The Centre for Internet and Society
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Press Release, March 11, 2016: The Law cannot Fix what Technology has Broken!
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/press-release-aadhaar-11032016-the-law-cannot-fix-what-technology-has-broken
<b>We published and circulated the following press release on March 11, 2016, as the Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. This Bill was proposed by finance minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley to give legislative backing to Aadhaar, being implemented by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).</b>
<p> </p>
<p>The Lok Sabha passed the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 today. This Bill was proposed by finance minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley to give legislative backing to Aadhaar, being implemented by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).</p>
<p>The Bill was introduced as a money bill and there was no public consultation to evaluate the provisions therein even though there are very serious ramifications for the Right to Privacy and the Right to Association and Assembly. The Bill has made it compulsory for an individual to enrol under Aadhaar in order to receive any subsidy,
benefit or service from the Government. Biometric information that is required for the purpose of enrolment has been deemed "sensitive personal information" and restrictions have been imposed on use, disclosure and sharing of such information for purposes other than authentication, disclosure made pursuant to a court order or in the interest of national security. Here, the Bill has acknowledged the standards of protection of sensitive personal information established under Section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Bill has also laid down several penal provisions for acts that include impersonation at the time of enrolment, unauthorised access to the
Central Identities Data Repository, unauthorised use by requesting entity, noncompliance with intimation requirements, etc.</p>
<h3>Key Issues</h3>
<h4>1. Identification without Consent</h4>
<p>Before the Aadhaar project it was not possible for the Indian government to identify citizens without their consent. But once the government has created a national centralized biometric database it will be possible for the government to identify any citizen without their consent. Hi-resolution photography and videography make it trivial for governments and also any other actor to harvest biometrics remotely. In other words, the technology makes consent irrelevant. A German ministers fingerprints were captured by hackers as she spoke using hand gesture at at conference. In a similar manner the government can now identify us both as individuals and also as groups without requiring our cooperation. This has direct implications for the right to privacy as we will be under constant government surveillance in the future as CCTV camera resolutions improve and there will be chilling effects on the
right to free speech and the freedom of association. The only way to fix this is to change the technology configuration and architecture of the project. The law cannot be used as band-aid on really badly designed technology.</p>
<h4>2. Fallible Technology</h4>
<p>The technology used for collection and authentication as been said to be fallible. It is understood that the technology has been feasible for a population of 200 million. The Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDAI has acknowledged the lack of data on how a biometric authentication technology will scale up where the population is about 1.2 billion. Further, a report by 4G Identity Solutions estimates that while in any population, approximately 5% of the people have unreadable fingerprints, in India it could lead to a failure to enroll up to 15% of the population.</p>
<p>We know that the Aadhaar number has been issued to dogs, trees (with the Aadhaar letter containing the photo of a tree). There have been slip-ups in the Aadhaar card enrolment process, some cards have ended up with
pictures of an empty chair, a tree or a dog instead of the actual applicants. An RTI application has revealed that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has identified more than 25,000 duplicate Aadhaar numbers in the country till August 2015.</p>
<p>At the stage of authentication, the accuracy of biometric identification depends on the chance of a false positive— the probability that the identifiers of two persons will match. For the current population of 1.2 billion the expected proportion of duplicates is 1/121, a ratio which is far too high. In a recent paper in EPW by Hans Mathews, a mathematician with CIS, shows that as per UIDAI's own statistics on failure rates, the programme would badly fail to uniquely identify individuals in India. <strong>[1]</strong></p>
<h3>Endnote</h3>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-27-february-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-flaws-in-uidai-process">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-27-february-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-flaws-in-uidai-process</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/press-release-aadhaar-11032016-the-law-cannot-fix-what-technology-has-broken'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/press-release-aadhaar-11032016-the-law-cannot-fix-what-technology-has-broken</a>
</p>
No publisherJapreet Grewal and Sunil AbrahamUIDBig DataPrivacyInternet GovernanceDigital IndiaAadhaarBiometrics2016-03-16T10:10:40ZBlog EntryAn Urgent Need for the Right to Privacy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/an-urgent-need-for-the-right-to-privacy
<b>Along with a group of individuals and organisations from academia and civil society, we have drafted and are signatories to an open letter addressed to the Union government and urging the same to "urgently take steps to uphold the constitutional basis to the right to privacy and fulfil it’s constitutional and international obligations." Here we publish the text of the open letter. Please follow the link below to support it by joining the signatories.</b>
<p> </p>
<h4><a href="http://goo.gl/forms/hw4huFcc4b" target="_blank">Read and sign the open letter.</a></h4>
<p> </p>
<h2>Text of the Open Letter</h2>
<p>As our everyday lives are conducted increasingly through electronic communications the necessity for privacy protections has also increased. While several countries across the globe have recognised this by furthering the right to privacy of their citizens the Union Government has adopted a regressive attitude towards this core civil liberty. We urge the Union Government to take urgent measures to safeguard the right to privacy in India.</p>
<p>Our concerns are based on a continuing pattern of disregard for the right to privacy by several governments in the past. This trend has increased as can be plainly viewed from the following developments.</p>
<p>In 2015, the Attorney General in the case of *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, argued before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no right to privacy under the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Court was persuaded to re-examine the basis of the right to privacy upsetting 45 years of judicial precedent. This has thrown the constitutional right to privacy in doubt and the several judgements that have been given under it. This includes the 1997 PUCL Telephone Tapping judgement as well. We urge the Union Government to take whatever steps are necessary and urge the Supreme Court to hold that a right to privacy exists under the Constitution of India.</p>
<p>Recently Mr. Arun Jaitley, Minister for Finance introduced the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016. This bill was passed on March 11, 2016 in the middle of budget discussion on a short notice as a money bill in the Lok Sabha when only 73 of 545 members were present. Its timing and introduction as a money bill prevents necessary scrutiny given the large privacy risks that arise under it. This version of the bill was never put up for public consultation and is being rushed through without adequate discussion. Even substantively it fails to give accountable privacy safeguards while making Aadhaar mandatory for availing any government subsidy, benefit, or service.</p>
<p>We urge the Union Government to urgently take steps to uphold the constitutional basis to the right to privacy and fulfil it’s constitutional and international obligations. We encourage the Government to have extensive public discussions on the Aadhaar Bill before notifying it. We further call upon them to constitute a drafting committee with members of civil society to draft a comprehensive statute as suggested by the Justice A.P. Shah Committee Report of 2012.</p>
<p>Signatories:</p>
<ul><li>Amber Sinha, the Centre for Internet and Society</li>
<li>Japreet Grewal, the Centre for Internet and Society</li>
<li>Joshita Pai, Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University</li>
<li>Raman Jit Singh Chima, Access Now</li>
<li>Sarvjeet Singh, Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University</li>
<li>Sumandro Chattapadhyay, the Centre for Internet and Society</li>
<li>Sunil Abraham, the Centre for Internet and Society</li>
<li>Vanya Rakesh, the Centre for Internet and Society</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/an-urgent-need-for-the-right-to-privacy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/an-urgent-need-for-the-right-to-privacy</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroUIDBig DataPrivacyInternet GovernanceDigital IndiaAadhaarBiometrics2016-03-17T07:40:12ZBlog EntryWill Only Legal Backing For Aadhaar Suffice?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/new-indian-express-march-14-2016-will-only-legal-backing-for-aadhaar-suffice
<b>Aadhaar is set to become mandatory, but the opponents of the scheme are not amused. Concerns about privacy of the Aadhaar number and the authenticity of the biometric data being collected have been expressed by people right from the beginning. But the government has not done much to address these issues.</b>
<p>The article was published in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Will-Only-Legal-Backing-For-Aadhaar-Suffice/2016/03/14/article3326144.ece">New Indian Express </a>on March 14, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“It does not matter what legislative backing they give it, it is still a surveillance programme. How can you have a privacy Bill for a surveillance programme? Legislative backing would be band-aid. I do not agree with it,” says Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of The Centre for Internet and Society. The society is a Bengaluru-based organisation looking at multi-disciplinary research and advocacy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Abraham says that ever since the Aadhaar scheme was implemented, there was a massive degradation of civil liberties. “It is an opaque technology. Why should the government have such a database?” he asks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Aadhaar1.jpg" alt="Aadhaar" class="image-inline" title="Aadhaar" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Abraham says that the keys to the data should not have rested with the government where it is vulnerable. Instead, the government should have explored the concept of introducing smart cards issued to the citizen with the data stored on it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Access to this data could not be had without the permission of the citizen, he says. At present, if something goes wrong or if the data is compromised, the government can always blame a lapse in technology, Abraham adds.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He questions the government’s logic where it assumes that only the poor section of society can misuse the benefits and says that it is well known that the problem exists in the supply chain and that the government has done nothing to address this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mathew Thomas of The Fifth Estate, an NGO, wonders what advantage the BJP suddenly found that they decided to pursue Aadhaar rather than send it to the trash bin as they had promised before the general elections.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thomas says Aadhaar is flawed and is a fraud on the Constitution and the government has taken the money bill route simply to avoid a debate on it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Just passing a Bill is meaningless. This is radically wrong and we all know that protection of privacy is nonsense. How do they plan to plug the leakages? Have they even conducted a study, because there is no evidence of it. The correct beneficiary can get an LPG cylinder, but what is stopping the person from using it for an auto or for his car? That the government can lie to its own people is terrible,” he says.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which is hearing the matter on privacy concerns about Aadhaar, is expected to have a hearing by the end of this month.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/new-indian-express-march-14-2016-will-only-legal-backing-for-aadhaar-suffice'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/new-indian-express-march-14-2016-will-only-legal-backing-for-aadhaar-suffice</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-03-16T02:31:52ZNews ItemThe New Aadhaar Bill in Plain English
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-new-aadhaar-bill-in-plain-english
<b>We have put together a plain English version of the The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016.
</b>
<h2 id="docs-internal-guid-4528559b-63ee-ea8a-5fc7-ff5b32b069f6" dir="ltr">The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016</h2>
<p> </p>
<p>Chapter I. PRELIMINARY</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 1</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">This Act is called Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">It will be applicable in whole of India (except the state of Jammu and Kashmir).</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">It will become applicable on a date to be notified by the Central Government.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 2</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Aadhaar number” is the identification number issued to an individual under the Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Aadhaar number holder” is the person who has been given an Aadhaar number;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“authentication” is the process of verifying the Aadhaar number, demographic information and biometric information of any person by the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR);</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“authentication record” is the record of the authentication which will contain the identity of the requesting entity and the response of the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Authority” or “UIDAI” refers to the Unique Identification Authority of India established under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“benefit” means any relief or payment which may be notified by the Central Government;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“biometric information” means photograph, fingerprint, Iris scan, or any other biological attributes specified by regulations;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Central Identities Data Repository” or “CIDR” means a centralised database containing all Aadhaar numbers, demographic information and biometric information and other related information;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Chairperson” means the Chairperson of the UIDAI;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“core biometric information” means fingerprint, Iris scan, or any biological attributes specified by regulations;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“demographic information” includes information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information as specified by regulations. This information will not include race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“enrolling agency” means an agency appointed by the UIDAI or a Registrar for collecting demographic and biometric information of individuals for issuing Aadhaar numbers;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“enrolment” means the process of collecting demographic and biometric information from individuals for the purpose of issuing Aadhaar numbers;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“identity information” in respect of an individual, includes his Aadhaar number, his biometric information and his demographic information;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Member” includes the Chairperson and Member of the Authority appointed under section 12;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“notification” means a notification published in the Official Gazette and the expression “notified” with its cognate meanings and grammatical variations will be construed accordingly;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“prescribed” means prescribed by rules made by the Central Government under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“records of entitlement” means the records of benefits, subsidies or services provided to any individual under any government programme;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“Registrar” means any person authorized by the UIDAI to enroll individuals under the Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“regulations” means the regulations made by the UIDAI under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“requesting entity” means an agency that submits the Aadhaar number and other information of an individual to the CIDR for authentication;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“resident” means a person who has resided in India for atleast 182 days in the last twelve months before the date of application for enrolment;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“service” means any facility or assistance provided by the Central Government in any form;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">“subsidy” means any form of aid, support, grant, etc. in cash or kind as notified by the Central Government.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter II. ENROLMENT</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 3</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Every resident is entitled to get an Aadhaar number.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">At the time of enrollment, the enrolling agency will inform the individual of the following details—</p>
</li>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">how their information will be used;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">what type of entities the information will be shared with; and</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> that they have a right to see their information and also tell them how they can see their information.</p>
</li></ol>
<li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> After collecting and verifying the information given by the individuals, the UIDAI will issue an Aadhaar number to each individual.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 4</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Once an Aadhaar number has been issued to a person, it will not be re-assigned to any other person.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">An Aadhaar number will be a random number and will not contain any attributes or identity of the Aadhaar number holder.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">if adopted by a service provider, an Aadhaar number may be accepted as proof of identity of the person.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 5</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will take special measures to issue Aadhaar number to women, children, senior citizens, persons with disability, unskilled and unorganised workers, nomadic tribes or to such other persons who do not have any permanent residence and similar categories of individuals.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 6</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI may require Aadhaar number holders to update their Aadhaar information, so that it remains accurate.</p>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter III. AUTHENTICATION</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 7</p>
<p dir="ltr">As a condition for receiving subsidy for which the expenditure is incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, the Government may require that a person should be authenticated or give proof of the Aadhaar number to establish his/her identity. In the case a person does not have an Aadhaar number, he/she should make an application for enrolment. If an Aadhaar number is not assigned, the person will be offered viable and alternate means of identification for receiving the subsidy, benefit or service.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 8</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will authenticate the Aadhaar information of people as per the conditions prescribed by the government and may also charge a fees for doing so.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Any requesting entity will— (a) take consent from the individual before collecting his/her Adhaar information; (b) use the information only for authentication with the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The entity requesting authentication will also inform the individual of the following— (a) what type of information will be shared for authentication; (b) what will the information be used for; and (c) whether there is any alternative to submitting the Aadhaar information to the requesting entity.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will respond to the authentication request with yes, no, or other appropriate response and share identity information about the Aadhaar number holder but not share any biometric information.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 9</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Aadhaar number or its authentication will not be a proof of citizenship or domicile.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 10</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI may engage any number of entities to establish and maintain the CIDR and to perform any other functions specified by the regulations.</p>
<h5 dir="ltr"><br class="kix-line-break" />Chapter IV. UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF INDIA</h5>
<p dir="ltr"><br class="kix-line-break" />Section 11</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> The UIDAI will be established by the Central Government to be responsible for the processes of enrolment and authentication of Aadhaar numbers.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will be a body corporate with the power to buy and sell property, to enter into contracts and to sue or be sued.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The head office of the UIDAI will be in New Delhi.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI may establish its offices at other places in India.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 12</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will have a Chairperson, two part-time Members and a chief executive officer, who to be appointed by the Central Government.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 13</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson and Members will be competent people with at least 10 years experience and knowledge in technology, governance, law, development, economics, finance, management, public affairs or administration.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 14</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson and the Members will be appointed for 3 years and can be re-appointed after their term. But no Member or Chairperson will be more than 65 years of age.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson and Members will take an oath of office and of secrecy.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson or Member may— (a) resign from office, by giving an advance written notice of at least 30 days; or (b) be removed from his office because she/he gets disqualified on any of the grounds mentioned in section 15.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The salaries and allowances of the Members and Chairperson will be prescribed under the government. <br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 15</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Central Government may remove a Chairperson or Member, who—<br class="kix-line-break" />(a) has gone bankrupt; <br class="kix-line-break" />(b) is physically or mentally unable to do his/her job;<br class="kix-line-break" />(c) has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude;<br class="kix-line-break" />(d) has a financial conflict of interest in performing his/her functions; or<br class="kix-line-break" />(e) has abused his/her position so that the government needs to remove him/her in public interest.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson or a Member will be given a chance to present his/her side of the story before being removed, unless he/she is being removed on the grounds of bankruptcy or criminal conviction. <br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 16</p>
