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Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory
<b>This document is divided into two parts - the first part lays out a series of research questions, potentially seeking to apply actor-network theory as a research methodology. The second part seeks to map literature around the Actor-Network Theory ("ANT") as a research methodology. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Part 1: Research Questions </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>The aim of this exercise is to delineate the contours of the paper, and provide some insight into the demarcation of the various sections.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The overall context to this paper will be determined by a globalized form of intellectual property ownership, and the various instances in which this narrative finds a place (either overtly or covertly) in the regulation of standard essential patents in India. In our paper, the globalized form of IP ownership is probably most clearly indicated in the standard setting process, where participants are International Standard Setting Organizations determining, in a manner of speaking - the rules of the game - that is - licensing on Fair Reasonable and Non Discriminatory Basis. The other important player to our understanding of global ownership would be multilateral organizations such as Ericsson, involved in many of the disputes before the Delhi High Court and the Competition Commission of India ("CCI"). Perhaps international actors/actants would also be international legal principles as well as international regulators such as the FTC or the ECC themselves. This phase of the paper will also trace India's specific location in global competition. In doing so, not only will the market positions of some of the players be examined, but also some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study some decisions by international regulators and courts to understand the tools and sites available for regulation as well as the nature of the regulatory process itself. <b><br /></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second phase of this chapter will seek to map the overall context to specific cases - that is, pending legal processes in India. This includes both, ongoing litigation on patent infringement at the Delhi High Court as well as ongoing disputes before the CCI as well. The characters in this litigation also trace back to the broader context; some of them more directly than others. The multinational corporations are directly involved in both contexts, whereas the domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actants.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This phase of the chapter will study three key litigations in India - Ericsson and Micromax, Ericsson and Intex, and a third that is yet to be defined. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative 'youth' of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. Perhaps this might also be an actant, in the context of the actor network theory. This phase of the chapter will most likely apply the doctrinal method of research, study academic texts as sources as well as study legal instruments and judicial decisions as sources.<b><br /></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The third phase of this chapter will now ask the question of standard essential patent (SEP) regulation, located within this broader matrix of intellectual property ownership and fluidity of actants. The specific question to be asked will be <i>what is the competition regulation challenge for SEPs in India?</i> This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation. It will be observed that the nature of the players in international litigation as well as in India is rather different. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India's existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is in this phase that one must also examine the usefulness of the actor-network theory as a research methodology to study SEP regulation in India. It must be noted that while SEP regulation so used is used to refer to competition regulation specifically, and not to other levers, such as mechanisms within intellectual property law itself. The focus of this exercise will be competition regulation, with an engagement with other areas of the law and the judicial process only in as much as it informs our understanding of competition regulation of SEPs or impedes it. If one were to apply the actor network theory to this phase of the exercise, one would view courts, parties involved in the litigation, the CCI, international legal principles, international market regulators, international SSOs, competition law as well as issues raised in the litigation as 'actants', both human and non human, who are to be treated on par with each other, with a study of the networks that these actants create, or are a part of.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Part 2: Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i> The aim of this exercise is to first, understand the ANT as a research methodology; second, to study its components and third, to ascertain its suitability as a research method for exploring the challenge of regulating SEP litigation through completion law mechanisms in India. </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>What is the Actor-Network Theory?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">David Banks, in a 2011 blog post, contextualized in trying to trace a relationship between our offline and online behavior presents an overview of the ANT.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Banks describes ANT as an <i>ongoing project that seeks to radically transform how social scientists talk about society's relationship to technology and other non human actors</i> ; and identifies Bruno Latour, John Law and Michael Callon as the major authors in this space. (It is observed that there might have been additions or deletions to this core list of thinkers - not to self for further reading).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In his paper<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> reflecting on the ANT, Bruno Latour refers to himself as a 'fellow traveler' of the various network 'revolutions', and says that in the network, he has found a <i>powerful way of rephrasing basic issues of social theory, epistemology and philosophy. </i>Latour says that in its simplest and deepest sense, the notion of the network is of use whenever action has to be redistributed.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> In a different paper, Latour argues that the purpose of the ANT is not to provide explanations for the behaviour and reasons of actors, but only to map procedures which enable actors to relate to each other and each others' world building capacity. My discomfort with this reading is trying to locate what these procedures would be in an SEP regulation environment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Identifying the components of the ANT</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Latour presents an actant - or an actor - as something that acts, or to which some sort of activity is assigned by others. <a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> There is no special motivation of humans or human actors. "An actant," says Latour, "can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of the action."<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> The conception of an actant, Latour further articulates, should be not as fixed entities, but as fluid, circulating objects, whose stability and continuity depends on other actions. <a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> <i> So what is on its agenda? The attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections established between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distributions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections, of the many elements that circulates and of the few ways through which they are sent.</i></b><a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a><b><i> </i> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Banks<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> identifies <i>actants</i> to be of two types - human and non human, further explaining that 'actors' is typically used to refer to humans. These actants have equal amounts of agency within the actor-network. Banks proceeds to demonstrate this applicability of equal agency with an illustration of getting wi-fi connectivity in Albany. In his narrative <a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> (and as he notes later himself), Banks uses the same language (read as according agency to the inanimate) to describe both, the human and non human actants. Says Banks, that the actants are merely nodes that <i>facilitate a larger functioning.</i> It is submitted that the 'larger functioning' being referred to is probably something that would be determined on a case to case basis - depending on what was being studied.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a 1999 paper <i>On</i> <i>Recalling ANT</i><a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a>, Latour articulates a problem with the usage of the word 'network' as a result of its usage having changed over time - from using it to refer to a series of transformations incapable of being captured by prevalent social theory at the time, to <i>an unmediated access to every piece of information</i> (to my understanding within the context of the World Wide Web). Latour explains that his new understanding is <i>exactly the opposite </i>of what they meant and that it ought not to be used to mean the transformations they were initially articulating.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another of Latour's papers is helpful in arriving at an understanding of the 'network', where he argues that it would be fallacious to consider it in a technical sense, as one would a sewage, a train or a telephone network.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> Unlike a technical network, Latour argues, an actor-network may have no compulsory paths, no nodes and might be quite local in nature. Latour further argues that thinking in terms of a network helps us overcome the <i>tyranny of distance</i>, citing a range of examples including standing one metre away from somebody in a telephone booth and yet being more closely connected to his mother, thousands of miles away, among others<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a>. In each of his illustrations, however, Latour articulates closeness or distance in terms of geography or presence in a physical sense, which might not be entirely applicable to the research question we're seeking to study. What might be more useful perhaps, is the articulation of the network where he argues that instead of tracing an individual to the collective or the agency, one could only at the number of connections an element has and gauge the importance of the element in light of these connections <b> . The greater the number of connections, the more important an element and vice versa. </b><a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>ANT Criticism and Applicability of the ANT to our research question?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Before delving into specifics of the ANT that lend themselves to a critique, I submit a broader reservation with the application of the ANT to studying legal and regulatory processes. From my reading and understanding of the ANT so far, a cornerstone appears to be the exclusion normative ideologies, with a focus on studying processes and networks as is, without formulating a value-judgment on their larger place in the society being studied. In so far as defending this claim, Latour and other supporters of this theory have relied on scientific examples (for instance, the reference to the Colombia Shuttle - NASA and its complex organizational structure)<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> or illustrations from the social sciences or social phenomena. I'm still attempting to locate a paper that utilizes the ANT to study law or regulation. <i>Prima</i> <i>facie</i>, the challenge being posed is to study inherently normative structures and processes with clear power structures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Banks<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> describes the efficacy of the ANT in describing the processes by which inventions and technological systems come into being, or fail to do so. Perhaps in studying the legal regulation of SEP litigation in India, the efficacy of the ANT would like in describing the processes by which legal regulation and legal systems in India (specifically to regulate SEPs) come into being, or fail to do so. By extension, for our research question, non human actants as identified by Banks<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> would probably be legal institutions and the parties to the litigation themselves. What is unclear at the moment is whether policy and legal instruments or levers themselves would be actors.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Banks, in his article also articulates criticisms<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> to the ANT propounded by Sandra Harding, David Bloor and Sal Restivo, on the grounds of being blind towards other social factors such as race or patriarchy. If one were to extend this to the research question at hand, an argument could be made that the ANT seeks to equate dissimilarly situated institutions. Corollaries to race and patriarchy might be found in the market power of parties (an Ericsson v. a Micromax), or even within regulatory set up itself, where, based on the facts so far, an argument could be made out that different regulators are situated differently, where the Delhi High Court could pass an order restraining another regulator - the Competition Commission of India, from passing its own order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A reference to the 'agency' critique of the ANT is made by Latour himself, in his 1999 paper. Latour goes on to acknowledges the critiques of the ANT, but says that most have (mistakenly) centered either around the actor or around the network; and that the idea was to never occupy a position in the agency/structure debate.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> Later in the paper, Latour further clarifies that actants are not to be perceived as playing the role of agency, and network is not to be seen as playing the role of the structure. Instead, says he, they represent two sides of the same phenomenon. Latour further explains that the ANT merely tried to learn from the actors (what was sought to be learnt was difficult to grasp), without attempting to be an explanation of societal pressures (and the reasons for such pressures) on actors. The difficulty in reading this paper for me was that it was rather dense in many respects, with various concepts - including, for instance, the idea of the 'social', which he refers to constantly, not being clearly articulated. Further, what is uncertain to me is how this question of agency will play out if applied to a legal or regulatory context. If, for instance, a legal principle was to be a non human actant, how would this have an agency independent of the human actor (the judge) that would be the one applying the legal principle in the first place? Can we truly exclude the question of agency from the ANT if the very exclusion of agency means a recognition of the existence of agency in the first place? How does one exclude the question of agency in seemingly unequally situated actors with an inherent power dynamic? Is the ANT, then even a useful research methodology? In his 1999 paper, Latour argues that the aim of the ANT is to study actors without the imposition of an <i>a priori definition of their world building capacities</i>.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a> The question now arises for me, is how to divest regulators of their 'world building capacities'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Explaining the rationale<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a> for the ANT (in social science research), Latour articulates a dissatisfaction that social scientists have with both, micro (local sites) and macro levels (more abstract ideas like culture, patriarchy etc.) of research. This dissatisfaction, he argues, results in a back and forth between these sites <i>ad infinitum.</i> The ANT, argues Latour, is a way of tracing these dissatisfactions, not for the purposes of finding a solution, but to <i>follow them elsewhere</i> and <i>explore the very conditions that make these two disappointments possible.</i> Latour further clarifies that one must not understand 'network' in ANT to mean a larger society that would help make sense of local interactions or as an anonymous <i>field of forces</i>. Instead, he says, it refers to summing up various interactions through <i>various devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae into a very local, very practical, very tiny locus.</i> My key takeaway from this articulation was that ANT could be used to study various interactions between various key stakeholders, with a very specific research question. Given that the locus could also be tiny, perhaps if the research question was narrowed further, the key stakeholders, or the 'network' and the 'actants' would reduce as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Latour has also argued that the ANT makes no assumptions about how an actor should behave and assumes infinite pliability and absolute freedom of actors. <a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> <b> <i> In itself AT is not a theory of action no more than cartography is a theory on the shape of coasts lines and deep sea ridges; it just qualify what the observer should suppose in order for the coast lines to be recorded in their fine fractal patterns. Any shape is possible provided it is obsessively coded as longitude and latitude. Similarly any association is possible provided it is obsessively coded as heterogeneous associations through translations. </i> </b> <b><i> </i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> <i> there is no difficulty in seeing that AT is not about traced networks by about a network-tracing activity. As I said above there is not a net and an actor laying down the net, but there is an actor whose definition of the world outlines, traces, delineate, limn, describe, shadow forth, inscroll, file, list, record, mark, or tag a trajectory that is called a network. No net exists independently of the very act of tracing it, and no tracing is done by an actor exterior to the net. A network is not a thing but the recorded movement of a thing. The questions AT addresses have now changed. It is not longer whether a net is representation or a thing, a part of society or a part of discourse or a part of nature, but what moves and how this movement is recorded. </i> </b> <b><i> </i></b> <a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a> <b><i> </i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A useful articulation of the application of ANT emerges out of Jonathan Murdoch's 1997 paper.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>He submits that the human gaze is being increasingly considered as an unreliable source of knowledge, being in a constant state of flux. Citing the example of the environment/biosphere to demonstrate the futility of the separations we make between nature and society, Murdoch argues that any solution to the environmental crisis will involve <i>a profound re-thinking of how we link these two domains.</i><a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a>Extending this argument to our research question, one might ponder for instance that any solution to the SEP litigation and regulation conundrum will involve a <i>profound re-thinking</i> of how we link the courts and the CCI. What is unclear is what method we will use to arrive at this re-thinking, or what the re-thought out version would look like.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Murdoch does, however, articulate concerns with the 'non dualistic' framework (which the ANT positions itself as) and argues, relying on others before him, that such an adoption could have far reaching consequences; that the very basis of the development of social science is such a binary division. Murdoch argues that the nature-society divide has enabled social scientists to break the hegemony of the natural scientists. Murdoch further submits his reading of Latour, where he states that the power of laboratories arises as a result of their ability to tie together actors that are beyond the lab into networks that are then used to disseminate scientific facts.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> Murdoch's paper largely focuses on blurring the distance between 'natural' and 'social' actors, and identifies the difficulties in attempting to compare the two. Murdoch questions if natural actors whose identity emerge from nature itself are malleable as social actors, who are by definition, a product of society. What is unclear, however, is how malleable are two dissimilarly situated social actors; and whether 'social actors' is broad enough to encompass all institutions born out of or with a human/societal interaction component. Specifically, for our paper, would courts and the CCI both qualify as social actors? Would legal principles? Would the decision making process by the courts itself? Latour's very example for proposing the ANT was that of pasteurization in France. Murdoch also questions whether it's possible to in fact treat various actants as each other. In order to address another critique of ANT, that where we exclude notions of power, Mudoch says Law's articulation - of focusing on 'victims' instead of 'heroes' might prove to be useful. This has not been discussed in detail, leaving the reader to make their own inferences.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> <i> In other words, can ANT, with its seamless webs, forever crisscrossing the human-nonhuman divide, provide a secure platform for critique, for the expression of a profound dissatisfaction with the activities of powerful social actors and the attribution of responsibility to those actors? Can it, in other words, ever do anything more than describe, in a prosaic fashion, the dangerous imbroglios that enmesh us? <br /> Does this emphasis on description necessarily represent "an insuperable obstacle to effective and convincing social criticism </i> </b> <b><i> </i></b></p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> David Banks, A Brief Summary of Actor Network Theory, available at <a href="http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/12/02/a-brief-summary-of-actor-network-theory/"> http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/12/02/a-brief-summary-of-actor-network-theory/ </a> (last accessed 29 August, 2015).</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Bruno Latour - Networks, Societies, Spheres : Reflections of an Actor - Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, available at <a href="http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094">http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094</a> (last accessed 31 August, 2015).</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Id at 797.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Bruno Latour - complications paper - at internal page 7.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Id.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Id at internal page 8.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Id at internal page 7.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Id.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Id.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at <a href="http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf"> http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf </a> (last accessed 28 August, 2015).</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Bruno Latour, On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few complications, available at <a href="http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-67%20ACTOR-NETWORK.pdf"> http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-67%20ACTOR-NETWORK.pdf </a> (last accessed 30 August, 2015) at internal page 2.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Id at internal page 4</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Id at internal page 6.i</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Latour, the networks, societies, spheres paper</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Id.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> Id.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> Id.</p>
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<div id="ftn18">
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Latour, recalling the ANT paper.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Recalling ANT paper, page 20</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Bruno Latour, On Recalling ANT, available at <a href="http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf"> http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-77-RECALLING-ANT-GBpdf.pdf </a> (last accessed 28 August, 2015).</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> Latour, the complications paper, page 9.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Id at 14.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> Jonathan Murdoch, Inhuman/nonhuman/: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1997, Volume 15, 731-576</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Murdoch at page 732.</p>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Murdoch at page 737.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-09-05T04:56:03ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies: Patent Pools
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools
<b>In this research paper, Nehaa Chaudhari gives an analysis of patent pools. She discusses the working of a patent pool, study patent pool in other areas of technology, and patenting in telecom and related technology.</b>
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<p><b><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-patent-pools.pdf" class="internal-link">Click to download the full research paper here</a></b> (PDF, 475 Kb)</p>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The network landscape over the past few years has been characterized by several battles of supremacy between two or more rival technologies. <a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a> These battles have included, <i>inter alia, </i>the constant efforts at besting rivals in the arena of patenting innovations in technology, often as a result characterised by the imposition of high royalties on rivals, for the use of one’s patents. However, having realised that such efforts at besting the other could prove detrimental for all parties concerned in the long run, and stall technological advancements which would in turn translate into lower business revenue, mechanisms were devised to ensure a relatively equitable utilization of patents in the market place. One such mechanism that has been developed is that of patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent pools have been developed around most areas of high end technology and research and development. Over the course of this paper, the author has confined herself to a study on patent pools in the area of telecommunications, and the issues to be addressed therein. Specifically, the author will be dealing with patent pools around 3G, 4G, LTE, TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE technologies. Within this framework, the author seeks to examine what are patent pools, whether and what kind of patent pools exist, their associated costs, their licensing arrangements and the structure of the payment of royalty, and the feasibility of these patent pools.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Understanding Patent Pools</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent pools are agreements among patent owners through which patent owners combine their patents, waiving their exclusive rights to the patent to enable others, or themselves, to obtain rights to license the pooled patents.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> Therefore, such pools may be focussed either on cross licensing, that is companies mutually making their patents available to each other, or on out licensing, that is, a group of companies making a collection of patents available to companies that do not or might not have patents of their own to contribute to the pool.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a> Typically, modern patent pools combine patents of various companies and are around inventions that are required to implement an established industry standard, are licensed as a whole (on an <i>all or nothing basis) </i>and not as individual licenses for patents owned by various companies within that pool, and are available to any non member for licensing.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a>Such licensing is done under a standard agreement and royalty rates, on a non discriminatory basis. The exception to this rule is that if certain members have contributed patents to the pool, they may receive more favourable terms, in recognition of their cross licensing relationship to the pool.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5] </a>When viewed from a law and economics perspective, patent pools are seen to be an efficient institutional solution to various problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights, and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed. <a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6] </a>However, this perspective also warns about the antitrust risks that may arise when competitors or potential competitors are involved in the coordination of their intellectual property. For instance, such pools may be used to allocate markets or otherwise chill competition. <a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">The Working of a Patent Pool</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Generally, a patent pool may be administered in one of two ways- it may either have an administrative entity, or may also just be a system of cross licensing between two firms.<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8]</a> In case of the former, the licensing agency may be one of the patent holders, <a href="#fn9" name="fr9">[9]</a> or may be an independent licensing company (e.g. MPEG).<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The ownership of patents within the pool is retained by the owners, who then license them to the operator/administrator on a non exclusive basis, with sub licensing rights. This means that the owners are free to continue to license their patents on an individual basis, and the administrator also has the right to further license the patents to any party who is interested in licensing from the patent pool.<a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11]</a> The responsibility of managing licensing and licenses is vested in the operator/administrator of the patent pool. Licensees are required to report sales and pay royalties to the pool administrator, who in turn would enforce the conditions of the license.<a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12] </a>The distribution of royalties between the members of the pool is on the basis of a formula which may, or may not be transparent to non member licensees, with the pool operator retaining a management fee.<a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13] </a>Typically, pool licenses are also structured in a manner so as to render difficult early termination by the licensee. The nature of the contract, once signed by a licensee, is typically binding in nature. Therefore, this would mean that the administrator of the patent pool could sue the licensee for non performance of the contract.<a href="#fn14" name="fr14">[14]</a> However, unless a pool operator is a member of the pool itself, it cannot sue for the infringement of patents. <a href="#fn15" name="fr15">[15]</a> Therefore, in the event that a patented technology were to be utilised without having taken a license, one or more of the individual patent owners would be required to take legal action. The involvement of the pool operator would be limited to being a part of any settlement discussions, if they were to occur, since one of the options for the alleged infringer could be to obtain a license for the patent pool.<a href="#fn16" name="fr16">[16]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Drawing Parallels with Other Patent Pools</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this section of the paper, the author seeks to study patent pools in other areas of technology in order to better understand the structure and pricing of patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The ‘3C DVD’ Patent Pool </b><br />Established in 1998, the <i>3C DVD Patent Pool</i> was the brainchild of <i>Philips</i>, <i>Sony</i> and <i>Pioneer</i>, and <i>L.G.</i> was subsequently inducted as a member. <i>Philips</i> acts as a licensing administrator for patents held by all the companies, which are over two hundred in number. These patents include those for the manufacture of the DVD players, and for the manufacture of the DVD disks themselves. <a href="#fn17" name="fr17">[17]</a> The player license per unit royalty was set as 3.5% of the net selling price of each player sold. This was subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which after January 1, 2000 became $5 per unit. The disc license royalty was set as $0.05 per disc sold.<a href="#fn18" name="fr18">[18]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The ‘DVD- 6C’ Patent Pool</b><br />Established in June 1999, the members of this pool at the time of its inception were <i>Hitachi</i>, <i>Matsushita</i>, <i>Mitsubishi</i>, <i>Time</i> <i>Warner</i>, <i>Toshiba</i>, and <i>JVC</i>. This pool was also for the DVD-ROM and the DVD- Video formats, with <i>Toshiba </i>acting as the administrator. <a href="#fn19" name="fr19">[19] </a>The royalties were set at $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder, which saw a substantial reduction in 2003.<a href="#fn20" name="fr20">[20]</a> Subsequently, there were various changes that were made to this group, including the inclusion of newer standards, the joining and subsequent departure of IBM and other organizations as a member etc. <i>Hitachi</i> and <i>Panasonic</i> also act as regional agents in certain regions of the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The MPEG LA pool<br /></b>The MPEG-2 is a standard for describing the coding of data <i>inter alia, </i>on DVD discs. For MPEG-2, a patent pool has been established, where the administrator is an independent, external organization known as the MPEG Licensing Authority, that set itself the aim to develop a patent pool for this standard.<b> </b> <a href="#fn21" name="fr21">[21]</a> The MPEG LA invited parties that thought they owned patents essential to this standard to join the program, which took off in 1997. At present, the pool has over a hundred patents and thousands of licensees.<a href="#fn22" name="fr22">[22]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Patenting in Telecom and Related Technology</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this section of the paper, the author examines the working of patenting and patent pools in the telecommunications sector and in areas of related technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Early Developments and the Emergence of GSM<br /></b>Patent pools are slowly developing into a key component of the telecommunications and the technological industry. The technology industry has been said to be an <i>ecosystem</i>, wherein there is a complex correlation between those who develop the technology and those who implement it in the creation and development of products.<a href="#fn23" name="fr23">[23]</a> In the telecommunications industry for instance, each handset manufacturer has declared only a small percentage of the various types of intellectual property assets that are necessary to implement a 3G compatible cellular phone. Therefore, the working in such a context is that various companies develop different technologies, and the same is shared by various manufacturers that seek to make use of this technology.<a href="#fn24" name="fr24">[24]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The revival of patenting in the sector of telecommunications, post a period of decline in the decades of the 19540s to the 1980s, is attributed to the advent of the GSM standard for mobile communications in Europe.<a href="#fn25" name="fr25">[25] </a>In 1988, the main European operators invited equipment suppliers and developed a procedure wherein manufacturers would have to give up their intellectual property rights and to provide free world wide licenses for essential patents.<a href="#fn26" name="fr26">[26]</a> After opposition from the manufacturers, the approach was modified to one wherein the operators required the suppliers to sign a declaration agreeing to serve all of the GSM community on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory conditions.<a href="#fn27" name="fr27">[27]</a> In the early 1990s, Motorola by refusing to grant non discriminatory licenses for its substantial portfolio of essential patents and only agreeing to enter into cross license agreements further intensified the debate over IPRs in telecommunications. The company only lifted these restrictions after various countries across the world expressed a preference for this standard. The experience in this standard has demonstrated that it would not be accurate to expect that all parties holding essential patents would be willing to license them to all interested parties.<a href="#fn28" name="fr28">[28]</a> Companies were only willing to relax their licensing conditions once revenue generating opportunities increased.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The 3G3P and the UMTS<br /></b>In July 2000 the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) and its 18 partners notified various agreements to the end of establishing a worldwide patent platform. The purpose behind this was disclosed to be that of providing a voluntary and cost effective mechanism to evaluate, verify and license patents that were essential for third generation (3G) mobile communication systems.<a href="#fn29" name="fr29">[29] </a>It was also claimed that the said agreements would have pro competitive effects and that the purpose behind this Platform was the facilitation of access to technology and consequent entry into the markets.<a href="#fn30" name="fr30">[30]</a> On the intellectual property front, the purpose was to reduce cost uncertainties and the delays that were accompaniments of licensing numerous essential patents for complex technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While it has often been considered to be a patent pool, this arrangement has been said to be only similar to a patent pool.<a href="#fn31" name="fr31">[31]</a> The 3G3P itself has argued that since it was a mere facilitator of transactions between patent holders and licensees, and that membership was open to both licensors and licensees as opposed to only licensors as in the case of patent pools, it would be fallacious to classify the Platform as a patent pool. Further, it has also been argued that licensing by members is not restricted to the Platform and that there was no bundling or real pooling of the patents <i>per</i> <i>se</i> and those licensees have the opportunity to pick and choose between patents with the licensing being carried out on a bilateral basis. Additionally, unlike in a patent pool, there is no single license between the patent holders as a collective and the licensee, and the parties have a choice between the Standard License of the Platform, and a negotiable individual license.<a href="#fn32" name="fr32">[32]</a> A Standard License provides for Standard Royalty Rate, a Maximum Cumulative Royalty Rate and a Cumulative Royalty Rate.<a href="#fn33" name="fr33">[33] </a>Bilateral transactions on the other hand, are negotiated between the parties where the consideration is to be determined on <i>fair and equitable</i> terms.<a href="#fn34" name="fr34">[34]</a> This Platform also provides for a price cap, which, instead of being absolute and set at a pre-determined royalty rate, is a <i>default five percent maximum (not minimum) cumulative royalty rate for potential licensees per product category.</i><a href="#fn35" name="fr35">[35]</a> The royalty rate for each individual patent will differ for each of the licensees and this depends on the patent portfolio under each product category that the licensee has chosen.<a href="#fn36" name="fr36">[36]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The concerns and challenges of the GSM experience were well perceived during the determination of the course of action for UMTS. European actors were especially wary of <i>Qualcomm</i> and expected the firm to demand high license fees, with some even fearing them to be in excess of 10%.<a href="#fn37" name="fr37">[37]</a> Subsequently, various attempts at developing licensing schemes failed, until 2004 and the establishment of the W-CDMA Patent Licensing Programme for UMTS FDD patents.<a href="#fn38" name="fr38">[38] </a>At the outset, seven licensors offered their patents as a bundle to prospective licensors, a number which decreased over time.<a href="#fn39" name="fr39">[39]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Development of LTE Patent Pools<br /></b>The next stage in the process of innovation in the realm of telecommunications was the development of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Standard, which while being essential to 4G technology has also seen application in the realm of 3G. Consequently, patent pools or similar structures have been developed in these areas. LTE patents are being viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property resource in the mobile telecommunications industry, with most operators around the world building LTE networks.<a href="#fn40" name="fr40">[40]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As per in a study conducted in 2011, 23% of the patents about this technology were owned by <i>L.G. Electronics</i>, with <i>Qualcomm</i> coming in second with 21%. <i>Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, Nokia</i> and <i>Samsung</i> each owned 9%, China’s <i>ZTE</i> owned about 6%<a href="#fn41" name="fr41">[41]</a> and <i>Nortel</i> owned 4%, which were later sold to a consortium of <i>Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM)</i> and <i>Sony</i>, after <i>Nortel</i> filed for bankruptcy in 2009.<a href="#fn42" name="fr42">[42]</a> <i>Ericsson</i> also independently owns 2% of the patent pool and <i>RIM</i> owns 1%.<a href="#fn43" name="fr43">[43]</a> However, another analysis<a href="#fn44" name="fr44">[44]</a> of IP databases conducted by <i>ZTE</i> in 2011 revealed differing results. As per this analysis, <i>InterDigital </i>was the leader, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and the Technology arm controlling 11% of LTE essential patents. <i>Qualcomm</i> controlled 13%, <i>Nokia</i> and <i>Samsung</i> 9% each, <i>Ericsson</i> controlled 8%, as did <i>Huawei</i>, <i>ZTE</i> controlled 7%, <i>L.G</i>. controlled 6% and <i>NTT</i> <i>DoCoMo</i> brought up the rear with 5%. The remaining 11% was held by various other firms.<a href="#fn45" name="fr45">[45]</a> It is to be realized that these studies have often come under criticism from different companies, with each of them eager to portray themselves as the market leader.<a href="#fn46" name="fr46">[46]</a> Setting aside criticism driven by corporate egos, the principle of it, that is, the difficulty in assessing and valuing patents cannot be disputed. Valuing patents is far from merely counting the number of patents owned by a company. The complications are especially evident when it comes to determining which of these patents are essential and which of them aren’t. Additionally, the worth of these patents varies depending on the existence or the absence of certain conditions, including transfer restrictions, cross licensing arrangements, ownership and market conditions.<a href="#fn47" name="fr47">[47]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The aforesaid discussion reveals the complexity and the fragmentation of the LTE environment, which further underscored the need to have patent pools in this field. Although the need for a patent pool was realized in 2009-2010, given that the WCDMA patent pool had been met with very limited success,<a href="#fn48" name="fr48">[48]</a> industry watchers were reluctant to be optimistic. This was in part fuelled by the understanding of the attitude of dominant players, wherein they continued to believe that they could derive more monetary, cross licensing and litigation defence value if they did not pool their patents.<a href="#fn49" name="fr49">[49]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The development of LTE patent pools can be traced back to 2009, and the response of <i>Via Licensing</i>¸<i> Sisvel</i> and <i>MPEG LA</i> to a Request for Information on forming such a patent pool by the <i>Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN).</i><a href="#fn50" name="fr50">[50]</a> <i>Sisvel’s</i> proposal, which it subsequently made at a public conference in 2010 sought to demonstrate that patent pools could prevent excessive costs from royalty stacking.<a href="#fn51" name="fr51">[51] </a>Among various other examples, <i>Roberto Dini</i>, the founder of <i>Sisvel</i> suggested that if patents were to be licensed individually, for instance, 85 patents for MPEG video at 50 cents apiece would cost $42.50. As opposed to this, the patent pool charged $2.50.<a href="#fn52" name="fr52">[52]</a> In 2011, the <i>NGMN</i> reiterated its recommendation to all stakeholders in the mobile industry that were interested in developing patent pools to hasten their development process to avoid further delays in LTE licensing.<a href="#fn53" name="fr53">[53]</a> The <i>NGMN</i> also went on to state that it would be ideal if all the parties were to agree on a single patent pool that promoted reasonable royalties, offered certainty on the availability of the licenses for patents and created a framework for evaluation of their essentiality, where the value of the patents essential to the pool would be established by the industry.<a href="#fn54" name="fr54">[54]</a> These recommendations were not without their fair share of criticism, both, from industry watchers<a href="#fn55" name="fr55">[55]</a> and from vendors.<a href="#fn56" name="fr56">[56]</a> Notwithstanding these reservations, both, <i>Sisvel</i><a href="#fn57" name="fr57">[57]</a> and <i>Via</i> <i>Licensing</i> have gone on to issue calls for patents for the purposes of creating patent pools in the LTE marketplace.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <i>Sisvel </i>LTE Patent Pool materialized in late 2012, wherein licenses were offered under a portfolio of patents essential to LTE.<a href="#fn58" name="fr58">[58]</a> The pool includes patents owned by <i>Cassidian</i>, the <i>China Academy of Telecommunication Technology, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, France Telecom, TDF</i>, and <i>KPN</i>, in addition to some patents that had been originally filed by <i>Nokia </i>but were acquired by <i>Sisvel </i>in 2011.<a href="#fn59" name="fr59">[59]</a> The pool is also open to other organizations that have patents essential to LTE. At present, the current portfolio of these patents is available under standard terms and conditions. The running royalty rate is 0.99 Euros per device.<a href="#fn60" name="fr60">[60]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Having promised a launch within a few months in June, 2012<a href="#fn61" name="fr61">[61]</a> <i>Via Licensing </i>has also developed its own LTE Patent Pool, with the initial companies in this pool being <i>AT&T, </i><i>Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing, HP, KDDI Corporation, MTT DoCoMo, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica</i> and <i>ZTE.</i><a href="#fn62" name="fr62">[62]</a> Like <i>Sisvel’s</i> Patent Pool, this pool is also open to other organizations that believe they possess essential LTE patents, and they are encouraged to submit the same for evaluation.<a href="#fn63" name="fr63">[63]</a> The patent pool floated by <i>Via</i> leans heavily towards service providers, but some of the big players in the industry including <i>Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei Technologies</i> and <i>Samsung</i> <i>Electronics</i> are conspicuous by their absence.<a href="#fn64" name="fr64">[64]</a> This absence is felt even in <i>Sisvel’s</i> patent pool, with the reasoning being proposed<a href="#fn65" name="fr65">[65]</a> that these key patent holders may prefer private licensing and subsequent litigation over pooled resources in patent pools.<a href="#fn66" name="fr66">[66]</a> Understandably, the launch of the LTE Patent Pools has been met with approval by the <i>NGMN</i><a href="#fn67" name="fr67">[67]</a> but given the nascent stages in which both of these pools find themselves, it would be premature to comment (without first observing for a few months) the likelihood of their success or failure and how they would play out against each other.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The TD-SCDMA and the TD-LTE<br /></b>Reportedly, China has spent several billion dollars on the import of analog and GSM technology,<a href="#fn68" name="fr68">[68]</a> and the country’s mobile communications industry continues to be dominated by foreign players.<a href="#fn69" name="fr69">[69]</a> Therefore, in continuation of a purportedly <i>growing trend</i><a href="#fn70" name="fr70">[70]</a> in the area of telecommunications as well, domestically developed systems are being preferred and developed over standardized technologies that enjoy strong patent protection outside China.<a href="#fn71" name="fr71">[71]</a> Besides the avoidance of paying royalties to foreigners, the idea is also to use China’s strong market presence and have more participants in China’s home grown technology.<a href="#fn72" name="fr72">[72]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Time Divisional- Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), developed by the <i>China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT)</i>, in collaboration with <i>Datang </i>and<i> Siemens</i><a href="#fn73" name="fr73">[73]</a> is a Chinese indigenously developed 3G technology standard developed by China to reduce its dependence on western standards.<a href="#fn74" name="fr74">[74]</a> Interestingly however, it has been reported that the Chinese hold core patent technology only about 7% whereas most of the rest of it is taken by other foreign organizations.<a href="#fn75" name="fr75">[75]</a> In 2000, an industry consortium, the TD-SCDMA forum was established. The participants were <i>China</i> <i>Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel, </i>and<i> Siemens</i>, with the objective of developing and supporting this technology. Government support was received in 2002, following which the <i>TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance </i>was founded by well known market players including <i>Datang</i>, <i>SOUTEC</i>, <i>Holley</i>, <i>Huawei</i>, <i>LENOVO, ZTE, CEC</i> and <i>China</i> <i>Putian</i>. There has also been the creation of various joint ventures with international giants such as <i>Alcatel</i>, <i>Ericsson</i>, <i>Nokia</i>, (erstwhile) <i>Nortel</i>, <i>Philips</i>, <i>Samsung</i> and <i>Siemens</i> have also been created.<a href="#fn76" name="fr76">[76]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Information about the existence of patent pools in this technology has been hard to come by. One of the few to write about patent pools in his 2008 paper,<a href="#fn77" name="fr77">[77]</a> <i>Dazheng Wang</i> proposes patent pools as a solution to the problem of commercialization of TD-SCDMA. He suggests that the framework of this patent pool should be on the industry principles of fair, reasonable and non discriminatory licensing terms for essential patents, with the end result being one of increased innovation and competition and an overall increase in market presence. Interestingly, a few articles<a href="#fn78" name="fr78">[78]</a> on blog posts on the internet speak about the existence of patent pools and their apparent misuse<a href="#fn79" name="fr79">[79]</a> as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is submitted that these inconsistencies regarding the division of patents between various patent holders, where the percentage of patents held by each company have been pegged differently,<a href="#fn80" name="fr80">[80]</a> and about the existence of a patent pool or not raise pressing concerns about the payment of royalties and how licensing works in such a situation. On a very basic level, in order to be able to pay royalties and enter into licensing agreements, the existence of an identified, non disputed patent holder would be the <i>sine qua non, </i>which seems to be missing in the case of patents for TD-SCDMA. This problem is only further compounded by the lack of clarity on the very existence of patent pools. Had there been specified patent pools, the issues of determination of essential patents and the setting of royalties and licensing fees would have been standardized, a situation that cannot be invoked, without dispute, in the present Chinese context.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is further submitted that despite China being the world’s largest market for mobile communications, and its progress from a mere importer to a developer of some parts of technology,<a href="#fn81" name="fr81">[81]</a> the Chinese experiment with TD-SCDMA seems to have met with limited success, in comparison to what was envisaged. For instance, while an agency had forecast that the number of TD-SCDMA subscribers in 2010 would be 34 million, by April, 2010 there were only 8 million or (even lower) subscribers.<a href="#fn82" name="fr82">[82]</a> One of the reasons for preferring other standards, for instance, the W-CDMA is the number of handsets compatible with the same and the consequent variety that is available to the consumer. To illustrate, one could look at the figures from June, 2010. At this point of time <i>China Unicom</i> had 94 models for W-CDMA from twenty four manufacturers including nine foreign ones, whereas <i>China Mobile</i> had only twenty eight models that were compatible with TD-SCDMA.<a href="#fn83" name="fr83">[83]</a> Interestingly, if one were to measure popularity in terms of sheer numbers, TD-SCDMA would emerge the winner over W-CDMA by a couple of million subscribers, but if the growth rate were to be considered, W-CDMA would come out on top. While TD-SCDMA grew only by 24%, W-CDMA has grown at 32% monthly since the start of its service is October, 2009.<a href="#fn84" name="fr84">[84]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">China’s experiments with creating its home grown telecommunication standards have not stopped with the development of the TD-SCDMA, with the country being on track in the development of the TD-LTE. Reports suggest that although the systems are in ‘trial’ mode officially, the 4G spectrum situation remains uncertain.<a href="#fn85" name="fr85">[85]</a> It is submitted that although this is in the nascent stages as compared to the TD-SCDMA, the concerns expressed earlier about TD-SCDMA and the suggestions made therein for the technology to realise its full potential would be equally applicable in this scenario as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, in light of this discussion it would not be fallacious to conclude that while the TD-SCDMA, and now more recently the TD-LTE standard might still be in its nascent stages, on a fundamental level it seems to have not fulfilled the objectives with which it was developed, especially given that a sizeable portion of its patents continue to be owned by foreign corporations. In addition to the challenges of attracting subscribers, it would also need to streamline its system of patents, royalties and licensing, if it wants to have a truly global or even national presence. To this end perhaps patent pools structured along the lines of those being developed or in place for other mobile communication technologies might provide a viable solution meriting consideration.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Concluding Observations</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the fundamental concerns that plague most downstream organizations in the mobile communications sector is the prevalence of high licensing fees that need to be paid on essential patents, the cost of which often trickles down to the customers. A study on the licensing arrangements prevalent at the moment<a href="#fn86" name="fr86">[86]</a> reveals that as of the moment, the result of royalty rate caps is that they save money for downstream manufacturers, but this is at the expense of upstream licensors. The most significant savers are the ones downstream with no IP to trade, and vertically integrated companies while losing some revenue, are able to save significantly more in reduced expenses.<a href="#fn87" name="fr87">[87]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, it comes as no surprise that efforts at limiting aggregate licensing fees have been at the forefront over the past couple of years. It is in this scenario that patent pools have developed, with operators such as <i>Via Licensing</i> and <i>Sisvel</i> even promoting themselves as being able to put together patent pools that would greatly limit licensing fees.<a href="#fn88" name="fr88">[88] </a>However, some owners of intellectual property continue to find bilateral licensing and cross licensing to be more profitable as opposed to patent pools.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the key concerns when it comes to fore when dealing with how patent pools are structured is about the distribution of income received from royalties within the members of the pool, which ties in with the bigger question of classifying patents as essential and non essential. More often than not, patent pools also have to grapple with the problem of members having conflicting interests. For instance, manufacturers have the incentive to cap aggregate royalties of certain essential patents that they would use in manufacturing, in order to reduce their licensing costs. However, these manufacturers could have also brought their own essential patents to the pool, perhaps of a new way of doing things, and would certainly be averse of having caps imposed on these royalties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the key other considerations that patent pools need to take into account include the royalty rates affixed. In an interview some time ago, the founder of <i>Sisvel</i>, went on to state that while affixing these royalty rates, there could be no discrimination against licensees, since that would be a sure fire way of ensuring the collapse of the patent pool.<a href="#fn89" name="fr89">[89]</a> Additionally, patent pools also need to account for the difference in regulatory mechanism and their execution that exists across jurisdictions. For instance, customs officials in France pay a lot more attention to counterfeit goods than they would to patent infringing products, whereas those in Germany would have a keen eye on the latter.<a href="#fn90" name="fr90">[90]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Various other concerns have also been identified with regard to patent pools over time. One of these is that they could potentially eliminate competition that comes from outside of patent pools.<a href="#fn91" name="fr91">[91]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, patent pools are not all inclusive, since participation is entirely voluntary. Therefore, patent pools would not even be reasonably expected to cover all essential patents required to make a standardised product. This problem is rendered even more complex as a result of the presence of multiple patent pools around the same technology, as in the case of DVDs and more recently, LTE technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In sum, while portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets by reducing transaction costs for licensees, while preserving to a definitive extent financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing inventions and undertake new research, the significant shortcomings of these pools also need to be taken into account before they can be heralded as the solution to problems presented by complex patent landscapes. While voluntary patent pools might have proved to be beneficial in some respects, the imposition of patent pools would be a fallacious approach to undertake.</p>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. Hui Yan, <i>The 3G Standard Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship?, </i>DRUID Working Paper No 07-01, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1454&cf=9 (last accessed 07 12 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, <i>Efficient Patent Pools,</i> 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 691, 691 (2004)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. <i>Patent Pools- Some Not So Frequently Answered Questions, </i>available at <a href="http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html">http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. Philip B. Nelson, <i>Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, </i>Rutgers Law Journal, Volume 38:539, 559 (2007)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>].</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1984).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. Philips has been known to have been the licensing agency for patent pools where it was a member</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr14" name="fn14">14</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr15" name="fn15">15</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr16" name="fn16">16</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 3</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr17" name="fn17">17</a>]. Rudi Bekkers et. al., <i>Patent Pools and Non Assertion Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi Party IPR Holders in Standardization</i>, available at <a href="http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf">http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf</a> 22 (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr18" name="fn18">18</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr19" name="fn19">19</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr20" name="fn20">20</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr21" name="fn21">21</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr22" name="fn22">22</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr23" name="fn23">23</a>]. Keith Mallinson, <i>Fixing IP Prices with Royalty Rate Caps and Patent Pools, </i>available at <a href="http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html">http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr24" name="fn24">24</a>]. <i>Id.