indeed, ICANN tells us that the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/governance-06feb13-en.pdf">I* run the Internet</a>. They are the leaders of the <i>status quo</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the IANA transition is anything <i>but</i> an affirmation of the <i>status quo</i>. Stakeholders and participants in IANA transition (in the <a href="https://community.icann.org/x/37fhAg">CWG</a>, <a href="https://www.nro.net/nro-and-internet-governance/iana-oversight/consolidated-rir-iana-stewardship-proposal-team-crisp-team">CRISP</a> and <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06">IETF</a>) have raised serious concerns about the <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/">desirability of IANA continuing within ICANN</a>, and about ICANN’s (inadequate) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/10/19/cauldron-part-2-is-the-names-iana-compatible-with-the-others/">accountability</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability">transparency</a>. True, ICANN has instituted processes to enable discussion on these issues, and the ICG is part of the process. It is entrusted with the momentous task of shifting from the <i>status quo</i> of the IANA Functions contract to a new mechanism of oversight. Given its composition, an assumption that the ICG may have vested interests in maintaining <i>status quo</i> is not out-of-the-way. In fact, some members of the ICG have <a href="http://isoc-ny.org/919">previously made statements</a> to the effect that Internet is not broken, and it does not need fixing. This poses a real danger to the IANA transition process and the global Internet community must demand safeguards.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Lakshmi Venkataraman performed the revolving door analysis on the ICG. She is a IV year at NALSAR University of Law and an intern at CIS during December 2014. Geetha Hariharan assisted in writing this post. </i></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door</a>
</p>
No publisherLakshmi VenkataramanICANNIANA Transition2014-12-16T05:44:40ZBlog EntryCIS’ Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann
<b>CIS has been working towards enhancing transparency and accountability at ICANN since 2014. While initial efforts have resulted in ICANN revealing its sources of income in a granular fashion in 2015, we are yet to see this level of transparency become a default approach within ICANN. Here, Padma Venkataraman chronologically maps CIS’ efforts at enhancing financial transparency and accountability at ICANN, while providing an outline of what remains to be done. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>With the $135 million sale of .web,<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> the much protested renewal of the .net agreement<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> and the continued annual increase in domain name registrations,<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> among other things, it is no surprise that there are still transparency and accountability concerns within the ICANN Community. CIS, as part of its efforts to examine the functioning of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, has filed many DIDP requests till date, in a bid for greater transparency of the organisation’s sources of revenues.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2014</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2015</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2017</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>-----</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2014</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In 2014, CIS’ Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>However, as no details of historical revenue had been provided, CIS filed a DIDP request in December 2014, seeking financial disclosure of revenues for the years 1999 to 2014, in a detailed manner - similar to the 2014 report that had been provided.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> It sought a list of individuals and entities who had contributed to ICANN’s revenues over the mentioned time period.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In its response, ICANN stated that it possessed no documents in the format that CIS had requested, that is, it had no reports that broke down domain name income and revenue received by each legal entity and individual.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> It stated that as the data for years preceding 2012 were on a different system, compiling reports of the raw data for these years would be time-consuming and overly burdensome. ICANN denied the request citing this specific provision for non-disclosure of information under the DIDP.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2015</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In July 2015, CIS filed a request for disclosure of raw data regarding granular income for the years 1999 to 2014.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> ICANN again said that it would be a huge burden ‘to access and review all the raw data for the years 1999 to 2014 in order to identify the raw data applicable to the request’.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> However, it mentioned its commitment to preparing detailed reports on a go-forward basis - all of which would be uploaded on its Financials page.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2017</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To follow up on ICANN’s commitment to granularity, CIS sought a detailed report on historical data for income and revenue contributions from domain names for FY 2015 and FY 2016 in June 2017.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a> In its reply, ICANN stated that the Revenue Detail by Source reports for the last two years would be out by end July and that the report for FY 2012 would be out by end September.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In 2014, CIS asked for disclosure of a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue and detailed granular income for the years 1999 to 2014. ICANN published the first but cited difficulty in preparing reports of the second. In 2015, CIS again sought detailed reports of historical granular revenue for the same period, and ICANN again denied disclosure claiming that it was burdensome to handle the raw data for those years. However, as ICANN agreed to publish detailed reports for future years, CIS recently asked for publication of reports for the FYs 2012, 2015 and 2016. Reports for these three years were uploaded according to the timeline provided by ICANN.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>CIS appreciates ICANN’s cooperation with its requests and is grateful for their efforts to make the reports for FYs 2012 to 2016 available (and on a continued basis). However, it is important that detailed information of historical revenue and income from domain names for the years 1999 to 2014 be made publicly available. It is also crucial that consistent accounting and disclosure practices are adopted and made known to the Community, in order to avoid omissions of statements such as Detail Revenue by Source and Lobbying Disclosures, among many others, in the annual reports - as has evidently happened for the years preceding 2012. This is necessary to maintain financial transparency and accountability, as an organisation’s sources of revenues can inform the dependant Community about why it functions the way it does. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>It will also allow more informed discussions about problems that the Community has faced in the past and continues to struggle with. For example, while examining problems such as ineffective market competition or biased screening processes for TLD applicants, among others, this data can be useful in assessing the long-term interests, motives and influences of different parties involved.</span></p>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a><span> Report of Public Comment Proceeding on the .net Renewal. </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP <span>Request no - 20141222-1, </span>22 December 2014. </span><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span> Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure - <span>Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.</span></span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP <span>Request no - 20150722-2, 22 July 2015. </span></span><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf</span></a><span>; </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP Request No. 20170613-1, 14 June 2017. </span></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-31T02:10:11ZBlog EntryWhy Presumption of Renewal is Unsuitable for the Current Registry Market Structure
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure
<b>With the recent and much protested renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal has again come to the forefront. While this seems relatively uncontroversial to most, Padma Venkataraman, a law student and intern at CIS looks at presumptive renewal through a critical lens. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the recent renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal is worth reconsidering. When we talk about presumption of renewal for registry agreements, it means that the agreement has a reasonable renewal expectancy at the end of its contractual term. According to the current base registry agreement, it shall be renewed for 10-year periods, upon expiry of the initial (and successive) term, unless the operator commits a fundamental and material breach of the operator’s covenants or breach of its payment obligations to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure">Download the entire blog post here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-31T02:53:26ZBlog EntryComments on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy
<b>ICANN sought community input on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy on 7 November 2016. In response to this the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted its comments.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We at CIS are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy (“Policy”). We provide our specific comments to the Policy below, in three sections. The first section addresses the<i> Terms of </i><i>Participation</i>, the second deals with the <i>Reporting</i><i> and Complaint</i><i> Procedure</i>, and the third places on record our observations on questions and issues for further consideration which have not been covered by the Policy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Besides various other observations, CIS broadly submitted:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of “Specified Characteristics” results in its meaning being unclear and exclusionary.</li>
<li>CIS strongly supports the phrase “including, but not limited to” that is followed by a bulleted list of inappropriate conduct.</li>
<li>The word “consent” is entirely missing from the draft policy even though the deciding factor in the “appropriateness” of an act or conduct is active and explicit consent to the act by both/ all individuals involved.</li>
<li>There is a need for clarity of communication platforms. The current Policy fails to specify instances of face-to-face and online communications.</li>
<li>The policy fails to account for a body of persons (as is provided for in the IETF policy) for the redressal of harassment complaints.</li>
<li>The provision for an informal resolution of a harassment issue is problematic as it could potentially lead to negative consequences for the complainant. </li>
<li>The Ombudsperson’s discretion in the determination of remedial action is detrimental to transparency and accountability.</li>
<li>The Policy in its current form lacks provisions for ensuring privacy and confidentiality of the complainant as well as interim relief while the Ombudsperson is looking into the complaint</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Read the Complete Submission <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/comments-on-icann-anti-harassment-policy.pdf">here</a></b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi MardaICANNInternet Governance2017-01-13T15:56:40ZBlog EntryICANN accountability, IANA transition and open questions
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions
<b>On February 3, 2015, the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) hosted a pre-event briefing in light of ICANN52 (Singapore, February 7-12, 2015). Geetha Hariharan attended the event.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At a briefing on ICANN52 organized by the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) on 3 February, 2015 (‘CCG Briefing Event’), consensus was seen on two broad things: ICANN’s processes on IANA transition and accountability are crucial for Internet governance this year, and India’s participation (both municipal and international) is wanting. The meeting, which saw discussion following the Chatham House rules, was attended by members from industry associations, government and civil society. A light parsing of the current proposals from the CWG-Names and CRISP (the names and numbers communities) for IANA transition brought the composition of the transition proposals under scrutiny.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CRISP and the proposed Service Level Agreements:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <a href="https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ICG-RFP-Number-Resource-Proposal-1_IO20150119.txt">proposal from the numbers community</a>, the CRISP, suggests that ICANN and the five RIRs enter into Service Level Agreements. Under the proposal, existing accountability, oversight and policy development mechanisms remain unchanged, with ICANN agreeing to perform IANA functions to meet requisite service levels. If it fails to meet such standards, the RIRs may terminate the contract or refuse to renew it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CRISP proposal does not look beyond ICANN for an IANA functions operator, and places its faith entirely in ICANN’s past performance of numbering IANA functions. As so many have said before, the CRISP proposal is blithe in its lack of review mechanism or safeguards, having even fewer safeguards than the CWG-Names proposal. Doubtless, a cause for concern.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CWG-Names and the Four New Entities:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-naming-transition-01dec14-en.pdf">CWG-Names proposal</a> suggests that four new entities be created to replace the NTIA’s role under the IANA Functions Contract. Under the proposal, ICANN will continue to be the IANA Functions Operator for the present. It will enter into an IANA Functions Contract with <strong>“Contract Co.”</strong>, a new shell entity which will replace NTIA as the contracting party. Contract Co. is to be a lightweight entity, with few staff or administrative capabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At present, the NTIA performs what it considers a <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/16/this_is_how_the_us_government_runs_the_internet/">“clerical role”</a> in its oversight of the DNS. However, the IANA Functions Contract also includes review functions, such as the rebidding and renewal process to determine whether ICANN (or some other entity) ought to continue as the IANA functions operator. Under the CWG-Names proposal, these review functions, which also include budget reviews, reporting, etc. are to be carried out by a <strong>“Multi-stakeholder Review Team (MRT)”</strong>, the terms of whose composition are as yet undecided.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The composition of the MRT is crucial to an independent and representative oversight of IANA. At the CCG Briefing Event, concerns were raised as to the representation of ccTLDs on the MRT. Not all ccTLDs are represented in the ICANN ecosystem, in the ccNSO; 152 ccTLDs are <a href="http://ccnso.icann.org/about/members.htm">members</a> of the ccNSO. Of course, one may argue that this concern exists under the present IANA functions contract as well. But the devil is in the details, or lack thereof. We don’t know, for instance, who will populate the MRT, whether they will enjoy immunities normally reserved for diplomatic or consular agents, or most importantly, what relationship the MRT will enjoy with ICANN. Will there be a contract with ICANN, or a memorandum of understanding that sets out ICANN’s responsibilities, failing which the IANA contract may be terminated?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The third new creation of the CWG-Names proposal is the <strong>“Customer Standing Committee (CSC)”</strong>. While the CSC’s composition is also nebulous, its functions are to work with the MRT to establish Service Levels and Performance Indicators for the naming functions, and to receive performance reports from the IANA operator (ICANN). Clause C.2.8 of the present IANA functions contract requires that the IANA operator (ICANN) develop performance standards for all enumerated IANA functions (see Clause C.2.9.1 to C.2.9.4), and also to report on them (Clause C.4). Presumably, the CSC will fill the role of the NTIA’s Contracting Officer’s Representative in receiving these performance reports.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The fourth and final new entity is the <strong>“Independent Appeals Panel (IAP)”</strong>, the composition of which is also undecided. The IAP is intended to hear and adjudicate all actions related to the root zone or root zone WHOIS, and under the present proposal, the CWG-Names suggests it should be constituted from time to time in the manner of a binding arbitration process. However, it should be noted that the CWG-Names proposal is unclear whether the IAP decisions are binding on or advisory to the ICANN Board. Concerns of the IAP’s composition aside, dangers of making its decisions only advisory to the ICANN Board loom large and real, and the CCG Briefing Event reflected this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Already, the ICANN Board wields extensive power with regard to policy decisions. For instance, policies developed under the global policy development process by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/review-procedures-2012-02-25-en">may be rejected</a> by the ICANN Board by a 2/3rds majority vote. Such a rejection may result in a mediation process according to agreed procedure. Another instance is the change in the ICANN Board’s treatment of GAC advice. Prior to the amendment to ICANN’s Bye-laws, the Board was not required to provide reasons for its rejection of GAC advice. In its present form, Article XI, Section 2(1) of ICANN’s Bye-laws make such reasons mandatory. How ought IAP decisions be treated, as binding or advisory? If they are to be binding, ICANN or any other IANA functions operator will have to enter into a legal arrangement (by contract or MoU, or in the best case, an amendment to ICANN Bye-laws).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Dodging the real issues: ICANN incumbency, IANA separation and where will all the money come from?</h3>