<p dir="ltr">An Ex-Chairperson or Ex-Member will have to take the approval of the Central Government,—</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">to accept any job in any entity (other than a government organization) which was associated with any work done for the UIDAI while that person was a Chairperson or Member, for a period of three years after ceasing to hold office;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">to act or advise any entity on any particular transaction for which that person had provided advice to the UIDAI while he/she was the Chairperson or a Member;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">to give advice to any person using information which was obtained as the Chairperson or a Member which is not available to the public in general; or</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">to accept any offer of employment or appointment as a director of any company with which he/she had direct and significant official dealings during his/her term of office, for a period of three years.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 17</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Chairperson will preside over the meetings of the UIDAI and have the powers and perform the functions of the UIDAI.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 18</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> The chief executive officer (CEO) of the UIDAI will not be below the rank of Additional Secretary to the Government of India.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The chief executive officer will be responsible for— (a) the day-to-day administration of the UIDAI; (b) implementing the programmes and decisions of the UIDAI; (c) making proposals for the UIDAI; (d) preparation of the accounts and budget of the UIDAI; and (e) performing any other functions prescribed in the regulations.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The CEO will annually submit the following things to the UIDAI for its approval — (a) a general report covering all the activities of the Authority in the previous year; (b) programmes of work; (c) the annual accounts for the previous year; and (d) the budget for the coming year.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The CEO will have administrative control over the officers and other employees of the Authority.</p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr"><br class="kix-line-break" />Section 19</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> The time and place of the meetings of the UIDAI and the rules and procedures of those meetings will be prescribed by regulations.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The meetings will be presided by the Chairperson, and if they are absent, then the senior most Member of the UIDAI.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">All decisions at the meetings of the UIDAI will be taken by a majority vote. In case of a tie, the person presiding the meeting will have the casting vote.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">All decisions of the UIDAI will be signed by the Chairperson or any other Member or the Member-Secretary authorised by the UIDAI in this behalf.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">If any Member, who is a director of a company and because of this has any financial interest in matters coming up for consideration at a meeting, that member should disclose the financial interest and not take any further part in the discussions and decision on that matter.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 20</p>
<p dir="ltr">No actions or proceeding of the UIDAI will become invalid merely because of—</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of, the UIDAI;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">any defect in the appointment of a person as Chairperson or Member of the Authority; or</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">any irregularity in the procedure of the Authority not affecting the merits of the case.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 21</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI, with the approval of the Government, can decide on the number and types of officers and employees that it would require.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The salaries and allowances of the employees, officer and chief executive officer will be prescribed under the government.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 22.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Once the UIDAI is establishment—</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr"> all the assets and liabilities of the existing Unique Identification Authority of India, established by the Government of India through notification dated the 28th January, 2009, will stand transferred to the new UIDAI.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">all data and information collected during enrolment, all details of authentication performed, by the existing Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to have been done by the UIDAI. All debts, liabilities incurred and all contracts entered into by the Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to have been entered into by the UIDAI;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">all money due to the existing Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to be due to the UIDAI; and</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">all suits and other legal proceedings instituted by or against such Unique Identification Authority of India may be continued by or against the UIDAI.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">Section 23</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will develop the policy, procedure and systems for issuing Aadhaar numbers to individuals and perform their authentication. The powers and functions of the UIDAI include—</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">specifying the demographic information and biometric information required for enrolment and the processes for collection and verification of that information;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">collecting demographic information and biometric information from people seeking Aadhaar numbers;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">appointing of one or more entities to operate the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">generating and assigning Aadhaar numbers to individuals;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">performing authentication of Aadhaar numbers;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">maintaining and updating the information of individuals in the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">omitting and deactivating an Aadhaar number;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">specifying the manner of use of Aadhaar numbers for the purposes of providing or availing of various subsidies and other purposes for which Aadhaar numbers may be used;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">specifying the terms and conditions for appointment of Registrars, enrolling agencies and service providers and revocation of their appointments;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">establishing, operating and maintaining of the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">sharing the information of Aadhaar number holders;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">calling for information and records, conducting inspections, inquiries and audit of the operations of the CIDR, Registrars, enrolling agencies and other agencies appointed under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">specifying processes relating to data management, security protocols and other technology safeguards under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">specifying the conditions/procedures for issuance of new Aadhaar number to existing Aadhaar number holder;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">levying and collecting the fees or authorising the Registrars, enrolling agencies or other service providers to collect fees for the services provided by them under this Act;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">appointing committees necessary to assist the Authority in discharge of its functions;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">promoting research and development for advancement in biometrics and related areas;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">making and specifying policies and practices for Registrars, enrolling agencies and other service providers;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">setting up facilitation centres and grievance redressal mechanisms;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">other powers and functions as prescribed.</p>
</li></ol>
<p dir="ltr">The Authority may,— (a) enter into agreements with various state governments and Union Territories for collecting, storing, securing or processing of information or delivery of Aadhaar numbers to individuals or performing authentication; (b) appoint Registrars, engage and authorize agencies to collect, store, secure, process information or do authentication or perform other functions under this Act. The Authority may engage consultants, advisors and other persons required for efficient discharge of its functions.<br class="kix-line-break" /><br class="kix-line-break" /></p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter V. GRANTS, ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT AND ANNUAL REPORT</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 24</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Central Government may grant money to the UIDAI as it may decide, upon due appropriation by Parliament.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 25</p>
<p dir="ltr">Fees/revenue collected by the UIDAI will be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 26</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will prepare an annual statement of accounts in the format prescribed by Central Government</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Comptroller and Auditor-General will audit the account of the UIDAI annually at intervals decided by him, at the UIDAI’s expense.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Comptroller and Auditor-General or his appointees will have the same powers of audit they usually have to audit Government accounts.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will forward the statement of accounts certified by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the audit report, to the Central Government who will lay it before both houses of Parliament.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 27</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will provide returns, statements and particulars as sought, to the Central Government, as and when required.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will prepare an annual report containing the description of work for previous years, annual accounts of previous year, and the programmes of work for coming year.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The copy of the annual report will be laid before both houses of Parliament by the Central Government.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter VI. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 28</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will ensure the security and confidentiality of identity information and authentication records.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will take measures to ensure that all information with the UIDAI, including CIDR records is secured and protected against access, use or disclosure and against destruction, loss or damage.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures, and ensure the same are imposed through agreements/arrangements with its agents, consultants, advisors or other persons.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Unless otherwise provided, the UIDAI or its agents will not reveal any information in the CIDR to anyone.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">An Aadhaar number holders may request UIDAI to provide access his information (excluding the core biometric information) as per the regulations specified.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 29</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The core biometric information collected will not be a) shared with anyone for any reason, and b) used for any purpose other generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Identity information, other than core biometric information, may be shared only as per this Act and regulations specified under it.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Identity information available with a requesting entity will not be used for any purpose other than what is specified to the individual, nor will it be shared further without the individual’s consent.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Aadhaar numbers or core biometric information will not be made public except as specified by regulations.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 30</p>
<p dir="ltr">All biometric information collected and stored in electronic form will be deemed to be “electronic record” and “sensitive personal data or information” under Information Technology Act, 2000 and its provisions and rules will apply to it in addition to this Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 31</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">If the demographic or biometric information about any Aadhaar number holder changes, is lost or is found to be incorrect, they may request the UIDAI to make changes to their record in the CIDR, as necessary.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The identity information in the CIDR will not be altered, except as provided in this Act.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 32</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will maintain the authentication records in the manner and for as long as specified by regulations.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Every Aadhaar number holder may obtain his authentication record as specified by regulations.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will not collect, keep or maintain any information about the purpose of authentication.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 33</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI may reveal identity information, authentication records or any information in the CIDR following a court order by a District Judge or higher. Any such order may only be made after UIDAI is allowed to appear in a hearing.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The confidentiality provisions in Sections 28 and 29 will not apply with respect to disclosure made in the interest of national security following directions by a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, or an officer of a higher rank, authorised for this purpose.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">An Oversight Committee comprising Cabinet Secretary, and Secretaries of two departments — Department of Legal Affairs and DeitY— will review every direction under 33 B above.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Any directions under 33 B above are valid for 3 months, after which they may be extended following a review by the Oversight Committee.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter VII. OFFENCES AND PENALTIES</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 34</p>
<p dir="ltr">Impersonating or attempting to impersonate another person by providing false demographic or biometric information will punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, and/or fine of up to ten thousand rupees.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 35</p>
<p dir="ltr">Changing or attempting to change any demographic or biometric information of an Aadhaar number holder by impersonating another person (or attempting to do so), with the intent of i) causing harm or mischief to an Aadhaar number holder, or ii) appropriating the identity of an Aadhaar number holder, is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 36</p>
<p dir="ltr">Collection of identity information by one not authorised by this Act, by way of pretending otherwise, is punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 37</p>
<p dir="ltr">Intentional disclosure or dissemination of identity information, to any person not authorised under this Act, or in violation of any agreement entered into under this Act, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 38</p>
<p dir="ltr">The following intentional acts, when not authorised by the UIDAI, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and a fine not less than ten lakh rupees:</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">accessing or securing access to the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">downloading, copying or extracting any data from the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">introducing or causing any virus or other contaminant into the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">damaging or causing damage to the data in the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">disrupting or causing disruption to access to CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">causing denial of access to an authorised to the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">revealing information in breach of (D) in Section 28, or Section 29;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">destruction, deletion or alteration of any files in the CIDR;</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">stealing, destruction, concealment or alteration of any source code used by the UIDAI.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 39</p>
<p dir="ltr">Tampering of data in the CIDR or removable storage medium, with the intention to modify or discover information relating to Aadhaar number holder will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and a fine up to ten thousand rupees.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 40</p>
<p dir="ltr">Use of identity information in violation of Section 8 (3) by a requesting entity will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).</p>
<p dir="ltr"><br class="kix-line-break" />Section 41</p>
<p dir="ltr">Violation of Section 8 (3) or Section 3 (2) by a requesting entity or enrolling agency will be punishable with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 42</p>
<p dir="ltr">Any offence against this Act or regulations made under it, for which no specific penalty is provided, will be punishable with be punishable with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to twenty five thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 43</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">In case of an offence under Act committed by a Company, all person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company will also be held to be guilty and liable for punishment unless they can prove lack of knowledge of the offense or that they had exercised all due diligence to prevent it.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">In case an offence is committed by a Company with the consent, connivance or neglect of a director, manager, secretary or other officer of a company, they will also be held guilty of the offence.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 44</p>
<p dir="ltr">This Act will also apply to offences committed outside of India by any person, irrespective of their nationality, if the offence involves any data in the CIDR.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 45</p>
<p dir="ltr">Offences under this Act will not be investigated by police officers below the rank of Inspector of Police.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 46</p>
<p dir="ltr">Penalties imposed under this Act will not prevent imposition of any other penalties or punishment under any other law in force.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 47</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Courts will take cognizance of offences under this Act only upon complaint being made by the UIDAI or any officer authorised by it.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">No court inferior to that of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate will try any offence under this Act.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">Chapter VIII. MISCELLANEOUS</h5>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 48</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Central Government has the power to supersede the UIDAI, through a notification, not for longer than six months, in the following circumstances: i) In case of circumstances beyond the control of the UIDAI, ii) The UIDAI has defaulted in complying with directions of the Central Government, affecting financial position of the UIDAI, iii) Public emergency</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Upon publication of notification, Chairperson and Members of the UIDAI must vacate the office</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Powers, functions and duties will be performed by person(s) authorised by the President.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Properties controlled and owned by UIDAI will vest in the Central Government.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Central Government will reconstitute the UIDAI upon expiration of supersession, with fresh appointment of Chairperson and Members.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 49</p>
<p dir="ltr">Chairperson, members, employees etc. are deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 50</p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Central Government has the power to issue directions to the UIDAI on questions of policy (to be decided by the Government), except technical and administrative matters and the UIDAI will be bound by it.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI will be given an opportunity to express views before direction is given.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 51</p>
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI may delegate its powers and functions to a Member or officer of the UIDAI.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 52</p>
<p dir="ltr">No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings will lie against the Central Government, UIDAI, Chairperson, any Member, officer, or other employees of the UIDAI for an act done in good faith.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 53</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Central Government has the power to makes Rules for matters prescribed under this provision.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 54</p>
<p dir="ltr">UIDAI has the power to make regulations for matters prescribed under this provision.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 55</p>
<p dir="ltr">Rules and regulations under this Act will be laid before each House of Parliament for a total period of thirty days, both Houses must agree in making modification, and then the Rules will come into effect.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 56</p>
<p dir="ltr">Provisions of this Act are in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law currently in effect.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 57</p>
<p dir="ltr">This Act will not prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law by the State or other bodies.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 58</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The Central Government may pass an order to remove a difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, not beyond three years from the commencement of this Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 59</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Action take by Central Government under the Resolution of the Government of India for setting up the UIDAI or by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the notification including the UIDAI under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology will be deemed to have been validly done or taken.</p>
<p> </p>
<h5 dir="ltr">STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS</h5>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Correct identification of targeted beneficiaries for delivery of subsidies, services, frants, benefits, etc has become a challenge for the Government</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">This has proved to be a major hindrance for successful implementation of these programmes.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">In the absence of a credible system to authenticate identity of beneficiaries, it is difficult to ensure that the subsidies, benefits and services reach to intended beneficiaries.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The UIDAI was established to lay down policies and implement the Unique Identification Scheme of the Government, by which residents of India were to be provided unique identity number.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">Upon successful authentication, this number would serve as proof of identity for identification of beneficiaries for transfer of benefits, subsidies, services and other purposes.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">With increased use of the Aadhaar number, steps to ensure security of such information need to be taken and offences pertaining to certain unlawful actions, created.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">It has been felt that the processes of enrolment, authentication, security, confidentiality and use of Aadhaar related information must be made statutory.</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p dir="ltr">The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 seeks to provide for issuance of Aadhaar numbers to individuals on providing his demographic and biometric information to the UIDAI, requiring Aadhaar numbers for identifying an individual for delivery of benefits, subsidies, and services, authentication of the Aadhaar number, establishment of the UIDAI, maintenance and updating the information of individuals in the CIDR, state measures pertaining to security, privacy and confidentiality of information in possession or control of the UIDAI including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository and identify offences and penalties for contravention of relevant statutory provisions.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-new-aadhaar-bill-in-plain-english'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-new-aadhaar-bill-in-plain-english</a>
</p>
No publisherAmber Sinha, Vanya Rakesh and Vipul KharbandaUIDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAadhaarBiometrics2016-03-11T04:41:38ZBlog EntryAadhaar Bill fails to incorporate suggestions by the Standing Committee
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-fails-to-incorporate-suggestions-by-the-standing-committee
<b>In 2011, a standing committee report led by Yashwant Sinha had been scathing in its indictments of the Aadhaar BIll introduced by the UPA government. Five years later, the NDA government has introduced a new bill which is a rehash of the same. I look at the concerns raised by the committee report, none of which have been addressed by the new bill.
