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TIkTok: It’s time for Biden to make a decision on his digital policy with China
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tiktok-it2019s-time-for-biden-to-make-a-decision-on-his-digital-policy-with-china
<b>As the United State's new president comes into office he is faced with creating a cohesive digital relations policy that corrects some of the damage done by his predecessor. This article is the first part of a series analysing his policies and challenges. </b>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<p dir="ltr">While on the campaign trail, now US president elect Joe Biden, made it clear to voters that he viewed Tik Tok as “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tiktok-ban-biden/biden-says-he-sees-tiktok-as-a-matter-of-genuine-concern-idUKKBN26938G">a matter of genuine concern</a>.” The statement came amidst a growing environment of hostility within the American government against the application. At the helm of the hostility was (now former) president Donald Trump’s passing of an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/">executive order</a> banning Tik Tok in the country and his attempts at forcing its parent company ByteDance to restructure the app under American ownership. Now, as the presidency passes hands, it is worth examining how the government got here and just how concerned the Biden administration should be with Tik Tok and how their strategy with the app could set the tone for digital relations with China going forward </p>
<p><strong id="docs-internal-guid-8317df8f-7fff-409d-699d-15c5d046a96a"><br /></strong></p>
<h3>The Road so far: The ban and forced sale of TikTok</h3>
<p><br />America’s motivation to ban and sell the application can be explained by two contrasting factors: the cybersecurity risks that TikTok poses, and the country’s currently ongoing trade war with China. On the security side TikTok has faced immense scrutiny from governments around the world as to the amount of data that the application collects from its users as well as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9dffdb8f-f00e-4305-a69a-158b845f6970">potential links between Bytedance and the Chinese government</a>. Furthermore there is a belief that due to the <a href="https://diplomatist.com/2020/09/05/understanding-the-national-intelligence-law-of-china-why-india-banned-tik-tok/">Chinese legislation</a> that compels companies to assist the state on matters of national intelligence, there is little TikTok could do should the Chinese state decide to use it as an instrument of data collection. On the side of trade, the TikTok ban represents one of the more landmark blows dealt by the Trump government in its trade war with China. The US, since the start of his presidency has levied exclusive tariffs on specific Chinese commodities totalling to more than <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/">$550 billion</a>. China has in response levied its own tariffs on certain American goods, with a total value of those estimated at <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/">$185 billion</a>. Beyond these tariffs, the move to ban TikTok extends the trade war by creating clear hurdles for Chinese corporations to exist within the US market and firmly extended Trump’s protectionist trade policies into the digital sphere. </p>
<p>As such, on 6th August 2020, Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/aug/07/donald-trump-tiktok-executive-order-explainer">released an executive order</a> banning TikTok (as well as Chinese messaging and social media app Wechat). The ban has, however, since been indefinitely suspended as part of ongoing litigation on the matter at the federal level.</p>
<p>Shortly after the ban, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/">came the attempts at forcing through the sale</a>. While the deal has generally been referred to as ‘the TikTok sale’, it is not actually an outright purchase of the social media platform by an American company (<a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/13/21360130/microsoft-tiktok-acquisition-bid-rejection-bytedance">Microsoft attempted such a purchase but was rejected by Byte Dance</a>). Rather, the deal would see the establishment of a new US based subsidiary called TikTok global that would be partly owned (20%) by Oracle and Walmart, with Oracle becoming a trusted technology provider in order to ensure that US user’s data remains within the state. The<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/sep/22/tiktok-sale-the-reasons-behind-it-and-the-new-deal"> agreement stipulates</a> that the board of this new entity would have 4 out of 5 of the seats populated by US citizens, and that the company would go public as well. The current agreement would still see Bytedance retain ownership of the algorithms used by TikTok, which is in line with restrictions from the Chinese government preventing the sale of the algorithm to a foriegn owner without a state granted license.</p>
<p><strong><br /></strong></p>
<h3>How should the Biden administration handle this situation? </h3>
<p><br />Dealing with the TikTok question must be one of the Biden administration’s top most priorities. The most obvious question they face is whether or not to reverse the ban and to continue to push through the sale between Bytedance and Oracle. </p>