</i> See Appendix 1 for a graphical representation of declared intellectual property assets in 2009.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr25" name="fn25">25</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 25</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr26" name="fn26">26</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 27</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr27" name="fn27">27</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 27</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr28" name="fn28">28</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 28</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr29" name="fn29">29</a>]. Dessy Choumelova, <i>Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Agreements- the Particular Case of 3G3P, </i>available at <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf-">http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf-</a> 41 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr30" name="fn30">30</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr31" name="fn31">31</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr32" name="fn32">32</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr33" name="fn33">33</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr34" name="fn34">34</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr35" name="fn35">35</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 42-43.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr36" name="fn36">36</a>]. <i>Id</i> at 43.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr37" name="fn37">37</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 29.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr38" name="fn38">38</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 39.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr39" name="fn39">39</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 17 at 39.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr40" name="fn40">40</a>]. Elizabeth Woyke,<i> Identifying the Tech Leaders in LTE Wireless Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/">http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr41" name="fn41">41</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr42" name="fn42">42</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr43" name="fn43">43</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr44" name="fn44">44</a>]. Caroline Gabriel, <i>ZTE Claims 7% of LTE Essential Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm">http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr45" name="fn45">45</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr46" name="fn46">46</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr47" name="fn47">47</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 40.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr48" name="fn48">48</a>]. Keith Mallinson, <i>Mallinson: Uncertain Futures in LTE Patent Pool Licensing, </i>available at <a href="http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25">http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr49" name="fn49">49</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr50" name="fn50">50</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr51" name="fn51">51</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr52" name="fn52">52</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: left; ">[<a href="#fr53" name="fn53">53</a>]. <i>NGMN Board Recommendation on LTE Patent Pool, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool">http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr54" name="fn54">54</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr55" name="fn55">55</a>]. Caroline Gabriel, <i>NGMN’s Calls for an LTE Patent Pool Will be Futile in the Current IPR Climate</i>, available at <a href="http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/">http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr56" name="fn56">56</a>]. Michelle Donegan, <i>Vendors Balk at LTE Patent Pool Proposal, </i>available at <a href="http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362">http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr57" name="fn57">57</a>]. <i>SISVEL: Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), </i>available at <a href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458">http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr58" name="fn58">58</a>]. <i>LTE Patent Pool from Sisvel</i>, available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel">http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr59" name="fn59">59</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr60" name="fn60">60</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr61" name="fn61">61</a>]. Mike Dano, <i>Via Promises LTE Patent Pool Launch Within Months, </i>available at <a href="http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15">http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15</a> (last accessed 07 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr62" name="fn62">62</a>]. <i>LTE Patent Pool Available Through Via’s Licensing Program, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program">http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr63" name="fn63">63</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr64" name="fn64">64</a>]. Stephen Lawson, <i>Lte Patent Pool Brings Together Technologies From At&T, Zte, Hp And Others, </i>available at <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others">http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr65" name="fn65">65</a>]. Peter White, <i>Sisvel LTE Patent Pool Emerges After All- Majors Still Hold Back from Committing, </i>available at <a href="http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm">http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr66" name="fn66">66</a>]. Shankar Pandiath, <i>Sisvel Launches Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), </i>available at <a href="http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm">http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr67" name="fn67">67</a>].<i>NGMN Board Welcomes Launch of LTE Patent Pool, </i>available at <a href="http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool">http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool</a> (last accessed 09 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr68" name="fn68">68</a>]. ELSPETH THOMSON AND JON SIGURDSON (EDS.), CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 17 (2008, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr69" name="fn69">69</a>]. Cong Cao, <i>Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry, </i>available at <a href="http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924">http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr70" name="fn70">70</a>]. Peter Zura, <i>China Launches TD-SCDMA Telecom Standard</i>¸ available at <a href="http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html">http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html</a> (last accessed 10 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr71" name="fn71">71</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr72" name="fn72">72</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr73" name="fn73">73</a>]. <i>TD-SCDMA (time division synchronous code division multiple access)</i>, available at <a href="http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA">http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA</a> (last accessed 07 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr74" name="fn74">74</a>]. SHAHD AKHTAR AND PATRICIA ARINTO (EDS.), DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC : 2009-2010 8 (2010, Sage Publications, New Delhi).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr75" name="fn75">75</a>]. <i>Supra </i>note 1 at 2. See Appendix 2 for the breakup of patent holding. However, see details on <i>Infra</i> note 78 for a contradictory view, wherein China claims to own 30% of all TD-SCDMA patents.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr76" name="fn76">76</a>]. Pierre Vialle, <i>On the relevance of Indigenous Standard Setting Policy: the Case of TD-SCDMA in China, </i>2<sup>nd</sup> International Conference on Economics, Trade and Development, (2012) 36 IPEDR 184-185 (IACSIT Press, Singapore).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr77" name="fn77">77</a>]. Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: <i>A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA’s Commercialization</i>, <a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744">http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr78" name="fn78">78</a>]. <i>China Owns 30% of TD-SCDMA Related Patents, </i>available at <a href="http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html">http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr79" name="fn79">79</a>]. <i>The Legal Regulation on Patent Pool Misuse, </i>available at <a href="http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html">http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html</a> (last accessed 11 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr80" name="fn80">80</a>]. <i>Supra </i>notes 75 and 78.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr81" name="fn81">81</a>]. Tomoo Marukawa, <i>Chinese Innovations in Mobile Telecommunications: Third Generation vs. “Guerrilla Handsets”, </i>Paper presented at the IGCC Conference: Chinese Approaches to National Innovation, La Jolla, California, June 28-29, 2010 at 1.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr82" name="fn82">82</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 8.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr83" name="fn83">83</a>]. <i>Id </i>at 9.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr84" name="fn84">84</a>]. <i>Id</i> at 9.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr85" name="fn85">85</a>]. <i>China to Speed Up TD-LTE Process, </i>available at <a href="http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29">http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29</a> (last accessed 08 December, 2012)</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr86" name="fn86">86</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr87" name="fn87">87</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr88" name="fn88">88</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr89" name="fn89">89</a>]. <i>Sisvel’s Patent Strategy, </i>available at <a href="http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html">http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html</a> (last accessed 12 December, 2012).</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr90" name="fn90">90</a>]. <i>Id.</i></p>
<p>[<a href="#fr91" name="fn91">91</a>]. <i>Supra</i> note 23.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaIntellectual Property RightsPublicationsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2013-07-03T06:57:59ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace — CIS’s Upcoming A2K Research Initiative
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place
<b>Pervasive technologies have flooded the Indian market and are changing the ways in which the average Indian accesses knowledge but very little is understood about these technologies, particularly when it comes to their legality. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) plans to begin a research project that aims to understand how pervasive technologies interact with Intellectual Property laws and what can be done to protect these technologies from being labelled “illegal” and eradicated from the Asian market.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Between 2000 and 2012, mobile phone subscriptions in India increased from 3.578 million to 893.86 million — an increase of almost 250 per cent.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1]</a> In fact, mobile device sales were expected to reach 231 million units in 2012, an 8.5 per cent increase from 2011<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> and an incredible leap from the 21 million units sold in India in 2004.<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a> While mobile phone penetration has been rising steadily in India,<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a> the cost of mobile phones has plummeted, meaning that the ability to purchase and use mobile phones in India is becoming more and more widespread, especially in the marginalized classes. Mobiles are not the only technology that has experienced this phenomenon; indeed, many different types of pervasive technologies (mass-market networked communication technologies) have become increasingly more accessible across the board in Indian society.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When I use the term <i>pervasive,</i> I am referring to those technologies that are the most accessible to and used by the typical Indian. These technologies are characterized by their ability to provide access to media without significant cost to the user through both their low cost and their features. Mobile phones, netbooks and media players, as well as hardware, software and associated content are all considered to be pervasive technologies. For research purposes, CIS will only consider those technologies that cost under USD 100 or about INR 5,400. Considering that in 2011 it was estimated that about 75 per cent of the mobile devices sold in India cost below USD 75,<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a> this is not a restrictive figure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Although these technologies have become near ubiquitous in India and similar developing markets, very little is actually understood about how they interact with Intellectual Property (IP) laws. The pervasive technology industry exists somewhere between formal and informal and legal and illegal (as Carolyn Nordstrom would put it, these technologies would be il slash legal, or il/legal),<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6]</a> and can shift in and out of the legal/formal and illegal/informal realm depending on the stage of production; this is why they are often referred to as “gray market” technologies (though in some cases, it may even be appropriate to call them extra-legal). This lack of compliance with IP laws have made technologies both quite cheap to purchase and a popular platform for software, hardware and content innovation. The result is that these technologies often contain the newest and most interesting features and they provide the most “bang-for-your-buck” for content and value-added services. Thus, a consumer can buy a grey market technology that will have a wide array of features and services for a much lower price than would be paid to one of the larger manufacturers for an equal or even lesser product.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is the low cost but highly sophisticated state of these pervasive technologies that is changing the way that people across the world access information and media, particularly those individuals and groups that routinely face barriers to mainstream structures of access. For those that were left on the wrong side of the infamous “digital divide”, pervasive technologies have been arguably the most effective means of providing real access to knowledge to the masses within India and across Asia, even more so than directed development initiatives. Indeed, pervasive technologies are not the future solution for access to knowledge; they are the current reality.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Although pervasive technologies are plausibly the most effective tools of access for knowledge in the marketplace in emerging economies like China, Indonesia and India, very little scholarly research has been done on pervasive technologies in the developing world, especially research that acknowledges the significant role that pervasive technologies have had in bridging the digital divide. This absence of appreciation for the significance of pervasive technologies in developing economies, coupled with a lack of understanding around their complex interaction with national and international IP regimes, may lead to a policy vacuum within which the existence of pervasive technologies could be jeopardized. Accordingly, CIS will begin a new access to knowledge research initiative that aims to understand the relationship between pervasive technologies and Intellectual Property. <i>Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace </i>will span over two-and-a-half calendar years (30 calendar months) and will recruit researchers from China, India, and other parts of Asia. Interaction will also be established with members of like-minded projects in Africa and Latin America. This research will begin as soon as it is approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The current project proposal is available for download as a <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf" class="internal-link">PDF document</a> (299 Kb).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The immediate aim of the research is to understand the legal environment, in which pervasive technologies exist, but simply generating comprehension is not enough; pervasive technologies must be allowed a more formal space in the Indian market. As part of the research project, CIS plans to carry out both an advocacy phase and dissemination phase in order to use the research outputs to create a more widespread understanding of the importance of pervasive technologies as access to knowledge tools. We hope that the research will encourage the formation of IP reforms and norms that recognize the role that pervasive technologies play in providing access to knowledge and enable their continued participation in the Indian market and society.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="visualHighlight">As the formal research project has yet to commence, I will be working on a small section of the <i>Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace</i> research on pervasive mobile phone technologies. CIS currently possesses 12 mobile phones that fall into the definition of pervasive technologies, though we will hopefully add to our collection as the research continues. The aim of this research is to document as much information about the life-cycles, hardware, software and content of each phone as possible in order to generate a better understanding of how these phones exist and interact with IP regimes and norms. The blog series on this research should begin in the next couple of weeks.</span></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
<p><b> </b></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. Data available on the International Telecommunications Union Data Explorer at <a href="http://bit.ly/MIfEYO">http://bit.ly/MIfEYO</a><br />[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, <a href="http://bit.ly/tKe7nU">http://bit.ly/tKe7nU</a>(November 22, 2011).<br />[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>].Gartner Inc., ‘Forecast: Mobile Terminals, Worldwide, 2000-2009<i> </i>report’ (July, 2005), but cited information can be retrieved from <a href="http://bit.ly/PTAOFC">http://bit.ly/PTAOFC</a><br />[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>].International Telecommunications Union, 'The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures' available at <a href="http://bit.ly/qtwGU">http://bit.ly/qtwGU</a><br />[<a href="#fr5" name="fn35">5</a>].Gartner Inc. Gartner Says Indian Mobile Handset Sales to Reach 231 Million Units in 2012, <a href="http://bit.ly/qtwGU">http://bit.ly/qtwGU</a> (November 22, 2011).<br />[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>].Nordstrom, C. <i>Global Outlaws: Crime, Money, and Power in the Contemporary World </i>(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 256.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place</a>
</p>
No publisherJadine LannonAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2012-10-30T06:23:53ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place — A Presentation by Sunil Abraham
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place
<b>The 2012 Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest was organized in Rio de Janeiro from December 15 to 17, 2012. The Centre for Internet & Society partnered FGV, Washington College of Law, the American Embassy, African Information Research and Training and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development in this event. Sunil Abraham made a presentation on Pervasive Technologies on the opening day, December 15, 2012.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham presented on 13 different smartphones from the Indian market such as: The Classroom in a Box, The Supercharger, The Networker, The Linguist, TV on the Go, The Spy, The Semi-Smartphone, The Trendy, The Boombox, 3D, The Mighty Mini, The Pianist, and the Indian Experience.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most of the above devices are manufactured in China and imported into India through local companies for domestic consumption and made available for its 900 million mobile subscribers.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies.pdf" class="internal-link">Download the presentation</a> [PDF, 4.61 Mb]</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/access-to-knowledge-in-market-place</a>
</p>
No publishersunilFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2013-02-13T07:05:15ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies Project Working Document Series: Literature Review on IPR in Mobile app development
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-literature-review-on-ipr-in-mobile-app-development
<b>This post is literature survey of material exploring and analysing the role of Application Platforms in the Mobile Applications Development ecosystem, albeit from an intellectual property perspective. The document is a work in progress. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>1. What are the decisions developers are making within their practice in terms of location of their enterprise and clients, scale of audience, funding, business models and mobile apps marketplace (app stores)? Who is the primary actor in the mobile applications development cycle in India?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> 1.1. Is the mobile apps marketplace organically developing into a Bazaar model, or a Cathedral model?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> 1.2. What are the contractual terms between the enterprise and the employee? What is the typical nature of agreements in the mobile apps development industry between enterprise- employee and enterprise- client?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The role of Mobile application developers (“developers”) is critical in the app market, especially when such markets are regarded as the key entry and dissemination point for mobile content. Developers are seen as innovation engines and the fastest route to innovation, so understanding factors that attract and retain third party mobile application developers is of importance to mobile platform providers in order to survive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> Who are the primary actors in the mobile applications development cycle in India?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This chapter of the Pervasive Technologies Project (“Project”) aims to study developers who are key contributors to the mobile applications space within India; and the problems, those being faced by them as they attempt to navigate an emerging and ambiguous ecosystem. The results of our qualitative research give us insight into the characteristics of this new tribe. A majority of the developers do not own the products they innovate and instead assign ownership of their IP over to their clients. Innovating for the purpose of creating and retaining ownership is a key motivation and is reflected in the tendency of developers to move away from the services sector to develop their own products.<a name="_ftnref1" href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As one developer puts it, “unless you're a 1000 man enterprise, there's no economic benefit in services; as competition has driven pricing so low, everyone's struggling to deliver $12-14 per hour.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Every startup in mobile development, especially, is doing services to stay afloat and would like to move toward a product model.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Further, IAMAI conducted a survey<a name="_ftnref2" href="#_ftn2"><strong>[2]</strong></a> in 2013 and the report presents an analysis in four sections:</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>a) Who? The App Developer in India</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>b) What? The Preference of Users and Developers in India</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>c) Why? The Business of Apps in India</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>d) How? The Future of Apps in India</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The Report states:</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>“The vast majority of app developers in India are male. In their survey of 454 developers, only 35 respondents were female reflecting the gender bias. On the demand side 80 percent of smartphone users in India are male reinforcing the male dominance. Geographically the respondents were all based in India except one developer of Indian origin residing in Malaysia. The well known and established IT cities in India are attractive for app developers because they provide with easy access to infrastructure, skill and a ready market for products. The survey shows the concentration of app developers in the cities of Bangalore, Mumbai, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad and Ahmedabad. A larger percentage of developers in such IT cities make apps on a full-time basis as compared to developers in other cities. The survey data also shows that Bangalore, Mumbai and NCR have the maximum number of companies (organized business operations) engaged in app development. Cities like Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and Chennai host many small teams of app developersas well as self-employed app professionals. In most of the other cities such as Bhubaneshwar, Cochin, Coimbatore, Gandhinagar and Kota, app development is done primarily on a part-time basis and is not the primary source of income. This could be the result of limited monetization options that make app development an unsustainable livelihood for many.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>The popularity of international apps was evident in the survey data. The average download of ‘Indian’ apps was very low. Only 14 of the 454 developers has crossed the hundred thousand download mark, of which only 5 surpassed the one million milestone. These numbers do not pertain to a single app, but to the cumulative number of downloads across all the apps created by each developer, supporting the thesis of low visibility of apps developed domestically.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>In their sample of 454 developers, entertainment apps including gaming and social networking are the dominant categories reflecting demand side preference. Utilities, health and education are the other important categories. The survey also below provided the number of apps developed under each category. The list does not include lifestyle and enterprise apps which are exceptions. One forceful result of their survey is the focus of app developers on foreign app demand in preference to producing locally-relevant content - as the latter is less profitable. Each respondent in their sample had developed an average of 38 apps. Of these 13 have developed 100 or more apps and these are the larger professional app companies. After excluding extreme values, the average number of apps developed by each respondent fell to 17.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Skewed revenue sharing models biased against content providers was one of the main reasons why Indian app developers focus on international app stores such as Apple App Store or Google PlayStore that offer a flat 70 percent of the total revenue to developers. This adversely affected development of India-specific apps and even popular apps such as Saavn and Zomato have expanded abroad because of this very reason.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Survey results indicated an Android dominated future for the app economy in India for two apparent reasons. One, Android devices are more affordable and two, the Android ecosystem is open allowing OEMs such as Samsung and HTC to manufacture mobile devices that use the Android OS. The drawback turns out to be the resulting fragmentation in screen sizes, resolution limits and hardware traits. Because of this, “developing apps that work across the whole range of Android devices can be extremely challenging and time-consuming.” Moreover, Indian app developers need to recognise the existence of an active market for used phones and thus the appeal of ‘backward compatibility’ i.e. an app that can work across old devices as well as new ones and also function across both old and new versions of operating systems will stand a better chance of success.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>On the whole, app development was not considered to be a remunerative business opportunity. 17 percent of respondents who answered the question on choice of revenue model indicated that they did not have a specific revenue generation plan. While some developers are engaged in contractual development, there are few developers who self finance their project and do not actively market or promote their app. The business of app development in India seems to be at a stage in which it could be characterised as one based on a ‘hit and trial’ philosophy. Self financing is common in the industry. Only 7 and 13 developers approached banks or venture capitalists for financing. Funding an app developer was not an investor’s primary choice. Recognising the market failure and the utility of apps, the Department of Electronics and IT and Department of Telecommunication have both instituted funds to encourage mobile technology ventures</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>and app development in India.<a name="_ftnref3" href="#_ftn3"><strong>[3]</strong></a> One can argue on the efficacy of the use of limited public resources for app development, but not the fact that app development in India needs a boost. The industry is still very young and ‘unorganized’ and is largely dependent on own and informal sources for financing. The study presents presents the source of financing for app developers.”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Understanding of IP</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There is a lack of understanding of IP amongst the developers. During the course of interviews, IP was often thought of as mere content or code. There was also confusion between the terms IP and IPR. The few developers who understood the nuances of IP better, voiced a need for the developer community to deepen their understanding of what parts of their work are IP. Samuel Mani, Founding Partner of <a href="http://www.mcmlaw.in/">Mani Chengappa & Mathur, </a>stressed that developers should recognize the value within not just the product or software itself, but the background business processes. According to Mani, the execution of the idea is the true source of innovation; how one accesses the market, and maybe who the market is as well.<a name="_ftnref4" href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The IAMAI report<a name="_ftnref5" href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> had some observations on the impact of IP on the apps industry. According to the report, “<em>since the industry thrived on innovation, protection of intellectual property was important to developers. The balance between protection and sharing of innovation was part of a larger and often tendentious debate on open source versus proprietary software development.<a name="_ftnref6" href="#_ftn6"><strong>[6]</strong></a> The survey did not attempt to deconstruct that debate; merely reported that 70 percent of respondents were of the view that intellectual property protection was a concern for app developers. However, not all had taken steps to protect intellectual property. The lack of seriousness could be associated with poor revenue potential from apps. Among those who had, some obtained copyrights/patents, while others worked with individual checks on in-app piracy using code morphing, copy protection, server–based checks, or both etc (The study provides data on different IP protection measures).”</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Nature of their clients</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Out-sourced 'mobile app services' is marginal as a business model here in India.<a name="_ftnref7" href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Ownership of their product/service:</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Often, the lack in understanding can be traced to the developers working in isolation from the legalities involved in assigning the product to the client. Majority of those interviewed developed mobile app products for clients, and in turn assigned ownership of their products to their clients. As previously mentioned, they commonly shared an interest in leaving the services sector to create products of their own, with some of them already having made the transition within their business model.<a name="_ftnref8" href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Contractual clauses most important to mobile app developers: </strong>Delving deeper into the aspect of assigning ownership to clients, the most common practice is for developers to enter into a work-for-hire agreement with the client. Typically, a work-for-hire agreement mandates that if a worker is paid to carry out a particular project, whatever is created within the project belongs to the client.<a name="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For startups where team players are small in number, it is likely that all will have access to any contract agreements entered into with clients. For larger corporate software developer firms, there may be a specialized department for legal-related matters. In such cases, the mobile app developers themselves would seldom lay eyes on the legalese of contracts, for the primary reason being that it doesn't concern them. Instead, the terms of agreement more familiar to them would be those that they obliged to upon working for their employer. The interviews revealed that the importance of contract agreements was actually underestimated in the country.<a name="_ftnref10" href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Within a work-for-hire agreement, it is commonplace for developers to enter into restrictive agreements that obstruct the freedoms of what they can do with the code created for the client. Problematic areas proved to be those related to the time periods in which the developer was not allowed to take up future work for competing clients (i.e. the non-compete clause), or could not talk about their work for the client at all (the “quiet period”).<a name="_ftnref11" href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Developers are unable to license their work to other interested clients when one client retains ownership. “Clients typically do not want a perpetual license, but complete ownership”, says a website developer. He further explains that, “this means they could make a derivative work or use it for another project. Depending on how bad we want the project, we'll work out some middle ground.” But it does not seem to be so easy for he and his SME to do so: “The thing about contracts is it’s all about a sort of differential bargaining power that the two parties have... you’ll have very little control about what happens once you’ve got paid.”<a name="_ftnref12" href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To have any sort of bargaining power within a work-for-hire arrangement requires a lot of time for negotiating, and the space for communication to begin with. In many cases, contracts may not even be introduced into a work agreement, leaving a lot of intricacies to the unknown.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The problems are further compounded by contract illiteracy, more so in second tier cities.<a name="_ftnref13" href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>2. What is the nature of innovation emerging from the mobile app industry?</strong> <strong>What is the awareness of the "mobile applications developer and its enterprise on rules concerning code, content and design? How does re-use and sharing of code, content and design occur in the mobile application developer ecosystem ? What is the perceived impact of the Indian IPR regime on the aforementioned aspects? Finally, do the emerging trends in re-use and sharing of code run afoul of Indian IP law?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There is a marked shift towards using open source software amongst developers. According to a Gartner study, most software makers will have some open source applications or code in their portfolio by 2016. The study also reaches the conclusion that 99% of Forbes’ Global 2000 companies will be using some form of open source software.<a name="_ftnref14" href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Awareness</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The interviews revealed different personal understandings of the meaning of IP. The most common responses were the following<a name="_ftnref15" href="#_ftn15">[15]</a>:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>A :</strong> When questioned about IP to developers, they did not know what it meant, because it didn’t have anything to do with what they were doing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>B : </strong>Developers often did not know what part of their app was IP... there is was gap in understanding with respect to IP.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For the most part, it seems, IP was considered to refer to content or code across interviews, and was even confused at one point with IPR (IP Rights) within a response referring to an SME's trademark and pending application.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For those who appeared to be better versed in matters related to IP, they emphasised on the need for developers to be better acquainted with what parts of their work are IP. One interviewee stressed on the importance of developers to recognize the value of background business processes, apart from software and the product itself. <a name="_ftnref16" href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In certain cases, it took $1 million in sales for a medium-sized software development enterprise to start paying attention to IP. The enterprise tried to obtain patent protection for their application, but the effort turned out to be futile.<a name="_ftnref17" href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Protection of work (Speaks to awareness also)</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">When asked, those interviewed responded with a variance in answers. Some simply stated that their work is not protected, while a few mentioned that they acquired trademark or intend to apply for trademark protection. One interviewee had a patent pending in India and the US, as well. In many conversations, developers mentioned that their code for their apps is under open source licenses, and a couple others entailed sharing that the content is under creative commons licenses, “individual licenses,” or joint copyright. Additionally, within one interview, one mentioned the use of encryption tools as a technical means of protection for their work.<a name="_ftnref18" href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<em>The concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context... it becomes a question of priority between innovation and protection" — Aravind Krishnaswamy, Levitum.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Of the developers interviewed, many exhibited some sort of confusion or misunderstanding related to the protection of their works by means of intellectual property rights (IPR). Those interviewed seemed to either express an interest to acquire IPR in the future for their products in the forms of patent or trademark protection, or expressed their appreciation for openness source licensing—or both! Beneath these immediate responses, however, many repeated patterns, as well as contradictions, are revealed. Conversations that followed within these interviewed entailed the opportunity to hear from personal experiences and opinions on different areas within their practice intersecting IPR.<a name="_ftnref19" href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Across interviews conducted, one particular observation entailed the tendency for developers to have worked in the past for corporate employers that have dealt with cases of infringement or have acquired IP protection. Almost half of those interviewed shared the fact that they worked for a corporate employer and became better familiar with different notions of intellectual property through that experience. It may not be too far-fetched to suggest, then, that for the developer the idea of acquiring IPR protection is one that may be reinforced from previous employers or other successful development companies with IPR of their own.<a name="_ftnref20" href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Impact of law & reasons for IPR Protection</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One would assume that if a startup was bootstrapped with minimal cash flow, then it would place a low priority on getting IP protection for its products. Aravind Krishnaswamy of startup, <a href="http://levitum.in/">Levitum</a>, also stated that <em>“the concept of securing IP was relatively new within the Indian context.” <a name="_ftnref21" href="#_ftn21"><strong>[21]</strong></a></em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yet, many developers who were interviewed did express an interest in IPR. The main concerns developers believed IP protection would address, were proving ownership over their work or preventing problems in the future. One developer's commented on how the mobile app market is a “new and potentially volatile area for software development.” For this reason, it was imperative that he and his team attempted to avoid trouble in the future, and ensure that they going about mobile app development the right and moral way.<a name="_ftnref22" href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Within another interview, developer, John Paul of mobile app SME, Plackal, explained his motives for seeking to acquire patent protection, the application for which back then was pending in India and the US: "<strong>For us, applying for a patent is primarily defensive.</strong> And if it does get infringed upon, it would give us a good opportunity to generate revenue from it." For the company's trademark, they sought to be able to enforce their ownership over their product's brand: “As a precautionary, we've trademarked the app so that should there be a situation where the app is pirated, we can claim ownership for that app.”<a name="_ftnref23" href="#_ftn23">[23]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Do the emerging trends run afoul of Indian law?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yes. This was evident from the legal practices of mobile app developers and the resulting cases of infringement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Some instances of infringement (limited to Mobile app content (i.e. logos, pictures, etc.)) are<a name="_ftnref24" href="#_ftn24"><strong>[24]</strong></a>:</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Pirated apps in app stores</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• “Dummy apps” or imitations of another's app</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Breaching app stores user agreement</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Violation of License agreements of code created by another</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Violation of Open source licenses</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Breaching of terms of agreement for by commissioning clients</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">• Breaching of terms of agreement for by those hired</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some of the developers indicated that they weren't a fish big enough to be pursued for infringement. “The big companies do not go after small developers; it depends on how much money they're making.” said a developer. He added,“Patent lawsuits can cost something like millions of dollars, so unless they're going to get more back, they wouldn't go through the trouble of doing so... but that is true even in the US.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Some added that others who may have been apparently copying you, may have been working on the same content independently. Corporate players are in non-compliance knowingly than not, whereas more SMEs infringe upon others without being aware that they are. Just as well, the degree to which infringement takes place may differ between the two types of industry players: “At the corporate level, where they know they are not in compliance, the degree of non-compliance might be very small or specific, but it still exists.” On the other hand, for startup developers, a substantial amount of their code may not comply with the licenses and agreements they are obliged to—something that could pose problems for them later down the road if left unfixed. <a name="_ftnref25" href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>3. The apps marketplace is extremely important since they are the gatekeepers enabling access to apps. What is the nature of the apps marketplace? What are the limitations associated with it ? How do the existing regulatory models intersect with this relatively new marketplace? What is the enforcement carried out by these app stores in terms of IP?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">“<strong><em>The app platform is a gatekeeper which provides the consumer and developer a virtual space to buy and sell products (mobile apps). What is the nature of the app platform? What are the limitations associated with it?</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>An app dealing in pirated content or infringing intellectual property faces the risk of getting barred by the app platform. What is the enforcement carried out by app platforms to protect intellectual property?”</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Firstly, what is an app platform?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Iansteti and Levien<a name="_ftnref26" href="#_ftn26"><strong>[26]</strong></a></em> state that at the core of each innovation network is a focal organization known as <strong>platform owner</strong> (or keystone) that provides the platform to facilitate contribution by other members in the network.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Hagiu<a name="_ftnref27" href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> defines a platform as a product, service or technology that provides a foundation for other parties to develop complementary products.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Specifically<em>, I Kouris<a name="_ftnref28" href="#_ftn28"><strong>[28]</strong></a></em> defines an app platform as a special kind of electronic market which enable software developers to distribute their software applications(apps) among users of mobile devices like smartphones or tablets. An app platform owner dictates the entire infrastructure(like user interface, server space, etc.) and determines the rules for the interaction between the developers and users. They usually provide information about apps and developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality. <em>Fransman M<a name="_ftnref29" href="#_ftn29"><strong>[29]</strong></a></em> characterised the app platform as an 'innovation ecosystem incorporating app developers effectively.'</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Innovation can happen within the enterprise, or can take a more open route and benefit from external innovation. In order to gain the benefit of external innovation, platform owners must open their platforms up beyond their internal base of developers and provide resources to third party developers.<a name="_ftnref30" href="#_ftn30">[30]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>What is the platform concept in software?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Broadly, <em>Noori<a name="_ftnref31" href="#_ftn31"><strong>[31]</strong></a></em>, discusses the issues about the platform concept in software and attempts to address the subject of platform strategy. Tsai, Phal & Robert<a name="_ftnref32" href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> further the discussion by stating principles for an effective platform strategy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In mobile ecosystems <strong>building a developer community</strong> is one of the niches to attract the developers to join the ecosystem. However, health can mean differing things for different ecosystem members. In order to stimulate innovation<a name="_ftnref33" href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> the keystone company is often forced to relinquish much of their control over the platform to the development community. This involves a careful balancing act in relinquishing enough control to create a healthy environment for developers, and not stifling innovation while retaining a necessary and desired degree of control.<a name="_ftnref34" href="#_ftn34">[34]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Baskin<a name="_ftnref35" href="#_ftn35">[35]</a> examines the problems concerning software patent under the mobile applications platform environment. The scope of the analysis is limited to two mobile applications platforms: Apple's iOS and Google's Android. The analysis throws light on the problems of innovation in software systems like iOS and Android. The note also proposes several changes to both antitrust and patent laws that will make it more difficult for established market players to prevent new competitors from entering high tech markets, thereby promoting greater openness and innovation. The part on software patents discusses the effects of enforcement of patent rights on open and closed systems. The note observes that the US Federal Circuit's decisions (Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., io7 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) have severely curtailed both the enablement and best mode requirements for successful software patents., thereby limiting the disclosure and preventing many of the invention's useful elements from reaching the public domain. Patentability issues have affected open systems such as Android more than Apple, owing to a greater dependency on third parties to run android systems, leading to more patent infringement issues. It recommends, that, intellectual property law should promote open systems above patent protection in high tech fields, allow reverse engineering of software and introduce an 'independent invention' defence in the law for innovators.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A certain paper addresses rejection of apps in the AppStore on three grounds: rejection on content grounds (including some competition-driven restrictions), rejection on development grounds, and the regulation of transactions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Apple's and Google's foray into building a mobile development platform</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Coming from the music and personal computer industry, Apple disrupted the mobile industry by making its mobile development platform available to third party developers and eliminating the barriers between those developers and customers. The main goal of Apple in the mobile world is to increase the cross-sales of its high-margin products by providing a continuous experience roaming (iPhone, iPad, Mac, and Apple TV) using complements such as mobile applications, content, services, and accessories.<a name="_ftnref36" href="#_ftn36">[36]</a> Google, on the other hand, is an online advertising company which provides an open source mobile operating system, in the shape of Android, on which mobile handset manufacturers can develop smartphones without paying software licensing fees. By commoditizing mobile device production under its unique governance structure and building a large developer community, Google secured a means of reducing the barriers to new users accessing their advertising through smartphones. Microsoft through its Windows Phone is the most recent addition to the leading mobile platform providers. Its motivations lie in trying to protect its core business of software licensing which has been disrupted by falling PC sales linked to the emergence of mobile technology and free cloud technology services provided by companies such as Google which have impacted respectively on its licensing fees for Windows OS and Microsoft Office<a name="_ftnref37" href="#_ftn37">[37]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Luis H Hestres<a name="_ftnref38" href="#_ftn38">[38]</a> analyzes Apple’s guidelines and approval process on the App Store, discusses content-based rejections of apps, and outlines the consequences of this process for developers’ and consumers’ freedom of expression. It outlines a set of principles to ensure “app-neutrality” whilie ensuring device quality and safety. The article illustrates challenges faced by app developers working on the iOS platform. Criticisms have come forth about Apple's arbitrary and opaque review process. Apple has a rejection rate of 30% of the 26,000 apps submitted to the app store each week<a name="_ftnref39" href="#_ftn39">[39]</a>. Van Grove<a name="_ftnref40" href="#_ftn40">[40]</a> comments that the ambiguity, opaqueness, and susceptibility to outside pressures that seems to characterize Apple’s approval process do a disservice to a democratic online culture. With more than 400 million iOS devices sold worldwide since 2007<a name="_ftnref41" href="#_ftn41">[41]</a>, Apple’s devices and app store have become important online intermediaries for Internet users. The article proposes a few basic guidelines, anchored on widely accepted international laws and treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Statistics</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A Report<a name="_ftnref42" href="#_ftn42">[42]</a> presents us with some important insights into the growth of Google Play. Following are the highlights of the report: There are now well over 1 million apps available on Google Play App downloads and revenue from Google Play increased dramatically over the past year; Markets such as Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia are driving growth in app downloads from Google Play; Google Play is experiencing rapid expansion of monetization in established markets such as Japan, the United States and South Korea; Games played a major role in the acceleration of Google Play revenue growth, but almost all app categories experienced expansion and accounted for almost 90% of revenue in Q1 2014; The freemium business model advanced its domination of Google Play app revenue, and represents a growing proportion of downloads; Asian markets lead the way in generating freemium revenue. Another report8 reiterates the explosion of gaming apps.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4. How does Indian copyright law and patent law apply to the mobile applications development ecosystem, in respect of the various business models operating in the industry?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4.1. The patent regime is grounded on a laboratory model of innovation. What does the niche mobile applications development industry (working on a micro-creativity model of innovation) require differently from the patent regime to foster growth?</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4.2. Similarly, copyright law has a distinct design for digital objects. Examine the design and its suitability to regulate a mobile application.</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>A.</strong> The interviews reveal a dichotomy existing in the mobile app developer space. While some developers argued for strong IPR protections, several of app developers opposed strict IPR protection (patents, especially) and advocated use of open source software.<a name="_ftnref43" href="#_ftn43">[43]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Open source for future protection (Applicable as literature to Research question 2)</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sometimes developers license for community values primarily, however, the assumption is that dominant reason is to retain the ability to use their own work across clients. A designer from a services enterprise gave a different reason for doing so: to guarantee their ability to use their work again. “Since we use a bunch of templates and things like that, those we license using a non-exclusive license, because we reuse those elements on different bits of code in different projects,” he explains, “so there are bits of it which is used over multiple projects and there are stuff that is built exclusively for the client.”<a name="_ftnref44" href="#_ftn44">[44]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Here one can gather some insight, that perhaps developers do not necessarily license for community values primarily, but for the ability to use their own work across clients. That being said, we begin to wonder what the possibility that open source code may serve as a loophole for work-for-hire contracts, which require the developer to assign all written intellectual property to whoever is commissioning the project. If the code happened to “already be available by open source,” a developer may still be honouring any restrictive agreements with clients, and ensuring their ability to use their code in this future again.<a name="_ftnref45" href="#_ftn45">[45]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As a developer suggests, that startups should first and foremost protect themselves by making wiser choices related to code in order to prevent being litigated against by others—such as using an open source equivalent to a piece of code that one does not have the rights to, or instead putting the extra time in to develop it from scratch.<a name="_ftnref46" href="#_ftn46">[46]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Of those who expressed an interest in the open source movement, not all had said that their products were to be open licensed as well. One developer explicitly stated: “I like the idea of open source, and building upon others' work...but our app is not open source, it's proprietary.” It may be a given, then, that all or most developers within our interview sample rely on open source code within their practice, but not all may contribute their resulting product's source code back.<a name="_ftnref47" href="#_ftn47">[47]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Vivek Durai, from Humble Paper said that despite the fact that “open source has really taken route... on the smaller levels, people will come to a point when philosophies begin to change the moment you start seeing commercial.”<a name="_ftnref48" href="#_ftn48">[48]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>B.</strong> A certain paper<a name="_ftnref49" href="#_ftn49">[49]</a> examines from various angles the complex relationship between intellectual-property rights and technological innovation. Following are the conclusions:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">1) Intellectual property rights are most likely to foster innovation when the following conditions converge in a particular industry: (a) high research-and-development costs; (b) a high degree of uncertainty concerning whether specific lines of research will prove fruitful; (c) the content of technological advances can be ascertained easily by competitors through “reverse engineering”; and (d) technological advances can be mimicked by competitors rapidly and inexpensively.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">2) The likelihood that intellectual-property rights will impede more than stimulate innovation increases as more and more of the following factors obtain in a particular field: (a) trade-secret protection or lead-time advantages reduce the ability of competitors to take advantage of technological advances; (b) innovation in the field tends to be highly cumulative; (c) researchers in the field are motivated primarily by non-monetary incentives; (d) the field is characterized by strong network externalities. The last three of these circumstances were all present during the development of the technical infrastructure of the Internet; it is thus not surprising that that development proceeded rapidly and effectively with little reliance upon intellectual-property systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">3) The following techniques may be employed to mitigate the economic side-effects of intellectual-property systems: (a) compulsory licenses; (b) facilitation of price discrimination; (c) strict enforcement of the “utility” requirement; (d) encouragement of appropriate cross-licensing agreements (provided that cartel behavior can be simultaneously discouraged); (e) narrow interpretations of “similarity”; (f) strict enforcement of “enablement” and “best-mode” requirements; and (g) the affirmative defenses of patent and copyright misuse.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">4) In contexts in which reliance upon these mitigating devices is not feasible, the following alternative ways of solving the public-goods problem may be superior to intellectual-property rights as ways of stimulating innovation:government research; government funding for private research; or post-hoc government rewards for private technological advances.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>C. </strong>In a paper<a name="_ftnref50" href="#_ftn50">[50]</a>, the authors study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. They analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two‐tiered patent system. In the two‐tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, ‘gold‐plate’ patent. Introducing a second patent‐tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold‐plate tier attracts inventors with high ex‐ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>D. </strong>Copyrights related to apps are still being hashed out in the courts. Oracle, for example, sued Google<a name="_ftnref51" href="#_ftn51">[51]</a> for copyright infringement regarding the structure of Java APIs in its Android operating system<a name="_ftnref52" href="#_ftn52">[52]</a>, and the case was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">E. Policy Levers in Patent Law<a name="_ftnref53" href="#_ftn53">[53]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The paper argues that some industries should be the subject of patent tailoring – which can make them illustrative of certain policy levers. Use of obviousness and disclosure doctrines to modulate the scope and frequency of patents, as might be necessary where anti-commons to patent thicket theories are applicable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Nature of software vis-a-vis biological/chemical inventions</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Software inventions tend to have a quick, cheap, and fairly straightforward post- invention development cycle. Most of the work in software development occurs in the initial coding, not in development or production. The lead time to market in the software industry tends to be short. Because innovation is less uncertain in software than in industries like biotechnology, Merges’ economic framework suggests that the non-obviousness bar should be rather high.