</b>
<p id="docs-internal-guid-0c1d0148-5959-8221-80f0-984c1f109411" dir="ltr">The article was published by <a class="external-link" href="http://thewire.in/2016/03/10/aadhaar-bill-fails-to-incorporate-standing-committees-suggestions-24433/">The Wire</a><a class="external-link" href="https://globalvoices.org/2016/02/09/a-good-day-for-the-internet-everywhere-india-bans-differential-data-pricing/"> </a>on March 10, 2016</p>
<p dir="ltr">In December, 2010, the UPA Government introduced the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 in the Parliament. It was subsequently referred to a Standing Committee on Finance by the Speaker of Lok Sabha under Rule 331E of the the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. This Committee, headed by BJP leader Yashwant Sinha took evidence from the Minister of Planning and the UIDAI from the government, as well as seeking the view of parties such as the National Human Rights Commission, Indian Banks Association and researchers like Dr Reetika Khera and Dr. Usha Ramanathan. In 2011, having heard from various parties and considering the concerns and apprehensions about the UID scheme, the Committee deemed the bill unacceptable and suggested a re-consideration of the the UID scheme as well as the draft legislation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Aadhaar programme has so far been implemented under the Unique Identification Authority of India, a Central Government agency created through an executive order. This programme has been shrouded in controversy over issues of privacy and security resulting in a Public Interest Litigation filed by Judge Puttaswamy in the Supreme Court. While the BJP had criticised the project as well as the draft legislation when it was in opposition, once it came to power and particularly, after it launched various welfare schemes like Digital India and Jan Dhan Yojna, it decided to continue with it and use Aadhaar as the identification technology for these projects. In the last year, there have been orders passed by the Supreme Court which prohibited making Aadhaar mandatory for availing services. One of the questions that the government has had to answer both inside and outside the court on the UID project is the lack of a legislative mandate for a project of this size. About five years later, the new BJP led government has come back with a rehash of the same old draft, and no comments made by the standing committee have been taken into account.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Standing Committee on the old bill had taken great exception to the continued collection of data and issuance of Aadhaar numbers, while the Bill was pending in the Parliament. The report said that the implementation of the provisions of the Bill and continuing to incur expenditure from the exchequer was a circumvention of the prerogative powers of the Parliament. However, the project has continued without abeyance since its inception in 2009. I am listing below some of the issues that the Committee identified with the UID project and draft legislation, none of which have been addressed in current Bill.</p>
<p dir="ltr">One of the primary arguments made by proponents of Aadhaar has been that it would be useful in providing services to marginalized sections of the society who currently do not have identification cards and consequently, are not able to receive state sponsored services, benefits and subsidies. The report points that the project would not be able to achieve this as no statistical data on the marginalized sections of the society are being used to by UIDAI to provide coverage to them. The introducer systems which was supposed to provide Aadhaar numbers to those without any form of identification, has been used to enroll only 0.03% of the total number of people registered. Further, the <a href="http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Committees/Biometrics_Standards_Committee_report.pdf">Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDAI</a> has itself acknowledged the issues caused due to a high number of manual laborers in India which would lead to sub-optimal fingerprint scans. A <a href="http://www.4gid.com/De-dup-complexity%20unique%20ID%20context.pdf">report by 4G Identity Solutions</a> estimates that while in any population, approximately 5% of the people have unreadable fingerprints, in India it could lead to a failure to enroll up to 15% of the population. In this manner, the project could actually end up excluding more people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Report also pointed to a lack of cost-benefit analysis done before going ahead with scheme of this scale. It makes a reference to the <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/684/1/identityreport.pdf">report</a> by the London School of Economics on the UK Identity Project which was shelved due to a) huge costs involved in the project, b) the complexity of the exercise and unavailability of reliable, safe and tested technology, c) risks to security and safety of registrants, d) security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and operational costs and e) extreme dangers to rights of registrants and public interest. The Committee Report insisted that such global experiences remained relevant to the UID project and need to be considered. However, the new Bill has not been drafted with a view to address any of these issues.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Committee comes down heavily on the irregularities in data collection by the UIDAI. They raise doubts about the ability of the Registrars to effectively verify the registrants and a lack of any security audit mechanisms that could identify issues in enrollment. Pointing to the news reports about irregularities in the process being followed by the Registrars appointed by the UIDAI, the Committee deems the MoUs signed between the UIDAI and the Registrars as toothless. The involvement of private parties has been under question already with many questions being raised over the lack of appropriate safeguards in the contracts with the private contractors.</p>
<span id="docs-internal-guid-0c1d0148-595b-32fa-49d2-8f6a347a4c00">Perhaps the most significant observation of the Committee was that any scheme that facilitates creation of such a massive database of personal information of the people of the country and its linkage with other databases should be preceded by a comprehensive data protection law. By stating this, the Committee has acknowledged that in the absence of a privacy law which governs the collection, use and storage of the personal data, the UID project will lead to abuse, surveillance and profiling of individuals. It makes a reference to the Privacy Bill which is still at only the draft stage. The current data protection framework in the Section 43A rules under the Information Technology Act, 2000 are woefully inadequate and far too limited in their scope. While there are some protection built into Chapter VI of the new bill, these are nowhere as comprehensive as the ones articulated in the Privacy Bill. Additionally, these protections are subject to broad exceptions which could significantly dilute their impact.</span>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-fails-to-incorporate-suggestions-by-the-standing-committee'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-fails-to-incorporate-suggestions-by-the-standing-committee</a>
</p>
No publisheramberUIDAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-03-10T15:58:57ZBlog EntryAadhaar Bill 2016 & NIAI Bill 2010 - Comparing the Texts
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-2016-niai-bill-2010-text-comparison
<b>This is a quick comparison of the texts of the Aadhaar Bill 2016 and the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010. The new sections in the former are highlighed, and the deleted sections (that were part of the latter) are struck out.</b>
<p> </p>
<iframe src="http://cis-india.github.io/aadhaar-bill-2016/" frameborder="0" height="500px" width="100%"> </iframe>
<p> </p>
<p>Source: <a href="http://cis-india.github.io/aadhaar-bill-2016/">http://cis-india.github.io/aadhaar-bill-2016/</a></p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-2016-niai-bill-2010-text-comparison'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-2016-niai-bill-2010-text-comparison</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroUIDAadhaarBig DataPrivacy2016-03-09T11:25:01ZBlog EntryA comparison of the 2016 Aadhaar Bill, and the 2010 NIDAI Bill
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-comparison-of-the-2016-aadhaar-bill-and-the-2010-nidai-bill
<b>This blog post does a clause-by-clause comparison of the provisions of National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 and the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016
</b>
<ul id="docs-internal-guid-400d9138-596b-bafd-2e9b-46f6530d6e51"><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Title</h3>
</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The Bill was titled as the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The Bill has been titled as the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Purpose/Object Clause</h3>
</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The purpose of Bill was stated to provide for the establishment of the National Identification Authority of India to issue identification numbers to residents of India as well as certain other classes of individuals , to facilitate access to benefits and services, to which they are entitled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The purpose of this Bill has been stated to ensure targeted delivery of subsidies, benefits and services to residents of India in an efficient and transparent manner by assigning unique identity numbers to such individuals.</p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Definitions</h3>
</li></ul>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Authentication” was defined as the process in which the Aadhaar number, along with other attributes (including biometrics) are submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for verification, done on the basis of information, data or documents available with the Repository.</p>
2016 Bill : “Authentication” has been defined as the process by which the Aadhaar number, along with demographic or biometric information of an individual is submitted to the Central Identities Data Repository for the purpose of verification, done on the basis of the correctness of (or lack of) information available with it.</li></ol>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Authentication Record” was not defined in the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Authentication Record” has been defined under clause 2(d) as the record of the time of authentication, the identity of the entity requesting such record and the response provided by the Authority for this purpose.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Authority” was defined under clause 2(d) as National Identification Authority of India established under provisions of the Bill. </p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> 2016 Bill :“Authority” has been defined under clause 2(e) as Unique Identification Authority of India established under provisions of the Bill.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> </p>
<ol start="4"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Benefit” was not defined in the previous Bill. </p>
2016 Bill : “Benefit” has been defined under clause 2(f) as any advantage, gift, reward, relief, or payment (either in cash or kind), or such other benefits, which is provided to an
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">individual/ a group of individuals as notified by the Central Government.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="5"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Biometric Information” was defined under clause 2(e) as a set of biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations.</p>
2016 Bill : “Biometric Information” has been defined under clause 2(g) as biological attributes of an individual like photograph, fingerprint, Iris scan, or other such biological
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">attributes as may be specified by regulations.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="6"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Core Biometric Information” was not defined in the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Core Biometric Information” has been defined under clause 2(j) as biological attribute of an individual like fingerprint, Iris scan, or such other biological attribute as
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">may be specified by regulations.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="7"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Demographic Information” was defined under clause 2(h) as information specified in the regulations for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number, like information relating to the name, age, gender and address of an individual (other than race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health), and such other information.</p>
2016 Bill : “Demographic Information” has been defined under clause 2(k) as information of an individual as may be specified by regulations for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number like information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information, excluding race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history of an individual.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="8"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Enrolling Agency” was defined under clause 2(i) as an agency appointed by the Authority or the Registrars for collecting information under the Act.</p>
2016 Bill : “Enrolling Agency” has been defined under clause 2(l) as an agency appointed by the Authority or a Registrar for collecting demographic and biometric information of individuals under this Act.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="9"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Member” was defined under clause 2(l) to include the Chairperson and a part-time Member of the Authority appointed under the provisions of the Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Member” has been defined under clause 2(o) to include the Chairperson and Member of the Authority appointed under the provisions of the Bill.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="10"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Records of Entitlement” was not defined under the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Records of Entitlement” has been defined under clause 2(r) as the records of benefits, subsidies or services provided to, or availed by, any individual under any programme.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="11"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Requesting Entity” was not defined under the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Requesting Entity” has been defined under clause 2(u) as an agency or person that submits information of an individual comprising of the Aadhaar number and</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">demographic or biometric information to the Central Identities Data Repository for the purpose of authentication.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="12"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Resident” was defined under clause 2(q) as an individual usually residing in a village, rural area, town, ward, demarcated area (demarcated by the Registrar General of Citizen Registration) within a ward in a town or urban area in India.</p>
2016 Bill : “Resident” has been defined under clause 2(v) as an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="13"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Review Committee” was defined under clause 2(r) as the Identification Review Committee constituted under the provisions of the Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Review Committee” has not been defined under the Bill.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="14"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Service” was not defined in the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Service” has been defined under clause 2 (w) as any provision, facility, utility or any other assistance provided in any form to an individual or a group of individuals as may be notified by the Central Government.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ol start="15"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: “Subsidy” was not defined in the previous Bill.</p>
2016 Bill : “Subsidy” has been defined under clause 2(x) as any form of aid, support, grant, subvention, or appropriation (either in cash or kind), as may be notified by the Central Government, given to an individual or a group of individuals.
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Enrolment</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Aadhaar Numbers</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Under clause 3(2) of the Bill, it is stated that at the time of enrolment, The enrolling agency shall inform the individual undergoing enrolment the following details:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(a) the manner in which the information so collected shall be used,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(b) the nature of recipients with whom the information is intended to be shared during authentication,and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(c) the existence of a right to access information, the procedure for making such requests for access, and details of the person/department in-charge to whom such requests can be</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">made.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Properties of Aadhaar Number </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill : Clause 4 (3) stated that subject to authentication, the Aadhaar number shall be accepted as a proof of identity of the Aadhaar number holder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 4 (3) states that subject to authentication, the Aadhaar number (either in physical or electronic form) shall be accepted as a proof of identity of the Aadhaar</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">number holder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The Explanation under this clause states that for the purpose of this provision, “electronic form” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in section 2 (1) (r) of the Information Technology Act, 2000.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Authentication</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Proof of Aadhaar number necessary for receipt of certain subsidies, benefits and services, etc. </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Under clause 7 of the Bill it is provided that for the purpose of establishing an individual's identity as a condition to receipt a a subsidy, benefit or service. the Central or State Government (as the case may be), require that such individual undergo authentication, or furnish proof of possession of Aadhaar number. In case the Aadhaar number has not been assigned to an individual, such individual must make an application for enrolment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The Proviso states that the individual shall be offered alternate and viable means of identification for delivery of the subsidy, benefit or service, in an Aadhaar number is not assigned to an individual.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Authentication of Aadhaar number </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 5 of the Bill stated that authentication of the Aadhaar number shall be performed by the Authority, in relation to the holders’ biometric and demographic information, subject to such conditions and on payment of the prescribed fees. Also, it was provided that the Authority shall respond to an authentication query with a positive, negative or other appropriate response (excluding any demographic and biometric information).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The Bill states that authentication of the Aadhaar number shall be performed by the Authority, in relation to the holders’ biometric and demographic information, subject to such conditions and on payment of the prescribed fees.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Clause 8 (2) provides that unless otherwise provided in the Act, the requesting entity shall— </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">For the purpose of authentication, obtain the consent of an individual before collecting his identity information, and</p>
</li><li style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">ensure that the identity information of an individual is only used for submission to the Central Identities Data Repository for authentication.</p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Clause 8 (3) provides that the following details shall be informed by the requesting entity to the individual submitting his identity information for the purpose of authentication: </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> a. the nature of information that may be shared upon authentication;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> b. the uses to which the information received during authentication may be put by the requesting entity; and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> c. alternatives to submission of identity information to the requesting entity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Clause 8(4) states that the Authority shall respond to an authentication query with a positive, negative or other appropriate response (excluding any core biometric information).</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Prohibition on requiring certain information. </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 9 of the Bill prohibited the Authority to make an individual give information pertaining to his race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : This provision has been removed from the 2016 Bill.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Unique Identification Authority Of India</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Establishment of Authority </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 11(1) of the Bill stated that the Central Government shall establish an Authority called as the National Identification Authority of India, to exercise the powers conferred on it and to perform the functions assigned to it under this Act. Also, clause 11(3) provided that the head office of the Authority shall be in the National Capital Region, referred to in section 2(f) of the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 11(1) of the Bill states that the Central Government shall establish an Authority called as the Unique Identification Authority of India, responsible for the processes of enrolment, authentication and perform such other functions assigned to it under this Act. Also, clause 11(3) provides that the head office of the Authority shall be in New Delhi.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Composition of Authority</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 12 provided that the Authority shall consist of a Chairperson and two part-time Members, to be appointed by the Central Government. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 12 of the Bill provides that the Authority shall consist of a Chairperson (appointed on part-time or full- time basis) , two part-time Members, and the chief executive officer (who shall be Member-Secretary of the Authority), to be appointed by the Central Government.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Qualifications for appointment of Chairperson and Members of Authority</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 13 provided that the Chairperson and Members of the Authority shall be persons of ability, integrity and outstanding calibre having experience and knowledge in the matters relating to technology, governance, law, development, economics, finance, management, public affairs or administration. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 13 provides that the Chairperson and Members of the Authority shall be persons of ability and integrity having experience and knowledge of at least ten years in matters relating to technology, governance, law, development, economics, finance, management, public affairs or administration.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="4"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Term of office and other conditions of service of Chairperson.</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Proviso to Clause 14 (1) stated that the Chairperson of the Unique Identification Authority of India, who would have been appointed before the commencement of this Act by notification A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I (Vol.II) dated the 2nd July, 2009, shall continue as a Chairperson of the Authority for the term for which he had been appointed. Clause 14(4) prohibited the Chairperson from holding any other office during the period of holding his office in the Authority. Proviso to clause 14 (5) stated the salary, allowances and the other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : These provisions have not been included in the Bill.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="5"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Removal of Chairperson and Members</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 15 (2) stated that unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard has been duly provided, the Chairperson or a Member shall not be removed under clauses (d) or (e) of sub-section (1).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 15 (2) stated that unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard has been duly provided, the Chairperson or a Member shall not be removed under clauses (b), (d) or (e) of sub-section (1).</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="6"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Restrictions on Chairperson or Members on employment after cessation of office</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 16 (a) provided that the Chairperson or a member, who ceases to hold office, shall not accept any employment in, or connected with the management or administration of, any person which has been associated with any work under the Act, for a period of three years from the date on which they cease to hold office, without previous approval of the Central Government. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The proviso to this clause stated that this provision shall not apply to any employment under the Central Government, State Government, local authority, any statutory authority or any corporation established by or under any Central, State or provincial Act or a Government Company, as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 195.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill: Clause 16 (a) provides that the Chairperson or a member, who ceases to hold office, shall not accept any employment in, or connected with the management of any organisation, company or any other entity which has been associated with any work done or contracted out by the Authority (whether directly or indirectly), during his tenure as Chairperson or Member, as the case may be, for a period of three years from the date on which he ceases to hold office, without previous approval of the Central Government. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The proviso to this clause stated that this provision shall not apply to any employment under the Central Government, State Government, local authority, any statutory authority or any corporation established by or under any Central, State or provincial Act or a Government Company, as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="7"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Functions of Chairperson</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 17 of the Bill provided that the Chairperson shall have powers of general superintendence, direction in the conduct of the affairs of the Authority, preside over the meetings of the Authority, and exercise and discharge such other powers and functions of the Authority as prescribed, without prejudice to any of the provisions of the Act. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 17 of the Bill states that the Chairperson shall preside over the meetings of the Authority, and exercise and discharge such other powers and functions of the Authority as prescribed, without prejudice to any of the provisions of the Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="8"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Chief Executive Officer</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 20 (1) of the Bill stated that a chief executive officer, not below the rank of the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, who shall be the Member-Secretary of the Authority,shall be appointed by the Central Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 18 (1) stated that a chief executive officer, not below the rank of the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, shall be appointed by the Central Government. In the list of its responsibilities, clause 18 (2) (e) additionally provides for performing such other functions, or exercising such other powers, as may be specified by regulations.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="9"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Meetings </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 18 (4) provided that all decisions of the Authority shall be authenticated by the signature of the Chairperson or any other Member who is authorised by the Authority for this purpose.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 19 (4) provided that all decisions of the Authority shall be signed by the Chairperson, any other Member or the Member-Secretary authorised by the Authority.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="10"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Vacancies, etc., not to invalidate proceedings of Authority</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 19 (b) of the Bill stated that No act or proceeding of the Authority shall be invalid merely by reason of any defect in the appointment of a person as a Member of the Authority</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 20 (b) of the Bill stated that No act or proceeding of the Authority shall be invalid merely by reason of any defect in the appointment of a person as Chairperson or Member of the Authority</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="11"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Powers and functions of Authority</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p> Clause 23 (2) (k)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 23 (2) (k) provided that the powers and functions of the Authority may include sharing the information of Aadhaar number holders, with their written consent, with such agencies engaged in delivery of public benefits and public services as the Authority may by order direct, in a manner as specified by regulations. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 23 (2) (k) provides that the powers and functions of the Authority may include sharing the information of Aadhaar number holders, subject to the provisions of this Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Clause 23 (2) (r) </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill : Clause 23 (2) (r) stated that the powers and functions of the Authority may include specifying, by regulation, the policies and practices for Registrars, enrolling agencies and other service providers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 23 (2) (r) states that the powers and functions of the Authority may include evolving of, and specifying, by regulation, the policies and practices for Registrars, enrolling agencies and other service providers.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Grants, Accounts and Audit and Annual Report</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 25 provided that the fees or revenue collected by the Authority shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and the entire amount so credited be transferred to the Authority.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 25 states that the fees or revenue collected by the Authority shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Identity Review Committee</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 28 of the Bill provided for establishment of the Identity Review Committee, consisting of three members (including the chairperson) who are persons of eminence, ability, integrity and having knowledge and experience in the fields of technology, law, administration and governance, social service, journalism, management or social sciences. Clause 29 of the Bill enlisted several functions to be undertaken by the Review Committee so constituted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill: These provisions have been removed from the Bill.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Protection of Information</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Security and confidentiality of information</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 30 (2) of the Bill stated that the Authority shall take measures (including security safeguards) to ensure security and protection of information in possession/control of the Authority (including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository), against any loss, unauthorised access, use or unauthorised disclosure of the same.</p>
<p>2016 Bill : Clause 28 (3) states that the Authority shall take measures to ensure security and protection of information in possession/control of the Authority (including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository), against access, use or disclosure not permitted under this Act or regulations made thereunder, and against accidental or intentional destruction, loss or damage.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">A new provision-clause 28(4)- states that the Authority shall undertake the following additional measures for protection of information:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(a) adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(b) ensure that the agencies, consultants, advisors or other persons appointed or engaged for performing any function of the Authority under this Act, have in place appropriate technical and organisational security measures for the information, and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(c) ensure that the agreements or arrangements entered into with such agencies, consultants, advisors or other persons, impose obligations equivalent to those imposed on the Authority under this Act, and require such agencies, consultants, advisors and other persons to act only on instructions from the Authority.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Restriction on sharing information </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The Bill did not provide for restrictions on sharing of information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill: This new provision under Clause 29 states that no core biometric information, collected or created under this Act, shall be—</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(a) shared with anyone for any reason whatsoever; or</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(b) used for any purpose other than generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication under this Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Also, the identity information, other than core biometric information, collected or created</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">under this Act may be shared only in accordance with the provisions of this Act as specified under Regulations.</p>
<p>Clause 29 (3) prohibits usage of identity information available with a requesting entity for any purpose, other than that specified to the individual at the time of submitting any identity information for authentication, or disclosed further, except with the prior consent of the individual to whom such information relates.</p>
<p>Clause 29 (4) prohibits publication, displaying or publicly posting of the Aadhaar number or core biometric information collected or created under this Act in respect of an Aadhaar number holder, except for the purposes as may prescribed in Law.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Biometric information deemed to be sensitive personal information.</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"> 2010 Bill: The Bill did not contain provisions stating that the biometric information shall be deemed to be sensitive personal information for the purpose of this Act. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill: Clause 30 states that the biometric information collected and stored in electronic form shall be deemed to be “electronic record” and “sensitive personal data or information”, and the provisions contained in the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the rules made thereunder shall apply to such information,to the extent not in derogation of the provisions of this Act.</p>
<p> The Explanation defines</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(a) “electronic form” - as defined under section 2 (1) (r) of the Information Technology Act, 2000,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(b) “electronic record” as defined under section 2 (1) (t) of the Information Technology Act, 2000</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(c)“sensitive personal data or information” - as defined under clause (iii) of the</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Explanation to section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="4"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Security and confidentiality of information</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 30 (2) of the Bill stated that the Authority shall take measures (including security safeguards) to ensure security and protection of information in possession/control of the Authority (including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository), against any loss, unauthorised access, use or unauthorised disclosure of the same.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 28 (3) states that the Authority shall take measures to ensure security and protection of information in possession/control of the Authority (including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository), against access, use or disclosure not permitted under this Act or regulations made thereunder, and against accidental or intentional destruction, loss or damage.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">A new provision-clause 28(4)- states that the Authority shall undertake the following additional measures for protection of information:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(a) adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(b) ensure that the agencies, consultants, advisors or other persons appointed or engaged for performing any function of the Authority under this Act, have in place appropriate technical and organisational security measures for the information, and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">(c) ensure that the agreements or arrangements entered into with such agencies, consultants, advisors or other persons, impose obligations equivalent to those imposed on the Authority under this Act, and require such agencies, consultants, advisors and other persons to act only on instructions from the Authority.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="5"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Alteration of demographic information or biometric information. </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 31 (4) prohibits alteration of identity information in the Central Identities Data Repository, except in the manner provided in this Act or regulations made thereof.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="6"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Access to own information and records of requests for authentication.</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 32 (3) provides that the Authority shall not collect, keep or maintain any information about the purpose of authentication, either by itself or through any entity under its control.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="7"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Disclosure of information in certain cases </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The provision creates an exception under Clause 33 for the purposes of disclosure of information in certain cases like disclosure (including identity information or details of authentication) made pursuant to an order of a competent court; or disclosure (including identity information) made in the interests of national security in pursuance of directions issued by an officer(s) not below the rank of Joint Secretary or equivalent in the Central Government specifically authorised in this behalf by an order of the Central Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The provision creates an exception under Clause 33 for the purposes of disclosure of information in certain cases like disclosure (including identity information or details of authentication) made pursuant to an order not inferior to that of a District Judge (provided that the court order shall be made only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Authority); or disclosure (including identity information or authentication records) made in the interests of national security in pursuance of directions issued by an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India, authorised in this behalf by an order of the Central Government.</p>
<p>The proviso to Clause 33 (2) states that every direction so issued shall be reviewed by an Oversight Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretaries to the Government of India in the Department of Legal Affairs and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology, before it takes effect.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">The second proviso states that any such direction so issued shall be valid for a period of three months from the date of its issue, which may be extended for a further period of three months after the review by the Oversight Committee.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Offences and Penalties</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Penalty for impersonation at time of enrolment. </strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The penalty for impersonation was prescribed under Clause 34 as imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The penalty for impersonation was prescribed under Clause 34 as imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or both.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Penalty for unauthorised access to the Central Identities Data Repository</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 38 (g) stated that any person not authorised by the Authority, provides any assistance to any person to do any of the acts mentioned under sub-clauses (a)-(f) shall be punishable. If anyone, who is not authorised by the Authority, performs any activity as listed under (a)-(i), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall be liable to a fine which shall not be less than one crore rupees.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 38 (g) stated that any person not authorised by the Authority, reveals any information in contravention of sub-section section 28 (5), or shares, uses or displays information in contravention of section 29 or assists any person in any of the acts mentioned under sub-clauses (a)-(f) shall be punishable. If anyone, who is not authorised by the Authority, performs any activity as listed under (a)-(i), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall be liable to a fine which shall not be less than ten lakh rupees. Additionally, the Explanation states that the expression “computer source code” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation to section 65 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Penalty for unauthorised use by requesting entity and noncompliance with intimation requirements</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 40 of the Bill prescribed penalty for manipulating biometric information and stated that a person who gives/attempts to give any biometric information which does not pertain to him for the purpose of getting an Aadhaar number, authentication or updating his information, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with a fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill: Clause 40 prescribes penalty for a person, being a requesting entity, uses the identity information of an individual in contravention of clause 8(3) , to be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with a fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees or, in the case of a company, with a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or with both. Clause 41 of the Bill states that Whoever, being an enrolling agency or a requesting entity, fails to comply with the requirements of clause 3(2)-list of details to be informed to the individual undergoing enrolment, and clause 8(3)-informing individual undergoing enrolment details for the purpose of authentication, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with a fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees or, in the case of a company, with a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or with both.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="4"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>General Penalty</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: For an offence committed under the Act or rules made thereunder, for which no specific penalty was provided, the penalty was prescribed as imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or fine as prescribed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : For an offence committed under the Act or rules made thereunder, for which no specific penalty was provided, the penalty was prescribed as imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or fine as prescribed.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Miscellaneous</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<ol><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Power of Central Government to supersede Authority.</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 47(1)(c) stated that if at any time the Central Government is of the opinion that such circumstances exist which render it necessary in the public interest to supersede the Authority, may do so in the manner prescribed under this provision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 48(1)(c) states that if at any time the Central Government is of the opinion that a public emergency exists, then the Central Government may supersede the Authority, in the manner prescribed under this provision.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="2"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Power to remove difficulties.</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The proviso to Clause 56(1) stated that an no order by Central Government, which may appear necessary to remove a difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, shall be made under this section after the expiry of two years from the commencement of this Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : The proviso to Clause 58(1) stated that an no order by Central Government, which may appear necessary to remove a difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, shall be made under this section after the expiry of three years from the commencement of this Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<ol start="3"><li style="list-style-type: decimal;" dir="ltr">
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr"><strong>Savings</strong></p>
</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: Clause 57 provided that any action taken by the Central Government under the Resolution of the Government of India, Planning Commission bearing notification number A-43011/02/ 2009-Admin.I, dated the 28th January, 2009, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2016 Bill : Clause 59 states that any action take by Central Government under the Resolution of the Government of India, Planning Commission bearing notification number A-43011/02/2009-Admin. I, dated the 28th January, 2009, or by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the Cabinet Secretariat Notification bearing notification number S.O. 2492(E), dated the 12th September, 2015, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been validly done or taken under this Act.</p>
<p> </p>
<ul><li style="list-style-type: disc;" dir="ltr">
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">Statement of Objects and Reasons</h3>
</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" dir="ltr">2010 Bill: The Bill stated that the Central Government decided to issues unique identification numbers to all residents in India, which involves collection of demographic, as well as biometric information. The Unique Identification Authority of India was constituted as an executive body by the Government, vide its notification dated the 28th January, 2009. The Bill addressed and enlisted several issues with the issuance of unique identification numbers which should be addressed by law and attract penalties, such as security and confidentiality of information, imposition of obligation of disclosure of information so collected in certain cases, impersonation at the time of enrolment, unauthorised access to the Central Identities Data Repository, manipulation of biometric information, investigation of certain acts constituting offence, and unauthorised disclosure of the information collected for the purposes of issuance of the numbers. To make the said Authority a statutory one, the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 was proposed to establish the National Identification Authority of India to issue identification numbers and authenticate the Aadhaar number to facilitate access to benefits and services to such individuals to which they are entitled and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.Apart from the above mentioned purposes, The National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 also seeks to provide for the Authority to exercise powers and discharge functions so prescribed , ensure that the Authority does not require any individual to give information pertaining to his race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health, may engage entities to establish and maintain the Central Identities Data Repository and to perform any other functions as may be specified by regulations, constitute the Identity Review Committee and take measures to ensure that the information in the possession or control of the Authority is secured and protected against any loss, unauthorised access or use or unauthorised disclosure thereof.</p>
<span id="docs-internal-guid-400d9138-596d-34f7-a004-875694b1e54e">2016 Bill: The Bill states that correct identification of targeted beneficiaries for delivery of subsidies, services, frants, benefits, etc has become a challenge for the Government and has proved to be a major hindrance for successful implementation of these programmes. In the absence of a credible system to authenticate identity of beneficiaries, it is difficult to ensure that the subsidies, benefits and services reach to intended beneficiaries. The Unique Identification Authority of India was established by a resolution of the Government of India, Planning Commission vide notification number A-43011/02/ 2009-Admin.I, dated the 28th January, 2009, to lay down policies and implement the Unique Identification Scheme of the Government, by which residents of India were to be provided unique identity number. Upon successful authentication, this number would serve as proof of identity for identification of beneficiaries for transfer of benefits, subsidies, services and other purposes. With increased use of the Aadhaar number, steps to ensure security of such information need to be taken and offences pertaining to certain unlawful actions, created. It has been felt that the processes of enrolment, authentication, security, confidentiality and use of Aadhaar related information must be made statutory. For this purpose, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 seeks to provide for issuance of Aadhaar numbers to individuals on providing his demographic and biometric information to the Unique Identification Authority of India, requiring Aadhaar numbers for identifying an individual for delivery of benefits, subsidies, and services, authentication of the Aadhaar number, establishment of the Unique Identification Authority of India, maintenance and updating the information of individuals in the Central Identities Data Repository, state measures pertaining to security, privacy and confidentiality of information in possession or control of the Authority including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository and identify offences and penalties for contravention of relevant statutory provisions.</span>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-comparison-of-the-2016-aadhaar-bill-and-the-2010-nidai-bill'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-comparison-of-the-2016-aadhaar-bill-and-the-2010-nidai-bill</a>