<p>The case for enforcing the ban until the sale to American owners seems one that is straightforward enough. The cybersecurity concerns surrounding Bytedance’s proximity to the Chinese state and the influence of Chinese legislation are reasonable concerns. And any data gained from the application in the hands of a hostile state could be potentially harmful. This threat could be potentially reduced based on the role played by Oracle as a trusted technology partner. However with details of what exactly constitutes the functions of a ‘trusted technology partner’ it is impossible to say this with any great certainty. Simultaneously, there is a slight sense of irony in a Chinese based digital company protesting against another country’s protectionist stance to the internet. </p>
<p>Nonetheless these benefits are in many ways greatly over exaggerated, and in many ways allowing TikTok to return without requiring a sale could prove more beneficial in the long term. Not only would the app’s return be welcomed by its immense audience (estimated 100 million US users), it would also be a clear demonstration of America’s commitment to a less fragmented internet and more open digital economy. Furthermore, revoking the ban would also allow for the opportunity to reassess and reformulate the US’s economic and political strategy with regards to Chinese technology. </p>
<p>On the economic side, a retraction of the ban could signal the beginning of the end of the US-China trade war. Chinese investors are sure to see the shift from a radical republican president to a centrist democrat one as the perfect opportunity to increase foreign investment, which had been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3116929/china-ma-relative-normalcy-biden-pent-demand-coronavirus">steadily declining recently</a>. Such investment could prove significantly more substantial to the United States in a post covid-19 world as opposed to even in 2019. It is not unimaginable that Biden would look to maximise this opportunity to boost the economy. </p>
<p>On the political side, the government has to evaluate the success of sanctions levied against Chinese technology and whether that approach of blanket banning will translate effectively to the digital sphere. Not only has the US’s sanctions against <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/124824d6-3b13-4dbb-8b38-926797f9b695">certain chinese technologies</a> proved unsuccessful, tools such as VPNs that can negate a ban make this strategy even less effective in the digital space. </p>
<p>The largest hurdle to revoking the ban would be the genuine cybersecurity concerns with a Chinese corporation having access American citizens’ data. However, dealing with these concerns through a simple ban of the application would only solve this one instance of excessive surveillance and data collection by a foreign app. Rather any solution must look to fix the issue at its root - that being the need for a more cohesive, detailed and overarching national data protection and cybersecurity policy. Such a policy could place clear limitations on data collection, stipulate data localisation policies for sensitive information and outline numerous other means of reducing the threat involved with allowing applications from states such as China to operate in the US. </p>
<p> Ultimately, Biden will be confronted with the reality of this situation the moment he enters office. The decision he makes on TikTok would set the tone for his term and for his government’s relationship with China. Whatever he decides to do, he needs to do it as soon as possible. The clock is ticking. </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tiktok-it2019s-time-for-biden-to-make-a-decision-on-his-digital-policy-with-china'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tiktok-it2019s-time-for-biden-to-make-a-decision-on-his-digital-policy-with-china</a>
</p>
No publisheramanSocial MediaInternational Relations2021-01-22T06:11:43ZBlog EntryCIS Report on Legal and Policy Implications of Autonomous Weapons Systems
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-1
<b></b>
<p> </p>
<p> <span id="docs-internal-guid-84c0c475-7fff-97fa-8ad9-9325cbd3eb3a">Link to full report: </span> <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems">https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems</a></p>
<p>Wars have been a part of human existence from the very beginning. However, the evolution of civilization has led to the evolution of wars. As a society, our discourse is now centred around on how this new generation of wars is best fought rather than whether at all to fight them. This inevitability of war has further led countries to develop means and methods of warfare, for inevitability of war is only acceptable when it is accompanied by the inevitability of victory. Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) or Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have, in recent times, sparked a global debate regarding what is being called the future of technology: artificial intelligence. In the backdrop of revolutionizing wars, AWS are being developed by certain countries to gain an edge over the others, forcing others to participate in the arms race of the 21st century in order to prevent asymmetric development of warfare. The international community must now contemplate the legal, moral and ethical implications of further developing existing automated weapons and giving them more autonomy than ever before. </p>
