The Centre for Internet and Society
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Digital native: Look before you (digitally) leap
http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/indian-express-nishant-shah-may-28-2017-digital-native-look-before-you-digitally-leap
<b>Creating a digital future is great, but there’s a serious need to secure the infrastructure first.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/digital-native-look-before-you-digitally-leap-4676270/">Indian Express</a> on May 28, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Digital technologies of connectivity have one unrelenting promise — they offer us new ways of doing things, augmenting existing practices, amplifying capacities and affording new possibilities of information and data transactions that accelerate the ways in which we live. This idea of the internet as infrastructure is central to India’s transition into an information technologies future.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nandan Nilekani, almost a decade ago, in his book, Imagining India, had clearly charted how the digital is the basis for shaping the future of our communities, societies and governance. As one of the architects of Aadhaar, Nilekani had argued that the country of the 21st century will have to be one that seriously invests in the digital infrastructure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 10 short years, we have reached a point where we no longer question the enormous investment we make in digital systems of governance and functioning, and we appreciate the economic and networked values of projects like #DigitalIndia and #MakeInIndia that shape our markets and cities into becoming the new cyber-hubs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is no denying that digital offers a new way of consolidating a country as polyphonic, multicultural, expansive and diverse as India. We also have to appreciate that, even if selectively, the digitisation of public records, government services, and state support is clearly producing an administrative momentum that is reforming various practices of corruption and incompetence in the massive state machinery. The role of the digital as infrastructure has been a boon for many developing countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This positioning, however, masks the fact that infrastructure needs its own support and care systems. Take roads, for example. Roads allow for connectivity, movement and mobility between different spaces. They are one of the most important of state and public infrastructures and for all our jokes about pot-holes and eroding spaces for pedestrians, roads remain the life-line of our everyday life. A complex mechanism of planning, regulation and maintenance needs to be put into place in order to make roads survive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The amount of attention we pay to roads — the material quality, the land that it occupies, the lanes for different vehicles, the traffic lights and zebra crossings, blockages and streamlines, authorising specific use of roads and disallowing certain activities to happen there — is staggering. A public planner would tell you that before the road comes into being, the idea of the road has to be formulated. The road needs protection and planning and its own infrastructure of support and creation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When it comes to the information superhighway of the digital web, this remains forgotten. We are so focused on the digital as infrastructure that we seem to pay no attention to its infrastructure. Thus, when we proposed, deployed and now enforced a project like Aadhaar, the focus remained on its unfolding and its operations. Aadhaar as an aspiration of governance has its values and has the capacity to become a system that augments statecraft.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, the infrastructure that is needed to make Aadhaar possible — rules and regulations around privacy, bills and acts about data sharing and ownership, contexts of informed consent and engagement, community awareness and data security protocol — have been missing from the debates. For years now, activists have been advising and warning the state that building this digital infrastructure without building the contexts within which they make sense is not just irresponsible, but downright dangerous.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Different governments have turned a deaf ear to these protests. Now, when the Aadhaar portals are found disclosing massive volumes of public data, making people vulnerable to data and identity theft and fraud, we are realising the massive projects we have started without thinking about the context of security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the ongoing controversies around #AadhaarLeaks, the question is not whether the disclosure of this information was a leak, a breach or an ignorant exposure of sensitive information. The response to it cannot be just about fixing the infrastructure and building more robust systems. The question that we need to confront is how do we stop thinking of the internet as infrastructure and start focusing on the infrastructure that needs to be set into place so that these digital systems promise safety, security, and protection for the lives they intersect with.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/indian-express-nishant-shah-may-28-2017-digital-native-look-before-you-digitally-leap'>http://editors.cis-india.org/raw/indian-express-nishant-shah-may-28-2017-digital-native-look-before-you-digitally-leap</a>
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No publishernishantBiometricsResearchers at WorkAadhaar2017-06-08T01:22:54ZBlog EntrySharad Sharma Apologises for Trolling Aadhaar Critics; Unmasking Ispirit's Controversial Trolling Program
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/inc42-may-23-2017-shweta-modgil-sharad-sharma-aplogises-for-trolling-aadhaar-critics
<b>Last weekend I was at Aditi Mittal’s standup comedy show in Mumbai where she made a cheeky remark that stayed with me – “Do you guys know what India’s soft power is today? It is trolling!” </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The blog post by Shweta Modgil was <a class="external-link" href="https://inc42.com/buzz/sharad-sharma-trolling-aadhaar/">published by Inc 42</a> on May 23, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">While she was poking fun at the Snapchat-Snapdeal-Evan Spiegel controversy, in a bizarre coincidence those words came back to haunt me three days later. That was when one of biometric authentication system Aadhaar’s most vocal critics, Kiran Jonnalagadda, co-founder of Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), an advocacy group, revealed in a series of tweets that @Confident_India, one of the anonymous accounts arguing in favour of Aadhaar and attacking its critics on Twitter, was being operated by none other than Sharad Sharma, the founder of software products think tank iSPIRT.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the time, <b>Sharad had completely denied that he was tweeting from an anonymous account</b>. But today, on Twitter, Sharad apologised for the anonymous trolling <a class="external" href="https://twitter.com/sharads/status/866943195678035968/photo/1" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" target="_blank">on Twitter</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a tweet, Sharad stated that “There was a lapse of judgement on my part. I condoned tweets with uncivil comments. So I’d like to unreservedly apologise to everybody who was hurt by them.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He added that “Anonymity seemed easier than propriety, and tired as I was by personal events and attacks on iSPIRT’s reputation, I slipped.” Furthermore, he stated that he would not be part of anything like this again or allow such behaviour to continue. He also revealed that an iSPIRT Guidelines and Compliance Committee (IGCC) has been set up to investigate the matter and recommend corrective action.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">On Catching a Troll</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 17 May, Kiran tweeted out a revelation, which shook a lot of people – “Have we caught an Aadhaar troll?” Kiran used Twitter’s account reset option on Confident_India with Sharad Sharma’s number to see if it is was accepted. And, as per a screenshot posted by him, it did.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This was further corroborated by many other Twitter users. Medianama’s Nikhil Pahwa (and co-founder of IFF) also confirmed the same, tweeting that the troll account does link to Sharad Sharma.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a <a class="external-link" href="https://medium.com/@jackerhack/inside-the-mind-of-indias-chief-tech-stack-evangelist-ca01e7a507a9">detailed</a> Medium post, Kiran then revealed how he investigated the rise of anonymous Twitter accounts and trolls responding to critics of Aadhaar. But what he revealed next was the shocking part – that at the 27th Fellows meeting of the think tank, a plan was hatched to respond to critics of India Stack which involved the use of trolls. A group called Sudham, created earlier, divided people who were broadcasting different views on Aadhaar, into different categories and then underlined various proposals on dealing with them. One of the groups called “archers” was entrusted to carry out the mainstream debate, while another group of “swordsmen” was entrusted to challenge people who were categorised as informed yet “trolling.” Swordsmen would do this by coordinating on WhatsApp with quick responses and in numbers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/WhatCanYoDo.jpg" alt="Trolled" class="image-inline" title="Trolled" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Kiran got a hold of the presentation and also shared how one controversial slide also showed a detractor matrix.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is this slide which Kiran uses to illustrate the fact that: “ iSPIRT has an officially sanctioned trolling program where the trolls coordinate on WhatsApp and attack together on Twitter, exactly the behaviour seen in all the tweets above—and I’ve only covered the leader’s tweets. There are at least a dozen known troll accounts that attack in packs.”</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">First Denial</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Back when the information was first revealed, Sharad Sharma responded by denying that he was tweeting from the <a class="external" href="https://twitter.com/Confident_India" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">@<b>Confident_India</b></a> Twitter account.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He further added that he was in for a family emergency in the US. And that he was clueless as to why his number was linked with that account.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But, interestingly, what roused the investigator’s suspicions was that Sharad shared the same denial from another troll account @indiaforward2 – which was captured by another Twitter user before it was deleted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The denial from Sharad’s true account came half an hour later. But the damage had been done and all fingers pointed in the direction of Sharad Sharma engaging in trolling from those accounts. Kiran then wrote another damning post on Sharad’s <a class="external-link" href="https://medium.com/@jackerhack/sharad-sharmas-dubious-denial-b0b9aa6c6b8f">dubious denial</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As can be guessed, all the tweets related to this matter from Sharad’s and Indiaforward’s accounts have been deleted. The last tweet from Confident India’s account on 17 May professed that he is not Sharad Sharma.