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ICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy
<b>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.</b>
<h2>Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[<i>Quick Note</i>: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a>]</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, <i>doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds</i> from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<h2>Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:</span></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds</span></li>
</ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes: </span></span></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles:</span></span></i> <span>In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding:</span></span></i><span> Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes:</span></span></i><span> If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a <i>material change</i> is concerned, <i>at ICANN’s will</i> (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN <i>may</i> reject or deny the application concerned.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks:</span></span></i><span> In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> Further, ICANN also said that it was not <i>required</i> to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is <i>allowed</i> to do so, when it feels the need.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired. </span></p>
<h3><span><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s lack of <i>substantive compliance</i>, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction:</span></span></i><span> ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding <i>on which date</i> the mechanisms are to be deemed as <i>pending</i>, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the <i>time of scheduling</i> of the auction.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a> This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process:</span></span></i><span> In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the <i>extent</i> of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant <i>does not assign</i> its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint:</span></span></i><span> ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a> After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships:</span></span></i><span> ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy:</span></span></i><span> Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a> However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is <i>specifically designed</i> to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘<i>within ICANN’s bylaws</i> to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway <i>only</i> through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Note</span></span></i><span>: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through <i>mechanisms listed in its Bylaws</i>, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.</span></p>
<h3><span><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations:</span></span></i> <span>Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘<i>shall</i> pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a> With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a> Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a> While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a> In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a> A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a> After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a> It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a> While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a> It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a <i>proposal</i> for the <i>process</i> by which allocation is undertaken.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘<i><span>grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’</span></i><span>, the creation of a fund for ‘<i>specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, </i>the ‘<i>establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’</i>, among others, to be decided by the Board.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a></span></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates:</span></span></i><span> The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a <i>timeframe</i> for the allocation of such proceeds.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a> However, the entire process has been very slow, with the <i>first</i> CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a> Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only <i>procedural</i> regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.</span></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p</span></a><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>df</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> <span>4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a><span> PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> <span>An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (</span><a href="http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html"><span>http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction"><span>http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/"><span>https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html"><span>http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <span>Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/bylaws"><span>https://pti.icann.org/bylaws</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> <span>1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> <span>6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> <span>26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> <span>6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a><span> 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>) </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> <span>PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm"><span>https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm</span></a><span>); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668"><span>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668</span></a><span>); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a><span> 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> <span>AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a><span> 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (</span><a href="https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations"><span>https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> <span>Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation"><span>https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/policy"><span>https://www.icann.org/policy</span></a><span>); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a><span>5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29"><span>http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web"><span>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>); </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a><span> 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102"><span>https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-28T15:49:38ZBlog EntryComments from the Centre for Internet and Society on Renewal of .NET Registry Agreement
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed renewal of the .NET Registry Agreement.</b>
<p>With inputs from Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS would like to express its strong opposition to the proposed renewal. This is for three primary reasons:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Inconsistency with ICANN’s core values</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is important to consider the proposed renewal in light of two Core Values which are meant to guide the decisions and actions of ICANN. <br /> <br />Section 1.2.(b)(iii) of the Bylaws contemplates ICANN’s responsibility to, “ Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment in the DNS market;” and S ection 1.2(b)(iv) envisages, “Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial to the public interest as identified through the bottom-up, multistakeholder policy development process;”. <br /> <br />The presumptive renewal of the .NET Registry agreement precludes an open tender, thereby significantly undermining competition in the DNS market. It ignores the public interest consideration, as the absence of competitive pressure on the contract also means the absence of pressure to lower user costs.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Historical accident</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Verisign’s operations over .NET is a historical accident; one that does not justify its collection of .NET revenues in perpetuity. <span></span><span>Policies for Contractual Compliance of</span> <span>Existing Registries</span> was approved in 2007 to include presumptive renewal. However, during the deliberations in that Policy Development Process, there was significant objection to presumption of renewal of registry contracts; with constituencies and individuals pointing out that such renewal was blatantly anti competitive, and allowed for presumption to prevail even in the case of material breaches.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The proposed agreement contemplates using a portion of Registry Level </b><br />Transaction Fees to create a “special restricted fund for developing country Internet communities to enable further participation in the ICANN mission for these stakeholders.” This form of tokenism to the global south will do little to achieve meaningful participation and diversity of civil society. .NET should instead, be opened to a competitive bid and open tender, in order to encourage innovators from around the world to benefit from it.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Irregularity of contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The argument that the proposed changes are to bring the contract in line with other gTLD registry agreements doesn't hold because this contract is in itself completely irregular: it was not entered into after a competitive process that other gTLD registry agreements are subject to; and it is not subject to the price sensitivity that other contracts are either.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNInternet Governance2017-06-06T13:35:53ZBlog EntryCIS representation at ICANN 58
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58