<p><span style="text-align: justify; ">Both the CWG-Names and CRISP proposals skim past certain issues relating to ICANN’s incumbency in the IANA role. The </span><strong>first concern</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">, of course, is whether ICANN should continue to be the IANA functions operator. Both proposals accept ICANN’s role, suggesting no change. While there are compelling reasons for ICANN’s continued role as IANA functions operator, unquestioning incumbency is equal to lack of accountability. And as neither proposal sets out a review process (the CWG-Names proposal only mentions that the MRT shall have this function), it is a concern.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Perhaps the </span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability">CCWG-Accountability</a><span>, convened under the Enhancing ICANN Accountability process, is better equipped to provide suggestions. However, the CCWG-Accountability is hard-pressed for time. Its two Workstreams, dealing with IANA transition related accountability mechanisms and ICANN’s internal accountability, are unlikely to see desired progress before the transition deadline of September 2015. For instance, within the CCWG-Accountability, a debate is ongoing as to ICANN’s composition. At the time of its incorporation, a suggestion that ICANN ought to have statutory members was floated, but turned down. The suggestion has </span><a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/12/19/icann-accountability-a-coup-or-a-contract/">reared its head again</a><span> in the CCWG-Accountability, to consider checks and balances on the ICANN Board.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>second concern</strong> relates to IANA’s continued existence within ICANN, without separation of policy and implementation. This concern has been clamouring for attention for many months. Milton Mueller, for instance, has recommended <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/03/03/a-roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/">structural separation</a> of IANA and ICANN, as did I and others during the course of the face-to-face meetings of the CWG-Names (I attended remotely).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A structural separation is beneficial for many reasons. It enforces a simple separation of powers. “When”, as Montesquieu stated, “the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may rise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner”. Tyranny is speaking in terms too extreme for ICANN, perhaps, it is undeniable that ICANN has grown larger in scope and size from its original incorporation. It was incorporated, as Professor DeNardis has noted [<i>Protocol Politics</i>, 161], to perform technical coordination of the global DNS and other functions performed originally by Jon Postel as IANA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today, in addition to technical coordination and policy-setting for names and numbers (through the gPDP), ICANN is a major player in the Internet governance institutional space; its involvement in and aggressive marketing of the NETmundial Initiative is but an example. For instance, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (FY2015). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone (FY2015). Separating IANA from ICANN will, as others have suggested, protect it from political or other influences within ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In any event, once the NTIA terminates the IANA functions contract, IANA is not strictly required to be within the US. At the moment, Clause C.2.1 of the IANA functions contract requires that the IANA functions operator be “a wholly U.S. owned and operated firm or fully accredited United States University or College operating in one of the 50 states of the United States or District of Columbia; b) incorporated within one of the fifty (50) states of the United States or District of Columbia; and c) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or District of Columbia”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Were structural separation to be achieved, IANA could be incorporated in another, neutral jurisdiction. Not only would be assuage optical considerations and ensure separation of powers, but as our experience with filtering on the Internet shows (see, for instance, the Open Net Initiative’s <a href="https://opennet.net/">research</a>), unilateral controls are much harder to enforce when the apparatus is decentralized.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>third concern</strong> raised at the CCG Briefing Event concerned the funding of the new entities proposed by the CWG-Names. Would these entities be self-financing, or perhaps ICANN would support them? While some participants felt ICANN could also provide financial support, this would, in my view, bring ICANN too close to its oversight entities, and increase chances of influence.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNIANA Transition2015-02-06T11:39:21ZBlog EntryWhere Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know
<b>Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond. </b>
<p> </p>
<h3>Why Is ICANN Here?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (<a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann.org">ICANN</a>) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a result of <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order">an agreement</a> with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-factsheet-24mar14-en.pdf">IANA functions</a>, which include making changes to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_root_zone">root zone file</a> (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite">the TCP/IP suite</a>. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is the <i>de facto</i> policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en">the UDRP</a> for domain name disputes), maintaining the <a href="http://whois.icann.org/">WHOIS database</a>, etc. for domain names.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/bharti/bharti-agmt-pdf-09jan14-en.pdf">the <strong>.bharti </strong>Registry Agreement</a>, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, <strong>.bharti</strong>) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals <span>X</span> US $0.25). <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-en">TLD Registries</a> “own” TLDs like <strong>.com</strong>, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-agreements-en">816 such Registry Agreements</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like <a href="https://in.godaddy.com/">Go Daddy</a> and <a href="http://www.bigrock.in/">Big Rock</a>, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en#raa">yearly accreditation fee</a> of US $4000 to ICANN (see <span>Clause 3.9</span>). Each Registrar also <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/financials-55-2012-02-25-en">pays to ICANN</a> fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are <a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html">over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (<a href="http://www.nixi.in/en/contact-us/103-irinn">NIXI as IRINN</a>), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [<i>see, ex.</i>:<i> </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun09-en.pdf">FY09 Financial Statements, page 3</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>And this isn’t all of it! With its </span><a href="http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/">new gTLD program</a><span>, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for </span><a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20141129_icann_new_gtld_auction_proceeds_approaching_30_million/">as high as US $6 million</a><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering <i>status quo </i>(for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions">As we have written before</a>, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 17</a>). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 11</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To its credit, ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en">makes public</a> its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if <a href="https://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#six41">IP addresses are not property to be sold</a>? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. <span>To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</a><span> (DIDP), </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en">Ombudsman</a><span>, </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review">Reconsideration and Independent Review</a><span> and the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf">Accountability and Transparency Review</a><span> (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV">Article IV, Section 2</a><span>), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (</span><i>nemo debet esse judex in propria causa</i><span>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A">ICANN Open Forum</a> in Istanbul (IGF 2014).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door">revolving door study</a> by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But ICANN is <i>intended </i>to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. <a href="http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/sun-iana-stewardship-accountability">As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52</a>, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is <a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/564269949237985280">still asking that question</a>. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS <a href="http://openup2014.org/privacy-vs-transparency-attempt-resolving-dichotomy/">has advocated</a> transparency as a check-and-balance for power.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. <b>We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file">please go here</a></b>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-netmundial-2015-01-28-en">NETmundial Request</a></b>, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they <i>already implement</i> the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that <i>permeate through the work of any entity </i>– particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en">Ombudsman Request</a></b>, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V">Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws</a>. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en">Annual Reports</a>; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>CIS' Annual Reports are <a href="http://cis-india.org/about/reports">here</a>. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. <i>Pranav Bidare (<i style="text-align: justify; ">3rd year)</i> of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.</i></i></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaAccountabilityICANNIANA TransitionTransparencyDIDP2015-03-05T07:43:45ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #2: Granular Revenue/Income Statements from ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking current and historical details of ICANN's income/revenue from its various sources. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-decoration: underline;">22 December 2014</span><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: Request for granular income/revenue statements of ICANN from 1999-2014</strong><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier this month, on 3 December 2014, Mr. Samiran Gupta presented CIS with detailed and granular information regarding ICANN’s domain names income and revenues for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014. This was in response to several requests made over a few months. The information we received is available on our website.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The information mentioned above was, <i>inter alia</i>, extremely helpful in triangulating ICANN’s reported revenues, despite and in addition to certain inconsistencies between the Annual Report (FY14) and the information provided to us.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We recognize that ICANN makes public its current and historical financial information to a certain extent. Specifically, its Operating Plan and Budget, Audited Financial Statements, Annual Reports, Federal and State Tax Filings, Board Compensation Report and ccTLD Contributions Report are available on the website.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, a detailed report of ICANN’s income or revenue statement, listing all vendors and customers, is not available on ICANN’s website. Our research on accountability and transparency mechanisms in Internet governance, specifically of ICANN, requires information in such granularity. <strong>We request, therefore, historical data re: income and revenue from domain names (1999-2014), in a manner as detailed and granular as the information referenced in FN[1]</strong>. We would appreciate if such a report lists all legal entities and individuals who contribute to ICANN’s domain names income/ revenue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We look forward to the receipt of this information within the stipulated period of 30 days. Please feel free to contact us in the event of any doubts regarding our queries.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to CIS's request can be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf"><strong>found here</strong></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 2)</strong></a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See <i>ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues</i>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See <i>Historical Financial Information for ICANN</i>, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/historical-2012-02-25-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/historical-2012-02-25-en</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-05T08:07:02ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #3: Cyber-attacks on ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of cyber-attacks on ICANN, and ICANN's internal and external responses to the same. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>24 December 2014</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Geoff Bickers, Team Lead, ICANN Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) & Director of Security Operations</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. John Crain, Chief Security, Stability and Resiliency Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Members of the ICANN-CIRT & ICANN Security Team</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: Details of cyber-attacks on ICANN</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We understand that ICANN recently suffered a spear-phishing attack that compromised contact details of several ICANN staff, including their email addresses; these credentials were used to gain access to ICANN’s Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS).<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> We are glad to note that ICANN’s critical functions and IANA-related systems were not affected.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The incident has, however, raised concerns of the security of ICANN’s systems. In order to understand when, in the past, ICANN has suffered similar security breaches, we request details of all cyber-attacks suffered or thought/suspected to have been suffered by ICANN (and for which, therefore, investigation was carried out within and outside ICANN), from 1999 till date. This includes, naturally, the recent spear-phishing attack.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We request information regarding, <i>inter alia</i>,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(1) the date and nature of all attacks, as well as which ICANN systems were compromised,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(2) actions taken internally by ICANN upon being notified of the attacks,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(3) what departments or members of staff are responsible for security and their role in the event of cyber-attacks,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(4) the role and responsibility of the ICANN-CIRT in responding to cyber-attacks (and when policies or manuals exist for the same; if so, please share them),</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(5) what entities external to ICANN are involved in the identification and investigation of cyber-attacks on ICANN (for instance, are the police in the jurisdiction notified and do they investigate? If so, we request copies of complaints or information reports),</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(6) whether and when culprits behind the ICANN cyber-attacks were identified, and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(7) what actions were subsequently taken by ICANN (ex: liability of ICANN staff for security breaches should such a finding be made, lawsuits or complaints against perpetrators of attacks, etc.).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, we also request information on the role of the ICANN Board and/or community in the event of such cyber-attacks on ICANN. Also, when was the ICANN-CIRT set up and how many incidents has it handled since its existence? Do there exist contingency procedures in the event of compromise of IANA systems (and if so, what)?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN responded to our request by noting that it is vague and broad in both time and scope. In response, ICANN has provided information regarding certain cyber-incidents already in the public domain, while noting that the term "cyber-attack" is both wide and vague. While the information provided is undoubtedly useful, it is anecdotal at best, and does not provide a complete picture of ICANN's history of vulnerability to cyber-attacks or cyber-incidents, or the manner of its internal response to such incidents, or of the involvement of external law enforcement agencies or CIRTs in combating cyber-incidents on ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-23jan15-en.pdf"><b>found here</b></a>. A short summary our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><b>in this table (Request S. no. 3)</b></a>.</p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See<i> ICANN targeted in spear-phishing attack</i>, <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en">https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en</a>. <i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See <i>IANA Systems not compromised</i>, <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-19-en">https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-19-en</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-05T08:16:26ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #5: The Ombudsman and ICANN's Misleading Response to Our Request
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of the complaints received and resolved, parties involved and the nature of complaints under the Ombudsman process. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. ICANN's response is misleading in its insistence on confidentiality of all Ombudsman complaints and resolutions.</b>
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<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>26 December 2014</span></p>
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<p><span>To:<br /> Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Chris LaHatte, Ombudsman, ICANN </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><span><strong>Sub: Details regarding complaints submitted to the ICANN Ombudsman </strong></span></p>
<p><span>We are very pleased to note that ICANN’s transparency and accountability mechanisms include maintaining a free, fair and impartial ombudsman. It is our understanding that any person with a complaint against the ICANN Board, staff or organization, may do so to the designated ombudsman.[1]</span><span> </span><span>We also understand that there are cases that the ICANN ombudsman does not have the authority to address. </span></p>
<p><span>In order to properly assess and study the efficiency and effectiveness of the ombudsman system, we request you to provide us with the following information: </span></p>
<p><span>(i) A compilation of all the cases that have been decided by ICANN ombudsmen in the history of the organization. </span></p>
<p><span>(ii) The details of the parties that are involved in the cases that have been decided by the ombudsmen. </span></p>
<p><span>(iii)A description of the proceedings of the case, along with the party that won in each instance. </span></p>
<p><span>Further, we hope you could provide us with an answer as to why there have been no ombudsman reports since the year 2010, on the ICANN website.[2]</span><span> </span><span>Additionally, we would like to bring to your notice that the link that provides the ombudsman report for the year 2010 does not work.</span></p>