</p>
No publisherVanya RakeshAadhaarInternet GovernanceUID2016-03-09T04:08:01ZBlog EntryAadhaar: Still Too Many Problems
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-march-7-2016-pranesh-prakash-aadhaar-still-too-many-problems
<b>While one wishes to welcome govt’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/VSqpBps7Y5YrUhvS5mGgSO/Aadhaar-still-too-many-problems.html">published by Livemint </a>on March 7, 2016.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Aadhaar Bill has been introduced as a money bill, even though it doesn’t qualify as such under Article 110 of the Constitution. If the Speaker agrees to this, it will render the Rajya Sabha toothless in this matter, and will weaken our democracy. The government should reintroduce it as an ordinary legislative bill, which is what it is.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the government has in the past argued before the Supreme Court that Aadhaar is voluntary, Section 7 of the bill allows the government to mandate an Aadhaar number (or application for an Aadhaar number) as a prerequisite for obtaining some subsidies, benefits, services, etc. This undermines its arguments before the Supreme Court, which led the court to pass orders holding that Aadhaar should not be made mandatory. This move to make it mandatory will now need the government to argue that rather than contravene the apex court order, it has instead removed the rationale for it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Interestingly, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government seems to have done a U-turn on the issue of the unique identification number not being proof of citizenship or domicile. The previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government never meant the Aadhaar number to be proof of citizenship or domicile. This was attacked by the Yashwant Sinha-chaired standing committee on finance, which feared that illegal immigrants would get Aadhaar numbers. Now, the BJP and the NDA seem to be in agreement with the original UPA vision of Aadhaar.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Importantly, there is very strong language when it comes to the issue of privacy and confidentiality of the information that is held by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Section 29 (1), for instance, says that no biometric information will be shared for any reason whatsoever, or used for any purpose other than Aadhaar number generation and authentication. However, that provision is undermined wholly by Section 33, which says that “in the interest of national security”, the biometric info may be accessed if authorized by a joint secretary. This will only fan the fears of those who have argued that the real rationale for Aadhaar was not, in fact, delivery of services, but to create a national database of biometric data available to government snoops.</p>
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<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Also Read</h2>
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<h3><strong><a href="http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/HzYm3AxWjrs5BhbD7ghFMM/Pros-and-cons-of-Aadhaar-bill.html" target="_blank"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Pros and cons of Aadhaar bill</span></a></strong></h3>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, there are no remedies available for governmental abuse of this provision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Lastly, in terms of privacy, the concern of those people who have been opposing Aadhaar is not just that the biometric and other identity information may be leaked to private parties, but also that having a unique Aadhaar number helps private parties to combine and use other databases that are linked with Aadhaar numbers in a manner that is not within the subject’s control. This is not at all addressed in this bill, and we need a robust data protection law in order to do that.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are some other crucial details that the law doesn’t address: Is user consent, to be taken by third parties that use the UID database for authentication, needed for each instance of authentication, or would a general consent hold forever? How can consent be revoked?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There were many other objections that were raised against the Aadhaar scheme that have not been addressed by the government. For instance, in a recent article in the <i>Economic and Political Weekly</i>, Hans Varghese Mathews points out that going by the test data UIDAI made available in 2012, for a population of 1.3 billion people, the incidence of false positives—the probability of the identities of two people matching—is 1/112.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is far too high a ratio to be acceptable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Actual data from the field in Andhra Pradesh—of people who were unable to claim rations under the public distribution system (PDS)—paints a worse picture. A survey commissioned by the Andhra Pradesh government said 48% of respondents pointed to Aadhaar-related failures as the cause of their inability to claim rations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So, even if the Aadhaar numbers were no longer issued to Lord Hanuman (Rajasthan), to dogs (e.g., Tommy Singh, a mutt in Madhya Pradesh), and with photos of a tree (New Delhi), it might not prove to be usable in a country of India’s size, given the capabilities of the fingerprint machines. As my colleague Sunil Abraham notes, the law cannot fix technological flaws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So, while one wishes one could welcome the government’s attempt to bring Aadhaar within a legislative framework, the fact is there are too many problems that still remain unaddressed for one to be optimistic.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Pranesh Prakash is policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a think tank.</i></p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-march-7-2016-pranesh-prakash-aadhaar-still-too-many-problems'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-march-7-2016-pranesh-prakash-aadhaar-still-too-many-problems</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-04-06T15:31:32ZBlog EntryFlaws in the UIDAI Process
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-27-february-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-flaws-in-uidai-process
<b>The accuracy of biometric identification depends on the chance of a false positive: the probability that the identifiers of two persons will match. Individuals whose identifiers match might be termed duplicands. When very many people are to be identified success can be measured by the (low) proportion of duplicands. The Government of India is engaged upon biometrically identifying the entire population of India. An experiment performed at an early stage of the programme has allowed us to estimate the chance of a false positive: and from that to estimate the proportion of duplicands. For the current population of 1.2 billion the expected proportion of duplicands is 1/121, a ratio which is far too high. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was published in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/9/special-articles/flaws-uidai-process.html">Economic & Political Weekly</a>, Journal » Vol. 51, Issue No. 9, 27 Feb, 2016.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">A legal challenge is being mounted in the Supreme Court, currently, to the programme of biometric identification that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is engaged upon: an identification preliminary and a requisite to providing citizens with “Aadhaar numbers” that can serve them as “unique identifiers” in their transactions with the state. What follows will recount an assessment of their chances of success. We shall be using data that was available to the UIDAI and shall employ only elementary ways of calculation. It should be recorded immediately that an earlier technical paper by the author (Mathews 2013) has been of some use to the plaintiffs, and reference will be made to that in due course.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Aadhaar numbers themselves may or may not derive, in some way, from the biometrics in question; the question is not material here. For our purposes a biometric is a numerical representation of some organic feature: like the iris or the retina, for instance, or the inside of a finger, or the hand taken whole even. We shall consider them in some more detail later. The UIDAI is using fingerprints and iris images to generate a combination of biometrics for each individual. This paper bears on the accuracy of the composite biometric identifier. How well those composites will distinguish between individuals can be assessed, actually, using the results of an experiment conducted by the UIDAI itself in the very early stages of its operation; and our contention is that, from those results themselves, the UIDAI should have been able to estimate <i>how many individuals would have their biometric identifiers matching those of some other person</i>, under the best of circumstances even, when any good part of population has been identified.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/Flaws_in_the_UIDAI_Process_0.pdf">Read the full article here</a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>The author thanks Nico Temme of the Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica in The Netherlands for the bounds he derived on the chance of a false positive. He is particularly grateful to the anonymous referee of this journal who, through two rounds of comment, has very much improved the presentation of the results. A technical supplement to this paper is placed on the EPW website along with this paper</i>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-27-february-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-flaws-in-uidai-process'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-27-february-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-flaws-in-uidai-process</a>
</p>
No publisherhansUIDPrivacyInternet GovernanceFeaturedAadhaarHomepage2016-03-06T10:40:59ZBlog EntryComments by the Centre for Internet and Society on the Report of the Committee on Medium Term Path on Financial Inclusion
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-medium-term-path-on-financial-inclusion
<b>Apart from item-specific suggestions, CIS would like to make one broad comment with regard to the suggestions dealing with linking of Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts. Aadhaar is increasingly being used by the government in various departments as a means to prevent fraud, however there is a serious dearth of evidence to suggest that Aadhaar linkage actually prevents leakages in government schemes. The same argument would be applicable when Aadhaar numbers are sought to be utilized to prevent leakages in the banking sector.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-governmental organization which undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the course of its work CIS has also extensively researched and witten about the Aadhaar Scheme of the Government of India, specially from a privacy and technical point of view. CIS was part of the Group of Experts on Privacy constituted by the Planning Commission under the chairmanship of Justice AP Shah Committee and was instrumental in drafting a major part of the report of the Group. In this background CIS would like to mention that it is neither an expert on banking policy in general nor wishes to comment upon the purely banking related recommendations of the Committee. We would like to limit our recommendations to the areas in which we have some expertise and would therefore be commenting only on certain Recommendations of the Committee.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Before giving our individual comments on the relevant recommendations, CIS would like to make one broad comment with regard to the suggestions dealing with linking of Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts. Aadhaar is increasingly being used by the government in various departments as a means to prevent fraud, however there is a serious dearth of evidence to suggest that Aadhaar linkage actually prevents leakages in government schemes. The same argument would be applicable when Aadhaar numbers are sought to be utilized to prevent leakages in the banking sector.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another problem with linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers, even if it is not mandatory, is that when the RBI issues an advisory to (optionally) link Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts, a number of banks may implement the advisory too strictly and refuse service to customers (especially marginal customers) whose bank accounts are not linked to their Aadhaar numbers, perhaps due to technical problems in the registration procedure, thereby denying those individuals access to the banking sector, which is contrary to the aims and objectives of the Committee and the stated policy of the RBI to improve access to banking.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Individual Comments</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 1.4 - Given the predominance of individual account holdings, the Committee recommends that a unique biometric identifier such as Aadhaar should be linked to each individual credit account and the information shared with credit information companies. This will not only be useful in identifying multiple accounts, but will also help in mitigating the overall indebtedness of individuals who are often lured into multiple borrowings without being aware of its consequences.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: The discussion of the committee before making this recommendation revolves around the total incidence of indebtedness in rural areas and their Debt-to-Asset ratio representing payment capacity. However, the committee has not discussed any evidence which indicates that borrowing from multiple banks leads to greater indebtedness for individual account holders in the rural sector. Without identifying the problem through evidence the Committee has suggested linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers as a solution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 2.2 - On the basis of cross-country evidence and our own experience, the Committee is of the view that to translate financial access into enhanced convenience and usage, there is a need for better utilization of the mobile banking facility and the maximum possible G2P payments, which would necessitate greater engagement by the government in the financial inclusion drive.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: The drafting of the recommendation suggests that RBI is batting for the DBT rather than the subsidy model. However an examination of the discussion in the report suggests that all that the Committee has not discussed or examined the subsidy model vis-à-vis the direct benefit transfer (DBT) model here (though it does recommend DBT in the chapter on G-2-P payments), but only is trying to say is that where government to people money transfer has to take place, it should take place using mobile banking, payment wallets or other such technologies, which have been known to be successful in various countries across the world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 3.1 - The Committee recommends that in order to increase formal credit supply to all agrarian segments, the digitization of land records should be taken up by the states on a priority basis.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 3.2 - In order to ensure actual credit supply to the agricultural sector, the Committee recommends the introduction of Aadhaar-linked mechanism for Credit Eligibility Certificates. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the revenue authorities issue Credit Eligibility Certificates to Tenant Farmers (under ‘Andhra Pradesh Land Licensed Cultivators Act No 18 of 2011'). Such tenancy /lease certificates, while protecting the owner’s rights, would enable landless cultivators to obtain loans. The Reserve Bank may accordingly modify its regulatory guidelines to banks to directly lend to tenants / lessees against such credit eligibility certificates.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: The Committee in its discussion before the recommendation 3.2 has discussed the problems faced by landless farmers, however there is no discussion or evidence which suggests that an Aadhaar linked Credit Eligibility Certificate is the best solution, or even a solution to the problem. The concern being expressed here is not with the system of a Credit Eligibility Certificate, but with the insistence on linking it to an Aadhaar number, and whether the system can be put in place without linking the same to an Aadhaar number.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 6.11 - Keeping in view the indebtedness and rising delinquency, the Committee is of the view that the credit history of all SHG members would need to be created, linking it to individual Aadhaar numbers. This will ensure credit discipline and will also provide comfort to banks.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: There is no discussion in the Report on the reasons for increase in indebtedness of SHGs. While the recommendation of creating credit histories for SHGs is laudable and very welcome, however there is no logical reason that has been brought out in the Report as to why the same needs to be linked to individual Aadhaar numbers and how such linkage will solve any problems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 6.13 - The Committee recommends that bank credit to MFIs should be encouraged. The MFIs must provide credit information on their borrowers to credit bureaus through Aadhaar-linked unique identification of individual borrowers.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: Since the discussion before this recommendation clearly indicates multiple lending practices as one of the problems in the Microfinance sector and also suggests better credit information of borrowers as a possible solution, therefore this recommendation per se, seems sound. However, we would still like to point out that the RBI may think of alternative means to get borrower credit history rather than relying upon just the Aadhaar numbers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 7.3 - Considering the widespread availability of mobile phones across the country, the Committee recommends the use of application-based mobiles as PoS for creating necessary infrastructure to support the large number of new accounts and cards issued under the PMJDY. Initially, the FIF can be used to subsidize the associated costs. This will also help to address the issue of low availability of PoS compared to the number of merchant outlets in the country. Banks should encourage merchants across geographies to adopt such applicationbased mobile as a PoS through some focused education and PoS deployment drives.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 7.5 - The Committee recommends that the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) should ensure faster development of a multi-lingual mobile application for customers who use non-smart phones, especially for users of NUUP; this will address the issue of linguistic diversity and thereby promote its popularization and quick adoption.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 7.8 - The Committee recommends that pre-paid payment instrument (PPI) interoperability may be allowed for non-banks to facilitate ease of access to customers and promote wider spread of PPIs across the country. It should however require non-bank PPI operators to enhance their customer grievance redressal mechanism to deal with any issues thereof.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 7.9 - The Committee is of the view that for non-bank PPIs, a small-value cashout may be permitted to incentivize usage with the necessary safeguards including adequate KYC and velocity checks.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comments</strong>: While CIS supports the effort to use technology and mobile phones to increase banking penetration and improve access to the formal financial sector for rural and semi-rural areas, sufficient security mechanisms should be put in place while rolling out these services keeping in mind the low levels of education and technical sophistication that are prevalent in rural and semi-rural areas.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 8.1 - The Committee recommends that the deposit accounts of beneficiaries of government social payments, preferably all deposits accounts across banks, including the ‘inprinciple’ licensed payments banks and small finance banks, be seeded with Aadhaar in a timebound manner so as to create the necessary eco-system for cash transfer. This could be complemented with the necessary changes in the business correspondent (BC) system (see Chapter 6 for details) and increased adoption of mobile wallets to bridge the ‘last mile’ of service delivery in a cost-efficient manner at the convenience of the common person. This would also result in significant cost reductions for the government besides promoting financial inclusion.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: While the report of the Committee has already given several examples of how cash transfer directly into the bank accounts (rather than requiring the beneficiaries to be at a particular place at a particular time) could be more efficient as well as economical, the Committee is making the same point again here under the chapter that deals specifically with government to person payments. However even before this recommendation, there has been no discussion as to the need for linking or “seeding” the deposit accounts of the beneficiaries with Aadhaar numbers, let alone a discussion of how it would solve any problems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>Recommendation 10.6 - Given the focus on technology and the increasing number of customer complaints relating to debit/credit cards, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) may be invited to SLBC meetings. They may particularly take up issues of Aadhaar-linkage in bank and payment accounts.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>CIS Comment</strong>: There is no discussion on why this recommendation has been made, more particularly; there is no discussion at all on why issues of Aadhaar linkage in bank and payment accounts need to be taken up at all.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-medium-term-path-on-financial-inclusion'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-medium-term-path-on-financial-inclusion</a>
</p>
No publishervipulPrivacyInternet GovernanceFeaturedFinancial InclusionAadhaarHomepage2016-03-01T13:53:38ZBlog EntryReply to RTI Application under RTI Act of 2005 from Vanya Rakesh
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reply-to-rti-application-under-rti-act-of-2005-from-vanya-rakesh
<b>Unique Identification Authority of India replied to the RTI application filed by Vanya Rakesh. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Madam,</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Please refer to your RTI application dated 3.12.2015 received in the Division on 10.12.2015 on the subject mentioned above requesting to provide the information in electronic form via the email address vanya@cis-india.org, copies of the artwork in print media released by UIDAI to create awareness about use of Aadhaar not being mandatory.</li>
<li>I am directed to furnish herewith in electronic form, copy of the artwork in print media released / published in the epapers edition of the Times of India and Dainik Jagran in their respective editions of dated 29.8.2015 in a soft copy, about obtaining of Aadhaar not being mandatory for a citizen, as desired.</li>
<li>In case, you want to go for an appeal in connection with the information provided, you may appeal to the Appellate Authority indicated below within thirty days from the date of receipt of this letter.<br />Shri Harish Lal Verma,<br />Deputy Director (Media),<br />Unique Identification Authority of India<br />3nd Floor, Tower – II, Jeevan Bharati Building,<br />New Delhi – 110001.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><br />Yours faithfully,<br /><br />(T Gou Khangin)<br />Section Officer & CPIO Media Division<br /><br />Copy for information to: Deputy Director (Establishment) & Nodal CPIO</p>
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<p>Below scanned copies:</p>
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<th>RTI Reply</th>
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<td><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/RTIReplytoSh.VanyaRakesh.jpg" alt="RTI Reply" class="image-inline" title="RTI Reply" /></td>
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<table class="plain">
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<th>Coverage in Dainik Jagran<br /></th>
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<td><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/DainikJagran29.08.2015.png" alt="Dainik Jagran" class="image-inline" title="Dainik Jagran" /></td>
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<p><b><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uid-ad" class="internal-link">Download the coverage in the Times of India here</a></b>. Read the earlier blog entry <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-regarding-the-uidai">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reply-to-rti-application-under-rti-act-of-2005-from-vanya-rakesh'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reply-to-rti-application-under-rti-act-of-2005-from-vanya-rakesh</a>
</p>
No publishervanyaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2016-01-13T02:40:57ZBlog EntrySupreme Court provides partial relief for Aadhaar