<b>The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) organized ICANN 58 at Copenhagen from March 9 to March 16, 2017. On behalf of the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), Vidushi Marda participated in the event and made a presentation.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS' focus at ICANN can broadly be divided into four heads: human rights, jurisdiction, transparency and accountability. Since March last year, we have also been pushing for changes in ICANN's expected standards of behavior, along with adoption of an anti harassment policy. After the IANA transition in September last year, the community is now divided into sub groups (SGs) that look into different issues for ICANN post transition, including the 4 that CIS works on. More information on ICANN 58 can be <a class="external-link" href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/copenhagen58">accessed here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2017-03-28T14:22:22ZNews ItemComments on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy
<b>ICANN sought community input on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy on 7 November 2016. In response to this the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted its comments.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We at CIS are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy (“Policy”). We provide our specific comments to the Policy below, in three sections. The first section addresses the<i> Terms of </i><i>Participation</i>, the second deals with the <i>Reporting</i><i> and Complaint</i><i> Procedure</i>, and the third places on record our observations on questions and issues for further consideration which have not been covered by the Policy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Besides various other observations, CIS broadly submitted:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of “Specified Characteristics” results in its meaning being unclear and exclusionary.</li>
<li>CIS strongly supports the phrase “including, but not limited to” that is followed by a bulleted list of inappropriate conduct.</li>
<li>The word “consent” is entirely missing from the draft policy even though the deciding factor in the “appropriateness” of an act or conduct is active and explicit consent to the act by both/ all individuals involved.</li>
<li>There is a need for clarity of communication platforms. The current Policy fails to specify instances of face-to-face and online communications.</li>
<li>The policy fails to account for a body of persons (as is provided for in the IETF policy) for the redressal of harassment complaints.</li>
<li>The provision for an informal resolution of a harassment issue is problematic as it could potentially lead to negative consequences for the complainant. </li>
<li>The Ombudsperson’s discretion in the determination of remedial action is detrimental to transparency and accountability.</li>
<li>The Policy in its current form lacks provisions for ensuring privacy and confidentiality of the complainant as well as interim relief while the Ombudsperson is looking into the complaint</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Read the Complete Submission <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/comments-on-icann-anti-harassment-policy.pdf">here</a></b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi MardaICANNInternet Governance2017-01-13T15:56:40ZBlog EntryNavigating the 'Reconsideration' Quagmire (A Personal Journey of Acute Confusion)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion
<b>An earlier analysis of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy already brought to light our concerns about the lack of transparency in ICANN’s internal mechanisms. Carrying my research forward, I sought to arrive at an understanding of the mechanisms used to appeal a denial of DIDP requests. In this post, I aim to provide a brief account of my experiences with the Reconsideration Request process that ICANN provides for as a tool for appeal.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Backdrop: What is the Reconsideration Request Process?</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Reconsideration Request process has been laid down in Article IV, Section 2 of the</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Bylaws. Some of the key aspects of this provision have been outlined below<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>,</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>ICANN is obligated to institute a process by which a person <i>materially affected </i>by ICANN action/inaction can request review or reconsideration.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>To file this request, one must have been adversely affected by actions of the staff or the board that contradict ICANN’s policies, or actions of the Board taken up without the Board considering material information, or actions of the Board taken up by relying on false information.</li>
<li>A separate Board Governance Committee was created with the specific mandate of reviewing Reconsideration requests, and conducting all the tasks related to the same.</li>
<li>The Reconsideration Request must be made within 15 days of:
<ul>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD ACTION: the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution, unless the posting of the resolution is not accompanied by a rationale, in which case the request must be submitted within 15 days from the initial posting of the rationale;</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO STAFF ACTION: the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action, and</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD OR STAFF INACTION: the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>.The Board Governance Committee is given the power to summarily dismiss a reconsideration request if:
<ul>
<li>the requestor fails to meet the requirements for bringing a Reconsideration Request;</li>
<li>it is frivolous, querulous or vexatious; or </li>
<li>the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>If not summarily dismissed, the Board Governance Committee proceeds to review and reconsider.</li>
<li>A requester may ask for an opportunity to be heard, and the decision of the Board Governance Committee in this regard is final.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The basis of the Board Governance Committee’s action is public written record information submitted by the requester, by third parties, and so on.</li>
<li>The Board Governance Committee is to take a decision on the matter and make a final determination or recommendation to the Board within 30 days of the receipt of the Reconsideration request, unless it is impractical to do so, and it is accountable to the Board to make an explanation of the circumstances that caused the delay.</li>
<li>The determination is to be made public and posted on the ICANN website.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has provided a neat infographic to explain this process in a simple fashion, and I am reproducing it here:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Reconsideration.jpg" alt="Reconsideration" class="image-inline" title="Reconsideration" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(Image taken from <span></span><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/reconsiderationen</span>)</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our Tryst with the Reconsideration Process</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Grievance</b><br />Our engagement with the Reconsideration process began with the rejection of two of our requests (made on September 1, 2015) under ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. The requests sought information about the registry and registrar compliance audit process that ICANN maintains, and asked for various documents pertaining to the same<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a>:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Copies of the registry/registrar contractual compliance audit reports for all the audits carried out as well as external audit reports from the last year (20142015).</li>
<li>A generic template of the notice served by ICANN before conducting such an audit.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries to whom such notices were served in the last year.</li>
<li>An account of the expenditure incurred by ICANN in carrying out the audit process.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries that did not respond to the notice within a reasonable period of time.</li>
<li>Reports of the site visits conducted by ICANN to ascertain compliance.</li>
<li>Documents which identify the registries/registrars who had committed material discrepancies in the terms of the contract.</li>
<li>Documents pertaining to the actions taken in the event that there was found to be some form of contractual noncompliance.</li>
<li>A copy of the registrar selfassessment form which is to be submitted to ICANN.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN integrated both the requests and addressed them via one response on 1 October, 2015 (which can be found <span></span><span>here</span>). In their response, ICANN inundated us with already available links on their website explaining the compliance audit process, and the processes ancillary to it, as well as the broad goals of the programme none of which was sought for by us in our request. ICANN then went on to provide us with information on their ThreeYear Audit programme, and gave us access to some of the documents that we had sought, such as the preaudit notification template, list of registries/registrars that received an audit notification, the expenditure incurred to some extent, and so on .</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Individual contracted party reports were denied to us on the basis of their grounds for nondisclosure. Further, and more disturbingly, ICANN refused to provide us with the names of the contracted parties who had been found under the audit process to have committed discrepancies. Therefore, a large part of our understanding of the way in which the compliance audit process works remains unfinished.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What we did</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dissatisfied with this response, I went on to file a Reconsideration request (number 1522) as per their standard format on November 2, 2015. (The request filed can be accessed <span></span><span>here</span>).As grounds for reconsideration, I stated that “<i>As a part of my research I was tracking the ICANN compliance audit process, and therefore required access to audit reports in cases where discrepancies where formally found in their actions. This is in the public interest and therefore requires to be disclosed...While providing us with an array of detailed links explaining the compliance audit process, the ICANN staff has not been able to satisfy our actual requests with respect to gaining an understanding of how the compliance audits help in regulating actions of the registrars, and how they are effective in preventing breaches and discrepancies.