The Centre for Internet and Society
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NETmundial and Suggestions for IANA Administration
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration
<b>Following NTIA's announcement to give up control over critical Internet functions, the discussion on how that role should be filled has gathered steam across the Internet governance space.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This post maps the discussion across the NETmundial submissions and presents six emerging evolution scenarios related to the IANA functions:</p>
<ol>
<li>Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</li>
<li>Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</li>
<li>No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</li>
<li>No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</li>
<li>Multiplication of TLD registries and root servers</li>
<li>Maintenance of status quo</li>
</ol><ol> </ol>
<hr />
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">I. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The proposal under this category demands for the separation of IANA function from technical policy making, and suggests that the IANA function be transferred to an intergovernmental body.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Such proposal is listed below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organization</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>The Next Best Stage for the Future of Internet Governance is Democracy</td>
<td>Global Geneva</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This proposal by Global Geneva seeks the establishment of an intergovernmental organisation called World Internet Organisation (WIO), under which IANA (which is understood to be essentially technical and concerning safety and security of the Internet would be located. WIO would additionally have a special link/status/contract with IANA to avoid unwanted interference from governments. A 75% majority at WIO would be requested to act/modify/contest an IANA decision, making it difficult for governments to go beyond reasonable and consensual demands. WIO would act in concert with World Internet Forum, under which ICANN would be located, whereby it would make policy decisions regarding gTLDs apart from its other present functions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">II. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are certain proposals whereby it is proposed that IANA function should be separated from technical policy making, or ICANN, and IANA function, which is perceived to be a purely administrative one in such submissions, should be handed over to some sort of non-multilateral organisation, which take different forms in each proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most such submissions have emerged from the civil society or the technical community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Governance Project submission envisions the creation of a DNS Authority under whose umbrella IANA would function. The DNS Authority would be separate from ICANN. This proposal has been endorsed by the submissions of InternetNZ as well as Article 19 and Best Bits. Avri Doria’s submission, along with the submission of APC, envisions the establishment of an independent IANA, separate from the technical policy function. Such independence is sought to be preceded by a transition period by a body called IANA Stewardship Group which would be constituted mostly by members from the technical community. IANA is sought to be governed via MoUs with all stakeholders, on the same lines as the MoU between ICANN and the IETF, as described in RFC2860, RFC6220. The focus of these MoUs would not be policy but will be on performance and adherence to service level agreements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are listed below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Roadmap for Globalising IANA: Four Principles and a Proposal for Reform</td>
<td>Internet Governance Project</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem- ICANN</td>
<td>Article 19 and Best Bits</td>
<td>Civil Society<br /></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Content Contribution to NetMundial on the Roadmap for the Futher Evolution of the IG Ecosystem regarding the Internationalisation of the IANA Function</td>
<td>InternetNZ</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-contribution-to-netmundial-on-the-roadmap-for-the-futher-evolution-of-the-ig-ecosystem-regarding-the-internationalisation-of-the-iana-function/130">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-contribution-to-netmundial-on-the-roadmap-for-the-futher-evolution-of-the-ig-ecosystem-regarding-the-internationalisation-of-the-iana-function/130</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>One Possible Roadmap for IANA Evolution</td>
<td>Avri Doria, Independent Researcher</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>APC Proposals for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Association for Progressive Communications (APC)</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>APC is an international organisation with its executive director's office in South Africa</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">III. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions propose that the IANA function should come under a multilateral body. However they do not suggest the separation of IANA function from policymaking, or from ICANN; or they are at least silent on this latter issue. 2 such proposals come from the civil society and 2 from the government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of these submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal<br /></th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Roadmaps for Further Evolution of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Association for Proper Internet Governance</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Russian Parliament Submission to NET mundial</td>
<td>State Duma of the Russian Federation (Parliament of the Russia)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/themes/133">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/themes/133</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Contribution from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Global Multiskaeholder (sic) Meeting for the Future of the Internet, 23-24 April 2014 Sao Paulo, Brazil</td>
<td>Cyber Space National Center, Iran</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-global-multiskaeholder-meeting-for-the-future-of-the-internet-23-24-april-2014-sao-paolo-brazil/236">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-global-multiskaeholder-meeting-for-the-future-of-the-internet-23-24-april-2014-sao-paolo-brazil/236</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Towards Reform of Global Internet Governance</td>
<td>The Society for Knowledge Commons</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>India and Brazil</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/towards-reform-of-global-internet-governance/240">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/towards-reform-of-global-internet-governance/240</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">IV. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions do not consider the issue of separation of IANA function from policymaking, or ICANN, or at least do not state an opinion on the separation of IANA function from ICANN. However, they do suggest that the control of IANA should be held by a non-multilateral body, and not the US Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many of these submissions also suggest that the oversight of ICANN should be done by a non-multilateral body, therefore it makes sense that the IANA function is administered by a non-multilateral body, without its removal from the ICANN umbrella.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th class=" tt_icon_asc">Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Norwegian Contribution to the Sao Paulo Meeting</td>
<td>Norwegian government</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Norway, Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/norwegian-government/137">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/norwegian-government/137</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Contribution from the GSM Association to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>GSMA</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-gsm-association-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/141">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-gsm-association-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/141</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Contribution of Telefonica to NETmundial</td>
<td>Telefonica, S.A.</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-of-telefonica-to-netmundial/143">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-of-telefonica-to-netmundial/143</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>ETNO Contribution to NETmundial</td>
<td>ETNO [European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association]</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/etno-contribution-to-netmundial/148">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/etno-contribution-to-netmundial/148</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>French Government Submission to NETmundial</td>
<td>French Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/french-government-submission-to-netmundial/154">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/french-government-submission-to-netmundial/154</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Nominet Submission on Internet Governance Principles and the Roadmap</td>
<td>Nominet</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nominet-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-the-roadmap/156">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nominet-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-the-roadmap/156</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Submission by AHCIET to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. NETmundial</td>
<td>AHCIET</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/submission-by-ahciet-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance-netmundial/157">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/submission-by-ahciet-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance-netmundial/157</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Spanish Government Contribution to the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, Spain</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/multistakeholder-human-rights-stability-gac/165">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/multistakeholder-human-rights-stability-gac/165</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/177">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/177</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Future Development of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Orange Contribution for NETmundial</td>
<td>Orange Group</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Deputy to the Chief Regulatory Officer Orange Group</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/orange/199">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/orange/199</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Submission on Internet Governance Principles and Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Kuwait Information Technology Society</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/kuwait-information-technology-society-kits-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/214">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/kuwait-information-technology-society-kits-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/214</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Content Submission by the Federal Government of Mexico</td>
<td>Secretara de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Mexico</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-submission-by-the-federal-government-of-mexico/219">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-submission-by-the-federal-government-of-mexico/219</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Better Understanding and Co-operation for Internet Governance Principles and Its Roadmap</td>
<td>Japan Internet Service Providers Association</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/better-understanding-cooperation-for-internet-governance-principles-its-roadmap/222">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/better-understanding-cooperation-for-internet-governance-principles-its-roadmap/222</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom’s Contribution for to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom AG</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Germany / Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/deutsche-telekom-s-contribution-for-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/225">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/deutsche-telekom-s-contribution-for-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/225</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>NRO Contribution to NETmundial</td>
<td>NRO (for AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE-NCC)</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nro-contribution-to-netmundial/259">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nro-contribution-to-netmundial/259</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>Evolution and Internationalisation of ICANN</td>
<td>CGI.br- Brazilian Internet Steering Committee</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>Addressing Three Prominent “How To” Questions on the Internet Governance Ecosystem Future</td>
<td>Luis Magalhes, Professor at IST of University of Lisbon, Portugal; Panelist of ICANN’s Strategy Panel on the Role in the Internet Governance System</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/addressing-three-prominent-how-to-questions-on-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-future/294">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/addressing-three-prominent-how-to-questions-on-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-future/294</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>NETmundial Content Submission- endorsed by NIC Mexico</td>
<td>NIC Mexico</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/netmundial-content-submission-endorsed-by-nic-mexico/302">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/netmundial-content-submission-endorsed-by-nic-mexico/302</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">V. Multiplication of TLD registries and Root Servers</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are based on the assumption that reform in the current ICANN/IANA administrative structure is impossible as the US government is unlikely to give up its oversight role over both. Instead, these submissions suggest that multiple TLD registries and root servers should be created as alternatives to today’s IANA/ICANN so that a healthy market competition can be fostered in this area, rather than fostering monopoly of IANA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Internet Governance: What Next?</td>
<td>EUROLINC</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>France, Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-governance-what-next/129">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-governance-what-next/129</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>The Intergovernance of the InterPLUS</td>
<td>INTLNET</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-intergovernance-of-the-interplus/293">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-intergovernance-of-the-interplus/293</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>VI. Maintenance of status quo</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are based on the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” principle, and are of the opinion that there is no need to change the administration of IANA function as it functions efficiently in the current system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>United Kingdom Government Submission</td>
<td>Department For Culture Media and Sport, United Kingdom Government</td>
<td>Government<br /></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/united-kingdom-government-submission/79">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/united-kingdom-government-submission/79</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Perspectives from the Domain Name Association</td>
<td>Domain Name Association</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/perspectives-from-the-domain-name-association/249">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/perspectives-from-the-domain-name-association/249</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr />
