Centre for Internet and Society

Reply comments of CIS in the matter of the WIPO draft proposal

praskrishna — 2011-08-22T13:18:38Z

Reply comments of CIS, Daisy Forum of India and Inclusive Planet to the comments filed by Steven J Metaliz in the matter of the WIPO draft proposal.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/accessibility/publications/Reply-Comments-to-WIPO-draft-proposal

Re:Wiring Bodies

Asha Achuthan — 2015-04-14T12:49:46Z

Asha Achuthan initiates a historical research inquiry to understand the ways in which gendered bodies are shaped by the Internet imaginaries in contemporary India. Tracing the history from nationalist debates between Gandhi and Tagore to the neo-liberal perspective based knowledge produced by feminists like Martha Nussbaum; Asha’s research offers a unique entry point into cyberculture studies through a feminist epistemology of science and technology. The monograph establishes that there is a certain pre-history to the Internet that needs to be unpacked in order to understand the digital interventions on the body in a range of fields from social sciences theory to medical health practices to technology and science policy in the country.

Section I (Attitudes to Technology) attempts to trace the trajectories of the critiques of technology standing in for science in the Indian context. This section traces the methodology of critique itself that animates the political in India and shows the ways in which these critiques access anterior difference, the ways in which they posit resistance as providing the crisis to closure of hegemonic western science and the ways in which this resistance fails to meet the promise of crisis.

Section II (Mapping Transitions) explores in detail the responses to science and technology in feminist and gender work in India. Here, Asha presents an ‘attitude’ to technology as discrete from ‘man’. Feminist and gender work in India have articulated four responses to technology across state and civil society positions. These being the presence of women as agents of technological change, the demand for improved access for women to the fruits of technology, the demand for inclusion of women as a constituency that must be specifically provided for by technological amendments a need for recognition of technology’s ills particularly for women and the consequent need for resistance to technology on the same count.

Keeping in mind that woman’s lived experiences have served as the vantage point for all four of the responses to technology in the Indian context, Asha suggests the need to revisit the idea of such experience itself, and the ways in which it might be made critical, rather than valorising it as an official counterpoint to scientific knowledge, and by extension to technology. Section III (Working towards an Alternative) does not address the ‘technology question’ in a direct sense but makes an effort to make that exploration.

Asha concludes by saying that she treats technology as a part of the philosophy of modern western science and the relationship between technology and bodies is the more obvious relationship upon which the formulations of human-technology relationships are built.

Download the monograph here [PDF, 2.58 MB]

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/rewiring-bodies

Privacy IT Act

praskrishna — 2011-08-21T13:43:02Z

pdf

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/privacy-it-act.pdf

Privacy and IT Act (PDF)

praskrishna — 2011-08-21T16:17:47Z

pdf

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/privacy-it.pdf

Privacy and IT Act (ODT)

praskrishna — 2011-08-21T13:52:15Z

open office

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/privacy-it-act.odt

Privacy after Big Data: Compilation of Early Research

Saumyaa Naidu — 2016-11-12T01:37:03Z

Download the Compilation (PDF)

Privacy after Big Data

Evolving data science, technologies, techniques, and practices, including big data, are enabling shifts in how the public and private sectors carry out their functions and responsibilities, deliver services, and facilitate innovative production and service models to emerge. For example, in the public sector, the Indian government has considered replacing the traditional poverty line with targeted subsidies based on individual household income and assets. The my.gov.in platform is aimed to enable participation of the connected citizens, to pull in online public opinion in a structured manner on key governance topics in the country. The 100 Smart Cities Mission looks forwards to leverage big data analytics and techniques to deliver services and govern citizens within city sub-systems. In the private sector, emerging financial technology companies are developing credit scoring models using big, small, social, and fragmented data so that people with no formal credit history can be offered loans. These models promote efficiency and reduction in cost through personalization and are powered by a wide variety of data sources including mobile data, social media data, web usage data, and passively collected data from usages of IoT or connected devices.

These data technologies and solutions are enabling business models that are based on the ideals of ‘less’: cash-less, presence-less, and paper-less. This push towards an economy premised upon a foundational digital ID in a prevailing condition of absent legal frameworks leads to substantive loss of anonymity and privacy of individual citizens and consumers vis-a-vis both the state and the private sector. Indeed, the present use of these techniques run contrary to the notion of the ‘sunlight effect’ - making the individual fully transparent (often without their knowledge) to the state and private sector, while the algorithms and means of reaching a decision are opaque and inaccessible to the individual.

These techniques, characterized by the volume of data processed, the variety of sources data is processed from, and the ability to both contextualize - learning new insights from disconnected data points - and de-contextualize - finding correlation rather than causation - have also increased the value of all forms of data. In some ways, big data has made data exist on an equal playing field as far as monetisation and joining up are concerned. Meta data can be just as valuable to an entity as content data. As data science techniques evolve to find new ways of collecting, processing, and analyzing data - the benefits of the same are clear and tangible, while the harms are less clear, but significantly present.

Is it possible for an algorithm to discriminate? Will incorrect decisions be made based on data collected? Will populations be excluded from necessary services if they do not engage with certain models or do emerging models overlook certain populations? Can such tools be used to surveil individuals at a level of granularity that was formerly not possible and before a crime occurs? Can such tools be used to violate rights – for example target certain types of speech or groups online? And importantly, when these practices are opaque to the individual, how can one seek appropriate and effective remedy.