</i>” Therefore, I requested them to make the records in question publicly available “<i>We request ICANN to make the records in question, namely the audit reports for individual contracted parties that reflect discrepancies in contractual compliance, which have been formally recognised as a part of your enforcement process. We further request access to all documents that relate to the expenditure incurred by ICANN in the process, as we believe financial transparency is absolutely integral to the values that ICANN stands by.</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Board Governance Committee’s response</b><sup>3</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The determination of the Board Governance Committee was that our claims did not merit reconsideration, as I was unable to identify any “<i>misapplication of policy or procedure by the ICANN Staff</i>”, and my only issue was with the substance of the DIDP Response itself, and <i>substantial disagreements with a DIDP response are not proper bases for reconsideration </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(emphasis supplied).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The response of the Board Governance Committee was educative of the ways in which they determine Reconsideration Requests. Analysing the DIDP process, it held that ICANN was well within its powers to deny information under its defined Conditions for NonDisclosure, and denial of substantive information did not amount to a procedural violation. Therefore, since the staff adhered to established procedure under the DIDP, there was no basis for our grievance, and our request was dismissed..</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, as a postscript, it is interesting to note that the Board Governance Committee delayed its response time by over a month, by its own admission “<i>In terms of the timing of the BGC’s recommendation, it notes that Section 2.16 of Article IV of the Bylaws provides that the BGC shall make a final determination or recommendation with respect to a reconsideration request within thirty days, unless impractical. To satisfy the thirtyday deadline, the BGC would have to have acted by 2 December 2015. However, due to the timing of the BGC’s meetings in November and December, the first practical opportunity for the BGC to consider Request 1522 was 13 January 2016.</i>”<sup>4</sup></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Whither do I wander now?</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To me, this entire process reflected the absurdity of the Reconsideration request structure as an appeal mechanism under the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. As our experience indicated, there does not seem to be any way out if there is an issue with the substance of ICANN’s response. ICANN, commendably, is particular about following procedure with respect to the DIDP. However, what is the way forward for a party aggrieved by the flaws in the existing policy? As I had <span></span><span>analysed</span> <span>earlier</span>, the grounds for ICANN to not disclose information are vast, and used to deny a large chunk of the information requests that they receive. How is the hapless requester to file a meaningful appeal against the outcome of a bad policy, if the only ground for appeal is noncompliance with the procedure of said bad policy? This is a serious challenge to transparency as there is no other way for a requester to acquire information that ICANN may choose to withold under one of its myriad clauses. It cannot be denied that a good information disclosure law ought to balance the free disclosure of information with the holding back of information that truly needs to be kept private.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> However, it is this writer’s firm opinion that even instances where information is witheld, there has to be a stronger explanation for the same, and moreover, an appeals process that does not take into account substantive issues which might adversely affect the appellant falls short of the desirable levels of transparency. Global standards dictate that grounds for appeal need to be broad, so that all failures to apply the information disclosure law/policy may be remedied.<sup>6</sup> Various laws across the world relating to information disclosure often have the following as grounds for appeal: an inability to lodge a request, failure to respond to a request within the set time frame, a refusal to disclose information, in whole or in part, excessive fees and not providing information in the form sought, as well as a catchall clause for other failures.<sup>7</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, independent oversight is the heart of a proper appeal mechanism in such situations<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a>; the power to decide the appeal must not rest with those who also have the discretion to disclose the information, as is clearly the case with ICANN, where the Board Governance Committee is constituted and appointed by the ICANN Board itself [one of the bodies against whom a grievance may be raised].</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Suggestions</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We believe ICANN, in keeping with its global, multistakeholder, accountable spirit, should adopt these standards as well, especially now that the transition looms around the corner. Only then will the standards of open, transparent and accountable governance of the Internet upheld by ICANN itself as the ideal be truly, meaningfully realised. Accordingly, the following standards ought to be met with:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Establishment of an independent appeals authority for information disclosure cases</li>
<li>Broader grounds for appeal of DIDP requests</li>
<li>Inclusion of disagreement with the substantive content of a DIDP response as a ground for appeal.</li>
<li>Provision of proper reasoning for any justification of the witholding of information that is necessary in the public interest.</li>
</ol>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Article IV, Section 2, ICANN Bylaws, 2014 <i>available at </i>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylawsen/#IV</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Copies of the request can be found <span></span><span>here</span> and <span></span><span>here</span>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Katherine Chekouras, <i>Balancing National Security with a Community's RighttoKnow: Maintaining </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA 's NonPreemption Clause</i>, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 107, (2007).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Toby Mendel, <i>Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study</i> 151 (2nd edn, 2008).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Id</i>, at 152</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><sup>3</sup>4 Available <span></span><span>here</span>. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration1522cisfinaldetermination13jan16en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Mendel, <i>supra </i>note 6.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini Baruah and Geetha HariharanICANNInternet Governance2016-11-30T13:48:41ZBlog Entry'Delink ICANN from US jurisdiction'
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction
<b>Eight Indian civil society organisations involved with internet governance have called for complete delinking of ICANN from US jurisdiction, saying an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s control is unacceptable.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.deccanherald.com/content/580590/delink-icann-us-jurisdiction.html">published by Deccan Herald</a> on November 12.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable.<br /><br />The demand from Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society and IT for Change as well as Delhi-based Software Freedom Law Centre among others came against the backdrop of ICANN’s meeting in Hyderabad that ended on Wednesday. <br /><br />The other organisations involved in the campaign are Free Software Movement of India (Hyderabad), Society for Knowledge Commons, Digital Empowerment Foundation, Delhi Science Forum and Third World Network (all in New Delhi).<br /><br />“Urgent steps (should) be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation . We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US, we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country’s jurisdiction,” a joint statement said.<br /><br />Though the US has given up its role of signing entries to the Internet’s root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet, the groups said, the organisation that manages ICANN continues to be under US jurisdiction and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies.<br /><br />“Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world,” the statement said.<br /><br />Explaining the issue, it said country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction.<br /><br />“Iran’s .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government,” the statement said.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-november-12-2016-delink-icann-from-us-jurisdiction</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2016-11-15T14:16:36ZNews ItemICANN Begins its Sojourn into Open Data
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data
<b>The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) recently announced that it will now set up a pilot project in order to introduce an Open Data initiative for all data that it generates. We would like to extend our congratulations to ICANN on the development of this commendable new initiative, and would be honoured to support the creation of this living document to be prepared before ICANN 58.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To quote the ICANN blog directly, the aim of this project is to “<em>bring selected data sets into the open, available through web pages and programming APIs, for the purposes of external party review and analysis</em>” <a href="#ftn1">[1]</a>. This will play out through the setting up of three components:</p>