<p>Read more on <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-iana-role-structures" class="internal-link">ICANN/IANA: Role and Structural Considerations</a> (PDF Document, 1215 Kb)</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration</a>
</p>
No publishersmarikaICANNIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundial2014-04-23T04:00:49ZBlog EntryBrazil passes Marco Civil; the US-FCC Alters its Stance on Net Neutrality
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality
<b>Hopes for the Internet rise and fall rapidly. Yesterday, on April 23, 2014, Marco Civil da Internet, the Brazilian Bill of Internet rights, was passed by the Brazilian Senate into law. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Marco Civil</i>, on which we <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/marco-civil-da-internet">blogged</a> previously, includes provisions for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression of all users, rules mandating net neutrality, etc. Brazil celebrated the beginning of NETmundial, a momentous first day about which Achal Prabhala <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-0">blogs</a>, with President Rousseff’s approval of the<i> Marco Civil</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At about the same time, news <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/568be7f6-cb2f-11e3-ba95-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zmtOMMj0">broke</a> that the US Federal Communications Commission is set to propose new net neutrality rules. In the wake of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/14/net-neutrality-internet-fcc-verizon-court">Verizon net neutrality decision</a> in January, the proposed new rules will <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/2147520/report-us-fcc-to-allow-payments-for-speedier-traffic.html">prohibit</a> Internet service providers such as Comcast from slowing down or blocking traffic to certain websites, but permit fast lane traffic for content providers who are willing to pay for it. This fast lane would prioritise traffic from content providers like Netflix and Youtube on commercially reasonable terms, and result in availability of video and other content at higher speeds or quality. An interesting turn-around, as <i>Marco Civil</i> expressly mandates net neutrality for all traffic.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundialICANNMarco Civil2014-04-24T10:05:32ZBlog EntryCIS Comments: Enhancing ICANN Accountability
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability
<b>On May 6, 2014, ICANN published a call for public comments on "Enhancing ICANN Accountability". This comes in the wake of the IANA stewardship transition spearheaded by ICANN and related concerns of ICANN's external and internal accountability mechanisms. Centre for Internet and Society contributed to the call for comments.</b>
<h3><strong>Introduction:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On March 14, 2014, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced its intent</a> to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder Internet governance community. ICANN was tasked with the development of a proposal for transition of IANA stewardship, for which ICANN subsequently <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">called for public comments</a>. At NETmundial, ICANN President and CEO Fadi Chehadé acknowledged that the IANA stewardship transition and improved ICANN accountability were <a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/issuance-of-netmundial-multistakeholder-statement-concludes-act-one-of-2014-internet-governance-trifecta/">inter-related issues</a>, and <a href="http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/icanns-accountability-in-the-wake-of-the-iana-functions-stewardship-transition/">announced</a> the impending launch of a process to strengthen and enhance ICANN accountability in the absence of US government oversight. The subsequent call for public comments on “Enhancing ICANN Accountability” may be found <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en">here</a>.</p>
<h3><strong>Suggestions for improved accountability:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the event, Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) wishes to limit its suggestions for improved ICANN accountability to matters of reactive or responsive transparency on the part of ICANN to the global multi-stakeholder community. We propose the creation and implementation of a robust “freedom or right to information” process from ICANN, accompanied by an independent review mechanism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article III of ICANN Bye-laws note that “<i>ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness</i>”. As part of this, Article III(2) note that ICANN shall make publicly available information on, <i>inter alia</i>, ICANN’s budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, as well as information on accountability mechanisms and the outcome of specific requests and complaints regarding the same. Such accountability mechanisms include reconsideration (Article IV(2)), independent review of Board actions (Article IV(3)), periodic reviews (Article IV(4)) and the Ombudsman (Article V).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) sets forth a process by which members of the public may request information “<i>not already publicly available</i>”. ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">may respond</a> (either affirmatively or in denial) to such requests within 30 days. Appeals to denials under the DIDP are available under the reconsideration or independent review procedures, to the extent applicable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN has historically been prompt in its response to DIDP Requests, CIS is of the view that absent the commitments in the AoC following IANA stewardship transition, it would be desirable to amend and strengthen Response and Appeal procedures for DIDP and other, broader disclosures. Our concerns stem from the fact that, <i>first</i>, the substantive scope of appeal under the DIDP, on the basis of documents requested, is unclear (say, contracts or financial documents regarding payments to Registries or Registrars, or a detailed, granular break-up of ICANN’s revenue and expenditures); and <i>second</i>, that grievances with decisions of the Board Governance Committee or the Independent Review Panel cannot be appealed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, CIS proposes a mechanism based on “right to information” best practices, which results in transparent and accountable governance at governmental levels.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>First</i>, we propose that designated members of ICANN staff shoulder responsibility to respond to information requests. The identity of such members (information officers, say) ought to be made public, including in the response document.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Second</i>, an independent, third party body should be constituted to sit in appeal over information officers’ decisions to provide or decline to provide information. Such body may be composed of nominated members from the global multi-stakeholder community, with adequate stakeholder-, regional- and gender-representation. However, such members should not have held prior positions in ICANN or its related organizations. During the appointed term of the body, the terms and conditions of service ought to remain beyond the purview of ICANN, similar to globally accepted principles of an independent judiciary. For instance, the Constitution of India forbids any disadvantageous alteration of privileges and allowances of judges of the <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p05125.html">Supreme Court</a> and <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p06221.html">High Courts</a> during tenure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Third</i>, and importantly, punitive measures ought to follow unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of requests by ICANN information officers. In order to ensure compliance, penalties should be made continuing (a certain prescribed fine for each day of information-denial) on concerned officers. Such punitive measures are accepted, for instance, in Section 20 of India’s Right to Information Act, 2005, where the review body may impose continuing penalties on any defaulting officer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Finally</i>, exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time-bound. Any and all information exempted from disclosure should be clearly set out (and not merely as categories of exempted information). Further, all exempted information should be made public after a prescribed period of time (say, 1 year), after which any member of the public may request for the same if it continues to be unavailable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS hopes that ICANN shall deliver on its promise to ensure and enhance its accountability and transparency to the global multi-stakeholder community. To that end, we hope our suggestions may be positively considered.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Comment repository</strong>:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All comments received by ICANN during the comment period (May 6, 2014 to June 6, 2014) may be found <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/">at this link</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundialICANNAccountability2014-06-10T13:03:57ZBlog EntryDo you agree with our fee hike? Press 1 to answer Yes; or 2 for Yes
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike
<b>It has long been a concern that domain-name overseer ICANN is largely funded by companies reliant on the organization to make money.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Kieren McCarthy was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/29/icann_fee_agreement_survey_only_yes_option/">published in the Register</a> on September 29, 2015.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Every biz that wishes to sell domain names – called a registrar – has to pay the organization $4,000 a year, plus 18 cents on every domain they sell.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition, they have to pay a variable fee that comprises the money ICANN says it spends on registrar-related activities divided by the number of companies that are accredited. This year that cost was $3.8m and with roughly 1,150 companies, that's $3,300 a head.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The pricing structure provides California-based ICANN with just under $40m a year, more than a third of its total budget. But in order to make sure the non-profit organization doesn't abuse its market control to hike up its fees, each year the registrars have to formally approve the fee structure that the ICANN Board has adopted. And they do that through an online vote.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This year, some registrars are wondering whether the $3.8m spent by ICANN is a good deal for them.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"What do your ICANN fees get you?" ICANN asks itself in an email sent to all registrars. "In addition to helping cover the expenses associated with ICANN meetings and ICANN's day-to-day operations, your fees have allowed us to conduct regular outreach with registrars through 'roadshow' type training seminars, webinars, in-person events, and site visits."</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Don't ask, don't tell</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It's not clear how that money is spent nor on what, since ICANN continues to provide only the vaguest details over its budget, providing annual sums for "travel" and for "meetings" across the entire organization.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is also actively refusing to hand that information over, telling one outfit that formally asked for additional financial data that for it to do so would be "extremely time consuming and overly burdensome." That organization – the Centre for Internet and Society – is <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration-15-15-cis-redacted-08sep15-en.pdf" target="_blank">appealing that decision</a> [PDF] to ICANN's Board with a decision made two days ago but still unpublished.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN expenditure is <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/24/icann_on_dangerous_path/?page=3">increasing</a>: in 2014 alone, its "travel" costs jumped by 85 per cent to $17m; its meetings budget nearly doubled from an average of $3.2m per public meeting in 2013 to $6m in 2014. But there is almost no information on where this money has been spent, and so far no explanation for why it spent $113m in 2014 with an income of just $84m.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What else is ICANN spending registrars' fees on? "We've recruited Registrar Services staff dedicated to serving Europe, the Middle East/Africa, and Asia and have already begun a series of (low-cost) micro-regional events in China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, with plans taking shape for events in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas in the near future," we're told.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But existing registrars are wondering whether all these new staff and events are needed. Are there hundreds of new registrars entering the market? Are they in Asia?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately, ICANN has stopped providing that kind of information. In 2009, under pressure to be more open about what was going on, the organization made big play of the fact it was going to produce statistics showing how many registrars there were, how big they were, and where they were based in a new "dashboard."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But those stats stopped being produced two years ago and the <a href="https://charts.icann.org/public/index-registrar-registration.html" target="_blank">most recent data provided</a> is from 2012.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Software and security</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Where else do the millions of dollars from the companies that support ICANN go? "We're building up the 'GDD Portal'," says a note from ICANN's staff, "which will become a one-stop destination for all registrar resources at ICANN, and transitioning our customer relationship management software from RADAR to salesforce.com."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is the same GDD Portal that ICANN had to shut down earlier this year because of a security breach. It had misconfigured out-the-box software and <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/03/02/icann_suffers_another_security_breach/">exposed every user's information</a>, including financial projections, launch plans, and confidential exchanges, to every other user. Having at first claimed there was "no indication" that confidential information was exposed, it later admitted that it <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/">had in fact happened 330 times</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As for RADAR, it was <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/24/icanns_technical_competence_questioned_by_verisign/">specifically named</a> in a report by Verisign as a security risk; this is one of the things on a "growing list of examples where ICANN's operational track record leaves much to be desired."</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">We're listening...</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, in explaining why the registrar fees are a good deal for the companies, ICANN's staff note: "Most importantly, we're doing our best to listen to you to ensure that our work is of real value to you."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately that listening does not extend to hearing any complaints about the fees, or what they are spent on.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All registrars receive an email during the annual approval of the fees levied against them with a link to an online survey. Incredibly enough, however, they are only allowed to agree to the fees – there is no option to disagree. Or in fact do anything other than sign up for another year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And what is ICANN's explanation for why the companies that provide it with over a third of its budget are not allowed to express anything but approval of the fees ICANN sets? Problems with the voting software:</p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify; ">The system is only able to accept affirmative expressions of approval. (A technical limitation in the voting software prevents us from knowing when we've reached the level of approval required if we offer both a 'yes, I approve,' and a 'no, I don't approve' option.) But if you have reservations about approving the budget or concerns you'd like addressed first, please let me know and I'll be happy to try to address those directly with you.</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So despite charging the companies $3,500 each a year to run the systems that they use, ICANN has been unable to find voting software that is capable of accepting more than one answer. Money well spent.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-register-september-29-2015-kieren-mccurthy-do-you-agree-with-our-fee-hike</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2015-10-01T15:28:37ZNews ItemPeering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii
<b>In a previous blog post, I had introduced the concept of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) and their extremely vast grounds for non-disclosure. In this short post, I have made an analysis of every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to, to point out the flaws in their policy that need to be urgently remedied.</b>
<p>Read the previous blog post <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a>. Every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to can be <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/transparency-en">accessed here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The table <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M1gWBpa7tlxGPMWyB6xJryddahyZzjVIarSz0RJswDM/edit?usp=sharing">here</a> is a comprehensive breakdown of all the different DIDP requests that ICANN has responded to. This table is to be read with <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x1vG23FdIAzo4ro80eEieaokBpAeNVtYXjds6mHt2DE/edit?usp=sharing">this document</a>, which has a numbered list of the different non-disclosure exceptions <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">outlined in ICANN’s policy</a>. What I sought to scrutinize was the number of times ICANN has provided satisfactory information, the number of times it has denied information, and the grounds for the same. What we found was alarming:</p>
<ol>
<li>Of a total of 91 requests (as of 13/10/2015), <b>ICANN has fully and positively responded to only 11.</b></li>
<li>It has responded <b>partially</b> <b>to 47 of 91 requests, </b>with some amount of information (usually that which is available as public records).</li>
<li>It has <b>not responded at all to 33 of 91 requests</b>.</li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (1)<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>17 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (2)<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>39 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (3)<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>31 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (4)<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>5 times.</b></li>
<li><b>T</b>he Non-Disclosure Clause (5)<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>34 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (6)<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>35 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (7)<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>once.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (8)<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>22 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (9)<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>30 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (10)<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>10 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (11)<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>12 times.</b></li>
<li>The Non-Disclosure Clause (12)<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> has been invoked <b>18 times.</b></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This data is disturbing because it reveals that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. Therefore, it is clear that there is a failure on part of ICANN to uphold the transparency it claims to stand for, and this needs to be remedied at the earliest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Pie1.png" title="Pie Chart 1" height="342" width="327" alt="Pie Chart 1" class="image-inline" /></p>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_Pie1.png" alt="Pie Chart 2" class="image-inline" title="Pie Chart 2" /></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Internal information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications, including internal documents, memoranda, and other similar communications to or from ICANN Directors, ICANN Directors' Advisors, ICANN staff, ICANN consultants, ICANN contractors, and ICANN agents</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information exchanged, prepared for, or derived from the deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process between and among ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><sup>[6]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><sup>[7]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to endanger the life, health, or safety of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><sup>[8]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information subject to the attorney– client, attorney work product privilege, or any other applicable privilege, or disclosure of which might prejudice any internal, governmental, or legal investigation</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><sup>[10]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information that relates in any way to the security and stability of the Internet, including the operation of the L Root or any changes, modifications, or additions to the root zone</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><sup>[11]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Trade secrets and commercial and financial information not publicly disclosed by ICANN</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><sup>[12]</sup></sup></a> “<i>Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual</i>”</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini BaruahICANNInternet Governance2015-10-15T03:14:18ZBlog EntryThe 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
<b>CIS research shows how Western, male, and industry-driven the IANA transition process actually is.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN</a> to run something called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Analysis of the process since then shows how flawed the “global multistakeholder community” that converges at ICANN has not actually represented the disparate interests and concerns of different stakeholders. CIS research has found that the discussions around IANA transition have not been driven by the “global multistakeholder community”, but mostly by males from industry in North America and Western Europe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">CIS analysed the five main mailing lists where the IANA transition plan was formulated: ICANN’s <a href="http://mm.ianacg.org/pipermail/icg-forum_ianacg.org/">ICG</a> <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/">Stewardship</a> and <a href="https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/">CCWG Accountability</a> lists; IETF’s <a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ianaplan/">IANAPLAN</a> list; and the NRO’s <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/">IANAXFER</a> list and <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/crisp/">CRISP</a> lists. What we found was quite disheartening.</p>
<ul>
<li>A total of <em>239 individuals</em> participated cumulatively, across all five lists.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><em>Only 98 substantively contributed to the final shape of the ICG proposal</em>, if one takes a count of 20 mails (admittedly, an arbitrary cut-off) as a substantive contribution, with 12 of these 98 being ICANN staff some of whom were largely performing an administrative function.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We decided to look at the diversity within these substantive contributors using gender, stakeholder grouping, and region. We relied on public records, including <a href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/">GNSO SOI statements</a>, and extensive searches on the Web. Given that, there may be inadvertent errors, but the findings are so stark that even a few errors wouldn’t affect them much.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>2 in 5</strong> (39 of 98, or 40%) were from a single country: the <strong>United States of America</strong>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes <em>Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand</em>), which only has developed countries.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>None</strong> were from the EEC (Eastern European and Russia) group, and only <strong>5 of 98</strong> from all of GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).</li>
<li><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were <em>male</em> and 21 were female.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.</li></ul>
<p>This shows also that the process has utterly failed in achieving the recommendation of Paragraph 6 of the <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>NETMundial outcome document</a>, which states:
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders <b>extending beyond the ICANN community</b>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beyond the IANA transition, one notes that even the communities within ICANN are not very diverse. For instance:</p>
<ul>
<li style="><strong>3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America</strong> (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's </a><a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accreditation-qualified-list.html">accredited registrars list</a>), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).</p>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>45% of all the registries are from the United States of America</strong>! (307 out of 672 registries listed in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/listing-2012-02-25-en">ICANN’s registry directory</a> in August 2015.)</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>66% (34 of 51) of <a href="http://www.bizconst.org/members/">the Business Constituency</a> at ICANN are from a single country: the United States of America</strong>. (N.B.: This page doesn’t seem to be up-to-date.)</li>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This shows that businesses from the United States of America continues to dominate ICANN to a very significant degree, and this is also reflected in the nature of the dialogue within ICANN, including the fact that the proposal that came out of the ICANN ‘global multistakeholder community’ on IANA transition proposes a clause that requires the ‘IANA Functions Operator’ to be a US-based entity. For more on that issue, see this post on the jurisdiction issue at ICANN (or rather, on the lack of a jurisdiction issue at ICANN).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshMulti-stakeholderICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2016-11-03T10:42:53ZBlog EntryBreaking Down ICANN Accountability: What It Is and What the Internet Community Wants
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants
<b>At the recent ICANN conference held in Dublin (ICANN54), one issue that was rehashed and extensively deliberated was ICANN's accountability and means to enhance the same. In light of the impending IANA stewardship transition from the NTIA to the internet's multi-stakeholder community, accountability of ICANN to the internet community becomes that much more important. In this blog post, some aspects of the various proposals to enhance ICANN's accountability have been deconstructed and explained.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, known as ICANN, is a private not-for-profit organization, registered in California. Among other functions, it is tasked with carrying out the IANA function<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a>, pursuant to a contract between the US Government (through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration – NTIA) and itself. Which means, as of now, there exists legal oversight by the USG over ICANN with regard to the discharge of these IANA functions.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in 2014, the NTIA, decided to completely handover stewardship of the IANA functions to the internet’s ‘global multistakeholder community’. But the USG put down certain conditions before this transition could be effected, one of which was to ensure that there exists proper accountability within the ICANN.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The reason for this, was that the internet community feared a shift of ICANN to a FIFA-esque organization with no one to keep it in check, post the IANA transition if these accountability concerns weren’t addressed.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And thus, to answer these concerns, the Cross Community Working Group (CCWG-Accountability) has come up with reports that propose certain changes to the structure and functioning of ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of the discussions that took place at ICANN54 in Dublin, this blog post is directed towards summarizing some of these proposals - those pertaining to the Independent Review Process or IRP (explained below) as well the various accountability models that are the subject of extensive debate both on and off the internet.</p>
<h3><b>Building Blocks Identified by the CCWG-Accountability <br /></b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability put down four “building blocks”, as they call it, on which all their work is based. One of these is what is known as the Independent Review Process (or IRP). This is a mechanism by which internal complaints, either by individuals or by SOs/ACs<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a>, are addressed. However, the current version of the IRP is criticized for being an inefficient mechanism of dispute resolution.<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6] </a></p>
<p>And thus the CCWG-Accountability proposed a variety of amendments to the same.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another building block that the CCWG-Accountability identified is the need for an “empowered internet community”, which means more engagement between the ICANN Board and the internet community, as well as increased oversight by the community over the Board. As of now, the USG acts as the oversight-entity. Post the IANA transition however, the community feels they should step in and have an increased say with regard to decisions taken by the ICANN Board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As part of empowering the community, the CCWG-Accountability identified five core areas in which the community needs to possess some kind of powers or rights. These areas are – review and rejection of the ICANN budget, strategic plans and operating plans; review, rejection and/or approval of standard bylaws as well fundamental bylaws; review and rejection of Board decisions pertaining to IANA functions; appointment and removal of individual directors on the Board; and recall of the entire Board itself. And it is with regard to what kind of powers and rights are to be vested with the community that a variety of accountability models have been proposed, both by the CCWG-Accountability as well as the ICANN Board. However, of all these models, discussion is now primarily centered on three of them – the Sole Member Model (SMM), the Sole Designator Model (SDM) and the Multistakeholder Empowerment Model (MEM).</p>
<h3><b>What is the IRP?</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Independent Review Process or IRP is the dispute resolution mechanism, by which complaints and/or oppositions by individuals with regard to Board resolutions are addressed. Article 4 of the ICANN bylaws lay down the specifics of the IRP. As of now, a standing panel of six to nine arbitrators is constituted, from which a panel is selected for hearing every complaint. However, the primary criticism of the current version of the IRP is the restricted scope of issues that the panel passes decisions on.<a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The bylaws explicitly state that the panel needs to focus on a set on procedural questions while hearing a complaint – such as whether the Board acted in good faith or exercised due diligence in passing the disputed resolution.</p>