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-october-15-2015-apurva-vishwanath-saurabh-kumar-supreme-court-provides-partial-relief-for-aadhaar
<b>In a small but significant win for the government, the Supreme Court on Thursday allowed the use of the Aadhaar number for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, pensions by central and state governments, and the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, in addition to its current use in the public distribution system (PDS) and the distribution of cooking gas and kerosene.</b>
<p>The article by Apurva Vishwanath and Saurabh Kumar was published in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Politics/XoXAlzO9SeGqB15LvBj0yN/SC-extends-voluntary-use-of-Aadhaar-for-govt-schemes.html">Livemint </a>on October 15, 2015. Sunil Abraham was quoted.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an interim order on 11 August, the apex court had restricted the use of Aadhaar, the unique identity number, to the PDS and the distribution of cooking gas and kerosene.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Subsequently, several state governments, government departments and regulatory agencies put up a joint defence seeking a modification of the interim order. They included the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Securities and Exchange Board of India and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, the governments of Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan, and industry body Indian Banks’ Association, along with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the issuer of Aadhaar.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A five-judge constitutional bench comprising Chief Justice H.L Dattu and justices M.Y Eqbal, C. Nagappan, Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy said in an order on Thursday: “We are of the opinion that in para 3 of the interim order, we can include schemes like MGNREGS, pensions by state and central government, Jan Dhan Yojana and Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme along with PDS and LPG (liquefied petroleum gas).”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Para 3 of the 11 August interim order had allowed the voluntary use of Aadhaar only for direct benefit transfer in foodgrain, kerosene and cooking gas schemes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The court’s interim order threw an element of uncertainty around flagship government programmes such as biometric attendance for government employees; the Jan Dhan Yojana, the Prime Minister’s ambitious financial inclusion initiative; digital certificates, and pension payments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It also threatened to derail India’s progress towards a cashless economy where payments banks are expected to play an important role.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All of these depend on linking accounts to individuals electronically, and are dependent on the Aadhaar number.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“The government was able to convince the court on the utility of Aadhaar which is critical to provide services to the most vulnerable section of the society,” said a government official who spoke on condition of anonymity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The apex court, however, did not allow the use of Aadhaar for the e-know-your-customer (e-KYC) specifically, which would have helped banks, including payments banks, to enrol new customers and telecom operators for issuing SIM cards. However, it is noteworthy that while obtaining bank accounts under the Jan Dhan scheme, banks use e-KYC. The clarification that RBI sought from the court, on whether the Aadhaar number can be used as proof of identification to open a bank account, still remains uncertain.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This will affect banks, mutual funds and companies that have won in-principle payments bank licences such as Airtel M Commerce Services Ltd (from the stable of Bharti Airtel Ltd, which had a customer base of 231.6 million as of July) and Vodafone m-pesa Ltd (a part of Vodafone India Ltd, which had a customer base of 185.4 million as of July).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The licensees also include the department of posts, which has 155,015 post offices across the country, of which 139,144 are in rural areas. The sheer reach of these entities is unrivalled. These entities hope to ride on the technology platform to reach customers, and e-KYC is critical to the process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“The reason why the court has allowed use of Aadhaar for Jan Dhan Yojana and not other banking services is perhaps because the government made a humanitarian argument that the poorest will be able to avail banking services. It is, however, a technologically flawed argument, deeply so,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bengaluru-based research organization Centre for Internet and Society.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The bench ordered the Union government to follow all earlier interim orders issued by the Supreme Court starting September 2013. Some of these orders include restrain on sharing of biometrics and keeping Aadhaar voluntary.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As of now, 920 million Indian citizens have been allotted Aadhaar numbers. The interim stay was affecting beneficiaries of the MGNREGS (91.7 million), pensioners (27.1 million) and recipients of scholarships (25.7 million), among others, according to data from the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Till now, 187 million bank accounts have been opened under the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The apex court made the interim ruling in an ongoing hearing where several pleas related to Aadhaar were clubbed together. Some relate to Aadhaar numbers being made mandatory to enable people to avail of certain government benefits and services. Others deal with the number being a violation of privacy, especially in the absence of any backing regulation or oversight, and yet others deal with possible misuse of the information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, the constitution bench had clarified on Wednesday that only pleas seeking clarification and modification of the interim order will be decided, and the issue concerning the right to privacy will be heard subsequently by another constitution bench.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I am very disappointed with the court’s order. The government claims that Aadhaar is voluntary, but actually it will not be till it is delinked from all government schemes. This way, people who do have Aadhaar are excluded and will have to run from pillar to post to receive benefits if they do not have the number,” said Kamayani Bali Mahabal, a Mumbai-based lawyer, human rights activist and a petitioner in the UIDAI case. She added that the order may increase the incidents of fake Aadhaar numbers as ineligible people choose to gain from all schemes, depriving the poor and aged of real benefits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The attorney general, Mukul Rohatgi, on Wednesday assured the court that the government has issued advertisements in over 20 languages that Aadhaar is a voluntary scheme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 Wednesday, <i>PTI </i>reported that a Right to Information application has showed that the UIDAI has identified more than 25,000 duplicate Aadhaar numbers till August.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mathew Thomas, one of the petitioners challenging the use and validity of the Aadhaar scheme, also expressed disappointment at the court’s ruling today. “Aadhaar is a case of great importance to the billion citizens of India. It is unfortunate that the constitution bench spent only a few hours in hearing the issues,” he said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Supreme Court will appoint a larger bench of at least nine judges to hear the privacy issue. The court in 1954, in the case of M.P. Sharma vs Satish Chandra, ruled that the right to privacy was not a fundamental right recognized by the Constitution. This case was decided by an eight-judge bench of the apex court, and only a bench of equal or larger strength will be able to override that decision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Chief Justice in the order on Thursday said that the larger bench, with nine or 11 judges, will be constituted at the earliest to hear the matter on Aadhaar potentially violating privacy and other intervening applications.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The petitioners have argued that UIDAI was approved only by an empowered group of ministers during the United Progressive Alliance tenure and has no statutory authority to collect biometrics of residents. Senior counsel for the petitioners, Shyam Divan, said: “The only law in India which allows the government to collect fingerprints is the Prisoner’s Act of 1920, which is a colonial enactment.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The UIDAI does not have any legislative backing and was constituted by notification in 2009 by the erstwhile Planning Commission. Divan, however, said that the Planning Commission notification has no effect since the body itself has ceased to exist, and added that the centre is not introducing a legislation empowering the Aadhaar scheme as it realizes the vulnerability of the entire exercise.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The National Identification Authority of India Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha in 2010.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2012, the centre was mulling a privacy law that could be enacted to support the UIDAI scheme and, in connection, the Planning Commission then formed an expert committee on privacy under A.P Shah, a former chairperson of the Law Commission.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-october-15-2015-apurva-vishwanath-saurabh-kumar-supreme-court-provides-partial-relief-for-aadhaar'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-october-15-2015-apurva-vishwanath-saurabh-kumar-supreme-court-provides-partial-relief-for-aadhaar</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2015-10-18T05:01:49ZNews ItemStudying the Emerging Database State in India: Notes for Critical Data Studies (Accepted Abstract)
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract
<b>"Critical Data Studies (CDS) is a growing field of research that focuses on the unique theoretical, ethical, and epistemological challenges posed by 'Big Data.' Rather than treat Big Data as a scientifically empirical, and therefore largely neutral phenomena, CDS advocates the view that data should be seen as always-already constituted within wider data assemblages." The Big Data and Society journal has provisionally accepted a paper abstract of mine for its upcoming special issue on Critical Data Studies.</b>
<p> </p>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Through the last decade, the Government of India has given shape to an digital identification infrastructure, developed and operated by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The infrastructure combines the task of assigning unique identification numbers, called Aadhaar numbers, to individuals submitting their biometric and demographic details, and the task of authenticating their identity when provided with an Aadhaar number and associated data (biometric data, One Time Pin sent to the pre-declared mobile number, etc.). The aim of UIDAI is to provide universal authentication-as-a-service for all residents of India who approach any public or private agencies for any kind of service or transaction. Simultaneously, the Aadhaar numbers will function as unique identifiers for joining up databases of different government agencies, and hence allow the Indian government to undertake big data analytics at a governmental scale, and not only at a departmental one.</p>
<p>In this paper, I am primarily motivated by the challenge of finding points and objects to enter into a critical study of such an in-progress data infrastructure. As I proceed with an understanding that data is produced within its specific social and material context, the question then is to read through the data to reflect on its possible social and material context. This is complicated when approaching a big data infrastructure that is meant to produce data for explicitly intra-governmental consumption and circulation. The problem then is not one of reading through available big data, but one of reading through the assemblage and imaginaries of big data to reflect on the kind of data it will give rise to, and thus on the politics of the data assemblage and the database state it enables.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Logic of the Database State</h2>
<p>Application of data to inform governmental acts have taken place at least since government has been understood as responsible for the welfare of the population and the territory. The measurement of the population and the territory – the number of people, their demographic features, amounts and locations of natural resources, and so on – have always been integral to the functioning of the modern nation-state. Database state is used in this paper to identify a particular mode of mobilisation of data within governmental acts, which is fundamentally shaped by the possibilities of big data extraction, appropriation, and analytics pioneered by a range of companies since late 1990s. The reason for not using big data state but database dtate is that big data refers to a body of technologies emerging in response to a set of data management and analysis challenges situated in a certain moment of development of information technologies, whereas database refers to a symbolic form (Manovich 1999): a form in which not only the population is made visible to the government (as a collection of visual, textual, numeric, and other forms of records), but also how the acts of government are made visible to the population (as a collection of performance indicators, budget allocation and utilisation tables, and other data visualised through dashboards, analog and digital).</p>
<p>The data production and management logic of this database state is specifically inspired by the notion of platform introduced by the so-called Web 2.0 companies: providing a common service layer upon which various other applications may also run, but under specific arrangements (including distribution of generated user data) with the original common layer provider. Data assemblages of the database state are expected to enable the government to function as a platform, as an intensely data-driven layer that widely gathers data about population individuals and feeds it back selectively to various providers of public and private services. This transforms the data assemblage from one vertical of governmental activities to a horizontal critical infrastructure for modularisation of governmental activities.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Studying the Emerging Database State in India</h2>
<p>Government of India is presently debating the legal and technical validity of the digital identity infrastructure programme in the Supreme Court, while simultaneously carrying out the enrollment drive for the same, linking up assignment of unique identity numbers with a national drive for population registration, and rolling out citizen-facing services and applications that implement the Aadhaar number as a necessary key to access them. With the enrollment process going on and the integration with various governmental processes (termed seeding by Aadhaar policy literature) just beginning, I enter this study through two key sets of objects reflecting the imaginaries and the technical specifications of the emerging database state in India. The first entry point is through the various official documents of vision, intentions, plans, and reconsiderations, and the second entry point is through the Application Programming Interface (API) documentations published by UIDAI to specify how its identity authentication platform will collaborate with various public and private services.</p>
<p>The first section of the paper provides a brief survey of pre-UIDAI attempts by the Government of India to deploy unique identification numbers and Smart Cards for specific population groups, so as to understand the initial conceptualisation of this data assemblage of a digital identification platform. The second section foregrounds how this platform undertakes a transformation of the components and relations of the pre-existing data assemblage of the Government of India, as articulated in various official documents of promised utility and proposed collaborations. The third section studies the API documentations to track how such imaginaries are materially interpreted and operationalised through the design of protocols of data interactions with various public and private agencies offering services utilising the identity authentication platform.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Notes for Critical Data Studies</h2>
<p>Expanding the early agenda note on Critical Data Studies by Craig Dalton and Jim Thatcher (2014), Rob Kitchin and Tracey P. Lauriault have taken steps towards emphasising the responsibility of this nebulous research strategy to chart and unpack the data assemblages (2014). This is exactly what I propose to do in this paper. While Kitchin and Lauriault provide a detailed list of the components of the apparatus of a data assemblage (2014: 7), I find the concepts of infrastructural components and infrastructural relations very useful in thinking through the emerging infrastructure of authentication. Thus, my approach to these tasks of charting and unpacking is focused on the infrastructural relations that the digital identity infrastructure re-configures, instead of the infrastructural components it mobilises (Bowker et al 2010). This tactical choice of focusing on the infrastructural relations is also necessitated by the practical difficulty in having comprehensive access to the individual components of the data assemblage concerned. Addressing questions of causality and quality becomes difficult when studying the assemblage sans the produced data, and rigorously analysing concerns of security and uncertainty pre-requires an actually existing data assemblage, with a public interface to investigating its leakages, breakages, and internal functioning. In the absence of such points of entry into the data assemblage, which I fear may not be an exceptional case, I attempt an inverted reading. Turning the data infrastructure inside out, in this paper I describe how the digital identity platform is critically reshaping the basis of governmental acts in India, through a specific model of production, extraction and application of big data.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Bibliography</h2>
<p>Bowker, Geoffrey C., Karen Baker, Florence Millerand, & David Ribes. 2010. Toward Information Infrastructure Studies: Ways of Knowing in a Networked Environment. Jeremy Hunsinger, Lisbeth Klastrup, & Matthew Allen (Eds.) International Handbook of Internet Research. Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York. Pp. 97-117.</p>
<p>Dalton, Craig, & Jim Thatcher. 2014. What does a Critical Data Studies Look Like, and Why do We Care? Seven Points for a Critical Approach to ‘Big Data.’ Society and Space. May 19. Accessed on July 08, 2015, from <a href="http://societyandspace.com/material/commentaries/craig-dalton-and-jim-thatcher-what-does-a-critical-data-studies-look-like-and-why-do-we-care-seven-points-for-a-critical-approach-to-big-data/" target="_blank">http://societyandspace.com/material/commentaries/craig-dalton-and-jim-thatcher-what-does-a-critical-data-studies-look-like-and-why-do-we-care-seven-points-for-a-critical-approach-to-big-data/</a>.</p>
<p>Kitchin, Rob, & Tracey P. Lauriault. 2014. Towards Critical Data Studies: Charting and Unpacking Data Assemblages and their Work. The Programmable City Working Paper 2. July 29. National University of Ireland Maynooth, Ireland. Accessed on July 08, 2015 from <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474112" target="_blank">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474112</a>.</p>
<p>Manovich, Lev. 1999. Database as Symbolic Form. Convergence. Volume 5, Number 2. Pp. 80-99.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>Note: Call for Papers for the special issue can found here: <a href="http://bigdatasoc.blogspot.in/2015/06/call-for-proposals-special-theme-on.html" target="_blank">http://bigdatasoc.blogspot.in/2015/06/call-for-proposals-special-theme-on.html</a>.</em></p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/studying-the-emerging-database-state-in-india-accepted-abstract</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroBig DataData SystemsResearchFeaturedAadhaarResearchers at WorkE-Governance2015-11-13T05:54:53ZBlog EntryAadhaar Number vs the Social Security Number
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-vs-social-security-number
<b>This blog calls out the differences between the Aadhaar Number and the Social Security Number </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In response to news items that reported the Government of India running pilot projects to enroll children at the time of birth for Aadhaar numbers - an idea that government officials in the news items claimed was along the lines of the social security number - this note seeks to point out the ways in which the Aadhaar number and the social security number are different.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Governance</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN is governed by Federal legislation: </b> The issuance, collection, and use of the SSN is governed by a number of Federal and State legislation with the most pertinent being the Social Security Act 1935<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> - which provides legal backing for the number, and the Privacy Act 1974 which regulates the collection, access, and sharing of the SSN by Federal Executive agencies.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar was constituted under the Planning Commission: </b> The UIDAI was constituted as an attached office under the Planning Commission in 2009.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> A Unique Identification Authority Bill has been drafted, but has not been enacted.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> Though portions of the Information Technology Act 2008 apply to the UID scheme, section 43A and associated Rules (India's data protection standards) do not clearly apply to the UIDAI as the provision has jurisdiction only over body corporate.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Purpose<b> </b></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN was created as a number record keeping scheme for government services: </b> The Social Security Act provides for the creation of a record keeping scheme - the SSN. Originally, the SSN was used as a means to track an individuals earnings in the Social Security system.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> In 1943 via an executive order, the number was adopted across Federal agencies. Eventually the number has evolved from being a record keeping scheme into a means of identity. In 1977 it was clarified by the Carter administration that the number could act as a means to validate the status of an individual (for example if he or she could legally work in the country) but that it was not to serve as a national identity document.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> Today the SSN serves as a number for tracking individuals in the social security system and as one (among other) form of identification for different services and businesses. Alone, the SSN card does not serve proof of identity, citizenship, and it cannot be used to transact with and does not have the ability to store information. <a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar was created as a biometric based authenticator and a single unique proof of identity:</b> The Aadhaar number was established as a single proof of identity and address for any resident in India that can be used to authenticate the identity of an individual in transactions with organizations that have adopted the number. The scheme as been promoted as a tool for reducing fraud in the public distribution system and enabling the government to better deliver public benefits.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Applicability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN is for citizens and non-citizens authorized to work: </b> The social security number is primarily for citizens of the United States of America. In certain cases, non citizens who have been authorized by the Department of Homeland Security to work in the US may obtain a Social Security number.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar is for residents: </b> The aadhaar number is available to any resident of India.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span> </span></b></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Storage, Access, and Disclosure</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN and applications are stored in the Numident:</b> The numident is a centralized database containing the individuals original SNN and application and any re-application for the same. All information stored in the Numident is protected under the Privacy Act. Individuals may request records of their own personal information stored in the Numident. With the exception of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, third parties may only request access to Numident records with the consent of the concerned individual.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> Federal agencies and private entities that collect the SSN for a specific service store the number at the organizational level. The Privacy Act and various state level legislation regulates the disclosure, access, and sharing of the SSN number collected by agencies and organizations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span> </span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar and data generated at multiple sources is stored in the CIDR and processed in the data warehouse: </b> According to the report "Analytics, Empowering Operations", <i> "At UIDAI, data generated at multiple sources would typically come to the CIDR (Central ID Repository), UIDAIs Data centre, through an online mechanism. There could be certain exceptional sources, like Contact centre or Resident consumer surveys, that will not feed into the Data center directly. Data is then processed in the Data Warehouse using Business Intelligence tools and converted into forms that can be accessed and shared easily." </i> Examples of data that is stored in the CIDR include enrollments, letter delivery, authentication, processing, resident survey, training, and data from contact centres.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> It is unclear if organizations that authenticate individuals via the Adhaar number store the number at the organizational level. Biometrics are listed as a form of sensitive personal information in the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) 2011, thus if any body corporate collects biometrics with the Aadhaar number - the storage, access, and disclosure of this information would be protected as per the Rules, but the Aadhaar number is not explicitly protected. <a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Use by public and private entities</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Public and private entities can request SSN: </b> Public and private entities can request the SSN to track individuals in a system or as a form of identifying an individual. Any private business is allowed to request and use the SSN as long as the use does not violate federal or state law. Legally, an individual is only required to provide their SSN to a business if they are engaging in a transaction that requires notification to the Internal Revenue Service or the individual is initiating a transaction that is subject to federal Customer Identification Program rules.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> Thus, an individual can refuse to provide their SSN, but a private business can also refuse to provide a service.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Any public authority requesting the SSN must provide a disclosure notice to the individual explaining if the provision of SSN is required or optional. According to the Privacy Act of 1974, no individual can be denied a government service or benefit for not providing the SSN unless Federal law specifically requires the number for a particular service.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> Thus, there are a number of Federal legislation in the U.S that specifically require the SSN. For example, the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act 1994 allows for the use of the SSN for jury selection and allows for cross matching of SSNs and Employer Identification Numbers for investigation into violation of Federal Laws. <a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Public and private entities can request Aadhaar:<span> </span></b> The Aadhaar number can be adopted by any public or private entity as a single means of identifying an individual. The UIDAI has stated that the Aadhaar number is not mandatory,<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a> and the Supreme Court of India has clarified that services cannot be denied on the grounds that an individual does not have an Aadhaar number.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Verification</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The SSN can be verified only in certain circumstances: </b> The SSA will only respond to requests for SSN verification in certain circumstances:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<ul>