<p> It is to ally such concerns that a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was convened by the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) in December 2016, clearly demonstrating the global interest in the issue at hand. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects or the UN CCW was established with the aim of restricting weapons considered to cause unnecessary suffering and impact civilians disproportionately and indiscriminately. </p>
<p> <br /><strong>This paper is divided into 4 Chapters. </strong></p>
<p><strong>Chapter I</strong> authored by Anoushka Soni defines and differentiates between certain key terms imperative for a better understanding of autonomous weapon systems in all its technicalities. Further, the Chapter also provides a broad overview of the difference in existing state practice by reviewing the lack of universality of a definition for autonomous weapons. </p>
<p><strong>Chapter II</strong> also authored by Anoushka Soni analyses autonomous weapons from the perspective of international humanitarian law. It first contemplates the prima facie illegality of autonomous weapons, and subsequently focuses on their lawful use with regard to the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity and the conclusion provides a normative look at the way forward. </p>
<p><strong>Chapter III</strong> authored by Elizabeth Dominic goes into the question of accountability and redress and evaluates models of criminal and civil liability in case autonomous weapons systems go wrong.</p>
<p><strong>Chapter IV</strong> authored by Elizabeth Dominic evaluates the role of the private sector in the development, trade and policy framework on autonomous weapons systems around the world.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/legal-and-policy-implications-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-1</a>
</p>
No publisherAnoushka Soni, Elizabeth Dominichuman rightsInternet LawInternational RelationsAutonomous weapons2021-03-22T05:31:18ZBlog EntryCIS Submission to UN High Level Panel on Digital Cooperation
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperation
<b>The UN high-level panel on Digital Cooperation issued a call for inputs that called for responses to various questions. CIS responded to the call for inputs. </b>
<p><span style="text-align: start; float: none;">The high-level panel on
Digital Cooperation was convened by the UN Secretary-General to advance
proposals to strengthen cooperation in the digital space among
Governments, the private sector, civil society, international
organizations, academia, the technical community and other relevant
stakeholders. The Panel issued a call for input that called for
responses to various questions. CIS responded to the call for inputs.<br /><br />The response can be accessed <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-co-operation.pdf">here</a>.<br /></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperation'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperation</a>
</p>
No publisherAayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai HickokInternational RelationsInternet Governance2019-02-07T07:26:22ZBlog EntryResponse to GCSC on Request for Consultation: Norm Package Singapore
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-gurshabad-grover-elonnai-hickok-january-22-2019-response-to-gcsc-on-request-for-consultation
<b>The GCSC opened a public comment procedure to solicit comments and obtain additional feedback. CIS responded to the public call-offering comments on all six norms and proposing two further norms.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder initiative comprised of eminent individuals across the globe that seeks to promote awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cyber security. CIS is honoured to have contributed research to this initiative previously and commends the GCSC for the work done so far.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The GCSC <a href="https://cyberstability.org/research/singapore_norm_package/">announced the release of its new Norm Package</a> on Thursday November 8, 2018 that featured six norms that sought to promote the stability of cyberspace.This was done with the hope that they may be adopted by public and private actors in a bid to improve the international security architecture of cyberspace</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The norms introduced by the GCSC focus on the following areas:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Norm to Avoid Tampering</li>
<li>Norm Against Commandeering of ICT Devices into Botnets</li>
<li>Norm for States to Create a Vulnerability Equities Process</li>
<li>Norm to Reduce and Mitigate Significant Vulnerabilities</li>
<li>Norm on Basic Cyber Hygiene as Foundational Defense</li>