<ol><li>Development of a catalogue of existing data sets which will be appropriate for publication</li>
<li>Selection of the technology necessary for managing the publication of these data sets.</li>
<li>Creation of a process to prioritise the order in which the data sets are made available <a href="#ftn2">[2]</a>.</li></ol>
<h3><strong>Principles in Question</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Centre for Internet and Society firmly believes in the value of accessible, inclusive open data standards as a tool for enhancing transparency in any system. Greater transparency goes a long way towards bringing a regulatory authority closer to those who are governed under it – be it a state or a body such as ICANN. It is, in fact, an indispensable component of a multistakeholder model of governance to facilitate informed participation by all parties concerned in the decision making process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The right to information that a regulatory authority owes those it regulates has two kinds of components. The first may be described as reactive disclosure – “<em>when individual members of the public file requests for and receive information</em>” <a href="#ftn#3">[3]</a>. The second is disclosure that is more proactive in nature – “<em>when information is made public at the initiative of the public body, without a request being filed</em>” <a href="#ftn4">[4]</a>. The former is epitomized by initiatives such as the Freedom of
Information Act <a href="#ftn5">[5]</a> in the United States, the Right to Information Act in India <a href="#ftn6">[6]</a>, or ICANN’s very own Documentary Information Disclosure Policy <a href="#ftn7">[7]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Proactive disclosure policies, on the other hand, operate out of the principle that the provision of information by those in positions of regulatory authority will ensure free and timely flow of information to the public, and the information so provided will be equally accessible to everyone, without the need for individual requests being filed <a href="#ftn8">[8]</a>. Proactive disclosure also goes a long way towards preventing officials from denying or manipulating information subsequent to publication <a href="#ftn9">[9]</a>. Scholars have touted proactive disclosure as the “<em>future of the right to know</em>” <a href="#ftn10">[10]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At the Centre for Internet and Society, much of our research has pointed towards the direction of creating better open data standards for governments (Please see “<a href="http://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/open-government-data-study">Open Data Government Study: India</a>”). We are one of the Lead Stewards of the International Open Data Charter <a href="#ftn11">[11]</a> and have maintained that it is crucial for governments to maintain open data standards in the interest of transparency and accountability. We firmly believe that the same principles extend also to ICANN – a body which, as per its own by-laws commits towards operating “…<em>to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness</em>”<a href="#ftn12">[12]</a>.</p>
<h3><strong>Suggestions</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While this policy is in its nascent stage, we would like to put forward certain principles which we believe ought to be kept in mind before it gets chalked out, in the best interest of the ICANN community:</p>
<ol><li>To determine what data sets should be made publicly accessible, it would be useful to carry out an analysis of existing DIDP requests to understand trends in the kind of information that the ICANN community is interested in accessing, which can then be proactively disclosed. It would be redundant on ICANN’s part to disclose, under this Open Data Policy, data which is already publicly available.</li>
<li>ICANN should first develop a catalog of all existing data sets with ICANN, apply the principles for deciding appropriateness for publication, then make publicly available both the full catalog, and the actual data sets identified for publication. ICANN should make clear the kind of information it is not going to make accessible
under this open data standards, and justify the principles on the basis of which it is choosing to do so (analogous to the exceptions clauses under the DIDP).</li>
<li>With respect to technology to be selected for managing the publication of data sets, free and open source software (such as CKAN) ought to be used, and open standards should be adopted for the use and licensing of such data.</li>
<li>Such data ought to be downloadable in bulk in CSV/JSON/XML formats.</li>
<li>DIDP responses and the open data work flows ought to be integrated so that all the responses to DIDP requests are automatically published in a machine-readable format as open data.</li>
<li>Qualitative (text of speeches, slides from presentations, recordings of sessions, etc.) and quantitative data should both be included under this new policy.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion, we would like to extend our congratulations to ICANN on the development of this commendable new initiative, and would be honoured to support the creation of this living document before ICANN 58.</p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<h3><strong>Endnotes</strong></h3>
<div id="ftn1">
<p>[1] Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, <em>ICANN Kicks off Open Data Initiative Pilot</em>, (November 6, 2016), available at <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-kicks-off-open-data-initiative-pilot">https://www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-kicks-off-open-data-initiative-pilot</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p>[2] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p>[3] Naniette Coleman, <em>Proactive vs. Reactive Transparency</em>, (February 8, 2010), available at: <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/proactive-vs-reactive-transparency">http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/proactive-vs-reactive-transparency</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p>[4] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p>[5] Freedom of Information Act, 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p>[6] Right to Information Act, 2005 <em>available at</em> http://righttoinformation.gov.in/rti-act.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p>[7] ICANN, <em>Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</em>, available at <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p>[8] Helen Darbishire, <em>Proactive Transparency: The future of the right to information?</em> Working paper. N.p.: World Bank, (2009).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p>[9] Id.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p>[10] Darbishire, <em>supra</em> note 8.</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p>[11] Open Data Charter, <em>Who We Are</em>, available at <a href="http://opendatacharter.net/who-we-are/">http://opendatacharter.net/who-we-are/</a> (Last visited on November 10, 2016).</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p>[12] Article III(1), Bylaws For Internet Corporation For Assigned Names And Numbers</p>
</div>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/icann-begins-its-sojourn-into-open-data</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini Baruah and Sumandro ChattapadhyayOpen DataICANNinternet governance2016-11-12T01:17:24ZBlog EntryHow Workstream 2 Plans to Improve ICANN's Transparency
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/how-workstream-2-plans-to-improve-icanns-transparency
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society has worked extensively on ICANN’s transparency policies. We are perhaps the single largest users of the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. Our goal in doing so is not to be a thorn in ICANN’s side, but to try and ensure that ICANN, the organisation, as well as the ICANN community have access to the data required to carry out the task of regulating the global domain name system.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The transparency subgroup of ICANN’s Workstream 2 dialogue attempts to see how they could effectively improve the transparency and accountability of the organization. The main document under scrutiny at the moment is the draft Transparency Report published a few days before the 57th ICANN meeting in Hyderabad.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The report begins with an acknowledgement of the value of taking tips from the Right to Information policies of other institutions and governments. My colleague Padmini Baruah had earlier written a blog post comparing the exclusion policy of ICANN’s DIDP and the Indian Government’s RTI where she found that “the net cast by the DIDP exclusions policy is more vast than even than that of a democratic state’s transparency law.”<a href="#ftn1">[1] </a>The WS2 report not only discusses the DIDP process, but also discusses ICANN’s proactive disclosures (with regard to lobbying etc) and whistleblower policies. This article focuses solely on the first.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As our earlier blog posts have mentioned, CIS sent in 28 DIDP requests over the last two years. Our experience with DIDP has been less than satisfactory and we are pleased that DIDP reform was an important part of the discussions of this subgroup. The report proposes some concrete structural changes to the DIDP process but skirts around some of the more controversial ones.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The recommendation to make the process of submitting requests clearer is a good one. There are currently no instructions on the follow-up process or what ICANN requires of the requestors. The report also recommends capping any extension to the original 30-day limit to an additional 30 days. While this is good, we further recommend that ICANN stay in touch with the requestor in order to help them to the best of its ability. The correspondence should ideally not be limited to a notification that they require an extension. Any clarifications on the part of the requestor must be resolved by ICANN. We commend the report for pointing out that the status quo – where there is no outside limit for extension of time beyond the mandated 30 days – is problematic as it allows the ICANN staff to give lesser priority to responding to DIDP requests. We strongly suggest that extensions of time on responding to DIDP requests be restricted to a maximum of 7 days after the passing of the 30-day period, after which liability should be strictly imposed on ICANN in the form of an individual fine, analogous to India’s RTI policy.