<li>Before issuing a replacement SSN, posting a wage item to the Master Earnings File, or establishing a claims record - the SSA will verify that the name and the number match as per their records.</li>
<li>When legally permitted, the SSA verification system will verify SSNs for government agencies.</li>
<li>When legally permitted the SSA verification system will verify a workers SSN for pre-registered and approved private employers.</li>
<li>If an individual has provided his/her consent, the SSA will verify a SSN request from a third party.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For verification the SSN number must be submitted with an accompanying name to be matched to and additional information such as date of birth, fathers name, mothers name etc. When verifying submitted SSN's, the system will respond with either confirmation that the information matches or that it does not match. It is important to note that because SSN is verified only in certain circumstances, it is not guaranteed that the person providing an SSN number is the person whom the number was assigned.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Aadhaar number can be verified in any transaction: </b> If an organization, department, or platform has adopted the Aadhaar number as a form of authentication, they can send requests for verification to the UIDAI. The UIDAI will respond with a yes or no answer. When using their Aadhaar number as a form of authentication individuals can submit their number and demographic information or their number and biometrics for verification.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span> </span></b></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Lost or stolen</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN can be replaced: </b> If an individual loses his/her SSN card lost or their number is fraudulently used, they can apply for a replacement SSN card or a new SNN number. <a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar number can be replaced: </b> If an individual has lost their Aadhaar number, there is a process that they can follow to have their number re-sent to them. If the number cannot be located by the UIDAI , the individual has the option of re-enrolling for a new Aadhaar number.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a> <b> </b>The UIDAI has built the scheme with the understanding the biometrics are a unique identifier that cannot be lost or stolen, and thus have not created a system to address the possibility of stolen or fraudulent use of biometrics.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Implementation</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Legislation and formal roll out: </b> The SSN program was brought into existence via the Social Security Act and officially rolled out while eventually being adopted across Federal Departments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Bill and pilot studies:</b> The UID scheme has been envisioned as being brought into existence via the Unique Identification Authority Bill 2010 which has not been passed. Thus far, the project has been implemented in pilot phases across States and platforms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span> </span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>Enrollment</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Social Security Administration: </b> The Social Security Agency is the soul body in the US that receives and processes applications for SSN and issues SSN numbers. <a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>UIDAI, registrars, and enrolling agencies: </b> The UIDAI is the soul body that issues Aadhaar numbers. Registrars (contracted bodies under the UIDAI_ - and enrolling agencies (contracted bodies under Registrars) are responsible for receiving and processing enrollments into the UID scheme.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Required supporting documents</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>SSN requires proof of age, identity, and citizenship: </b> To obtain a SSN you must be able to provide proof of your age, your identity, and US citizenship. The application form requires the following information:</p>
<ul>
<li>Name to be shown on the card</li>
<li>Full name at birth, if different</li>
<li>Other names used</li>
<li>Mailing address</li>
<li>Citizenship or alien status</li>
<li>Sex</li>
<li>Race/ethnic description (SSA does not receive this information under EAB)</li>
<li>Date of birth</li>
<li>Place of birth</li>
<li>Mother's name at birth</li>
<li>Mother's SSN (SSA collects this information for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on an original application for a child under age 18. SSA does not retain these data.)</li>
<li>Fathers' name</li>
<li>Father's SSN (SSA collects this information for IRS on an original application for a child under age 18. SSA does not retain these data).</li>
<li>Whether applicant ever filed for an SSN before</li>
<li>Prior SSNs assigned</li>
<li>Name on most recent Social Security card</li>
<li>Different date of birth if used on an earlier SSN application.</li>
<li>Date application completed</li>
<li>Phone number</li>
<li>Signature</li>
<li>Applicant's relationship to the number holder.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Aadhaar requires proof of age, address, birth, and residence and biometric information:</b> The application form requires the following information:</p>
<ul>
<li>Name</li>
<li>Date of birth</li>
<li>Gender</li>
<li>Address</li>
<li>Parent/guardian details</li>
<li>Email</li>
<li>Mobile number</li>
<li>Indication of consenting or not consenting to the sharing of information provided to the UIDAI with Public services including welfare services</li>
<li>Indication of if the individual wants the UIDAI to facilitate the opening of a bank account linked to the Aadhaar number and permits the sharing of information for this purpose</li>
<li>If the individual has no objection to linking their present bank account to the Aadhaar number and the relevant bank details</li>
<li>Signature<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a></li>
</ul>
<div style="text-align: justify; "><br clear="all" />
<hr />
<div id="ftn1">
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Sahil Makkar, "PM's idea to track kids from birth hits practical hurdles", Business Standard. April 11<sup>th</sup> 2015. Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/pm-s-idea-to-track-kids-from-birth-hits-practical-hurdles-115041100828_1.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> The Social Security Act of 1935. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/35act.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> The United States Department of Justice, "Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974". Available at: http://www.justice.gov/opcl/social-security-number-usage</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Government of India Planning Commission "Notification". Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/images/notification_28_jan_2009.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> The National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010. Available at: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/UID/The%20National%20Identification%20Authority%20of%20India%20Bill,%202010.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> History of SSA 1993 - 2000. Chapter 6: Program Integrity. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/ssa2000chapter6.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Social Security Number Chronology. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/ssnchron.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> History of SSA 1993 - 2000, Chapter 6: Program Integrity. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/ssa2000chapter6.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> UID FAQ: Aadhaar Features, Eligibility. Available at: https://resident.uidai.net.in/faqs</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Social Security Numbers for Noncitizens. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10096.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Aapka Aadhaar. Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/aapka-aadhaar.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Program Operations Manual System. Available at: https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203325025</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> UIDAI Analytics -Empowering Operations - the UIDAI Experience. Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/images/commdoc/other_doc/uid_doc_30012012.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information rules 2011) available at: http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511(1).pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> IdentityHawk, "Who can lawfully request my social security number?" Available at: http://www.identityhawk.com/Who-Can-Lawfully-Request-My-Social-Security-Number</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> SSA FAQ " Can I refuse to give my social security number to a private business?" Available at: https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/3791/Can-I-refuse-to-give-my-Social-Security-number-to-a-private-business</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> The United States Department of Justice, "Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974". Available at: http://www.justice.gov/opcl/social-security-number-usage</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Social Security Number Chronology. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/ssnchron.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Aapka Aadhaar. Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/what-is-aadhaar.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Business Standard, "Aadhaar not mandatory to claim any state benefit, says Supreme Court" March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/aadhaar-not-mandatory-to-claim-any-state-benefit-says-supreme-court-115031600698_1.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> Social Security History 1993 - 2000, Chapter 6: Program Integrity. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/ssa2000chapter6.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Aapka Aadhaar. Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/auth.html</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> SSA. New or Replacement Social Security Number Card. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> UIDAI, Lost EID/UID Process. Available at: https://uidai.gov.in/images/mou/eiduid_process_ver5_2_27052013.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn25">
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Social Security. Availabl at: http://www.ssa.gov/</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn26">
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> Social Security Administration, Application for a Social Security. Available at: http://www.ssa.gov/forms/ss-5.pdf</p>
</div>
<div id="ftn27">
<p><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Aadhaar enrollment/correction form. Available at: http://hstes.in/pdf/2013_pdf/Genral%20Notification/Aadhaar-Enrolment-Form_English.pdf</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-vs-social-security-number'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-vs-social-security-number</a>
</p>
No publisherelonnaiAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2015-07-24T01:24:00ZBlog EntryLive Chat: Aadhaar: An identity crisis?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-17-2015-aadhaar-an-identity-crisis
<b>The Aadhaar card is not compulsory for citizens and "no person should be denied any benefits or ‘suffer’ for not having the Aadhaar cards issued by Unique Identification Authority of India," the Supreme Court ruled on Monday. </b>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The live chat was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-debate-around-aadhaar-card/article7003376.ece">published in the Hindu</a> on March 17, 2015. Sunil Abraham took part in the discussions.</p>
<hr />
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Four years after Aadhaar was launched – and touted as a panacea to access social services and subsidies – its users continue to be dogged by an array of problems ranging from technical glitches to procedural delays. And those who do not have an Aadhaar card find themselves quizzed by government authorities.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><i>The Hindu</i>’s Tamil Nadu edition today <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/issues-in-obtaining-aadhaar-from-glitches-to-lack-of-forms/article7000268.ece" target="_self">highlighted the challenges</a> ordinary citizens - both those who have cards and those who do not – face, be it from non-availability of application forms or glitches in the biometrics process.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">We will be hosting a live chat on Aadhaar at 5 pm today. You can pose questions and share your views with Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bangalore-based research organisation, Centre for Internet and Society; K. Gopinath, Professor at the Computer Science and Automation Department at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) and The Hindu’s K. Venkatraman.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Anon </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">What could have happened such that the current government, who were once in the opposition, were members of the parliamentary committee that strongly opposed UIDAI, now suddenly wants to use it everywhere? What could have transpired such that the PM got so convinced that it would help its citizens more than it could potentially harm?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham: </b>Usually the party that is in power is pro-surveillance and anti-censorship and the opposition is pro-privacy and pro-free speech. After the elections - if the parties swap positions as a result of the mandate - then they usually also swap positions on surveillance and censorship. This phenomenon is not specific to India.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath:</b> The leakage in the current models is very high. Hence, the attraction.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The issue earlier was whether there was some costs to the use of sw (esp. proprietary) from outside the country. Probably, these have been addressed.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Saurabh </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhaar was supposed to be a good 2 factor authentication mechanism, what happens to it now ?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> Aadhaar architecture was designed to allow for multiple authentication factors. Unfortunately biometrics is a poor authentication factor since it cannot be revoked. Any two-factor authentication scheme where one factor is biometrics is in reality only a one-factor scheme. Pin code as with credit cards and debit cards would have been much more secure for authentication.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K Venkataramanan:</b> It will continue to be relevant, but is unlikely to be mandatory for quite some time.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath:</b> Real-time 2-factor auth (biometrics, signatures) are not easy, esp over Internet, and would require a much longer rollout</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Saurabh </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I did not get Aadhar for myself or my family. Does this mean, I will not have to as yet.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> As per the UIDAI - Aadhaar is not mandatory. Also according to the latest remarks from the Supreme Court - Aadhaar should not be made mandatory without enabling law. But many state and central government agencies have ignored the comments made by the SC and have made Aadhaar mandatory for various programmes and schemes.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Hindu:</b> Is Aadhaar virtually redundant now following the SC order? Nothing more than an expensive experiment?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath: </b>I think it will be used as an addl auth mechanism (just like elec./ph. receipts). May be once the technology is demo'ed properly (it has not been done seriously anywhere else), it will be taken up again.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Abubacker </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I am an NRI and need to have Aadhaar Card? How to obtain Appointmet - I am from Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K Venkataramanan:</b> Your family member or representative living in Tuticorin may apply for Aadhaar through the local body. It may be possible to get a date for recording biometrics. However, you have to come down here for recording biometric details.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Kishore J </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Why is Govt. not able to legalize the Aadhar, I'm assuming the only reason Supreme court keeps blocking it is because its not a law passed by Parliament ?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath:</b> SC goes by the constitution. If there is some concern someone is being "excluded", they will block it.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham: </b>The NIA bill was proposed in parliament and then referred to a Standing Committee. Our summary and detailed feedback to the Bill is available here: http://cis-india.org/intern... The Standing Committee harshly criticized the Bill. See: http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Finance/42%20Report.pdf After which the Bill has not been reworked by the UIDAI or the Planning Commission /Niti Aayog for re-presentation to the Parliament.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> No - it is not just an expensive experiment. It is much more dangerous - it is what security experts call a Honey Pot. A centralized repository of biometrics harvested from residents of India. These biometrics can be used to authenticate transactions in the UIDAI database and other services. If there is a breach - then this huge collection of authentication factors will end us in the hands of criminal elements or some foreign state.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From vaz </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhar is a joke, i have so many IDs and i cannot get any benefits out of it, it is simply wasting time, if Govt really want mandate make it easy for people, i pay taxes and Govt should treat me like one , i can not waste my time standing in queues to get that card, get me time slot and don't waste my time.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> This is because the process of registration has been outsourced to private agencies. These private agencies have futher outsourced to others and so on and so forth. Consequently, there is very poor management and quality control by these agencies. If indeed corruption was a priority - we should have tackled high-ticket corruption first. We could have had biometric registration just for only the politicians and bureaucrats. We could use biometric authentication with them to create a non-repudiable audit trail of subsidies flowing from the Centre to the Panchayat. Unfortunately, we tried to register everybody simultaneously and that has resulted in poor quality of biometrics and demographic data. We have visited some of the registration centre and have seen the reality on the ground.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Guest </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I have been threatened by Gas Agency people if i don't link Aadhar to Bank Account, won't be given a refilling cylinder.Is this a right one?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K Venkataramanan:</b> There is an option for getting DBT even without Aadhaar. The bank account and the gas agency consumer account can be linked without Aadhar. Please check www.mylpg.in for knowing how to apply for DBT registration without Aadhaar</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Hindu: </b>Your views Prof Gopinath? Do you see it as a biometrics Honey Pot too?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath: </b>From a security pov, it is certainly risky. It needs really robust technologies before one can think of rolling out. For example, we have "denial of service" attacks. ie, a service can be shut out by random bombardment of msgs. Most curr large scale systems are designed to handle it but some cannot handle it if large numbers collude. This only prevents access to service but other attacks can exfiltrate (take out) data, modify data, etc.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Hindu:</b> And Mr. Venkataramanan, your thoughts?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From kuldeep singh chauhan </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">We need a strong law for data security. Aadhar is collecting data but there is no provision except some provisions of IT Act and IPC for data security.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath:</b> Yes, the legislation is weak or unnecessarily vague (eg. the IT2000 act) or too broad in scope. I think what we need is a citizen's charter for data access, security and privacy. Also, what needs to be done when systems do not work!</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> There are two interpretations of Sec. 43A of the IT Act. Acccording to most experts it only applies to Body Corporates in other words it does not apply to the Government when it plays the role of a data controller. According to an order issued by the IT Secy of Maharastra [the court of first instance for 43A of ITA] -this section will also apply to the Government. But beyond that order we have no clarity on this question.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Pavan </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">With no privacy laws, isn't it a bad idea to store citizen's data in a database? We all know how inept our government is in ensuring any security/privacy.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> With or without laws. Centralized approaches to identity/authentication management are much more fragile and vulnerable compared to decentralized options. The Internet is secured by digital signatures - there is no centralized repository of all these signatures. Therefore there is no centralized point of failure for the Internet. If the Aadhaar project was based on Smart Cards instead of Biometrics - then just like the Internet it would be robust without a central point of failure. http://cis-india.org/intern...</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K. Gopinath:</b> Storing all info in a single place is a big security risk. It needs very robust technologies (such as replication and "secret sharing protocols") that work inspite of failures. These have been done here and there but doing it on a large scale requires care.