Traditionally, data protection standards have defined and established protections for certain categories of data. Yet, data science techniques have evolved beyond data protection principles. It is now infinitely harder to obtain informed consent from an individual when data that is collected can be used for multiple purposes by multiple bodies. Providing notice for every use is also more difficult – as is fulfilling requirements of data minimization. Some say privacy is dead in the era of big data. Others say privacy needs to be re-conceptualized, while others say protecting privacy now, more than ever, requires a ‘regulatory sandbox’ that brings together technical design, markets, legislative reforms, self regulation, and innovative regulatory frameworks. It also demands an expanding of the narrative around privacy – one that has largely been focused on harms such as misuse of data or unauthorized collection – to include discrimination, marginalization, and competition harms.

In this compilation we have put together a series of articles that we have developed as we explore the impacts – positive and negative – of big data. This includes looking at India’s data protection regime in the context of big data, reviewing literature on the benefits of harms of big data, studying emerging predictive policing techniques that rely on big data, and analyzing closely the impact of big data on specific privacy principles such as consent. This is a growing body of research that we are exploring and is relevant to multiple areas of our work including privacy and surveillance. Feedback and comments on the compilation are welcome and appreciated.

Elonnai Hickok
Director - Internet Governance

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-after-big-data-compilation-of-early-research

Privacy Act and IT

praskrishna — 2011-08-21T16:19:51Z

word file

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/privacy-it-act.docx

Porn: Law, Video, Technology

Namita A Malhotra — 2015-04-14T12:43:14Z

Namita Malhotra’s monograph on Pornography and Pleasure is possibly the first Indian reflection and review of its kind. It draws aside the purdah that pornography has become – the forbidden object as well as the thing that prevents you from looking at it – and fingers its constituent threads and textures.

This monograph is not so much about a cultural product called porn as it is a meditation on visuality and seeing, the construction and experience of gazing, technology and bodies in the law, modern myths, the interactions between human and filmic bodies. And technology not necessarily as objects and devices that make pornography possible (but that too), but as history and evolution, process and method, and what this brings to understanding what pornography is.

Namita’s approach brings film studies, technology studies, critical theory, philosophy, literature and legal studies into a document that reads as part literature review, part analysis, going deep, as a monograph should. Reading through this I was struck by the ways of seeing and writing, that a subject like pornography demands – and allows for. I found the structure of the entire piece well conceived, akin to 3D models of spirals rather than linear, much like the experience of watching itself, perhaps. Personally, I know I’m going to keep going back to this monograph for its rich references as much as for how Malhotra examines visual (con)texts across multiple disciplines. And, far from being a distant academic paper, I see how Namita has worked in and been informed by her own fond appreciation of diverse texts with useful and unusual departures into literature and philosophy.

The emphasis on amateur pornography is critical considering the pandemic of hysterical blindness that afflicts public conversations in India around this phenomenon in particular, and the Obscene more generally. A line from the monograph ‘pornography does ideological work’ stands out for me, as Namita shows how it (the monograph, amateur porn, pornography) effectively slices through the careful fabrications called Nation, Culture and Justice in particular; and also in terms of how porn constitutes particular kinds of knowing, speech and experience that reflect on the status quo of politics and of seeing/visuality. The deep engagement with the Mysore Mallige movie/case is an interesting and tender one, perhaps one of the first such in-depth analyses, and a great example of how amateur porn works and what it means.

Considering the appalling lack of insight in responding to the Obscene and the Pornographic, the messy rhetoric and outrage that result when the Pornographic is made public, when the law acts on the visual, on technology, Namita’s analysis is a sharp lens that provides much-needed rejoinders. The sections dealing with these kinds of past events – the moment of public outrage around the revelation of a piece of porn, it’s journey of creation and circulation, the public and institutional esponses to it, are really excellent analyses of a particular kind of moment in contemporary Indian society that have become (to my mind) increasingly difficult to talk about.

There can only be more sharing of this document, perhaps re-purposed, in parts, to become more accessible to communities engaged with commenting, acting and responding to the Obscene, the Visual and the Law (I say this from a perspective of utility and instrumentality that “activism” necessarily deploys, but within what is possible for cannibalisation. Also, because people don’t read) because there just isn’t enough thoughtful work on pornography in the current climate.

The monograph moves to examining the ‘being’ of the pornographic artifact as a digital image and how and why it, especially “video pornography provides a new model for relating to the mass-produced, one in which the body’s susceptibility constitutes both a yielding and a resistance to the hypnotic seduction of the image.”

I find this quote tantalising for it offers a critical perspective on pornography as a challenging politics rather than as ‘merely’ text, which is what this monograph attempts to do. To take this further and to explore the response between the visual and the human, the “something that takes place between the text and the person watching”, could be to move towards reception studies and studies of the experiencing of porn either as star/creator, fan or audience. There are fascinating possibilities here for inventive methodologies and formats in which this could be done, montage-ing academic text with visual ethnographies, online aggregation and collation of visual data and experiences, and so on. This next stage could be exciting in how it could really engage with the body of porn and its people.

Introduction by Maya Ganesh

Download the monograph here [PDF, 3.73 MB]

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/porn-law-video-technology

Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools

nehaa — 2013-07-03T06:57:59Z

In this research paper, Nehaa Chaudhari gives an analysis of patent pools. She discusses the working of a patent pool, study patent pool in other areas of technology, and patenting in telecom and related technology.

Click to download the full research paper here (PDF, 475 Kb)

Introduction

The network landscape over the past few years has been characterized by several battles of supremacy between two or more rival technologies. [1] These battles have included, inter alia, the constant efforts at besting rivals in the arena of patenting innovations in technology, often as a result characterised by the imposition of high royalties on rivals, for the use of one’s patents. However, having realised that such efforts at besting the other could prove detrimental for all parties concerned in the long run, and stall technological advancements which would in turn translate into lower business revenue, mechanisms were devised to ensure a relatively equitable utilization of patents in the market place. One such mechanism that has been developed is that of patent pools.