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<p><span>In order to properly assess the mechanism that ICANN uses for grievance redressal, it would be necessary to examine the details of all the cases that ICANN ombudsmen have presided over in the past. In this regard, kindly provide us with the above information.</span></p>
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<p><span>We do hope that you will be able to furnish this information to us within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any doubts regarding our queries. Thank you so much. </span></p>
<p><span>Yours sincerely,<br /> Lakshmi Venkataraman<br /> NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, </span><span>for </span><span>Centre for Internet & Society<br /> W: http://cis-india.org</span></p>
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<h2>ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In its response, ICANN declines our request on grounds of confidentiality. It refers to the ICANN Bylaws on the office of the Ombudsman to argue that all matters brought before the Ombudsman "shall be treated as confidential" and the Ombudsman shall "<span>take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman". ICANN states that the Ombudsman publishes Annual Reports, in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "</span><span>a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". </span><span>In sum, ICANN states that m</span><span>aking Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline our DIDP request. But it is important to investigate ICANN's reasons. The <span>ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman for 2 year terms, under </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V">Article V of ICANN’s Bylaws</a><span>. As we note </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know">in an earlier post</a><span>, the Ombudsman’s principal function is to receive and dispose of <span style="text-align: justify; ">complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency.</span></span><span> He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. He/she also </span><span>reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en">Annual Reports</a><span>; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy. </span><span>It is clear, therefore, that the Ombudsman receives and disposes of complaints under a procedure that is inadequately transparent. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN argues, however, that for reasons of confidentiality and integrity of the Ombudsman office, ICANN is unable to disclose details regarding Ombudsman complaints, the complainants/respondents and a description of the proceedings (including the decision/resolution). Indeed, ICANN states its</span><span> "Bylaws and <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf">the Ombudsman Framework</a> obligates the Ombudsman to treat all matters brought before him as confidential and 'to take reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman'.” For this reason, ICANN considers that "D</span><span>isclosing details about the parties involved and the nature of the cases that have been decided by the Ombudsmen would not only compromise the confidentiality of the Ombudsman process but would also violate the ICANN Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework." </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>While the privacy of parties both involved and "not involved in the complaint" can be preserved (by redacting names, email addresses and other personal identification), h</span><span>ow valid is ICANN's dogged insistence on confidentiality and non-disclosure? Let's look at Article V of ICANN's Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework both.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Do ICANN Bylaws bind the Ombudsman to Confidentiality?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under Article V, Section 1(2) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for a 2 year term (renewable). As noted earlier, the Ombudsman's principal function is to<span> </span><span>“provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly” or inappropriately (Art. V, Section 2). The Ombudsman is not a judge; his conflict resolution tools are "</span><span>negotiation, facilitation, and 'shuttle diplomacy'. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>According to Art. V, Section 3(3), the Ombudsman has access to "all necessary information and records from staff and constituent bodies" to evaluate complaints in an informed manner. While the Ombudsman can <i>access</i> these records, he may not "publish if otherwise confidential". When are these records confidential, then? Section 3(3) supplies the answer. The confidentiality obligations are as "imposed by the complainant or <span style="text-align: justify; ">any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN". For instance, the complainant can waive its confidentiality by publishing the text of its complaint <span style="text-align: justify; ">and the Ombudsman's response to the same </span>(such as the <a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/ica-tells-icann-ombudsman-office-its-irt-report-tardy-nonresponsive-and-non-persuasive/">Internet Commerce Association's complaint</a> regarding the Implementation Review Team under the new gTLD program), or a complaint may be publicly <a href="http://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-discuss/2012-November/010974.html">available on a listserv</a>. In any event, there is no blanket confidentiality obligation placed on the Ombudsman under ICANN's Bylaws.</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, the Ombudsman also publishes Annual Reports,</span><span style="text-align: justify; "> in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "</span><span style="text-align: justify; ">a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". That is, the Ombudsman's Annual Report showcases a graph comparing the increase in the number of complaints, categories of complaints (i.e., whether the complaints fall within or outside of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction), and a brief description of the Ombudsman's scope of resolution and response. The Annual Reports indicate that the mandate of the Ombudsman's office is extremely narrow. In 2014, for instance, 75 out of 467 complaints were <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf">within Mr. LaHatte's jurisdiction</a> (page 5), but he notes that his ability to intervene is limited to "failures in procedure". <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf">As an input to the ATRT2 Report noted</a>, the Office of the Ombudsman “appears so restrained and contained” (page 53). As the ATRT2 noted, "</span></span></span><span>ICANN needs to reconsider the Ombudsman’s charter and the Office’s role as a symbol of good governance to be further incorporated in transparency processes"; the Office's transparency leaves much to be desired.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">But I digress.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman is authorised to make reports on any complaint and its resolution (or lack thereof) to the ICANN Board, and unless the Ombudsman says so <i>in his sole discretion</i>, his reports are to be posted on the website (Art. V, Section 4(4)). <span style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman can also report on individual requests, such as </span><a href="https://omblog.icann.org/index.html%3Fp=1015.html" style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. LaHatte's response to a complaint regarding a DIDP denial</a><span style="text-align: justify; "> (cached). </span>Some reports are actually available on the Ombudsman page; the last published report dates back to 2012, though in 2013 and 2014, the Ombudsman dealt with more complaints within his jurisdiction than in 2012 or prior. </span></span><span>So ICANN's argument that disclosing the information we ask for in our DIDP Request would violate ICANN Bylaws and the confidentiality of the Ombudsman is misleading. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Does the Ombudsman Framework Prohibit Public Reporting?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So if ICANN Bylaws do not <i>ipso facto</i> bind the Ombudsman's complaint and conflict resolution process to confidentiality, does the Ombudsman Framework do so?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman does indeed have confidentiality obligations under <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf" style="text-align: justify; ">the Ombudsman Framework</a> (page 4). All matters brought before the Ombudsman shall be treated as confidential, and the identities of parties not involved in the complaint are required to be protected. The Ombudsman may reveal the identity of the complainant to the ICANN Board or Staff only to further the resolution of a complaint (which seems fairly obvious); this obligation is extended to ICANN Board and Staff as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the Framework makes crystal clear, the <i>identity of complainants</i> are to be kept confidential. Nothing whatsoever binds the Ombudsman from revealing the stakeholder group or affiliation of the complainants - and these are possibly of more importance. What stakeholders most often receive unfair or inappropriate treatment from ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies? Does business suffer more, or do non-commercial users, or indeed, governments? It is good to know <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf">what countries the complaints come from (page 4-5)</a>, but given ICANN's insistence on its multi-stakeholder model as a gold standard, it is important to know what stakeholders suffer the most in the ICANN system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In fact, in the first page, the Ombudsman Framework says this: "<span><strong>The Ombudsman may post complaints and resolutions to a dedicated portion of the ICANN website</strong> (http://www.icann.org/ombudsman/): (i) <strong>in order to promote an understanding of the issues in the ICANN community</strong>; (ii) to raise awareness of administrative fairness; and (iii) <strong>to allow the community to see the results of similar previous cases</strong>. These postings will be done in a <strong>generic manner</strong> to protect the confidentiality and privilege of communicating with the Office of Ombudsman." But the ICANN website does not, in fact, host records of any Ombudsman complaints or resolutions; it links you only to the Annual Reports and Publications. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As I've written before, the Annual Reports provide no details regarding the nature of each complaint, their origins or resolution, and are useful if the only information we need is bare statistics of the <i>number of complaints received</i>. That is useful, but it's not enough. Given that the Ombudsman Framework <i>does</i> allow complaint/resolution reporting, it is baffling that ICANN's response to our DIDP request chooses to emphasise only the confidentiality obligations, while conveniently leaving out the parts enabling and encouring reporting. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Should ICANN Report the Ombudsman Complaints?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course it should. The Ombudsman is aimed at filling an integral gap in the ICANN system - he/she listens to complaints about treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies. As the discussions surrounding the appeal procedures in the CWG-Names show, and as the ATRT2 recommendations on Reconsideration and Independent Review show, conflict resolution mechanisms are crucial in any environment, not least a multi-stakeholder one. And in an organisation that leaves much desired by way of accountability and transparency, not reporting on complaints against the Board, staff or constituencies seems a tad irresponsible.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If there are privacy concerns regarding the identities of complainants, their personal identifying information can be redacted. Actually, <a href="https://omb.icann.org/portal/complaint.php">in the complaint form</a>, adding a waiver-of-confidentiality tick-box would solve the problem, allowing the complainant to choose whether to keep his/her complaint unreportable. But the details of the respondents ought to be reported; as the entity responsible and accountable, ICANN should disclose whom complaints have been made against.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-ombudsman-response-27jan15-en.pdf"><b>found here</b></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 5)</strong></a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[1] </span><span><i>See</i> </span><span>What the Ombudsman can do for you</span><span>, </span><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/contact- 2012-02-25-en</span><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[2] <i>See</i> Annual Reports & Publications, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012- 02-25-en.</span></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1</a>
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No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-06T11:11:31ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #7: Globalisation Advisory Groups
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking information regarding the creation and dissolution of the President's Globalisation Advisory Groups. The GAGs were created to advise the ICANN Board on its globalisation efforts, and to address questions on Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
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<h2>CIS Request</h2>
<p><span>12 January 2015</span></p>
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<p><span>To:<br /> Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</span></p>
<p><span> Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</span></p>
<p><span> Ms. Theresa Swineheart, Senior Advisor to the President on Strategy </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><span><strong>Sub: Creation and dissolution of the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups </strong></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On 17 February 2014, at a Special Meeting of the ICANN Board, the Board passed a resolution creating the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups.</span><span>1 </span><span>Six Globalisation Advisory Groups were created, including on IANA globalization, legal structures, Internet governance, the Affirmation of Commitments, policy structures and the root server system.</span><span>2 </span><span>According to the minutes of the meeting, the Advisory Groups were to meet with the community at ICANN49 (Singapore, March 2014), make recommendations to the Board, and the Board would present their reports at ICANN50 (London, June 2014).</span><span>3 </span><span>Mr. Chehade was vested with the authority to change the Advisory Groups and their composition without the need for a further resolution, but the manner of dissolution was not laid out. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN lists the Advisory Groups on its “Past Groups” page, with no further information.</span><span>4 </span><span>Presumably, the Groups remained in existence for at most one month. No explanation is provided for the reasons regarding the dissolution of all the Advisory Groups. There are no reports or transcripts of meetings with the community at ICANN49 or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or the Board.</span></p>
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<p><span>The Globalisation Advisory Groups covered issues crucial for ICANN and the global Internet governance community, including its seat (“Legal Structures”), the Affirmation of Commitments (considered critical for ICANN’s accountability), the IANA stewardship transition, and ICANN’s (increasing) involvement in Internet governance. Given this, we request the following information: </span></p>
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<li><span>Of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups created, is any Group active as of today (12 January 2015)? </span></li>
<li><span>When and how many times did any of the Groups meet?</span></li>
<li><span>On what date were the Groups dissolved? Were all Groups dissolved on the </span><span>same date?</span></li>
<li><span>By what mechanism did the dissolution take place (oral statement, email)? If the dissolution occurred by way of email or statement, please provide a copy of the same.</span></li>
<li><span>Did any of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups present any report, advice, or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or any member(s) of the Board, prior to their dissolution? If yes, please provide the report/recommendations (if available) and/or information regarding the same.</span></li>
<li><span>Why were the Advisory Groups dissolved? Has any reason been recorded, and if not, please provide an explanation.</span></li>
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<div class="column"><span>We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.</span></div>
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<div class="column"><span>Thank you very much.</span></div>
<p>Warm regards,<br /> Geetha Hariharan<br /> Centre for Internet & Society</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to this request is positive. ICANN states that the Board did indeed set up the six Globalisation Advisory Groups (GAGs) on 17 February 2014 to tackle issues surrounding ICANN's globalisation efforts. The Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance were issues taken up by the GAGs. However, after the NTIA made its announcement regarding the IANA transition in March 2014, the GAGs were disbanded so as to avoid duplication of work on issues that "<span>had a home in the global multistakeholder discussions". As a result, by a Board resolution dated 27 March 2014, the GAGs were dissolved. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>This is an example of a good response to an information request. Some documentation regarding the creation and dissolution of the GAGs existed, such as the Board resolutions. The response points us to these documents, and summarises the reasons for the GAGs' creation and dissolution. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is possible that this response is clear/comprehensive because the GAGs no longer exist, and in any event, did not perform any work worth writing about. Queries about ICANN's involvement in Internet governance (NETmundial, the NETmundial Initiative, etc.) garner responses that are, to say it informally, cage-y and surrounded by legalese.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-09feb15-en.pdf"><strong>found here</strong></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 7)</strong></a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[1] </span><span><i>See</i> </span><span>Approved Board Resolutions | Special Meeting of the Board</span><span>, </span><span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-02-17-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-02-17-en</a></span><span>.</span></p>
<p>[2] <i>See</i> President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/globalization-19feb14-en.pdf">https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/globalization-19feb14-en.pdf</a>.</p>
<p>[3] <i>See</i> Minutes | Special Meeting of the Board, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/board- material/minutes-2014-02-17-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/board- material/minutes-2014-02-17-en</a>.</p>
<p>[4] <i>See</i> Past Committees, Task Forces, and Other Groups, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/past-2012-02-25-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/past-2012-02-25-en</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups</a>
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No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-17T10:07:26ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #8: ICANN Organogram