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Meanwhile, iSPIRT finally <a class="external-link" href="https://medium.com/@mtrajan/ispirt-response-to-kiran-jonnalagadda-3f977fb91df4">responded</a> to Kiran’s revelations on Medium –“We want to categorically state that the allegations against iSPIRT coordinating and/or promoting any troll campaign are false and the evidence presented is a deliberate misreading of our intent to engage with those speaking against India Stack.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The post further explained that in its Fellows meeting held in February and April 2017, it did address the issue of the chatter around India Stack. It says, “Our volunteer, Tanuj Bhojwani, led the discussion and we outlined our strategy for dealing with our detractors. The slide in question is clearly titled “Detractor Matrix.” The slide outlines how we classify those speaking against India Stack, and how we are engaging with them. We called one category of people “informed yet trolling (IYT),” a category of people deliberately misleading people, despite understanding the nuance behind the debate.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The post admitted that the think tank encouraged volunteers to respond to these IYT Twitter handles directly from their own personal handles. However, at no point did it endorse or recommend anonymous trolling.<br /><br />“We are aware that some volunteers and their friends have created an anonymous campaign to Support Aadhaar. This is not a troll campaign, but an informational one. It is also not an iSPIRT campaign.”<br /><br />It concluded with: “Kiran’s motivated misrepresentation of the slides perhaps speaks to his biases against iSPIRT.” The post added that it plans to investigate the confusion around the alleged mobile number and account link and clarify all outstanding questions.<br /><br />Meanwhile coming back to trolling from where we started. Though Sharad’s apology did not say directly whether he operated the two Twitter accounts — @Confident_ India and @Indiaforward2 — which he was suspected of using for trolling- he signs off by saying that he requests “those who I have disappointed to look at this as an exception.”</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Aadhaar Controversy</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the series of incidents raises many doubts over an esteemed organisation such as iSPIRT, the controversy over Aadhaar, India’s massive biometric identification programme, has been raging for many months now.<br /><br />Over the last few months, it has come under fire for not addressing the privacy concerns of an individual and leaking individual data. Aadhaar critics have pointed out that it is more a mass surveillance tool, can lead to identity thefts, and linking basic services with it spells doom.<br /><br /><a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/aadhaar-numbers-of-135-mn-may-have-leaked-claims-cis-report/articleshow/58529002.cms">This month</a>, a CIS (Centre for Internet and Society ) report revealed that Aadhaar numbers and personal information of as many as 135 million Indians could have been leaked from four government portals, due to lack of IT security practices. The report claimed that the absence of “proper controls” in populating the databases could have disastrous results as it may divulge sensitive information about individuals, including details about the address, photographs, and financial data. It also added that as many as 100 Mn bank account numbers could have been “leaked.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, on May 16, the CIS <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof/view">updated its report</a> and clarified that although the term ‘leak’ was originally used 22 times in its report, <b>it is at “best characterised as an illegal data disclosure or publication and not a breach or a leak.</b>” It also claimed that some of its findings were “misunderstood or misinterpreted” by the media and that it never suggested that the biometric database had been breached.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Meanwhile, the Aadhaar-issuing authority UIDAI has asked CIS to explain its sensational claim that 13 crore Aadhaar numbers were “leaked” and provide details of servers where they are stored. The UIDAI also wants CIS to clarify what kind of “sensitive data” is still with the Centre or anyone else. The UIDAI has strongly denied any breach of its database and has asked CIS to provide details such as the servers where the downloaded “sensitive data” is stored.<br /><br />While the security of the above-mentioned Aadhaar data is still being debated, the government’s push towards making it compulsory across industries has become a major topic of debate in India.<br /><br />From linking bank accounts, to PAN numbers, to obtaining free gas connections under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, to linking scholarships to linking Aadhaar numbers to social welfare schemes for electronically disbursing money to specific beneficiaries, or the Aadhaar-enabled Payment System (AEPS), the government has been pushing on with Aadhaar to make it a mandatory ID rather than the voluntary one it was envisaged to be originally. India still does not have a data protection and privacy law and making Aadhaar mandatory in such a country is not without risks.<br /><br />Given the fact that the UIDAI cannot afford to carry out authentication-based rollouts across schemes in haste as the failure rate of AEPS can lead to denial of direct benefits, it makes more sense to retain Aadhaar as a voluntary authenticator, at least until the government solves on-ground issues around Aadhaar-based authentication. Because any failure can erode public faith in Aadhaar as the beneficiary would not get his rightful ration over authentication failure— and, to that extent, in the government itself. So, for beneficiaries who depend on public distribution systems (PDS) for rice, sugar, kerosene or oil, authentication failure is a serious problem.<br /><br />It is to this effect that PILs (public interest litigation suits) have been filed in the Supreme Court stating that making Aadhaar compulsory is illegal and would virtually convert citizens into “slaves” as they would be under the government’s surveillance all the time. The Supreme Court had itself stated in August 2015 that Aadhaar cards will not be mandatory for availing benefits of government’s welfare schemes and had also barred authorities from sharing personal biometric data collected for enrollment under the scheme.<br /><br />Last month too, it lambasted the Narendra Modi-led BJP government at the Centre for making Aadhaar card a mandatory prerequisite to avail government services. The court will examine all applications against Aadhaar on June 27 2017, while the government remains steadfast on not extending the deadline of June 30 by which various schemes such as the grant of scholarships, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and various other social welfare schemes were to seek mandatory Aadhaar number.<br /><br />While the debate rages on, controversies keep on piling up. Recently, linking people living with HIV/ AIDS with Aadhaar cards has allegedly driven away patients from hospitals and antiretroviral therapy (ATR) centres in Madhya Pradesh. As per health department sources, the MP State AIDS Control Society made Aadhaar card number compulsory from February this year for those affected by the virus to get free medicines and treatment in accordance with the Central government’s policy making Aadhaar mandatory to avail benefits of any government scheme.<br /><br />However, this led to negative fallout as many patients and suspected victims started avoiding ATR centres and district hospitals after the new rule came into effect. The patients feared that the compulsory submission of Aadhaar card to get free medicines and medical check-ups could lead to the disclosure of their identity, inviting social stigma.<br /><br />While there is no denying the fact that, in a welfare state, technology can play a big role in enabling the state to hand out entitlements more efficiently and distribute public services at scale. But doing the same at the cost of an individual citizen’s privacy and resting it all on one mandatory number whose authentication is still not completely foolproof, is hardly the way a welfare state would like to operate.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/inc42-may-23-2017-shweta-modgil-sharad-sharma-aplogises-for-trolling-aadhaar-critics'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/inc42-may-23-2017-shweta-modgil-sharad-sharma-aplogises-for-trolling-aadhaar-critics</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-26T01:08:09ZNews ItemiSpirt's Sharad Sharma: Sorry, I trolled Aadhaar critics
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-may-24-2017-shalina-pillai-anand-j-ispirts-sharad-sharma-sorry-i-trolled-aadhaar-critics
<b>Sharad Sharma, the man who is seen as one of the critical backbones of India's digital drive, profusely apologized on Tuesday for anonymously trolling those arguing for better privacy and security standards in Aadhaar.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Shalina Pillai and Anand J was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/people/ispirts-sharad-sharma-sorry-i-trolled-aadhaar-critics/articleshow/58817320.cms">Times of India</a> on May 24, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The apology came a few days after <a class="key_underline" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Kiran-Jonnalagadda">Kiran Jonnalagadda</a>, co-founder of developer community platform HasGeek and one of those who were at the receiving end of the trolling, used internet tools to discover the faces behind the trolling. <br /> <br /> The trolls allegedly included several other members of iSpirt, the software product association co-founded by Sharma and which leads IndiaStack, a set of technologies that can be used to digitise many everyday processes used by common people. The issue has divided India's nascent startup community like never before, and coming soon after the division over the arrest of <a class="key_underline" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Stayzilla">Stayzilla</a> co-founder Yogendra Vasupal, there are many who now worry for the ecosystem.This may also explain the apology by Sharma, who has been at the forefront of building this ecosystem. <br /> <br /> In the apology mail that he tweeted, Sharma said: "There was a lapse of judgment on my part. I condoned tweets with uncivil comments. So I would like to unreservedly apologise to everybody who was hurt by them. Anonymity seemed easier than propriety, and tired as I was by personal events and attack on iSpirt's reputation, I slipped. I won't be part of anything like this again nor passively allow such behaviour to happen, even in the worst of times." <br /> <br /> <a class="key_underline" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Nandan-Nilekani">Nandan Nilekani</a> tweeted in response to Sharma's apology that it was brave of him to do so. Several others in iSpirt also backed Sharma after the public apology . There was a surge of tweets in response to Sharma's and Nilekani's tweets, some welcoming the turn of events and others saying it wasn't enough. Jonnalagadda is among those who are not satisfied. "There were several individuals at iSpirt behind these trolls and Sharma's apology is not enough," he told TOI. <br /> <br /> Aadhaar, aggressively pushed by the government, is being fiercely questioned by privacy and security advocates. Though most of these activists say they are asking for implementation of safeguards, the Twitter hashtags used by some of them include #antiaadhaar, #destroyaadhaar and #attackaadhaar, which seem to suggest they are entirely opposed to the authentication mechanism. <br /> <br /> Both sides have used intemperate and often abusive language on social media -many using anonymous names. The latest flashpoint was a report by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) released earlier this month that said some 135 million Aadhaar numbers were leaked through government databases. There have also been accusations that private companies that verify Aadhaar credentials often get access to the full Aadhaar information of individuals. These provoked the proAadhaar trolls. Jonnalagadda, Nikhil Pahwa, co-founder of the Internet Freedom Foundation, which works on issues including net neutrality, and free expression and privacy on the internet, and Sunil Abraham of CIS were under particular attack.