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Implementing a rational software policy obviously requires some significant changes to existing case law. A number of policy levers might be brought to bear on this problem. First, obviousness doctrine needs to be reformed, preferably by way of a more informed application of the level of skill in the art or alternatively by application of new secondary considerations of non-obviousness.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Poor handling of software patents by the Federal Circuit</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The paper argued that broad software patents were indeed what the existing Federal Circuit jurisprudence will likely produce. By relaxing the enablement requirement and permitting software inventions defined in broad terms, supported by very little in the way of detailed disclosure, the Federal Circuit has encouraged software patents to be drafted broadly and to be applied to allegedly infringing devices that are far removed from the original patented invention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">By implication, the Federal Circuit’s standard also seems to suggest that many narrower software patents on low- level incremental improvements will be invalid for obviousness in view of earlier, more general disclosures. They may also be invalidated under the on- sale bar, because the Supreme Court’s view that a software invention is “ready for patenting” when it is the subject of a commercial order and when the inventor has described its broad functions, even if it is not clear how the code will be written or that it will work for its intended purpose, means that any patentee who waits until the code is written to file a patent application risks being time-barred for not filing earlier. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s current standard seems to be precisely backwards. Software is an industry characterized by at least to a limited extent by competition theory and to a greater extent by cumulative innovation. Cumulative innovation theory suggests that patent protection for incremental software inventions should be relatively easy to acquire in order to reward incremental improvements, implying a somewhat lower obviousness threshold. It also suggests that the resulting patents should be narrow and, in particular, that they should not generally extend across several product generations for fear of stifling subsequent incremental improvements. This suggests that software patents should be limited in scope.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Second, a higher disclosure requirement and restrictions on the doctrine of equivalents will help reduce patent scope. Additionally, the authors think software patents are the ideal candidate for a new policy lever: reverse engineering. Many commentators have explained the importance of permitting competitors to reverse engineer a product in order to see how it works and to figure out ways to design around it. In the case of copyright, courts have adapted the doctrine of fair use, together sometimes with copyright misuse, to allow competitors to engage in reverse engineering of computer software. Patent law includes no express provision allowing reverse engineering, nor is there any judicially developed exception akin to copyright’s fair use doctrine that might permit it. Indeed, patent law generally lacks provisions akin to fair use or other exceptions that might readily be pressed into the service of reverse engineering, although commentators have suggested that patent law may need such exceptions for precisely this reason.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This does not mean that reverse engineering a patented product is necessarily illegal patent law. Some inventions, such as the paper clip, are readily apparent once embodied in a product. Improvers do not need to reverse engineer the paper clip and figure out how it works in order to improve it; they just need to look at it. Additionally, in many cases, the patentee has done all the work necessary for reverse engineering patented inventions by virtue of disclosing how to make and use the claimed invention in the patent specification. <em>In theory, an express </em> <em>provision authorizing reverse engineering would be superfluous if the enabling disclosures </em> <em>required to secure a patent were sufficiently strong – someone who wanted to learn how a </em> <em>patented device worked would only need to read the patent specification.</em> Patentable inventions in software, however, generally do not have these characteristics. Software devices typically cannot be readily understood by casual inspection, and particularly not without access to human-readable source code or other documentation. Examination of the patent itself is unlikely to yield information equivalent to a reverse engineered inspection because the Federal Circuit does not require would-be patentees of software inventions to disclose the implementing source code or, for that matter, very much at all about their inventions. Accordingly, software patents present unique obstacles to consummation of the patent law’s traditional rights-for-disclosure bargain with the public. The specific reverse engineering techniques commonly used for software, in turn, may raise some infringement problems that are unique to software. The definition of infringement in the patent statute is extremely broad, encompassing anyone who “makes, uses, offers to sell, ... sells..., or imports” a patented product. Reverse engineering a patented computer program by decompiling it likely fits within this broad category of prohibited conduct, at least where the program itself is claimed as an apparatus. Reverse engineering clearly constitutes a “use” of the patented software, though owners of a particular copy of the program surely have the right to use it. More significantly, decompilation may also constitute “making” the patented program by generating a temporary yet functional copy of it in RAM memory and, in certain instances, a longer-term (though still “intermediate”) copy in more permanent memory. Those copies probably constitute patent infringement unless protected by some defense. The result of all of this is that the nominally neutral patent law rule – no defense for reverse engineering – affects software more than other industries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The need for a reverse engineering exception in patent law militates in favor of adapting the existing doctrines of exhaustion or experimental use to that end. Patent misuse might also be adapted, as it has been in the copyright arena, to prevent patent holders from deterring or prohibiting reverse engineering related to their inventions. The exception might even be created out of whole cloth by reinterpreting the infringement provisions of section 271(a). The resulting patent doctrine would constitute a macro policy lever. As Cohen and Lemley observe, in most industries there is either no need to reverse engineer an invention or reverse engineering can be done without infringing the patent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The paper concludes by stating,<em> “Only in software is there a need for a particular doctrine to protect the right to reverse engineer —and therefore the ability of improvers to innovate. Thus, a judicially created reverse engineering defense would make sense across the board in software cases but not in other patent cases.”</em></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn1" href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a>Samantha Cassar, "<a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/app-developers-series-services-products-dichotomy-ip-2013-part-i">App Developers Series: Products-Services Dichotomy & IP (Part I)</a>”, last accessed July 21, 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn2" href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a>IAMAI, “An inquiry into the impact of India's App economy”, 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn3" href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a>DoT has set up a 1000 crore app development centre called Application Development Infrastructure and 700 crores under the National E-Governance Plan have been allocated for mobile technology ventures</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn4" href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a>Supra note 1</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn5" href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a>Supra note 2</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn6" href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a>Hippel, Eric von, and Georg von Krogh. "Open source software and the “private-collective” innovation model: Issues for organization science." Organization science 14.2 (2003): 209-223.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn7" href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a>Supra note 1</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn8" href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn9" href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Samantha Cassar, “<a name="parent-fieldname-title"></a><a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/mobile-app-developer-series-terms-of-agreement-iv">Mobile App Developer Series: Terms of Agreement – Part IV</a>”, last accessed July 21</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn10" href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn11" href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn12" href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn13" href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn14" href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a>Gartner Data</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn15" href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a>Supra note 1</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn16" href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn17" href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a>Samantha Cassar, “<a name="parent-fieldname-title1"></a><a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii">Interviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II</a>”, last accesed July 21, 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn18" href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn19" href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn20" href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn21" href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn22" href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn23" href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn24" href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a>Samantha Cassar, “<a name="parent-fieldname-title2"></a><a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-name-of-the-game-part-iv">Interviews with App Developers: Name of the Game (Part IV)</a>”, last accessed July 21, 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn25" href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn26" href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a>"Strategy as Ecology," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, March 2004.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn27" href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Evans, D. S., A. Hagiu and R. Schmalensee, 2006, Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn28" href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a>Kouris, Iana and Kleer, Rob, "BUSINESS MODELS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIES FOR APP PLATFORMS" (2012). <em>2012 International Conference on Mobile Business.</em> Paper 22.<br /> http://aisel.aisnet.org/icmb2012/22</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn29" href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a>Fransman, M. (2014) Models of Innovation in Global ICT Firms: The Emerging Global Innovation Ecosystems. JRC Scientific and Policy Reports –EUR 26774 EN. Seville: JRC-IPTS</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn30" href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Deniz and Kehoe, Factors that attract and retain third party developers in mobile ecosystems, June 2013</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn31" href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a>Nadea Saad Noori (2009) Managing External Innovation: The case of platform extension, available at <a href="http://www3.carleton.ca/tim/theses/2009/Noori2009.pdf">http://www3.carleton.ca/tim/theses/2009/Noori2009.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn32" href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a>Tsai, Phal & Robert, Industry Platform Construction and Development in a changing environment: Evidence from the ICT Industry, available at <a href="http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/acc_papers/6s5aqckmne7ggybu0vfxryrynuog.pdf">http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/acc_papers/6s5aqckmne7ggybu0vfxryrynuog.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn33" href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Supra note 9</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn34" href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> Ibid.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn35" href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a>John Baskin, Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software Systems: Promoting Innovation Through Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws (2013)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn36" href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> Constantinou, 2012b</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn37" href="#_ftnref37">[37]</a>Ibid.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn38" href="#_ftnref38">[38]</a>Luis H Hestres (2013) App Neutrality: Apple’s App Store and Freedom of Expression Online , American University , International Journal of Communication 7 (2013), 1265–1280</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn39" href="#_ftnref39">[39]</a>Supra note 9</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn40" href="#_ftnref40">[40]</a>Ibid.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn41" href="#_ftnref41">[41]</a> Supra note 9</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn42" href="#_ftnref42">[42]</a>App Annie Data</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn43" href="#_ftnref43">[43]</a>Supra note 1</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn44" href="#_ftnref44">[44]</a>Samantha Cassar, “<a name="parent-fieldname-title3"></a><a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-open-source-community-and-contradictions-iii">Interviews with App Developers: Open Source, Community, and Contradictions – Part III”</a>, last accessed July 21</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn45" href="#_ftnref45">[45]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn46" href="#_ftnref46">[46]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn47" href="#_ftnref47">[47]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn48" href="#_ftnref48">[48]</a>Ibid</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn49" href="#_ftnref49">[49]</a> William Fisher, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: THEORETICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn50" href="#_ftnref50">[50]</a><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490195">Patent Quality and a Two‐Tiered Patent System</a> (Vidya Atal and Talia Brar, 2014)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn51" href="#_ftnref51">[51]</a><a href="http://copyrightalliance.org/2014/05/federal_circuit_releases_decision_oracle_v_google">http://copyrightalliance.org/2014/05/federal_circuit_releases_decision_oracle_v_google</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn52" href="#_ftnref52">[52]</a>http://copyrightalliance.org/2014/05/federal_circuit_releases_decision_oracle_v_google#.VYf0i9Z5MxB</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="_ftn53" href="#_ftnref53">[53]</a><a href="http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4qr081sg">http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4qr081sg</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-literature-review-on-ipr-in-mobile-app-development'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-literature-review-on-ipr-in-mobile-app-development</a>
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No publishersinhaHomepageAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-08-31T13:48:02ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies Project Working Document Series: Document 2 Literature Review on Competition Law + IPR + Access to < $100 Mobile Devices
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-document-2-literature-review-on-competition-law-ipr-access-to-100-mobile-devices-1
<b>This note is the second document in the series of Working Documents that I will be creating for my research under the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace (“PT Project”).</b>
<p>View the first document <a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law">here.</a> Note: The research was for this blog post was done by <span>Amulya Purushothama which wasn't acknowledged earlier. <br /></span></p>
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<h2>Preliminary</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This note will serve as the literature review for my research paper under this project. This note- to be revised periodically- maps the existing literature around questions of competition law intersecting with intellectual property law on the specific issue of enabling access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices; which might be impaired as a result of intellectual property protections, particularly standard essential patents.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">This note will explore the literature around the relationship between intellectual property and competition law; with a specific focus on the antitrust/competition concerns that arise around the licensing of standard essential patents. This note will study the approach adopted in other jurisdictions in the employment of existing mechanisms in competition law as possible solutions to issues with the licensing of standard essential patents.</p>
<h3><b>Literature Review</b></h3>
<p><b>Smartphones and Access to knowledge.</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Avendus Capital report<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> on mobile data usage in India provides important information about mobile internet users in India. Particularly the striking fact that more than half of the internet users in India use it on their low cost mobile phone and that access to these phones therefore becomes a step toward access to the internet. John Harmen Valk and others <a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> have through their report demonstrated how mobile phones with internet access have been used to further educational outcomes in India and Asia and underscores the idea that access to such technology is important.</p>
<h3><b>Competition Law and Intellectual Property</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Academic writing around the nexus between intellectual property law and competition law presents varied perspectives; particularly on the question of whether they each acted as incentives for innovation, or whether competition law hindered innovation that intellectual property (seemingly) promoted. This narrative does not question a more fundamental concept; of whether intellectual property protections necessarily incentivized innovation; but takes that as the underlying assumption that they do.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Gitanjali Shankar and Nitika Gupta have noted that antitrust law and intellectual property have in the past seen to diverse and work against each other with different approaches to monopoly and that the two have also been viewed as related to each other in so far as intellectual property has been viewed as one of the tools to regulate competition in the market place. they propose that if the latter approach is taken and the two branches of law are seen to converge, two guidelines must be followed in to balance the various interests and ensure clarity, first that IP laws must only be extended by legislation and not through judicial interpretation, the second that when two interpretations are available during the enforcement of any intellectual property, that interpretation must be chosen which is in line with encourages the free market and promotes fair competition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">They have argued that both antitrust law and intellectual property have separate operational areas and their functions must be kept independent of each other. They argue that the domain of intellectual property concerns the assignment and defense of intellectual property rights and the domain of antitrust deals with the use and exercise of such rights within the market. They argue that competition law does not call into question that basis of IPRs that it doesn't question the exclusivity of legal rights, merely their abuse which results in unfair trade practices. They argue that the distance between economic and legal monopolies should be maintained and these fall within the domains of antitrust law and intellectual property respectively. They further argue that antitrust law exists to ensure that the IPR owner does not abuse his rights and thus bolsters intellectual property rights. <a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Robert Pitofsky while reviewing a work of Prof. Mark Lemley explains that while anti-trust laws and intellectual property laws have the same long term goals of incentivizing innovation and investment in innovation, they are bound to conflict with each other in the short term as anti-trust law seeks to achieve this goal via limiting the possibilities of a monopoly and further ensuring that monopolies do not abuse the power they enjoy in the market place. Antitrust policies assume that the free market will fairly allocate resources and thereby encourage innovation efficiently. Pitofsky goes on to state that intellectual property on the other hand believes in rewarding innovation and thereby incentivizing investing in innovation, intellectual property is basically a grant of limited monopolies to ensure that costs of innovation are recovered and product quality is maintained. He argues that it is critical to ensure that patents are granted after thorough analysis to ensure a balance between anti-trust policies and intellectual property rights and to ensure that the larger goals of incentivizing innovation are achieved.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Katrina Perehudoff and Sophie Bloemen have argued that anti-competitive strategies such as defensive patenting (the creation of weak and frivolous patents around their main patent) and vexatious litigation (the use of litigation as a threat to smaller and medium enterprises who cannot afford costs of litigation) have ensured that the bestselling originators medicine dominates the market for artificially long periods of time ensuring that the company therefore profits at the expense of public interest and obstructs widespread access, it is argued that such practices go against the aims of the patent system which were to ensure that the innovator could recoup costs of invention and in fact hamper incentives to invent. <a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> It is submitted that while in this instance the discussion of defensive patenting as well as holding out is in the context of healthcare, similar trends have been witnessed in the space of technological patents as well. With standard essential patents for instance, there exists a very real danger of frivolous litigation and hold-outs ensuring market dominance by larger players, forcing out smaller and medium sized enterprises.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While acknowledging that intellectual property law and competition law might both seek to achieve a common goal of incentivizing innovation, Daniel Ravicher and Shani Dilloff have argued that the scrutiny of intellectual property exploitation from an antitrust perspective lacks economic and political merit. They argue that governments and courts have time and again preferred to enforce antitrust policy at the expense of enforcing intellectual property rights as evidenced by the cases of International Salt Co. v. United States<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a>, United States v. Lowe's Inc. <a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a>, and Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> among others. They argue that the law depends on the flawed assumption that intellectual property confers upon the rights holder some kind of market power through creation of monopolies as evidenced by Jefforson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> and the U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines on licensing of intellectual property<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> and is therefore in the wrong.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">They argue that no such power is conferred on the rights holder because intellectual property rights do not confer monopolies so much as they ensure that a certain standard of uniqueness is assured, and that this standard of uniqueness falls short of the uniqueness required to obtain monopoly power within a market. They argue that IPRs do not grant the ability to raise prices above the competitive level and do not grant the right to exclude a rival or to exclude new entrants in the field, they only grant a right to prohibit others from exploiting their creation in an unfair manner and provide for sufficient limitations and exceptions to ensure that fair exploitation of their works is still allowed. And therefore while sound economic theory that ensures free marketplace through government regulation underlies most of antitrust policy, scrutiny of intellectual property through an antitrust point of view is economically flawed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a departure from other perspectives, the authors in this paper also argue that the factors affecting the employment of antitrust policies are not entirely legal; and that this preference is often a reflection of non-meritorious factors such as arguable predictions for the future, difference in financial stability of the competing parties, the political persuasion of the decision maker or the posturing of the parties and the courts being simply hostile to intellectual property rights and is unfair to intellectual property owners. They further argue that this preference is politically indefensible as it undermines the intent of the legislature. They argue that because of these things the case law so far that deals with this conflict is unreliable, unpredictable and not credible. They lastly argue that the solution out this conflict is to ensure economic efficiency by exempting intellectual property rights from scrutiny based on antitrust policies.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Robert Anderson argues that IPRs do not inherently confer market power on rights holders and that in many cases restrictions on licensing could encourage competitive behavior and economic efficiency while not losing sight of the fact that IPRs can result in anti-competitive behavior in certain circumstances, particularly in context of network industries and that competition law must respond to these issues. This paper also makes a reference to the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), and the provision that it makes that allow member countries to curb anticompetitive practices through Article 8.2 and Article 40 and thus catering to the interests of developing nations. The paper also notes that the TRIPS Agreement does not set out a specific list of practices that should be treated as abuses. Further, this paper goes on to analyse intellectual property regimes in the US, Canada, Japan and the EU and concludes that the US has maintained a liberal environment for granting of intellectual property rights while being cautious of abuse of IPRs for anticompetitive purposes, that Canada on the other hand has been suspicious of legislative efforts to curb the proper use of IPRs that the EU has adopted a far stricter approach to the issue to achieve market integration, and that Japan has chosen a somewhat middle path by providing for a case by case evaluation of practices. It is argued that certain restraints on international trade such as the restriction on parallel importation due to IPRs segment markets and is harmful to trade and collective innovation and some mechanism for exhausting of these rights must be considered. <a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> This cross jurisdictional analysis is particularly useful, and will be examined in detail in my research paper.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Elieen Mc Dermott, in a discussion on FTC public hearings in December 2008 to discuss the overlap between intellectual property laws and antitrust and competition laws, identifies that Innovation Alliance, an organization that represents technology patent owning companies put forward three principles to govern antitrust policies, the first to define antitrust policy to promote consumer welfare and to limit its role to conduct that has "a demonstrable anticompetitive effect", second to bring on board the diverse range of interests and business models involved and third to ensure that principles behind patent law have evolved before allowing antitrust enforcement agency involvement in patent cases.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> This submission by Innovation Alliance will now be studied in greater detail while attempting a submission on India's stance on competition law issues in the licensing of standard essential patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that for most of history, antitrust law and intellectual property law have undermined their own purpose of encouraging innovation by protecting too much, whether it is the shielding of inefficient business from competition or the shielding of IPRs beyond what is necessary to incentivize innovation, in both cases the consumer is harmed and the costs of innovation increases. He argues that while it is good that we have lately come to view patents as a kind of property as opposed to a kind of monopoly, since there is no real proof that patents lead to market power, we haven't extended to patents the same kind of conditions we extend to other kinds of property, like the obligation to define the boundaries of ownership another being the obligation to ensure that notice of the claim to property is rendered in time, neither of these obligations, he says, are imposed upon patent holders. He states that this leads to over protection and wastage of state resources.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He goes on to offer a few principles for antitrust in innovation intensive markets that involve exercise of patent rights; the first being that the purpose of antitrust must not be to fix defects in other regimes, but only to correct private markets, second that any antitrust or intellectual property intervention is justified only when congress or a tribunal has a reason for thinking that such an intervention is necessary to ensure more competition or more innovation, third is that many IP practices do not conflict with antitrust laws and antitrust policies shouldn't intervene in such cases, fourth that innovation provides society with more gains than simple production and trading under constant technology and therefore, when we have to choose between innovation and competition, we must choose innovation, fifth that innovation is more than what is simply defined under intellectual property law and at times, when practices seem clearly anti-competitive and IP statutes do not provide us with answers, we should consider antitrust policies as guidelines, sixth that IP protections can at times protect competition more efficiently than antitrust legislation, seventh that IP law must constantly examine its roots as antitrust legislation has and ensure that any expansion of IPR is well thought out.<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">John Barton examines antitrust treatment of oligopolies that use IPRs defensively to block new entrants into the market. These oligopolists each have substantial patent portfolios that are infringed by its competitors but never a matter of litigation as there is the fear of counter litigation. Therefore there is an implied licensing of patent portfolios among the oligopolists. It is further argued that under systems like this, while there is an incentive for firms to acquire more patents to build defensive portfolios, there is no incentive to actually carry out new research therefore firms will obtain patents on existing research base and therefore this stunts innovation. Further oligopolists holding cross-infringing patents may put up entry barriers for new entrants and thereby dis-incentivize innovation. Due to all of these reasons, the paper argues for patent law reform and appropriate application of antitrust analysis to ensure that the IP system encourages innovation.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a></p>
<h3><b>Essential Facilities Doctrine</b></h3>
<p>This section of the note looks at the literature surrounding the Essential Facilities Doctrine- an aspect of antitrust law that is employed in order to adjudge behavior as anticompetitive or the lack thereof.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Essential facilities doctrine is an aspect of antitrust law that imposes a duty upon firms that have patents/ copyrights or trade secrets with regard to an essential facility to ensure that they do not put in place a monopoly and make the facility available to their rivals. In the context of IPRs, an essential facilities doctrine functions in a way that is equivalent to compulsory licensing regimes. Different jurisdictions adopt different standards and approaches to the employment of this doctrine. By tracking the literature around this doctrine, these different approaches across jurisdictions will be studied, including landmark cases, and submissions made in the research paper on whether this doctrine may be employed in India - specifically to adjudge whether there was a case to be made out for anti -competitive behavior in the smartphone wars on standard essential patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">MCI Communications Corporation v. AT&T<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> is the landmark case with regard to the essential facilities doctrine, in this case MCI argued that AT&T's switching equipment was an essential facility and access to such an essential facility was necessary to conduct telemarketing business. The court in this case laid down the necessary elements to establish a claim to essential facilities:</p>
<p>a) Control of an essential facility by a monopolist</p>
<p>b) Competitors inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility</p>
<p>c) The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor and</p>
<p>d) The feasibility of providing the facility.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro have argued that a unilateral refusal to deal (which is often one of the conditions that needs to be met before the essential facilities doctrine is employed) can be justified in the context of profit-maximizing firms in certain cases such as: cases where the owner of the facility wants to ensure a certain level of service quality with his facility, cases where the owner wants to prevent free riding, prevent new entrants into the market, cases where the owner wants to promote price discrimination in the sale of the final product, and cases where the owner is not adequately compensated for licensing out his essential facility. These justifications it is argued increase economic efficiency in the market, ensure quality of services rendered, increase incentives for investment and innovation etc. It is further argued that in the long run, it is more economically efficient for companies to refuse to deal rather than to set higher prices, simply because in a system where one cannot refuse to deal, the incentive for firms to misrepresent their actual costs to obtain licenses etc., and further that an obligation to license can have negative effects on economic welfare, it can reduce welfare in the short run by forcing inefficient licensing, it can also reduce welfare in the long run by reducing incentives for innovation and investment and creation of intellectual property.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks on the other hand have argued in support of the essential facilities doctrine and supported the use of this doctrine in cases concerning intellectual property rights, the authors here argued that the harshness of the anticompetitive effects of denial of access take precedence over business justifications, especially when specific animus to injure a rival has been proven. The authors argued that while it was important to ensure that the doctrine was not expanded to include a vague and amorphous set of rights, it was important to ensure that the monopolists arguments against the doctrine should not succeed regardless of the nature of the essential facility, whether it is intellectual property or even if the case did not involve vertically related markets.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Paul Maquardt and Mark Leddy in their response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks argued that it is not anticompetitive behavior if the normal enforcement of an intellectual property right results in market power is getting skewed in favor of the rights holder, and the intellectual property rights should not be limited by compulsory licensing. They have argued that the essential facilities doctrine should only apply in cases where the rights holder attempts to leverage his exclusionary rights from the market in which the innovation competes into a related market or in cases of abuse of those rights because in cases where the rival is competing directly with the facility incorporating the intellectual property protection, the rights holder would not be damaging incentives to innovate as he would in cases of abuse or in cases of leveraging the protection to attain profits in a related field. They argue that to force compulsory licensing in other cases where the rival is in direct competition to the right holder would harm incentives to innovate and create intellectual property, a goal that both intellectual property rights and anti-trust laws are supposed to achieve. <a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Martin Cave and Peter Crowther have argued that the European Commission seems to have embraced the essential facilities doctrine quite well despite not properly codifying the criteria used to determine whether a facility is essential and access to this facility should be mandatory. They have found that in the U.S., a) the courts have decided the question of whether or not a facility is "essential" on the basis of whether new entrants to the field would be able to duplicate the facility as evidenced by the cases of MCI Communications Corporation v. AT&T<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> and Hecht v. Pro Football Inc It is as yet undecided at what point a refusal to deal in a facility will render the rival without an alternative option. In Camco Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a>it was decided that a facility was essential insofar as alternatives were inferior. There is no requirement of a duplication of the facility to be impossible as evidenced from Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a> . They have also found that as per Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. <a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a>, there is no general duty to deal on the monopolists. They have also found that liability under the essential facilities doctrine can be found in the presence of the following conditions: a) control of an essential facility by a monopolist, b) a competitor's inability to duplicate the facility, c) the denial of the use of the facility to the rival, and d) the feasibility of providing the facility</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under analysis of the law in Australia, they found that section 46 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 proscribes taking advantage of a substantial degree of market power for the purpose of a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, b) preventing the entry of a person into a market or c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in a market. They found two important cases in Australian law, Queensland Wire, the first Australian case to consider adopting the US essential facilities doctrine which ruled that the monopolistic firm couldn't refuse to sell facilities to the smaller firm if had been subject to competition in the supply of that product while not actually mentioning the essential facilities doctrine, the second case of importance would be Pont Data litigation where Pont Data wanted to supply stock exchange information which the Australian Stock Exchange had a monopoly on, the court on appeal held that ASX should be ordered to supply information but "on terms designed to obtain a broad and substantial justice between parties"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">They have further argued that there is even less certainty in respect of the price at which access to an essential facility should be made available. This is evidenced by their study of the laws in New Zealand. They found that in New Zealand the landmark judgment to study would be the Privy Council judgment in Clear Telecommunications Ltd v. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. This case arose out of a dispute between the state owned telecom which monopolized the public telecommunication system and Clear a new entrant into the market after Telecomwas privatized. The dispute mainly concerned about the price which Clear should pay Telecom for providing access to the Telecom network, while Clear argued that it should only be required to pay Telecom for the direct costs of providing access, Telecom held that Clear should pay the equivalent of profits which telecom would lose by granting access- the opportunity costs. The Privy Council agreed with Telecom in that insofar as Clear had not proved that it would be forced to pay monopoly prices because it was paying opportunity costs, it had not been proved that there were any entry barriers to the market.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In their analysis of the European Union, these authors found that Article 86 prohibits the abuse of the dominant position within a common market by under takings that consist in particular of a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions, b) limiting production markets… to the prejudice of consumers, c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions. The European Court of Justice has already decided that dominance can be assessed by a reference to the dependence of the consumer on the supplier inCommercial Solvents v. Commission. <a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> And in Hugin v. Commission<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a> The court first mentioned essential facilities in the United Brands case<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a> where the ECJ held that the charging of discriminatory prices against and the refusal to supply a longstanding customer and distributor who had taken part in a sales campaign on behalf of a competitor had infringe article 86. Therefore if a firm acts in such a way that it could possibly affect rivals by precluding access to an essential facility, it would be an abuse of intellectual property.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Albertina Albors-Llorens has reported on the recent judgment of the ECJ in Oscar Bronner CmbH and Co. KG v.Mediaprint Zeitungs -und Zeitschriftenverlag CmbH & Co. KG and others<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a>, the ECJ in this case has defined "essential facilities" as a "facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers"<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a> under the doctrine, any dominant undertaking that owns or controls an essential facility and refuses without an objective justification <a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a> to make the facility available to its competitors or makes it available under discriminatory terms abuses its position of dominance. The court here distinguished the case from earlier case law including the case of Commercial Solvents and from the Magill case<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a> where the court held that copyright holders who published guides of television programmes for their channels refused to license an independent company which wanted to publish a comprehensive television program guide had based their position of dominance and prevented a the emergence of a new beneficial product to the consumer and therefore it was not objectively justified and that it was otherwise impossible for Magill to obtain the information that was essential to carry on its business. She reports that the court in Bronner held that this case was distinguished from the precedent as there were less advantageous methods of distribution available and it wasn't impossible forBronner to set up their own home delivery system.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Gregory Gundlach and Paul Bloom have analyzed the history of the essential facilities doctrine and cases refusals to deal , they have noted the refusal by Microsoft to deal with firms seeking to provide compatible software products and share its knowledge of its key operating systems for IBM compatible computers and its investigation by the Federal Trace Comission (FTC). They trace back the essential facilities doctrine from the case of United States v. Grinnel Corporation<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34">[34]</a> which held that monopolization necessarily had to include the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and the acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen or historic accident. Preventing a rival from accessing an essential facility was held to be evidence suggestive of intent to monopolize and a challenge to the Sherman Act. They argue that this doctrine presents a challenge to marketers as they now have to ensure that they don't compete themselves into antitrust challenges, ensure that rivals don't attempt to free ride on their research and investment, they argue that while forcing firms to enable their rivals to access their essential facilities is at odds with the idea of competitive behavior, prudent application of this doctrine may ensure that welfare is substantially enhance and innovation is encouraged. They propose that the duty to deal be imposed only when commercial viability of the rival is at stake as a measure of protecting the rights of the firms. They also propose that new modes of competition such as strategic alliances, long term partnership be kept in mind before when forming future policy development in the area. <a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35">[35]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch have compared the law in the US with the law in the European Union and several other countries, and argue that there is a growing international consensus that it is sometimes appropriate to require a regime of nondiscriminatory access to infrastructure and related facilities. They have pointed out that common law countries and civil law countries have responded to the issue in different ways, for example, Germany has dealt with the issue by passing the German Act Against Restraints that contains provisions regarding abuse of dominant position in refusal to allow other undertakings access to essential facilities without proper justification. South Africa, they note has adopted a two pronged approach to unilateral refusal to deals, one through the South African Competition act that prohibits refusals to deal and another through the same legislation that prohibits refusal to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is economically feasible. They argue that since the essential facilities doctrine has become an accepted law in most competition jurisdictions, the US must work to harmonize their laws with the rest of the world to ensure better trade practices. <a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36">[36]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Daniel E Troy has argued that post the Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. case, jurisprudence in competition law shifted from intent to the actions of the monopolists. He argues that there are no clear rules regarding when the essential facilities doctrine should be invoked or a consensus as to what the doctrine requires once invoked. He proposes that the resulting confusion be resolved by ensuring that the essential facilities doctrine cover all arbitrary refusals to deal when such a refusal threatens the commercial viability of the rival party, or when access to the facility is necessary for entry into the market or when duplication of the facility exceeds the standard cost of entry.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37">[37]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Howard Shelanski has argued that unilateral refusal to deal must be susceptible to antitrust scrutiny, he argues that neither economics not IP policy considerations provide a sound basis for exempting refusals to supply IP from antitrust laws on unilateral refusals to deal. He argues that while there may be a case for treating IPRs different on some occasion that should be based on logical links between IP and the considerations that weigh against antitrust mandates to deal in any property: deterrence of innovation, investment or precompetitive conduct.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38">[38]</a></p>
<h3><b>Royalty Stacking in Smartphone Industry</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ann Armstrong, Joseph J Mueller and Timothy D Syrett<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39">[39]</a> have collected and analysed data on the royalty burdens to be faced by a standard smartphone supplier and the adverse effects royalty stacking might have on competition in the smart phone industry. It is an article rich in detail and carefully explains the costs of each of the components that make up a smartphone, in doing so they also trace the mobile phone Standard Essential Patents (SEP) litigation occurring in United States of America (USA). They conclude that royalties demands on a smartphone could exceed the cost of the devices components, and that due to royalty stacking, costs of patent royalties act as an entry barrier for many suppliers thereby limiting competition in the market. They have argued that in calculating the royalty for a component, licensees, advocates and courts should base their conclusions on the price of the component and not on percentage of sales price of the entire smartphone which is the current practice. They have argued that this valuation is even more important for standardized technologies because patent holders usually only have a small slice of the declared patents for a particular standard and where that standard is just one of the many supported by the device. They present data to prove that when royalties are so vigorously calculated, they turn out to be a fraction of what patent-holders claim. This article was used mostly for background information on how royalty stacks work and how FRAND prices must ideally be calculated, and as a source of information on litigation surrounding royalty stacking in USA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Damien Geradin in his articles<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40">[40]</a> on pricing abuses by SEP holders in SSOs in EU and USA documents the evolution of competition law in these courts and the work of the Federal Trade Commission in this regard. He examines the role of the FTC in quite some detail, and this article provided important background information on the question of the potential role of the CCI.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41">[41]</a> have argued that in creating a right enabling environment for the ICT, one of the goals of regulation is to create a stable, open and future-proof environment that encourages access and doesn't limit it.</p>
<h3><b>Tracing Mobile Phone SEP Litifation:Treatment by European Commission and Federal Trade Commission</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42">[42]</a> have inquired into the question of whether SSOs provide for an environment of exploitation and abuse due to royalty stacking, weak enforcement of FRAND terms, and hold-ups. They have identified three criteria for the establishment/adoption of an industry standard - first, that it is a set of technical specifications; second, that these technical specifications provide a common design; and third, that the common design provided may be for a product or a process. These criteria have been used in the paper.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Michael A Carrier in his article<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43">[43]</a> focuses on the smartphone industry and the ongoing patent and FRAND licensing litigation wars. He traces court rulings on holdups and injunctions granted on SEPs and discusses EC investigations into Motorola and Samsung in detail. This article was useful in that it provided for a good resource on recent judgments surrounding FRAND Licensing and SEP litigations focusing on the smartphone industry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44">[44]</a> in their article demonstrate that even a threat to obtain a permanent injunction enhances the patent holders negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. They argue that such overcharging occurs more noticeably in the case of weak patents covering a minor feature of the product with a sizeable price/cost margin. They present data to show that these holdup problems are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions. , that they are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking, and that royalty stacking can become a huge problem especially in a standard setting context. This article was useful in understanding the holdup issues with regard to SEPs and the effect of royalty stacking.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Lemley and Shapiro in another article<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45">[45]</a> have argued that one method of efficiently settling FRAND disputes would be to impose an obligation on the SEP owner to entire into a binding final offer decided in arbitration with any willing licensee to determine the royalty rate. This article provided important insights into the holdup problem and possible solutions that could be considered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Phillipe Baechtold in his presentation<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46">[46]</a> makes the argument that the central problem with the approach to solving the issue of ensuring Standard Setting organisations achieve interoperability and allow for licensing on FRAND terms is that a problem with patent laws is being solved in a manner that focuses other legal systems such as competition law, health law etc. He argues that there is a need to address these issues within the patent system itself. This article has been used to understand different solutions to the issue that have been proposed so far.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Richard Schmalensee<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47">[47]</a> in his article argues that competition policy should not favour patent holders who would use their patents to stop innovation and that SSOs should determine standards based on lower post-standard royalty rates. The claim of interest in his article is that in the absence of a deceptive act, it would be difficult to prove in a case that a differing standard could have been adopted had there been a full disclosure of patent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Gertjan Kuipers<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48">[48]</a> has provided a useful resource on the Apple v Samsung cases in Netherlands and this has been useful to understand non<ins cite="mailto:AMULYA" datetime="2015-06-25T13:39">-</ins>disclosure of patents as an anti-competitive practice within SSOs. Leon Greenfields article that surveys non-US decisions on SEP disputes also makes for a useful resource in the same regard. <a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49">[49]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In their article, Damien Neven and Miguel de la Mano<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50">[50]</a> discuss the activities of the Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission during the course of one year and discuss cases and policy developments during that time. It served as a useful resource on cases relating to violation of FRAND Commitments and in understanding the functioning of SSOs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bjorn Lundgvist<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51">[51]</a> has analysed EU and US antitrust/competition law, and argued that Orange Book Standard case where it was held that abuse of dominant position is a valid claim if a patentee refuses to conclude a license agreement on non discriminatory and non-restrictive terms, is problematic as the potential licensee only has the option of paying the customary royalty rate or accepting the rate that the patentee offers by applying "reasonable excercised discretion" and that this doesn't give much leeway for licensees to question the validity of the rate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">James Abell<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52">[52]</a> documents cases in the US federal courts regarding standards development organisations, antitrust law and fraud his analysis of the Broadcom Corp v. Qualcomm Inc., was particularly well done and proved to be useful in tracing SEP litigation in the US. Koren W Wong Ervin <a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53">[53]</a> in her important article traces SEP litigation across the world in various countries. This makes for an important resource on the subject as it serves as a primer on SEP litigation in many jurisdictions including China, Japan, India, EU and the US among others.</p>
<h3><b>Mobile Phone SEP Litigation in India</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ravikant Bharadwaj in his article<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54">[54]</a> provides a broad overview of standard setting in India and the competition and IPR issues associated with it. He makes the important argument that once an industry standard has been set, and since the goal is to ensure inter-operability, denial of access to these standards on FRAND terms could become barriers to trade.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Anubha Sinha<a href="#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55">[55]</a> in her report on Spicy IP traces the Ericsson- Micromax dispute at the Competition Commission of India (CCI), this has been used as a background document to trace the timeline in the dispute while tracing mobile phone SEP litigation in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prashanth Reddy in his article <a href="#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56">[56]</a> argues against interim injunctions stating that these injunctions should be used as an exception and not as a matter of a rule. He argues that in many cases courts either don't provide reasoning or provide insufficient reasoning behind orders granting injunctions. He argues that protection of IPRs cannot be a convincing reason on its own in this context particularly because patent infringement cases are complicated and can only be decided after a full trial and appreciation of evidence. In this context, he argues that issuing interim injunctions as a matter of course is a harmful practice that must be done away with.Vaibav Choukse makes a very similar argument in his article as well.<a href="#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57">[57]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">John E Matheson in his article<a href="#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58">[58]</a> seeks to understand how standards must be developed and what best practices can be followed by India in forming its IPR policy. He specifically argues that the litigation costs that invariably occur during hold ups and reverse hold ups ensure that smaller companies and newer start-ups ultimately give in to patentees who enjoy more market power and can bear the litigation costs for as long as it takes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Pankaj Soni and Satyoki Koundinya in their article<a href="#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59">[59]</a> outline the questions at the heart of the mobile phone FRAND disputes and focus on the disputes in India including Ericsson-Micromax, Intex, Vringo and Asus and ZTE disputes providing a fairly comprehensive timelines of the same. They argue that the threat of injunctions often bring licensees to the discussion table which otherwise would not have happened and that disallowing this would disincentivise patentees from disclosing their patents. This article makes important arguments in terms of what would incentivize pro-competitive behavior and how policy surrounding holdups could influence anti-competitive behavior.</p>
<p><b> </b></p>