<a href="#ftn2">[2]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the major areas of focus for this report and for our earlier analysis was the problematic nature of the exclusions to the DIDP. I had written that the conditions were "numerous, vaguely worded and contain among them a broad range of information that should legitimately be in the public domain.”<a href="#ftn3">[3] </a>This is echoed by the report which calls for a deletion of two clauses that we found most used in denying our requests for information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The report also calls into question the subjective nature of the last condition which states that ICANN can deny information if they find requests “not reasonable, excessive or overly burdensome, not feasible, abusive or vexatious or made by a vexatious or querulous individual.” As seen from our blog posts, we are of the firm belief that such a subjective condition has no place in a robust information disclosure policy. Requiring the Ombudsman’s consent to invoke it is a good first step. In addition to that, we strongly encourage that objective guidelines which specify when a requestor is considered “vexatious” be drawn up and made public.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The most disappointing aspect of this report is that it does not delve into details about having an independent party dedicated to reviewing the DIDP process to address grievances. We believe that this must not be left to the Ombudsman who cannot devote all their time to this process. We are of the opinion that an independent party would also be able to more effectively oversee the tracking and periodic review of the DIDP mechanism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion, we believe that this report is a good start but does not comprehensively answer all of our issues with the DIDP process as it is. We look forward to more engagement with the Transparency subgroup to close all loopholes within the DIDP process.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn1">[1] </a>Padmini Baruah, <em>Peering behind the veil of ICANN’s DIDP</em>, (September 21, 2015), <em>available at</em> <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp</a> (Last visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn2">[2] </a>Section 20(1), Right to Information Act, 2005.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn3">[3] </a>Asvatha Babu, If the DIDP Did Its Job, (November 3, 2016), <em>available at</em> <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job</a> (Last Visited on November 9, 2016).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/how-workstream-2-plans-to-improve-icanns-transparency'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/how-workstream-2-plans-to-improve-icanns-transparency</a>
</p>
No publisherAsvatha BabuICANNInternet Governance2016-11-11T10:05:04ZBlog EntryInternet's Core Resources are a Global Public Good - They Cannot Remain Subject to One Country's Jurisdiction
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good
<b>This statement was issued by 8 India civil society organizations, supported by 2 key global networks, involved with internet governance issues, to the meeting of ICANN in Hyderabad, India from 3 to 9 November 2016. The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the 8 organizations that drafted this statement.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Recently, the US gave up its role of signing entries to the Internet's root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet. This is about the Internet addresses that end with .com, .net, and so on, and the numbers associated with each of them that help us navigate the Internet. We thank and congratulate the US government for taking this important step in the right direction. However, the organisation that manages this system, ICANN,<a href="#ftn1">[1]</a> a US non-profit, continues to be under US jurisdiction, and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies. Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We the undersigned therefore appeal that urgent steps be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation.<a href="#ftn2">[2]</a> We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US; we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country's jurisdiction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Domain name system as a key lever of global control</strong><br />A few new top level domains like .xxx and .africa are already under litigation in the US, whereby there is every chance that its law could interfere with ICANN's (global) policy decisions. Businesses in different parts of the world seeking top level domain names like .Amazon, and, hypothetically, .Ghaniancompany, will have to be mindful of de facto extension of US jurisdiction over them. US agencies can nullify the allocation of such top level domain names, causing damage to a business similar to that of losing a trade name, plus losing all the 'connections', including email based ones, linked to that domain name. For instance, consider the risks that an Indian generic drugs company, say with a top level domain, .genericdrugs, will remain exposed to.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sector specific top level domain names like .insurance, health, .transport, and so on, are emerging, with clear rules for inclusion-exclusion. These can become de facto global regulatory rules for that sector. .Pharmacy has been allocated to a US pharmaceutical group which decides who gets domain names under it. Public advocacy groups have protested <a href="#ftn3">[3]</a> that these rules will be employed to impose drugs-related US intellectual property standards globally. Similar problematic possibilities can be imagined in other sectors; ICANN could set “safety standards”, as per US law, for obtaining .car.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction. Iran's .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. With the 'Internet of Things', almost everything, including critical infrastructure, in every country will be on the network. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>ICANN must become a truly global body</strong><br />Eleven years ago, in 2005, the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at the World Summit on the Information Society demanded that ICANN should “negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A process is currently under-way within ICANN to consider the jurisdiction issue. It is important that this process provides recommendations that will enable ICANN to become a truly global body, for appropriate governance of very important global public goods.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Below are some options, and there could be others, that are available for ICANN to transit from US jurisdiction.</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify;">
<li>ICANN can get incorporated under international law. Any such agreement should make ICANN an international (not intergovernmental) body, fully preserving current ICANN functions and processes. This does not mean instituting intergovernmental oversight over ICANN.</li>
<li>ICANN can move core internet operators among multiple jurisdictions, i.e. ICANN (policy body for Internet identifiers), PTI <a href="#ftn4">[4]</a> (the operational body) and the Root Zone Maintainer must be spread across multiple jurisdictions. With three different jurisdictions over these complementary functions, the possibility of any single one being fruitfully able to interfere in ICANN's global governance role will be minimized.</li>
<li>ICANN can institute a fundamental bylaw that its global governance processes will brook no interference from US jurisdiction. If any such interference is encountered, parameters of which can be clearly pre-defined, a process of shifting of ICANN to another jurisdiction will automatically set in. A full set-up – with registered HQ, root file maintenance system, etc – will be kept ready as a redundancy in another jurisdiction for this purpose. <a href="#ftn5">[5]</a> Chances are overwhelming that given the existence of this bylaw, and a fully workable exit option being kept ready at hand, no US state agency, including its courts, will consider it meaningful to try and enforce its writ. This arrangement could therefore act in perpetuity as a guarantee against jurisdictional interference without actually having ICANN to move out of the US.</li>
<li>The US government can give ICANN jurisdictional immunity under the United States International Organisations Immunities Act . There is precedent of US giving such immunity to non-profit organisations like ICANN. <a href="#ftn6">[6]</a> Such immunity must be designed in such a way that still ensures ICANN's accountability to the global community, protecting the community's enforcement power and mechanisms. Such immunity extends only to application of public law of the US on ICANN decisions and not private law as chosen by any contracting parties. US registries/registrars, with the assent of ICANN, can choose the jurisdiction of any state of the US for adjudicating their contracts with ICANN. Similarly, registries/registrars from other countries should be able to choose their respective jurisdictions for such contracts.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We do acknowledge that, over the years, there has been an appreciable progress in internationalising participation in ICANN's processes, including participation from governments in the Governmental Advisory Committee. However, positive as this is, it does not address the problem of a single country having overall jurisdiction over its decisions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Issued by the following India based organisation:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore </li>
<li>IT for Change, Bangalore </li>
<li>Free Software Movement of India, Hyderabad </li>
<li>Society for Knowledge Commons, New Delhi</li>
<li>Digital Empowerment Foundation, New Delhi</li>
<li>Delhi Science Forum, New Delhi</li>
<li>Software Freedom Law Centre - India, New Delhi</li>
<li>Third World Network - India, New Delhi</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Supported by the following global networks:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Association For Progressive Communications</li>
<li>Just Net Coalition</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><br />For any clarification or inquiries you may may write to or call:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>Parminder Jeet Singh: <a class="mail-link" href="mailto:parminder@itforchange.net">parminder@itforchange.net</a> +91 98459 49445, or </li>