<h3><b>Changes Proposed by the Internet Community to Enhance the IRP <br /></b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To tackle this and other concerns with the existing version of the IRP, the CCWG-Accountability proposed a slew of changes in the <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-draft-2-proposal-work-stream-1-recs-03aug15-en.pdf">second draft proposal</a> that they released in August this year. What they proposed is to make the IRP arbitral panel hear complaints and decide the matter on both procedural (as they do now) and substantive grounds. In addition, they also propose a broadening of who all have locus to initiate an IRP, to include individuals, groups and other entities. Further, they also propose a more precedent-based method of dispute resolution, wherein a panel refers to and uses decisions passed by past panels in arriving at a decision.</p>
<p>At the 19<sup>th</sup> October “Enhancing ICANN-Accountability Engagement Session” that took place in Dublin as part of ICANN54, the mechanism to initiate an IRP was explained by Thomas Rickert, CCWG Co-Chair.<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8] </a></p>
<p>Briefly, the modified process is as follows -</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>An objection may be raised by any individual, even a non-member. </li>
<li>This individual needs to find an SO or an AC that shares the objection. </li>
<li>A “pre-call” or remote meeting between all the SOs and ACs is scheduled, to see if objection receives prescribed threshold of approval from the community. </li>
<li>If this threshold is met, dialogue is undertaken with the Board, to see if the objection is sustained by the Board. </li>
<li>If this dialogue also fails, then IRP can be initiated. </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The question of which “enforcement model” empowers the community arises post the initiation of this IRP, and in the event that the community receives an unfavourable decision through the IRP or that the ICANN Board refuses to implement the IRP decision. Thus, all the “enforcement models” retain the IRP as the primary method of internal dispute resolution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The direction that the CCWG-Accountability has taken with regard to enhancement of the IRP is heartening. And these proposals have received large support from the community. What is to be seen now is whether these proposals will be fully implemented by the Board or not, in addition to all the other proposals made by the CCWG.</p>
<h3><b>Enforcement – An Overview of the Different Models </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to trying to enhance the existing dispute resolution mechanism, the CCWG-Accountability also came up with a variety of “enforcement models”, by which the internet community would be vested with certain powers. And in response to the models proposed by the CCWG-Accountability, the ICANN Board came up with a counter proposal, called the MEM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Below is a tabular representation of what kinds of powers are vested with the community under the SMM, the SDM and the MEM.</p>
<table class="grid listing" style="text-align: justify; ">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Power</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>SMM</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>SDM</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>MEM</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Reject/Review Budget, Strategies and OPs.</p>
<p>+</p>
<p>Review/Reject Board decisions with regard to IANA functions.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member has the reserved power to reject the budget up to 2 times.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Member also has standing to enforce bylaw restrictions on the budget, etc.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Designator can only trigger Board consultations if opposition to budget, etc exists. Further, bylaws specify how many times such a consultation can be triggered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Designator only possesses standing to enforce this consultation.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Community can reject Budget up to two times. Board is required by bylaws to reconsider budget post such rejection, by consulting with the community. If still no change is made, then community can initiate process to recall the Board.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Reject/Review amendments to Standard bylaws and Fundamental bylaws</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member has right to veto these changes. Further, member also standing to enforce this right under the relevant Californian law.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Designator can also veto these changes. However, ambiguity regarding standing of designator to enforce this right.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>No veto power granted to any SO or AC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Each SO and AC evaluate if they want to voice the said objection. If certain threshold of agreement reached, then as per the bylaws, the Board cannot go ahead with the amendment.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Appointment and Removal of individual ICANN directors</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sole Member can appoint and remove individual directors based on direction from the applicable Nominating Committee.</p>
</td>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>The SOs/ACs cannot appoint individual directors. But they can initiate process for their removal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, directors can only be removed for breach of or on the basis of certain clauses in a “pre-service letter” that they sign.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p>Recall of ICANN Board</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Sole Member has the power to recall Board.</p>
<p>Further, it has standing to enforce this right in Californian courts.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Sole Designator also has the power to recall the Board.</p>
<p>However, ambiguity regarding standing to enforce this right.</p>
</td>
<td>
<p>Community is not vested with power to recall the Board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, if simultaneous trigger of pre-service letters occurs, in some scenarios, only then can something similar to a recall of the Board occur.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><b>A Critique of these Models </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">SMM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Sole Member Model (or SMM) was discussed and adopted in the <a href="http://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ccwg-draft-2-proposal-work-stream-1-recs-03aug15-en.pdf">second draft proposal</a>, released in August 2015. This model is in fact the simplest and most feasible variant of all the other membership-based models, and has received substantial support from the internet community. The SMM proposes only one amendment to the ICANN bylaws - a move from having no members to one member, while ICANN itself retains its character as a non-profit mutual-benefit corporation under Californian laws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This “sole member” will be the community as a whole, represented by the various SOs and ACs. The SOs and ACs require no separate legal personhood to be a part of this “sole member”, but can directly participate. This participation is to be effected by a voting system, explained in the second draft, which allocates the maximum number of votes each SO and AC can cast. This ensures that each SO/AC doesn’t have to cast a unanimous vote, but each differing opinion within an SO/AC is given equal weight.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">SDM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A slightly modified and watered down version of the SMM, proposed by the CCWG-Accountability as an alternative to the same, is the “Sole Designator Model” or the SDM. Such a model requires an amendment to the ICANN bylaws, by which certain SOs/ACs are assigned “designator” status. By virtue of this status, they may then exercise certain rights - the right to recall the Board in certain scenarios and the right to veto budgets and strategic plans.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, there is some uncertainty in Californian law regarding who can be a designator - an individual or an entity as well. So whether unincorporated associations, such as the SOs and ACs, can be a “designator” as per the law is a question that doesn’t have a clear answer yet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Where most discussion with respect to the SDM has occurred has been in the area of the designator being vested with the power to “spill” or remove all the members of the ICANN Board. The designator is vested with this power as a sort of last-resort mechanism for the community’s voice to be heard. However, an interesting point raised in one of the Accountability sessions at ICANN54 was the almost negligible probability of this course of action ever being taken, i.e. the Board being “spilled”. So while in theory this model seems to vest the community with massive power, in reality, because the right to “spill” the Board may never be invoked, the SDM is actually a weak enforceability model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Other Variants of the Designator Model:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability, in both its first and second report, discussed variants of the designator model as well. A generic SO/AC Designator model was discussed in the first draft. The Enhanced SO/AC Designator model, discussed in the second draft, also functions along similar lines. However, only those SOs and ACs that wanted to be made designators apply to become so, as opposed to the requirement of a mandatory designator under the SDM model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After the second draft released by the CCWG-Accountability and the counter-proposal released by the ICANN Board (see below for the ICANN Board’s proposal), discussion was mostly directed towards the SMM and the MEM. However, the discussion with regard to the designator model has recently been revived by members of the ALAC at ICANN54 in Dublin, who unanimously issued a statement supporting the SDM.<sup><sup>[9]</sup></sup> And following this, many more in the community have expressed their support towards adopting the designator model.<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">MEM:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Multi-stakeholder Enforcement Model or MEM was the ICANN Board’s counter-model to all the models put forth by the CCWG-Accountability, specifically the SMM. However, there is no clarity with regard to the specifics of this model. In fact, the vagueness surrounding the model is one of the biggest criticisms of the model itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CCWG-Accountability accounts for possible consequences of implementation every model by a mechanism known as “stress-tests”. The Board’s proposal, on the other hand, rejects the SMM due to its “unintended consequences”, but does not provide any clarity on what these consequences are or what in fact the problems with the SMM itself are.<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11] </a></p>
<p>In addition, many are opposed to the Board proposal in general because it wasn’t created by the community, and therefore not reflective of the community’s views, as opposed to the SMM.<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12] </a></p>
<p>Instead, the Board’s solution is to propose a counter-model that doesn’t in fact fix the existing problems of accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What is known of the MEM though, gathered primarily from an <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-03aug15/pdfgD8eDsxAn8.pdf">FAQ</a> published on the ICANN community forum, is this: The community, through the various SOs and ACs, can challenge any action of the Board that is CONTRADICTORY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL BYLAWS only, through a binding arbitration. The arbitration panel will be decided by the Board and the arbitration itself will be financed by ICANN. Further, this process will not replace the existing Independent Review Process or IRP, but will run parallely.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even this small snippet of the MEM is filled with problems. Concerns of neutrality with regard to the arbitral panel and challenge of the award itself have been raised.<a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, the MEM seems to be in direct opposition to the ‘gold standard’ multi-stakeholder model of ICANN. Essentially, there is no increased accountability of the ICANN under the MEM, thus eliciting severe opposition from the community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What is interesting to note about all these models, is that they are all premised on ICANN continuing to remain within the jurisdiction of the United States. And even more surprising is that hardly anyone questions this premise. However, at ICANN54 this issue received a small amount of traction, enough for the setting up of an ad-hoc committee to address these jurisdictional concerns. But even this isn’t enough traction. The only option now though is to wait and see what this ad-hoc committee, as well as the CCWG-Accountability through its third draft proposal to be released later this year, comes up with.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. The IANA functions or the technical functions are the name, number and protocol functions with regard to the administration of the Domain Name System or the DNS.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government">http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/19/congress_tells_icann_quit_escaping_accountability/?page=1">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/19/congress_tells_icann_quit_escaping_accountability/?page=1</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government">http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/icann-internet-us-government</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. SOs are Supporting Organizations and ACs are Advisory Committees. They form part of ICANN’s operational structure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>]. Leon Sanchez (ALAC member from the Latin American and Caribbean Region) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 5) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Thomas Rickert (GNSO-appointed CCWG co-chair) speaking at the Enhancing ICANN Accountability Engagement Session !, ICANN54, Dublin (see page 15,16) <a href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en">https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/mon-enhancing-accountability/transcript-enhancing-accountability-19oct15-en</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. <a href="http://www.brandregistrygroup.org/alac-throws-spanner-in-icann-accountability-discussions">http://www.brandregistrygroup.org/alac-throws-spanner-in-icann-accountability-discussions</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/internet_community_icann_accountability/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/22/internet_community_icann_accountability/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/07/icann_accountability_latest/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/07/icann_accountability_latest/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150923_empire_strikes_back_icann_accountability_at_the_inflection_point/">http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150923_empire_strikes_back_icann_accountability_at_the_inflection_point/</a></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/09/06/icann-accountability-a-three-hour-call-trashes-a-year-of-work/">http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/09/06/icann-accountability-a-three-hour-call-trashes-a-year-of-work/</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-icann-accountability-what-it-is-and-what-the-internet-community-wants</a>
</p>
No publisherramyaICANNInternet Governance2015-11-05T15:29:26ZBlog EntryComments on the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (WSIS+10)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10
<b>Following the comment-period on the Zero Draft, the Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly's Overall Review of implementation of WSIS Outcomes was released on 4 November 2015. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document from diverse stakeholders. The Centre for Internet & Society's response to the call for comments is below.</b>