<h3><b>Abuse of Dominance and Competition Law and Policy in India</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Competition Commission of India Guide to Abuse of Dominance<a href="#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60">[60]</a> lays out in clear simple terms what constitutes abuse of dominance under competition law in India, while it does not refer to case law on the matter, it does make for a great source for interpreting and understanding Indian competition law and was used for the same purposes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Samir Gandhi<a href="#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61">[61]</a> in his article analyses trends in enforcement of competition law in India. He provides data to prove that the CCIs decisions seem to want to establish a greater familiarity with complex tools of assessments like including economic measures etc. He argues that the CCI is eager to make up for lost time and therefore doesn't shy away from issuing judgments quickly and imposing severe penalties. This is useful in understanding whether or not the CCI is the appropriate and competent authority to deal with cases that are likely to come up involving the smartphone industry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Pratibha Jain and others<a href="#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62">[62]</a> conduct a fascinating study of how competition law is enforced in the country, in a fairly comprehensive report with individual case studies. They demonstrate quite clearly that the CCI refrains from laying down broad principles and restricts its rulings to the facts of a particular case. It also provides important data on how many cases are dismissed and in how many cases the CCI has found anti-competitive behavior. This data helps understand how effective or otherwise the CCI has been.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Archana Shanker and Shraddha Singh<a href="#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63">[63]</a> in their article have argued that competition law and IP must both be used in a harmonious manner. In doing so they have analyzed relevant legislation and important cases such as Micromax and Intex, They have analysed how capable the CCI or courts in India are when it comes to determining FRAND terms in the context of SSOs and SEPs. They argue that the CCI has shown a lack of understanding of the IP aspects in these cases and have focused on competition law to their exclusion. While this is a well written and informative article on mobile phone SEP litigation in India, it is important to point out that the article does not deal with how courts in India have failed to appreciate concerns regarding hold-ups while issuing stays or ex-parte orders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Kanika Chaudhary<a href="#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64">[64]</a> has written about jurisdictional issues that the CCI might face due to the wording of the Competition Act that states that the act is applicable to anti-competitive behavior notwithstanding other laws and yet another section stating that competition law must be harmonized with existing laws. She argues that there is a need to restructure competition law in this regard to avoid conflicts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CUTS International report on the CCI<a href="#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65">[65]</a> provides for an important resource on comments about the CCI and its judgments and media reactions to the CCI. The report submits that while the CCI is generally seen to be doing well in the media, several academics have argued that the CCI is riddled by legal lacunae, that it lacks teeth and that because most of its orders have been appealed in courts, and it lacks autonomy due to rules of procedure, it is not an effective or efficient forum and needs to be improved by further legislation. The same has been corroborated by a report in the Indian Express that speaks of new bills that were in the offing in 2012 that were aimed at giving the CCI more teeth. <a href="#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66">[66]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Peter Alexiadis<a href="#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67">[67]</a> in his outlines general principles of ex post and ex ante intervention and how the two disciplines come into tension with each other when competition law is involved in a dispute along with any other legal regime such as IPR laws. He explores ways in which these two disciplines must be balanced. This article was used to understand how the ex-post decisions involving competition law inevitably are backward looking and adopt a narrow view of the product, looking largely at its demand side-substitutability. This helps explore the argument that a sector specific regulatory body could better address complex technical and economic questions specific to the industry, as opposed to litigation merely being played out in the courts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">George Cary and Mark W Nelson<a href="#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68">[68]</a> have delved into the question of the role of antitrust in policing abuse by patent holders with royalty stacks in standard setting organisations. They have argued that it is important for a legal tool to police this abuse because while other areas of law may prove capable of addressing these issues, these disputes are, at their core antitrust disputes. And only antitrust law can ensure that private parties and government enforcement authorities can seek redress where there is harm to competition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Suzanne Michael in her article<a href="#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69">[69]</a> argues that SEP holders who have their patent incorporated as a standard stand to gain by increasing royalty rates beyond RAND terms and beyond their actual economic value as they hold a monopoly simply because they own the standard. She argues that this will harm consumer interest and slow innovation. She further argues that an ex-ante approach should therefore be taken in ordering remedies in these cases to protect consumer interest. She also looks into the question of holdups and injunctions in cases involving RAND commitment. But her argument about ex ante remedies in RAND cases is an interesting point relevant to the paper.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Anne Layne-Farrar, A Jorge Padilla and Richard Schmalensee<a href="#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70">[70]</a> in their article delve into the question of what exactly would constitute FRAND terms in the context of licensing terms for essential IP in a standards setting organization. They have also analyzed the Georgia-Pacific guidelines and extending it to a standard setting organization and the numeric proportionality method proposed by courts in EU. They conclude that the Georgia-Pacific guidelines might work in FRAND disputes, that while this would leave FRAND basically undefined, it would be made an enforceable promise with an SSO and that these guidelines would provide sufficient direction and predictability in litigation. This article has been used to understand what kind of guidelines a regulatory body could be expected to codify for patent remedies in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Rahul Singh in his article<a href="#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71">[71]</a> analyses how due to its nature, the CCI is not sector specific and is supposed to look at "anti-competitive behavior" in all sectors most of whom already have their own sector specific regulator. He argues that unlike sector specific regulators, the CCI can privately enforce orders and pursue claims for damages and that this makes the CCI better situated to deal with consumer welfare areas. He further argues that to reduce transaction costs, enhance legal certainty and predictability, enforcement of such disputes must be left in the hands of the CCI. This argument has been extended to argue that courts enforcing IPRs would be less suited to handle these matters and more likely to cause inefficiencies and unpredictability and a re-imagined, empowered CCI would be the best suited judge of these issues.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">K.D.Raju in his article<a href="#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72">[72]</a> analyses broadly the connection between IP laws and competition law in India. He argues that while the jurisprudence behind IPR and competition law has traditionally been viewed as incompatible with each other, in effect, they seek to further the same goals. He argues that the competition laws as they exist in India currently cannot effectively deal with the nexus with IPR and suggests that the CCI come out with IPR specific guidelines to deal with upcoming litigation in the area.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Apoorva and Shreeja Sen<a href="#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73">[73]</a> in their report trace the stay orders in courts across India holding up CCI investigations and how this is symptomatic of the fact that courts do not understand concerns regarding hold-ups and reverse hold-ups in IP related cases where time is of the essence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Karthik Jayakumar<a href="#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74">[74]</a> has written about the Bhatia International case regarding arbitration, we use this to merely draw parallels with IPR laws in that just as in Bhatia the court held that arbitrations having their seat outside India were still within the jurisdiction of Indian courts and this was overruled in the BALCO case , the role of the CCI also has to be made clear through legislative reform or judicial pronouncement for the regulator to address questions of competition law across different sectors without a threat of stay orders from courts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nick Robinson in his article<a href="#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75">[75]</a> speaks of good governance courts, and of how courts in India have used good governance and right to life to become essentially second governments regulating everything from encouraging the use of natural gas to regulated encroachment on preservation of public forests to guidelines for school safety at the expense of government and independent regulators. While Nick Robinson makes a larger argument about good governance courts, it is used only for the limited purpose of supporting the argument made in the paper about judicial interventions allowing for anti-competitive behavior.</p>
<div>
<hr />
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Avendus Capital, India's Mobile Internet: The Revolution Has Begun: An Overview of How Mobile Internet Is Touching the Lives of Millions, Avendus Capital Private Limited, September 2013, available at http://www.avendus.com/Files/Fund%20Performance%20PDF/Avendus_Report-India's_Mobile_Internet-2013.pdf (last accessed 14 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
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<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> John-Harmen Valk et.al, Using Mobile Phones to Improve Educational Outcomes: An Analysis of Evidence from Asia, The International Review of Research in Open and Distributed Learning, Vol 11, No 1 (2010), available at http://www.irrodl.org/index.php/irrodl/rt/printerFriendly/794/1487 (last accessed 10 May, 2015);</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Gitanjali Shankar & Nikita Gupta, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Divergence, Convergence and Independence, NUJS Law Review, Vol.4, (2011), pp.113-132.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Robert Pitofsky, Comments on Lemley: An Introduction to IPR and Antitrust, Southwestern Journal of Law & Trade in the Americas, Vo.13, (2006-07), pp.257-263</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Katrina Perehudoff & Sophie Bloemen, Anti-Competitive Strategies Hamper Access to Medicines in Europe, Amsterdam Law Forum,Vol.3, 2011, pp 81-87.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> 332 U.S. 392 (1947)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> 371 U.S. 38 (1962)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> 466 U.S. 2 (1984).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr.public.guidelines.ipguide.htm (Last Accessed: 1/12/14)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Daniel B Raviche & Shani C Dilloff, Antitrust Scrutiny of Intellectual Property Exploitation: It just don't make no kind of sense, Southwester Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol.8, (2001-02), p.83-158</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Robert D Anderson, The Interface Between Competition and policy and Intellectual Property in the Context of the International Trading System, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.1, (1998), pp.655-680.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Eileen Mc Dermot, Managing Intellectual Property, No.187, March 2009</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Howard Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where we are and where we should be going, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.77, (2010-11), p.749-759</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> John H Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios , Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2002), pp. 851-882</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> 708 F.2d 1081(7th Cir.) Cert. Denied. 464 U.S.955 (1983</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Richard J Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vo.93, No.23 (Nov.12, 1996), pp.12749-12755.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70, No.2, (2002), pp.443-462</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Paul D Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.70, No.3, (2003), pp.847-873</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> 410 U.S. 366 (1973)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> 436 U.S. 585 (1985)</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> 194, F. 2d, 484,487 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 344, U.S. 817 (1952</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> 326 U.S. 1 (1945).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> 472, U.S. 585.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> Ref. Case 6 and 7/1973, Commercial Solvents v. Commission 1974 ECR 223.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Case 22/1978 (1979), ECR, 1869.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Ref. C. 27/1976, United Brands v. Commission (1978) , ECR 207.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Martin Cave & Peter Crowther, Competition Law Approaches to Regulating Access to Utilities: The Essential Facilities Doctrine, Rivisita Internazionale Di Scienze Sociali, Anno 103, No.1, Interconnection Pricing Workshop (Milan April 7-8 , 1995), pp. 141-157</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> Case C-7/97, (1999) 4 CMLR 112</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> B&I Line plc. V. Sealink harbors Ltd, a Commission of 11 June 1992, (1992), C.M.L.R 255 at paragraph 4.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> Objective justifications such as shortage of the product were accepted in Case77/77 Benezine en Petroleum Handlesmaatschappij BV v. British Petroleum (1978) ECR 1513</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Case T-69/89 Radio Telefis Eireaan v. Commission (1991) ECR II-485 on appeal Cases C-241P and 242/91P RTE and ITP v. Commission (1995) ECR I-743.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn34">
<p><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34">[34]</a> Albertina Albros -Llorens, The Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC Competition Law, the Cambridge Law Journal, Vol.58, No.3 (Nov.,1999) , pp. 490-492.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn35">
<p><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35">[35]</a> 1966, p. 570-71</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn36">
<p><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36">[36]</a> Gregory T Gundlack & Paul N Bloom, The Essential Facility Doctrine: Legal limits and Antitrust Considerations, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, Vol.12, No.2 (Fall,1993), pp.156-169.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn37">
<p><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37">[37]</a> Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 76, No. 3 (201), pp. 741-767.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn38">
<p><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38">[38]</a> Daniel E Troy, Unclogging the Bottle neck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 83, No.2, (Mar., 1983), pp.441-487.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn39">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39">[39]</a> Ann Armstrong et al., The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Smartphones, available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf (last accessed 15 May, 2015);</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn40">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40">[40]</a> Damien Geradin, Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in A Standard Setting Context: A View from Europe, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2009), 329-357; Damien Geradin, Ten Years of DG Competition Effort to Provide Guidance on the Application of Competition Rules to the Licensing of Standard Essential Patents: Where Do We Stand?, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Geradin_DG_Competition.pdf (last accessed 19 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn41">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41">[41]</a> Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in ROBERT SCHWARE (ED.), E-DEVELOPMENT: FROM EXCITEMENT TO EFFECTIVENESS (2005, World Bank Publications).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn42">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42">[42]</a> Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 Eur. Competition J. 101,103 (2007).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn43">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43">[43]</a> Michael A. Carrier, A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing, Competition Policy International, CPI Antitrust Chronicle April 2012 (2) at 2.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn44">
<p><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44">[44]</a> Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, Texas law Review, Vol.85, 2007, 1991-2050.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn45">
<p><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45">[45]</a> Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard Essential Patents, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol.28, 2013 at 1136-1137</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn46">
<p><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46">[46]</a> Phillipe Baechtold, IPRs and Standards Setting: Some Issues, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_smes_ge_07/wipo_smes_ge_07_www_81604.ppt (last accessed 19 May, 2015) at 1</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn47">
<p><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47">[47]</a> Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists and Competition Policy, 57(3) THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 526-552 (September, 2009).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn48">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48">[48]</a> Gertjan Kuipers et.al, A Further Perspective on Apple v. Samsung: How to Successfully Enforce Standard Essential Patents in the Netherlands, Berichten Industriele Eigendon, Aug. 2012, available at http://www.debrauw.com/News/Publications/Documents/artikel1_Kuipers-Groeneveld-Lamme.pdf (last accessed 21 May, 2015) at 222</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn49">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49">[49]</a> Leon Greenfield, et al., SEP Enforcement Disputes, Beyond the Water's Edge: A Survey of Recent Non US Decisions, Antitrust, Vol.27, No.3, 2013 at 3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn50">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50">[50]</a> Damien Neven and Miguel de la Mano, Economics at DG Competition, 2009-2010, 37(4) REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION, 309-333 (December, 2010).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn51">
<p><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51">[51]</a> Björn Lundqvist, Standardisation under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws, (2014).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn52">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52">[52]</a> James E Abell, Setting the Standard: A Fraud-based approach to Antitrust pleading in standard development, 75(4) UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1601-1631 (2008).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn53">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53">[53]</a> Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Standard-Essential Patents: The International Landscape, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/standard-essential_patents_the_intl_landscape.pdf (last accessed 22 May, 2015) at 14.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn54">
<p><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54">[54]</a> Ravikant Bharadwaj, Standard Setting in India: Competition Law and IP Issues, IMJ, Vol.5, 2013 at.1, 2.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn55">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55">[55]</a> Anubha Sinha, Micromax Files Complaint: CCI Orders Investigation into Ericsson's FRANDLY Licensing, SpicyIP, 29 November 2013, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/11/micromax-files-complaint-cci-orders-investigation-into-ericssons-frandly-licensing.html (last accessed 22 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn56">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56">[56]</a> Prashanth T Reddy, Interim Justice: Troubling Trend, Business Standard, 30 March 2013, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/interim-justice-troubling-trend-113033000223_1.html (last accessed 23 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn57">
<p><a href="#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57">[57]</a> Vaibhav Choukse, The Debate on Essentials, BUSINESS LINE, (March 29, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn58">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58">[58]</a> John E Matheson, Patents and Standards, FRAND Challenges for India's ICT Sector, SpicyIP Discussion paper series, Paper no. 201401, 2014, available at: http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FRAND-Challenges-for-Indias-ICT-Sector.pdf (last accessed 21 May, 2015) at 7</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn59">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59">[59]</a> Pankaj Soni and Satyoki Koundinya, Taking the FRANDLY Approach, a First Look at FRAND Battles in India, Remfry and Sagar, available at http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/IAM-Yearbook/2015/Country-by-country/Taking-the-FRAND-ly-approach-a-first-look-at-FRAND-battles-in-India (last accessed 21 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn60">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60">[60]</a> Competition Commission of India, Guide to Abuse of Dominance, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/Advocacy/Awareness/Abuse_Dominance.pdf (last accessed 21 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn61">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61">[61]</a> Samir Gandhi et al., Enforcement Trends in India under Competition Act 2002, Practical Law, 1 June 2013, available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-532-3777?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=#a456237 (last accessed 11 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn62">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62">[62]</a> Pratibha Jain et.al., Competition Law in India, A Report on Jurisprudential Trends, Nishit Desai and Associates, available at http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Competition_Law_in_India.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn63">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63">[63]</a> Archana Shanker and Shraddha Singh Chauhan, How to use Patent and Competition Law Effectively in Tandem, 1 September 2014, Managingip, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/3382427/How-to-use-patent-and-competition-law-effectively-in-tandem.html (last accessed 20 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn64">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64">[64]</a> Kanika Chaudhary Nayar, India: Jurisdiction of the CCI: Navigating Through Muddy Waters, 28 April 2015, Mondaq, Available at: http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/392738/Antitrust+Competition/Jurisdiction+Of+The+CCI+Navigating+Through+Muddy+Waters</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn65">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65">[65]</a> CUTS International, Competition Commission of India Through the Eyes of the Media: Doing Well!, 17 September 2012, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Competition_Commission_of_India_through_the_eyes_of_the_media-Doing_well.pdf (last accessed 13 May, 2015) at 13.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn66">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66">[66]</a> Bureau, Bill Aimed at Giving CCI More Teeth Tabled, Indian Express, 11 December 2012, Available at: http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/bill-aimed-at-giving-cci-more-teeth-tabled/1043320/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn67">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67">[67]</a> Peter Alexiadis, Balancing the application of ex post and ex ante disciplines under community law in electronic communications markets: square pegs in round holes? RIGHTS AND REMEDIES IN A LIBERALISED AND COMPETITIVE INTERNAL MARKET (2012).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn68">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68">[68]</a> George S Cary, Mark W Nelson et al, the case for Antitrust law to police the patent holdup problem in standard setting, 77(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 913-945 (2011).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn69">
<p><a href="#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69">[69]</a> Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 889-911 (2011).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn70">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70">[70]</a> Anne Layne-Farrar, A Jorge Padilla and Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organisations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74(3) ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 671-706 (2007).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn71">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71">[71]</a> Rahul Singh, The Teeter Totter of Regulation and Competition: Balancing the Indian Competition Commission with Sectoral Regulators, Washungton University Global Studies Law Review, Vol.8, Issue 1, January 2009 at 97-102.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn72">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72">[72]</a> K D Raju, The Inevitable Connection Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Emerging Jurisprudence and Lessons for India, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.18, No.2, 2013, at 111-122.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn73">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73">[73]</a> Apoorva, Shreeja Sen, Multiple Court Stays Hold UP CCI Investigations, Livemint, 28 November 2014, available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/5Lm7tjIuogbBsm6qRb4exH/Multiple-court-stays-hold-up-CCI-investigations.html (last accessed 23 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn74">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74">[74]</a> Karthik Jayakumar, Bhatia v. Balco, Who Should Stand?, 18 August 2013, available at http://blog.athirtyeight.com/2013/08/bhatia-v-balco-who-should-stand.html (last accessed 22 May, 2015).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn75">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75">[75]</a> Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol.8, Issue 1, January 2009 at 21.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-document-2-literature-review-on-competition-law-ipr-access-to-100-mobile-devices-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-working-document-series-document-2-literature-review-on-competition-law-ipr-access-to-100-mobile-devices-1</a>
</p>
No publisherAmulya Purushothama and Nehaa ChaudhariAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-09-03T02:02:51ZBlog EntryPERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES: DOCUMENT 1 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR A PAPER ON COMPETITION LAW + IPR + ACCESS TO < $100 MOBILE DEVICES
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law
<b>This blog post is the research methodology for my research paper under the Pervasive Technologies Project. This is a work in progress and is likely to be modified from time to time.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">See a subsequent version titled <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-research-questions-and-a-literature-review-on-actor-network-theory">Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory</a></p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Preliminary</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent <i>inter alia </i>on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the 'developmental effects' of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper under the <i>Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place</i> Project (<b>"PT Project"</b>) examines one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: <i>first, </i>that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; <i>second, </i>that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; <i>third</i>, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a 'stable, open and future- proof environment' (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and <i>fourth,</i> that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.</p>
<h3><b>Research Questions</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper will examine whether there is a role to be played by one regulator, that is, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First, what is the relationship between intellectual property and competition law? Second, what are the competition law/antitrust concerns that arise around the licensing of intellectual property (standard essential patents)? Third, can existing mechanisms in competition law address concerns around the licensing of standard essential patents on sub hundred dollar devices, and is competition law a viable solution to address this issue? If so, which ones? Fourth, given the frequency of these litigations, is there a role to be played by an <i>ex-post</i> regulator, such as the CCI, or is there a need for <i>ex-ante</i> regulation?</p>
<h3><b>Research Objects</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an attempt to address these research questions, this paper will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. This paper will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research paper will also examine select tools and sites sought to be used to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to these sub hundred dollar mobile devices: first, principles, legal frameworks and provisions of competition law/antitrust law; second, all relevant judicial decisions.</p>
<h3><b>Research Method</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First , this research paper will begin with establishing the case for the intervention of the regulator and/or the judiciary in the sub hundred dollar mobile device market by undertaking a review of primary and secondary literature<a name="_ftnref1"></a><a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>("literature"). Second, also through a literature review, the research will be contextualized to India in terms of the market, the actors involved and the legal framework. Third, a cross jurisdictional comparative legal search will be undertaken to understand the potential areas of intervention for the judiciary and the Competition Commission of India based on existing legal disputes in other jurisdictions; and the possible challenges that might ensue. Fourth, in a scenario building exercise, an attempt will be made to outline the role that the judiciary and the regulator might play in India, in order to ensure access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is not impeded by litigation around standard essential patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Generally, in the writing of this paper, inputs will be sought from experts including MHRD Chair Professors, legal practitioners in India, academics in India and abroad and members of relevant departments of the Indian Government.</p>
<h3><b>Research Communication</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This research will be communicated through a series of blog posts- one every month from December, 2014 to December, 2015. A preliminary draft of a research paper will be produced by December, 2015, tentatively to be presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, New Delhi. The final output will be a research paper.</p>
<h3><b>References</b></h3>
<ol>
<li>Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in Robert Schware (ed.), E-development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005, World Bank Publications).</li>
<li>Jyoti Saraswati, Dot. Compradors- Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry (2012, Pluto Press)</li>
</ol>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
</div>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn1"></a><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of this document, primary and secondary literature includes academic articles and books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, blog posts, case law and other legal provisions.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaIntellectual Property RightsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2015-10-04T02:51:06ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies Project Presentations at the 4th Global Congress, 2015
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-presentations-at-the-4th-global-congress-2015
<b>These are the presentations made by the members of the PT Project team at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 2015 at National Law University, New Delhi.</b>
<ul>
<li><b>Nehaa Chaudhari: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-india" class="internal-link">The Curious Case of the CCI: Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India</a></b></li>
<li><b>Amba Uttara Kak and Maggie Huang: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rethinking-music-copyright-management-in-the-age-of-digital-distribution-business-models-licensing-practices-and-copyright-institutions-in-india" class="internal-link">Rethinking Music Copyright Management in the Age of Digital Distribution: Business Models, Licensing Practices and Copyright Institutions in India</a></b></li>
<li><b>Rohini Lakshané</b>:<b> <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-landscaping-in-the-sub-100-mobile-device-market-in-india" class="internal-link">Patent Landscaping in the sub-$100 Mobile Device Market in India</a></b></li>
<li><b>Anubha Sinha: <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ip-in-mobile-applications-development" class="internal-link">IP in Mobile Applications Development in India</a><br /></b></li>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-presentations-at-the-4th-global-congress-2015'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-project-presentations-at-the-4th-global-congress-2015</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaCopyrightAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2016-01-21T16:33:41ZBlog EntryPervasive Technologies Project in Hong Kong
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/pervasive-technologies-project-in-hong-kong
<b>Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society (UNU-CS) held a new networking initiative. Digital Asia Hub and the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society co-hosted a series of events aimed at fostering engagement and knowledge sharing at the intersection of technology, society, law, policy and international development. </b>
<p>CIS shared its insights on the Pervasive Technologies project.</p>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/PosterofPTProject.jpg/@@images/d92ab03b-ab18-4507-a297-ca6f68e3e914.jpeg" alt="Pervasive Technologies" class="image-inline" title="Pervasive Technologies" /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/pervasive-technologies-project-in-hong-kong'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/news/pervasive-technologies-project-in-hong-kong</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2017-03-20T16:09:22ZNews ItemPervasive Mobile Technologies: Meet Our Mobile Devices!
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices
<b>As a part of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research project, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is researching 12 mobile phone devices to generate a better understanding of the intellectual property (IP) implications of pervasive mobile technologies available in the Indian market. This post is an introduction to our 12 mobile phones.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As detailed in my introductory blog on <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-access-to-knowledge-in-the-market-place">Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace Research Initiative</a>, CIS will be conducting research on mobile technologies as a small off-shoot of the overall project. Pervasive technologies that can be purchased for less than USD 100 play an integral role in bringing access to knowledge to those that routinely face barriers to the consumption of information. However, their legality, particularly in terms of their use of IP, is unclear. In order to better understand the legal environment in which these technologies exist, CIS purchased 12 mobile phones to study the patent implications of their hardware, software and content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Through examination, research, interviews and consultancies, we hope to create an in-depth documentation of each device, an extensive database or account of the patents implicated, and a number of narrower research avenues on topics related to IP, patents, and mobile technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This blog post will serve as a brief introduction to our mobile devices. The information that I have compiled was discovered through shallow interaction with the phones — turning a device on and exploring the interface and content — which is why the documentation is not particularly extensive at this point. I have had difficulty identifying certain features of some of the phones, like which media formats they support or whether or not they are EDGE<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> — enable, but I am confident that I will be able to ascertain these specifications in the near future; however, certain features, like what OS (operating system) they run on and what chip set they are using, will require collaboration with experts to identify. The exploration is on-going, and more information will be posted as it is discovered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Aside from all of the usual functions of a mobile phone (making calls, receiving calls, saving numbers, etc.), each of our mobiles devices possess what I have termed the "basics": dual GSM SIM capabilities with dual standby, the ability to connect to 2G networks, GPRS, a WAP browser (except device 011), bluetooth capabilities, a microSD slot, a dual camera (a camera that takes still photos and records video), an FM radio receiver and the ability to play .mp3 audio files and .mp4 video files, record audio and view .jpg images. Each phone also has a handful of various "utilities" and "extras" applications (such as an alarm, a calculator, a calendar, etc.) as well as at least one game. The full specifications of each phone will be provided in the near future, along with further pictures of each device.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As much of the research in this project pertains to the IP implications of the devices, we have decided to withhold the make and model of each device to shield the producers from any negative repercussions that could be the result of our research inquiries. They have been assigned the numeric code names 001 to 012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Without further ado, I'd like to introduce you to our mobile phones:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">001 - The Classroom in a Box</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 6,300.00 / $113.00</p>
</div>
<p><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Pico-Projector</li>
<li>Analog TV Receiver</li>
<li>MS Office Document Viewer</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/001Front.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="001Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This bar-design feature phone has all of the basics with a few added bonuses: an analog TV receiver, viewer, and a built-in pico-projector that projects the mobile's screen onto any surface. Though this phone does not technically fall into our definition of pervasive technologies because of its price, it was the first mobile phone with a built-in pico-projector as well as an analog TV receiver available on the Indian market for less than Rs. 10,000 when it was purchased more than a year ago. Since then, other sub-USD100 pico-projector mobile devices have made an appearance on the Indian market, but each of those devices appear to have been discontinued and 001 continues to be the cheapest pico-projector mobile phone available for purchase.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">002 - The Supercharger</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,499.00 / $45.00</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
</div>
<ul>
<li>Solar Panel </li>
<li>Hindi Keyboard</li>
</ul>
<div></div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/002Front.jpg" alt="null" style="float: left; " class="image-inline" title="002Front" /></p>
</th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">002 is a sleek candybar feature phone with a particularly interesting innovation. While it uses a standard lithium-ion battery that can be recharged via connection to a wall socket or electrical device (such as a laptop), it also has a built-in solar panel that can generate some charge as well. The solar panel technology is not yet very efficient—the panel would have to be placed in direct sunlight for multiple hours to fully charge the battery—but it represents an important step towards untethering mobile phones and mobile phone users from costly electricity infrastructure, a development that would have significant implications for rural populations who have unreliable access to electricity.</td>
<th>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/002Back.jpg" alt="null" style="float: right; " class="image-inline" title="002Back" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3></h3>
<h3>003 - The Networker</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,250.00 / $22.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Wi-Fi</li>
<li>Optical Trackpad</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
<li>Support for 8 Languages</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/003Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="003Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>With a boxy, QWERTY-keyboard design and relatively small screen, 003 does not appear, at first glance, to be anymore than an average feature phone — but appearances can be deceiving. With a highly responsive optical trackpad, an analog TV receiver, BlackBerry-esque interface and WiFi capabilities, this mobile device packs some sophisticated technologies and features. Further, it is the only phone in our collection that can connect to the internet using WLAN networks.</p>
<p>Considering that some of the other devices are much more complex — and expensive — than 003, the wide-spread exclusion of WiFi capabilities in our collection is intriguing. Is the choice to include or exclude mobile technology a matter of economics? Are cellular WiFi components expensive, and producers are choosing to exclude WiFi as a method of cutting costs? Is it simply a response to patterns of consumer demand? The WiFi questions will be explored in more depth in up-coming blog posts.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>004 - The Linguist</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,250.00 / $40.00</p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span class="s1"> </span>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Support for 14 Languages</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
<li>Large Number of Pre-loaded Apps</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/004Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="004Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it may be hard to believe at first glance, this mobile device was purchased for less than Rs. 2500. With its large internal memory, support for 14 different languages (including Tamil, Bengali and Hindi), and its large array of pre-loaded games and social media applications already set it apart from the less sophisticated mobiles in our collection, 004 also runs on a mysterious Android-like operating system similar to the popular MIUI Android ROM developed by the Chinese-based company Xiaomi Tech. This give it a very sophisticated interface with the look and feel of a smartphone, though the device itself lacks many of the capabilities that are often considered as smartphone criteria (GPS, high-speed internet access, push/pull email, Wi-Fi, an app store, etc.). Because this device, and others like it in our collection, have more sophisticated hardware, software and content than a generic feature phone, but are not as capable as a smartphone, I have taken to calling these devices "semi-smart". <br /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>005 - TV on the Go</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,450.00 / $26.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span class="s1"> </span>Analog TV receiver</li>
<li>Arabic Keyboard</li>
<li>Secondary Forward-facing Camera</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/005Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="005Front" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it doesn't have any particular innovation that sets it apart from the other devices, 005 is a hardy QWERTY-design feature phone with all of the basics as well as a good collection of social media applications and an analog TV receiver. Though its keyboard can be programmed to write in English, Tamil, Arabic and Hindi script, the buttons have the Arabic <i>abjad</i> on them, which brings up the question of which market this mobile was originally designed for. <br /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>006 - The Spy</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,680.00 / $30.00</p>
</div>
<p><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES:</b></span></p>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Secondary “Spy” Camera</li>
<li>Ability to behave as a modem via USB connection</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/006Camera.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="006Camera" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">006 is an interesting candy bar feature phone. On initial examination, this mobile appears to be a completely generic feature phones with all of the basics, but nothing auxiliary. However, a more careful inspection will reveal a secondary camera with an unusual placement — instead of being place at the top of the screen like all of the other secondary cameras found on our devices, this camera is situated on the right hand side of the phone. <br /></td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/copy_of_006Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="006Front" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The manufacturer of this device actually refers to this secondary camera as a "spy" camera, and it is truly an appropriate name; from a distance, it looks more like a headphone jack than a camera, and its placement allows for photo and video to be taken without any suspicious movement or positioning by the user. The secondary camera has 1.3 megapixels and can take relatively high resolution photos and videos.</p>
<h3>007 - The Semi-Smartphone</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,150.00 / $39.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS (maybe MIUI)</li>
<li>USB Tethering</li>
<li>Push Email</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/007Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="007Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Device 007 is a semi-smart touchscreen phone, and by far the most sophisticated device in our collection. We believe that it uses MIUI OS, which gives it a very similar look to Android and a functionality that is reminiscent of iOSx. While it doesn't have an app store, 007 is jam-packed with pre-loaded applications and can support a wide variety of file formats. Further, while the phone cannot connect to WLAN networks on its own; it can connect to WiFi by tethering to a networked device via USB connection.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>008 - The Trendy</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,350.00 / $42.00</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Support for 9 languages</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/008Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="008Front" /></p>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Another mainstream look-alike, 008 runs the same unidentified OS as device 004 and has similar capabilities. Its plastic casing is a bit flimsy, but its "back", "home" and "list" buttons are touch sensitive. Its sophisticated OS and pre-loaded applications make it a semi-smart device.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>009 - The Boombox</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,420.00 / $26.00</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Huge built-in speaker</li>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
</ul>
<table class="vertical listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/009.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="009Front" /></p>
</th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">Though it is less recognizable than some of the other devices, this mobile may have one of the significant smartphone qualifiers that our other devices lack: an app store — or what appears to be an app store. The app store icon itself is actually the icon for the Android app store, but the interface is completely different, and the only thing available for download is a handful of games. Interestingly enough, many of these games also make appearances on some of the other mobile devices (like fishing joy and tear clothes). Further, I would not call this phone semi-smart, as its interface is not particularly any more sophisticated than some of the other feature phones in our collection.</td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/009Back.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="009Back" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<table class="invisible">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>009 also features a large built-in speaker, the Opera Mini mobile browser and an Android-like OS, though this OS is less sophisticated than that of 004 and 008.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>010 - 3D</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,440.00 / $26.00</p>
</div>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Android-like OS</li>
<li>Pre-loaded Stereoscopic (3D) videos</li>
<li>Support for 13 languages</li>
</ul>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/0010Front.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="0010Front" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">This semi-smart touchscreen phone also has an Android-like operating system. Though it lacks an app store and push-email, it comes pre-loaded with a veritable smorgasbord of games and social media applications and supports 13 different languages. It also comes with a pair of 3D glasses and two short, very basic pre-loaded stereoscopic videos.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>011 - The Mighty Mini</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 750.00 / $14.00</p>
<p class="p1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Dual GSM SIM support</li>
<li>Best bang-for-your-buck for a basic mobile phone</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/011.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="011" /></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At Rs. 750, this little feature phone was the least expensive phone we could find that still had almost all of the basics. Even without any extra features, it is still almost Rs. 200 cheaper than the majority of the most basic GSM dual SIM mobiles available on the formal Indian market<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a>— and, in most cases, 011 has more capabilities than most of those devices. With .mp3 and .mp4 file playback, a dual camera, colour display, a WAP browser, MMS messaging support, two charging ports and Urdu and Hindi language support, this mobile phone personifies affordable accessibility to knowledge and media.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>012 - The Pianist</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 1,550.00 / $28.00</p>
<p class="p1"><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>Touch piano</li>
<li>Two charging ports</li>
<li>Support for a multitude of audio, video and image formats</li>
</ul>
</div>
<table class="listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/012.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="012" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p> </p>
<p>012 is a basic candy bar feature phone with a particularly novel innovation: a touch piano. It is quite sensitive to touch and has a one octave range.</p>
</td>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/012Back.jpg" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="012Back" /></th>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr />
<h3></h3>
<h3>013 - The Indian Experience</h3>
<div>
<p class="p1">Price: Rs. 2,100.00 / $38.00</p>
</div>
<p><b>KEY FEATURES</b></p>
<ul>
<li>India<b> </b>specific content</li>
<li>Proprietary App Store</li>
</ul>
<table class="vertical listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/013Front.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="013Front" /></th>
<td style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>This little touchscreen mobile is chockfull of “Indian-specific” content, including an application that links directly to an online portal where consumers can download “Hungama” videos, music and movies onto the phone—for a price. Many of the games also charge a monthly user fee, though interestingly enough, Angry Birds and Talking Tom Cat are pre-loaded and free to play. This phone also has a proprietary app store with a limited amount of mBounce<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">4]</a> applications and games available for purchase. I am not yet sure if this app store can be remotely updated with new apps, but the device can receive data vis USB connection, so it is possible that new applications can be added through direct file transfer.</p>
<p>It also has keyboard support for English, Hindi and Tamil, but the interface cannot be set it appear in anything other than English.</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, also known as Enchanced GPRS (EGPRS) is a mobile phone technology that also improved data transmission on GSM networks. It is considered a pre-3G radio technology. Read more about it here: <a class="external-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution</a><br />[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. Information retrieved from <a href="http://www.flipkart.com/">www.flipkart.com</a>. The prices shown here have been verified as being the same or very similar (though never more expensive) to the prices offered by each brand's official distributors. See Flipkart search links:</p>
<ul>
<li>Mircomax: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/UW3q0U">http://bit.ly/UW3q0U</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Spice Mobility: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/V0DK9i">http://bit.ly/V0DK9i</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Karbonn: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/10DKKbz">http://bit.ly/10DKKbz</a></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lava: <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ">http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ</a></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a> mBounce Ltd is a Hong Kong-based company that performs a variety of mobile phone application support services like proprietary in-house billing infrastructure for app stores, the pre-loading of applications and app stores, and application creation. They are MediaTek-nominated key partner in providing MRE (Maui Runtime Environment) App Store Solutions, but mBounce applications and software can also be placed on other mobile operating systems. You can read more about mBounce here: <a href="http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home">http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home</a> and here: http://developer.mediatek.com/mre/en/partner/335</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices</a>
</p>
No publisherjdineFeaturedAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2012-12-21T07:48:40ZBlog EntryPatents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patents-and-mobile-devices-in-india-an-empirical-survey
<b>Though India has the second-largest wireless subscriber base in the world, with more than 150 mobile device vendors, it has, until recently, remained relatively unaffected by the global smartphone wars. Over the past three years, however, a growing number of patent enforcement actions have been brought by multinational firms against domestic Indian producers. These actions, which have largely resulted in judgments favoring foreign patent holders, have given rise to a variety of proposals for addressing this situation.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In order to assess the potential impact of patents on the mobile device market in India, and to assist policy makers in formulating and implementing regulations affecting this market, we have conducted a comprehensive patent landscape analysis of the mobile device sector in India using public data relating to Indian patent ownership by technology type, nationality, and industry classification. Our results illuminate a number of important features of the Indian mobile device market, including the overwhelming prevalence of foreign patent holders, the rate at which foreign and domestic firms are obtaining patents, and how these patent holdings are likely to shape industrial dynamics in the Indian market for mobile devices, as well as the availability of low-cost mobile devices that can significantly enhance public health, agriculture, safety and economic development throughout India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/SSRN-id2756486.pdf/view" class="external-link">Download the full paper here</a></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>This paper was <a class="external-link" href="https://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/2017/02/patents-and-mobile-devices-in-india-an-empirical-survey/">published by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law </a>on February 9, 2017.</i><br /></b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patents-and-mobile-devices-in-india-an-empirical-survey'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patents-and-mobile-devices-in-india-an-empirical-survey</a>
</p>
No publisherrohiniIntellectual Property RightsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2017-03-29T04:03:03ZBlog EntryPatent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance
<b>India requires every patentee to file an annual statement, also known as “Form 27”, describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents. If a patent is not locally worked within three years of its issuance, any person may request a compulsory license, and if the patent is not adequately worked within two years of the grant of such a compulsory license, it may be revoked. The research paper on Form 27 practices and compliance by patentees authored by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.</b>
<p>The research paper by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society was <a class="external-link" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3004283">published on SSRN</a> on July 17, 2017. The paper has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.</p>
<hr />
<p>The potency of India’s patent working requirement was demonstrated by the 2012 issuance of a compulsory license for Bayer’s patented drug Nexavar. In order to provide the public with information about patent working, India requires every patentee to file an annual statement on “Form 27” describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to a key industry sector: mobile devices. We obtained from public online records 4,916 valid Forms 27, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents. These represented only 20.1% of all Forms 27 that should have been filed and corresponded to only 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, and even among Forms 27 that were obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules. Patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, while several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the reporting of required information. Many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their Forms without explanation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, undoubtedly leading to significant non-compliance. However, some of the complaints raised by patentees and industry observers may have merit. Namely, that patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. We hope that this study will contribute to the ongoing conversation in India regarding the most appropriate means for collecting and disseminating information regarding the working of patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/files/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products">Download the Paper</a></b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance</a>
</p>
No publisherrohiniPatentsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2017-10-13T04:32:49ZBlog EntryPatent Working Requirements and Complex Products
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products
<b>The paper titled "Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products" has been published in the latest issue of the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law. It is one of the outputs of the Pervasive Technology project and has been authored by Prof. Jorge L. Contreras, Paxton M. Lewis, and Rohini Lakshané.</b>
<p><strong><a class="external-link" href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Contreras_Article_Vol-7-No-1_1-.pdf">Download PDF here</a>. </strong><span>The paper was <a class="external-link" href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/">published by JIPEL NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law</a>, Vol. 7 - No.1 on January 16, 2018.</span></p>
<hr />
<div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#intro">Introduction</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#I">I. Patent Working Requirements</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IA">A. History of Patent Working Requirements</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IB">B. The Evolution of India’s Patent Working Requirement</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IB1">1. Background</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IB2">2. The Patents Act, 1970</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IB3">3. India’s Current Working Requirement</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IC">C. The Indian Working Requirement and Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corporation</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#ID">D. Form 27 and India’s Reporting Requirement</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IE">E. Theory and Criticism of Form 27</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#II">II. Empirical Study of Indian Form 27 Disclosures in the Mobile Device Industry</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIA">A. Background: Existing Data and Studies</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIB">B. Methodology</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIC">C. Limitations</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#III">III. Findings</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIA">A. Aggregated Data – Forms Found and Missing</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIB">B. Working Status</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIC">C. Descriptive Responses</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIC1">1. Working Status Not Disclosed</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIC2">2. Patents Not Worked</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIC3">3. Varied Interpretations of Working</a></div>
<div class="l3" style="padding-left: 60px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IIIC4">4. Changes in Status</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IV">IV. Discussion and Analysis</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IA">A. Process Weaknesses</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IB">B. Non-Enforcement and Non-Compliance</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IC">C. Uncertainty Surrounding Working and Complex Products</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#ID">D. Strategic Behavior</a></div>
<div class="l2" style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#IE">E. Opportunities for Further Study</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#conclusion">Conclusion</a></div>
<div class="l1" style="text-align: justify; "><a href="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/vol-7-no-1-1-contreras/#appendix">Appendix</a></div>
</div>
<p><span> </span></p>
<h3><a name="intro"></a>Introduction</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2012, Natco Pharma Ltd. (“Natco”) petitioned the Indian Patent Office (“IPO”) for a compulsory license to manufacture Bayer’s patented cancer drug, Nexavar.<a name="_ftnref1"></a> Natco cited numerous grounds in support of its petition, including Nexavar’s high cost and limited availability in India.<a name="_ftnref2"></a> But along with these relatively common complaints in the global access to medicines debate,<a name="_ftnref3"></a> Natco raised a less typical theory; Bayer failed to “work” the patent sufficiently in India.<a name="_ftnref4"></a> In doing so, Natco invoked a seldom-used provision of Indian patent law that allows any person to seek a compulsory license under an Indian patent that is not actively being commercialized by its owner within three years from the issuance of the patent.<a name="_ftnref5"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patent working requirements exist in different forms throughout the world. Broadly speaking, to “work” a patent is to practice, in some manner, the patented invention within the country that issued the patent. While patents are seen as a means to create incentives for inventors to share their ideas, working requirements are intended to mitigate the exclusivity of patent monopolies by requiring the patent holder to disseminate its invention into the local market.<a name="_ftnref6"></a> The patent holder thereby imparts knowledge and skills to the local community, enhances economic growth, supports local manufacturing, and promotes the introduction of innovative new products into the local market.<a name="_ftnref7"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While patent working requirements have existed in various jurisdictions for more than a century, working requirements have seldom been the subject of vigorous enforcement.<a name="_ftnref8"></a> The U.S.-Brazil dispute and the Natco case represent a revival of interest in patent working requirements. In particular, the <i>Natco</i> case has reintroduced questions of whether working requirements are, or should be, allowed under the TRIPS Agreement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In prior work, Contreras and LakshanÈ have analyzed the domestic Indian patent landscape pertaining to mobile device technology.<a name="_ftnref9"></a> The authors now extend that work to examine the working of those patents. This Article presents a detailed case study of the Indian patent working statutes and their procedures, particularly the requirement that all patent holders file an annual form (Form 27) to demonstrate that their patents are being worked in the country. We collected and reviewed all publicly available Forms 27 in the mobile device sector to assess the completeness and accuracy of the information disclosed. We then analyzed the results to assess the robustness of India’s patent working requirement and its utility for complex information and communication-based products and technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The remainder of this Article proceeds in four principal parts. Part I.A provides a brief history of patent working requirements. Part I.B describes the development of India’s current working requirements and its novel Form 27 filing requirement. Part II describes our empirical study of India’s Form 27 filings in the mobile device sector. Part III discusses our findings and analysis. We conclude with recommendations for further study and policy.</p>
<h3><a name="I"></a>I. Patent Working Requirements</h3>
<h4><a name="IA"></a>A. History of Patent Working Requirements</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The origins of patent working requirements have been traced to the 1300s, when early patent privileges were granted in jurisdictions such as feudal England and the Republic of Venice, with an expectation that foreign innovators would teach the invented art to local industry.<a name="_ftnref10"></a> The underlying incentive for providing monopoly rights was thus tied to local industrialization.<a name="_ftnref11"></a> This incentive to share technology was directed not only to local citizens but, even more so, to foreign inventors.<a name="_ftnref12"></a> Countries issued patent privileges to encourage foreigners to migrate and develop or protect local industry by teaching their art to the local population.<a name="_ftnref13"></a> Local industrialization was thus considered a central means to economic development and technological advancement.<a name="_ftnref14"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite these early developments, by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, developed countries’ conceptual understanding of a patentee’s obligation and its relevance to national development began to shift away from local manufacturing.<a name="_ftnref15"></a> As a result, in many developed countries disclosure through importation became sufficient to meet the “informational goal” of patents, particularly patents that represented improvements to existing technologies.<a name="_ftnref16"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property prohibited the automatic forfeiture of a patent for a failure to work it locally.<a name="_ftnref17"></a> While both developed and developing countries disputed the proper remedy for the failure to work a patent, there remained a consensus that failure to work a patent was inconsistent with the patent privilege.<a name="_ftnref18"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A half-century later, the 1925 Hague Conference, which amended the Paris Convention, recognized the failure to work a patent as an abuse that member states could “take necessary legislative measures to prevent.”<a name="_ftnref19"></a> As a remedy for non-working, drafters viewed compulsory licensing of non-worked patents as more palatable than outright forfeiture.<a name="_ftnref20"></a> Nevertheless, forfeiture of patent rights was still permitted under the Convention, though an action for forfeiture could not be brought until two years following the issuance of the first compulsory license covering the non-worked patent.<a name="_ftnref21"></a>In the 1967 Stockholm amendments to the Convention, further limitations on compulsory licensing for non-working patents were introduced, notably prohibiting member states from permitting the grant of a compulsory license for failure to work until three years after the issuance of the allegedly non-worked patent.<a name="_ftnref22"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Within the flexibilities allowed by the Convention, developing countries continued to adopt strict working requirements and to resist international requirements that favored developed countries.<a name="_ftnref23"></a> For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries proposed revisions to the Paris Convention that would have provided that mere importation did not satisfy local working requirements and to permit the expansion of sanctions for non-working beyond compulsory licensing.<a name="_ftnref24"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The desire of developed countries for stronger international rules relating to intellectual property led to the formation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994, under which the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement was negotiated.<a name="_ftnref25"></a> While the TRIPS Agreement does not explicitly address patent working requirements, Article 2.1 incorporates Article 5A of the Paris Convention (i.e. the article related to compulsory licensing and the limitations on granting compulsory licenses discussed above), and Article 2.2 reinforces the existing obligations of members of the Paris Union.<a name="_ftnref26"></a> Additionally, Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which establishes requirements for patentable subject matter, prohibits “discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced” raising a question as to whether countries with local working requirements must recognize importation as an acceptable manner of satisfying those requirements.<a name="_ftnref27"></a>However, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits a member state to allow exceptions to the exclusive rights of a patent holder, and Article 31 allows a state to issue a “compulsory” license under one or more patents without the authorization of the patent holder “in the case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”<a name="_ftnref28"></a> Given these mixed signals, commentators are divided on whether, and how, the TRIPS Agreement may affect local working requirements.<a name="_ftnref29"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To date, the only WTO dispute challenging the validity of national working requirements has been between the United States and Brazil.<a name="_ftnref30"></a> In 2000, the Clinton administration, responding to concerns raised by the American pharmaceutical industry, initiated a WTO dispute proceeding to challenge Brazil’s local working requirement.<a name="_ftnref31"></a> The United States argued that Article 68 of Brazil’s 1996 Industrial Property Law violated Articles 27(1) and 28(1)<a name="_ftnref32"></a> of the TRIPS Agreement for discriminating against U.S. owners of Brazilian patents whose products were imported, but not locally produced, in Brazil.<a name="_ftnref33"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite the pending WTO litigation, the Brazilian Ministry of Health adopted an aggressive stance toward reducing the price of antiretroviral medications and threatened to issue compulsory licenses for the local manufacture of two such drugs, both patented by U.S. companies, if they were not discounted by 50%.<a name="_ftnref34"></a> In response to political and public pressures, the United States and Brazil settled the dispute before any definitive opinion was issued by the WTO.<a name="_ftnref35"></a></p>
<h4><a name="IB"></a></h4>
<h5><a name="IB1"></a></h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a British colony, India’s pre-independence patent laws were modeled largely on then-prevailing English law.<a name="_ftnref36"></a> India gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947 and almost immediately began to consider the adoption of patent laws reflecting emerging national goals of industrialization and economic development.<a name="_ftnref37"></a> Thus, in early 1948, a committee known as the Tek Chand Committee was appointed to review and reconcile India’s patent laws with its national interests.<a name="_ftnref38"></a> The committee’s efforts resulted in the Chand Report, which recommended the use of compulsory patent licenses to stimulate India’s industrial economy.<a name="_ftnref39"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A second major report commissioned by the Indian government and prepared primarily by Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, was issued in 1959.<a name="_ftnref40"></a> The Ayyangar Report suggested that India should deviate from the “unsuitable patent policies of industrialized nations” because patent regimes operate differently in developing versus developed nations.<a name="_ftnref41"></a> Recognizing that a significant weakness in developing nations “is that foreign patent owners do not work the invention locally,” the Ayyangar Report recommended compulsory licensing as “the remedy to redress the handicap of foreigners not working the invention locally.”<a name="_ftnref42"></a></p>
<h5><a name="IB2"></a>2. The Patents Act, 1970</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The India Patents Act, 1970, was enacted in 1972.<a name="_ftnref43"></a> Among other things, it sought to address the economic repercussions resulting from foreign dominance of the patent landscape in India, as recommended by the Chand Report and the Ayyangar Report.<a name="_ftnref44"></a> Accordingly, Section 83 of the 1970 Act provides certain policy-driven justifications for India’s working requirements, explaining:</p>
<blockquote>“that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are <i>worked</i> in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay; [and]</blockquote>
<blockquote>that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the <i>importation</i> of the patented article[.]”<a name="_ftnref45"></a></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These provisions make clear that working a patent in India is both an important policy goal and consists of something more than importation of the patented article into India. Some additional knowledge transfer must occur so that manufacturing of other steps necessary for commercialization are carried out in India.</p>
<p>Following the Ayyangar Report’s recommendations, Section 84(1) of the 1970 Act provided for compulsory licensing of patents as follows:</p>
<blockquote>“At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the sealing of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller<a name="_ftnref46"></a> alleging that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied or that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price and praying for the grant of a compulsory licence to work the patented invention.”<a name="_ftnref47"></a></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These requirements, particularly the availability of the patented article to the public at a “reasonable price,” seek to address issues raised in the debate over access to medicines, and particularly the high pricing maintained by many Western pharmaceutical firms in developing countries.<a name="_ftnref48"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, working of patents more generally is incorporated into the compulsory licensing regime through Section 90, which clarifies when the “reasonable requirements of the public” will be deemed not to have been satisfied.<a name="_ftnref49"></a> In particular, Section 90(c) specifies that, for purposes of compulsory licensing under Section 84, “the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied Ö if the patented invention is not being worked in the territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable[.]”<a name="_ftnref50"></a> Thus, local working of patents is tied to the public interest and has become express grounds for requesting a compulsory license in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to giving applicants the right to seek a compulsory license under non-worked patents, the 1970 Act also gave the Controller the power to <i>revoke</i> a patent on the grounds that the reasonable requirements of the public were not being satisfied or the patented invention was not available to the public at a reasonable price.<a name="_ftnref51"></a> Under Section 89(1), any interested person could apply to the Controller for such an order of revocation no earlier than two years following the grant of the first compulsory license under the relevant patent.<a name="_ftnref52"></a></p>
<h5><a name="IB3"></a>3. India’s Current Working Requirement</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India became a member of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995, also making India a party to the TRIPS Agreement.<a name="_ftnref53"></a> In order to reconcile the 1970 Act with the TRIPS Agreement, India amended its Patents Act in 1999, 2002, and 2005.<a name="_ftnref54"></a> Most relevant to this Article, the 2002 amendments modified India’s compulsory licensing and working requirements.<a name="_ftnref55"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s amended Patents Act retains strong working requirements, which permit the Controller to revoke unworked patents.<a name="_ftnref56"></a> Section 83 of the Act, as amended in 2002, provides several additional justifications for India’s patent working requirement not contemplated in earlier versions of the Act. For example, the 2002 amendments recognize that patents are intended to support the “transfer and dissemination of technology . . . in a manner conducive [sic] to social and economic welfare.”<a name="_ftnref57"></a> Several of the new justifications emphasize that patents should support, and not impair, the public interest, particularly “in sectors of vital importance for socio-economic and technological development of India.”<a name="_ftnref58"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Against this backdrop, the amended Act explicitly makes compulsory licenses available for non-worked patents. Section 89 explains that one of the “general purposes” of compulsory licenses is to ensure that “patented inventions are worked on a commercial scale in the territory of India without undue delay and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable.”<a name="_ftnref59"></a> The amended Act expanded Section 84(1), which authorizes third parties to seek compulsory licenses, to include as an express basis for seeking a compulsory license “that the patented invention <i>is not worked</i> in the territory of India.”<a name="_ftnref60"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus, new section 84(1)(c) establishes working of a patent as an independent ground for seeking a compulsory license, in addition to the grounds under sections 84(a) and (b) that the patented technology fails to reasonably meet public needs. This approach contrasts with the original 1970 formulation, discussed above, in which non-working of a patent formed a basis for seeking a compulsory license, but only as an element of the “reasonable requirements of the public,” rather than an independent ground in itself.<a name="_ftnref61"></a></p>
<p>Section 84(6) specifies factors that the Controller must take into account when considering an application for a compulsory license, including:</p>
<blockquote>(i) the nature of the invention, the time which has elapsed since the sealing of the patent and the measures already taken by the patentee or any licensee to make full use of the invention;</blockquote>
<blockquote>(ii) the ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage;</blockquote>
<blockquote>(iii) the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the invention, if the application were granted;</blockquote>
<blockquote>(iv) as to whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a licence from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period as the Controller may deem fit [i.e., not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months] . . . . <a name="_ftnref62"></a></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 84(6) appears to represent a concession to patent holders, making clear that compulsory licenses will only be granted to applicants that are able to exploit the licensed patent rights in a manner that is likely to remedy the failure of the patent holder to work the patent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While a formal definition of working is not provided under the statute, the language of section 83 suggests that the patented invention must be manufactured locally to the extent possible and that importation would be acceptable only if local manufacturing is unreasonable.<a name="_ftnref63"></a> Additionally, the statutory language suggests that if importation is necessary, only the patent holder or its chosen licensees may import the patented invention.<a name="_ftnref64"></a> The statute also fails to establish any circumstances that may be excused from India’s patent working requirement. This omission may have been intentional, perhaps suggesting that any technology that is worth patenting in India should also be capable of being worked in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In short, India’s patent working requirement is intended to be taken seriously. The penalties for failing to work a patent include the issuance of a compulsory license beginning three years after patent issuance, and if that does not fulfill public requirements for the patented article, possible revocation of the patent. Moreover, there is evidence that Indian courts may be reluctant to grant injunctive relief to patent holders that do not work their patents.<a name="_ftnref65"></a></p>
<h4><a name="IC"></a>C. The Indian Working Requirement and Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corporation</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s patent working requirement was featured prominently in Natco’s recent compulsory license request with respect to Bayer’s Indian patent covering sorefanib tosylate, a kidney and liver cancer drug marketed by Bayer as NexavarTM. Bayer obtained an Indian patent covering Nexavar in 2008.<a name="_ftnref66"></a> Despite Bayer’s estimate that more than 8,800 patients in India were eligible to take the drug, its imports were sufficient to supply only 200 patients.<a name="_ftnref67"></a> Moreover, Bayer priced a monthly dose of the drug at more than 280,000 Rupees (approximately US$5,608), a price unaffordable to the vast majority of Indians.<a name="_ftnref68"></a> In response, Natco, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, attempted to negotiate a license with Bayer to manufacture and sell Nexavar in India.<a name="_ftnref69"></a> However, when negotiations were unsuccessful, Natco applied to the Drug Controller General of India for regulatory approval to manufacture a generic version of Nexavar in India.<a name="_ftnref70"></a> The approval was granted.<a name="_ftnref71"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Natco then petitioned the Controller of Patents under section 84 of the Patents Act for a compulsory license to manufacture a generic version of Nexavar.<a name="_ftnref72"></a> Natco offered several justifications in support of its application for a compulsory license, including Nexavar’s high cost and limited availability in India.<a name="_ftnref73"></a> In addition, Natco argued that Bayer had failed to work its patent in India within three years of its issuance, as required under section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act. Specifically, Natco argued that “[t]he patented product is being imported into India and hence the product is not worked in the territory of India to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable.”<a name="_ftnref74"></a> Additionally, Natco argued that Bayer faced “no hurdle[s] preventing [it] from working the Patent in India” because Bayer already had “manufacturing facilities in India for several products.”<a name="_ftnref75"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bayer responded that it actively imported Nexavar into India, which demonstrated sufficient working, and argued that India’s working requirement did not require manufacture of the patented product in India.<a name="_ftnref76"></a> In evaluating Natco’s petition, the Controller considered the legislature’s intent, the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and India’s Patents Act.<a name="_ftnref77"></a> In view of these authorities, the Controller interpreted the term “worked” to mean that the patented invention must be manufactured or licensed within India, reasoning that “[u]nless such an opportunity for technological capacity building domestically is provided to the Indian public, they will be at a loss as they will not be empowered to utilise [sic] the patented invention, after the patent right expires.”<a name="_ftnref78"></a> Under this interpretation, the Controller concluded that Bayer had not worked its patent in India since importation is not sufficient to constitute “working” a patent.<a name="_ftnref79"></a> Accordingly, in 2012 the Controller issued a compulsory license to Natco under Bayer’s patent covering Nexavar.<a name="_ftnref80"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Bayer unsuccessfully appealed the Controller’s decision to the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).<a name="_ftnref81"></a> The IPAB affirmed the Controller’s decision, but disagreed with the Controller’s interpretation of the term “worked.”<a name="_ftnref82"></a> Instead of ruling that working categorically excludes importation of the patented product into India, the IPAB concluded that determining whether a patented invention is worked must be considered on a case-by-case basis.<a name="_ftnref83"></a> Thus, the term “worked” does not necessarily exclude importation, but it also does not strictly require manufacturing in India.<a name="_ftnref84"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In affirming the decision of the IPAB, the Bombay High Court opined that “[m]anufacture in all cases may not be necessary to establish working in India[.]”<a name="_ftnref85"></a> However, the court implied that working a patent <i>without</i> local manufacture could be a high hurdle to clear, reasoning that the patent holder must then “establish those reasons which makes it impossible/prohibitive for it to manufacture the patented drug in India.”<a name="_ftnref86"></a> It is only when the patent holder satisfies the authorities that “the patented invention could not be manufactured in India” that it can be considered worked by import.<a name="_ftnref87"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Apart from the working requirement, the Bombay court focused on whether Bayer had reasonably satisfied the requirements of the public, recognizing that those requirements might differ depending on the type of product covered by the patent.<a name="_ftnref88"></a> Thus, when assessing whether demand for the patented article was met to an “adequate extent,” the considerations pertaining, for example, to a luxury article would vary significantly from those pertaining to a lifesaving medicine. In the case of medicines, the court reasoned, meeting public demand to an adequate extent should be deemed to mean it is available to 100% of the market: “Medicine has to be made available to every patient and this cannot be deprived/sacrificed at the altar of rights of [the] patent holder.”<a name="_ftnref89"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following Natco’s successful application for, and defense of, its compulsory license, other generic drug manufacturers sought compulsory licenses to manufacture patented pharmaceutical products in India. For example, in 2013, BDR Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., an Indian manufacturer, filed an application for a compulsory license to manufacture Bristol Myers Squibb’s anti-cancer drug dasatinib (marketed as SprycelTM),<a name="_ftnref90"></a> and the Indian Ministry of Health recommended that the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) grant local manufacturers compulsory licenses for trastuzumab, a breast cancer drug marketed by Roche (HerclonTM) and Genentech (HerceptinTM) and ixabepilone (Roche’s IxempraTM).<a name="_ftnref91"></a> To date, each of these petitions has failed for various reasons other than that pertaining to dasatinib, which remains under consideration by DIPP.<a name="_ftnref92"></a></p>
<h4><a name="ID"></a>D. Form 27 and India’s Reporting Requirement</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian patent working requirement under Section 84 of the Patents Act, as well as the availability of compulsory licenses for non-worked patents, is not unique to India, and other developing countries have adopted similar legal requirements.<a name="_ftnref93"></a> India has, however, enacted what appears to be a unique reporting structure associated with its patent working requirement.<a name="_ftnref94"></a> India adopted a form submission requirement as a means to regulate the patent working requirement under the India Patents Act in 1970.<a name="_ftnref95"></a>Specifically, section 146(2) of the Patents Act provides that:</p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify; ">every patentee and every licensee (whether exclusive or otherwise) shall furnish in such manner and form and at such intervals (not being less than six months) as may be prescribed statements as to the extent to which the patented invention has been worked on a commercial scale in India.<a name="_ftnref96"></a></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In support of this statutory requirement, the patent rules adopted by the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry provide that the required statements of working must be submitted in a prescribed format (Form 27).<a name="_ftnref97"></a> The rules also provide that such statements must be furnished to the Controller of Patents in respect of every calendar year within three months following the end of such year.<a name="_ftnref98"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Form 27, a template of which is appended to the 2003 version of the Indian patent rules, requires the patent holder to disclose “the extent to which the patented invention has been worked on a commercial scale in India.”<a name="_ftnref99"></a> To that end, Form 27 requires that the patent holder complete the following information:</p>
<p>The patented invention:</p>
<blockquote>(i) { } Worked { } Not worked [Tick (✓) mark the relevant box]</blockquote>
<blockquote>a. if not worked: reasons for not working and steps being taken for the working of the invention.</blockquote>
<blockquote>b. if worked: quantum and value (in Rupees), of the patented product:</blockquote>
<blockquote>manufactured in India</blockquote>
<blockquote>imported from other countries (give country wise details)</blockquote>
<blockquote>(ii) the licenses and sub-licenses granted during the year;</blockquote>
<blockquote>(iii) state whether the public requirement<a name="_ftnref100"></a> has been met partly/adequately/to the fullest extent at reasonable price.<a name="_ftnref101"></a></blockquote>
<p>Under Section 122, failing to submit a Form 27 or providing false information on the form may lead to a significant fine, imprisonment, or both.<a name="_ftnref102"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Though India’s working requirement first appeared in the Patents Act in 1970, it appears to have been ignored until around 2007. In 2007, the Controller first mentioned the local working of patented inventions in his annual report.<a name="_ftnref103"></a> The reports provided by the Controller between 2007 and 2009 indicate that, on average, less than 15 percent of Indian patents were being worked commercially.<a name="_ftnref104"></a> In 2009, 2013 and 2015, the Controller issued public notices calling on patent owners to comply with their obligations to file statements of working on Form 27.<a name="_ftnref105"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the penalties for failing to furnish information via Form 27 are steep, potentially resulting in fines or imprisonment,<a name="_ftnref106"></a> local critics claim that many patent holders fail to make the required filings and that the Indian government has never taken meaningful action to penalize this non-compliance.<a name="_ftnref107"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On February 12 2013, the Indian Patent Office announced plans to make Form 27 submissions for the year 2012 available to the public via the IPO website.<a name="_ftnref108"></a> As discussed in Part II.A below, that effort has been met with limited success.</p>
<h4><a name="IE"></a>E. Theory and Criticism of Form 27</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is little legislative or administrative history explaining the genesis of India’s unique Form 27 requirement. On one hand, a requirement that the details of patent working be disclosed by patent holders supports the goal of making unworked patents available for compulsory licensing in India, both to promote economic development and public access to patented products. A public registry of Forms 27 could also shift enforcement of India’s working requirement from the IPO and Controller to private sector entities with the greatest incentive to monitor the working of patents in their respective industries. This shift could relieve India’s resource-strapped administrative agencies of a potentially significant policing function, one that it does not appear they were actively enforcing in any event.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, it is not clear that these goals are well served by the current Form 27 framework, which has been criticized by a number of local commentators.<a name="_ftnref109"></a> For example, the IPAB ruled in <i>Natco</i> that the term worked must be decided on a case-by-case basis. How, then, should patent holders answer the first question posed in Form 27 and its sub-questions? How is a patent holder to know whether importation or licensing in a certain case will qualify as working a patent in India? If the Form is intended to increase transparency and certainty regarding the working of patents in India, it is hindered in so doing by the lack of a formal definition of working. This lack of clarity affects both patent holders, who are less able to order their affairs so as to comply with statutory working requirements, as well as potential compulsory licensees, who lack a clear assurance of when a compulsory license petition will be successful.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Commentators have raised a variety of additional critiques of the Form 27 framework. The U.S.-based Intellectual Property Owners Association, in a formal 2014 submission to the U.S. Trade Representative, has referred to the Form 27 process as “highly burdensome” and warns that the information disclosed in publicly-accessible forms could “result in even greater pressure on Indian authorities to compulsory license [patented] products.”<a name="_ftnref110"></a>Moreover, the association argues that Form 27 does not adequately recognize that some patents may be practiced by multiple products, or that multiple patents may be practiced by a single product.<a name="_ftnref111"></a> Thus, it may be unrealistic for patent holders to attribute a “specific commercial value” to specific patented features of complex technologies.<a name="_ftnref112"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, a number of Indian practitioners have raised concerns that the public disclosure of confidential plans for working patents through Form 27 may jeopardize or destroy valuable trade secrets and proprietary information.<a name="_ftnref113"></a> This threat could cause patent holders to disclose as little specific or valuable information as possible in their Form 27 filings, a result that is suggested by the findings discussed in Part III below.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Based on studies of filed Forms 27, Professor Shamnad Basheer,<a name="_ftnref114"></a> has concluded that India’s local working Form 27 submission requirements are not being taken seriously, particularly by international pharmaceutical companies.<a name="_ftnref115"></a> As a result, in 2015 Professor Basheer initiated public interest litigation in the High Court of Delhi against the Indian government for failure to comply with India’s patent laws.<a name="_ftnref116"></a> The suit seeks a judicial order compelling the Indian government “to enforce norms relating to the disclosure of ‘commercial working’ of patents by patentees and licensees” and to take action “against errant patentees and licensees for failure to comply with the mandate.”<a name="_ftnref117"></a> In 2016 an Indian patent attorney, Narendra Reddy Thappeta, filed an application to intervene in Basheer’s public interest suit, among other things, in order to raise issues regarding the difficulty of complying with Form 27 requirement for information and communication technology providers.<a name="_ftnref118"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite its perceived problems, Form 27 has proven useful in Indian proceedings. Notably, the information disclosed in Bayer’s Form 27 filings played an important role in the <i>Natco</i> case by helping to establish the low number of patients having access to the drug.<a name="_ftnref119"></a> Basheer refers to the working requirement as “a central pillar of the Indian patent regime” and views the disclosure requirements of Form 27 as essential tools to ensure that needed information is made public.<a name="_ftnref120"></a></p>
<h3><a name="II"></a>II. Empirical Study of Indian Form 27 Disclosures in the Mobile Device Industry</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In order to gain a better understanding of India’s patent working requirement, particularly patent holders’ compliance with the statutory requirement to declare information about the working of their patents through Form 27, we conducted an empirical study of all available Form 27 submissions for Indian patents in the mobile device sector. In this Part, we describe the objectives, background and methodology of this study.</p>
<h4><a name="IIA"></a>A. Background: Existing Data and Studies</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Every year, the Controller publishes an Annual Report containing statistics relating to patent filings in India. Since 2010, this report has contained data relating to Form 27 filings. This data indicates that a significant number of patent holders fail to file Form 27 as required. Below is a summary of this data as derived from the Controller’s Annual Reports from 2010 to 2016:</p>
<p><i>Table 1</i></p>
<p><i>Indian Controller of Patents Form 27 Filing Data (2010-2016)</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><figure><img alt="X" height="500" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Table_Body_1.png.pagespeed.ic.AmWItQDjL-.webp" width="500" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Under the Patents Act, a Form 27 must be filed every year with respect to every issued patent in India. Accordingly, the discrepancy between the number of patents in force for a given year and the number of Forms 27 filed likely indicates non-compliance with the filing requirement. Interestingly, it appears that instances of non-compliance dropped noticeably in years immediately after the Controller issued its public reminders to file Form 27 in December 2013, February 2013 and early 2015.</span><a name="_ftnref122"></a><span> Even so, compliance has not been complete even in these years.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above, Professor Shamnad Basheer has conducted two studies of Form 27 compliance in India. The first study, released in April 2011, focused on the pharmaceutical sector.<a name="_ftnref123"></a> The researchers selected seven pharmaceutical products directed at either cancer or hepatitis, all of which were subject either to Indian litigation or patent office oppositions and were patented in India between 2006 and 2008. They then collected Form 27 filings relating to each of these patents through a series of Right to Information (RTI) petitions to the Indian Patent Office (IPO).<a name="_ftnref124"></a> Based on the Forms produced by the IPO in response to these requests, the researchers found significant non-compliance with Form 27 filing requirements: some firms failed to file forms in some years, while some forms that were filed were incomplete.<a name="_ftnref125"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Professor Basheer’s second study had a broader scope, covering a total of 141 patents: 52 patents held by 13 firms in the pharmaceutical sector, 52 patents held by 7 firms in the telecommunications sector, and 37 patents held by 4 institutions which are claimed to have arisen from publicly-financed research.<a name="_ftnref126"></a> The researchers used series of RTI petitions to collect a total of 263 Forms 27 corresponding to these patents filed between 2009 and 2012.<a name="_ftnref127"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Based on a total of 141 patents, full compliance with Form 27 filing requirements would have yielded 423 Forms 27 over the three-year period studied. The total of 263 Forms identified indicates a non-compliance ratio of approximately 38%,<a name="_ftnref128"></a> assuming that all filed forms were produced by the IPO. A review of the reported data<a name="_ftnref129"></a> indicates that some firms, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, were assiduous in filing Forms 27. For example, Genentech and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, with two patents each, each filed six Forms 27, suggesting full compliance. Other firms, however, fell far short of this measure. Apple, for example, with four patents, filed only one Form.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to raw filing statistics, Prof. Basheer investigates the quality of the disclosures made in individual Forms 27. He finds that significant numbers of filed Forms “were grossly incomplete, incomprehensible or inaccurate.”<a name="_ftnref130"></a> For instance, numerous forms failed to indicate how patents were being worked or the quantity, value or place of manufacture of patented products as required by the Form.<a name="_ftnref131"></a> In addition, of forty-two Forms that disclosed non-working of a patent, twenty-eight (65%) failed to offer any reason for non-working.<a name="_ftnref132"></a> Though the raw data underlying these conclusions does not appear to be publicly available, choice excerpts from a few Forms are offered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the prior studies cited above suggest that there are substantial non-compliance issues with Form 27 practice in India, additional data is required to develop a more complete understanding of this issue. The Controller’s annual report data is provided only at a gross level and lacks any detail regarding compliance. Prof. Basheer’s pioneering studies, while first alerting the public to the problems of non-compliance, cover only small, non-random samples of patents and end prior to the general online availability of Forms 27.</p>
<h4><a name="IIB"></a>B. Methodology</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this study, we sought to assess annual Form 27 submissions across a comprehensive set of patents and a substantial time frame. To do so, we utilized a set of 4,052 Indian patents identified by Contreras and LakshanÈ as of February 2015 in a prior study of the Indian mobile device patent landscape (Landscape Study).<a name="_ftnref133"></a> Another 367 patents pertaining to mobile device technology, which were not included in the original Landscape Study, were also identified by an independent contracted search firm. In the aggregate, we analyzed 4,419 Indian patents issued as of February 2015 in the mobile device sector, which we believe to represent the large majority of issued Indian patents in this sector as of the date selected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We identified Form 27 filings with respect to each such patent through searches<a name="_ftnref134"></a> of two public online databases maintained by the Indian Patent Office: Indian Patent Advanced Search System (“InPASS”) and Indian Patent Information Retrieval System (“IPAIRS”).<a name="_ftnref135"></a> We manually eliminated duplicate results obtained from these two databases.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Our initial searches in 2015 yielded Form 27 submissions for only 1,999 out of 4,419 patents. These searches yielded no Forms 27 for some firms known to be significant patent holders in the mobile devices industry. To attempt to locate the missing forms, LakshanÈ, through the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), submitted two formal requests to the IPO located in Mumbai under the Indian Right to Information (“RTI”) Act of 2005. The first RTI application was submitted on June 10, 2015, requesting Form 27 information for over 800 patents.<a name="_ftnref136"></a> On June 17, the IPO replied with generic instructions on how to find Form 27 submissions online.<a name="_ftnref137"></a> A second RTI application was filed on March 11, 2016.<a name="_ftnref138"></a> The second request sought Form 27 filings pertaining to 61 of the remaining patents.<a name="_ftnref139"></a> These 61 patents were selected to represent a sample of patents held by the full cross-section of patent holders identified in the Landscape Study. In April 2016, the IPO replied that, due to internal resource constraints, it could only provide CIS with Forms 27 for eleven (11) of the requested patents.<a name="_ftnref140"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nevertheless, a few days after IPO’s reply, Form 27 submissions pertaining to patents in the Landscape Study started appearing on InPASS and IPAIRS. We repeated the search for Forms 27 corresponding to all 4,419 patents in our dataset in August 2016 and obtained a total of 4,935 Forms 27 corresponding to a total of 3,126 patents (an increase of 1,127 patents over the initial search).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All Forms 27 that we accessed were downloaded as PDF files or original image files and manually entered into a text-searchable spreadsheet maintained at CIS.<a name="_ftnref141"></a> All information from the Forms 27 was transcribed into the spreadsheet, including all textual descriptions of patent working and licensing. The results were then analyzed as described in Part III.A below.</p>
<h4><a name="IIC"></a>C. Limitations</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The present study was limited by the technical capabilities of the IPO’s online Form 27 repository.<a name="_ftnref142"></a> As described above, we found significant gaps in posted Forms 27 in our initial search, and it took a formal RTI application to spur the IPO to upload additional forms. Yet, we still identified 1,400 fewer Forms 27 than issued patents in the mobile devices category. The degree to which these missing forms arise from abandoned or expired patents, or additional failures of the IPO to upload filed forms, is unclear. Other than the IPO web site, there is no practical way to identify or access Forms 27 filed with the IPO. Technical issues with the InPASS and IPAIRS databases were constant challenges during this study. The databases were frequently unavailable, produced conflicting results, and were subject to numerous runtime errors and failures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite these technical challenges, we believe that we have identified a large segment of filed Forms 27 covering Indian patents held by all major patent holders in the mobile device sector. We hope that this study will further encourage the IPO to improve the regularity and reliability of its Form 27 database.</p>
<h3><a name="III"></a>III. Findings</h3>
<p>In this Section, we describe the findings of our empirical collection analysis of Forms 27 pertaining to Indian patents in the mobile device sector.</p>
<h4><a name="IIIA"></a>A. Aggregated Data ñ Forms Found and Missing</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above, we used a dataset comprising 4,419 Indian patents in the mobile device sector issued as of February 2015. Of these, at least 107 patents were likely expired prior to the date on which a Form 27 would have been filed,<a name="_ftnref143"></a> leaving 4,312 patents for which at least one Form 27 could have been filed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We were able to identify and obtain a total of 4,916 valid Forms 27<a name="_ftnref144"></a>which corresponded to 3,126 of these patents, leaving 1,186 Indian patents for which a Form 27 could have been filed, but was not found. This total represents 27.5% of the patents for which at least one Form 27 could have been filed: a significant portion of the total number of patents in the field, and within the general range of missing Forms identified by both the Controller and Basheer (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Based on the year of grant of each of the 4,312 patents identified in the mobile device sector as to which a Form 27 could have been filed, we determined that a total of 24,528 Forms 27 should have been filed with respect to these patents.<a name="_ftnref145"></a> This figure represents the sum of total Forms 27 that could have been filed for each such patent, which ranges from a low of one to a high of eight Forms 27 per patent. In our sample, no single patent was associated with more than five Forms 27. As noted above, we obtained a total of 4,935 Forms 27 filed with respect to 3,126 patents, representing only 20.1% of the total Forms 27 that should have been filed and made available with respect to the 4,312 patents studied. Figure 1 below compares the number of Forms 27 filed in each year since 2009 with the number of Forms 27 that should have been filed each year based on the number of mobile device patents in force from year to year.</p>
<p><i>Figure 1</i></p>
<p><i>Actual vs. Required Form 27 Filings, by year </i><i>(based on number of mobile device patents in force)</i></p>
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<p><figure><img alt="Graph of Forms Filed in 2009-2016" height="500" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/400x500xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_Graphic_1.png.pagespeed.ic.FfVWJPa0FL.webp" width="400" /></figure></p>
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<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As shown in Figure 1, Form 27 filings have fallen well below the required number every year. In 2009, the first year in which Forms 27 were filed in any numbers, only 36 Forms were filed, representing only 2.8% of the 1,302 Forms that should have been filed based on the number of mobile device patents in force that year. By 2013, the number of Forms filed rose to 2,389, representing 70.7% of the 3,379 Forms that should have been filed. This ratio declined again in 2014 to 1,392 Forms out of a total of 3,639 (38.3%). Data for 2015 and 2016 are likely incomplete given the February 2015 cutoff for patents in our study. We also expect that many of the 1,186 “missing” Forms 27 were filed more recently and have not yet been uploaded by the IPO in a searchable format.</p>
<p>One possible explanation for the beginning of filings in 2009 and the significant jump in filings in 2013 may be the Controller’s public notifications of the need to file Forms 27 in 2009 and 2013.<a name="_ftnref146"></a></p>
<p>Figure 2 below illustrates the number of issued <i>patents</i> in the mobile device sector for which Forms 27 were found and missing, categorized by patent holder (assignee). Complete data is contained in the Appendix, Table A1.</p>
<p><i>Figure 2</i></p>
<p><i>Forms 27 (Identified and Missing) Per Assignee</i></p>
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<p><figure><img alt="X" height="500" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/500x500xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Image_Body_Figure_2_.png.pagespeed.ic.BrOpEsIv3V.webp" width="500" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
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<p> </p>
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<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As shown in Figure 2, missing Forms 27 were distributed among most holders of Indian patents in the mobile device sector. Of the 40 firms identified as holding issued mobile device patents, Forms were missing for 37 of these (92.5%). In most cases, more Forms 27 were found than missing. In a few cases, however (most notably Philips), more Forms 27 were missing than found. In the case of four large patent holders (Qualcomm, Siemens, Philips and Samsung), more than 100 Forms 27 were missing. Forms 27 were missing for patents with issuance dates ranging from 2004 to 2015.<a name="_ftnref147"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are several possible reasons that Forms 27 may not have been identified for all issued Indian patents. One possibility, is non-compliance by the patent holder. This is likely the case with respect to the early years (2009-2010), when filing requirements were not yet normalized. However, in more recent years, the following factors suggest that patent holder non-compliance is <i>not</i> a significant cause of missing Forms 27 in the IPO database: (1) Forms 27 were missing for nearly all patent holders across the board, (2) large patent holders filed hundreds of Forms 27 and were clearly aware of their filing requirements, (3) the incremental cost of filing Forms 27 is minimal, and (4) in most cases, large patent holders simply copy text from one form to another (not in itself ideal, see below), requiring little incremental effort to file additional forms. Rather, given our experience with IPO during this study (see Methodology, above), we expect that the missing forms are due largely to the IPO’s failure to upload Forms 27 to its web site in a timely and reliable manner, and the dropping of Forms 27 once uploaded.</p>
<h4><a name="IIIB"></a>B. Working Status</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above, we reviewed 4,935 Forms 27 filed with respect to 3,126 patents in the mobile device sector. Figure 3 below illustrates the number of patents for which Forms 27 were filed and which the assignee designated that the patent was worked versus not worked (or, in a few cases, made no indication of working status).<a name="_ftnref148"></a></p>
<p><i>Figure 3</i></p>
<p><i>Working Status, by Assignee</i></p>
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<p><figure><img alt="X" height="500" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/500x500xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Image_Body_Figure_3.png.pagespeed.ic.-INHJW2qMm.webp" width="500" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
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<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These results suggest that different patentees have developed significantly different strategies regarding their Form 27 filings. For example, Qualcomm, the largest holder of patents in the mobile device sector (1,298 patents, 993 of which have associated Forms 27), represents that nearly all of its patents (986, 99.3%) are being worked. Samsung, on the other hand, holds the second-highest number of patents (551 patents, 430 of which have associated Forms 27). Yet Samsung claims that it is working only 12 of its patents (2.3%). Clearly, these two patentees are employing different strategies regarding the declaration of working. A glance at Figure 3 suggests that some patentees such as RIM (now renamed Blackberry) follow Qualcomm’s approach of declaring most patents to be worked, while others (Ericsson, LG, Motorola, Panasonic, Philips, Siemens) follow Samsung’s approach and declare most patents not to be worked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course, one might reason that there may be some difference between the patents themselves, and that the patentees’ declarations may simply reflect the fact that some firms’ patents are used more pervasively in India. This conjecture, however, is unlikely. Most of the patentees studied are large multinationals whose patents cover the same products. Many of these patents are declared as essential to the same technical standards. Moreover, given the generally ambiguous evidence proffered by patentees supporting their designated working status (see Part III.C, below), we doubt there are substantial enough differences among the patentees’ portfolios to account for the significant divide in declarations of working status.</p>
<h4><a name="IIIC"></a>C. Descriptive Responses</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above,<a name="_ftnref149"></a> Form 27 requires the patentee to disclose whether or not a patent is being worked in India. If so, the patentee must disclose the number and amount of revenue attributable to products covered by the patent that are manufactured in India and are imported from other countries. If the patent is not being worked, the patentee must explain why and describe what steps are being taken to work the invention. In both cases, the patentee must also identify licenses and sublicenses granted and state how it is meeting public demand for products at a reasonable price.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As first observed by Basheer, there is widespread non-compliance with these reporting and disclosure requirements.<a name="_ftnref150"></a> We largely confirm this result. Below is a summary of our findings with respect to the descriptive responses for the 4,935 Forms 27 that we reviewed.</p>
<h5><a name="IIIC1"></a>1. Working Status Not Disclosed</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For a surprising number of Forms 27 (95 or 3%), the working status of the relevant patent was not designated (i.e., neither the box for “worked” nor “not worked” was checked by the patentee). Table 1 below shows the patentees that filed Forms 27 in this manner.</p>
<p><i>Table 1</i></p>
<p><i>Forms 27 Failing to Disclose Working Status</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><figure><img alt="X" height="400" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Table_Body_2.png.pagespeed.ic.vT6PSYutGl.webp" width="400" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Clearly, these sophisticated multinational firms understood the filing requirements for Form 27 and, in most cases, filed additional Forms 27 that did indicate whether the relevant patent was or was not being worked. Thus, the principal reason for filing a Form 27 without designating its working status appears to be the patentee’s uncertainty regarding the patent’s working status in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Illustrating this point, Motorola declares in several of its Forms of this nature that “[i]t is not possible to determine accurately whether the patented invention has been worked in India or not, due to the nature of the invention.”<a name="_ftnref151"></a> While Motorola fails to explain how “the nature of the invention” makes it impossible to determine whether or not the patent is being worked, it uses this litany in most of its Forms 27 that fail to disclose working status. Ericsson adopts a slightly different approach, stating that while it is actively seeking opportunities to work the patent, there may have been some uses of the patented technology.<a name="_ftnref152"></a> Thus, again, it is uncertain whether the patent is being worked or not. Presumably, these patentees felt that it was preferable to file an incomplete, rather than incorrect, Form 27.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Interestingly, most patentees never revised their working non-designations over the years. Thus, if a patent was not designated as worked or not worked in the first year a Form 27 was filed, subsequent filings for that patent typically duplicated the language of prior years’ filings. One exception appears to be Google, which acquired Motorola’s patent portfolio in 2012. For Indian Patent No. 243210 issuing in 2010, Motorola filed Forms 27 in 2010 and 2011 without indicating whether or not the patent was worked. However, in 2013, Google/Motorola filed a Form 27 for the same patent indicating that it was <i>not</i> worked.</p>
<p>Google has elected to opt for non-working when it is uncertain of the working status of a patent. For example, the following qualified language is used in several Forms in which Google indicates that a patent is not being worked:</p>
<blockquote style="text-align: justify; ">Based on a reasonable investigation, it is Google’s belief that the patent has not been worked in India. The uncertainty arises because Google’s products and services are covered by numerous patents belonging to Google’s very large worldwide patent portfolio, and Google does not routinely keep track of which individual patent is being employed in Google’s products and services. The present statement is being filed on the basis of Google’s current estimation, but Google requests opportunities to revise the statement, should it transpire at a later date that the patent is being worked contrary to their present belief.<a name="_ftnref153"></a></blockquote>