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of its oragnisational structure and headcount of all staff. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>13 January 2015</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To:</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, President and CEO</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: ICANN organogram</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong><span>In order to understand ICANN’s organizational structure, decision-making and day-to-day functioning, may we request an organogram of ICANN. We request that the organogram include ICANN’s reporting hierarchy, mentioning positions held in all departments. Wherever possible (such as middle and senior management), we request names of the ICANN staff holding the positions as well. Along with this, could you also provide a count per department of the number of ICANN staff employed in all departments as of this date?</span><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN does not provide all the information we requested, but it responded with the following:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First, ICANN has responded that its current staff headcount is approx. 310. ICANN states that it already makes publicly available an <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/management-org-01feb15-en.pdf">organisational chart</a>. This is immensely useful, for it sets out the reporting hierarchies at senior and mid-managerial levels. However, it doesn't tell us the organisational structure categorised by all departments and staff in the said departments. The webpages of some of ICANN's departments list out some of its staff; for instance, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/about-2014-10-10-en">Contractual Compliance</a>, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/gse-2012-02-25-en">Global Stakeholder Engagement</a> and <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/policy">Policy Development</a> (scroll down).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What you will notice is that ICANN provides us a list of staff, but we cannot be sure whether the team includes more persons than those mentioned. Second, a quick glance at the Policy Development staff makes clear that ICANN selects from outside this pool to coordinate the policy development. For instance, the IANA Stewardship Transition (the CWG-IANA) is supported by <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/profiles/grace-abuhamad">Ms. Grace Abuhamad</a>, who is not a member of the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/policy">policy support staff</a>, but coordinates the IANA mailing list and F2F meetings anyway. What this means is that we're no longer certain who within ICANN is involved in policy development and support, whom they report to, and where the Chinese walls lie. This is why an organogram is necessary: the policy-making and implementation functions in ICANN may be closely linked because of staff interaction, and effective Chinese walls would benefit from public scrutiny.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, ICANN says that one may explore staff profiles on the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/community/explore?profile_search%5Bbadge_filters%5D%5B%5D=staff_badge&profile_search%5Bbadge_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bcountry_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bicann_experience_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Big_experience_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Binterest_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Blanguage_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bmembership_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bprofile_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Bsearch_text%5D=&utf8=%E2%9C%93">Staff page</a>. While short biographies/profiles are available for most staff on the Staff page, it's unclear what departments they work in, how many staff members work each in department, whom they report to, and what the broad range of their responsibilities include.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Privacy concerns do not preclude the disclosure of such information for two reasons. First, staff profiles imply a consent to making staff information public (at least their place in the organisational structure, if not their salaries, addresses, phone extension numbers, etc.). Second, such information is necessary and helpful to scrutinise the effectiveness of ICANN's functioning. Like the example of the policy-making process mentioned above, greater transparency in internal functioning will itself serve as a check against hazards like partisanism, public comment aggregation, drafting of charters for policy-making and determining scope, etc. While the functioning itself may or need not change, scrutiny can ensure responsibility from ICANN and its staff.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be </span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-organogram-response-11feb15-en.pdf" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>found here</strong></a><span style="text-align: justify; ">. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 8)</strong></a><span style="text-align: justify; ">.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-17T11:39:16ZBlog EntryNavigating the 'Reconsideration' Quagmire (A Personal Journey of Acute Confusion)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion
<b>An earlier analysis of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy already brought to light our concerns about the lack of transparency in ICANN’s internal mechanisms. Carrying my research forward, I sought to arrive at an understanding of the mechanisms used to appeal a denial of DIDP requests. In this post, I aim to provide a brief account of my experiences with the Reconsideration Request process that ICANN provides for as a tool for appeal.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Backdrop: What is the Reconsideration Request Process?</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Reconsideration Request process has been laid down in Article IV, Section 2 of the</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Bylaws. Some of the key aspects of this provision have been outlined below<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>,</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>ICANN is obligated to institute a process by which a person <i>materially affected </i>by ICANN action/inaction can request review or reconsideration.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>To file this request, one must have been adversely affected by actions of the staff or the board that contradict ICANN’s policies, or actions of the Board taken up without the Board considering material information, or actions of the Board taken up by relying on false information.</li>
<li>A separate Board Governance Committee was created with the specific mandate of reviewing Reconsideration requests, and conducting all the tasks related to the same.</li>
<li>The Reconsideration Request must be made within 15 days of:
<ul>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD ACTION: the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution, unless the posting of the resolution is not accompanied by a rationale, in which case the request must be submitted within 15 days from the initial posting of the rationale;</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO STAFF ACTION: the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action, and</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD OR STAFF INACTION: the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>.The Board Governance Committee is given the power to summarily dismiss a reconsideration request if:
<ul>
<li>the requestor fails to meet the requirements for bringing a Reconsideration Request;</li>
<li>it is frivolous, querulous or vexatious; or </li>
<li>the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>If not summarily dismissed, the Board Governance Committee proceeds to review and reconsider.</li>
<li>A requester may ask for an opportunity to be heard, and the decision of the Board Governance Committee in this regard is final.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The basis of the Board Governance Committee’s action is public written record information submitted by the requester, by third parties, and so on.</li>
<li>The Board Governance Committee is to take a decision on the matter and make a final determination or recommendation to the Board within 30 days of the receipt of the Reconsideration request, unless it is impractical to do so, and it is accountable to the Board to make an explanation of the circumstances that caused the delay.</li>
<li>The determination is to be made public and posted on the ICANN website.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has provided a neat infographic to explain this process in a simple fashion, and I am reproducing it here:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Reconsideration.jpg" alt="Reconsideration" class="image-inline" title="Reconsideration" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(Image taken from <span></span><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/reconsiderationen</span>)</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our Tryst with the Reconsideration Process</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Grievance</b><br />Our engagement with the Reconsideration process began with the rejection of two of our requests (made on September 1, 2015) under ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. The requests sought information about the registry and registrar compliance audit process that ICANN maintains, and asked for various documents pertaining to the same<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a>:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Copies of the registry/registrar contractual compliance audit reports for all the audits carried out as well as external audit reports from the last year (20142015).</li>
<li>A generic template of the notice served by ICANN before conducting such an audit.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries to whom such notices were served in the last year.</li>