Patent pools have been developed around most areas of high end technology and research and development. Over the course of this paper, the author has confined herself to a study on patent pools in the area of telecommunications, and the issues to be addressed therein. Specifically, the author will be dealing with patent pools around 3G, 4G, LTE, TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE technologies. Within this framework, the author seeks to examine what are patent pools, whether and what kind of patent pools exist, their associated costs, their licensing arrangements and the structure of the payment of royalty, and the feasibility of these patent pools.

Understanding Patent Pools

Patent pools are agreements among patent owners through which patent owners combine their patents, waiving their exclusive rights to the patent to enable others, or themselves, to obtain rights to license the pooled patents.[2] Therefore, such pools may be focussed either on cross licensing, that is companies mutually making their patents available to each other, or on out licensing, that is, a group of companies making a collection of patents available to companies that do not or might not have patents of their own to contribute to the pool.[3] Typically, modern patent pools combine patents of various companies and are around inventions that are required to implement an established industry standard, are licensed as a whole (on an all or nothing basis) and not as individual licenses for patents owned by various companies within that pool, and are available to any non member for licensing.[4] Such licensing is done under a standard agreement and royalty rates, on a non discriminatory basis. The exception to this rule is that if certain members have contributed patents to the pool, they may receive more favourable terms, in recognition of their cross licensing relationship to the pool.[5] When viewed from a law and economics perspective, patent pools are seen to be an efficient institutional solution to various problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights, and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed. [6] However, this perspective also warns about the antitrust risks that may arise when competitors or potential competitors are involved in the coordination of their intellectual property. For instance, such pools may be used to allocate markets or otherwise chill competition. [7]

The Working of a Patent Pool

Generally, a patent pool may be administered in one of two ways- it may either have an administrative entity, or may also just be a system of cross licensing between two firms.[8] In case of the former, the licensing agency may be one of the patent holders, [9] or may be an independent licensing company (e.g. MPEG).[10]

The ownership of patents within the pool is retained by the owners, who then license them to the operator/administrator on a non exclusive basis, with sub licensing rights. This means that the owners are free to continue to license their patents on an individual basis, and the administrator also has the right to further license the patents to any party who is interested in licensing from the patent pool.[11] The responsibility of managing licensing and licenses is vested in the operator/administrator of the patent pool. Licensees are required to report sales and pay royalties to the pool administrator, who in turn would enforce the conditions of the license.[12] The distribution of royalties between the members of the pool is on the basis of a formula which may, or may not be transparent to non member licensees, with the pool operator retaining a management fee.[13] Typically, pool licenses are also structured in a manner so as to render difficult early termination by the licensee. The nature of the contract, once signed by a licensee, is typically binding in nature. Therefore, this would mean that the administrator of the patent pool could sue the licensee for non performance of the contract.[14] However, unless a pool operator is a member of the pool itself, it cannot sue for the infringement of patents. [15] Therefore, in the event that a patented technology were to be utilised without having taken a license, one or more of the individual patent owners would be required to take legal action. The involvement of the pool operator would be limited to being a part of any settlement discussions, if they were to occur, since one of the options for the alleged infringer could be to obtain a license for the patent pool.[16]

Drawing Parallels with Other Patent Pools

In this section of the paper, the author seeks to study patent pools in other areas of technology in order to better understand the structure and pricing of patent pools.

The ‘3C DVD’ Patent Pool
Established in 1998, the 3C DVD Patent Pool was the brainchild of Philips, Sony and Pioneer, and L.G. was subsequently inducted as a member. Philips acts as a licensing administrator for patents held by all the companies, which are over two hundred in number. These patents include those for the manufacture of the DVD players, and for the manufacture of the DVD disks themselves. [17] The player license per unit royalty was set as 3.5% of the net selling price of each player sold. This was subject to a minimum fee of $7 per unit, which after January 1, 2000 became $5 per unit. The disc license royalty was set as $0.05 per disc sold.[18]

The ‘DVD- 6C’ Patent Pool
Established in June 1999, the members of this pool at the time of its inception were Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and JVC. This pool was also for the DVD-ROM and the DVD- Video formats, with Toshiba acting as the administrator. [19] The royalties were set at $.075 per DVD Disc and 4% of the net sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum royalty of $4.00 per player or decoder, which saw a substantial reduction in 2003.[20] Subsequently, there were various changes that were made to this group, including the inclusion of newer standards, the joining and subsequent departure of IBM and other organizations as a member etc. Hitachi and Panasonic also act as regional agents in certain regions of the world.

The MPEG LA pool
The MPEG-2 is a standard for describing the coding of data inter alia, on DVD discs. For MPEG-2, a patent pool has been established, where the administrator is an independent, external organization known as the MPEG Licensing Authority, that set itself the aim to develop a patent pool for this standard. [21] The MPEG LA invited parties that thought they owned patents essential to this standard to join the program, which took off in 1997. At present, the pool has over a hundred patents and thousands of licensees.[22]

Patenting in Telecom and Related Technology

In this section of the paper, the author examines the working of patenting and patent pools in the telecommunications sector and in areas of related technology.