<li>Norm Against Offensive Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The GCSC opened a public comment procedure to solicit comments and obtain additional feedback. CIS responded to the public call-offering comments on all six norms and proposing two further norms. We sincerely hope that the Commission may find the feedback useful in their upcoming deliberations.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://cis-india.org/response-to-gcsc-on-request-for-consultation-norm-package-singapore/at_download/file">Read the full submission here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-gurshabad-grover-elonnai-hickok-january-22-2019-response-to-gcsc-on-request-for-consultation'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-gurshabad-grover-elonnai-hickok-january-22-2019-response-to-gcsc-on-request-for-consultation</a>
</p>
No publisherArindrajit Basu, Gurshabad Grover and Elonnai HickokCyber SecurityInternational RelationsInternet Governance2019-01-27T15:43:12ZBlog EntryMapping of Sections in India’s MLAT Agreements
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-mlat-agreements-sections-map-dec-2016
<b>This set of infographics by Leilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa Naidu maps out and compares the various sections that exist in the 39 MLATs (mutual legal assistance treaty) between India and other countries. An MLAT is an agreement between two or more countries, drafted for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws.
</b>
<p> </p>
<h4>Download: <a href="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/docs/CIS_IndiaMLATAgreementsSectionsMap_Dec2016.pdf">Infographic</a> (PDF) and <a href="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/docs/CIS_IndiaMLATAgreementsSectionsMap_Dec2016.xlsx">data</a> (XLSX)</h4>
<hr />
<p>We have found that India’s 39 MLAT documents are worded, formatted and sectioned differently. At the same time, many of the same sections exist across several MLATs. This diagram lists the sections found in the MLAT documents and
indicates the treaties in which they were included or not included. To keep the list of sections concise and to more easily pinpoint the key differences between the agreements, we have merged sections that are synonymous in meaning but
were worded slightly differently. For example: we would combine “Entry into force and termination” with “Ratification and termination” or “Expenses” with “Costs”.</p>
<p>At the same time, some sections that seemed quite similar and possible to merge were kept separate due to potential key differences that could be overlooked as a result. For example: “Limitation on use” vs. “Limitation on compliance” or “Serving of documents” vs. “Provision of (publicly available) documents/records/objects” remained separate for further analysis and comparison.</p>
<p>These differences in sectioning can be analysed to facilitate a thorough comparison between the effectiveness, efficiency, applicability and enforceability of the various provisions across the MLATs. The purpose of this initial mapping is to provide an overall picture of which sections exist in which MLAT documents. There will be further analysis of these sections to produce a more holistic content-based comparison of the MLATs.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Aggregated Analysis of Sections of MLAT Agreements</h2>
<img src="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/img/CIS_IndiaMLATAgreementsSectionsMap_Dec2016_Aggregate_01.png" alt="Aggregated analysis of sections of MLAT agreements by India" />
<img src="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/img/CIS_IndiaMLATAgreementsSectionsMap_Dec2016_Aggregate_02.png" alt="Aggregated analysis of sections of MLAT agreements by India" />
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-mlat-agreements-sections-map-dec-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-mlat-agreements-sections-map-dec-2016</a>
</p>
No publisherLeilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa NaiduInternational RelationsCybersecurityBilateral AgreementInternet GovernanceMLATCyber Security2016-12-31T06:52:46ZBlog EntryMapping of India’s Cyber Security-Related Bilateral Agreements
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016
<b>With the rapid spread of cloud computing and the growth of cyber spaces, large masses of information are now easily transmittable transnationally, necessitating the ratification of new agreements and cooperation efforts amongst states in order to secure cyber spaces and regulate exchanges of information. In an attempt to understand the nature and extent of current international collaborative efforts in cyber security, we have compiled the following data regarding India’s cyber security-related bilateral agreements. The intention of this exercise is to offer a dynamic visualization that demonstrates which countries India has collaborated with on cyber security efforts and initiatives. This is an ongoing map that we will be updating as our research continues.</b>