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some of the iSpirt fellows and volunteers TOI spoke to had little remorse. "I am not saying iSpirt should have done what it did. But I can imagine why iSpirt reacted like this as we all have been under constant personal attack for a year now," said an iSpirt fellow, who did not want to be identified. Jas Gulati, co-founder and CEO at <a class="key_underline" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Nowfloats">Nowfloats</a> and a volunteer at iSprit, said iSpirt was an open organisation. "Sharad was upfront about it and I think it's very positive." <br /> <br /> The Aadhaar privacy advocates, including Jonnalagadda and Pahwa, are clear they value iSpirt, but say it was undermining itself by its actions. One pointed to a February meeting of iSpirt where they created a programme called Sudham that distributed prominent Aadhaar critiques into four quadrants -`Misinformed, fearful and engaging', `Informed, fearful and engaging', `Misinformed and trolling' and `Informed and trolling' -and assigned different members to deal with each quadrant. Some of those who were assigned responsibilities appear to have taken their job too seriously . <br /> <br /> Pahwa told TOI, "The work done by the Product Nation initiative at iSpirt is what makes it an important organization. But when people raise questions of IndiaStack and Aadhaar, many in that team respond with venom. iSpirt is unique, in that it is a thinktank that plays the role of an activist and lobbyist with a high degree of influence with the government and so they must develop processes for better governance, transparency and accountability ." <br /> <br /> Anand Venkatanarayanan, a senior engineer at <a class="key_underline" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/NetApp">NetApp</a> and independent Aadhaar researcher, said iSpirt should not be judged based on what Sharma did. "What we are trying to do is strengthen the Aadhaar system. Currently, they do not even have a process to report bugs. Large companies all have SOPs (standard operating procedures) to deal with issues. UIDAI does not," he said, noting that his views are personal and not that of his employer's.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-may-24-2017-shalina-pillai-anand-j-ispirts-sharad-sharma-sorry-i-trolled-aadhaar-critics'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-may-24-2017-shalina-pillai-anand-j-ispirts-sharad-sharma-sorry-i-trolled-aadhaar-critics</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-26T00:13:38ZNews ItemAadhaar Card: One Identity, Multiple Disorders
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indiasaga-may-25-2017-aadhaar-card-one-identity-multiple-disorders
<b>It is still hazy to see the desperation of the union government to imposing the Aadhaar Card mandatory when matters related to Aadhaar Card are already sub judice. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This was blog post by Gaurav Raj was <a class="external-link" href="http://theindiasaga.com/politics-governance/aadhaar-card-one-identity-multiple-disorders">published by India Saga</a> on May 25, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The constitutionality of Aadhaar is yet to be decided by the Supreme Court, however, the enrolment of Aadhaar has reached the mark of more than one billion. Recently, the government declared Aadhaar mandatory to file Income Tax Return (ITR) while the Supreme Court is opined not to treat Aadhaar mandatory, but voluntarily. Now it is imperative of the government to confide the citizens that the Aadhaar information- demography and biometrics-are in safe hands, a debate which has been heating up, and the contempt of the court’s decision by the government is for greater good. But the uproar against the speculation of identity revelation threat and possible misuse of Aadhaar details by the government-corporate nexus, plausible reasons to doubt the security of privacy, which is a fundamental right of Indian citizen. Ironically, after the Finance Minister Arun Jaitley defended the ‘Aadhaar Money Bill controversy’ filed by former congress MP Jairam Ramesh in the court, the Supreme Court is in dilemma and yet to decide whether ‘Right to Privacy' is a fundamental right or not.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Why Aadhaar Card Mandatory?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nandan Nilekani, the co-founder of Infosys and the ideologue of Aadhaar, said that Aadhaar will change the PDS system in India since it ensures no ghost or fake beneficiaries to avail unentitled benefits of the various welfare schemes and subsidies. Nilekani also says that there might be margin of error up to 5 per cent in distributing the subsidies or benefits of various welfare schemes to the masses. The top-honcho technocrat has also defended Aadhaar that any breach of privacy of citizens is not possible as the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is efficient to secure the public data under CIDR.<br /><br />The government claims that the corruption-mounted Public Distribution System (PDS) in India is reformed due to the introduction of the 12 digit unique identification number. More than 40000 crore have been saved in the form of exchequer due to curb of fake and ghost beneficiaries in the PDS system. Now if we believe Nilekani claim of 5% error, then more than 5 crore beneficiaries would be losing their benefits due the error in the biometric identification. The Infosys co-founder later said that if there is a margin of error then ‘One Time Password’ (OTP) comes in. However, he didn’t define what if there is a congestion of network in the remotest Indian villages where phone signals are rare? Standing on the PDS shop waiting for food grains and network, is certainly not an ideal way to avail the benefits of the government welfare schemes. In 2011, activist and writer Ruchika Gupta said in an interview to Tahalka, “The UID cannot address the bulk of delivery problems in the two of the biggest social sectors programmes like MGNREGA and PDS. Linking UID with social sector legislation is completely baseless.”</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">PAN Card Linked with Aadhaar Card?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government has directed the Reserve Bank of India to make Aadhaar mandatory for Income Tax Return filing. Currently, there are approximately 24.37 crores PAN holders in India, however 3.8 crore people file income tax return every year. There have been cases of people owned not more than one but 100 PAN Cards with them. PAN cards in India are mostly used by the citizens as a proof of identity. The government believes that PAN card linking with Aadhaar will curb the tax evasion.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How Safe Is Your Data In This Panopticon Model Of Mass Surveillance?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the late 18th century, the well-known English social reformer and jurist Jeremy Bentham wanted to build a ‘panoptican’ for a mass surveillance of the prisoners in England. He advocated designing an institutional building be used to keep an eye on all the jail inmates by a single watchman. Very similarly, India is witnessing the biggest surveillance program ever under the name of single identity and availing benefits of governments’ schemes. Another logic behind enrolment of Aadhaar is the ‘national security’. National security? How can any government ensure national security backing Aadhaar, when international companies have been hired in consortium to collect residents’ biometric and demography details? In 2010, Accenture, Mahindra-Satyam Morpho and L1 identity solutions were pooled in by UIDAI for leveraging de-duplication exercise of Aadhaar and data collection. L1 Identity Solutions’ top brasses are the former Director CIA George Tenet and former Homeland Security deputy secretary Adm James. With its headquarters in Connecticut, this company is one of the biggest defence contractors specialised in facial recognition and biometrics. L1 Identity Solutions and Accenture work in a close affinity to US intelligence agencies. This is an age of information. Corporate houses and big telecom players are dying to get details of consumers. Obvious are the concerns about the safety and security of the people’s data. It is feared that the database can be used for various marketing and business purposes.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CIDR, A Single Database Of People’s Data</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) is a data management and storing agency in India which is initiated for the Aadhaar project. It is regulated by the statutory body of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). This centralised database is probably one of the biggest repositories on this planet.<br /><br />In 2010, experts had claimed that more than a thousand government sites and portals were attacked more than 4000 times by China alone in one year. In April 2011, 77 million Sony Playstations and digital media delivery service Qriocity were hacked which resulted into a shutdown of the network for a week. The London School of Economics also reported that a central database of vulnerable to hacking and other terrorist and cyber crime activities. Recently Wannacry Ransomware virus hits the globe. More than 99 countries were affected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Building one single repository for billions of Aadhaar Card data seems to be a big risk in the most vulnerable country where dat breach is at most.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Data Leak Crisis</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">UIDAI has so far spent approximately 5982.62 crores for more than a billion enrolments of Aadhaar Cards. 1615.34 crores have been spent between the financial year 2015-2016. Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru-based organization (CIS) has learned that data of more than 130 million Aadhaar card holders has been leaked from four government websites. They are National Social Assistance Programme, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Chandranna Bima Scheme and Daily Online Payments Reports of NREGA. It also includes Bank details and other confidential details of millions of residents.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What is Next?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Lok Sabha has passed the Aadhaar Bill as Money Bill. Mukul Rohatgi said in the Supreme Court that according to Article 110 of the constitution, there is use of consolidated funds of India so the bill is a Money bill. Chief Justice Khehar said, “Your object might be good but whether it is a ‘Money Bill’ or not is the question.” Justice Ramana referred to a 2014 judgment passed by the Apex court that courts had no jurisdiction over procedurals matters of legislative.” In response P. Chidambram, the counsel for Jairam Ramesh said, “This petition is not about a procedural matter. There has been substantive infraction.”</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indiasaga-may-25-2017-aadhaar-card-one-identity-multiple-disorders'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indiasaga-may-25-2017-aadhaar-card-one-identity-multiple-disorders</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-26T00:01:54ZNews ItemWill Aadhaar leaks be used as an excuse to shut out scrutiny of welfare schemes?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-may-20-2017-anumeha-yadav-will-aadhaar-leaks-be-used-as-an-excuse-to-shut-out-scrutiny-of-welfare-schemes
<b>Aadhaar data of all 23 crore beneficiaries of Direct Benefit Transfer schemes could be publicly available, says a report by Centre for Internet and Society. </b>
<div class="article-body" style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>The blog post by Anumeha Yadav was <a class="external-link" href="https://scroll.in/article/837717/will-aadhaar-leaks-be-used-as-an-excuse-to-shut-out-scrutiny-of-welfare-schemes">published on Scroll </a>on May 20, 2017.</p>