<p class="Normal1" style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p class="Normal1" style="text-align: justify; ">The WSIS+10 Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, scheduled for December 2015, comes as a review of the WSIS process initiated in 2003-05. At the December summit of the UN General Assembly, the WSIS vision and mandate of the IGF are to be discussed. The Draft Outcome Document, released on 4 November 2015, is towards an outcome document for the summit. Comments were sought on the Draft Outcome Document. Our comments are below.</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The Draft Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s Overall Review of the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (“<i>the current Draft</i>”) stands considerably altered from the Zero Draft. With references to development-related challenges, the Zero Draft covered areas of growth and challenges of the WSIS. It noted the persisting digital divide, the importance of innovation and investment, and of conducive legal and regulatory environments, and the inadequacy of financial mechanisms. Issues crucial to Internet governance such as net neutrality, privacy and the mandate of the IGF found mention in the Zero Draft.</li>
<li>The current Draft retains these, and adds to them. Some previously-omitted issues such as surveillance, the centrality of human rights and the intricate relationship of ICTs to the Sustainable Development Goals, now stand incorporated in the current Draft. This is most commendable. However, the current Draft still lacks teeth with regard to some of these issues, and fails to address several others. </li>
<li>In our comments to the Zero Draft, CIS had called for these issues to be addressed. We reiterate our call in the following paragraphs.</li>
</ol>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(1) </strong><strong>ICT for Development</strong></h2>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>In the current Draft, paragraphs 14-36 deal with ICTs for development. While the draft contains rubrics like ‘Bridging the digital divide’, ‘Enabling environment’, and ‘Financial mechanisms’, the following issues are unaddressed:</li>
<li>Equitable development for all;</li>
<li>Accessibility to ICTs for persons with disabilities;</li>
<li>Access to knowledge and open data.</li>
</ol>
<h3><i><span>Equitable development</span></i></h3>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>In the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html">Geneva Declaration of Principles</a> (2003), two goals are set forth as the Declaration’s “ambitious goal”: (a) the bridging of the digital divide; and (b) equitable development for all (¶ 17). The current Draft speaks in detail about the bridging of the digital divide, but the goal of equitable development is conspicuously absent. At WSIS+10, when the WSIS vision evolves to the creation of inclusive ‘knowledge societies’, equitable development should be both a key principle and a goal to stand by.</li>
<li>Indeed, inequitable development underscores the persistence of the digital divide. The current Draft itself refers to several instances of inequitable development; for ex., the uneven production capabilities and deployment of ICT infrastructure and technology in developing countries, landlocked countries, small island developing states, countries under occupation or suffering natural disasters, and other vulnerable states; lack of adequate financial mechanisms in vulnerable parts of the world; variably affordable (or in many cases, unaffordable) spread of ICT devices, technology and connectivity, etc. </li>
<li>What underscores these challenges is the inequitable and uneven spread of ICTs across states and communities, including in their production, capacity-building, technology transfers, gender-concentrated adoption of technology, and inclusiveness. </li>
<li>As such, it is essential that the WSIS+10 Draft Outcome Document reaffirm our commitment to equitable development for all peoples, communities and states.</li>
<li>We suggest the following inclusion to <strong>paragraph 5 of the current Draft</strong>:</li>
</ol>
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; ">“5. We reaffirm our common desire and commitment to the WSIS vision to build </span><i style="text-align: justify; "><span>an equitable,</span></i><span style="text-align: justify; "> people-centred, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society…”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Accessibility for persons with disabilities</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">10. Paragraph 13 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles (2003) pledges to “pay particular attention to the special needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups of society” in the forging of an Information Society. Particularly, ¶ 13 recognises the special needs of older persons and persons with disabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">11. Moreover, ¶ 31 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles calls for the special needs of persons with disabilities, and also of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, to be taken into account while promoting the use of ICTs for capacity-building. Accessibility for persons with disabilities is thus core to bridging the digital divide – as important as bridging the gender divide in access to ICTs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">12. Not only this, but the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/inc/doc/outcome/362828V2E.pdf">WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes</a> (June 2014) also reaffirms the commitment to “provide equitable access to information and knowledge for all… including… people with disabilities”, recognizing that it is “crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of Information Society…” (¶8).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">13. In our previous submission, CIS had suggested language drawing attention to this. Now, the current Draft only acknowledges that “particular attention should be paid to the specific ICT challenges facing… persons with disabilities…” (paragraph 11). It acknowledges also that now, accessibility for persons with disabilities constitutes one of the core elements of quality (paragraph 22). However, there is a glaring omission of a call to action, or a reaffirmation of our commitment to bridging the divide experienced by persons with disabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">14. We suggest, therefore, the addition of the following language the addition of <strong>paragraph 24A to the current Draft</strong>. Sections of this suggestion are drawn from ¶8, WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes.</p>
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"24A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">Recalling the UN Convention on the rights of people with disabilities, the Geneva principles paragraph 11, 13, 14 and 15, Tunis Commitment paras 20, 22 and 24, and reaffirming the commitment to providing equitable access to information and knowledge for all, building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use of ICTs by all, including youth, older persons, women, indigenous and nomadic peoples, people with disabilities, the unemployed, the poor, migrants, refugees and internally displaced people and remote and rural communities, it is crucial to increase the participation of vulnerable people in the building process of information Society and to make their voice heard by stakeholders and policy-makers at different levels. It can allow the most fragile groups of citizens worldwide to become an integrated part of their economies and also raise awareness of the target actors on the existing ICTs solution (such as tolls as e- participation, e-government, e-learning applications, etc.) designed to make their everyday life better. We recognise need for continued extension of access for people with disabilities and vulnerable people to ICTs, especially in developing countries and among marginalized communities, and reaffirm our commitment to promoting and ensuring accessibility for persons with disabilities. In particular, we call upon all stakeholders to honour and meet the targets set out in Target 2.5.B of the Connect 2020 Agenda that enabling environments ensuring accessible telecommunication/ICT for persons with disabilities should be established in all countries by 2020.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Access to knowledge and open data</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">15. The Geneva Declaration of Principles dedicates a section to access to information and knowledge (B.3). It notes, in ¶26, that a “rich public domain” is essential to the growth of Information Society. It urges that public institutions be strengthened to ensure free and equitable access to information (¶26), and also that assistive technologies and universal design can remove barriers to access to information and knowledge (¶25). Particularly, the Geneva Declaration advocates the use of free and open source software, in addition to proprietary software, to meet these ends (¶27).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">16. It was also recognized in the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes (‘Challenges-during implementation of Action Lines and new challenges that have emerged’) that there is a need to promote access to all information and knowledge, and to encourage open access to publications and information (C, ¶¶9 and 12).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">17. In our previous submission, CIS had highlighted the importance of open access to knowledge thus: “…the implications of open access to data and knowledge (including open government data), and responsible collection and dissemination of data are much larger in light of the importance of ICTs in today’s world. As Para 7 of the Zero Draft indicates, ICTs are now becoming an indicator of development itself, as well as being a key facilitator for achieving other developmental goals. As Para 56 of the Zero Draft recognizes, in order to measure the impact of ICTs on the ground – undoubtedly within the mandate of WSIS – it is necessary that there be an enabling environment to collect and analyse reliable data. Efforts towards the same have already been undertaken by the United Nations in the form of ‘Data Revolution for Sustainable Development’. In this light, the Zero Draft rightly calls for enhancement of regional, national and local capacity to collect and conduct analyses of development and ICT statistics (Para 56). Achieving the central goals of the WSIS process requires that such data is collected and disseminated under open standards and open licenses, leading to creation of global open data on the ICT indicators concerned.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">18. This crucial element is missing from the current Draft of the WSIS+10 Outcome Document. Of course, the current Draft notes the importance of access to information and free flow of data. But it stops short of endorsing and advocating the importance of access to knowledge and free and open source software, which are essential to fostering competition and innovation, diversity of consumer/ user choice and ensuring universal access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">19. We suggest the following addition – of <strong>paragraph 23A to the current Draft</strong>:</p>
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"23A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We recognize the need to promote access for all to information and knowledge, open data, and open, affordable, and reliable technologies and services, while respecting individual privacy, and to encourage open access to publications and information, including scientific information and in the research sector, and particularly in developing and least developed countries.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(2) </strong><strong>Human Rights in Information Society</strong></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">20. The current Draft recognizes that human rights have been central to the WSIS vision, and reaffirms that rights offline must be protected online as well. However, the current Draft omits to recognise the role played by corporations and intermediaries in facilitating access to and use of the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">21. In our previous submission, CIS had noted that “the Internet is led largely by the private sector in the development and distribution of devices, protocols and content-platforms, corporations play a major role in facilitating – and sometimes, in restricting – human rights online”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">22. We reiterate our suggestion for the inclusion of <strong>paragraph 43A to the current Draft</strong>:</p>
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"43A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We recognize the critical role played by corporations and the private sector in facilitating human rights online. We affirm, in this regard, the responsibilities of the private sector set out in the Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), and encourage policies and commitments towards respect and remedies for human rights.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>(3) </strong><strong>Internet</strong> <strong>Governance</strong></h2>
<h3><i><span>The support for multilateral governance of the Internet</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">23. While the section on Internet governance is not considerably altered from the zero draft, there is a large substantive change in the current Draft. The current Draft states that the governance of the Internet should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with full involvement of all stakeholders” (¶50). Previously, the zero draft recognized the “the general agreement that the governance of the Internet should be open, inclusive, and transparent”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">24. A return to purely ‘multilateral’ Internet governance would be regressive. Governments are, without doubt, crucial in Internet governance. As scholarship and experience have both shown, governments have played a substantial role in shaping the Internet as it is today: whether this concerns the availability of content, spread of infrastructure, licensing and regulation, etc. However, these were and continue to remain contentious spaces.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">25. As such, it is essential to recognize that a plurality of governance models serve the Internet, in which the private sector, civil society, the technical community and academia play important roles. <strong>We recommend returning to the language of the zero draft in ¶32: “open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet”.</strong></p>
<h3><i><span>Governance of Critical Internet Resources</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">26. It is curious that the section on Internet governance<strong> </strong>in both the zero and the current Draft makes no reference to ICANN, and in particular, to the ongoing transition of IANA stewardship and the discussions surrounding the accountability of ICANN and the IANA operator. The stewardship of critical Internet resources, such as the root, is crucial to the evolution and functioning of the Internet. Today, ICANN and a few other institutions have a monopoly over the management and policy-formulation of several critical Internet resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">27. While the WSIS in 2003-05 considered this a troubling issue, this focus seems to have shifted entirely. Open, inclusive, transparent and <i>global</i> Internet are misnomer-principles when ICANN – and in effect, the United States – continues to have monopoly over critical Internet resources. The allocation and administration of these resources should be decentralized and distributed, and should not be within the disproportionate control of any one jurisdiction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">28. Therefore, we reiterate our suggestion to add <strong><span>paragraph 53A</span></strong> after Para 53:</p>
<table class="plain">