<h5><a name="IIIC2"></a>2. Patents Not Worked</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We examined a total of 2,380 Forms 27 that indicated the relevant patents were not being worked. If a patent is specified as not being worked, the patentee must disclose the reasons for the failure to work the patent, and describe what steps are being taken to work the invention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a small number of cases, the patentee offered some plausible explanation for non-working of the patent. The most common of these, claimed by in Ericsson in thirty-six Forms 27, was that the underlying technology was still under development,<a name="_ftnref154"></a> making working impossible, at least until that development was completed. In a handful of other Forms 27 (6), Ericsson and Nokia have claimed that a patent was not being worked because it covered a technology awaiting approval or endorsement by a standards body.<a name="_ftnref155"></a> In the vast majority of cases, however, no explanation is offered as to why a particular patent is not being worked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With respect to disclosure of the patentees’ plans for working a non-worked patent, most simply include stock language stating that they are “actively seeking” or “on the lookout for” commercial working opportunities in the future.<a name="_ftnref156"></a> Alcatel-Lucent adopted an even more passive and non-specific stance toward its plans to work patents, stating in numerous Forms 27 (applicable to 29 patents) that “as and when there is a specific requirement, the patent will be worked.”<a name="_ftnref157"></a></p>
<h5><a name="IIIC3"></a>3. Varied Interpretations of Working</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We reviewed 2,425 Forms 27 that listed the subject patent as being worked. In such cases, the patentee must disclose the number and amount of revenue attributable to products covered by the patent, whether manufactured in India or imported from other countries. A tiny percentage of the Forms 27 that we reviewed provided this information in the form requested. As we discuss in our conclusions, below, it is likely that the format of the required response is simply unsuitable for complex products such as mobile devices. Below we summarize and classify the types of responses that patentees offered regarding the working of their patents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>a. Specific Information</i> ñ Very few Forms 27 actually provide the specific product volume and value information required by the Form. The only patentee that provided the specific information required by Form 27 was Panasonic, which, with respect to the only two patents that it claimed to work (of a total of 66 Indian patents as to which a Form 27 was found), listed specific product volumes and values.<a name="_ftnref158"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Other patentees disclosed specifics regarding the technical details of their worked patents, but declined to provide product volume and value information. For example, Ericsson discloses: “the stated patent covers a specific detail of data transmission to a mobile in a GSM or WCDMA mobile network where said transmission of data is not performed if the mobile has not enough battery capacity left for the transfer.”<a name="_ftnref159"></a> Ericsson goes on, however, to explain that because this patented technology is intended to be used in conjunction with other patented technologies, it is not possible to provide the financial value of the worked patent “in isolation.”<a name="_ftnref160"></a> Oracle also adopts this approach of offering specific product information, while declining to estimate associated sales volume or revenue.<a name="_ftnref161"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>b. Relevance to a Standard</i> ñ In several cases, a patentee describes its patented invention by reference to an industry standard. For example, Nokia-Siemens utilize the following description for one patent that is allegedly worked: “Invention relevant for IEEE 802.16-2009 and IEEE 802.16-2011 standard.”<a name="_ftnref162"></a> While the patentee offers no additional information regarding the working of the patent, the desired implication, presumably, is that the patent covers an aspect of the standard, and if the standard is implemented in products sold in India (as it likely is), then the patent is thereby worked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some patentees offer less specific information regarding the standards that their patents cover. For example, Ericsson states in one Form that “This patent is essential for a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard and Ericsson is also, subject to reciprocity, committed to make its standard essential patents available through licensing on fair, reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.”<a name="_ftnref163"></a> In this formulation, the patentee appears both to be implying working of the patent by virtue of the implicit inclusion of the standard in Indian products, and also to be making known its willingness to enter into licenses in the future on FRAND terms. This future-looking perspective, however, is not responsive to the information called for by Form 27 for patents that are allegedly being worked, and implies that the patent is not, in fact, being worked yet in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>c. Indian Licensees</i> ñ Some licensees, Qualcomm in particular, disclose that they have licensed their patents to Indian firms. These licenses are disclosed in Qualcomm’s Forms 27 for various patents.<a name="_ftnref164"></a> However, it is not clear what manufacturing or other activity is carried out by these Indian licensees. Ericsson, which has been engaged in litigation with numerous Indian and Chinese vendors of mobile devices in India, reports that it is receiving royalties from at least two of these entities under court order, though it stops short of stating that these entities are licensed under Ericsson’s patents.<a name="_ftnref165"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>d. Worldwide Licensees</i> ñ In addition to Indian licensees, Qualcomm discloses that, as of 2014, it had granted worldwide CDMA-related patent licenses to more than 225 licensees around the world, and that CDMA-based devices were imported into India from “countries such as Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States.”<a name="_ftnref166"></a> While Qualcomm is not specific regarding the linkage, if any, between its worldwide licensees and mobile devices sold in India, it reports that more than 37.7 million CDMA-based mobile devices were sold in India in 2014 at an average price of USD $161.94.<a name="_ftnref167"></a> And though not express, the implication of these data is that all CDMA-based mobile devices sold in India somehow utilize Qualcomm’s patented technology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The granting of worldwide licenses raises an interesting question regarding local working of patents. As Ericsson (which claims to have executed more than 100 patent licensing agreements) explains, its global licensees are, by definition, licensed in every country, including India. Because their global license agreements “are operational in India”, the licensees are theoretically authorized to work Ericsson’s patents in India. But it is not clear that this means that the patents are <i>actually</i> being worked in India. Simply granting a worldwide patent license does not mean that the licensed patent is being worked, just as the issuance of a patent in a country does not mean that the patent is being worked in that country.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>e. Too Big to Know</i> ñ Some patentees claim that they or their patent portfolios are simply too vast to determine how particular patents are being worked in India, or the number or value of patented products sold in India. Nokia, for example, uses the following language in 82 separate Form 27 filings: “Nokia’s products and services are typically covered by tens or hundreds of the nearly 10,000 patents in Nokia’s worldwide portfolio. Nokia does not keep records of which individual patents are being employed in each of Nokia’s products or services, and is therefore unable to report the quantum and value of its products or services which employ the patented invention.”<a name="_ftnref168"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a similar vein, Ericsson notes that its patented technologies are intended to be used in combination with a large number of other technologies patented by Ericsson and others. Accordingly, “it is close to impossible to prove an indication of specific or even close to accurate financial value of the said patent in isolationÖ”<a name="_ftnref169"></a> This said, Ericsson goes on to disclose its total product sales in India (3.09 billion SEK in 2013) and also notes that it earns revenue from licensing its patents (without disclosing financial data).<a name="_ftnref170"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>f. On the Lookout</i> ñ Curiously, some patentees that claim to be working their patents use the same language regarding their search for working opportunities as they and others use with respect to non-worked patents. For example, Ericsson makes this statement regarding some of the patents that it is allegedly working in India: “The patentee is in the lookout for appropriate working opportunities in a large scale although there may have been some use of the patented technology in conjunction with other patented technologies.”<a name="_ftnref171"></a> This language is uncertain and does not seem to support a claim that, to the patentee’s knowledge, the patent is actually being worked. At best, it expresses optimism toward the possibility of finding an opportunity to work the patent in the future.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>g. Information Provided Upon Request</i> ñ Some patentees decline to provide any information about the working of their patents in Forms 27, but offer to provide this information if requested (presumably by a governmental authority).<a name="_ftnref172"></a> Some patentees further explain their hesitation to provide this information in Form 27 on the basis that the information is confidential, but commit to provide it if requested.<a name="_ftnref173"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>h. Corporate PR</i> ñ Some patentees, in addition to, or in lieu of, providing information about their patents, offer general corporate information of a kind that would often be found in corporate press releases and annual reports. For example, Research in Motion offers this glowing corporate report in lieu of any information about its allegedly worked patents:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Patentee is a leading designer, manufacturer and marketer of innovative wireless solutions for the worldwide mobile communications market. Through the development of integrated hardware, software and services that support multiple wireless network standards, the patentee provides platforms and solutions for seamless access to time-sensitive information including email, phone, SMS messaging, internet and intranet-based applications. Patentee’s technology also enables a broad array of third party developers and manufacturers to enhance their products and services with wireless connectivity. Patentee’s portfolio of award-winning products, services and embedded technologies are used by thousands of organizations around the world (including in India) and include the Blackberry wireless platform, the RIM Wireless Handheld product line, software development tools, radio-modems and software/hardware licensing agreements.<a name="_ftnref174"></a></p>
<p>RIM then goes on to explain that it has so many patents that identifying how the instant patent is worked in India is impossible (see “Too Big to Know” above).</p>
<p>Ericsson likewise offers a bit of self-serving corporate history in twenty-eight different Forms 27 in which it states:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ericsson’s history in India goes back 112 years during which period Ericsson has contributed immensely to the telecommunication field in India. Ericsson provides, maintains and services network for several major government and private operators in India. At present, Ericsson has more than 20,000 employees across 25 offices in India. Further, Ericsson has established manufacturing units, global service organization and R&D facilities in India…<a name="_ftnref175"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>i. Just Don’t Know</i> ñ Some patentees simply assert that they are unable to determine information regarding working of their patents, without any explanation why. Alcatel-Lucent, for example, offers the following unsatisfying disclosure with respect to the eight patents that it claims to be working in India: “The patentee is unable to particularly determine and provide with reasonable accuracy the quantum and value of the patented invention worked in India, including its manufacture and import from other countries during the year 2014.”<a name="_ftnref176"></a></p>
<p><i>j. No Description</i> ñ Some patentees simply omit to provide any information whatsoever regarding the working of their patents, even when patents are allegedly worked.<a name="_ftnref177"></a></p>
<h5><a name="IIIC4"></a>4. Changes in Status</h5>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While some of the “boilerplate” responses provided by patentees in their filed Forms 27 might suggest that patentees give little thought to the content of Form 27 filings, we identified a small but non-trivial number of patents (4.1%) as to which the patentee changed the working status, either from worked to not worked, or vice versa. Overall, we identified 128 instances in which the working status of a patent was changed from one year to the next. Of these, 51 went from worked to not worked, and 77 went from not worked to worked. Such changes suggest that patentees give at least some thought to the manner in which they work their patents, and seek to correct inaccurate disclosures, though these observed variances could also be attributed to changes in law firm, changes in interpretation of filing requirements or mere clerical errors and inconsistencies in filings from year to year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 17 cases, the status of the same patent changed <i>twice</i> over the course of three or more Forms 27. Almost all of these three-stage “flip-flops” moved from worked to not worked to worked, with the aberrant ‘not worked’ year occurring in 2013. In fact, 2013 seems to have been a popular year for changes in working status, whether because of heightened awareness, and therefore greater scrutiny of Form 27 filings due to the Controller General’s public notice of that year, or changes in interpretation of filing requirements occasioned by a widely-attended seminar or article. But whatever the cause, it seems highly unlikely that, over the course of three years, a single patent could go from being worked in India, to not being worked, to being worked again. As a result, we attribute these flip-flop changes primarily to filing errors and inconsistencies rather than genuine attempts to correct inaccurate disclosures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Corresponding to changes in working status, patentees often changed the textual descriptions of working or non-working contained in their Forms 27. These changes usually involved adding stock language regarding working or non-working to a Form 27 that previously contained no descriptive information. However, in some cases the patentee’s descriptive text bears little relation to the purported working status of the patent. For example, as illustrated in Table 2 below, a single patentee’s disclosures with respect to two different patents across three filings employ the same textual descriptions but for <i>different</i> working status.</p>
<p><i>Table 2 </i><i>Comparison of Working Status Descriptions</i></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><figure><img alt="X" height="500" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Table_Body_3.png.pagespeed.ic.95TVjrA-CV.webp" width="400" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As illustrated by Table 2, the patentee’s working description (Text A) is identical in 2011 and 2014 for both patents, though in 2014 one patent is allegedly worked and the other is not. Likewise, in 2013, one patent is worked and the other is not, yet the textual description for both is identical (Text B). Putting aside, for a moment, the fact that neither Text A not Text B is particularly responsive to the information requirements of Form 27, it is puzzling why the patentee would use the same stock language to describe both working and non-working of its patents. The only consistency that emerges from this example is across filing years, suggesting, perhaps, that the textual descriptions used in these forms was more dependent on the person or firm making the filing in a particular year than the alleged working status of the patents in question.</span></p>
<h3><a name="IV"></a>IV. Discussion and Analysis</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Professor Basheer charges that significant numbers of Forms 27 are “grossly incomplete, incomprehensible or inaccurate,” and has sued the Indian Patent Office to compel it to improve its monitoring and enforcement of Form 27 filings.<a name="_ftnref178"></a> Our results confirm that there are overall weaknesses in the Indian Form 27 system, several of which reveal deeper problems with the implementation of India’s patent working requirement.</p>
<h4><a></a>A. Process Weaknesses</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Though filings in support of India’s patent working obligation have been required since 1972, and Form 27 has been on the books since 2003, meaningful filings of Form 27 did not begin until the Controller’s first public notice on this topic in 2009. In the following eight years, Form 27 filings have increased, but are still well below required levels (see Part III.A, above). Even at their peak in 2013, we located only 70.7% of required Forms 27 in the mobile device sector, a sector characterized by sophisticated firms that are advised by counsel. Filing ratios were significantly lower in every other year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are several possible reasons for these discrepancies. First are possible issues with the IPO’s electronic access to records. As noted in Part II, we experienced significant difficulties obtaining Forms 27 through the IPO’s web site. It was only after two RTI requests that significant numbers of Forms 27 were made accessible online. It is possible that the IPO has additional Forms 27 in its files that have not been made accessible electronically. For a system the purpose of which is to make information about non-worked patents available to the public, such lapses are inexcusable, particularly given that India’s current working requirement is nearing its 50th anniversary. Accordingly, we expect that improvements to the IPO’s electronic filing and access systems may improve the profile of Form 27 filing compliance.</p>
<h4><a name="IVB"></a>B. Non-Enforcement and Non-Compliance</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As noted above, we expect that some portion of the apparent non-compliance with India’s Form 27 requirement is attributable to the inaccessibility of properly filed Forms 27. However, it is also likely that some portion of the deficit in available Forms 27 is due to actual non-compliance by patentees. Though there are stiff penalties on the books for failing to comply with Form 27 filing requirements, including fines and imprisonment,<a name="_ftnref179"></a> we are unaware of any enforcement action by the IPO or any other Indian governmental authority regarding such non-compliance.<a name="_ftnref180"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given that records of all issued Indian patents are available online, and that all filed Forms 27 should also be available online, it would not seem particularly difficult for the IPO to implement an automatic monitoring and alert system warning patentees that they have not filed required Forms 27. Such a system would likely increase compliance substantially. However, we find no evidence that the IPO monitors or otherwise keeps track of Form 27 filings or seeks to contact patentees who fail to meet their filing requirements. As a result, it is not surprising that non-compliance is widespread.</p>
<h4><a name="IVC"></a>C. Uncertainty Surrounding Working and Complex Products</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When Forms 27 are filed, many of them lack any meaningful detail regarding the manner in which patents are worked or the reasons that they are not worked. While the descriptive requirements of Form 27 are quite clear, even the largest and most sophisticated patentees seemingly struggle with determining whether or not a patent is actually worked in India and, if so, how to quantify its working in the manner required by the Form. There are several reasons that this degree of uncertainty exists. First, India has no clear statutory, regulatory or judicial guidelines for interpreting its working requirement. As the court noted in <i>Natco</i>, the working determination must be made on a case by case basis, with attention to the specific details of the patent in question.<a name="_ftnref181"></a> This open-ended standard offers little guidance to firms regarding the degree to which importation or licensing may qualify as working a patent, or even what degree of assembly, packaging or distribution within India will so qualify.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, some patentees have taken the position in their Forms 27 that merely licensing a patent to an Indian firm qualifies as working the patent in India.<a name="_ftnref182"></a> Some have even gone so far as to take the position that granting a <i>worldwide</i> patent license qualifies as working the licensed patent in India, given that India is part of the world.<a name="_ftnref183"></a> These conclusions seem stretched, but they have not, to our knowledge, ever been challenged by the IPO or any private party.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What’s more, several patentees take the position that it is impossible to determine the value attributable to a single patent that covers only one element of a complex standard or product (“too big to know”).<a name="_ftnref184"></a> While these patentees may disclose the size of their large patent portfolios or total Indian product revenues, these figures do not provide the information required by Form 27 relative to the individual patent that is claimed to be worked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given the degree of uncertainty surrounding the Indian working requirement and how it is satisfied, it is not surprising that the disclosures contained in most Forms 27 are meaningless boilerplate that convey little or no useful information about the relevant patents or products. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is even <i>possible</i> for a willing patentee to provide the product and revenue information currently required by Form 27 for complex, multi-patent products such a mobile devices.<a name="_ftnref185"></a> It may be time for the IPO to revisit the information requirements of Form 27, which were seemingly developed with products covered by one or a handful of patents in mind, to more suitable address complex electronic and communications products that may be covered by hundreds or thousands of patents each.</p>
<h4><a name="IVD"></a>D. Strategic Behavior</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an environment of extreme uncertainty and low enforcement, it is not surprising that patentees have developed self-serving strategies to achieve their internal goals while arguably complying with the requirements of Form 27. Evidence of strategic behavior can be seen clearly in the divide between those patentees that claim that they are working most of their patents and those that claim that they are not.<a name="_ftnref186"></a> We can assume that there are not significant differences in the portfolio make-up among these different patentees, so the large difference between their ratios of worked and non-worked patents must be attributable primarily to decisions made to further corporate interests.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For example, it is possible that those patentees claiming significant working of their patents do so in order to avoid requests for compulsory licenses against their patents. Such patentees may wish to exploit the Indian market themselves, or license others to do so on terms of their choosing, so may seek to avoid compulsory licensing on terms dictated by the government. Those patentees claiming significant non-working, on the other hand, may actively be <i>seeking</i> applications for compulsory licensing. Why? Perhaps because these patentees do not plan to sell products in India and see little prospect of entering into commercial license agreements with Indian producers. Thus, their greatest prospect of any financial return on their patents may be a compulsory license. As unlikely as it sounds, they may be using Form 27 as a legally-sanctioned “To Let” sign for otherwise unprofitable patents.<a name="_ftnref187"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Whatever the underlying reasons are for patentee strategic decisions in the filing of Forms 27, IPO owes the public greater clarity regarding the formal requirements for working patents in India. It is only when disclosures are made in a consistent and understandable format that the public will acquire the knowledge about patent working that the Act intends for them to receive.</p>
<h4><a name="IVE"></a>E. Opportunities for Further Study</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is the first comprehensive and systematic study of reporting compliance with India’s patent working requirements. It covers only one industry sector: mobile devices. Expanding this study to additional industry sectors, particularly pharmaceuticals and biomedical products, would likely yield additional insights.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It would also be informative to revisit the instant set of patents in a few years time to determine whether increased IPO access to electronic records may alter the somewhat poor compliance landscape revealed by this study. That is, if a significant number of Forms 27 that have been filed are simply unavailable through the IPO’s web site, then hopefully continued information technology improvements at the IPO will improve availability in years to come.</p>
<h3><a name="conclusion"></a>Conclusion</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s annual Form 27 filing requirement is intended to provide the public with information regarding the working of patents in India so as to enable informed requests to be made for compulsory licenses of non-worked patents. While such a goal is laudable, it is not clear that this system is currently achieving the desired results.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the first systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to a key industry sector ñ mobile devices ñ we found significant under-reporting of patent working, likely due to some combination of systemic deficiencies and non-compliance by patentees. Thus, from 2009 to 2016, we could identify and access only 20.1% of Forms 27 that should have been filed in this sector, corresponding to 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, suggesting that defects in the Indian Patent Office’s online access system may play a role in the unavailability of some forms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But even among Forms 27 that were accessible, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Form and the Indian Patent Rules. Patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, some arguing that importation of products into India or licensing of Indian suppliers constituted working, while others even went so far as to argue that the granting of a worldwide license to a non-Indian firm constituted working in India. Several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the provision of information relating to individual patents, and instead provided gross revenue and product sale figures, together with historical anecdotes about their long histories in India. And many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their Forms without explanation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, likely encouraging non-compliance. Moreover, some of the complaints raised by patentees and industry observers regarding the structure of the Form 27 requirement itself have merit. Namely, patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. We hope that this study will contribute to the ongoing conversation in India regarding the most appropriate means for collecting and disseminating information regarding the working of patents.</p>
<h3><a name="appendix"></a>APPENDIX</h3>
<p>TABLE A1</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><figure><img alt="X" height="700" src="http://jipel.law.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/xNYU_JIPEL_Vol-7-No-1_1_Contreras_PatentWorkingRequirements_Table_Body_4.png.pagespeed.ic.Mcl57DRV78.webp" width="500" /></figure></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<div id="author">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_author"></a>Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation. JD (Harvard Law School), BSEE, BA (Rice University). The authors are grateful for constructive discussion and feedback at the 2016 Works in Progress in Intellectual Property conference at University of Washington, the 2017 International Intellectual Property Roundtable at NYU Law School, the 2017 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC) at Cardozo Law School, the Second International Conference on Standardization, Patents and Competition Issues at Jindal Global Law School, and a faculty workshop at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. We also thank Anubha Sinha, Shamnad Basheer, Nehaa Chaudhari, Kirti Gupta, Kshitij Kumar Singh, Marketa Trimble and Sai Vinod for their helpful input regarding this article, and Anna Liz Thomas and Nayana Dasgupta for valuable research assistance. The research for this article was conducted as part of the Pervasive Technologies Project at the Centre for Internet and Society, India, and has been supported, in part, by the International Development Research Centre (Canada), the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence at the University of Utah and Google, Inc. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.</p>
<p><a name="_author"></a>Program Officer, Centre for Internet and Society, India. Bachelor of Instrumentation Engineering (University of Mumbai).</p>
<p><a name="_author"></a>Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Utah. JD (University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law), BS, BA (Butler University).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a name="_ftn1"></a> Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., (2011) I.P.O. Order No. 1, at 6 (India).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a name="_ftn2"></a> <i>See id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn3"></a> The Natco case is one in a long line of cases in the ongoing “access to medicines” dispute, in which developing countries seek compulsory licenses for local use of lifesaving drugs that are patented by western pharmaceutical firms. <i>See, e.g.</i>, <span>Srividhya Ragavan, Patent and Trade Disparities in Developing Countries (2012)</span>; Charles R. McManis and Jorge L. Contreras, <i>Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access to Critical Technologies?</i>,<i> in</i> TRIPS and Developing Countries ñ Towards a New IP World Order? (Gustavo Ghidini, Rudolph J.R. Peritz & Marco Ricolfi, eds. 2014); Jerome H. Reichman, Comment<i>: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, </i>37 <span>J. L. Med. & Ethics </span>247, 250 (2009).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a name="_ftn4"></a> Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., <i>supra </i>note <a name="_ftnref"></a> at 6.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a name="_ftn5"></a> <i>See</i> Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, <span>India Code</span> (1970), ch. XVI, ß 84(1).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn6"></a> <i>See </i>Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, <i>From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property</i>, 36 <span>Mich. J. Int’l L.</span> 557, 576 (2015); <i>See also</i> Feroz Ali, <i>Picket Patents: Non-Working as an IP Abuse</i>, at *5, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732521">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732521</a> (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); <i>see also</i> Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, <i>Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements</i>, 19 M<span>inn. J. Int’l L. </span>275, 281 (2010).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a name="_ftn7"></a> Marketa Trimble, <i>Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives</i>, 6 U.C. Iʀᴠɪɴᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 483, 500-501 (2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a name="_ftn8"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 495.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p><a name="_ftn9"></a> Jorge L. Contreras & Rohini LakshanÈ, <i>Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey</i>, 50 <span>Vand. Transnat’l</span> L.J. 1 (2017). The data set used in the foregoing study can be found at <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dataset-patent-landscape-of-mobile-device-technologies-in-india">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dataset-patent-landscape-of-mobile-device-technologies-in-india</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a name="_ftn10"></a> Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 488. In England, royal patents were granted to foreigners who would teach their art to the local population<i>.</i> <i>Id.</i> at 488, 497. Venice provided monopoly rights and tax holidays for foreign inventors to immigrate and improve local industrialization. Ragavan, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p><a name="_ftn11"></a> <i>See </i>Ragavan, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 3; <i>see also</i> G.B. Reddy & Harunrashid A. Kadri, <i>Local Working of Patents ñ Law and Implementation in India</i>, 18 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 15, 15 (2013).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p><a name="_ftn12"></a> <i>See </i>Ragavan, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 3; <i>see also </i>Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 488.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p><a name="_ftn13"></a> <i>See </i>Ragavan, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 3; <i>see also </i>Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 16.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p><a name="_ftn14"></a> <i>See </i>Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 17; <i>see also</i> Ali, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at *9.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p><a name="_ftn15"></a> <i>See generally </i>Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, <i>Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute</i>, <span>27 Yale J. Int’l L.</span> 365, 371 (2002).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p><a name="_ftn16"></a> Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 498 (“In the United Kingdom in the 18th century ‘the requirement of compulsory working dropped into desuetude and its place was taken for all practical purposes, in particular in the practice of the law courts, by [the full disclosure] requirement’”) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p><a name="_ftn17"></a> Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 5(A)(1), March 20, 1883.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p><a name="_ftn18"></a> <i>See </i>Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 17; <i>see also </i>Champ & Attaran, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 371; Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 493ñ94.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p><a name="_ftn19"></a> Hague Revision to Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, World Intellectual Property Organization, art. (5)(A)(2), November 6, 1925.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p><a name="_ftn20"></a> <i>See </i>Champ & Attaran, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 372; <i>see also</i> Trimble, <i>supra</i>note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at *490-94 (tracing history of remedies for failure to meet working requirements, including forfeiture).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p><a name="_ftn21"></a> London Revision to Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 5(A)(4), June 2, 1934; <i>See</i> Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 494.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p><a name="_ftn22"></a> Stockholm Revision to Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 5(A)(2), July 14, 1967.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p><a name="_ftn23"></a> <i>See </i>Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 494-95;<i> see also</i> Janice M. Mueller, <i>The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation</i>, 68 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 491, 517-18 (2007)..</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p><a name="_ftn24"></a> <i>See </i>Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 494.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p><a name="_ftn25"></a> <i>See </i>Ragavan, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 65-66. <i>See generally</i> TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1c, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), <i>reprinted in </i>World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 365 (1995) [hereinafter “TRIPS Agreement”].</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p><a name="_ftn26"></a> Additionally, those countries that were not members of the Paris Union but are members of the WTO are therefore obligated to comply with the Paris Convention and its revisions under Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p><a name="_ftn27"></a> TRIPS Agreement, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, art. 27.1.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p><a name="_ftn28"></a> TRIPS Agreement, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, art. 30-31; <i>see also</i> <span>Ragavan, </span><i>supra</i>note <a name="_ftnref"></a>; McManis and Contreras, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p><a name="_ftn29"></a> <i>See generally </i>Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 496; Shamnad Basheer, <i>Making Patents Work: Of IP Duties and Deficient Disclosures</i>, 7 <span>Queen Mary J. Intell. Prop</span>. 3, 16-17 (2017).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p><a name="_ftn30"></a> Request for Consultations by the United States, <i>Brazil ñ Measures Affecting Patent Protection</i>, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000);<i> see also </i>Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 17; Trimble, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 496-497.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p><a name="_ftn31"></a> Champ & Attaran, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 380.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p><a name="_ftn32"></a> Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement defines the rights that may be conferred on patent owners.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p><a name="_ftn33"></a> Champ & Attaran, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 381-82.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn34">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn34"></a> <i>Id. </i>at 381. The two patented drugs that the Brazilian Ministry of Health threatened to grant compulsory licenses on were efavirenz and nelfinavir. These drugs are antiretroviral drugs used to treat AIDS. Geoff Dyer, <i>Brazil Defiant Over Cheap AIDS Drugs</i>, <span>Fin. Times</span>, Feb. 9, 2001, at 10.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn35">
<p><a name="_ftn35"></a> Barbara Crossette, <i>U.S. Drops Case Over AIDS Drugs in Brazil</i>, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2001), <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/world/us-drops-case-over-aids-drugs-in-brazil.html">http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/world/us-drops-case-over-aids-drugs-in-brazil.html</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn36">
<p><a name="_ftn36"></a> <span>Kalyan C. Kankanala, Arun K. Narasani & Vinita Radhakrishnan, Indian Patent Law & Practice</span> 1 (2010).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn37">
<p><a name="_ftn37"></a> <i>See</i> Mueller, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 509-511; <i>see also</i> <span>Ragavan</span>, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 31.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn38">
<p><a name="_ftn38"></a> Shri Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Report on the Revision of the Patents Law (September 1959) [hereinafter “Ayyangar Report”]; Ragavan,<i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 31-33.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn39">
<p><a name="_ftn39"></a> <span>P. Narayanan, Patent Law</span> 5 (4th ed. 2006).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn40">
<p><a name="_ftn40"></a> Ayyangar Report, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn41">
<p><a name="_ftn41"></a> <span>Ragavan</span>, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 35.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn42">
<p><a name="_ftn42"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 39-40.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn43">
<p><a name="_ftn43"></a> <i>See generally </i>The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970,<span> India Code</span> (1970).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn44">
<p><a name="_ftn44"></a> <i>See</i> <span>Ragavan, </span><i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 42-45 (summarizing changes effected by the 1970 law).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn45">
<p><a name="_ftn45"></a> The Patents Act, 1970 ß 83 (emphasis added).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn46">
<p><a name="_ftn46"></a> The Indian Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks, who will be referred to herein as the Controller for simplicity.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn47">
<p><a name="_ftn47"></a> The Patents Act, 1970, ß 84(1) (emphasis added). The three-year time period reflected in the Act is derived from Section 5(A)(4) of the Paris Convention (current numbering). <i>See</i> <i>supra </i>note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn48">
<p><a name="_ftn48"></a> The Patents Act, 1970 ß 84(1).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn49">
<p><a name="_ftn49"></a> <i>Id.</i> ß 90(c).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn50">
<p><a name="_ftn50"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn51">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn51"></a> <i>Id</i>. ß 89(3). While the language of Section 89 is couched in terms of the “reasonable requirements of the public,” it is interesting to note that the caption of the section reads “Revocation of patents by the Controller for non-working,” thus focusing more explicitly on the working requirement.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn52">
<p><a name="_ftn52"></a> The Patents Act, 1970 ß 89(1). The two-year time period reflected in the Act is derived from Section 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention (current numbering). <i>See supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a> and accompanying text.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn53">
<p><a name="_ftn53"></a> <i>See</i> India and the WTO, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Oʀɢ.,<a href="http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm">http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm</a>.<i> See generally </i>TRIPS Agreement.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn54">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn54"></a> India amended its 1970 Act in three amendments, corresponding to the transition periods permitted by the TRIPS Agreement. India played a significant role in establishing the TRIPS multi-year transition periods. <i>See </i>Mueller, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 518. For a discussion of India’s political and economic considerations underlying its support of compulsory licensing under TRIPS, <i>see</i> Omar Serrano & Mira Burri, <i>Making Use of TRIPS Flexibilities: Implementation and Diffusion of Compulsory Licensing Regimes in Brazil and India</i> (World Trade Inst. Working Paper No. 1 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn55">
<p><a name="_ftn55"></a> The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, <span>India Code</span> (2002).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn56">
<p><a name="_ftn56"></a> <i>Id</i>. ß 85.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn57">
<p><a name="_ftn57"></a> <i>Id.</i> ß 83(c).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn58">
<p><a name="_ftn58"></a> <i>Id</i>. ß 83(d)-(f).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn59">
<p><a name="_ftn59"></a> <i>Id</i>. ß 89.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn60">
<p><a name="_ftn60"></a> <i>Id</i>. ß 84(1) (emphasis added).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn61">
<p><a name="_ftn61"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn62">
<p><a name="_ftn62"></a> <i>Id.</i> ß 84(6).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn63">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn63"></a> <i>See </i>Thomas Cottier, Shaheeza Lalani & Michelangelo Temmerman, <i>Use It or Lose It: Assessing the Compatibility of the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Local Working Requirements</i>, 17 J. Int’l Econ. L. 437, 441 (2014).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn64">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn64"></a> <i>See </i>The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, <span>India Code</span> (1970), ß 90(2) (“No license granted by the Controller shall authorise the licensee to import the patented article or an article or substance made by a patented process from abroad where such importation would, but for such authorisation, constitute an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn65">
<p><a name="_ftn65"></a> <i>See</i> Basheer, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 9.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn66">
<p><a name="_ftn66"></a> Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., (2011) I.P.O. Order No. 1, 5 (India).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn67">
<p><a name="_ftn67"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 22.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn68">
<p><a name="_ftn68"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 25 (noting that an average Indian government employee would have to work for 3.5 years to afford a single month’s dosage).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn69">
<p><a name="_ftn69"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 6.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn70">
<p><a name="_ftn70"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 5.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn71">
<p><a name="_ftn71"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn72">
<p><a name="_ftn72"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 6.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn73">
<p><a name="_ftn73"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn74">
<p><a name="_ftn74"></a> Id. at 37.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn75">
<p><a name="_ftn75"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn76">
<p><a name="_ftn76"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 38.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn77">
<p><a name="_ftn77"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 40-41.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn78">
<p><a name="_ftn78"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 43.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn79">
<p><a name="_ftn79"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 45 (“I am therefore convinced that ‘worked in the territory of India’ means ‘manufactured to a reasonable extent in India.’”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn80">
<p><a name="_ftn80"></a> <i>Id. </i>at 60.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn81">
<p><a name="_ftn81"></a> Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., (2013) I.P.A.B. Order No. 45 (India).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn82">
<p><a name="_ftn82"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn83">
<p><a name="_ftn83"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn84">
<p><a name="_ftn84"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 43.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn85">
<p><a name="_ftn85"></a> Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Bombay High Ct. at 29 (Jul. 15, 2014).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn86">
<p><a name="_ftn86"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn87">
<p><a name="_ftn87"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn88">
<p><a name="_ftn88"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 24.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn89">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn89"></a> <i>Id</i>. Bayer subsequently appealed to the Indian Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. <i>See</i> Samanwaya Rautray, <i>Nexavar License Case: SC Dismisses Bayer’s Appeal Against HC Decision</i>, <span>Economic Times</span>, Dec. 13, 2014, <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/nexavar-licence-case-sc-dismisses-bayers-appeal-against-hc-decision/articleshow/45500051.cms">http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/nexavar-licence-case-sc-dismisses-bayers-appeal-against-hc-decision/articleshow/45500051.cms</a></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn90">
<p><a name="_ftn90"></a> Harsha Rohatgi, <i>Indian Patent Office Rejects Compulsory Licensing Application: BDR Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bristol Myers Squibb</i>, Khurana & Khurana (last visited Oct. 20, 2017), <a href="http://www.khuranaandkhurana.com/2013/11/13/indian-patent-office-rejects-compulsory-licensing-application-bdr-pharmaceuticals-pvt-ltd-vs-bristol-myers-squibb/">http://www.khuranaandkhurana.com/2013/11/13/indian-patent-office-rejects-compulsory-licensing-application-bdr-pharmaceuticals-pvt-ltd-vs-bristol-myers-squibb/</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn91">
<p><a name="_ftn91"></a> Patralekha Chatterjee, <i>2013: India Battles for Right to Use Compulsory Licenses to Make Medicines Affordable</i>, <span>Intellectual Property Watch</span>(last visited Oct. 20, 2017), <a href="https://www.ip-watch.org/2013/01/22/2013-india-battles-for-right-to-use-compulsory-licences-to-make-medicines-affordable/">https://www.ip-watch.org/2013/01/22/2013-india-battles-for-right-to-use-compulsory-licences-to-make-medicines-affordable/</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn92">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn92"></a> <i>See</i> Pankhuri Agarwal, <i>DIPP Drags the Dasatinib Compulsory License Drama: A Situation of ‘Extreme Urgency’?</i>, SpicyIP blog (Sep. 24, 2016), <a href="https://spicyip.com/2016/09/dipp-drags-the-dasatinib-compulsory-license-drama-a-situation-of-extreme-urgency.html">https://spicyip.com/2016/09/dipp-drags-the-dasatinib-compulsory-license-drama-a-situation-of-extreme-urgency.html</a>. <i>See, e.g.</i>, IPO Order No. C.L.A. No.1 of 2015, In the matter of Lee Pharma Ltd v. AstraZeneca AB, dated January 19, 2016 (rejecting application due to lack of evidence presented under all three prongs of Section 84 analysis).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn93">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn93"></a> For example, Article 68 of Brazil’s 1996 Industrial Property Law subjects a patentee to compulsory licensing if the patentee does not exploit “the object of the patent within the Brazilian territory for failure to manufacture the product or failure to use a patented process.” 68 C.P.I., Law No. 9,279 (Brazil, May 14, 1996). For additional examples, <i>See </i>Cottier et al., <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 461-71.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn94">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn94"></a> While form submissions to show the working of a patent are unique to India’s patent law, a submission requirement to maintain intellectual property rights is similarly used in the United States for trademarks. In the United States, registered trademark owners must submit a declaration of use to avoid cancellation of the registration. <i>See </i>15 U.S.C. ß 1058.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn95">
<p><a name="_ftn95"></a> The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970), ß 146(2).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn96">
<p><a name="_ftn96"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn97">
<p><a name="_ftn97"></a> The Patent Rules, Rule 131, India (2003).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn98">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn98"></a> The Patent Rules, Rule 131, India (2003). There is an apparent discrepancy between section 146(2) of the India Patents Act, 1970 and Rule 131 of the Patent Rules, 2003. While section 146 suggests that patentees should file Forms 27 every six months, Rule 131 of the Patent Rules, 2003 requires the statements to be furnished in respect of every calendar year.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn99">
<p><a name="_ftn99"></a> The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970), ß 146(2).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn100">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn100"></a> The public requirement refers to “the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention.” The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, <span>India Code</span> (2002), ß 84(1)(a). In other words, if the patentee must explain how he has or has not met his duties under section 83 and 84 of the Patents Amendment Act of 2002.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn101">
<p><a name="_ftn101"></a> Patents Rules, Form 27, 2003.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn102">
<p><a name="_ftn102"></a> The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, <span>India Code</span> (2002), ß 122 provides:</p>
<p>“1) If any person refuses or fails to furnish-Ö b) to the controller any information or statement which he is required to furnish by or under section 146,</p>
<p>he shall be punishable with [a] fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">2) If any person, being required to furnish any such information as is referred to in sub-section (1), furnishes information or statement which is false, and which he either knows or has reason to believe to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.”</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn103">
<p><a name="_ftn103"></a> Annual Report 2007-08, Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks including GIR and PIS/NIIPM (IPTI), at 12; <i>see also</i> Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 21.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn104">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn104"></a> Annual Report 2008-09, Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Geographical Indications, at 21; Annual Report 2007-08, Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and TradeMarks including GIR and PIS/NIIPM (IPTI), at 12; <i>see also</i> Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 21-22.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn105">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn105"></a> Controller Gen. of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Public Notice No. CG/PG/2009/179, Dec. 24, 2009; Controller Gen. of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Public Notice No. CG/Public Notice/2013/77, Feb. 12, 2013; Controller Gen. of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Public Notice No. CG/Public Notice/2015/95, 2015.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn106">
<p><a name="_ftn106"></a> The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code (1970), ß 122. (A patentee may be imprisoned for submitting false information).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn107">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn107"></a> Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 22; <i>see also </i>Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India, Writ Petition, at F (Del. 2015) [hereinafter Basheer Writ Petition (2015)] (“[T]he Respondents authorities have never initiated action against any of the errant patentees.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn108">
<p><a name="_ftn108"></a> Prashant Reddy, <i>Patent Office Publishes All ‘Statements of Working’ ñ Finally</i>!, Spicy IP, (June 25, 2013) <a href="https://spicyip.com/2013/06/patent-office-publishes-all-statements.html">https://spicyip.com/2013/06/patent-office-publishes-all-statements.html</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn109">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn109"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a> (raising numerous deficiencies with Form 27); Shamnad Basheer & N. Sai Vinod <i>RTI Applications and ‘Working’ of Foreign Drugs in India</i>, Spicy IP, at 5 (Apr., 2011) (“However, Form 27 in its present format leaves much to be desired and we will be drafting a more optimal Form 27 and forwarding this to the government for consideration, so that the form can be a lot more clearer and can call for a greater range of information.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn110">
<p><a name="_ftn110"></a> Letter from Philip S. Johnson, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Assn., to Hon. Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 7, 2014).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn111">
<p><a name="_ftn111"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn112">
<p><a name="_ftn112"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn113">
<p><a name="_ftn113"></a> Prathiba Singh & Ashutosh Kumar, <i>When in Rome, do as the Romans do</i>, IP Pro Life Sciences at 16, (Mar. 10, 2013)<a href="http://ipprolifesciences.com/ipprolifesciences/IPPro%20Life%20Sciences_issue_04.pdf">http://ipprolifesciences.com/ipprolifesciences/IPPro%20Life%20Sciences_issue_04.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn114">
<p><a name="_ftn114"></a> Among other things, Prof. Basheer is the founder of the SpicyIP blog, a leading source of intellectual property news and commentary in India. <i>See</i>Part III.A, <i>infra</i>, for a discussion of the results of his studies of Form 27 compliance.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn115">
<p><a name="_ftn115"></a> Basheer & Vinod, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 6-8.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn116">
<p><a name="_ftn116"></a> Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn117">
<p><a name="_ftn117"></a> <i>Id.</i> at 1, 8.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn118">
<p><a name="_ftn118"></a> Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 5590 (Del. 2015), Application Seeking Permission to Intervene in the Above Public Interest Litigation (2016). Some of the issues raised by Mr. Thappeta are discussed in Part IV below.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn119">
<p><a name="_ftn119"></a> Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1323 of 2013, Judgment at 8ñ10 (Jul. 15, 2014).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn120">
<p><a name="_ftn120"></a> Basheer, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 17.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn121">
<p><a name="_ftn121"></a> Indian Patent Office reporting year (Apr. 1 – Mar. 31).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn122">
<p><a name="_ftn122"></a> <i>See supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn123">
<p><a name="_ftn123"></a> Basheer & Vinod, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn124">
<p><a name="_ftn124"></a> This study pre-dates the electronic availability of Forms 27.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn125">
<p><a name="_ftn125"></a> Basheer & Vinod, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 7-8.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn126">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn126"></a> Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at Annexure P-11, tbl. I. It is not clear how the studied patents were selected. They do not represent the totality of patents in the designated industry sectors. Likewise, it is not clear how “publicly-funded research” is defined nor the amount of such funding behind the selected patents.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn127">
<p><a name="_ftn127"></a> It appears that this study covered three “reporting years” at the IPO: 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12. Reporting years run from April 1 to March 31.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn128">
<p><a name="_ftn128"></a> This figure is calculated as 1 – 263/421. Prof. Basheer has reported this ratio as approximately 35%. Basheer, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 18.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn129">
<p><a name="_ftn129"></a> Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at Annexure P-11, tbl. I.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn130">
<p><a name="_ftn130"></a> <i>Id</i>. at 10.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn131">
<p><a name="_ftn131"></a><i> Id</i>. at 10-16; Basheer, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 19.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn132">
<p><a name="_ftn132"></a> Basheer, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 12-13.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn133">