<li>Vidushi Marda: <a class="mail-link" href="mailto:vidushi@cis-india.org">vidushi@cis-india.org</a> +91 99860 92252</li></ul>
<hr />
<p><a name="ftn1">[1]</a> Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn2">[2]</a> The “NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement” , endorsed by a large number of governments and other stakeholders, including ICANN and US government, called for ICANN to become a “truly international and global organization”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn3">[3]</a> See, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130515/00145123090/big-pharma-firms-seeking-pharmacy-domain-to-crowd-out-legitimate-foreign-pharmacies.shtml">https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130515/00145123090/big-pharma-firms-seeking-pharmacy-domain-to-crowd-out-legitimate-foreign-pharmacies.shtml </a></p>
<p><a name="ftn4">[4]</a> Public Technical Identifier, a newly incorporated body to carry out the operational aspects of managing Internet's identifiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn5">[5]</a> This can be at one of the existing non US global offices of ICANN, or the location of one of the 3 non-US root servers. Section 24.1 of ICANN Bylaws say, “The principal office for the transaction of the business of shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a name="ftn6">[6]</a> E.g., International Fertilizer and Development Center was designated as a public, nonprofit, international organisation by US Presidential Decree, granting it immunities under United States International Organisations Immunities Act . See <a class="external-link" href="https://archive.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html">https://archive.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNHomepageInternet Governance2016-11-14T06:39:52ZBlog EntryICANN 57
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad
<b>ICANN 57 is being hosted by the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India from November 3 to 9, 2016 in Hyderabad at Hyderabad International Convention Centre. Vidushi Marda participated in the event as a speaker.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As part of her work for the Cross Community Working Party on ICANN's Corporate and Social Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, Vidushi <a class="external-link" href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsononcomstake/Meeting+Notes?preview=/53772757/63146891/Presentation%20CCWP%20HR%20ICANN57%20complete%203.pdf">presented her work on the Human Rights Impact of new gTLD Subsequent Procedures</a> in Hyderabad.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Minister of Law & Justice and Minister of Electronics and Information Technology Ravi Shankar Prasad reiterated India’s commitment to the multistakeholder model during the Opening Ceremony of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN’s) 57th Public Meeting. The meeting, also known as ICANN57, is taking place in Hyderabad, India, from November 3 – 9, 2016 and has convened thousands of the global Internet community members (both on-site and remotely) to discuss and develop policies related to the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). It is hosted by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), with support from the Government of Telangana.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN57 is the first post-IANA stewardship transition public meeting and also the first Annual General Meeting under the new Meetings Strategy. ICANN meetings are held three times a year in different regions to enable attendees from around the world to participate in person. These meetings offer a variety of sessions such as workshops, open forums and working meetings on the development and implementation of Internet policies. ICANN meetings offer the best opportunity for face-to-face discussions and exchange of opinions among attendees dedicated to the continued stable and secure operation of the Domain Name System.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more info about the event, visit the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2016-11-05-en">ICANN website</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNIANAInternet Governance2016-11-08T01:14:37ZNews ItemIf the DIDP Did Its Job
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job
<b></b>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Over the course of two years, the Centre for Internet and Society sent 28 requests to ICANN under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP). A part of ICANN’s accountability initiatives, DIDP is “intended to ensure that information contained in documents concerning ICANN's operational activities, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.”</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Through the DIDP, any member of the public can request information contained in documents from ICANN. We’ve written about the process <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-documentary-information-disclosure-policy-2013-i-didp-basics">here</a>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii">here</a>. As a civil society group that does research on internet governance related topics, CIS had a variety of questions for ICANN. The 28 DIDP requests we have sent cover a range of subjects: from revenue and financial information, to ICANN’s relationships with its contracted parties, its contractual compliance audits, harassment policies and the diversity of participants in its public forum. We have blogged about each DIDP request where we have summarized ICANN’s responses.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Here are the DIDP requests we sent in:</p>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="147"><col width="137"><col width="152"><col width="119"><col width="135"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Dec 2014</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Jan/Feb 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Aug/Sept 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Nov 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Apr/May 2016</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings">ICANN meeting expenditure</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions">Revenue from gTLD auction</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial principles</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-19-icann2019s-role-in-the-postponement-of-the-iana-transition">IANA transition postponement</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-22-reconsideration-requests-from-parties-affected-by-icann-action">Board Governance Committee Reports</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2">Granular revenue statements</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups">Globalisation Advisory Groups</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues">Raw data - Granular income data</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-20-is-presumptive-renewal-of-verisign2019s-contracts-a-good-thing">Presumptive renewal of registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-23-icann-does-not-know-how-diverse-its-comment-section-is">Diversity Analysis</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann">ICANN cyber attacks</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram">Organogram</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-13-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registries">Compliance audits - registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-21-icann2019s-relationship-with-the-rirs">ICANN-RIR relationship</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Compliance audits</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial outcome document</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-9-exactly-how-involved-is-icann-in-the-netmundial-initiative">Involvement in NETmundial Initiative</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-14-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registrars">Compliance audits - registrars</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann">Harassment policy</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1">Complaints to ICANN ombudsman</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-10-icann-does-not-know-how-much-each-rir-contributes-to-its-budget">RIR contract fees</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-16-icann-has-no-documentation-on-registrars2019-201cabuse-contacts201d">Registrar abuse contact</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">DIDP statistics *</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-15-what-is-going-on-between-verisign-and-icann">Verisign Contractual violations</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants">gTLD applicant support program </a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-17-how-icann-chooses-their-contractual-compliance-auditors">Contractual auditors</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract">Root Zone Maintenance agreements</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-18-icann2019s-internal-website-will-stay-internal">Internal website</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN’s responses were analyzed and rated between 0-4 based on the amount of information disclosed. The reasons given for the lack of full disclosure were also studied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="73"><col width="568"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">DIDP response rating</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">0</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">No relevant information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">1</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Very little information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">2</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Partial information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">3</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Adequate information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">4</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">All information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has defined a set of preconditions under which they are not obligated to answer a request. These preconditions are generously used by ICANN to justify their lack of a comprehensive answer. The wording of the policy also allows ICANN to dodge answering a request if it doesn’t have the relevant documents already in its possession. The responses were also classified by the number of times a particular DIDP condition for non-disclosure was invoked. We will see why these weaken ICANN’s accountability initiatives. </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"><br /><img src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/1o_D1vsv4byFYcXE1BfpcMtIe_ZxSAWwxZ-QMIQ0OlZ3y0UzANNyepK64ktsqNF-HmkIyw1rgnESLv_1PrHMuH3WKRQhnEaLhoghGCU3eWofqhBiBLjbu3Wz6nrmVdAw9GEH-2K2" alt="null" height="303" width="368" /></div>