Early Developments and the Emergence of GSM
Patent pools are slowly developing into a key component of the telecommunications and the technological industry. The technology industry has been said to be an ecosystem, wherein there is a complex correlation between those who develop the technology and those who implement it in the creation and development of products.[23] In the telecommunications industry for instance, each handset manufacturer has declared only a small percentage of the various types of intellectual property assets that are necessary to implement a 3G compatible cellular phone. Therefore, the working in such a context is that various companies develop different technologies, and the same is shared by various manufacturers that seek to make use of this technology.[24]

The revival of patenting in the sector of telecommunications, post a period of decline in the decades of the 19540s to the 1980s, is attributed to the advent of the GSM standard for mobile communications in Europe.[25] In 1988, the main European operators invited equipment suppliers and developed a procedure wherein manufacturers would have to give up their intellectual property rights and to provide free world wide licenses for essential patents.[26] After opposition from the manufacturers, the approach was modified to one wherein the operators required the suppliers to sign a declaration agreeing to serve all of the GSM community on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory conditions.[27] In the early 1990s, Motorola by refusing to grant non discriminatory licenses for its substantial portfolio of essential patents and only agreeing to enter into cross license agreements further intensified the debate over IPRs in telecommunications. The company only lifted these restrictions after various countries across the world expressed a preference for this standard. The experience in this standard has demonstrated that it would not be accurate to expect that all parties holding essential patents would be willing to license them to all interested parties.[28] Companies were only willing to relax their licensing conditions once revenue generating opportunities increased.

The 3G3P and the UMTS
In July 2000 the 3G Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) and its 18 partners notified various agreements to the end of establishing a worldwide patent platform. The purpose behind this was disclosed to be that of providing a voluntary and cost effective mechanism to evaluate, verify and license patents that were essential for third generation (3G) mobile communication systems.[29] It was also claimed that the said agreements would have pro competitive effects and that the purpose behind this Platform was the facilitation of access to technology and consequent entry into the markets.[30] On the intellectual property front, the purpose was to reduce cost uncertainties and the delays that were accompaniments of licensing numerous essential patents for complex technologies.

While it has often been considered to be a patent pool, this arrangement has been said to be only similar to a patent pool.[31] The 3G3P itself has argued that since it was a mere facilitator of transactions between patent holders and licensees, and that membership was open to both licensors and licensees as opposed to only licensors as in the case of patent pools, it would be fallacious to classify the Platform as a patent pool. Further, it has also been argued that licensing by members is not restricted to the Platform and that there was no bundling or real pooling of the patents per se and those licensees have the opportunity to pick and choose between patents with the licensing being carried out on a bilateral basis. Additionally, unlike in a patent pool, there is no single license between the patent holders as a collective and the licensee, and the parties have a choice between the Standard License of the Platform, and a negotiable individual license.[32] A Standard License provides for Standard Royalty Rate, a Maximum Cumulative Royalty Rate and a Cumulative Royalty Rate.[33] Bilateral transactions on the other hand, are negotiated between the parties where the consideration is to be determined on fair and equitable terms.[34] This Platform also provides for a price cap, which, instead of being absolute and set at a pre-determined royalty rate, is a default five percent maximum (not minimum) cumulative royalty rate for potential licensees per product category.[35] The royalty rate for each individual patent will differ for each of the licensees and this depends on the patent portfolio under each product category that the licensee has chosen.[36]

The concerns and challenges of the GSM experience were well perceived during the determination of the course of action for UMTS. European actors were especially wary of Qualcomm and expected the firm to demand high license fees, with some even fearing them to be in excess of 10%.[37] Subsequently, various attempts at developing licensing schemes failed, until 2004 and the establishment of the W-CDMA Patent Licensing Programme for UMTS FDD patents.[38] At the outset, seven licensors offered their patents as a bundle to prospective licensors, a number which decreased over time.[39]

The Development of LTE Patent Pools
The next stage in the process of innovation in the realm of telecommunications was the development of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Standard, which while being essential to 4G technology has also seen application in the realm of 3G. Consequently, patent pools or similar structures have been developed in these areas. LTE patents are being viewed as among the most valuable intellectual property resource in the mobile telecommunications industry, with most operators around the world building LTE networks.[40]

As per in a study conducted in 2011, 23% of the patents about this technology were owned by L.G. Electronics, with Qualcomm coming in second with 21%. Motorola Mobility, InterDigital, Nokia and Samsung each owned 9%, China’s ZTE owned about 6%[41] and Nortel owned 4%, which were later sold to a consortium of Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM) and Sony, after Nortel filed for bankruptcy in 2009.[42] Ericsson also independently owns 2% of the patent pool and RIM owns 1%.[43] However, another analysis[44] of IP databases conducted by ZTE in 2011 revealed differing results. As per this analysis, InterDigital was the leader, with its Patent Holdings arm controlling 13% and the Technology arm controlling 11% of LTE essential patents. Qualcomm controlled 13%, Nokia and Samsung 9% each, Ericsson controlled 8%, as did Huawei, ZTE controlled 7%, L.G. controlled 6% and NTT DoCoMo brought up the rear with 5%. The remaining 11% was held by various other firms.[45] It is to be realized that these studies have often come under criticism from different companies, with each of them eager to portray themselves as the market leader.[46] Setting aside criticism driven by corporate egos, the principle of it, that is, the difficulty in assessing and valuing patents cannot be disputed. Valuing patents is far from merely counting the number of patents owned by a company. The complications are especially evident when it comes to determining which of these patents are essential and which of them aren’t. Additionally, the worth of these patents varies depending on the existence or the absence of certain conditions, including transfer restrictions, cross licensing arrangements, ownership and market conditions.[47]

The aforesaid discussion reveals the complexity and the fragmentation of the LTE environment, which further underscored the need to have patent pools in this field. Although the need for a patent pool was realized in 2009-2010, given that the WCDMA patent pool had been met with very limited success,[48] industry watchers were reluctant to be optimistic. This was in part fuelled by the understanding of the attitude of dominant players, wherein they continued to believe that they could derive more monetary, cross licensing and litigation defence value if they did not pool their patents.[49]