<p><a name="_ftn133"></a> <i>See</i> Contreras & LakshanÈ, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 27-28 (describing electronic search and case harvesting methodology).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn134">
<p><a name="_ftn134"></a> Searches were conducted and results were compiled by a contracted Indian service provider selected through a competitive bid process.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn135">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn135"></a> While InPASS and IPAIRS retrieve Form 27 submissions from the same URL, we observed that sometimes a submission that was displayed on data base was not displayed on the other. Thus, IPAIRS was used when Form 27 was not found for a queried patent on InPASS. InPASS has two features: Application Status and E-Register. At times, some forms were not available at E-Register that could be found through the Application Status table, and vice versa. Thus, both features were used. A detailed, step-by-step description of the search methodology used can be found at <a href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-statements-of-working-form-27-of-indian-mobile-device-patents">http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-statements-of-working-form-27-of-indian-mobile-device-patents</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn136">
<p><a name="_ftn136"></a> Ajoy Kumar, “Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005; regarding Form 27 Submissions for Patents,” The Centre for Internet and Society, (June 10, 2015), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-app-2015.pdf/at_download/file">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-app-2015.pdf/at_download/file</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn137">
<p><a name="_ftn137"></a> Boudhik Bhawan, “Supply of information sought under RTI ñ reg,” The Centre for Internet and Society, (June 17, 2015), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-reply-2015.pdf/at_download/file">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-reply-2015.pdf/at_download/file</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn138">
<p><a name="_ftn138"></a> Ajoy Kumar, “Request for Information under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005; regarding Form 27 Submissions for Patents,” The Centre for Internet and Society, (Mar. 11, 2016), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-app-2016.pdf/at_download/file">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-app-2016.pdf/at_download/file</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn139">
<p><a name="_ftn139"></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn140">
<p><a name="_ftn140"></a> Ujjwala Haldankar, “Supply of information sought under RTI, 2005 ñ reg,” The Centre for Internet and Society, (Apr. 4, 2016), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-reply-2016.pdf/at_download/file">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-reply-2016.pdf/at_download/file</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn141">
<p><a name="_ftn141"></a> Rohini LakshanÈ, Dataset for “Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India’s Form 27 Practice and Compliance,” The Centre for Internet and Society (Aug. 17, 2017), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dataset-for-patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance">https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dataset-for-patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products-an-empirical-assessment-of-indias-form-27-practice-and-compliance</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn142">
<p><a name="_ftn142"></a> Similar deficiencies with the IPO’s online filing facility have been noted by Basheer. <i>See</i> Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 17.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn143">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn143"></a> Prior to the 2002 Amendments to the Patents Act, 1970 (effective May 20, 2003), the term of product patents in India was 14 years from the date of issuance. Patents Act (2002 Amendments), Sec. 53. Accordingly, any patent issued in 1995 or earlier would be expired by 2009. Based on the data provided by the Controller and Basheer, it appears that few, if any, Forms 27 were filed prior to 2009. Thus, it is unlikely that any patent that expired prior to 2009 would have a corresponding Form 27. As a result, for purposes of counting Forms 27 that were, and should have been filed, we disregarded 107 patents in our dataset that were issued in 1995 or earlier (the vast majority of which were owned by Siemens).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn144">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn144"></a> A total of 4,935 Forms 27 were identified by our search. In 2013, Motorola filed 19 Forms 27 that were backdated to 2004 and 2005. These Forms corresponded to patents issued between 2008 and 2010, and apparently reflected the patentee’s incorrect belief that Form 27 must be filed as of the date of the filing of a patent application rather than the issuance of the patent. Because the patentee also filed Forms 27 dated as of 2013 for these patents, we have disregarded these spurious filings.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn145">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn145"></a> Based on the data provided by the Controller and Basheer, it appears that few, if any, Forms 27 were filed prior to 2009. Thus, we assumed that Forms 27, if filed, would only have begun to be filed in 2009. As discussed in note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, <i>supra</i>, the first patents that could be expected to have a filed Form 27 were issued in 1996 (i.e., one Form filed in 2009, the year of the patent’s expiration). Thus, beginning with patents issued in 1996, we calculated the total number of Forms 27 that could have been filed with respect to such patents beginning in 2009 and ending in 2016 (noting that we ended our study in August 2016). Thus, for patents issued in 1996 and expiring in 2009, one Form 27 could have been filed. For patents issued in 2002 to 2008, and expiring well after 2016, a total of eight Forms 27 could have been filed, in each case beginning in 2009 and ending in 2016. Patents issued in 2015 could have at most one Form 27 filed. Though Form 27 is not required to be filed until the year after a patent has been granted, some patentees have made filings in the year of grant. We counted these filings, but did not count year-of-grant filings in determining the maximum number of filings that could be made for a particular patent.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn146">
<p><a name="_ftn146"></a> <i>See supra </i>text accompanying note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn147">
<p><a name="_ftn147"></a> It is not surprising that no forms were available for patents issued prior to 2007, the first year that the Indian Controller of Patents drew attention to the Form 27 requirement. <i>See supra</i> Part I.D.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn148">
<p><a name="_ftn148"></a> For patents that had different working designations in Forms 27 filed in different years, we counted a patent to be declared as worked if at least one Form 27 so designated the patent.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn149">
<p><a name="_ftn149"></a> <i>See supra </i>text accompanying note <a name="_ftnref"></a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn150">
<p><a name="_ftn150"></a> <i>See </i>Basheer Writ Petition, <i>supra </i>note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 10.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn151">
<p><a name="_ftn151"></a> Motorola, Form 27 for 243220, IɴPASS (Mar. 31, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/243220_2013/243220_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/243220_2013/243220_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn152">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn152"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 241488, IɴPASS (Feb. 3, 2012), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2011/241488_2011/241488_2011.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2011/241488_2011/241488_2011.pdf</a>(“The patentee is in the look out for appropriate working opportunities in a large scale although there may have been some use of the patented technology in conjunction with other patented technologies.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn153">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn153"></a> Google, Form 27 for 243210, IɴPASS (Mar. 27, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/243210_2014/243210_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/243210_2014/243210_2014.pdf</a>. <i>See infra </i>Part III.D for a discussion of patents as to which the patentee has changed the working status over the years.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn154">
<p><a name="_ftn154"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Ericsson, Form 27 for 209941, IɴPASS (Mar. 30, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/209941_2014/209941_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/209941_2014/209941_2014.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn155">
<p><a name="_ftn155"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Ericsson, Form 27 for 259809, IɴPASS (Mar. 19, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/259809_2014/259809_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/259809_2014/259809_2014.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn156">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn156"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 227819, IɴPASS (Mar. 13, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/227819_2014/227819_2014.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/227819_2014/227819_2014.pdf</a>(“The patentee is in the look out for appropriate working opportunities in a large scale”); Motorola, Form 27 for 236128, IɴPASS (Mar. 8, 2013), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2012/236128_2012/236128_2012.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2012/236128_2012/236128_2012.pdf</a>(“The Patentee is actively looking for licensees and customers to commercialise the invention in the Indian environment.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn157">
<p><a name="_ftn157"></a> Alcatel-Lucent, Form 27 for 258507, IɴPASS (Mar. 18, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/258507_2014/258507_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/258507_2014/258507_2014.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn158">
<p><a name="_ftn158"></a> Panasonic, Form 27 for 239668, IɴPASS (Mar. 21, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/239668_2013/239668_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/239668_2013/239668_2013.pdf</a>; Panasonic, Form 27 for 208405, IɴPASS (Mar. 21, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/208405_2013/208405_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/208405_2013/208405_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn159">
<p><a name="_ftn159"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 233994, IɴPASS (Mar. 6, 2013), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2012/233994_2012/233994_2012.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2012/233994_2012/233994_2012.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn160">
<p><a name="_ftn160"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn161">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn161"></a><i> See</i> Oracle, Form 27 for 230190, IɴPASS (Mar. 24, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/230190_2013/230190_2013.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/230190_2013/230190_2013.pdf</a>(“The methods/structures of the patent are generally related to "Asynchronous servers". This product has been sold to several businesses in India in the past few years and is believed to be used by them. Additional information will be enquired and provided to the Patent Office upon request.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn162">
<p><a name="_ftn162"></a> Nokia Siemens, Form 27 for 254894, IɴPASS (Mar. 28, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/254894_2013/254894_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/254894_2013/254894_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn163">
<p><a name="_ftn163"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 249058, IɴPASS (Mar. 03, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/249058_2013/249058_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/249058_2013/249058_2013.pdf</a>; In other Forms 27, however, Ericsson</p>
<p>provides significant detail regarding the standards/specifications covered by its patents.</p>
<p><i>See, e.g.</i>, Ericsson, Form 27 for 213723, IɴPASS (Mar. 16, 2016), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/213723_2015/213723_2015.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/213723_2015/213723_2015.pdf</a>(citing ETSI TS 126 092 V4.0.0 (2001-03), ETSI TS 126 073 V4.1.0 (2001-12) and ETSI TS 126 093 V4.0.0 (2000-12), all of which are pertinent to the UMTS 3G standard).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn164">
<p><a name="_ftn164"></a> <i>See,</i> <i>e.g.</i>, Qualcomm, Form 27 for 251876, IɴPASS (Mar. 28, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/251876_2014/251876_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/251876_2014/251876_2014.pdf</a>(disclosing Indian licensee Innominds Software Pvt. Ltd.).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn165">
<p><a name="_ftn165"></a><i> See</i> Ericsson, Form 27 for 213723, IɴPASS (Mar. 16, 2016), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/213723_2015/213723_2015.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/213723_2015/213723_2015.pdf</a>(referencing royalty payments from Micromax and Gionee).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn166">
<p><a name="_ftn166"></a> Qualcomm, Form 27 for 251876, IɴPASS (Mar. 28, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/251876_2014/251876_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/251876_2014/251876_2014.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn167">
<p><a name="_ftn167"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn168">
<p><a name="_ftn168"></a>Nokia, Form 27 for 220072, IɴPASS (Mar. 20, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/220072_2013/220072_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/220072_2013/220072_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn169">
<p><a name="_ftn169"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 251757, IɴPASS (Mar 11, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/251757_2013/251757_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/251757_2013/251757_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn170">
<p><a name="_ftn170"></a> <i>Id</i>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn171">
<p><a name="_ftn171"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Ericsson, Form 27 for 248764, IɴPASS (Mar. 23, 2012)</p>
<p><a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=gPYX0WsErIRQR3is4uM1fw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=gPYX0WsErIRQR3is4uM1fw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn172">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn172"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Huawei, Form 27 for 251769, IɴPASS (Mar. 4, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/251769_2013/251769_2013.pdf%20">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/251769_2013/251769_2013.pdf</a>(“Information not readily available; efforts will be made to collect and submit further Information, if asked for.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn173">
<p><a name="_ftn173"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Hitachi, Form 27 for 226462, IɴPASS (Mar. 28, 2013), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/226462_2013/226462_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/226462_2013/226462_2013.pdf</a>(“Confidential Information will be provided if asked for.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn174">
<p><a name="_ftn174"></a> Research in Motion, Form 27 for 261068, IɴPASS (Feb. 10, 2015), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/261068_2014/261068_2014.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2014/261068_2014/261068_2014.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn175">
<p><a name="_ftn175"></a> Ericsson, Form 27 for 254652, IɴPASS (Mar. 21, 2016), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/254652_2015/254652_2015.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2015/254652_2015/254652_2015.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn176">
<p><a name="_ftn176"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Alcatel-Lucent, Form 27 for 202208, IɴPASS (Mar. 27, 2014), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/202208_2013/202208_2013.pdf">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/frm27/2013/202208_2013/202208_2013.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn177">
<p><a name="_ftn177"></a> <i>See, e.g.</i>, Ericsson, Form 27 for 235605, IɴPASS (Feb. 23, 2011), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=ghLLyAj0oCzH9pUf4tY2Kw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=ghLLyAj0oCzH9pUf4tY2Kw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d</a>; Ericsson, Form 27 for 235605, IɴPASS (Feb. 6, 2012), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=ghLLyAj0oCzH9pUf4tY2Kw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=ghLLyAj0oCzH9pUf4tY2Kw%3d%3d&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw%3d%3d</a>; Huawei, Form 27 for</p>
<p>249244, IɴPASS (Mar. 11, 2013), <a href="http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=9BzV82RULJkFoIPZZZeH9A%3d%3d&loc=+mN2fYxnTC4l0fUd8W4CAA%3d%3d">http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=9BzV82RULJkFoIPZZZeH9A%3d%3d&loc=+mN2fYxnTC4l0fUd8W4CAA%3d%3d</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn178">
<p><a name="_ftn178"></a> Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 10.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn179">
<p><a name="_ftn179"></a> A patentee may be imprisoned for submitting false information. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code, ß 122 (1970).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn180">
<p><a name="_ftn180"></a> <i>See</i> Reddy & Kadri, <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 22; Basheer Writ Petition (2015), <i>supra</i> note <a name="_ftnref"></a>, at 10 (“authorities have never initiated action against any of the errant patentees.”).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn181">
<p><a name="_ftn181"></a><i>See supra </i>text accompanying notes <a name="_ftnref"></a>-84.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn182">
<p><a name="_ftn182"></a><i>See supra</i> Part III.C.3.c<i>.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn183">
<p><a name="_ftn183"></a><i>See supra</i> Part III.C.3.d.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn184">
<p><a name="_ftn184"></a> <i>See</i> <i>supra</i> Part III.C.3.e.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn185">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn185"></a> For example, as of 2015, more than 61,000 patent disclosures had been made against ETSI’s 4G LTE standard, and more than 43,000 against ETSI’s 3G UMTS standard, both of which are only one of many standards embodied in a typical mobile device. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, <i>Mapping Standards to Patents Using Databases of Declared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems of Technological Classification</i> at 20, Table 5 (Regulation & Econ. Growth, Working Paper, 2015), <a href="http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_Mapping_Standards.pdf">http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_Mapping_Standards.pdf</a>.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn186">
<p><a name="_ftn186"></a><i>See supra</i> Part III.B.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn187">
<p><a name="_ftn187"></a> We thank Chris Cotropia for this insight.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn188">
<p><a name="_ftn188"></a> 421 Forms 27 were found for Motorola. This total has been reduced by the 19 Forms filed in 2013 and incorrectly backdated to 2004 and 2005.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn189">
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a name="_ftn189"></a> 101 Siemens patents expired prior to 1996.</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-working-requirements-and-complex-products</a>
</p>
No publisherJorge L. Contreras, Rohini Lakshané and Paxton M. LewisAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2018-01-23T15:09:30ZBlog EntryPatent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools
<b>The focus of this research paper is on an extremely limited though important aspect of patent pools — that of patent valuation and license fee determination. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of patent valuation and license fee determination as it exists independently is modified when it is applied in context of patent pools. </b>
<h2 class="WordSection1">I. Introduction</h2>
<p class="WordSection1" style="text-align: justify; ">A patent pool is essentially “An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or third parties. Pools usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees and allocate a portion of the licensing fees (royalties) to patent owners according to a pre-set formula or procedure.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">A patent pool particularly faces intense scrutiny by way of competition/ antitrust law and each step of structuring of a patent pool has to be done keeping the prevalent norms of antitrust law in context. This article merely brushes with the antitrust aspect, as a discussion on that topic is beyond the scope of this particular article. However, suffice is to say that like other aspects of structuring of a patent pool, patent valuation and licensing fee determination is also subject to antitrust law concerns.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Part II of this research paper is a discussion as regards factors which determine patent value in context of a patent pool. Similarly, Part III is a discussion as regards factors that determine license fee in context of a patent pool. Thereafter, Part IV discusses the methods which are applied for patent valuation and license fee determination. A number of these methods are independent evaluation methods and hence their dynamics when applied in context of patent pools may need to be altered in light of the discussion in Parts II and III. Part V discusses certain aspects of actual patent pools in the technological field to better understand the principles which have been discussed in Parts II-IV. Finally, Part VI concludes this research paper.</p>
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">II. Determination of Patent Value in a Patent Pool</h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">One of the prominent pillars of a patent pool is an appropriate patent valuation process. Patent valuation is a difficult and subjective task.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[2]</span></span></span></a> Moreover, the result of a patent valuation independently outside of a pool might be quite different from when it is part of a pool transaction. A “pool regularizes the valuation of individual patents - making, as the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘a division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims’”.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[3]</span></span></span></a> However, this value attribution process is not an arbitrary one but incredibly dynamic, and constantly evolving. This difficulty is furthered by the fact that the term “patent value” itself is subject to interpretation. Patent value essentially comprises of the economic benefit that the patent can bestow.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[4]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">A number of factors as discuss hereinafter determine the value of a patent. It is not necessary though that all the factors would come into play in context of every exercise of valuation of a patent in a pool. The factors determining patent value can be largely classified into a discussion as regards the types of patents in a patent pool in context of their relative importance and other complementary factors which further affect such importance.</p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Categories of Patents in a Patent Pool</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Patents in a pool can be classified based on their necessity and quality. Thus, arises the concept of essential and non-essential patents and strong and weak patents.<i><span> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><i><span><span> </span></span></i>Essential and Non-Essential Patents<br /></b>As the terms indicate, essential patents are those which are imperative for the success of pool creation and thus naturally have considerably more value. Non-essential patents on the other hand are patents which though not imperative may bring efficiency advantages to the pool. However, what exactly comprises an essential patent is a subjective and constantly evolving definition determined by each patent pool according to its commercial needs and capabilities. For example, the number of patents in the MPEG-2 pool, all of which are declared to be essential to the MPEG-2 standard, increased from 27 in 1997 to more than 900 in 2010.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[5]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Essential patents naturally have more economic value than non-essential patents.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[6]</span></span></span></a> “A pool that includes non-essential patents can increase prices for some consumers, while decreasing prices for other consumers.”<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[7]</span></span></span></a> Also, inclusion of inessential patents can raise potential concerns about foreclosure of alternative technologies and higher royalties for some licenses than would have occurred if these patents were excluded from the pool.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[8]</span></span></span></a> These concerns though should be balanced against the costs of excluding potentially essential patents from the pool.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[9]</span></span></span></a> Such concerns were raised in context of the DVD 3C patent pool.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[10]</span></span></span></a> Thus, it has to be decided on a case by case scenario as to whether the patent pool will include only essential patents or both essential as well as non-essential patents.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">“<span>Whether a patent pool improves a market’s transactional efficiency depends on the competitive characteristics of the patents included within the pool’s offering.”<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[11]</span></span></span></a> Properly demarcating all required patents for a technology is important during patent pool formation. Otherwise it may create a “hold out” problem where a patent owner will “hold out” for higher royalties, “knowing that the manufacturer has individually negotiated for and already acquired the rest of the necessary … patent licenses, and that the value of all those licenses depends on obtaining a license to its own patent.”<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[12]</span></span></span></a> </span>Essentiality of a patent can be determined based on certain characteristics of patents:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">a. Blocking Patents<br />Blocking patents comprise of improvement patents on an existing technology. Thus, the improvement patent is deemed to be “subservient” to the earlier, “dominant’ patent”<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[13]</span></span></span></a> and the subservient and dominant patents are said to block one another.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[14]</span></span></span></a> This is so because, the subservient patent cannot be exploited without infringing upon the dominant patent.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[15]</span></span></span></a> Likewise, the dominant patent cannot be developed in the improved embodiment without permission from the subservient patentee.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[16]</span></span></span></a> For example, the Wright brothers patents for aeroplane wings were improved upon by Glenn Curtiss and Alexander Graham Bell by using a set of wing flaps, or ailerons. The Curtiss patent, however, was found to infringe upon the Wright patent. As a result, Curtiss had no legal right to make, use, or sell his ailerons without a license from the Wright brothers, and the Wright brothers had no legal right to make, use, or sell Curtiss's commercially successful form of the stabilizing device. Their patents mutually infringed and blocked one another and they had to form a patent pool.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[17]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, public key encryption method was devised and patented at Stanford University, and licensed to Cylink. Soon thereafter, a team of scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed and patented an algorithm, and licensed its use to RSA. The RSA algorithm was successfully commercialized and became an industry standard. Cylink and RSA constituted blocking rival patents and the issue was resolved by formation of a patent pool.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[18]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">b. Complementary Patents<br />Complementary patents cover technologies that are largely lacking or inefficient absent a license to a separate patented product.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[19]</span></span></span></a> They occur as a consequence of independent invention. Thus, value of <span>complementary patents increases when combined with a separate patented invention;</span> they act synergistically, each increasing the value of the other.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[20]</span></span></span></a> “Two products or technologies are complements if an increase in the price of one of them reduces the demand for the other.”<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[21]</span></span></span></a> For example, production of a light bulb requires patent rights to both the vacuum bulb as well as the filament.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[22]</span></span></span></a> A patent pool that only contains complementary patents may have substantial market power if the pool does not face competition from alternative or substitutable technology.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[23]</span></span></span></a> This though, could lead to the occurrence of royally stacking i.e. double-marginalization, which can occur when firms sell or license complementary products or technologies and demand is sensitive to price.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[24]</span></span></span></a> It refers to the addition of successive mark-ups by suppliers in a vertical relationship.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[25]</span></span></span></a></p>
<div class="WordSection1">c. Competing Patents</div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Competing patents result when there exist totally novel products or processes that provide market substitutes for patented goods, or when inventors sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the original patent is deemed “invented around” and not infringed.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[26]</span></span></span></a> “Two products or technologies are substitutes if an increase in the price of one of them increases the demand for the other.”<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[27]</span></span></span></a> A patent pool may obtain market power by obtaining control over substitutable patents too.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[28]</span></span></span></a> An individual who acquires the rights to a competing patent eliminates or significantly lessens his need for competing patents within or outside of the pool.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[29]</span></span></span></a> Thus, the value of a pool consisting of competing patents increases with acquisition of substitute patents.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[30]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Strong and Weak Patents<br /></b>A patent pool can comprise of strong as well as weak patents. The value accorded to the patents would naturally be in accordance with its “strength.” “‘Low patent quality’ is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions.”<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[31]</span></span></span></a> Patents are “probabilistic rights”<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[32]</span></span></span></a> Their scope and extent often remains probabilistic until their claim determination which may often be done only upon adjudication. Similarly in situations of a patent flood,<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[33]</span></span></span></a> the overall quality of patents may become lower.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[34]</span></span></span></a> The additional protection of the pool affords a weak patent enforcement rights that it may not have secured standing alone.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[35]</span></span></span></a> Thus, even weak and invalid patents become important and can be used to exclude competitors, for example for litigation threats.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[36]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Some patent pools contain explicit agreements to support weak patents, such as covenants not to challenge patents, joint defense agreements, and allocation of patent rights to parties who are best able to defend them.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[37]</span></span></span></a> Some patent pools achieve a similar effect not by explicit agreements, but by creating an institutional environment where patentees find that it is mutually advantageous to recognize each other’s patents.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[38]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3>B. Other Factors Determining Patent Value in Context of Patent Pool</h3>
<p>Besides the patents themselves, other complementary criteria impact on patent value. These comprise of the holistic environment in which the patents subsist, as discussed hereinafter.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Subject matter of Invention<br /></b>“Value is highly dependent upon the subject matter of the invention.”<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[39]</span></span></span></a> Certain subject matter fields or innovations do not have sufficient commercial importance or market demand to warrant investments.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Scope of Invention<br /></b>A particular subject where there is extensive minefield of patents already in existence is less likely to have considerable patent value due to the limited patent scope as opposed to a field where patents are relatively lacking and there is possibility of a broader patent scope.<b> </b>Analogously, “value of a patent is derived from an ability to preclude others from practicing the unique innovation described by the words of the patent’s claims.”<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[40]</span></span></span></a> “Generalizing, a patent employing broad claim language is typically more valuable than a patent of narrowly written claims in the same technology arena.”<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[41]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Size of Patent Pool<br /></b>The size of a patent pool i.e. the number of its members and their patents is an important facet in determining the value of patents involved. Greater the number more are the governance issues as well as royalty determination issues, which in turn affect the valuation of the patents. This though does not imply that pools should be of a specific size, only that their size should meet efficiency demands.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Value of Patent Pool<br /></b>The patents under the purview of a patent pool determine the pool’s value which in turn determines the value of the patents within as well as out of the pool. Value of a patent pool may be limited if certain holders of essential patents are not members.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[42]</span></span></span></a> This may occur due to various reasons such as if it was perceived that the patent may have more value as an independent entity, or due to strategic interests, or choice of joining different pools.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[43]</span></span></span></a> Correspondingly, if the patent pool does not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[44]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">While it is evident that collecting all necessary patents where the end product or standards is determined is extremely difficult, it becomes considerably more difficult where there is no predetermined or identifiable end-product.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[45]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>Patent Portfolio</span></span></span><br /></b>Certain academic studies are of the opinion that “the real value of patents lies not in their individual significance, but instead in their aggregation into a patent portfolio: a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual patents that, when combined, confer an array of important advantages upon the portfolio holder.”<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[46]</span></span></span></a> This theory has been applied to explain the patent paradox where the patent intensity, i.e. patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[47]</span></span></span></a> Thus, greater the control of an entity over a portfolio of patents, more would be its negotiation power in context of valuation.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Signaling<br /></b>It has been opined that the value of patents inheres not so much in the exclusivity they confer upon inventors, but rather in their ability to serve as credible signals.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[48]</span></span></span></a> Firms use patents to credibly convey information about the invention to the market who otherwise might not be willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[49]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b><i> </i>Defensive Aspect<br /></b>Patent value is also ascertained based on its use to serve as an insurance, whereby competing firms use them as “bargaining chips” to negotiate and secure certain niches in the marketplace.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[50]</span></span></span></a> This is so especially from the negotiation as well as the litigation viewpoint.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Valuation Dynamics<br /></b>In context of certain subject matters, inability of the patents to be valued or possibility of dynamic changes in value creates problems in structuring the patent pool, or it might lead to issues of according over-value or under-value. For example, in the process of biological research, where hypotheses are often adjusted and experimentation continually refined, it is impossible to anticipate the particular value of a given research tool for an investigative procedure.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[51]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, in context of the Human Genome Sciences, the patent for the gene that encodes CCR5 protein, was likely not valued very highly, because of unsurity of its utility, which changed when independent research established its importance in the fight against HIV.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[52]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. Role of Independent Evaluator</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Often, independent experts in the relevant technology are employed for patent valuation purposes. Their role includes the responsibility of providing a mechanism for determining the market value of each participating patent for the purpose of setting appropriate royalty rates within the patent pool.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[53]</span></span></span></a> Also, they would evaluate the current state of the art and determine which patents are essential and which aren’t.<a href="#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[54]</span></span></span></a> An evaluator’s is a continuing responsibility throughout the existence of the duration of the patent pool to monitor developments in the field so as to ensure each patent’s essentiality and incorporate additional patents if necessary.<a href="#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[55]</span></span></span></a> Concerns though have been expressed as regards the expert’s ability and impartiality<span>.</span><a href="#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[56]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>III. Determination of License Fee for a Patent Pool</span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>Theorists, have suggested criteria to gauge viability of patent pools.<a href="#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[57]</span></span></span></a> The various elements involved in structuring of a patent pool do not function in a vacuum. Each has an impact on the other and ultimately they determine in totum, the licensing fees.</span></p>
<h3><span>A. Pool Dynamics</span></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The factors catalyzing pool creation impact on the licensing fee that is set. A patent pool may primarily be structured due to government influence,<a href="#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[58]</span></span></span></a> court influence,<a href="#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[59]</span></span></span></a> commercial and business perspective,<a href="#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[60]</span></span></span></a> to achieve or pursuant to standard setting,<a href="#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[61]</span></span></span></a> and social objectives.<a href="#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[62]</span></span></span></a> Accordingly, riders may be placed on creation of the pool and setting of licensing fees.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Analogously, members comprising the patent pool affect royalty determinations. Different perspectives can be observed in commercial entities as opposed to research entities or voluntary organizations. Similarly, the negotiation capabilities are different for established commercial conglomerates as opposed to entrepreneurs, or smaller entities.<a href="#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[63]</span></span></span></a> Similarly, patent pools may distinguish between patent contributing licensees and mere licensees in fixing royalty rates.<a href="#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[64]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Furthermore, pool governance as well as nature of the pool would have an impact on royalty determination. Pools can essentially be of two types based on regulation of members or licensing- open and closed.<a href="#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[65]</span></span></span></a> Correspondingly, the patent holders themselves may have different perspectives or expectations of their rights.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The negotiating entity too has an impact on royalty determination. “Agreements between the members of the patent pool and third parties can be established directly through patentees and licensees or indirectly through an entity specifically created to administer the pool.”<a href="#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[66]</span></span></span></a> There are a considerable number of business models involved in context of a patent pool that define the parameters of the relationship between what are primarily classified as IP creators and IP consumers.<a href="#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[67]</span></span></span></a> These dynamics have considerably altered with the strong and prolific emergence of IP intermediaries; they in turn affect the royalty rate negotiations.<a href="#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[68]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">B. Negotiation Dynamics</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">License negotiations involve complicated factors, such as uncertain outcomes, asymmetric information about the values of technologies and the contributions of licensees to a technology's value, the credibility of disagreements, differential bargaining power and skill, and the individual circumstances of licensors and licensees.<a href="#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[69]</span></span></span></a> Royalty determination depends on “the bargaining skills of patentees, their licensing objectives, the qualities of their patents, opportunity costs that patentees may have if they choose not to license their patents, the likelihood of injunctions, and the methods that courts apply to calculate infringement damages.”<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"> <a href="#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[70]</span></span></a></span> Pool members act strategically to maximize their share of the pool’s revenues.<a href="#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[71]</span></span></span></a> “The defining characteristic of patent ownership has been described as the right to extract royalties ‘as high as [one] can negotiate with the leverage’ of exclusivity.”<a href="#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[72]</span></span></span></a> <span>“The patent holder can ask for a high starting price; the potential infringer can counter by pointing to potential substitute technologies; and ultimately the process should yield a price that accurately reflects the marginal advantages of the patented technology.”<a href="#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[73]</span></span></span></a> </span>Again, negotiation strategies include deploying a number of tactics by corporates to whittle down an independent inventor’s patience and his price, thus reducing the licensing fee from the desired amount.<a href="#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[74]</span></span></span></a> <span>Correspondingly, there is no average length of time or amount of money needed for successfully creating a patent pool; it depends on the number of members involved in the negotiations and their commitment and willingness to negotiate an appropriate price.<a href="#_ftn76" name="_ftnref76"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[75]</span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Timing of the license negotiation too has an impact on determination of the royalty scheme. Licensing can occur in two primary settings: ex ante licensing, i.e. prior to pool formation; and ex post, i.e. post pool formation. In ex ante licensing, the manufacturer has a choice to alter existing products to incorporate the patented features, and can thus perform a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to making any product alterations.<a href="#_ftn77" name="_ftnref77"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[76]</span></span></span></a> Analogously, a holdout who demands royalties prior to the final organization of the pool can only demand a royalty that reflects the additional value that his new patent adds to the collection.<a href="#_ftn78" name="_ftnref78"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[77]</span></span></span></a> If he demands more than this value, the pool will work around the holdout’s patent by adopting a different standard, adjusting the patent pool to cover slightly different technology, or dissolving itself.<a href="#_ftn79" name="_ftnref79"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[78]</span></span></span></a> In ex post licensing, on the other hand, a holdout is in a stronger negotiating position, and can demand not only the marginal value of his patent, but also the switching costs that would be incurred if the established standard or licensing regime were limited by a court injunction.<a href="#_ftn80" name="_ftnref80"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[79]</span></span></span></a> Complicating this situation are <span>licenses that are granted ex ante but negotiated ex post.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Furthermore, patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations; however, it is also possible to compel parties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the industry.<a href="#_ftn81" name="_ftnref81"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[80]</span></span></span></a> Depending on the situation, the negotiation dynamics and hence the royalty scheme would be affected.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Rules governing damages for patent infringement also affect patentees’ decision to join a pool or to license independently, as the threat of injunctive relief can provide a patentee with bargaining power that can be disproportional to the number of patents he owns.<a href="#_ftn82" name="_ftnref82"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[81]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. Terms of License</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The terms of the license considerably influence royalty determination. These include, nature of licensed products,<a href="#_ftn83" name="_ftnref83"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[82]</span></span></span></a> character of license- whether exclusive or non-exclusive,<a href="#_ftn84" name="_ftnref84"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[83]</span></span></span></a> granting clause, geographic scope of the license, field of use governed by the license, provision of sublicensing, grantback provisions, future usage governance, non-assertion clauses, reach-through provisions, termination clause, and licensee’s ability to challenge patents in the pool.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Included herein too would be the treatment of after-acquired patents, which in turn can be classified into two types: (1) improvement patents based on a patented technology licensed by another member of the patent pool; and (2) patents unrelated to patented technologies licensed to the members of the patent pool.<a href="#_ftn85" name="_ftnref85"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[84]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">License governance in context of graduated and progressive licensing would also influence royalty determination. This would include “provisions for pool members to license their patents without licensing all the patents in a pool”<a href="#_ftn86" name="_ftnref86"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[85]</span></span></span></a> And the freedom “to license their patents bilaterally, i.e., outside of the pool structure.”<a href="#_ftn87" name="_ftnref87"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[86]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">IV. Methods for Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination</h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There are three basic methods of valuation: the cost method,<a href="#_ftn88" name="_ftnref88"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[87]</span></span></span></a> the market method,<a href="#_ftn89" name="_ftnref89"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[88]</span></span></span></a> and the income method.<a href="#_ftn90" name="_ftnref90"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[89]</span></span></span></a> In context of patent valuation, these methods find varied expressions. “A truly accurate assessment of patent value requires intensive legal and technical evaluation of individual patents.”<a href="#_ftn91" name="_ftnref91"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[90]</span></span></span></a> The economics literature, however, has also proposed several proxies for patent value based on objective and readily available information.<a href="#_ftn92" name="_ftnref92"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[91]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">In context of patent pools the dynamics of patent valuation methods is altered and they need to be viewed through the prism of factors discussed in Part II. This doesn’t imply that approaches to objective patent valuation are not relevant.<a href="#_ftn93" name="_ftnref93"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[92]</span></span></span></a> “However, such valuation approaches focus only on characteristics of patents at the time of issue and neglect to consider what happens afterwards.”<a href="#_ftn94" name="_ftnref94"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[93]</span></span></span></a> <span>“Technology developments or price fluctuations, among many factors, may alter the relationship between two patents … In turn, this may decrease the value of any static analysis conducted by experts.”</span><a href="#_ftn95" name="_ftnref95"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[94]</span></span></span></a><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Determination of the licensing fee of a patent pool is based on the joint affect of certain transactions. Again, as with patent valuation, so also with licensing fee determination, in context of patent pools, the factors discussed in Part III need to be given heed. The transactions influencing licensing fee determination essentially comprise of valuation of the patent, which in turn is used to set a royalty rate pertaining to allocation of various fees received by licensing of the pool patents. Thus, royalty payment is comprised of two components: a royalty rate and a royalty base, upon which the rate is applied.<a href="#_ftn96" name="_ftnref96"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[95]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Determining an Appropriate Royalty Base</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The scope of the royalty base can be determined in two principal ways- apportionment and entire market value rule.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The apportionment principle implies that when a patent reads on the entirety of an infringing product, the royalty base should be the total value of the sales (or use) of that product.<a href="#_ftn97" name="_ftnref97"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[96]</span></span></span></a> When the patent at issue covers only a component of the infringing product, the value of the sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented invention and the remaining unpatented components.<a href="#_ftn98" name="_ftnref98"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[97]</span></span></span></a> Thus, the principle aims at allocating awards in proportion to contribution, and is not based on any value attributable to the infringer’s or third parties’ inventions.<a href="#_ftn99" name="_ftnref99"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[98]</span></span></span></a> Thus, essentially, a licensor garners a royalty fee in proportion to the number of infringed patents owned by him.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The entire market value rule, recognizes that the economic value added to a product by a patented component may be greater than the value of the component alone.<a href="#_ftn100" name="_ftnref100"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[99]</span></span></span></a> Thus, this rule focuses on whether the patented component drives demand for the entire product, and if it is so, then the patentee may treat all revenue from the infringing product as an appropriate royalty base.<a href="#_ftn101" name="_ftnref101"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[100]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="WordSection1">B. Setting Royalty Rates</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Royalty rates are typically a percentage rate and thus reflects the proportion of the base value that the patented technology contributes.<a href="#_ftn102" name="_ftnref102"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[101]</span></span></span></a> Various approaches have emerged in determining royalty rates; these could be adapted in context of patent pools.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Rule of Thumb<br /></b>This approach suggests that the licensor should receive 25 percent of the licensee’s gross profit from the licensed technology.<a href="#_ftn103" name="_ftnref103"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[102]</span></span></span></a><sup> </sup>Thus, this rule’s purpose is not the valuation of a technology per se, but rather the apportionment of a technology’s value between the licensor and licensee.<a href="#_ftn104" name="_ftnref104"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[103]</span></span></span></a> The percentage split between the licensor and licensee should be adjusted upwards or downwards to take into account the parties’ respective investment and risk in the licensed technology.<a href="#_ftn105" name="_ftnref105"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[104]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Numerical Proportionality<br /></b>According to this approach, royalty entitlement of the holder of patents essential to a standard should be calculated in light of the proportional contribution of that patent owner’s essential patents compared to the total contribution of all other essential patents reading on the standard.<a href="#_ftn106" name="_ftnref106"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[105]</span></span></span></span></a> This method rests on the proposition that every patent is of equal value.<a href="#_ftn107" name="_ftnref107"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[106]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Industry Standards / Market or Comparable Technology Method<br /></b>Under this approach, the worth of a patent is determined by examining the royalty rates garnered in similar past transactions.<a href="#_ftn108" name="_ftnref108"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[107]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Discounted Cash Flow<br /></b>This approach proposes that patent price can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits derived from ownership, which includes projected sales of products (or components) based on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.<a href="#_ftn109" name="_ftnref109"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[108]</span></span></span></span></a> To implement it, one must determine (1) the future cash flows generated by the patent in question and (2) an appropriate discount rate.<a href="#_ftn110" name="_ftnref110"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[109]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Ranking<br /></b>This approach compares the intellectual property asset to be valued to comparable intellectual property assets on a subjective or objective scale.<a href="#_ftn111" name="_ftnref111"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[110]</span></span></span></a> There are five components to a ranking method: (i) scoring criteria; (ii) scoring system; (iii) scoring scale; (iv) weighting factors; and (v) decision table; these components are used to calculate a composite score for an asset, which is then compared to the average score for a comparable intellectual property asset to determine the relative value.<a href="#_ftn112" name="_ftnref112"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[111]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Cost-based Rate Setting<br /></b>This approach proposes that the patent holder’s cost of obtaining the invention and its patent forms the basis of the royalty rate; a profit margin is simply tacked onto the innovation cost.<a href="#_ftn113" name="_ftnref113"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[112]</span></span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Surrogate Measures<br /></b>Surrogate measures value patents by reference to the patents themselves.<a href="#_ftn114" name="_ftnref114"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[113]</span></span></span></a> They can be largely categorized into: (1) the number of patents issued to a company; (2) payment of patent maintenance fees i.e. patents which are regularly renewed are more valuable; (3) prior art citations i.e. more a patent is cited, more is its value; (4) characteristics of litigated patents i.e. patents which are the subject matter of litigation are more valuable.<a href="#_ftn115" name="_ftnref115"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[114]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Disaggregation Methods<br /></b>There are two basic types of disaggregation methods - value disaggregation and income disaggregation.<a href="#_ftn116" name="_ftnref116"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[115]</span></span></span></a> The former apportions some fraction of total value to intellectual property assets by setting the value of intangible assets equal to the value of a firm minus the firm’s monetary and tangible assets from to determine the value of the intangible assets.<a href="#_ftn117" name="_ftnref117"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[116]</span></span></span></a> The latter apportions some fraction of total earnings of a firm, based upon various factors, to intellectual property assets.<a href="#_ftn118" name="_ftnref118"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[117]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Option Methods<br /></b>This approach views an investment in intellectual property as an option to develop the intellectual property further, or to abandon the intellectual property, depending upon future technical and market information.<a href="#_ftn119" name="_ftnref119"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[118]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><b>Competitive Advantage Valuation (R)<br /></b>The major premise of the CAV method is that intellectual property assets have no inherent value; the value of intellectual property assets resides entirely in the value of the tangible assets which incorporate them.<a href="#_ftn120" name="_ftnref120"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[119]</span></span></span></a> The minor premise of the CAV method is that the value of a given intellectual property asset can best be measured by the competitive advantage which that asset contributes to a product, process, or service.<a href="#_ftn121" name="_ftnref121"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[120]</span></span></span></a> In its most general form, CAV method consists of following six basic steps<a href="#_ftn122" name="_ftnref122"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[121]</span></span></span></a>:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The intellectual property asset to be valued (IPA) is associated with a product and the product’s net present value is calculated.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The product's net present value is apportioned among tangible assets, intangible advantages and intellectual property assets. (There are three groups of intellectual property assets: technical [utility patents, functional software copyrights and technical trade secrets]; reputational [trademarks, service marks and brand names]; and operational [business method patents and proprietary business processes].</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The product is associated with competition parameters which can be used to compare the product to substitute products and competition parameter weights are calculated. (There are three groups of competition parameters: technical [price and performance], reputational [recognition and impression], and operational [cost and efficiency]. Weights are calculated for each parameter group and for individual parameters within each group).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The IPA is associated with an individual competition parameter and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to substitute intellectual property assets is calculated. (Substitute intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in substitute products and associated with the same competition parameter as the IPA).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The IPA is associated with complementary intellectual property assets and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to complementary intellectual property assets is calculated. (Complementary intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in the same product and associated with the same parameter group as the IPA).</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The value of the IPA is calculated by apportioning a share of the product's intellectual property asset value to the IPA based upon the IPA's competitive advantage contribution relative to substitute and complementary intellectual property assets. If the IPA is associated with multiple products, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution to each product is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA. If the IPA is associated with multiple parameters, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution for each parameter is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA.</li>