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"53A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We affirm that the allocation, administration and policy involving critical Internet resources must be inclusive and decentralized, and call upon all stakeholders and in particular, states and organizations responsible for essential tasks associated with the Internet, to take immediate measures to create an environment that facilitates this development.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3><i><span>Inclusiveness and Diversity in Internet Governance</span></i></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">29. The current Draft, in ¶52, recognizes that there is a need to “promote greater participation and engagement in Internet governance of all stakeholders…”, and calls for “stable, transparent and voluntary funding mechanisms to this end.” This is most commendable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">30. The issue of inclusiveness and diversity in Internet governance is crucial: today, Internet governance organisations and platforms suffer from a lack of inclusiveness and diversity, extending across representation, participation and operations of these organisations. As CIS submitted previously, the mention of inclusiveness and diversity becomes tokenism or formal (but not operational) principle in many cases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">31. As we submitted before, the developing world is pitifully represented in standards organisations and in ICANN, and policy discussions in organisations like ISOC occur largely in cities like Geneva and New York. For ex., 307 out of 672 registries listed in ICANN’s registry directory are based in the United States, while 624 of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars are US-based.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">32. Not only this, but 80% of the responses received by ICANN during the ICG’s call for proposals were male. A truly global and open, inclusive and transparent governance of the Internet must not be so skewed. Representation must include not only those from developing countries, but must also extend across gender and communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">33. We propose, therefore, the addition of a <strong><span>paragraph 51A</span></strong> after Para 51:</p>
<table class="plain">
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<th style="text-align: justify; "><span>"51A. <span style="text-align: justify; ">We draw attention to the challenges surrounding diversity and inclusiveness in organisations involved in Internet governance, including in their representation, participation and operations. We note with concern that the representation of developing countries, of women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups, is far from equitable and adequate. We call upon organisations involved in Internet governance to take immediate measures to ensure diversity and inclusiveness in a substantive manner.”</span></span></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prepared by Geetha Hariharan, with inputs from Sunil Abraham and Japreet Grewal. All comments submitted towards the Draft Outcome Document may be found <a class="external-link" href="http://unpan3.un.org/wsis10/Preparatory-Process-Roadmap/Comments-on-Draft-Outcome-Document">at this link</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-outcome-document-of-the-un-general-assembly2019s-overall-review-of-the-implementation-of-wsis-outcomes-wsis-10</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICT4DCall for CommentsWSIS+10Access to KnowledgeAccessibilityHuman Rights OnlineInternet GovernanceICANNIANA TransitionOpen SourceOpen Access2015-11-18T06:33:13ZBlog EntryICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy
<b>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.</b>
<h2>Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[<i>Quick Note</i>: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a>]</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, <i>doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds</i> from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<h2>Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:</span></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds</span></li>
</ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes: </span></span></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles:</span></span></i> <span>In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding:</span></span></i><span> Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes:</span></span></i><span> If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a <i>material change</i> is concerned, <i>at ICANN’s will</i> (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN <i>may</i> reject or deny the application concerned.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks:</span></span></i><span> In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> Further, ICANN also said that it was not <i>required</i> to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is <i>allowed</i> to do so, when it feels the need.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired. </span></p>
<h3><span><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s lack of <i>substantive compliance</i>, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction:</span></span></i><span> ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding <i>on which date</i> the mechanisms are to be deemed as <i>pending</i>, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the <i>time of scheduling</i> of the auction.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a> This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process:</span></span></i><span> In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the <i>extent</i> of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant <i>does not assign</i> its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint:</span></span></i><span> ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a> After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships:</span></span></i><span> ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy:</span></span></i><span> Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a> However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is <i>specifically designed</i> to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘<i>within ICANN’s bylaws</i> to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway <i>only</i> through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Note</span></span></i><span>: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through <i>mechanisms listed in its Bylaws</i>, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.</span></p>
<h3><span><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations:</span></span></i> <span>Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘<i>shall</i> pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a> With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a> Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a> While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a> In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a> A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a> After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a> It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a> While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a> It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a <i>proposal</i> for the <i>process</i> by which allocation is undertaken.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘<i><span>grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’</span></i><span>, the creation of a fund for ‘<i>specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, </i>the ‘<i>establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’</i>, among others, to be decided by the Board.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a></span></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates:</span></span></i><span> The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a <i>timeframe</i> for the allocation of such proceeds.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a> However, the entire process has been very slow, with the <i>first</i> CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a> Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only <i>procedural</i> regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.</span></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p</span></a><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>df</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> <span>4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a><span> PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> <span>An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (</span><a href="http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html"><span>http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction"><span>http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/"><span>https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html"><span>http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <span>Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/bylaws"><span>https://pti.icann.org/bylaws</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> <span>1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> <span>6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> <span>26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> <span>6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a><span> 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>) </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> <span>PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm"><span>https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm</span></a><span>); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668"><span>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668</span></a><span>); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a><span> 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> <span>AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a><span> 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (</span><a href="https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations"><span>https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> <span>Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation"><span>https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/policy"><span>https://www.icann.org/policy</span></a><span>); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a><span>5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29"><span>http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web"><span>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>); </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a><span> 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102"><span>https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-28T15:49:38ZBlog EntryIANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position
<b>Jyoti Panday participated in the workshop organized by CCAOI on "IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position" on May 30, 2015. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dr Ajay Kumar launched the IANA Transition Report and set the context for the workshop. Dr Mahesh Uppal was the moderator of the panel and other participants included Mr Samiran Gupta, ICANN providing an overview of the current status on the transition, Mr Parminder Singh, IT for Change and Mr Rahul Sharma, DSCI sharing concerns of different stakeholders.<br /><br />The panel also saw discussion on issues in the transition process that are of relevance to India and what should their position going forward including ensuring the efficiency of ICANN Functions included in the CWG draft proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS raised issues around financial accountability and the role of ICANN in shaping markets therefore the urgent need for improving transparency and accountability measures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The report launched at the workshop is <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ccaoi.in/UI/links/fwresearch/Study%20on%20the%20Indian%20Perspective%20on%20IANA%20transition.pdf">available here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-08-23T09:26:06ZNews ItemICANN 57
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad
<b>ICANN 57 is being hosted by the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India from November 3 to 9, 2016 in Hyderabad at Hyderabad International Convention Centre. Vidushi Marda participated in the event as a speaker.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As part of her work for the Cross Community Working Party on ICANN's Corporate and Social Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, Vidushi <a class="external-link" href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsononcomstake/Meeting+Notes?preview=/53772757/63146891/Presentation%20CCWP%20HR%20ICANN57%20complete%203.pdf">presented her work on the Human Rights Impact of new gTLD Subsequent Procedures</a> in Hyderabad.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Minister of Law & Justice and Minister of Electronics and Information Technology Ravi Shankar Prasad reiterated India’s commitment to the multistakeholder model during the Opening Ceremony of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN’s) 57th Public Meeting. The meeting, also known as ICANN57, is taking place in Hyderabad, India, from November 3 – 9, 2016 and has convened thousands of the global Internet community members (both on-site and remotely) to discuss and develop policies related to the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). It is hosted by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), with support from the Government of Telangana.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN57 is the first post-IANA stewardship transition public meeting and also the first Annual General Meeting under the new Meetings Strategy. ICANN meetings are held three times a year in different regions to enable attendees from around the world to participate in person. These meetings offer a variety of sessions such as workshops, open forums and working meetings on the development and implementation of Internet policies. ICANN meetings offer the best opportunity for face-to-face discussions and exchange of opinions among attendees dedicated to the continued stable and secure operation of the Domain Name System.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more info about the event, visit the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2016-11-05-en">ICANN website</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNIANAInternet Governance2016-11-08T01:14:37ZNews ItemInternet's Core Resources are a Global Public Good - They Cannot Remain Subject to One Country's Jurisdiction
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good
<b>This statement was issued by 8 India civil society organizations, supported by 2 key global networks, involved with internet governance issues, to the meeting of ICANN in Hyderabad, India from 3 to 9 November 2016. The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the 8 organizations that drafted this statement.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recently, the US gave up its role of signing entries to the Internet's root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet. This is about the Internet addresses that end with .com, .net, and so on, and the numbers associated with each of them that help us navigate the Internet. We thank and congratulate the US government for taking this important step in the right direction. However, the organisation that manages this system, ICANN,<a href="#ftn1">[1]</a> a US non-profit, continues to be under US jurisdiction, and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies. Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We the undersigned therefore appeal that urgent steps be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation.<a href="#ftn2">[2]</a> We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US; we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country's jurisdiction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Domain name system as a key lever of global control</strong><br />A few new top level domains like .xxx and .africa are already under litigation in the US, whereby there is every chance that its law could interfere with ICANN's (global) policy decisions. Businesses in different parts of the world seeking top level domain names like .Amazon, and, hypothetically, .Ghaniancompany, will have to be mindful of de facto extension of US jurisdiction over them. US agencies can nullify the allocation of such top level domain names, causing damage to a business similar to that of losing a trade name, plus losing all the 'connections', including email based ones, linked to that domain name. For instance, consider the risks that an Indian generic drugs company, say with a top level domain, .genericdrugs, will remain exposed to.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sector specific top level domain names like .insurance, health, .transport, and so on, are emerging, with clear rules for inclusion-exclusion. These can become de facto global regulatory rules for that sector. .Pharmacy has been allocated to a US pharmaceutical group which decides who gets domain names under it. Public advocacy groups have protested <a href="#ftn3">[3]</a> that these rules will be employed to impose drugs-related US intellectual property standards globally. Similar problematic possibilities can be imagined in other sectors; ICANN could set “safety standards”, as per US law, for obtaining .car.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction. Iran's .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. With the 'Internet of Things', almost everything, including critical infrastructure, in every country will be on the network. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>ICANN must become a truly global body</strong><br />Eleven years ago, in 2005, the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at the World Summit on the Information Society demanded that ICANN should “negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A process is currently under-way within ICANN to consider the jurisdiction issue. It is important that this process provides recommendations that will enable ICANN to become a truly global body, for appropriate governance of very important global public goods.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Below are some options, and there could be others, that are available for ICANN to transit from US jurisdiction.</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li>ICANN can get incorporated under international law. Any such agreement should make ICANN an international (not intergovernmental) body, fully preserving current ICANN functions and processes. This does not mean instituting intergovernmental oversight over ICANN.</li>