<hr />
<p>In the past three months, there have been several <a href="https://scroll.in/article/835546/the-centres-casual-response-to-aadhaar-data-breaches-spells-trouble">reports</a> about caches of Aadhaar data being publicly displayed on government websites across the country.</p>
<p>Personal information associated with the biometric-based 12-digit unique identification number, which the government wants every Indian resident to have, is mandated to be confidential under the Aadhaar Act, 2016.</p>
<p>But exactly how much Aadhaar data has been compromised by negligent government departments?</p>
<p>On May 2, researchers at the non-profit Centre for Internet and Society released a comprehensive report on the extent of the data breaches. They documented four government portals using Aadhaar for making payments and found that sensitive personal and financial information of nearly 13 crore people was being displayed on them, including details of about 10 crore bank accounts.</p>
<p>Two of the portals, for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the National Social Assistance Programme, belong to the Union rural development ministry. The others are run by the Andhra Pradesh government for the workers’ insurance scheme Chandranna Bima and for filing Daily Online Payment Reports of MNREGA.</p>
<p>The researchers estimated that Aadhaar data of all 23 crore beneficiaries of the central government’s various Direct Benefit Transfer schemes could be publicly available. This means nearly a fifth of India’s population is potentially exposed to irreversible privacy harm, and financial and <a href="https://scroll.in/article/833230/explainer-aadhaar-is-vulnerable-to-identity-theft-because-of-its-design-and-the-way-it-is-used">identity fraud</a>.</p>
<p>The Unique Identification Authority of India, the agency which manages the Aadhaar database, however, and had earlier <a class="link-external" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-leak-biometric-data-safe-says-uidai/articleshow/58486390.cms" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">denied any breach</a> of confidential data, has now reportedly said that such a data leak could only be the result of a potentially <a class="link-external" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/provide-hacker-details-outfit-that-claimed-data-leak-told/articleshow/58725132.cms?from=mdr" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">illegal hack attack</a> and asked CIS to provide details of the persons involved in the data theft.</p>
<p>The rural development ministry, on its part, has changed how its MNREGA database is accessed, redacting Aadhaar numbers and bank account details of the beneficiaries. Senior officials of the ministry, however, denied making systemic changes in the wake of the Centre for Internet and Society report.</p>
<p>“The researchers claimed that financial information of over 10 crore individuals was available publicly, on pension and MNREGA portals,” said Nagesh Singh, additional secretary in the ministry, “but bank account details were displayed only on two state department websites of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana as these states are far advanced in transparency practices.”</p>
<p>“For all other states,” Singh added, “financial information and Aadhaar numbers were removed or masked last year. For pension schemes we masked the data in June 2016, and for MNREGA this data was removed in December. Even if any data was showing, it would only be for the particular block the resident is in, not for any other state workers.”</p>
<p>All this was done, he said, “because the UIDAI communicated to us that this information is sensitive and should not be displayed and the Aadhaar regulations prohibit display of Aadhaar numbers”. The Aadhaar (Sharing of Information) Regulations were introduced last September.</p>
<figure class="cms-block-image cms-block"><img src="https://d1u4oo4rb13yy8.cloudfront.net/grvhfkothd-1494862823.png" /></figure>
<p>Contrary to Singh’s claims, social activists outside Andhra Pradesh and Telangana confirmed they could access bank account details of MNREGA workers until May 3. Only on May 4, two days after the Centre for Internet and Society report was released, did the details stop showing on the Management Information System.</p>
<p>“We could no longer access the electronic muster roll, and it started returning error messages,” said Ashish Ranjan of Jan Jagran Shakti Sangathan, a registered union of unorganised workers in Araria, Bihar. But until early May, he added, the Management Information System allowed anyone in any state to access the personal information of workers, even from other states.</p>
<p>Activists and beneficiaries relied on this system for two things. “Several of the new bank accounts have errors, and accessing this information directly helped get the discrepancies corrected without going to block level officials,” Ranjan explained. “It also helped track where the wages of workers were stuck.”</p>
<p>When activists asked why the data was no longer accessible, Ranjan said, rural development department officials said the Management Information System was changed “on the directions of the Supreme Court and the Union cabinet secretary.”</p>
<p>“This has been the pattern with the MNREGA MIS for long,” Ranjan said, referring to the information system. “Senior officials change access to a feature as they wish without clear processes or explanations.”</p>
<p>James Herenj, an activist with NREGA Watch, a non-profit which monitors the implementation of MNREGA in Jharkhand, had the same experience. “Bank account details were removed from the website last week,” he said, “this is a problem as we can no longer help MNREGA workers get data entry errors corrected.”</p>
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society researchers too contested the rural development ministry’s claim that Aadhaar numbers and bank account details were displayed only on Andhra Pradesh and Telangana government websites. They released a video clip showing them accessing bank account details and Aadhaar numbers of 801 MNREGA workers of Agara panchayat in Bengaluru through an internet search on March 25.</p>
<figure class="has-subtext cms-block-image cms-block"><img alt="Screenshot of a Chandigarh Union Territory website displaying Aadhaar information." src="https://scroll-img-process.s3.amazonaws.com/original/ogghbkwxim-1493054055.png" title="Screenshot of a Chandigarh Union Territory website displaying Aadhaar information." />Screenshot of a Chandigarh Union Territory website displaying Aadhaar information.</figure>
<h3 class="cms-block-heading cms-block"><b>Consent, please?</b></h3>
<p>The <a class="link-external" href="https://uidai.gov.in/images/the_aadhaar_act_2016.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Aadhaar Act</a>, 2016 requires both government and private agencies to take informed consent before using a person’s Aadhaar for authentication, but there is little evidence that consent is sought before Aadhaar is seeded with personal and financial information.</p>
<p>Indeed, when the Supreme Court first permitted the voluntary use of Aadhaar for MNREGA in October 2015, Aadhaar numbers of 2.36 crore workers had already been seeded to their bank accounts, without the consent of over 99% of them.</p>
<p>The rural development ministry’s <a class="link-external" href="http://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/1669D.O._letter_MGNREGA_dtd_10.06.2016.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">data</a> shows that until June 2016, only about 4,10,000, or less than 1% of the 10.7 crore MNREGA workers, had agreed to Aadhaar-based payments. The ministry worked around this by organising “consent camps” to retrospectively collect proof of consent.</p>
<h3 class="cms-block-heading cms-block"><b>Poor standards</b></h3>
<p>Writing in <i>The Economic Times</i>, Ram Sewak Sharma, chairperson of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and former director general of the Unique Identification Authority of India, <a class="link-external" href="http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/et-commentary/there-has-been-no-aadhaar-data-leak/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">argued</a> that the reports about “Aadhaar leaks” on government websites failed to account for provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Section 4 of this law provides for proactive disclosure of government decisions while Section 8 mandates public authorities to publish all information on welfare schemes, including details of beneficiaries.</p>
<p>This has created a situation, Sharma pointed out, where the transparency law may require even Aadhaar numbers of beneficiaries to be made public even though the Aadhaar Act mandates them to be confidential.</p>
<p>Right to Information activists, however, said the authorities were anything but devoted to the transparency law. Crucial information they seek on the <a href="https://scroll.in/article/833060/how-efficient-is-aadhaar-theres-no-way-to-know-as-the-government-wont-tell">efficacy of Aadhaar</a> in welfare schemes is routinely denied.</p>
<p>“The government is willfully manipulating information systems to subvert details of biometric failures,” said Amrita Johri, a member of the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information and an activist with the Right to Food campaign, which has petitioned the Delhi High Court against Aadhaar being mandatory for food rations. “We have come across instances of ration cardholders being turned back because of fingerprints being falsely rejected, or network failure, but on the Delhi government’s website, this is shown as the beneficiaries not having come to the ration shop at all.”</p>
<p>“Similarly, the government claims it has removed bogus ration cards through Aadhaar,” Johri added, “but they do not show any administrative action if such bogus cards were really found through Aadhaar even though Section 4 of the RTI Act requires disclosure of such decisions.”</p>
<figure class="has-subtext cms-block-image cms-block"><img alt="Jharkhand Directorate of Social Security displayed Aadhaar numbers, bank accounts numbers and transaction details of over 15 lakh pensioners." src="https://d1u4oo4rb13yy8.cloudfront.net/rzxkohofbe-1493106358.jpg" title="Jharkhand Directorate of Social Security displayed Aadhaar numbers, bank accounts numbers and transaction details of over 15 lakh pensioners." />Jharkhand Directorate of Social Security displayed Aadhaar numbers, bank accounts numbers and transaction details of over 15 lakh pensioners.</figure>
<p>Johri is concerned that the “Aadhaar leaks” could become an excuse to deny people “other useful information”. “When we requested officials to display how many biometric transaction were not successful, they told us that in a few days, they will remove the entire MIS as there had received orders from the food ministry to not display demographic data associated with Aadhaar,” she said. “But we pointed out that it was the creation of a single identification number that is the problem. Why should information on all other government schemes be removed?”</p>
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society report points out that while the law now makes Aadhaar numbers confidential, the government has failed to specify data masking standards. Section 6 of the Aadhaar Regulations lays down that no government or private agency should publish Aadhaar numbers unless they are redacted or blacked out “through appropriate means”.</p>
<p>But this is too vague, the report points out. “In some instances, the first four digits are masked while in others the middle digits are masked,” Srinivas Kodali, one of the authors of the report, explained, “which means someone with access to different databases can use tools for aggregation to reconstruct information hidden or masked in a particular database.”</p>