The development of LTE patent pools can be traced back to 2009, and the response of Via Licensing¸ Sisvel and MPEG LA to a Request for Information on forming such a patent pool by the Next Generation Mobile Network Alliance (NGMN).[50] Sisvel’s proposal, which it subsequently made at a public conference in 2010 sought to demonstrate that patent pools could prevent excessive costs from royalty stacking.[51] Among various other examples, Roberto Dini, the founder of Sisvel suggested that if patents were to be licensed individually, for instance, 85 patents for MPEG video at 50 cents apiece would cost $42.50. As opposed to this, the patent pool charged $2.50.[52] In 2011, the NGMN reiterated its recommendation to all stakeholders in the mobile industry that were interested in developing patent pools to hasten their development process to avoid further delays in LTE licensing.[53] The NGMN also went on to state that it would be ideal if all the parties were to agree on a single patent pool that promoted reasonable royalties, offered certainty on the availability of the licenses for patents and created a framework for evaluation of their essentiality, where the value of the patents essential to the pool would be established by the industry.[54] These recommendations were not without their fair share of criticism, both, from industry watchers[55] and from vendors.[56] Notwithstanding these reservations, both, Sisvel[57] and Via Licensing have gone on to issue calls for patents for the purposes of creating patent pools in the LTE marketplace.

The Sisvel LTE Patent Pool materialized in late 2012, wherein licenses were offered under a portfolio of patents essential to LTE.[58] The pool includes patents owned by Cassidian, the China Academy of Telecommunication Technology, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, France Telecom, TDF, and KPN, in addition to some patents that had been originally filed by Nokia but were acquired by Sisvel in 2011.[59] The pool is also open to other organizations that have patents essential to LTE. At present, the current portfolio of these patents is available under standard terms and conditions. The running royalty rate is 0.99 Euros per device.[60]

Having promised a launch within a few months in June, 2012[61] Via Licensing has also developed its own LTE Patent Pool, with the initial companies in this pool being AT&T, Clearwire Corporation, DTVG Licensing, HP, KDDI Corporation, MTT DoCoMo, SK Telecom, Telecom Italia, Telefónica and ZTE.[62] Like Sisvel’s Patent Pool, this pool is also open to other organizations that believe they possess essential LTE patents, and they are encouraged to submit the same for evaluation.[63] The patent pool floated by Via leans heavily towards service providers, but some of the big players in the industry including Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei Technologies and Samsung Electronics are conspicuous by their absence.[64] This absence is felt even in Sisvel’s patent pool, with the reasoning being proposed[65] that these key patent holders may prefer private licensing and subsequent litigation over pooled resources in patent pools.[66] Understandably, the launch of the LTE Patent Pools has been met with approval by the NGMN[67] but given the nascent stages in which both of these pools find themselves, it would be premature to comment (without first observing for a few months) the likelihood of their success or failure and how they would play out against each other.

The TD-SCDMA and the TD-LTE
Reportedly, China has spent several billion dollars on the import of analog and GSM technology,[68] and the country’s mobile communications industry continues to be dominated by foreign players.[69] Therefore, in continuation of a purportedly growing trend[70] in the area of telecommunications as well, domestically developed systems are being preferred and developed over standardized technologies that enjoy strong patent protection outside China.[71] Besides the avoidance of paying royalties to foreigners, the idea is also to use China’s strong market presence and have more participants in China’s home grown technology.[72]

Time Divisional- Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), developed by the China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT), in collaboration with Datang and Siemens[73] is a Chinese indigenously developed 3G technology standard developed by China to reduce its dependence on western standards.[74] Interestingly however, it has been reported that the Chinese hold core patent technology only about 7% whereas most of the rest of it is taken by other foreign organizations.[75] In 2000, an industry consortium, the TD-SCDMA forum was established. The participants were China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel, and Siemens, with the objective of developing and supporting this technology. Government support was received in 2002, following which the TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance was founded by well known market players including Datang, SOUTEC, Holley, Huawei, LENOVO, ZTE, CEC and China Putian. There has also been the creation of various joint ventures with international giants such as Alcatel, Ericsson, Nokia, (erstwhile) Nortel, Philips, Samsung and Siemens have also been created.[76]

Information about the existence of patent pools in this technology has been hard to come by. One of the few to write about patent pools in his 2008 paper,[77] Dazheng Wang proposes patent pools as a solution to the problem of commercialization of TD-SCDMA. He suggests that the framework of this patent pool should be on the industry principles of fair, reasonable and non discriminatory licensing terms for essential patents, with the end result being one of increased innovation and competition and an overall increase in market presence. Interestingly, a few articles[78] on blog posts on the internet speak about the existence of patent pools and their apparent misuse[79] as well.

It is submitted that these inconsistencies regarding the division of patents between various patent holders, where the percentage of patents held by each company have been pegged differently,[80] and about the existence of a patent pool or not raise pressing concerns about the payment of royalties and how licensing works in such a situation. On a very basic level, in order to be able to pay royalties and enter into licensing agreements, the existence of an identified, non disputed patent holder would be the sine qua non, which seems to be missing in the case of patents for TD-SCDMA. This problem is only further compounded by the lack of clarity on the very existence of patent pools. Had there been specified patent pools, the issues of determination of essential patents and the setting of royalties and licensing fees would have been standardized, a situation that cannot be invoked, without dispute, in the present Chinese context.