<h4 style="text-align: justify; ">Download: <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/CyberSecurityAgreements_Infographic_04.pdf">Infographic</a> (PDF) and <a href="https://github.com/cis-india/website/raw/master/docs/CIS_IndiaCyberSecBilateralAgreementMap_Dec2016.xlsx">data</a> (XLSX)</h4>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><br /> The data used for the info-graphic consists of India’s MLATs, cyber security-related MoUs and Joint Statements, and Cyber Frameworks. An MLAT is an agreement between two or more countries, drafted for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws. A MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) is a nonbinding agreement between two or more states outlining the terms and details of an understanding, including each party’s requirements and responsibility; it is often the first stage in the formation of a formal contract. For the purpose of this research, we have grouped Joint Statements with MoUs, as they both generally entail the informal agreement between two states to strengthen cooperation on certain issues. Lastly, a Cyber Framework consists of standards, guidelines and practices to promote protection of critical infrastructure. The data accounts for agreements centered on cyber security as well as any agreements mentioning cooperation efforts in Cyber Security, information security or cybercrime.</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/MLATAgreement.png/@@images/169c25c6-57a4-48c8-a33e-71aa36ea97ea.png" alt="MLAT Agreement" class="image-inline" title="MLAT Agreement" /></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Mapping of India’s Cybersecurity-related bilateral agreement has been updated on April 12, 2017 with the following changes:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>A new MoU was signed between Australia and India in April 2017, focusing on combating terrorism and civil aviation security. Cybersecurity cooperation is mentioned in the MoU<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU was signed between Bangladesh and India in April 2017. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the ICT Division of Bangladesh are the signing parties of the MoU. The agreement focuses on Cooperation in the area of Cyber Security<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>.</li>
<li>A preexisting MoU between France and India was added to the mapping, signed in January of 2016. Officials of both countries agreed to intensify cooperation between the Indian and French security forces in the fields of homeland security, cyber security, Special Forces and intelligence sharing to fight against criminal networks and tackle the common threat of terrorism<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU was signed between Indonesia and India in March 2017. It focuses on enhancing cooperation in cyber security and intelligence sharing<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU was signed between Kenya and India in January 2017, with “cyber security” mentioned as one of the key areas of cooperation<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a>.</li>
<li>A preexisting MoU between Malaysia and India was added to the mapping, signed in November of 2015. Both sides agreed to promote cooperation and the exchange of information regarding cyber security incident management, technology cooperation and cyber attacks, prevalent policies and best practices and mutual response to cyber security incidents<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a>.</li>
<li>A preexisting MoU between Mauritius and India, signed July 2016, was added to the mapping. This is a non-governmental MoU. Leading bourse BSE signed an agreement with Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) for collaboration in areas including cyber security<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a>.</li>
<li>A new joint statement between India and Portugal was signed in March 2017. The two countries agreed to set up an institutional mechanism to collaborate in the areas of electronic manufacturing, ITeS, startups, cyber security and e-governance.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a></li>
<li>A preexisting MoU, signed between Qatar and India in December of 2016, was added to the mapping. The agreement was regarding a protocol on technical cooperation in cyberspace and combatting cybercrime<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU was signed between Serbia and India in January 2017, focusing on cooperation in the field of IT, Electronics. The MoU itself does not explicitly mention cybersecurity. However, the MoU calls for cooperation and exchanges in capacity building institutions, which should entail cyber security strengthening<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a>.</li>
<li>A preexisting MoU between Singapore and India was added to the mapping. The MoU was signed in January 2016, focusing on the establishment of a formal framework for professional dialogue, CERT-CERT related cooperation for operational readiness and response, collaboration on cyber security technology and research related to smart technologies, exchange of best practices, and professional exchanges of human resource development<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a>.</li>
<li>A new joint statement was signed between UAE and India in January 2017, following up on their previous Technical Cooperation MoU signed in February 2016. To further deepen cooperation in this area, they agreed to set up joint Research & Development Centres of Excellence<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a>.</li>