<p>Kodali said that for information other than Aadhaar numbers, each ministry and department is required to classify the data that is sensitive, restricted or open, which they have failed to do. “The National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy, 2012 requires securing information of sensitive and restricted data but it does not recommend the ways to do it,” he said. “The standards around information disclosure and control do not exist, and the Ministry of Statistics expert committee on this was <a class="link-external" href="http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/SDC_Report_30mar17.pdf?download=1" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">unable to suggest</a> one last month.”</p>
<p>“Even for MNREGA data,” Kodali continued, “the Ministry of Rural Development’s chief data officer should have classified the financial information as restricted or open when the database was first created. But did they do this.”</p>
<p>Nagesh Singh, the additional secretary, however said his ministry “does not have a chief data officer to do this”. “The ministry’s economic advisor is the official responsible for categorising data and advises us on this,” he added.</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-may-20-2017-anumeha-yadav-will-aadhaar-leaks-be-used-as-an-excuse-to-shut-out-scrutiny-of-welfare-schemes'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-may-20-2017-anumeha-yadav-will-aadhaar-leaks-be-used-as-an-excuse-to-shut-out-scrutiny-of-welfare-schemes</a>
</p>
No publisherAnumeha YadavAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-20T07:09:51ZNews ItemAadhaar assurances fail to assuage privacy concerns
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-may-5-2017-anirban-sen-aadhaar-assurances-fail-to-assuage-privacy-concerns
<b>While Aadhaar may be secure from external attacks, a failsafe system hasn’t been developed to protect it from Edward Snowden-style leakages and hacks.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Anirban Sen was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Politics/clV1RHlNttIVTJNkQt8WqM/Aadhaar-assurances-fail-to-assuage-privacy-concerns.html">published by Livemint </a>on May 5, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As calls for a privacy and data protection law grow louder with each passing day amid reports of a central government ministry having made up to 130 million Aadhaar numbers public on its website, widespread concerns continue to emerge over loopholes in the security of the unique identification programme, though the man who created the system continues to defend the security and integrity of the system.<br /><br />Most worryingly, a consensus is emerging among security and privacy experts, who have argued that while the Aadhaar system may be secure from external attacks, a failsafe system has not been developed to protect it from Edward Snowden-style internal leaks or hacks.<br /><br />“(What has been suggested by the Unique Identification Authority of India and Nandan Nilekani) is that there will never be a data breach like what we saw in the US with the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, or Office of Personnel and Management breaches (data of federal government personnel, including more than 5.6 fingerprints, was leaked), or in Mexico or Turkey, or even in India when the department of defence was breached for cyber-espionage for multiple years without detection,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society.<br /><br />“While the system may be secure from external attacks, there is no failsafe system to make it invulnerable to Snowden-style breaches,” he added.<br /><br />In an interview, former UIDAI chairman and Infosys Ltd co-founder Nandan Nilekani continued to defend the security of the system and said steps are being taken everyday to enhance the failsafe processes surrounding the system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“I think the Aadhaar system is extremely well-designed. It’s not an online system that is exposed to the Internet. When enrolment happens, the packet is encrypted at source and sent, so that there can’t be a man-in-the-middle attack. And when the authentication happens, that is also encrypted—not compared to the original data, but to a digital minutiae. The point is that the system is very, very secure. So, if the objection is to centralization, then you should not have clouds. Clouds are also centralized,” said Nilekani. He added that Aadhaar was also safe from internal breaches, an assumption that is being challenged by security experts all across.<br /><br />“Within seven years of its launch, the Aadhaar system has made a remarkable leap in terms of its security and privacy and it will keep improving things. Technology does not come through immaculate conception, where one morning some perfect technology is born. It has to evolve. It’s called learning by doing,” added Nilekani. He added that improving the security of the system is an ongoing process and conceded that a data protection and privacy law needs to be in place to supplement the current Aadhaar law.<br /><br />“I know the government has sent a notice to everyone. If somebody has done it; they ought not to have done it—there’s a law for that,” said Nilekani when asked about recent instances of Aadhaar numbers being made public by government departments.<br /><br />“We should have a data protection and privacy law which is an umbrella law, which looks at all these phenomena and certainly Aadhaar should be part of that. That’s perfectly fine—but people are behaving as if Aadhaar is the only reason why we should have a privacy law,” added Nilekani.<br /><br />The last few weeks and months have witnessed a steady stream of negative news surrounding Aadhaar and three main cases are currently being fought in the Supreme Court, including one challenging the government’s decision to make the 12-digit ID mandatory for filing income tax returns as well as for obtaining and retaining a PAN Card.<br /><br />Meanwhile, as Mint reported in April, questions are being raised on the Aadhaar biometric authentication failure rate in the rural job guarantee scheme in areas such as Telangana.<br /><br />The report of Aadhaar numbers being listed on the government ministry website has caused widespread uproar, although a lawyer pointed out that it is not due to a breach in the Aadhaar system.<br /><br />“It’s a misnomer to say this a leak because this was voluntarily, very actively put up there. A leak is when some information being kept securely gets breached somehow and comes out. Now, why is this information up on government websites? This is the problem of our government’s perception of transparency...The fact that the Aadhaar numbers are on the government website is not a flaw of the Aadhaar system, but it is a flaw of the understanding of what needs to be done to demonstrate transparency,” said Rahul Matthan, partner at Trilegal.<br /><br />In a column in Mint, Matthan had also pointed out that while Aadhaar has been a transformative project, there remains enough scope of misusing the database.<br /><br />“There is a legitimate fear that this identity technology will open us all up to discrimination, prejudice and the risk of identity theft,” Matthan wrote. “Aadhaar has given us the tools to harness data in large volumes. If used wisely, this technology can transform the nation. If not, it can cause us untold harm. We need to be prepared for the impending flood of data—we need to build dams, sluice gates and canals in its path so that we can guide its flow to our benefit.”<br /><br />Even as both sides debate the issue of Aadhaar’s security, calls are getting louder to revamp the unique identification database.<br /><br />“The point is that the UIDAI knows the device ID of the machine with which the biometric transaction took place along with the time and date, which means that by just using basic data analytics, any one with access to the transaction logs from the UIDAI (which have to be kept for a period of 5 years and 6 months) can have a complete view of a person’s Aadhaar-based interactions that are increasing day by day.”<br /><br />“Further, the UIDAI has built up a biometric profile of the entire country. This means that courts can order UIDAI to provide law enforcement agencies the biometrics for an entire state (as the Bombay high court did) to check if they match against the fingerprints recovered from a crime scene. This too is surveillance, since it collects biometrics of all residents in advance rather than just that of criminal suspects,” said Prakash of CIS.<br /><br />“The UIDAI could have chosen to derive unique 16 digit numbers from your Aadhaar number and provide a different one to each requesting entity. That would have prevented much of these fears. But the UIDAI did not opt for that more privacy-friendly design,” he added.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-may-5-2017-anirban-sen-aadhaar-assurances-fail-to-assuage-privacy-concerns'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-may-5-2017-anirban-sen-aadhaar-assurances-fail-to-assuage-privacy-concerns</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-20T06:23:32ZNews ItemUIDAI goes after org that disclosed government departments were releasing Aadhaar data
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/medianama-nikhil-pahwa-may-19-2017-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar
<b>If there was ever a case of shoot the messenger, it is this. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The blog post by Nikhil Pahwa was published by <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2017/05/223-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar/">Medianama</a> on May 19, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The UIDAI, the body which runs the Aadhaar project in India, has written to the Centre for Internet & Society suggesting that <a href="http://www.medianama.com/2017/05/223-aadhaar-numbers-data-leak/">their disclosure of the fact that the data of 130 million Aadhaar users is being publicly disclosed on the Internet</a> is owed to a hack-attack, <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/provide-hacker-details-outfit-that-claimed-data-leak-told/articleshow/58725132.cms?from=mdr" rel="noopener noreferrer">reports the Times of India</a>. On being contacted by MediaNama, Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at CIS told MediaNama that “We are waiting for an official copy of the letter, and once we receive it we will decide on our future course of action.” The UIDAI told MediaNama that they’ll get back to us, and declined to share a copy of the letter with MediaNama.</p>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2017/05/223-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar/">Read the full story on Medianama</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/medianama-nikhil-pahwa-may-19-2017-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/medianama-nikhil-pahwa-may-19-2017-uidai-cis-india-aadhaar</a>
</p>
No publisherNikhil PahwaUIDAIAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-20T10:46:36ZNews ItemDebate over #Aadhaar Turns Nasty as Critics Accuse Supporters of Online Trolling
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-19-2017-ajoy-ashirwad-mahaprahasta-debate-over-aadhaar-turns-nasty-as-critics-accuse-supporters-of-online-trolling