</ol>
<p><b>Georgia Pacific<br /></b>The fifteen factors enumerated in the Georgia Pacific case, several of which repeat approaches discussed above, are used in royalty rate determination:<a href="#_ftn123" name="_ftnref123"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[122]</span></span></span></a></p>
<ul>
</ul>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The duration of the patent and the term of the license.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span> The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The opinion testimony of qualified experts.</li>
</ol>
<ul>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span> </span>The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-which desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Academics have prescribed modification to the approach towards these factors analyzing that the relevant questions in calculating a reasonable royalty fall into four basic categories: (1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).<a href="#_ftn124" name="_ftnref124"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[123]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>V. Patent Pool Examples<br /></span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The following discussion highlights certain aspects of patent pools from real world examples. These examples are restricted to the technological field. Study of these aspects is of value in understanding the concepts discussed hereinbefore.</p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">A. Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The MAA was formed in 1917 in U.S.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Apart from the “foundational” patents of Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers, which had substantial royalty rates, most licensing was conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement suits as the real payment for the exchange.<a href="#_ftn125" name="_ftnref125"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[124]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The MAA was open to anyone who wished to use the Wright-Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation fee and a licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built; these funds were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.<a href="#_ftn126" name="_ftnref126"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[125]</span></span></span></a> </span>MAA retained $ 25 (12.5%) to cover its administrative expenses, $ 135 (67.5%) was paid to the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and $ 40 (20%) was paid to the Curtiss-Burgess Airplane & Motor Corporation.<a href="#_ftn127" name="_ftnref127"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[126]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Patents added to the pool after its formation were divided into two classes- normal patents were licensed into the pool for all to use, with no special royalty payout going to the inventor or firm; exceptional patents earned ongoing royalties, in an amount determined by a formal arbitration procedure.<a href="#_ftn128" name="_ftnref128"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[127]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The MAA also included a grant-back provision that applied to after-acquired patents.<a href="#_ftn129" name="_ftnref129"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[128]</span></span></span></a></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MAA’s members could license their patents to non-members if the terms were no more favorable than to members and any MAA member could withdraw at any time, but its patents in the pool at the time of withdrawal would remain.<a href="#_ftn130" name="_ftnref130"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[129]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>B. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)</span></span></span></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MPEG technology allows for transmission and storage of digital video and audio signals.<span> It was formed by the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.C., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. in 1997. The patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard is administered by a common license administrator- MPEG-LA</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>MPEG-LA is required to grant licenses to any potential licensees, without discrimination and at a reasonable royalty rate.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">MPEG LA offers a portfolio of MPEG-2 systems licenses with a fixed royalty for each licensed mobile MPEG-2 systems signal receiver and a different fixed royalty for all other MPEG-2 systems devices.<a href="#_ftn131" name="_ftnref131"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[130]</span></span></span></a> Additional patents, not included in the portfolio, are available for specific implementations.<a href="#_ftn132" name="_ftnref132"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[131]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The pool offers a standardized five-year license to all prospective licensees.<a href="#_ftn133" name="_ftnref133"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[132]</span></span></span></a> The licensing royalties do not change if patents are added to the portfolio during the five-year licensing period, although the royalty rate may increase by up to 25% in a license renewal.<a href="#_ftn134" name="_ftnref134"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[133]</span></span></span></a> Each patent in the pool is valued equally.<a href="#_ftn135" name="_ftnref135"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[134]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>The license has a grant-back provision that requires the licensee to grant to the licensor and other portfolio licensees a nonexclusive license, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions, on any essential patent that the licensee has a right to license.<a href="#_ftn136" name="_ftnref136"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[135]</span></span></span></a> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There exists a partial termination right given to licensors, who may request that MPEG-LA terminate the license of that licensor’s IPR to a particular licensee, if that licensee has sued the licensor for infringement of an MPEG-2 essential or “related” patent or refused to license a related patent on fair and reasonable terms.<a href="#_ftn137" name="_ftnref137"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[136]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">C. DVD</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Sony, Philips and Pioneer organized the DVD3C patent pool in 1998 <span>for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Royalty payments are allocated under guidelines set by the Ground Rules for Royalty</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Allocation rather than on subjective analysis by an expert.<a href="#_ftn138" name="_ftnref138"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[137]</span></span></span></a> The royalty rate in standard licenses is not related to fluctuations in the market price of a licensed product; also, the royalty rate is not computed on a per-patent basis and does not fluctuate as patents are added or removed, therefore, the same royalty rate is payable when using one essential patent as when using several.<a href="#_ftn139" name="_ftnref139"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[138]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>Hitachi</span><span>, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor organized the DVD6C patent pool in 1999 again for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The DVD6C pool is also governed by the “Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation” guidelines.<a href="#_ftn140" name="_ftnref140"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[139]</span></span></span></a> The royalties are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $4.00 per product, whichever is higher. Royalties for DVD decoders are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $1.00 per product, whichever is higher.<a href="#_ftn141" name="_ftnref141"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[140]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The DVD6C agreement contains a grant-back clause, which, requires licensees to grant each of the licensing companies of DVD6C (and their licensees) a non-exclusive license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to use any of their patents that are deemed essential for the manufacture, use or sale of DVD Products; this grantback is restricted only to those DVD products actually licensed to the licensee.<a href="#_ftn142" name="_ftnref142"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[141]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">D. 3G Mobile Telephony</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; ">The 3G Patent Platform Partnership was formed in 1999. The purpose of the 3G Patent Platform Partnership is to allow for “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” access to rights essential for implementing the W-CDMA 3GPP standard.<a href="#_ftn143" name="_ftnref143"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[142]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">There are three form contracts associated with the Platform: the Framework Agreement, the Standard License, and the Interim License.<a href="#_ftn144" name="_ftnref144"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[143]</span></span></span></a> The Framework Agreement gives each member the choice either to license its essential patents according to the Standard License or to negotiate terms directly with a licensee.<a href="#_ftn145" name="_ftnref145"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[144]</span></span></span></a> The Standard License prescribes standardized royalties for licenses, to be determined by an independent commission.<a href="#_ftn146" name="_ftnref146"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[145]</span></span></span></a> If the patent owner foregoes the Standard License and fails to come to terms in bilateral negotiations, the Interim License comes into effect which has the same royalty terms as the Standard License.<a href="#_ftn147" name="_ftnref147"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[146]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h3 class="WordSection1">E. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">The Bluetooth SIG was formed in 1997 to provide a technology for interconnection of mobile phones, computers, laptops, printers, PDAs, and other devices via a short-range radio frequency band; SIG oversees the development of Bluetooth standards and its licensing.<a href="#_ftn148" name="_ftnref148"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[147]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">SIG’s member companies are divided into three different classes- (1) promoter company, which are intensely engaged in the strategic and technical development of Bluetooth wireless technology; they include Agere, Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">Toshiba; (2) associate members, who are licensed to use Bluetooth specifications and trademarks; (3) adopted members, which use published specifications and trademarks, but do not influence the specification process, nor do they have early access to unpublished specifications.<a href="#_ftn149" name="_ftnref149"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[148]</span></span></span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">SIG licenses to member companies on a royalty-free basis, but, associate members pay an annual fee based on their company’s annual revenue, with “small” associates (less than $100 million USD/year) paying $7,500 USD/year and “large” associates (more than $100 million USD/year) paying $35,000 USD/year; adopted members are not required to pay an annual fee.<a href="#_ftn150" name="_ftnref150"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[149]</span></span></span></a></p>
<h2><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>VI. Conclusion<br /></span></span></span></h2>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; ">As is evident, patent valuation and license fee determination are extremely subjective and case based. Moreover, their dynamics alter according to the situation, as in the context of patent pools. This dynamism is furthered by the fact that there are no strict or universal formulas or procedures which can be applied in such determinations. Furthermore, such determinations cannot be made in a vacuum but are subject to the cascading effect of a multitude of factors comprised of the holistic technological environment that may not be just restricted to the innovation in question.</p>
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<div id="ftn2">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 293 (Summer, 2012) citing <i>IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of Intellectual Property--The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical Technologies</i>, Knowledge Ecology International, (June 3, 2007) quoting Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[2]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v Gharda Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (Suit No.2932 of 2011; Decided On: 20.03.2012) Bombay H.C. (Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) including the patent right is valuable right for all the commercial purposes. These intangible assets play important role in any financial assessment of the trade/commercial or the market. It changes from time to time, market to market, person to person based upon the situations. If valuation is always a complex and flexible issue and a matter of discussion and debate in business strategies. The patent valuation involves many described and undescribed elements).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[3]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (October 1996) citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[4]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 463 (Spring, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[5]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools 77 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2010) MPEG LA Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf; MPEG LA, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License Briefing (Aug. 4, 2010).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[6]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Kramer, <i>supra</i> n.4 at 463 (essential patents of technical standards are more valuable, on average, than the general population of patents).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[7]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[8]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[9]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[10]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i>citing DVD 3C Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[11]</span></span></span></span></a><span>R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[12]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Daniel Lin, Research versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation And Standardization In The Software Industry 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 274 (2002).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[13]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma 16 Yale J. on Reg. 359 (Summer, 1999).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[14]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[15]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[16]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[17]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[18]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[19]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[20]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law And Patent Misconduct In The Proprietary Drug Industry 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1209 (1994). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[21]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[22]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[23]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment Of Current Law And Policy 38 Rutgers L. J. 539 (Winter, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[24]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[25]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[26]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn28">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[27]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn29">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[28]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Nelson, <i>supra</i> n.23.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn30">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[29]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David S. Taylor, The Sinking Of The United States Electronics Industry Within Japanese Patent Pools 26 GW J. Int'l L. & Econ. 181 (1992). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn31">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[30]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn32">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[31]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 309 (2002).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn33">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[32]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (June, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn34">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[33]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Meurer, <i>supra</i> n.31 (A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar inventions during an interval of a few years).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn35">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[34]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn36">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[35]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Robert P. Greenspoon and Catherine M. Cottle, Don't Assume A Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories With Licensing And Enforcement Reality 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 194 (2011). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn37">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[36]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Meurer, <i>supra</i> n.31. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn38">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[37]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert <i>supra</i> n.5 citing the cross-licensing arrangement between the Singer Manufacturing Company and Gegauf, contained provisions by which each of the parties agreed not to bring any infringement action against the other. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 178 (1963).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn39">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[38]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert <i>supra</i> n.5.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn40">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[39]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Kramer, <i>supra</i> n.4. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn41">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[40]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn42">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[41]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn43">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[42]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid 32 Pace L. Rev. 641 (Summer Issue, 2012). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn44">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[43]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 (To the extent that a patent pool successfully lowers total royalties relative to independent licensing, this leaves ‘headroom’ available for an independent licensor outside the pool to charge a high royalty for its patent).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn45">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[44]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i><i> </i>citing Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., et al., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn46">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[45]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012); Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763 (2010 / 2011) (the typical semiconductor chip likely involves hundreds, perhaps more, patents. In turn, that chip may be intended for use in a laptop computer, the other components of which involve hundreds, or more, patents. Without knowing how many patents actually read on a product, and how many have holders who will actively seek licensing fees, it can be exceedingly difficult to assign the contributed value to those that are known). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn47">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[46]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (November, 2005); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard and Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense Of “Apportionment” In Patent Damages 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255 (2011) (combining patented technologies typically creates value that is greater than the sum of the parts. For example, patent pools often bring together various technologies that are necessary to create the product in question. The stand-alone value of any one patent in the pool may be low or close to zero unless combined with the other patents in the pool). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn48">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[47]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Parchomovsky and Wagner, <i>supra</i> n.46.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn49">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[48]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn50">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[49]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn51">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[50]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn52">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[51]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Scott Iyama, The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1223 (March, 2005). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn53">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[52]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools For Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 229 (December, 2002). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn54">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[53]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump From Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1631 (July, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn55">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[54]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn56">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[55]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn57">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[56]</span></span></span></span></a><span> R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009) citing DVD-6 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn58">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[57]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket, 3 Nanotechnology L. & Bus. 317 (2006) suggests that to determine the viability of using a patent pool in a market, companies should ponder the following list of nine criteria: (1) product development driven by standards; (2) moderate fragmentation of patent landscape; (3) at least five pool members; (4) each member working on specific subcomponent of a product; (5) willingness of patent holders to negotiate; (6) commitment by members to create the pool; (7) an industry that is in the later stages of product development; (8) certainty of patent ownership; and (9) a patent pool clear of potential antitrust violations.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn59">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[58]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, where the U.S. government used the threat of compulsory licensing to compel the pioneers of the aircraft industry to form a patent pool in 1917. The industry was enmeshed in litigation over the scope and validity of patents, and some patentees, particularly the Wright-Martin Company, were demanding royalties that the government and other aircraft manufacturers deemed excessive. Creation of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association patent pool resolved the litigation chaos. The government negotiated a portfolio license from the pool with a royalty of $ 200 per aircraft, which was a fraction of the royalty that Wright-Martin was demanding for a single patent ($ 1,000 per aircraft). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn60">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[59]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13 discussing that pool agreements are frequently employed as a means of settling existing litigation, and citing examples including patent pools in the laser eye surgery, and the public key encryption industries;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>also see Lemley & Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property, <i>supra</i> n.32 discussing that the average royalty rate granted in all reasonable-royalty cases is 13.13% of the price of the infringing product, which is much higher than that of patent licenses negotiated without litigation.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn61">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[60]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Greenspoon and Cottle, <i>supra</i> n.35 discussing the value of patents as a form of currency that can be used to further goals unrelated to market creation or entry. Such goals can be to improve a firm's competitive position when trying to acquire start-up funds, to improve negotiating terms when licensing other patents, and to reduce the chance of paying excessive royalties to external patent owners;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><span>also see, Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing how different business strategies can cause firms to pool their patents with some firms, but not with others, citing the example of emergence of two pools to license DVD patents as a consequence of differing approaches to industry standards. One explanation offered for the existence of two separate pools is that the two groups could not reach an accord about their respective shares of joint royalty payments. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn62">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[61]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing how some pools license their patents royalty-free or at royalties that are deliberately held below profit-maximizing levels in an effort to promote adoption of new technologies covered by their patents, citing the example of the Bluetooth Special Interest Group and the Multimedia Home Platform. The article also discusses patent pools formed to license patents that are necessary to implement a defined standard, such as MPEG encoding, DVDs, or mobile telephony. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn63">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[62]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 discussing pools that limit royalties to promote social objectives rather than to profit from new products citing examples of companies, universities, and research organizations such as Syngenta- an agricultural technology company, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture, the SARS IP Working Group, and the UNITAID pool for AIDS medications.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn64">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[63]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing And The Emergence Of A New Patent Market 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 445 (2009) (The current state of affairs shows that the patent licensing market strongly favors larger corporations over smaller ones, enabling the larger corporations to reap much of the market opportunities and benefits while limiting them to smaller patentees).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn65">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[64]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Roger B. Andewelt, Practical Problems In Counseling And Litigating: Analysis Of Patent Pools Under The Antitrust Laws 53 Antitrust L.J. 611 (October 11, 1984/October 12, 1984) (Pools typically contain restrictions on those who join the pool by contributing patents and/or those who take licenses under the pooled patents).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn66">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[65]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn67">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[66]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Ann Weilbaecher, PSY.D., Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation 18 Ann. Health L. 281 (Summer, 2009).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn68">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[67]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Greenspoon and Cottle, <i>supra</i> n.35 identify five general types of entities that license and enforce patents: (1) Individual inventors with a single patent; (2) Individual serial inventors; (3) Non-Practicing Entities; (4) Operating companies who practice inventions acquired from others; and (5) Operating companies who practice inventions developed in-house.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn69">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[68]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See, Raymond Millien and Ron Laurie, A Survey Of Established & Emerging IP Business Models 9 Sedona Conf. J. 77 (2008) discussing various models, viz. Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies, Institutional IP Aggregators/Acquisition Funds, IP/Technology Development Companies, Licensing Agents, Litigation Finance/Investment Firms, IP Brokers, IP-Based M&A Advisory Firms, IP Auction Houses, On-Line IP/Technology Exchanges, Clearinghouses, Bulletin Boards, and Innovation Portals, IP-Backed Lending, Royalty Stream Securitization Firms, Patent Rating Software and Valuation Services, University Technology Transfer Intermediaries, IP Transaction Exchanges & Trading Platforms/IP Transaction Best Practices Development Communities, Defensive Patent Pools, Funds and Alliances, Technology/IP Spinout Financing, and Patent-Based Public Stock Indexes.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn70">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[69]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations 77 Antitrust L.J. 855 (2011).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn71">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[70]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5 </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn72">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[71]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn73">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[72]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting And The Failure Of Price Competition 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 217 (2009) citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn74">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[73]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Doug Lichtman, Understanding The Rand Commitment 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1023 (2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn75">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[74]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Peter N. Detkin, Leveling The Patent Playing Field 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 636 (Summer, 2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn76">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref76" name="_ftn76"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[75]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Lee, <i>infra</i> n.57. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn77">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref77" name="_ftn77"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[76]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Kelce Wilson, The Four Phases of Patent Usage 40 Cap. U.L. Rev. 679 (Summer, 2012). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn78">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref78" name="_ftn78"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[77]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Gavin D. George, What is Hiding in the Bushes? eBay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 557 (2007). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn79">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref79" name="_ftn79"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[78]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn80">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref80" name="_ftn80"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[79]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn81">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref81" name="_ftn81"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[80]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Daniel R. Cahoy and Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy 36 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 415 (Spring, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn82">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref82" name="_ftn82"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[81]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5; See for example, Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3 describing how in the airplane cross-licensing agreement, it provides that a board of arbitrators may decide in any case what reward should be paid to individual patent owners and this is based not upon the official determination of patentability by the Patent Office, but upon the unofficial determination of the importance of the invention by a board of arbitrators.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn83">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref83" name="_ftn83"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[82]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See Andewelt, <i>supra</i> n.64 (The scope and variety of patents included vary considerably from pool to pool. Some pools are limited to patents covering a single commercial device. Others contain numerous and diverse patents relating to different devices in different markets).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn84">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref84" name="_ftn84"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[83]</span></span></span></span></a><span> See, Scala, <i>supra</i> n.53 discussing how the non-exclusive character of a license is particularly important for those firms holding patents whose full utility is unascertainable at the time of the formation of the pool.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn85">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref85" name="_ftn85"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[84]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress In The Aircraft Industry And The Role Of Patent Pools And Cross-Licensing Agreements 2011 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1 (Spring 2011). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn86">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref86" name="_ftn86"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[85]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Ed Levy, et. al, Patent Pools And Genomics: Navigating A Course To Open Science? 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75 (Winter, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn87">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref87" name="_ftn87"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[86]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn88">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref88" name="_ftn88"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[87]</span></span></span></a> Ted Hagelin, Technology and Legal Practice Symposium Issue: Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133 (2002) (The cost method of valuation measures the value of an asset by the cost to replace the asset with an identical or equivalent asset. The assumption underlying the cost method of valuation is that the cost to purchase or develop a new asset is commensurate with the economic value that the asset can provide during its life).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn89">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref89" name="_ftn89"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[88]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i><i> </i>(The market method values an asset based upon comparable transactions between unrelated parties).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn90">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref90" name="_ftn90"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[89]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> (The income method values an asset based upon the present value of the net economic benefit (net future income stream) expected to be received over the life of the asset).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn91">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref91" name="_ftn91"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[90]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls Or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis Of Nonpracticing Entities 110 Colum. L. Rev. 114 (January, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn92">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref92" name="_ftn92"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[91]</span></span></span></span></a><i><span>Id.</span></i><span> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn93">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref93" name="_ftn93"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[92]</span></span></span></span></a><span>Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (December, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn94">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref94" name="_ftn94"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[93]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn95">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref95" name="_ftn95"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[94]</span></span></span></span></a><span>R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn96">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref96" name="_ftn96"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[95]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn97">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref97" name="_ftn97"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[96]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn98">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref98" name="_ftn98"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[97]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn99">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref99" name="_ftn99"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[98]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn100">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref100" name="_ftn100"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[99]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn101">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref101" name="_ftn101"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[100]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn102">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref102" name="_ftn102"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[101]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn103">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref103" name="_ftn103"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[102]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn104">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref104" name="_ftn104"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[103]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn105">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref105" name="_ftn105"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[104]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn106">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref106" name="_ftn106"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[105]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn107">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref107" name="_ftn107"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[106]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn108">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref108" name="_ftn108"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[107]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn109">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref109" name="_ftn109"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[108]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn110">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref110" name="_ftn110"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[109]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Malcolm T. "Ty" Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, PhD, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 194 (Fall, 2010).</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn111">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref111" name="_ftn111"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[110]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn112">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref112" name="_ftn112"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[111]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn113">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref113" name="_ftn113"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[112]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Geradin and Layne-Farrar, <i>supra</i> n.45. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn114">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref114" name="_ftn114"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[113]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn115">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref115" name="_ftn115"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[114]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i>; Meeks & Eldering, <i>supra</i> n.109.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn116">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref116" name="_ftn116"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[115]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Hagelin, <i>supra</i> n.87. </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn117">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref117" name="_ftn117"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[116]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn118">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref118" name="_ftn118"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[117]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn119">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref119" name="_ftn119"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[118]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn120">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref120" name="_ftn120"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[119]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn121">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref121" name="_ftn121"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[120]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn122">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref122" name="_ftn122"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[121]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn123">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref123" name="_ftn123"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[122]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn124">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref124" name="_ftn124"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[123]</span></span></span></span></a><span> Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach To Calculating Reasonable Royalties 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627 (Summer, 2010). </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn125">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref125" name="_ftn125"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[124]</span></span></span></a> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn126">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref126" name="_ftn126"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[125]</span></span></span></a> Michael Mattioli, Communities Of Innovation 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 103 (Winter, 2012).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn127">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref127" name="_ftn127"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[126]</span></span></span></a> Szakalski, <i>supra</i> n.84.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn128">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref128" name="_ftn128"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[127]</span></span></span></a> Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, <i>supra</i> n.3.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn129">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref129" name="_ftn129"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[128]</span></span></span></a> Mattioli, <i>supra</i> n.125.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn130">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref130" name="_ftn130"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[129]</span></span></span></a> Szakalski, <i>supra</i> n.84.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn131">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref131" name="_ftn131"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[130]</span></span></span></a> Gilbert, <i>supra</i> n.5.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn132">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref132" name="_ftn132"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[131]</span></span></span></a> Carlson, <i>supra</i> n.13.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn133">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref133" name="_ftn133"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[132]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn134">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref134" name="_ftn134"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[133]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn135">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref135" name="_ftn135"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[134]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn136">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="#_ftnref136" name="_ftn136"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[135]</span></span></span></a> Lin, <i>supra</i> n.12.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn137">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref137" name="_ftn137"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[136]</span></span></span></a> Dorothy Gill Raymond, Benefits and Risks Of Patent Pooling For Standard-Setting Organizations 16 Antitrust ABA 41 (Summer, 2002).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn138">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref138" name="_ftn138"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[137]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn139">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref139" name="_ftn139"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[138]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i> </span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn140">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref140" name="_ftn140"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[139]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn141">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref141" name="_ftn141"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[140]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn142">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref142" name="_ftn142"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[141]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn143">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref143" name="_ftn143"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[142]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn144">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref144" name="_ftn144"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[143]</span></span></span></a> Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European Commission's Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1693 (December, 2003).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn145">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref145" name="_ftn145"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[144]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn146">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref146" name="_ftn146"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[145]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn147">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref147" name="_ftn147"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[146]</span></span></span></span></a><span> <i>Id.</i></span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn148">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref148" name="_ftn148"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[147]</span></span></span></span></a><span> David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.</span></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn149">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref149" name="_ftn149"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[148]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
<div id="ftn150">
<p class="MsoFootnoteText" style="text-align:justify; "><a href="#_ftnref150" name="_ftn150"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span>[149]</span></span></span></a> <i>Id.</i></p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools</a>
</p>
No publishervikrantFeaturedPatentsAccess to KnowledgePervasive Technologies2014-07-09T09:46:16ZBlog EntryOpen Letter to Prime Minister Modi
http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi
<b>After the government introduced the "Make in India" and "Digital India" programmes, the air is thick with the promise of reduced imports, new jobs, and goods for the domestic market. In light of the patent wars in India, the government can ill-afford to overlook the patent implications in indigenously manufactured mobile phones. CIS proposes that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and a five percent compulsory license. </b>
<p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-741ac7e2-c01d-c02c-db3c-4cf2f2fdf6fc" style="text-align: justify; ">The blog post was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2015/03/223-digital-india-make-in-india-form-a-patent-pool-of-critical-mobile-technologies-cis-india/">re-published by Medianama</a> on March 24, 2015.</p>
<hr />
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; ">Honourable Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi,</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; ">We at the Centre for Internet and Society support the "<a class="external-link" href="http://www.makeinindia.com/">Make in India</a>" and "<a class="external-link" href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Digital%20India.pdf">Digital India</a>" initiatives of the Indian government and share your <a class="external-link" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8QLIuABSYk/">vision of a digitally empowered India</a> where “1.2 billion connected Indians drive innovation”, where “access to information knows no barriers”, and where knowledge is the citizens’ power. The government’s plan of incentivising the manufacturing of electronics hardware, including that of mobile phones in the 2015 Union Budget is equally encouraging. Towards this important goal of nation building, the Centre for Internet and Society is researching the patent and copyright implications of Internet-enabled mobile devices that are sold in the Indian market for Rs 6,000 or less.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; ">Bolstered by Make in India, several mobile phone manufacturers have started or ramped up their manufacturing facilities in India. Homegrown brands — such as <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-28/news/58546839_1_digital-india-spice-group-indian-cellular-association">Spice</a>, <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-02-04/news/58795672_1_devices-haridwar-april-2015">Maxx Mobile and Lava</a> — and foreign manufacturers alike are making humongous investments in mobile phone plants. Chip manufacturer <a href="http://www.mediatek.com/en/news-events/mediatek-news/mediatek-launches-rd-center-in-bengaluru/">Mediatek</a>; one of the newest entrants in the Indian smartphone market, <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Xiaomi-to-set-up-research-development-centre-in-India/articleshow/46043461.cms">Xiaomi</a>; and telecom company Huawei, all different links in the mobile phone manufacturing chain, are setting up research and development units in India having recognised its potential as a significant market. These developments promise to cut or substitute imports, cater to the domestic market, create millions of jobs, and stem the outflow of money from India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, mobile phone manufacturers, big and small, have also been embroiled in litigation in India for the past few years over patents pertaining to crucial technologies. Micromax, one of the several Indian mobile phone manufacturers with original equipment manufacturers in China <a class="external-link" href="http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=57850&yr=2013">was ordered by the Delhi High Court late last year to pay a substantial 1.25 to 2 per cent of the selling price of its devices to Ericsson</a>, which has claimed infringement of eight of its standard essential patents. <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/04/223-ericsson-sues-intex-patents/">Intex </a>and Lava, two members of Micromax’s ilk, have been similarly sued and claim to have received the short end of the stick in the form of unreasonable and exorbitant compensations and royalty rates. Chinese budget phone manufacturers operating in India — Xiaomi, OnePlus, and Gionee — also have come under the sledgehammer of sudden suspension of the sale of their devices. The bigger companies such as Asus, Samsung and ZTE have faced the heat of patent litigation as well.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; ">The fear of litigation over patent infringement could thwart local innovation. Additionally, the expenses incurred due to litigation and compensation could lead to the smaller manufacturers shutting shop or passing on their losses to their consumers, and in turn, driving the price points of Internet-enabled mobile devices out of the reach of many. It could also become a stumbling block to the success of ambitious plans of the government, such as the one to provide free <a href="http://www.firstpost.com/business/modis-big-bang-digital-india-plan-2500-cities-to-get-free-4g-level-wifi-2060449.html">WiFi in 2,500 cities and towns</a> across India.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; "><b>We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. </b>Such a pool would possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States regularly issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anti-competitive practices.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a> <a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a> Unfortunately, we did not receive a response <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices" class="internal-link" title="Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses">from the previous government to our suggestion</a> of establishing such a patent pool. We believe that our proposal falls in line with your ambitious programmes designed to work towards your vision of India, and we hope that you would consider it.</p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; ">Yours truly,<br />Rohini Lakshané,<br />Programme Officer,<br />The Centre for Internet and Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Copies to:</p>
<ol>
<li>Shri Arun Jaitley, Minister for Finance</li>
<li>Shri Rajiv Mehrishi, Secretary to Ministry of Finance</li>
<li>Smt. Smriti Zubin Irani, Minister for Human Resource Development</li>
<li>Shri Satyanarayan Mohanty, Secretary to Ministry of Human Resources Development</li>
<li>Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister for Commerce and Industry</li>
<li>Shri Amitabh Kant, Secretary to Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion</li>
<li>Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, Minister for Communication and Information Technology</li>
<li>Shri Rakesh Garg, Secretary to Department of Telecommunications</li>
<li>Shri R. S. Sharma, Secretary for Department of Electronics and Information Technology</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p>Also read: <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies">FAQ: CIS' Proposal for Compulsory Licensing of Critical Mobile Technologies </a></p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. <span id="docs-internal-guid-58b7fb82-db2b-7be3-83cf-b5045255b88c">James Love, Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) written comments and notice of intent to testify at the Special 301 Public Hearing, Page 6, "US use of compulsory licensing",<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/KEI_2014_Special301_7Feb20014_FRComments.pdf">http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/KEI_2014_Special301_7Feb20014_FRComments.pdf</a>, February 7, 2014, Last accessed February 10, 2015.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. <span id="docs-internal-guid-58b7fb82-db2b-7be3-83cf-b5045255b88c">Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation, Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Volume 18, Issue 3, Article 3, Page 862, "Compulsory licensing in the United States", <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1429&context=btlj">http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1429&context=btlj</a>, June 2003, Last accessed February 10, 2015.</span></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi'>http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi</a>
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