<li>ICANN can move core internet operators among multiple jurisdictions, i.e. ICANN (policy body for Internet identifiers), PTI <a href="#ftn4">[4]</a> (the operational body) and the Root Zone Maintainer must be spread across multiple jurisdictions. With three different jurisdictions over these complementary functions, the possibility of any single one being fruitfully able to interfere in ICANN's global governance role will be minimized.</li>
<li>ICANN can institute a fundamental bylaw that its global governance processes will brook no interference from US jurisdiction. If any such interference is encountered, parameters of which can be clearly pre-defined, a process of shifting of ICANN to another jurisdiction will automatically set in. A full set-up – with registered HQ, root file maintenance system, etc – will be kept ready as a redundancy in another jurisdiction for this purpose. <a href="#ftn5">[5]</a> Chances are overwhelming that given the existence of this bylaw, and a fully workable exit option being kept ready at hand, no US state agency, including its courts, will consider it meaningful to try and enforce its writ. This arrangement could therefore act in perpetuity as a guarantee against jurisdictional interference without actually having ICANN to move out of the US.</li>
<li>The US government can give ICANN jurisdictional immunity under the United States International Organisations Immunities Act . There is precedent of US giving such immunity to non-profit organisations like ICANN. <a href="#ftn6">[6]</a> Such immunity must be designed in such a way that still ensures ICANN's accountability to the global community, protecting the community's enforcement power and mechanisms. Such immunity extends only to application of public law of the US on ICANN decisions and not private law as chosen by any contracting parties. US registries/registrars, with the assent of ICANN, can choose the jurisdiction of any state of the US for adjudicating their contracts with ICANN. Similarly, registries/registrars from other countries should be able to choose their respective jurisdictions for such contracts.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We do acknowledge that, over the years, there has been an appreciable progress in internationalising participation in ICANN's processes, including participation from governments in the Governmental Advisory Committee. However, positive as this is, it does not address the problem of a single country having overall jurisdiction over its decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Issued by the following India based organisation:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore </li>
<li>IT for Change, Bangalore </li>
<li>Free Software Movement of India, Hyderabad </li>
<li>Society for Knowledge Commons, New Delhi</li>
<li>Digital Empowerment Foundation, New Delhi</li>
<li>Delhi Science Forum, New Delhi</li>
<li>Software Freedom Law Centre - India, New Delhi</li>
<li>Third World Network - India, New Delhi</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Supported by the following global networks:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Association For Progressive Communications</li>
<li>Just Net Coalition</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><br />For any clarification or inquiries you may may write to or call:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Parminder Jeet Singh: <a class="mail-link" href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net">parminder@itforchange.net</a> +91 98459 49445, or </li>
<li>Vidushi Marda: <a class="mail-link" href="mailto:vidushi@cis-india.org">vidushi@cis-india.org</a> +91 99860 92252</li></ul>
<hr />
<p><a name="ftn1">[1]</a> Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn2">[2]</a> The “NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement” , endorsed by a large number of governments and other stakeholders, including ICANN and US government, called for ICANN to become a “truly international and global organization”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn3">[3]</a> See, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130515/00145123090/big-pharma-firms-seeking-pharmacy-domain-to-crowd-out-legitimate-foreign-pharmacies.shtml">https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130515/00145123090/big-pharma-firms-seeking-pharmacy-domain-to-crowd-out-legitimate-foreign-pharmacies.shtml </a></p>
<p><a name="ftn4">[4]</a> Public Technical Identifier, a newly incorporated body to carry out the operational aspects of managing Internet's identifiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn5">[5]</a> This can be at one of the existing non US global offices of ICANN, or the location of one of the 3 non-US root servers. Section 24.1 of ICANN Bylaws say, “The principal office for the transaction of the business of shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn6">[6]</a> E.g., International Fertilizer and Development Center was designated as a public, nonprofit, international organisation by US Presidential Decree, granting it immunities under United States International Organisations Immunities Act . See <a class="external-link" href="https://archive.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html">https://archive.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNHomepageInternet Governance2016-11-14T06:39:52ZBlog EntryICANN Begins its Sojourn into Open Data
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data
<b>The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) recently announced that it will now set up a pilot project in order to introduce an Open Data initiative for all data that it generates. We would like to extend our congratulations to ICANN on the development of this commendable new initiative, and would be honoured to support the creation of this living document to be prepared before ICANN 58.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To quote the ICANN blog directly, the aim of this project is to “<em>bring selected data sets into the open, available through web pages and programming APIs, for the purposes of external party review and analysis</em>” <a href="#ftn1">[1]</a>. This will play out through the setting up of three components:</p>
<ol><li>Development of a catalogue of existing data sets which will be appropriate for publication</li>
<li>Selection of the technology necessary for managing the publication of these data sets.</li>
<li>Creation of a process to prioritise the order in which the data sets are made available <a href="#ftn2">[2]</a>.</li></ol>
<h3><strong>Principles in Question</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Centre for Internet and Society firmly believes in the value of accessible, inclusive open data standards as a tool for enhancing transparency in any system. Greater transparency goes a long way towards bringing a regulatory authority closer to those who are governed under it – be it a state or a body such as ICANN. It is, in fact, an indispensable component of a multistakeholder model of governance to facilitate informed participation by all parties concerned in the decision making process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The right to information that a regulatory authority owes those it regulates has two kinds of components. The first may be described as reactive disclosure – “<em>when individual members of the public file requests for and receive information</em>” <a href="#ftn#3">[3]</a>. The second is disclosure that is more proactive in nature – “<em>when information is made public at the initiative of the public body, without a request being filed</em>” <a href="#ftn4">[4]</a>. The former is epitomized by initiatives such as the Freedom of
Information Act <a href="#ftn5">[5]</a> in the United States, the Right to Information Act in India <a href="#ftn6">[6]</a>, or ICANN’s very own Documentary Information Disclosure Policy <a href="#ftn7">[7]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Proactive disclosure policies, on the other hand, operate out of the principle that the provision of information by those in positions of regulatory authority will ensure free and timely flow of information to the public, and the information so provided will be equally accessible to everyone, without the need for individual requests being filed <a href="#ftn8">[8]</a>. Proactive disclosure also goes a long way towards preventing officials from denying or manipulating information subsequent to publication <a href="#ftn9">[9]</a>. Scholars have touted proactive disclosure as the “<em>future of the right to know</em>” <a href="#ftn10">[10]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the Centre for Internet and Society, much of our research has pointed towards the direction of creating better open data standards for governments (Please see “<a href="http://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-government-data-study">Open Data Government Study: India</a>”). We are one of the Lead Stewards of the International Open Data Charter <a href="#ftn11">[11]</a> and have maintained that it is crucial for governments to maintain open data standards in the interest of transparency and accountability. We firmly believe that the same principles extend also to ICANN – a body which, as per its own by-laws commits towards operating “…<em>to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness</em>”<a href="#ftn12">[12]</a>.</p>
<h3><strong>Suggestions</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While this policy is in its nascent stage, we would like to put forward certain principles which we believe ought to be kept in mind before it gets chalked out, in the best interest of the ICANN community:</p>
<ol><li>To determine what data sets should be made publicly accessible, it would be useful to carry out an analysis of existing DIDP requests to understand trends in the kind of information that the ICANN community is interested in accessing, which can then be proactively disclosed. It would be redundant on ICANN’s part to disclose, under this Open Data Policy, data which is already publicly available.</li>
<li>ICANN should first develop a catalog of all existing data sets with ICANN, apply the principles for deciding appropriateness for publication, then make publicly available both the full catalog, and the actual data sets identified for publication. ICANN should make clear the kind of information it is not going to make accessible
under this open data standards, and justify the principles on the basis of which it is choosing to do so (analogous to the exceptions clauses under the DIDP).</li>
<li>With respect to technology to be selected for managing the publication of data sets, free and open source software (such as CKAN) ought to be used, and open standards should be adopted for the use and licensing of such data.</li>
<li>Such data ought to be downloadable in bulk in CSV/JSON/XML formats.</li>
<li>DIDP responses and the open data work flows ought to be integrated so that all the responses to DIDP requests are automatically published in a machine-readable format as open data.</li>
<li>Qualitative (text of speeches, slides from presentations, recordings of sessions, etc.) and quantitative data should both be included under this new policy.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion, we would like to extend our congratulations to ICANN on the development of this commendable new initiative, and would be honoured to support the creation of this living document before ICANN 58.</p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<h3><strong>Endnotes</strong></h3>
<div id="ftn1">
<p>[1] Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, <em>ICANN Kicks off Open Data Initiative Pilot</em>, (November 6, 2016), available at <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-kicks-off-open-data-initiative-pilot">https://www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-kicks-off-open-data-initiative-pilot</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p>[2] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p>[3] Naniette Coleman, <em>Proactive vs. Reactive Transparency</em>, (February 8, 2010), available at: <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/proactive-vs-reactive-transparency">http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/proactive-vs-reactive-transparency</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p>[4] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p>[5] Freedom of Information Act, 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p>[6] Right to Information Act, 2005 <em>available at</em> http://righttoinformation.gov.in/rti-act.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p>[7] ICANN, <em>Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</em>, available at <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p>[8] Helen Darbishire, <em>Proactive Transparency: The future of the right to information?</em> Working paper. N.p.: World Bank, (2009).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p>[9] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p>[10] Darbishire, <em>supra</em> note 8.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p>[11] Open Data Charter, <em>Who We Are</em>, available at <a href="http://opendatacharter.net/who-we-are/">http://opendatacharter.net/who-we-are/</a> (Last visited on November 10, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p>[12] Article III(1), Bylaws For Internet Corporation For Assigned Names And Numbers</p>
</div>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini Baruah and Sumandro ChattapadhyayOpen DataICANNinternet governance2016-11-12T01:17:24ZBlog Entry'Delink ICANN from US jurisdiction'
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction
<b>Eight Indian civil society organisations involved with internet governance have called for complete delinking of ICANN from US jurisdiction, saying an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s control is unacceptable.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.deccanherald.com/content/580590/delink-icann-us-jurisdiction.html">published by Deccan Herald</a> on November 12.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable.<br /><br />The demand from Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society and IT for Change as well as Delhi-based Software Freedom Law Centre among others came against the backdrop of ICANN’s meeting in Hyderabad that ended on Wednesday. <br /><br />The other organisations involved in the campaign are Free Software Movement of India (Hyderabad), Society for Knowledge Commons, Digital Empowerment Foundation, Delhi Science Forum and Third World Network (all in New Delhi).<br /><br />“Urgent steps (should) be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation . We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US, we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s jurisdiction,” a joint statement said.<br /><br />Though the US has given up its role of signing entries to the Internet’s root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet, the groups said, the organisation that manages ICANN continues to be under US jurisdiction and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies.<br /><br />“Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world,” the statement said.<br /><br />Explaining the issue, it said country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction.<br /><br />“Iran’s .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government,” the statement said.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2016-11-15T14:16:36ZNews ItemWSIS+10 High Level Event: A Bird's Eye Report