<b>Internet Freedom Foundation’s Kiran Jonnalagadda has alleged that iSPIRT and its co-founder Sharad Sharma set up fake Twitter profiles to harass, intimidate Aadhaar critics.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprahasta was published in the <a class="external-link" href="https://thewire.in/137371/aadhaar-ispirt-trolling-sharad-sharma/">Wire</a> on May 19, 2017.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As bizarre as this may sound, one of the founders of the Indian Software Products Industry Round Table (iSPIRT) – an influential think-tank closely associated with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) – Sharad Sharma, is battling allegations of trolling anti-Aadhar campaigners through fake Twitter profiles.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Kiran Jonnalagadda, one of the founders of Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), has alleged that a number of fake profiles started to troll him online earlier this month in response to his criticism of Aadhar on Twitter. Surprisingly, he said, one of the profiles –<a href="https://twitter.com/Confident_India" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="@confident_India">@confident_India</a> – which trolled him was apparently operated by Sharma, considered highly influential within the IT and start-up industry and a governing council member of iSPIRT.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>What is iSPIRT?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2013, a group of volunteers working with NASSCOM founded iSPIRT to represent the software products industry independently. It is widely known that many of these same volunteers also helped the UIDAI develop much of the initial Aadhaar infrastructure and ecosystem. <a href="http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/is-ispirt-an-alternative-to-nasscom/34763/1" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="According to Forbes India">According to Forbes India</a>, iSPIRT helps Indian software product companies “draft and take policy proposals to government officials; create reusable ‘playbooks’ from successful companies that can be applied by others; and create ‘self-help communities’.” <a href="http://www.ispirt.in/Our-Industry/SPI" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="It aims to facilitate">It aims to facilitate</a> Indian software product companies, which build affordable and innovative technologies, get a footprint in sectors like health, education, infrastructure and create conditions so that they get an equal platform to compete with big multinationals.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this mission, iSPIRT believes that Aadhaar-based technologies, which Indian software product companies may create, could help the Indian software product industry gain an advantage over multinationals, which may be skeptical about using Aadhaar. In other words, iSPIRT, one of the biggest advocates of Aadhaar, sees a commercial advantage to the increasing use of Aadhaar for many of the entrepreneurs associated with the Round Table. To this end, iSPIRT runs two initiatives – ProductNation and IndiaStack, a collection of open APIs for technology infrastructure projects like UPI and Aadhaar.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the mission may sound fine, many of the Aadhaar advocates within iSPIRT have had to face questions from civil society, most of which have to do with the suspicion that Aadhaar could compromise online privacy. This, over the past few months, has led to heated social media battles between iSPIRT and anti-Aadhaar campaigners.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, the debate took a darker turn when Jonnalagadda uploaded a video showing that the @Confident_India Twitter handle could be traced back to Sharma’s personal mobile phone number on Twitter. Sharma, has since then, apparently changed his number.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“It was only when I started to grow suspicious of the handle that I thought of using Sharma’s phone number to verify the account,” Jonnalagadda tells <i>The Wire. </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In <a href="https://medium.com/@jackerhack/inside-the-mind-of-indias-chief-tech-stack-evangelist-ca01e7a507a9" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="an article – “Inside the mind of India’s chief tech stack evangelist” – where he narrates the events">an article – “Inside the mind of India’s chief tech stack evangelist” – where he narrates the events</a>, he says “a flurry of newly created Twitter trolls accounts began heckling me about Aadhaar”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Around 10 such handles started making unprovoked attacks on Jonnalagadda and another founder of IFF, Nikhil Pahwa, accusing them of being guided by “greed, profit, and deceit” for being in the “#AntiAadhaar brigade.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the argument continued, @confident_India called Jonnalgadda “pretentious” mouthing “highfalutin stuff” and “techno-babble”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“All these did not perturb me as it was a part of routine arguments,” says Jonnalagadda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in what he calls a “lightbulb moment”, he had the first inkling that Sharma could be operating the account of @confident_India through this thread:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img alt="https://i0.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-1.png?ssl=1" class="shrinkToFit" height="659" src="https://i0.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-1.png?ssl=1" width="520" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://i0.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-1.png?ssl=1"></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>“</b>Sharad Sharma’s original account doesn’t follow any of these people on the thread. The conversation would not have shown on his timeline. Yet both @confident_India and Sharad Sharma made the same argument,” says Jonnalagadda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Then, he says, Sharma gave it out. A question addressed to Sharad Sharma ended up being answered by @confident_India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img alt="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-2.png?ssl=1" class="shrinkToFit" height="659" src="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-2.png?ssl=1" width="393" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>@Confident_India also went on a tirade against the IFF fellows and called them “JNUtype”, “ISISstooge” or belonging to Lutyens Delhi, insinuating that the IFF fellows are terrorists or largely belong to a certain social elite category of people. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><img alt="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-3.png?ssl=1" class="shrinkToFit" height="659" src="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thread-3.png?ssl=1" width="514" /></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>When this prompted Jonnalagadda to verify the account with Sharma’s number, it matched. He later posted the video on his account. </span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>An email from <i>The Wire</i> to Sharad Sharma remained unanswered at the time of writing. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>However, soon after this alleged expose kicked off a Twitter war between the two groups, Sharad responded with a reply to Nikhil Pahwa’s tweet. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><img alt="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Screen123.png?ssl=1" src="https://i1.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Screen123.png?ssl=1" /></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>iSPIRT also responded in various online forums. </span><span>“Sharad Sharma, co-founder of iSPIRT, named in these allegations is in the US for a medical emergency in his family. As of this morning, Eastern Standard Time, Sharad has categorically denied these allegations. We will further investigate the confusion around the alleged link of mobile number and clarify all outstanding questions. For the moment, we are prioritising the well-being of Sharad and his family,” </span><a href="https://medium.com/@mtrajan/ispirt-response-to-kiran-jonnalagadda-3f977fb91df4" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="says the organisation’s response"><span>says the organisation’s response</span></a><span>. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>“We want to categorically state that the allegations against iSPIRT coordinating and/or promoting any troll campaign are false and the evidence presented is a deliberate misreading of our intent to engage with those speaking against India Stack” it added. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Interestingly, however, what has emerged out of the controversy is another allegation by the IFF that iSPIRT had made trolling part of its policy to counter Aadhaar’s “detractors.”</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>At a fellows meeting earlier this year in February, iSPIRT charted out a “Detractors Matrix” in which they categorised the anti-Aadhar campaigners into four categories, namely “misinformed, fearful, and engaging”, “informed, fearful and engaging”, “misinformed and trolling” and lastly, “informed yet trolling”. </span><span>In an internal iSPIRT presentation, <a href="https://thewire.in/author/reetika-khera/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="Reetika Khera">Reetika Khera</a>, IIT professor and a renowned economist, and Nikhil Pahwa, IFF’s co-founder were shown as belonging to the last two categories. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To counter Aadhaar critics on online platforms, iSPIRT volunteers intended to group themselves into “archers” and “swordsmen” who would challenge their theories on Twitter and elsewhere.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><img alt="https://i2.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/unnamed.png?ssl=1" src="https://i2.wp.com/thewire.in/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/unnamed.png?ssl=1" /></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>iSPIRT has acknowledged discussing the “detractor matrix” in its reply to the allegation but dismissed it being equivalent to trolling, as Jonnalagadda alleges. </span><span>Co-founder of iSPIRT, ThiyagaRajan Maruthavanan, while responding to allegations said that there was no official involvement on behalf of iSPIRT.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>CIS allegations</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many of the pro-Aadhaar Twitter trolls, most noticeably Confident_India, have also lashed out at other Internet rights organisations. This includes the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) which last month released <a href="https://thewire.in/130948/aadhaar-card-details-leaked/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="a report that claimed">a report that claimed</a> that over 100 million Aadhaar numbers were publicly exposed by four government websites. The Confident_India Twitter handle has <a href="https://twitter.com/Confident_India/status/860461256393621506" rel="external nofollow" target="_blank" title="alleged">alleged</a> that CIS has violated foreign funding regulations (under the Foreign Contributions Regulations Act), that they are likely “funded by ISI” and that because of their “advocacy efforts”, the organisation should be shut down.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It should be noted that the Unique Identification Authority of India has also sent a sharp letter to CIS over its report and has suggested that some of the Aadhaar data that the report documented could not have been gotten through legal means.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-19-2017-ajoy-ashirwad-mahaprahasta-debate-over-aadhaar-turns-nasty-as-critics-accuse-supporters-of-online-trolling'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-19-2017-ajoy-ashirwad-mahaprahasta-debate-over-aadhaar-turns-nasty-as-critics-accuse-supporters-of-online-trolling</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-06-07T13:09:10ZNews ItemAadhaar data leak: Take precautions while sharing info on websites, MEITy tells all depts
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indian-express-may-11-2017-aadhaar-data-leak-take-precautions-while-sharing-info-on-websites-meity-tells-all-depts