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Kunal Soni </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">SC Adhar card recommendations, ok Got it! But what about the banks for example SBI who ask for adhar cards stating its the bank's rule? Who's going to answer the question as they would never listen to common man and they never did.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Sandeep </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Hi,May be it is a strong message, but what exactly is the need to make/introduce the Adhaar card, which is not recognizable worldwide? Why dont we make our passport smart enough and reduce it to a chip as in Europe. This will also enable everyone to get enrolled in our administrative system. Basically, we are only repeating the entire process with no international recognition.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Krishna Rao </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Need to make it mandatory in the lines of SSN in US. Else it would be very difficult to manage and ensure the subsidies and benefits reach the really deserved section.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Ramesh </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">It is a great concept it all information like property purchases, tax returns, ration card, pf, esi, bank accounts , rail, air tickets are all linked. will reduce corrupt practice considerably. It should be the main identity of an Indian</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From arun </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">@Sunil what are the privacy safeguards that are in place currently regarding protection of information collected by the government and private agencies designated for this?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> Do you mean legal or technical?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>K Venkataramanan:</b> @The Hindu: Yes, there are serious privacy issues involved in a centralised database. However, their is a counter-view that this is no different from any other data base available in the hands of the government such as the one relating to PAN. The main concern of those worried about the privacy problem in Aadhaar is that data collection is done by private agencies, and details such as biometric data could be misused</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Hindu:</b> Sunil, a question for you from arun</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Pawan </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Govt should give it legal recognition and give legal guarantee about the usage and storage of the data... After that there would be no concern related to identity security or enforcing it on the people.. People would trust it and come forward to register for it.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Sunil Abraham:</b> Legal recognition and guarantees are not sufficient. You cannot use the law to fix poor technology design. The security of the Internet is not a function of good law. It is a function of good technological design.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; "><b>Comment From Pappan </b></p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">the so called Europe, US an other developed countries already have Social security numbers, why cant we just look at it like that?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Social Security Number are an additional identifier. The database just contains a collection of identifiers. If that database is compromised the information cannot be used to authenticate transactions. This is very unlike the UIDAI centralized database which is a collection of authentication factors. Think of it as a database filled with the passwords of all Indian residents.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: @Kunal Soni - SBI can't insist on it as of now. The person who issued any circular to that effect may be hauled up in court</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I have two questions. First, why is the honourable supreme court strking down aadhar, on what grounds? Second, how can the government come around those objections and allay the courts fears/objections? The informed panelists may please give their opinions too. Thank you</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: There are 3 sets of petitioners who are being heard by the SC in the combined case. Some of them associated with the right are arguing that the UID is a threat to national security as it legitimizes illegal immigrants. Those associated with the left are arguing that it is a violation of the right to privacy. Still other who are ex-officers from the armed forces are arguing that the project is mired in corrupt practices.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: The Court has not struck down Aadhaar. It has only passed interim orders protecting the access to services of those who have not yet had them.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Aashish Gupta</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhaar was supposed to usher in portability of benefits. That is, you could migrate to a different state and still get the benefit you deserved.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: The Aadhaar database only contains information that identifies you and also allow you to authenticate against that database. It does not indicate eligibility for various schemes/subsidies. The migration across State level eligibility lists has to be done by the State. It is not a functionality provided by the UIDAI.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Ramesh</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Supreme Court should have suggested a better option instead of coming down heavily on the Aadhar Card. The card will straight eliminate multiple rations cards and voter ids.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: The previous technology adopted by the NDA government - smart cards or SCOSTA [for the MNIC]. This technology option is free from many of the flaws of UIDAI's current design.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Mrigesh</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Why is Aadhaar needed? I am for a middle class or for the elite class?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Geetha</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Has the government (or concerned agencies/departments) formulated any policy on using the Aadhar information collected? For instance, what agency can use the information, under what conditions, with whose approval, for what limited purposes? Is this policy publicly available?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: No. Anyone who is approved by the UIDAI as a legitimate can use the KYC API. Absolutely anyone can use the Authentication API. There is no policy on what data collection/retention practices must be adhered to by the users of both these APIs.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Arun Jayapal</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Has the government ever considered/analyzed a way to link the existing resources (such as ration card, DL, passport, voter id, etc.,) and not have come up with a completely new system (aadhaar). Is this not an absolute waste of time and resources?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Yes, you are absolutely right. The government should have used biometrics as a means to dedup an existing high value database like the Electoral Rolls or more importantly the PAN Card database. That would have been better RoI for our anti-corruption Rupee.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: @Ramesh The Court has come down heavily on only officials who insist on Aadhar for delivery of services when there are clear orders that it should not be mandatory</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From George J</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I'm an NRI. I presently work and live in a country where the first order of business on landing/Birth is to register one self and get a unique ID number and ID. This the case for expats as well as residents be they foreigners or Citizens. The registration process includes collection of Biometric data. This single No and Id is used for everything from Bank Accounts to School Admissions. It is good that India is doing something similar. It is high time people with multiple ration cards, Passports and the like are weeded out and provided a single verifiable identity. Data Security is of essence and necessary safeguards are available.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Could you name the country? And can you use biometrics your country to authenticate transactions in a centralized database for all sorts of transactions? If yes, then the technology design in your country is as poor as in ours and it is only a question of time when the centralized database leaks.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Aashish Gupta</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Apart from the Honey Pot, Aadhaar does not serve its primary purpose: tackling corruption. Most pilots of Aadhaar have crash landed, and as a result, state governments have created their own simpler systems to tackle corruption.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: See: http://www.thehindu.com/opi... If the authentication match is not working [1:1 match]. Then basically the dedup will not work [1:n] match. That is why they are doing demographic dedup before biometric dedup - because they know that the biometric dedup is fallible.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Balu</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">A citizenship card , backed with a strond database is a must for every citixen . Some serious thoughts should be done in this matter at the earliest , instead of wasting time and money on different schemes .</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: We should use decentralized Internet scale technologies based on open standards that are already proven. If we had used smart cards based on SCOSTA or EMV standard we would be in a much better place.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From PRASHANTH</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Has the government (or concerned agencies/departments) formulated any policy on using the Aadhar information collected? For instance, what agency can use the information, under what conditions, with whose approval, for what limited purposes? Is this policy publicly available?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From vikash</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">supreme court should not have to push such legal hurdles given that the 750 million card has already been generated.A lot of money has been investad in the project</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Saket</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aaadhar card is full of errors. At the place where I got registered person was issuing it in a hurry which creates lots of typing errors in DOB and Place.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Aashish Gupta</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The supreme court has not struck down aadhaar, it has said that aadhaar cannot be mandatory. This is to make sure that people who do not have an aadhaar card do not miss out on their entitlements.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Ramesh</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhaar should be made mandatory with necessary safeguards. Unless there is an ultimatum and time frame to get the card it will never be implemented. Even now many do not know where to get it done.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Aadharam</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Could you clarify whether this is an interim order or a final order on Aadhar? Is there scope for a retraction/shift on the Supreme Court's part?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Onkar Tiwari</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Why supreme court doesnt understand Adhar is necessary? it can curb corruption. it wll reduce corruption specially in manrega where people enters fake details and grab the money.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: It is only an interim order. The Court will, hopefully, resolve the questions raised by the petitioners about privacy and data security issues</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From George J</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I have taken Aadhar Card. The procedure asks the applicant themselves to verify the data entered for typing mistakes etc. before being uploaded, in fact where I registered they had asked for a sign off on the final data on a printout. So how errors can creep in is beyond me. However the photography equipment and skill of the data entry operator leave much to be desired as the mug shot is not very kind to me!</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">There should be a guide line which need to be followed as it is in the hands of private partners who are also ask for bribe from the poor people for the aadhar and they have no other option to pay for it as they thought that this only can help them to get the govt. facilities and subsidies.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: @Onkar Tiwari, It is up to the government to convince the court that Aadhaar will help curb corruption, and how. The Court is unlikely to stop the use of technology to improve delivery of services and curb corruption.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From v subrahmanian</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">help line over phone and the email correspondence is total waste.. they themselves are helpless. Any query has never been replied to the caller's satisfaction. Getting them on line itself is a challenge. It's so complex. Of course, every eligible citizen of this complex country must have the identity card. Why not if it is done through employer in case of organized salaried employees?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Ramakrishna Rao</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Hi !! I request the panelists to kindly sum up in few 4 or 5 points the reasons/grounds on which the parliamentary committee has rejected the aadhar</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The agencies who are collecting data for Aadhar Card are not doing good. The aadhar card is full with many kind of errors including Name and DOB.. Even a person is able to register twice under this scheme.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The Hindu: Mr. Venkataramanan would you like to respond to Ramakrishna Rao?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">@K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K. Gopinath: Dedup claims assume “good” conditions. For example, a farmhand may have rough skin, etc that may make the fingerprints problematic. 1% errors have been reported in the past. Real time txns: I think the current Aadhar is not geared for it. The connectivity is not there. Also, with fingerprint technologies, the ability to check large number of fingerprints for a match is not good enough. It has never been scaled to the extent that is being planned.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Sandeep</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Still not sure if Aadhaar then other ID cards not needed ? Or Still all along with Aadhaar ? then what is meaning of Aadhaar ? Only for LPG connection? Why not govt making Aadhaar is mandatory in all other fields as well , As Govt spent huge money for Aadhaar</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">@ Sunil - How plausible is the idea that govt can use UID data to profile public?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Sushubh</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I for one is very happy that at least the Supreme Court is not falling for this privacy infringing scam. People defending this card here on this platform needs to read more about it.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Govt. created panic among public regarding adhaar. Public is highly annoyed with the way the government is handling this adhaar project. Only court reprimands,govt. backtracks as far as the adhaar is concerned. It is high time for govt. to have serious insight into this.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary committee on Finance had objected to the UID being extended to non-citizens on the ground that it may end up in illegal immigrants getting Aadhaar numbers.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">It had also questioned the rollout ofthe scheme before legislation was passed. It had objected to its implementation without regard to its consequences.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Srinivasa</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I believe Nandan Nilkeni had mentioned certain very good examples of the system flagging duplicates. So I assume the system is robust. We need to make it mandatory for all services delivery and have suitable policy and technology to protect data.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: I don't think we can go by the assurance of someone no longer associated with the project. It is not persons that keep us safe it is proper technology and law.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The Hindu: Welcome back Sunil! Lots of questions await you</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: The committee had said UIDAI had no conceptual clarity, no proper assessment of the costs involved, and that it could end up in the hands of private agencies, that the technology was untested and the UID may not meet the objectives for which it was conceived</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Sorry I was logged out.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">There was a recent news in The Hindu about linking of Adhar cards to election voter ID cards in Andhra Pradesh. Do you think that adopting such moves by every state result in mandating the procedure eventually?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">First Passport then PAN , voter id and now adahar, in any country there is only passport and SSN, why india needs so many identity cards</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K. Gopinath: The PAN database has been problematic just as the voter id. Hence, every technology cycle, a new system is usually attempted that attempts to be "better" than the before. However, this requires care which is not in good supply in the govt where the "lowest" bidder wins or outsourcing happens.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The Hindu: We have Prof Gopinatha back too. Sorry about that technical glitch.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Deepak Vasudevan</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Why are different apex agencies managing Aadhar like UIDAI, Census and NPR? There should be one root (apex) body and others should report onto it.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Yes. The division of work between UIDAI and NPR is not very clear and has added to the confusion.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: The parliamentary standing committee, too pointed out the overlap of functions involving UIDAI and NPR</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The Hindu: There was this question for you earlier on the thread @K Gopinath - how robust is the de-duplication UID claims to have. And in real time transactions, is it possible to authenticate n request without 'false positives' or 'negatives'?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K. Gopinath: Dedup claims assume “good” conditions. For example, a farmhand may have rough skin, etc that may make the fingerprints problematic. 1% errors have been reported in the past. Real time txns: I think the current Aadhar is not geared for it. The connectivity is not there. Also, with fingerprint technologies, the ability to check large number of fingerprints for a match is not good enough. It has never been scaled to the extent that is being planned.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">When Union Of India aimed to greater transparency... these are the road blocks they get... If Aadhar is not mandatory... then make Voter ID, PAN Card, Ration card also not mandatory in their respective Govt Businesses ... make self declaration as mandatory .. lets go to the stone age in this Information age. Instead SC should direct the center to come up with procedure to accommodate legitimate citizens of India into the scheme in a time bound manner and frame policies to avoid misuse of the personal data. are we looking the current world Information age thru the same old glasses... it is time to adopt the change...</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Indeed we need more transparency. But privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power See: http://openup2014.org/priva...</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">K Venkataramanan: Linking Aadhaar and voter ID cards is also being tried out in other states It is only one more means of eliminating fake voters or duplicates, but is unlikely tobe a ground to make Aadhaar mandatory</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Ganesh</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">@Mr.Sunil, The current technology adopted for UIDAI is not good compared to last regime?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Please see my our open letter on this question http://cis-india.org/intern...</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Madhavan R</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Just because UPA government bring this, its not good for NDA to object it.. STOP wasting our money.. Just try to make best out of it..</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Pouring more money into a failed project will not save it. It has serious technological flaw and without addressing it we are just making a bad situation worse.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From George J</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Currently all embassy's are collecting biometric data when you apply for a visa. Most of this collection is done by private parties on behalf of the respective governments. So if an Indian has travelled abroad the chances of his Biometric data being available to foreign govts is 99%. So what is the big scare about this? The need that it should be secure and should not be misused is sacrosanct. with the kind of revelations that have been made about mass eavesdropping I think people should get used to living in glass houses!</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Pappan</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">@Sunil, please clarify about your comment on technology inadequecy</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Yuvaraj</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I strongly support Adhaar card implemenataion. intially they may face challeneges but for the long run its very effective mechanism to monitor every thing</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Monitoring everything means you monitor nothing. The bigger the haystack the harder it is to find the needle. Good surveillance practices means targetting survelliance not en masse data collection.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">It is heard that privacy of citizens is at stake with adhaar card. can panelists respond to this?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: I have dealt with your question here: http://www.business-standar...</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Srinivasa</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">That comparison of the two standards (SCOSTA and Aadhar) made interesting reading. Why not a system where you collect biometrics and iris and then issue a SCOSTA card? the biometrics and iris can be used to remove duplicates and maintain a clean registry by failing the duplicate SCOSTA cards. And all further transactions will only need a card based access.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Loganathan</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">This is one the worst move by any government in the center to remember. With no motive for the card, they introduced just to add to the loss in exchequer and there is no benefit out of it. Many have wrong data entered against their name and totally the waste one of all</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Sabari Arasu</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">I am aware of someone who is not Indian citizen got Aadhar card for himself and his family. This scares me a lot as anyone(read Bangaladheshis, Sri Lankans, Pakintanis, etc..) can get Aadhar card. Is there a measure taken by Government to identify these issues?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: This is possible because the technology [biometrics] cannot verify citizenship. Even worse biometrics can be imported from foreign countries and can be used to create resident ghosts. This is because the technology cannot even verify if the person in India. We will need surveillance cameras at every point of registration to take care of this possible fraud.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Chandra Sekhar</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhaar card was a huge opportunity for the government to improve the efficiency of governance.It was a challenging task and required great amount accuracy.The way this project was executed is a question mark on efficiency of governance.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The Hindu: Sunil, Venkatramanan, Gopinath - would you agree that Aadhaar was an opportunity to improve governance? @chandra sekhar</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Freebee lovers/netas will always oppose when you want to implement some thing which might deny them the benefit.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Any evidence to backup this statement?</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Comment From Guest</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">if the ASDHAAR is nt necessary as per SC then why everywhere it is being preferred identity such as Subsidy, Passport etc.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sunil Abraham: Preference is not the same as a mandatory requirement.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-17-2015-aadhaar-an-identity-crisis'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-march-17-2015-aadhaar-an-identity-crisis</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2015-04-03T06:54:25ZNews Item