<li>A preexisting MoU has been included in the mapping, signed in May of 2016. CERT-In agreed with the UK Ministry of Cabinet Office to promote close cooperation between both countries in the exchange in knowledge and experience in detection, resolution and prevention of security related incidents<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU between India and the US was signed in March 2017. CERT-In and CERT-US signed a MoU agreeing to promote closer co-operation and exchange of information pertaining to cyber security in accordance with relevant laws, rules and regulations and on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a>.</li>
<li>A new MoU was signed between Vietnam and India in January 2017, agreeing to promote closer cooperation for exchange of knowledge and experience in detection, resolution and prevention of cyber security incidents between both countries<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a>.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NOTE: Some preexisting MoUs were added as we were initially only including the most recent agreements in the mapping. Upon adding newly signed MoUs, we decided to also keep the preexisting ones and revisit the other entries to include any preexisting MoUs that were initially excluded due to not being the most-recent. In this respect, the visualization will be adjusted to indicate the number of MoUs per country.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a><a href="http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-australia-sign-mous-on-combating-terrorism-civil-aviation-security-2393843">http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-australia-sign-mous-on-combating-terrorism-civil-aviation-security-2393843</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a><a href="http://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/details/89237/2017-04-09">http://www.theindependentbd.com/arcprint/details/89237/2017-04-09</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a><a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/Full-text-of-Joint-Statement-issued-by-India-France/article14019524.ece">http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/Full-text-of-Joint-Statement-issued-by-India-France/article14019524.ece</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indianhome-ministry-indonesian-ministry-of-security-and-coordination/">http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indianhome-ministry-indonesian-ministry-of-security-and-coordination/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a><a href="https://telanganatoday.news/india-kenya-focus-defence-security-cooperation-pm">https://telanganatoday.news/india-kenya-focus-defence-security-cooperation-pm</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a><a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-and-malaysia-sign-3-mous-including-cyber-security/articleshow/49891897.cms">http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-and-malaysia-sign-3-mous-including-cyber-security/articleshow/49891897.cms</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a><a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bse-mauritius-stock-exchange-tie-up-to-promote-financial-mkts/1/723635.html">http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bse-mauritius-stock-exchange-tie-up-to-promote-financial-mkts/1/723635.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a><a href="http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/india-portugal-to-collaborate-in-ites-cyber-security/373666.html">http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/india-portugal-to-collaborate-in-ites-cyber-security/373666.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a><a href="http://naradanews.com/2016/12/india-qatar-sign-agreements-on-visa-cybersecurity-investments/">http://naradanews.com/2016/12/india-qatar-sign-agreements-on-visa-cybersecurity-investments/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a><a href="http://ehub.newsforce.in/cabinet-approves-mou-india-serbia-cooperation-field-electronics/">http://ehub.newsforce.in/cabinet-approves-mou-india-serbia-cooperation-field-electronics/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a><a href="http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-and-india-strengthen-cooperation-on-cyber-security">http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-and-india-strengthen-cooperation-on-cyber-security</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a><a href="http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27969/India++UAE+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India+January+2426+2017">http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27969/India++UAE+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India+January+2426+2017</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a><a href="http://www.bestcurrentaffairs.com/india-uk-mou-cyber-security/">http://www.bestcurrentaffairs.com/india-uk-mou-cyber-security/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a><a href="http://www.dqindia.com/india-cert-signs-an-mou-with-us-cert/">http://www.dqindia.com/india-cert-signs-an-mou-with-us-cert/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a><a href="http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=157458">http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=157458</a></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016</a>
</p>
No publisherLeilah Elmokadem and Saumyaa NaiduInternational RelationsCybersecurityBilateral AgreementInternet GovernanceMLAT2017-04-27T15:14:55ZBlog Entry