<b>‘Publishing identity info is in clear contravention of the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016’</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/aadhaar-data-leak-take-precautions-while-sharing-info-on-websites-meity-tells-all-depts-4650295/">published in the Indian Express</a> on May 11, 2017.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In light of various Central and state government departments making public Aadhaar information of several users on their websites, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITy) has written to secretaries of all government departments asking them to sensitise the officials and take precautions while publishing or sharing data on their websites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“It has come to notice that there have been instances wherein personal identity or information of residents, alongwith Aadhaar numbers and demographic information and other sensitive personal data such as bank details collected by ministries/departments, state departments for administration of welfare schemes etc. have been<br /> published online,” IT secretary Aruna Sundararajan wrote in the letter dated April 24.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Publishing identity information i.e. Aadhaar number along with demographic information is in clear contravention of the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 and constitutes an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years. Further, publishing of financial information including bank details, being sensitive personal data, is also in contravention of provision under IT Act, 2000 with violations liable to pay damages by way of compensation to persons affected,” she noted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to media reports, Aadhaar numbers of hundreds of thousands of pension beneficiaries were published on a state government website, and was followed by Chandigarh’s Food and Civil Supplies Department revealing the Aadhaar information of beneficiaries of public distribution system. Following Sundararajan’s letter, various central government ministries have issued advisories to sensitise the officials and the web information managers to comply with the IT Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier this month, a report by non-profit organisation The Centre for Internet and Society noted that up to 13.5 crore Aadhaar numbers were exposed and were publicly available on government websites, with about 10 crore of these being linked to bank account details. The 27-paged report — Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensitive personal financial information — has collected Aadhaar data from four government portals.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Two of these are national portals: National Social Assistance Programme and <a href="http://indianexpress.com/about/mahatma-gandhi">Mahatma Gandhi</a> National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, both under the rural development ministry. The other two studied by the report’s authors, Srinivas Kodali and Amber Sinha, are run by the AP government: a daily online payments report under MGNREGA by the state government, and Chandranna Bima Scheme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Based on the numbers available on the websites looked at, the estimated number of Aadhaar numbers leaked through these 4 portals could be around 130-135 million (13-13.5 crore) and the number of bank accounts numbers leaked at around 100 million (10 crore) from the specific portals we looked at,” the report stated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The letter</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“It has come to notice that there have been instances wherein…information of residents, alongwith Aadhaar numbers and demographic information…have been published online,” IT secretary Aruna Sundararajan wrote in the letter dated April 24</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indian-express-may-11-2017-aadhaar-data-leak-take-precautions-while-sharing-info-on-websites-meity-tells-all-depts'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-indian-express-may-11-2017-aadhaar-data-leak-take-precautions-while-sharing-info-on-websites-meity-tells-all-depts</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T14:59:38ZNews ItemTaking Cognisance of the Deeply Flawed System That Is Aadhaar
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-10-2017-shreyashi-roy-taking-cognisance-of-the-deeply-flawed-system-that-is-aadhaar
<b>Aadhaar and its many connotations have grown to be among the most burning issues on the Indian fore today, that every citizen aware of their rights should be taking note of.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Shreyashi Roy was <a class="external-link" href="https://thewire.in/133916/taking-cognisance-of-the-deeply-flawed-system-that-is-aadhaar/">published in the Wire</a> on May 10, 2017.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the <a href="https://thewire.in/130948/aadhaar-card-details-leaked/" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="leak of 130 million Aadhaar numbers">leak of 130 million Aadhaar numbers</a> recently coming to light, several activists, lawyers and ordinary citizens are up in arms about what is increasingly being viewed as a government surveillance system. Keeping this in mind, on Tuesday, May 9, Software Freedom Law Centre India (SFLC) hosted an event that brought together a panel to clearly articulate the dangers of Aadhaar and to discuss whether the biometric identification system is capable of being reformed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">SFLC is a donor-supported legal services organisation that calls itself a protector of civil liberties in the digital age.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Titled ‘Revisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond’, the discussion, with several eminent personalities who have in-depth knowledge of Aadhaar and its working, threw light on the various problems that have cropped up with regard to India’s unique identification system. The discussion was moderated by Saikat Datta, policy director at Centre for Internet and Society, which published the report that studied the third-party leaks of Aadhaar numbers and other personal data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The leaks</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The discussion took off from the point of the leaks, with Srinivas Kodali, a panelist and one of the authors of the report, explaining his methodology for the study that proved that the Aadhaar database lacked the security required when dealing with private information of people. He highlighted the fact that during the course of his research, he had noticed several leaks from government websites and notified the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) about the same. Yet, at every step, UIDAI continued to deny and reject the possibility of this happening. Kodali says, however, that he had noticed that the websites that were unknowingly leaking data were, in fact, fixing the leaks after being notified without acknowledging that the leak had happened in the first place. Kodali reiterated at the discussion, as in his report, that a simple tweaking of URL query parameters of the National Social Assistance Programme website could unmask and display private information. Unfortunately, UIDAI cannot be brought to task for unknowingly leaking information because there is no such provision.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He also addressed the question of the conflict of interest that existed in the entire system of building Aadhaar, which was created by developers who later left the UIDAI and built their own private companies, monetising the mine of private information that they were sitting on. Kodali blames UIDAI for this even being allowed, since the developers, though clearly lacking ethics, were in fact, merely volunteers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The system</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the glaring issues with the technology behind Aadhaar is that the software is not open source. Anivar Aravind, a panelist, called it “defected by design” and “bound to fail” because not only is the technology completely untested but there are very obvious leaks that are taking place. Moreover, UIDAI does not allow any third-party audits or any other persons to look at the technology. Datta pointed to the fact that this is unheard of in other nations, where software is routinely subjected to penetration testing and hacking experts are called upon to check how secure a database is.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Anupam Saraph, another panelist and future designer, illuminated the creation of the Aadhaar database, pointing out that this is a system less about identification and more about verification. All of the verification, moreover, has been done by private parties, making the database itself suspect and leaving everyone’s private information loose at the time of enrolment. In addition, Aadhaar was meant for all residents and not just citizens. But now there is a mix of both, creating confusion in many aspects. Saraph also brought up how one rogue agency with access to all this information could pose an actual national security threat, unlike all the requests for information on breaches that the government keeps pointing fingers at. Referring to Nandan Nilekani’s statement about Aadhaar not being like AIDS, Saraph pointed out that it was exactly like it because much like the body, which cannot distinguish between an invasion and itself, the Aadhaar system is not being able to distinguish between aliens and citizens and has begun denying the latter benefits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Supreme Court has declared time and again that Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory, but the government continues to – in complete disregard of the apex court’s judgment – insist on Aadhaar for a multitude of schemes. More and more schemes are being made unavailable without the existence of an Aadhaar number as the government continues to function in a complete lack of cognisance of the fact that the poor are losing out on something as basic as their food because of a number. Prasanna S., an advocate and a panelist, called it a “voluntary but mandatory” system that is becoming an evidence collection mechanism. Moreover, everything is connected through this one number, making many options like financial fraud, selective treatment of citizens and other horrors possible. The collection of all this information is not dangerous, screams the government. Maybe not in the hands of this one. But what of the next? What of rogues?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The legal aspect</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One of the panelists was Shyam Divan, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court, who has represented petitioners fighting against Aadhaar. Divan spoke about how along with a group of advocates he has been trying to get the apex court to rule on the issue but has been met with long queues before a ruling can be procured. He addressed the right to privacy aspect of the system and the recent declaration that the citizen does not have the absolute right to the body. He emphasised that the government cannot own the body and that for a free and democratic society, a limited government, instead of an all-knowing and all-seeing government, is essential. Unfortunately for India, there is no express right to privacy in the constitution, but that does not mean that rights can be taken away in exchange for a fingerprint. It is the government’s duty to respect privacy. For him, Aadhaar has become an instrument of oppression and exclusion, a point that Prasanna also agreed with, calling it a “systematic attack on consent”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is complete agreement that there has been a railroading of consent in this entire matter if Aadhaar being passed forcibly through the Lok Sabha as a money bill is anything to go by. If parliament’s consent can be disregarded in that fashion, what is an ordinary citizen to do in the face of this complete imbalance of power in the state’s hand?