<li>An account of the expenditure incurred by ICANN in carrying out the audit process.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries that did not respond to the notice within a reasonable period of time.</li>
<li>Reports of the site visits conducted by ICANN to ascertain compliance.</li>
<li>Documents which identify the registries/registrars who had committed material discrepancies in the terms of the contract.</li>
<li>Documents pertaining to the actions taken in the event that there was found to be some form of contractual noncompliance.</li>
<li>A copy of the registrar selfassessment form which is to be submitted to ICANN.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN integrated both the requests and addressed them via one response on 1 October, 2015 (which can be found <span></span><span>here</span>). In their response, ICANN inundated us with already available links on their website explaining the compliance audit process, and the processes ancillary to it, as well as the broad goals of the programme none of which was sought for by us in our request. ICANN then went on to provide us with information on their ThreeYear Audit programme, and gave us access to some of the documents that we had sought, such as the preaudit notification template, list of registries/registrars that received an audit notification, the expenditure incurred to some extent, and so on .</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Individual contracted party reports were denied to us on the basis of their grounds for nondisclosure. Further, and more disturbingly, ICANN refused to provide us with the names of the contracted parties who had been found under the audit process to have committed discrepancies. Therefore, a large part of our understanding of the way in which the compliance audit process works remains unfinished.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What we did</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dissatisfied with this response, I went on to file a Reconsideration request (number 1522) as per their standard format on November 2, 2015. (The request filed can be accessed <span></span><span>here</span>).As grounds for reconsideration, I stated that “<i>As a part of my research I was tracking the ICANN compliance audit process, and therefore required access to audit reports in cases where discrepancies where formally found in their actions. This is in the public interest and therefore requires to be disclosed...While providing us with an array of detailed links explaining the compliance audit process, the ICANN staff has not been able to satisfy our actual requests with respect to gaining an understanding of how the compliance audits help in regulating actions of the registrars, and how they are effective in preventing breaches and discrepancies.</i>” Therefore, I requested them to make the records in question publicly available “<i>We request ICANN to make the records in question, namely the audit reports for individual contracted parties that reflect discrepancies in contractual compliance, which have been formally recognised as a part of your enforcement process. We further request access to all documents that relate to the expenditure incurred by ICANN in the process, as we believe financial transparency is absolutely integral to the values that ICANN stands by.</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Board Governance Committee’s response</b><sup>3</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The determination of the Board Governance Committee was that our claims did not merit reconsideration, as I was unable to identify any “<i>misapplication of policy or procedure by the ICANN Staff</i>”, and my only issue was with the substance of the DIDP Response itself, and <i>substantial disagreements with a DIDP response are not proper bases for reconsideration </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(emphasis supplied).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The response of the Board Governance Committee was educative of the ways in which they determine Reconsideration Requests. Analysing the DIDP process, it held that ICANN was well within its powers to deny information under its defined Conditions for NonDisclosure, and denial of substantive information did not amount to a procedural violation. Therefore, since the staff adhered to established procedure under the DIDP, there was no basis for our grievance, and our request was dismissed..</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, as a postscript, it is interesting to note that the Board Governance Committee delayed its response time by over a month, by its own admission “<i>In terms of the timing of the BGC’s recommendation, it notes that Section 2.16 of Article IV of the Bylaws provides that the BGC shall make a final determination or recommendation with respect to a reconsideration request within thirty days, unless impractical. To satisfy the thirtyday deadline, the BGC would have to have acted by 2 December 2015. However, due to the timing of the BGC’s meetings in November and December, the first practical opportunity for the BGC to consider Request 1522 was 13 January 2016.</i>”<sup>4</sup></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Whither do I wander now?</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To me, this entire process reflected the absurdity of the Reconsideration request structure as an appeal mechanism under the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. As our experience indicated, there does not seem to be any way out if there is an issue with the substance of ICANN’s response. ICANN, commendably, is particular about following procedure with respect to the DIDP. However, what is the way forward for a party aggrieved by the flaws in the existing policy? As I had <span></span><span>analysed</span> <span>earlier</span>, the grounds for ICANN to not disclose information are vast, and used to deny a large chunk of the information requests that they receive. How is the hapless requester to file a meaningful appeal against the outcome of a bad policy, if the only ground for appeal is noncompliance with the procedure of said bad policy? This is a serious challenge to transparency as there is no other way for a requester to acquire information that ICANN may choose to withold under one of its myriad clauses. It cannot be denied that a good information disclosure law ought to balance the free disclosure of information with the holding back of information that truly needs to be kept private.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> However, it is this writer’s firm opinion that even instances where information is witheld, there has to be a stronger explanation for the same, and moreover, an appeals process that does not take into account substantive issues which might adversely affect the appellant falls short of the desirable levels of transparency. Global standards dictate that grounds for appeal need to be broad, so that all failures to apply the information disclosure law/policy may be remedied.<sup>6</sup> Various laws across the world relating to information disclosure often have the following as grounds for appeal: an inability to lodge a request, failure to respond to a request within the set time frame, a refusal to disclose information, in whole or in part, excessive fees and not providing information in the form sought, as well as a catchall clause for other failures.<sup>7</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, independent oversight is the heart of a proper appeal mechanism in such situations<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a>; the power to decide the appeal must not rest with those who also have the discretion to disclose the information, as is clearly the case with ICANN, where the Board Governance Committee is constituted and appointed by the ICANN Board itself [one of the bodies against whom a grievance may be raised].</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Suggestions</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We believe ICANN, in keeping with its global, multistakeholder, accountable spirit, should adopt these standards as well, especially now that the transition looms around the corner. Only then will the standards of open, transparent and accountable governance of the Internet upheld by ICANN itself as the ideal be truly, meaningfully realised. Accordingly, the following standards ought to be met with:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Establishment of an independent appeals authority for information disclosure cases</li>
<li>Broader grounds for appeal of DIDP requests</li>
<li>Inclusion of disagreement with the substantive content of a DIDP response as a ground for appeal.</li>
<li>Provision of proper reasoning for any justification of the witholding of information that is necessary in the public interest.</li>
</ol>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Article IV, Section 2, ICANN Bylaws, 2014 <i>available at </i>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylawsen/#IV</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Copies of the request can be found <span></span><span>here</span> and <span></span><span>here</span>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Katherine Chekouras, <i>Balancing National Security with a Community's RighttoKnow: Maintaining </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA 's NonPreemption Clause</i>, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 107, (2007).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Toby Mendel, <i>Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study</i> 151 (2nd edn, 2008).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Id</i>, at 152</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><sup>3</sup>4 Available <span></span><span>here</span>. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration1522cisfinaldetermination13jan16en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Mendel, <i>supra </i>note 6.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini Baruah and Geetha HariharanICANNInternet Governance2016-11-30T13:48:41ZBlog Entry