It is further submitted that despite China being the world’s largest market for mobile communications, and its progress from a mere importer to a developer of some parts of technology,[81] the Chinese experiment with TD-SCDMA seems to have met with limited success, in comparison to what was envisaged. For instance, while an agency had forecast that the number of TD-SCDMA subscribers in 2010 would be 34 million, by April, 2010 there were only 8 million or (even lower) subscribers.[82] One of the reasons for preferring other standards, for instance, the W-CDMA is the number of handsets compatible with the same and the consequent variety that is available to the consumer. To illustrate, one could look at the figures from June, 2010. At this point of time China Unicom had 94 models for W-CDMA from twenty four manufacturers including nine foreign ones, whereas China Mobile had only twenty eight models that were compatible with TD-SCDMA.[83] Interestingly, if one were to measure popularity in terms of sheer numbers, TD-SCDMA would emerge the winner over W-CDMA by a couple of million subscribers, but if the growth rate were to be considered, W-CDMA would come out on top. While TD-SCDMA grew only by 24%, W-CDMA has grown at 32% monthly since the start of its service is October, 2009.[84]

China’s experiments with creating its home grown telecommunication standards have not stopped with the development of the TD-SCDMA, with the country being on track in the development of the TD-LTE. Reports suggest that although the systems are in ‘trial’ mode officially, the 4G spectrum situation remains uncertain.[85] It is submitted that although this is in the nascent stages as compared to the TD-SCDMA, the concerns expressed earlier about TD-SCDMA and the suggestions made therein for the technology to realise its full potential would be equally applicable in this scenario as well.

Therefore, in light of this discussion it would not be fallacious to conclude that while the TD-SCDMA, and now more recently the TD-LTE standard might still be in its nascent stages, on a fundamental level it seems to have not fulfilled the objectives with which it was developed, especially given that a sizeable portion of its patents continue to be owned by foreign corporations. In addition to the challenges of attracting subscribers, it would also need to streamline its system of patents, royalties and licensing, if it wants to have a truly global or even national presence. To this end perhaps patent pools structured along the lines of those being developed or in place for other mobile communication technologies might provide a viable solution meriting consideration.

Concluding Observations

One of the fundamental concerns that plague most downstream organizations in the mobile communications sector is the prevalence of high licensing fees that need to be paid on essential patents, the cost of which often trickles down to the customers. A study on the licensing arrangements prevalent at the moment[86] reveals that as of the moment, the result of royalty rate caps is that they save money for downstream manufacturers, but this is at the expense of upstream licensors. The most significant savers are the ones downstream with no IP to trade, and vertically integrated companies while losing some revenue, are able to save significantly more in reduced expenses.[87]

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that efforts at limiting aggregate licensing fees have been at the forefront over the past couple of years. It is in this scenario that patent pools have developed, with operators such as Via Licensing and Sisvel even promoting themselves as being able to put together patent pools that would greatly limit licensing fees.[88] However, some owners of intellectual property continue to find bilateral licensing and cross licensing to be more profitable as opposed to patent pools.

One of the key concerns when it comes to fore when dealing with how patent pools are structured is about the distribution of income received from royalties within the members of the pool, which ties in with the bigger question of classifying patents as essential and non essential. More often than not, patent pools also have to grapple with the problem of members having conflicting interests. For instance, manufacturers have the incentive to cap aggregate royalties of certain essential patents that they would use in manufacturing, in order to reduce their licensing costs. However, these manufacturers could have also brought their own essential patents to the pool, perhaps of a new way of doing things, and would certainly be averse of having caps imposed on these royalties.

One of the key other considerations that patent pools need to take into account include the royalty rates affixed. In an interview some time ago, the founder of Sisvel, went on to state that while affixing these royalty rates, there could be no discrimination against licensees, since that would be a sure fire way of ensuring the collapse of the patent pool.[89] Additionally, patent pools also need to account for the difference in regulatory mechanism and their execution that exists across jurisdictions. For instance, customs officials in France pay a lot more attention to counterfeit goods than they would to patent infringing products, whereas those in Germany would have a keen eye on the latter.[90]

Various other concerns have also been identified with regard to patent pools over time. One of these is that they could potentially eliminate competition that comes from outside of patent pools.[91]

Additionally, patent pools are not all inclusive, since participation is entirely voluntary. Therefore, patent pools would not even be reasonably expected to cover all essential patents required to make a standardised product. This problem is rendered even more complex as a result of the presence of multiple patent pools around the same technology, as in the case of DVDs and more recently, LTE technology.

In sum, while portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can be helpful in resolving issues created by patent thickets by reducing transaction costs for licensees, while preserving to a definitive extent financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing inventions and undertake new research, the significant shortcomings of these pools also need to be taken into account before they can be heralded as the solution to problems presented by complex patent landscapes. While voluntary patent pools might have proved to be beneficial in some respects, the imposition of patent pools would be a fallacious approach to undertake.

[1]. Hui Yan, The 3G Standard Setting Strategy and Indigenous Innovation Policy in China: Is TD-SCDMA a Flagship?, DRUID Working Paper No 07-01, available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1454&cf=9 (last accessed 07 12 2012)

[2]. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 4 Am. Econ. Rev. 691, 691 (2004)

[3]. Patent Pools- Some Not So Frequently Answered Questions, available at http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/11/patent-pools-some-not-so-frequently.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[4]. Id.

[5]. Id.

[6]. Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, Rutgers Law Journal, Volume 38:539, 559 (2007)

[7].

[8]. Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1984).

[9]. Philips has been known to have been the licensing agency for patent pools where it was a member

[10]. Supra note 3

[11]. Supra note 3

[12]. Supra note 3

[13]. Supra note 3

[14]. Supra note 3

[15]. Supra note 3

[16]. Supra note 3

[17]. Rudi Bekkers et. al., Patent Pools and Non Assertion Agreements: Coordination Mechanisms for Multi Party IPR Holders in Standardization, available at http://www-i4.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Interest/EASST_Bekkers_Iversen_Blind.pdf 22 (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[18]. Id.

[19]. Id.

[20]. Id.

[21]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[22]. Supra note 17 at 23.