<p dir="ltr">Of the 28 DIDP requests, only 14% were answered fully, without the use of the DIDP conditions of non-disclosure. Seven out of 28 or 40% of the DIDPs received a 0-rated answer which reflects extremely poorly on the DIDP mechanism itself. Of the 7 responses that received 0-rating, 4 were related to complaints and contractual compliance. We had asked for details on the complaints received by the ombudsman, details on contractual violations by Verisign and abuse contacts maintained by registrars for filing complaints. We received no relevant information.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">We have earlier written about the extensive and broad nature of the 12 conditions of non-disclosure that ICANN uses. These conditions were used in 24 responses out of 28. ICANN was able to dodge from fully answering 85% of the DIDP requests that they got from CIS. This is alarming especially for an organization that claims to be fully transparent and accountable. The conditions for non-disclosure have been listed in <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3sI8lQtXMDTMmJoLXoxazFOVlU/view?usp=sharing">this document</a> and can be referred to while reading the following graph.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">On reading the conditions for non-disclosure, it seems like ICANN can refuse to answer any DIDP request if it so wished. These exclusions are numerous, vaguely worded and contain among them a broad range of information that should legitimately be in the public domain: Correspondence, internal information, information related to ICANN’s relationship with governments, information derived from deliberations among ICANN constituents, information provided to ICANN by private parties and the kicker - information that would be too burdensome for ICANN to collect and disseminate.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><img src="https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/CojQ-raMh1nblMO2TGtEJmrRE3MLKHSqltij-nrTdL4Cx2rzVtwzXZQBYBv0qpqxlZ_e0Ce1St7nnY6dN6dAn6G2VH-93iq2htQRQxmejjs-lXhUWNlGiPo9HpZlS69YbCFKEe7J" alt="null" height="425" width="624" /></p>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<p dir="ltr">As we can see from the graph, the most used condition under which ICANN can refuse to answer a DIDP request is F. Predictably, this is the most vaguely worded DIDP condition of the lot: “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures.” It is up to ICANN to decide what information is confidential with no justification needed or provided for it. ICANN has used this condition 11 times in responding to our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">It is also necessary to pay attention to condition L which allow ICANN to reject “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.” This is perhaps the weakest point in the entire list due its subjective nature. Firstly, on whose standards must this information request be reasonable? If the point of a transparency mechanism is to make sure that information sought by the public is disseminated, should they be allowed to obfuscate information because it is too burdensome to collect? Even if this is fair given the time constraints of the DIDP mechanism, it must not be used as liberally as has been happening. The last sub point is perhaps the most subjective. If a staff member dislikes a particular requestor, this point would justify their refusal to answer a request regardless of its validity. This hardly seems fair or transparent. This condition has been used 9 times in our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Besides the DIDP non-disclosure conditions, ICANN also has an excuse built into the definition of DIDP. Since it is not obliged to create or summarize documents under the DIDP process, it can simply claim to not have the specific document we request and thus negate its responsibility to our request. This is what ICANN did with one of our requests for raw financial data. For our research, we required raw data from ICANN specifically with regard to its expenditure on staff and board members for their travel and attendance at meetings. As an organization that is answerable to multiple stakeholders including governments and the public, it is justified to expect that they have financial records of such items in a systematic manner. However, we were surprised to learn that ICANN does not in fact have these stored in a manner that they can send as attachments or publish. Instead they directed us to the audited financial reports which did little for our research. However, in response to our later request for granular data on revenue from domain names, ICANN explained that while they do not have such a document in their possession, they would create one. This distinction between the two requests seems arbitrary to us since we consider both to be important to public.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Nevertheless, there were some interesting outcomes from our experience filing DIDPs. We learnt that there has been no substantive work done to inculcate the NETmundial principles at ICANN, that ICANN has no idea which regional internet registry contributes the most to its budget, and that it does not store (or is not willing to reveal) any raw financial data. These outcomes do not contribute to a sense of confidence in the organization.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has an opportunity to reform this particular transparency mechanism at its Workstream 2 discussions. ICANN must make use of this opportunity to listen and work with people who have used the DIDP process in order to make it useful, effective and efficient. To that effect, we have some recommendations from our experience with the DIDP process.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">That ICANN does not currently possess a particular document is not an excuse if it has the ability to create one. In its response to our questions on the IANA transition, ICANN indicated that it does not have the necessary documents as the multi stakeholder body that it set up is the one conducting the transition. This is somewhat justified. However, in response to our request for financial details, ICANN must not be able to give the excuse that it does not have a document in its possession. It and it alone has the ability to create the document and in response to a request from the public, it should.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN must also revamp its conditions for non-disclosure and make it tighter. It must reduce the number of exclusions to its disclosure policy and make sure that the exclusion is not done arbitrarily. Specifically with respect to condition F, ICANN must clarify how information was classified as confidential and why that is different from everything else on the list of conditions.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Further, ICANN should not be able to use condition L to outright reject a DIDP request. Instead, there must be a way for the requester and ICANN to come to terms about the request. This could happen by an extension of the 1 month deadline, financial compensation by requester for any expenditure on ICANN’s part to answer the request or by a compromise between the requester and ICANN on the terms of the request. The sub point about requests made “by a vexatious or querulous individual” must be removed from condition L or at least be separated from the condition so that it is clear why the request for disclosure was denied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN should also set up a redressal mechanism specific to DIDP. While ICANN has the Reconsideration Requests process to rectify any wrongdoing on the part of staff or board members, this is not adequate to identify whether a DIDP was rejected on justifiable grounds. A separate mechanism that deals only with DIDP requests and wrongful use of the non-disclosure conditions would be helpful. According to the icann bylaws, in addition to Requests for Reconsideration, ICANN has also established an independent third party review of allegations against the board and/or staff members. A similar mechanism solely for reviewing whether ICANN’s refusal to answer a DIDP request is justified would be extremely useful.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">A strong transparency mechanism must make sure that its objective are to provide answers, not to find ways to justify its lack of answers. With this in mind, we hope that the revamp of transparency mechanisms after workstream 2 discussions leads to a better DIDP process than we are used to.</p>
<p><span id="docs-internal-guid-b9e801b8-28c6-b8f5-d9ad-ac67daa46694"></span></p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaIANATransparency and AccountabilityInternet GovernanceICANNIANA TransitionTransparency2016-11-07T12:57:18ZBlog EntryInternet Democratisation: IANA Transition Leaves Much to be Desired
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation
<b>At best, the IANA transition is symbolic of Washington’s oversight over ICANN coming to an end. It is also symbolic of the empowerment of the global multistakeholder community. In reality, it fails to do either meaningfully.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The article was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/internet-democratisation-iana-transition-leaves-much-to-be-desired/story-t94hojZjDXqS4LjNSepZlN.html">Hindustan Times</a> on October 6, 2016.</p>
<hr />
<img src="https://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/605664440.jpg" alt="PardonSnowden.org" />
<h6> Many suspect Washington’s 2014 announcement of handing over control of the IANA contract to be fuelled by the outcry following Edward Snowden’s revelations of the extent of US government surveillance. Source: AFP</h6>