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report
<b>The WSIS+10 High Level was organised by the ITU and collaborative UN entities on June 9-13, 2014. It aimed to evaluate the progress on implementation of WSIS Outcomes from Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005, and to envision a post-2015 Development Agenda. Geetha Hariharan attended the event on CIS' behalf.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) +10 </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/">High Level Event</a><span> (HLE) was hosted at the ITU Headquarters in Geneva, from June 9-13, 2014. The HLE aimed to review the implementation and progress made on information and communication technology (ICT) across the globe, in light of WSIS outcomes (</span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/index-p1.html">Geneva 2003</a><span> and </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/index-p2.html">Tunis 2005</a><span>). Organised in three parallel tracks, the HLE sought to take stock of progress in ICTs in the last decade (High Level track), initiate High Level Dialogues to formulate the post-2015 development agenda, as well as host thematic workshops for participants (Forum track).</span><span> </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Track:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/copy2_of_HighLevelTrack.jpg/@@images/be5f993c-3553-4d63-bb66-7cd16f8407dc.jpeg" alt="High Level Track" class="image-inline" title="High Level Track" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Opening Ceremony, WSIS+10 High Level Event </i>(<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/ITU/status/334587247556960256/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level track opened officially on June 10, 2014, and culminated with the endorsement by acclamation (as is ITU tradition) of two <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/inc/doc/outcome/362828V2E.pdf">Outcome Documents</a>. These were: (1) WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes, taking stock of ICT developments since the WSIS summits, (2) WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, aiming to develop a vision for the post-2015 global information society. These documents were the result of the WSIS+10 <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/review/mpp/">Multi-stakeholder Preparatory Platform</a> (MPP), which involved WSIS stakeholders (governments, private sector, civil society, international organizations and relevant regional organizations).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>MPP</strong> met in six phases, convened as an open, inclusive consultation among WSIS stakeholders. It was not without its misadventures. While ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun I. Touré consistently lauded the multi-stakeholder process, and Ambassador Janis Karklins urged all parties, especially governments, to “<i>let the UN General Assembly know that the multi-stakeholder model works for Internet governance at all levels</i>”, participants in the process shared stories of discomfort, disagreement and discord amongst stakeholders on various IG issues, not least human rights on the Internet, surveillance and privacy, and multi-stakeholderism. Richard Hill of the Association for Proper Internet Governance (<a href="http://www.apig.ch/">APIG</a>) and the Just Net Coalition writes that like NETmundial, the MPP was rich in a diversity of views and knowledge exchange, but stakeholders <a href="http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/06/16/what-questions-did-the-wsis10-high-level-event-answer/">failed to reach consensus</a> on crucial issues. Indeed, Prof. Vlamidir Minkin, Chairman of the MPP, expressed his dismay at the lack of consensus over action line C9. A compromise was agreed upon in relation to C9 later.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some members of civil society expressed their satisfaction with the extensive references to human rights and rights-centred development in the Outcome Documents. While governmental opposition was seen as frustrating, they felt that the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">MPP had sought and achieved a common understanding</span></strong>, a sentiment <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748168051580928">echoed</a> by the ITU Secretary General. Indeed, even Iran, a state that had expressed major reservations during the MPP and felt itself unable to agree with the text, <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748723750711297">agreed</a> that the MPP had worked hard to draft a document beneficial to all.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Concerns around the MPP did not affect the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">review of ICT developments</span></strong> over the last decade. High Level Panels with Ministers of ICT from states such as Uganda, Bangladesh, Sweden, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and others, heads of the UN Development Programme, UNCTAD, Food and Agriculture Organisation, UN-WOMEN and others spoke at length of rapid advances in ICTs. The focus was largely on ICT access and affordability in developing states. John E. Davies of Intel repeatedly drew attention to innovative uses of ICTs in Africa and Asia, which have helped bridge divides of affordability, gender, education and capacity-building. Public-private partnerships were the best solution, he said, to affordability and access. At a ceremony evaluating implementation of WSIS action-lines, the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), India, <a href="https://twitter.com/covertlight/status/476748723750711297">won an award</a> for its e-health application MOTHER.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Outcome Documents themselves shall be analysed in a separate post. But in sum, the dialogue around Internet governance at the HLE centred around the success of the MPP. Most participants on panels and in the audience felt this was a crucial achievement within the realm of the UN, where the Tunis Summit had delineated strict roles for stakeholders in paragraph 35 of the </span><a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html">Tunis Agenda</a><span>. Indeed, there was palpable relief in Conference Room 1 at the </span><a href="http://www.cicg.ch/en/">CICG</a><span>, Geneva, when on June 11, Dr. Touré announced that the Outcome Documents would be adopted without a vote, in keeping with ITU tradition, even if consensus was achieved by compromise.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Dialogues:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/HighLevelDialogues.jpg/@@images/3c30d94f-7a65-4912-bb42-2ccd3b85a18d.jpeg" alt="High Level Dialogues" class="image-inline" title="High Level Dialogues" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Prof. Vladimir Minkin delivers a statement.</i> (<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/JaroslawPONDER/status/476288845013843968/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The High Level Dialogues on developing a post-2015 Development Agenda, based on WSIS action lines, were active on June 12. Introducing the Dialogue, Dr. Touré lamented the Millennium Development Goals as a “<i>lost opportunity</i>”, emphasizing the need to alert the UN General Assembly and its committees as to the importance of ICTs for development.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As on previous panels, there was <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">intense focus on access, affordability and reach in developing countries</span></strong>, with Rwanda and Bangladesh expounding upon their successes in implementing ICT innovations domestically. The world is more connected than it was in 2005, and the ITU in 2014 is no longer what it was in 2003, said speakers. But we lack data on ICT deployment across the globe, said Minister Knutssen of Sweden, recalling the gathering to the need to engage all stakeholders in this task. Speakers on multiple panels, including the Rwandan Minister for CIT, Marilyn Cade of ICANN and Petra Lantz of the UNDP, emphasized the need for ‘smart engagement’ and capacity-building for ICT development and deployment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A crucial session on cybersecurity saw Dr. Touré envision a global peace treaty accommodating multiple stakeholders. On the panel were Minister Omobola Johnson of Nigeria, Prof. Udo Helmbrecht of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Prof. A.A. Wahab of Cybersecurity Malaysia and Simon Muller of Facebook. The focus was primarily on building laws and regulations for secure communication and business, while child protection was equally considered.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The lack of laws/regulations for cybersecurity (child pornography and jurisdictional issues, for instance), or other legal protections (privacy, data protection, freedom of speech) in rapidly connecting developing states was noted. But the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">question of cross-border surveillance and wanton violations of privacy went unaddressed</span></strong> except for the customary, unavoidable mention. This was expected. Debates in Internet governance have, in the past year, been silently and invisibly driven by the Snowden revelations. So too, at WSIS+10 Cybersecurity, speakers emphasized open data, information exchange, data ownership and control (the <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ecj-rules-internet-search-engine-operator-responsible-for-processing-personal-data-published-by-third-parties">right to be forgotten</a>), but did not openly address surveillance. Indeed, Simon Muller of Facebook called upon governments to publish their own transparency reports: A laudable suggestion, even accounting for Facebook’s own undetailed and truncated reports.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a nutshell, the post-2015 Development Agenda dialogues repeatedly emphasized the importance of ICTs in global connectivity, and their impact on GDP growth and socio-cultural change and progress. The focus was on taking this message to the UN General Assembly, engaging all stakeholders and creating an achievable set of action lines post-2015.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Forum Track:</h3>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/copy_of_ForumTrack.jpg/@@images/dfcce68a-18d7-4f1e-897b-7208bb60abc9.jpeg" alt="Forum Track" class="image-inline" title="Forum Track" /></p>
<p><i>Participants at the UNESCO session on its Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues</i> (<a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/leakaspar/status/476690921644646400/photo/1">Source</a>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The HLE was organized as an extended version of the WSIS Forum, which hosts thematic workshops and networking opportunities, much like any other conference. Running in parallel sessions over 5 days, the WSIS Forum hosted sessions by the ITU, UNESCO, UNDP, ICANN, ISOC, APIG, etc., on issues as diverse as the WSIS Action Lines, the future of Internet governance, the successes and failures of <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/">WCIT-2012</a>, UNESCO’s <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/internetstudy">Comprehensive Study on Internet-related Issues</a>, spam and a taxonomy of Internet governance.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Detailed explanation of each session I attended is beyond the scope of this report, so I will limit myself to the interesting issues raised.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At ICANN’s session on its own future (June 9), Ms. Marilyn Cade emphasized the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">importance of national and regional IGFs</span></strong> for both issue-awareness and capacity-building. Mr. Nigel Hickson spoke of engagement at multiple Internet governance fora: “<i>Internet governance is not shaped by individual events</i>”. In light of <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/">criticism</a> of ICANN’s apparent monopoly over IANA stewardship transition, this has been ICANN’s continual <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en">response</a> (often repeated at the HLE itself). Also widely discussed was the <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">role of stakeholders in Internet governance</span></strong>, given the delineation of roles and responsibilities in the Tunis Agenda, and governments’ preference for policy-monopoly (At WSIS+10, Indian Ambassador Dilip Sinha seemed wistful that multilateralism is a “<i>distant dream</i>”).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This discussion bore greater fruit in a session on Internet governance ‘taxonomy’. The session saw <a href="https://www.icann.org/profiles/george-sadowsky">Mr. George Sadowsky</a>, <a href="http://www.diplomacy.edu/courses/faculty/kurbalija">Dr. Jovan Kurbalija</a>, <a href="http://www.williamdrake.org/">Mr. William Drake</a> and <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/agenda/session_docs/170/ThoughtsOnIG.pdf">Mr. Eliot Lear</a> (there is surprisingly no official profile-page on Mr. Lear) expound on dense structures of Internet governance, involving multiple methods of classification of Internet infrastructure, CIRs, public policy issues, etc. across a spectrum of ‘baskets’ – socio-cultural, economic, legal, technical. Such studies, though each attempting clarity in Internet governance studies, indicate that the closer you get to IG, the more diverse and interconnected the eco-system gets. David Souter’s diagrams almost capture the flux of dynamic debate in this area (please see pages 9 and 22 of <a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC%20framework%20for%20IG%20assessments%20-%20D%20Souter%20-%20final_0.pdf">this ISOC study</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There were, for most part, insightful interventions from session participants. Mr. Sadowsky questioned the effectiveness of the Tunis Agenda delineation of stakeholder-roles, while Mr. Lear pleaded that techies be let to do their jobs without interference. <a href="http://internetdemocracy.in/">Ms. Anja Kovacs</a> raised pertinent concerns about <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">including voiceless minorities in a ‘rough consensus’ model</span></strong>. Across sessions, <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">questions of mass surveillance, privacy and data ownership rose</span></strong> from participants. The protection of human rights on the Internet – especially freedom of expression and privacy – made continual appearance, across issues like spam (<a href="http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/CDS/sg/rgqlist.asp?lg=1&sp=2010&rgq=D10-RGQ22.1.1&stg=1">Question 22-1/1</a> of ITU-D Study Group 1) and cybersecurity.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Conclusion:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The HLE was widely attended by participants across WSIS stakeholder-groups. At the event, a great many relevant questions such as the future of ICTs, inclusions in the post-2015 Development Agenda, the value of muti-stakeholder models, and human rights such as free speech and privacy were raised across the board. Not only were these raised, but cognizance was taken of them by Ministers, members of the ITU and other collaborative UN bodies, private sector entities such as ICANN, technical community such as the ISOC and IETF, as well as (obviously) civil society.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Substantively, the HLE did not address mass surveillance and privacy, nor of expanding roles of WSIS stakeholders and beyond. Processually, the MPP failed to reach consensus on several issues comfortably, and a compromise had to be brokered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>But perhaps a big change at the HLE was the positive attitude to multi-stakeholder models from many quarters, not least the ITU Secretary General Dr. Hamadoun Touré. His repeated calls for acceptance of multi-stakeholderism left many members of civil society surprised and tentatively pleased. Going forward, it will be interesting to track the ITU and the rest of UN’s (and of course, member states’) stances on multi-stakeholderism at the ITU Plenipot, the WSIS+10 Review and the UN General Assembly session, at the least.</span></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-a-birds-eye-report</a>
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No publishergeethaWSIS+10PrivacyCybersecurityHuman Rights OnlineSurveillanceFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceFacebookData ProtectionMulti-stakeholderICANNInternet AccessITUInternet StudiesE-GovernanceICT2014-06-20T15:57:32ZBlog Entry