[23]. Keith Mallinson, Fixing IP Prices with Royalty Rate Caps and Patent Pools, available at http://ipfinance.blogspot.in/2011/07/fixing-ip-prices-with-royalty-rate-caps.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[24]. Id. See Appendix 1 for a graphical representation of declared intellectual property assets in 2009.

[25]. Supra note 17 at 25

[26]. Supra note 17 at 27

[27]. Supra note 17 at 27

[28]. Supra note 17 at 28

[29]. Dessy Choumelova, Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Agreements- the Particular Case of 3G3P, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2003_1_41.pdf- 41 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[30]. Id.

[31]. Id.

[32]. Id.

[33]. Id at 42.

[34]. Id at 42.

[35]. Id at 42-43.

[36]. Id at 43.

[37]. Supra note 17 at 29.

[38]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[39]. Supra note 17 at 39.

[40]. Elizabeth Woyke, Identifying the Tech Leaders in LTE Wireless Patents, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/09/21/identifying-the-tech-leaders-in-lte-wireless-patents/ (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[41]. Id.

[42]. Id.

[43]. Id.

[44]. Caroline Gabriel, ZTE Claims 7% of LTE Essential Patents, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2011/01/11/zte-claims-7-lte-essential-patents.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[45]. Id.

[46]. Id.

[47]. Supra note 40.

[48]. Keith Mallinson, Mallinson: Uncertain Futures in LTE Patent Pool Licensing, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/europe/story/mallinson-uncertain-outlook-patent-pool-licensing/2010-08-25 (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[49]. Id.

[50]. Id.

[51]. Id.

[52]. Id.

[53]. NGMN Board Recommendation on LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-recommendation-on-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[54]. Id.

[55]. Caroline Gabriel, NGMN’s Calls for an LTE Patent Pool Will be Futile in the Current IPR Climate, available at http://www.4gtrends.com/articles/53511/ngmns-calls-for-an-lte-patent-pool-will-be-futile-/ (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[56]. Michelle Donegan, Vendors Balk at LTE Patent Pool Proposal, available at http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=212362 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[57]. SISVEL: Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SISVEL%3A+Patent+Pool+for+3G+Long+Term+Evolution+(LTE).-a0199544458 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[58]. LTE Patent Pool from Sisvel, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-from-sisvel (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[59]. Id.

[60]. Id.

[61]. Mike Dano, Via Promises LTE Patent Pool Launch Within Months, available at http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/licensing-promises-lte-patent-pool-launch-within-months/2012-06-15 (last accessed 07 December, 2012)

[62]. LTE Patent Pool Available Through Via’s Licensing Program, available at http://4g-portal.com/lte-patent-pool-available-through-vias-licensing-program (last accessed 10 December, 2012).

[63]. Id.

[64]. Stephen Lawson, Lte Patent Pool Brings Together Technologies From At&T, Zte, Hp And Others, available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9232043/LTE_patent_pool_brings_together_technologies_from_AT_amp_T_ZTE_HP_and_others (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[65]. Peter White, Sisvel LTE Patent Pool Emerges After All- Majors Still Hold Back from Committing, available at http://www.rethink-wireless.com/2012/11/05/sisvel-lte-patent-pool-emerges-all-majors-hold-committing.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012)

[66]. Shankar Pandiath, Sisvel Launches Patent Pool for 3G Long Term Evolution (LTE), available at http://next-generation-communications.tmcnet.com/topics/nextgen-voice/articles/314957-sisvel-launches-patent-pool-3g-long-term-evolution.htm (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[67].NGMN Board Welcomes Launch of LTE Patent Pool, available at http://4g-portal.com/ngmn-board-welcomes-launch-of-lte-patent-pool (last accessed 09 December, 2012).

[68]. ELSPETH THOMSON AND JON SIGURDSON (EDS.), CHINA’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTOR AND THE FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION 17 (2008, World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore).

[69]. Cong Cao, Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry, available at http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/924 (last accessed 11 December, 2012)

[70]. Peter Zura, China Launches TD-SCDMA Telecom Standard¸ available at http://271patent.blogspot.in/2006/01/china-launches-td-scdma-telecom.html (last accessed 10 December, 2012)

[71]. Id.

[72]. Id.

[73]. TD-SCDMA (time division synchronous code division multiple access), available at http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/definition/TD-SCDMA (last accessed 07 December, 2012).

[74]. SHAHD AKHTAR AND PATRICIA ARINTO (EDS.), DIGITAL REVIEW OF ASIA PACIFIC : 2009-2010 8 (2010, Sage Publications, New Delhi).

[75]. Supra note 1 at 2. See Appendix 2 for the breakup of patent holding. However, see details on Infra note 78 for a contradictory view, wherein China claims to own 30% of all TD-SCDMA patents.

[76]. Pierre Vialle, On the relevance of Indigenous Standard Setting Policy: the Case of TD-SCDMA in China, 2^nd International Conference on Economics, Trade and Development, (2012) 36 IPEDR 184-185 (IACSIT Press, Singapore).

[77]. Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA’s Commercialization, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5076744&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F5076660%2F5076661%2F05076744.pdf%3Farnumber%3D5076744 (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[78]. China Owns 30% of TD-SCDMA Related Patents, available at http://www.cn-c114.net/582/a310685.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[79]. The Legal Regulation on Patent Pool Misuse, available at http://www.socpaper.com/the-legal-regulation-on-patent-pool-misuse.html (last accessed 11 December, 2012).

[80]. Supra notes 75 and 78.

[81]. Tomoo Marukawa, Chinese Innovations in Mobile Telecommunications: Third Generation vs. “Guerrilla Handsets”, Paper presented at the IGCC Conference: Chinese Approaches to National Innovation, La Jolla, California, June 28-29, 2010 at 1.