<p style="text-align: justify;">September 30, 2016, marked the expiration of a contract between the US government and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In simpler, acronym-free terms, Washington’s formal oversight over the Internet’s address book has come to an end with the expiration of this contract, with control now being passed on to the “global multistakeholder community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998 to manage the backbone of the Internet, which included the domain name system (DNS), allocation of IP addresses and root servers. After an agreement with the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), ICANN was tasked with operating the IANA functions, which includes maintenance of the root zone file of the DNS. Over the years Washington has rejected calls to hand over the control of IANA functions, but in March 2014 it announced its intentions to do so and laid down conditions for the handover. Many suspect the driving force behind this announcement to be the outcry following Edward Snowden’s revelations of the extent of US government surveillance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The conditions laid down by the NTIA were met, and the US government accepted the transition proposal, amidst much political pressure and opposition, most notably from Senator Ted Cruz.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This transition is a step in the right direction, but in reality, it changes very little as it fails to address two critical issues: Of jurisdiction and accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Jurisdiction is important while considering the resolution of contractual disputes, application of labour and competition laws, disputes regarding ICANN’s decisions, consumer protection, financial transparency, etc. Many of these questions, although not all, will depend on where ICANN is located. ICANN’s new bylaws mention that it will continue to be incorporated in California, and subject to California law just as it was pre-transition. Having the DNS subject to the laws of a single country can only lend to its fragility. ICANN’s US jurisdiction also means that it is not free from the political pressures from the US Senate and in turn, the toxic effect of American party politics that were made visible in the events leading up to September 30.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another critical issue that the transition does not address is that of ICANN accountability. Post-transition, ICANN’s board will continue to be the ultimate decision-making authority, thus controlling the organisation’s functioning, and ICANN staff will be accountable to the board alone.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To put things in perspective, look at the board’s track record in the recent past. In August, an Independent Review Panel (IRP) found that ICANN’s board had violated ICANN’s own bylaws and had failed to discharge its transparency obligations when it failed to look into staff misbehaviour. Following this, in September, ICANN decided to respond to such allegations of mismanagement, opacity and lack of accountability by launching a review. The review however, would not look into the issues, failures and false claims of the board, but instead focus on the process by which ICANN staff was able to engage in such misbehaviour. This ironically, will be in the form of an internal review that will pass through ICANN staff — the subjects of the investigation — before being taken up to the board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At best, the transition is symbolic of Washington’s oversight over ICANN coming to an end. It is also symbolic of the empowerment of the global multistakeholder community. In reality, it fails to do either meaningfully.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNIANAInternet Governance2016-11-03T07:52:37ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #28 - ICANN renews Verisign’s RZM Contract?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract
<b>Our request to ICANN was related to our (mistaken) assumption that Verisign and ICANN had signed an agreement for Root Zone Maintenance and had recently renewed it. In that context we had asked for information such as documents reflecting the decision making process, copy of the current RZM agreement, public comments and an audit report of Verisign’s RZM functions.</b>
<p><span id="docs-internal-guid-dc70c719-3ad7-83a2-c0d1-26fed23ada1a">The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20160502-1-cis-request-02may16-en.pdf"><span>here</span></a><span>.</span></p>
<h3><span>What ICANN said</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN clarified that it has never been party to the RZM agreement which was made between NTIA and Verisign. According to an ICANN-Verisign joint document, the Root Zone Management Systems allows “ICANN as the IANA Functions Operator (IFO), Verisign, as the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM), and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), as the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/root_zone_administrator_proposal-relatedtoiana_functionsste-final.pdf">Root Zone Administrator</a> (RZA).” The only agreement related to this is the one of cooperation between Verisign and the NTIA.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Accordingly, as the role of NTIA is transitioned to the multi-stakeholder community, Verisign and ICANN are working out terms and conditions of their own agreement to facilitate this transition together. In response to NTIA’s request for a proposal for this transition, Verisign and ICANN submitted this document. Besides these, ICANN states that it does not have any documents responsive to our requests.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span id="docs-internal-guid-dc70c719-3ad9-a0d0-e404-48de850f938b">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be found </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20160502-1-cis-response-01jun16-en.pdf"><span>here</span></a><span>.</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><br /></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><br /></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaICANNDIDPInternet Governance2016-07-30T08:10:17ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #27 - On ICANN’s support to new gTLD Applicants
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants
<b>In order to promote access to the New gTLD Program in developing regions, ICANN set up the New gTLD Applicant Support Program (Program) which seeks to facilitate cooperation between gTLD applicants from developing countries and those willing and able to support them financially (and in kind).</b>
<p><a class="external-link" href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/candidate-support/non-financial-support">Click for Applicant Support Directory</a></p>
<hr />
<p>We requested ICANN for information about this program. Specifically, we asked them for information on:</p>
<ul>
<li>The number of applicants to the program and the amount received by them;</li>
<li>The basis on which these applicants were selected;</li>
<li>The amount that has been utilized thus far for this program;</li>
<li>Contributions by donors;</li>
<li>What “in kind” support means and includes.</li>
</ul>
<p><span id="docs-internal-guid-d0a4e7de-3ad0-b071-d564-c2b005d37412">The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20160426-1-cis-request-26apr16-en.pdf"><span>here</span></a><span>.</span></p>
<h3><span>What ICANN said</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN answered all our questions in a satisfactory manner. There were three applicants to the program. Two of these: Nameshop, and Ummah Digital Ltd, did not meet the eligibility criteria listed in the handbook and therefore only one other applicant, DotKids, received the financial support. Of the USD 2,000,000 set aside, USD 135,000 was awarded to them.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The eligibility criteria is listed in the New <a class="external-link" href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/candidate-support/financial-assistance-handbook-11jan12-en.pdf">gTLD Financial Assistance Handbook</a> and candidates are evaluated by the Support Applicant Review Panel (SARP), “which was comprised of five volunteer members from the community with experience in the domain name industry, in managing small businesses, awarding grants, and assisting others on financial matters in developing countries.”</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The USD 2,000,000 allotted to this program was set aside by ICANN’s board and as it is not exhausted, no external contributions were sought by ICANN (in cash or in kind). However, ICANN failed to explain what “in kind” contributions would be.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaICANNDIDPInternet Governance2016-07-30T08:03:18ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #25 - Curbing Sexual Harassment at ICANN
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann
<b>Markus Kummer at Public Forum 2 mentioned that ICANN has standards of behavior regarding sexual harassment that are applicable for its staff.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/marrakech55/schedule/thu-public-forum/transcript-public-forum-10mar16-en.pdf">Marrakech Public Forum 2</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of that statement, CIS requested ICANN to publish the following information:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Information about the individual or organization conducting ICANN’s sexual harassment training</li>
<li>Materials used during this training</li>
<li>ICANN’s internal sexual harassment policy</li>
</ul>
<p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-fe41cc04-3a6e-cf9f-49f8-133f17ad6466" style="text-align: justify; "><span>The request filed by Padmini Baruah can be found </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20160423-4-cis-request-23apr16-en.pdf"><span>here</span></a><span>. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>What ICANN said</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s response answered our questions adequately. The organization conducting their sexual harassment training is <a class="external-link" href="http://www.navexglobal.com/en-us">NAVEX Global</a>. It is an interactive online training and as such, all materials are within that platform. Besides, ICANN could not publish these materials as it would be an infringement of NAVEX Global’s intellectual property right. ICANN also attached with the response, their internal sexual harassment policy.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr" id="docs-internal-guid-fe41cc04-3a6f-624f-fe3b-ddb4b40c7729" style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN's response to our DIDP request (and the attached policy document) may be found </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20160423-4-cis-response-21may16-en.pdf"><span>here</span></a><span>. </span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaICANNDIDPInternet Governance2016-07-30T06:14:29ZBlog Entry