[82]. Id at 8.

[83]. Id at 9.

[84]. Id at 9.

[85]. China to Speed Up TD-LTE Process, available at http://www.tdscdma-forum.org/en/news/see.asp?id=11998&uptime=2012-11-29 (last accessed 08 December, 2012)

[86]. Supra note 23.

[87]. Id.

[88]. Supra note 23.

[89]. Sisvel’s Patent Strategy, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article/2400452/Sisvels-patent-strategy.html (last accessed 12 December, 2012).

[90]. Id.

[91]. Supra note 23.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools

PDF Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:06:23Z

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-09-sept-2008.pdf

Parichiti - Domestic Workers’ Access to Secure Livelihoods in West Bengal

Anchita Ghatak — 2020-12-30T10:01:36Z

This report by Anchita Ghatak of Parichiti presents findings of a pilot study conducted by the author and colleagues to document the situation of women domestic workers (WDWs) in the lockdown and the initial stages of the lifting of restrictions. This study would not have been possible without the WDWs who agreed to be interviewed for this study and gave their time generously. We are grateful to Dr Abhijit Das of the Centre for Health and Social Justice for his advice and help. The report is edited by Aayush Rathi and Ambika Tandon, and this work forms a part of the CIS’s project on gender, welfare and surveillance supported by Privacy International, United Kingdom.

Domestic Workers’ Access to Secure Livelihoods in West Bengal: Read (PDF)

Cross-posted from Parichiti.

Executive Summary

Hundreds of thousands of women from poor communities work as domestic workers in Kolkata. Domestic work is typically a precarious occupation, with very little recognition in legislation or policy. Along with other workers in the informal economy, women domestic workers (WDWs) were severely impacted by the national lockdown enforced in March, with loss of livelihood and few options for survival.

Parichiti works with WDWs in 20 different locations - slums and informal settlements in Kolkata and villages in south 24 Parganas. We conducted this pilot study from late June to August 2020 to document the situation of WDWs from March onwards, in the lockdown and the initial stages of lifting of restrictions. We interviewed 14 WDWs on the phone to record their experiences during the lockdown and after, including impact on livelihoods. The objectives of the study were to document the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the lives of WDWs, with focus on economic and health dimensions.

We found that most domestic workers in our sample were paid for March, but faced difficulties in procuring wages April onwards. During this period, they faced economic hardships that threatened their survival, with members of their family also involved in the informal sector and experiencing loss of wages. Workers survived on relief received through civil society or by taking loans from banks or informal lenders. Some are now stuck in a debt trap.

Most went back to work from June, but faced several barriers – public transport services continued to be dysfunctional, apartment complexes prohibited entry of outsiders, and employers were reluctant to allow workers into their homes. Employers were wary of workers if they were employed in multiple households or used public transport, forcing workers to adapt to these conditions. Due to these reasons, some workers lost their jobs permanently, while others returned with lower wages or lower number of employers. Workers were well aware of the precautions to be taken at the home and workplace with regards to Covid-19.

Many WDWs were unable to access ration through the Public Distribution System. Some were not enrolled and others were enrolled in the districts they had migrated from. Some were not classified as below the poverty line and were hence not priority households for the state, although they were ‘deserving’ beneficiaries. All of the respondents were affected by Cyclone Amphan, which devastated parts of the state in May 2020. Despite the announcement of a sizeable compensation by the state, those whose homes were impacted were unable to get any relief. WDWs overall tended to not rely on the state for welfare or health services. Many regarded public health systems to have poor quality services, and turned to private services when possible. Both central and state governments fell short of meeting the needs of WDWs during the pandemic, which could potentially have long-term impact on their income and health.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/parichiti-domestic-workers-access-to-secure-livelihoods-west-bengal

Open Spectrum for Development India Case Study

praskrishna — 2012-07-26T08:17:15Z

This report is authored by Shyam Ponappa and jointly produced by APC and CIS.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/telecom/publications/india-untapped-potential

Open Government Data Study: India

pranesh — 2011-08-23T02:43:49Z

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/publications/open_data_india_final.pdf

Open Government Data Study

pranesh — 2015-09-03T08:08:22Z

CIS produced a report on the state of open government data in India, looking at policy, infrastructure, and particular case studies, as well as emerging concerns, future strategies and recommendations. The report is authored by Glover Wright, Pranesh Prakash, Sunil Abraham, and Nishant Shah. We are grateful to the Transparency and Accountability Initiative for providing generous funding for this report.

Cross-posted from the Transparency and Accountability Initiative website.

Open Government Data Study: India

India provides one of the most fascinating examples of the use of open government data in a developing country context. It has one of the best right to information laws in the world and the government’s approach to open data builds on this legacy of making open data relevant to Indian citizens. An estimated 456 million Indians live on less than $1.25 a day and a key issue for India, and other developing countries, is how open data can be accessible to them.

This paper reviews the progress being made towards open government data in India. Using case studies, it examines some of the pressing challenges facing the adoption of OGD in India. These include infrastructural problems, privacy concerns and the power imbalances that improved transparency can unwittingly create. It also examines government attitudes towards open data and related policies and reviews the relationships between open government data, the media and civil society.

The authors argue that the Indian Government’s responsibility should not stop short at just providing information, but also extend to making it available and accessible in a way that facilitates analysis and enhances offline usability – and ultimately makes it accessible to the poorest.

The paper concludes by suggesting technical and policy strategies to develop, promote, implement and maintain a robust open government data policy in India.

Download the report [PDF, 1.03 MB]

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-government-data-study

Open Government Data Report

praskrishna — 2011-08-23T02:40:59Z

Open Government Data Report (PDF) published by CIS.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/openness/publications/ogd-report