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Usha Ramanathan, a legal researcher and a long-time critic of Aadhaar, spoke about how India has turned into a state where there are more restrictions than fundamental rights, rather than the other way around. She related how there was no clarity at the beginning of Aadhaar of how it would be a card or a number and was never a government project in the first place. This is a private sector ambition that the government has jumped on board with, without considering that the private sector does not concern itself with civil liberties. As other panelists also pointed out, the private sector cannot and will not protect public interest. This is the job of the government, especially in an age of digitisation. But Aadhaar compromises the ability of the state to stand up for its citizens.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With June 30 approaching fast, many of those who have so far abstained from enrolling in the system are considering giving up their rebellion and going like sheep to get themselves registered in the database. In the words of Divan, they will have to “volunteer compulsorily for an Aadhaar”. The government is probably counting on this. Turning to the Supreme Court has been of no help, although a verdict can be hoped for in a couple of weeks. But what can we do if they rule for the government?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some of the panelists are on board with the idea of a civil disobedience movement, a kind of a rebellion against Aadhaar. Some suggested thinking of out-of-the-box ways to register one’s protest and dissent against what is clearly becoming the architecture of a surveillance state. Saraph was particularly vehement about the need to completely destroy the Aadhaar database – “shred it”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What all the panelists emphasised repeatedly was that there can be no improvements to a system that is so deeply flawed and that has had so many “teething problems” that are making millions suffer. The main takeaway from the discussion was that Aadhaar must see a speedy demise because it cannot be saved and cannot persist in its current state.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-10-2017-shreyashi-roy-taking-cognisance-of-the-deeply-flawed-system-that-is-aadhaar'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wire-may-10-2017-shreyashi-roy-taking-cognisance-of-the-deeply-flawed-system-that-is-aadhaar</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T14:52:58ZNews ItemRevisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/revisiting-aadhaar-law-tech-and-beyond
<b>Udbhav Tiwari attended a panel on "Revisiting Aadhaar: Law, Tech and Beyond" held at the India International Centre Annexe on May 9, 2017 in New Delhi, organised by the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC.in) in collaboration with Digital Empowerment Foundation and IT for Change.</b>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">The panel consisted of:</div>
<div style="text-align: justify; ">
<ul>
<li>Saikat Datta; Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society (Moderator) </li>
<li>Anivar Aravind; Founder/Director at Indic Project </li>
<li>Anupam Saraph; Professor and Future Designer </li>
<li>Prasanna S; Advocate </li>
<li>Shyam Divan; Senior Advocate, Supreme Court </li>
<li>Srinivas Kodali; Co-founder at Open Stats </li>
<li>Osama Manzar; Founder and Director, Digital Empowerment Foundation </li>
<li>Usha Ramanathan; Legal Researcher</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The panel was quite enlightening (and Saikat was a stellar moderator), with Mr. Divan's elucidation on the arguments made in the court for the Aadhaar case in particular being a great learning experience. Benjamin and Sheetal (both interns in the Delhi office) along with Sumandro also attended the event.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The other learning was that for people who have attended multiple such panels/seminars and meetings on Aadhaar, they can have a lot of repeated content. I passed on the feedback to SFLC about how they could possibly include a small 10 to 15 minute session in future such panels on developments since the previous such event on the Aadhaar and include practical aspects about what people can do about minimising the harms that we are all slowly being co opted into facing with the system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More info about the event <a class="external-link" href="http://sflc.in/panel-discussion-revisiting-aadhaar-law-tech-and-beyond-may-9-2017-new-delhi/">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/revisiting-aadhaar-law-tech-and-beyond'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/revisiting-aadhaar-law-tech-and-beyond</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T14:47:32ZNews ItemAadhaar security: Here's how your private information can be protected
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-sanjay-kumar-singh-aadhaar-security-here-is-how-your-private-information-can-be-protected
<b>Lock Aadhaar, and notify UIDAI if you get a one-time-password for a transaction you did not initiate</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Sanjay Kumar Singh was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/aadhaar-security-here-s-how-your-private-information-can-be-protected-117051000611_1.html">Business Standard</a> on May 11, 2017. Udbhav Tiwari was quoted.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">The linking of Aadhaar — the 12-digit unique identification number for Indian residents — across various benefits is going through a roller-coaster ride. On one hand, the government, keen to make it mandatory, is linking it with filing of income-tax returns and benefits. But, on the other, many are uncomfortable with it because of privacy issues and leakages that have been reported recently. The Supreme Court, on Tuesday, referred another fresh plea challenging the Aadhaar Act and its mandatory use in government schemes to a larger Constitution bench. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">There has been several reports that say that Aadhaar numbers and other personal data are being leaked. Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has published a report (titled Information security practices of Aadhaar, or lack thereof) where it lists four government departments that have posted Aadhaar numbers and other personal information of people. According to the report, an estimated 130-135 million Aadhaar numbers and 100 million bank account numbers were posted on the four portals that the CIS researchers checked. Normally such data should be kept on the government’s intranet, where only authorised people can access it. However, a few government departments have uploaded this data on their websites. In many cases, the data was in excel format, making it all the more easy for people to download and misuse it. The worst part: If your data is stolen, you cannot file even a First Information Report with the police. Only the nodal body, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), can file a police complaint.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Your data can be misused:</b> Experts say that leakage of Aadhaar numbers and other personal information into the public domain violates peoples’ privacy. “Your name, phone number, address, bank account number and Aadhaar number are personal information. Only you have the right to decide whether to release such information to others. Such data shouldn’t be complied in excel sheets in large numbers and be freely accessible on the internet to everyone," says Udbhav Tiwari, policy officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Tele-marketers and advertisers will have access to the personal information of all those people. More serious problems such as identity theft can occur. Says Smitha Krishna Prasad, project manager, Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University, Delhi: “The more sensitive information a person has about you, the easier it becomes to impersonate you when that person is speaking to, say, a bank." The impersonator could open a bank account or even take a loan in your name.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Suppose a hacker gets your email ID. “He will use the ‘password reset or forgot password’ feature to change your password and get access to your account. This feature poses questions based on personal info about you. Any such data collected about you comes useful here. Such hackers mine a lot of data about potential victims from all possible sources," says Shomiron Das Gupta of NetMonastery, a threat management provider. In the email, he could find info about your bank account, credit card account, etc, and cause financial losses to you.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Serious risks can also arise if someone manages to breach the biometric authentication or one-time password (OTP) required for using the Aadhaar system. “It is possible to copy an individual’s fingerprints, and replicate them using very commonly available resins. It is also possible for hackers to capture the data being communicated between a telephone tower and a mobile phone, especially if it is poorly encrypted. This will allow the hacker to see the OTP. Admittedly, this does require expertise and a targeted effort vis-a-vis an individual," says Tiwari. Now that the Aadhaar numbers of so many people have been divulged, someone could utilise their identities to steal their government-granted benefits, or obtain a SIM card, which could then be misused. Raman Jit Singh Chima, policy director, Access Now, says at many places where the Aadhaar number is required today, no biometric authentication is done. So just the number can be used to impersonate you.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Lock your biometrics:</b> If your Aadhaar number and other personal information have been leaked, here are a few steps you can take to safeguard yourself. One, be wary of any calls you receive asking for additional details, which may not have been leaked already. Be equally wary if you receive a call wherein someone rattles off your personal data and asks you to verify it. The caller could pretend to be calling from your bank. It is best not to reveal or confirm any information over the phone at all. Two, you have the option to lock your biometric data online. Even if someone manages to steal your fingerprint, he will not be able to use it if you have locked your biometric data (see table). Also, if you get an OTP on your phone for an Aadhaar utilisation that you did not initiate, notify the UIDAI, and thus ensure that no transaction is carried out using your Aadhaar account.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Need for a privacy law: </b>To prevent data leaks in the future, the government needs to sensitise state government officials who work with Aadhaar data about the need to protect the its privacy. More importantly, India needs a comprehensive data protection law. At present, there is limited provision in the Information Technology Act of 2008 under which you can file a civil case against a corporate that has leaked your personal information. “The person affected by data leakage has to show that he has suffered wrongful loss, or somebody else has enjoyed a wrongful gain, and then claim compensation," says Prasad.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After the Radia tapes incident, the government had said it would pass a comprehensive privacy law. “This law would lead to the creation of a data protection authority with enforcement powers, which would be able to penalise both companies and government bodies violating privacy principles. Despite the process beginning in 2012-13, and multiple drafts being leaked into the public domain, there has not been much progress on this count," says Chima. He adds that when the privacy law becomes a reality, any part of the Aadhaar Act that is contrary to it should also be amended.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>How to lock your biometric data online</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Go to the UIDAI web site: https://uidai.gov.inGo to Aadhaar services, then Lock/Unlock Biometrics Enter Aadhaar number Enter security code that appears below the Aadhaar numberYou will receive an OTP on your registered mobile number. Enter it Click ‘Verify’Click box against ‘Enable biometric lock’Click on Submit buttonSame procedure can be repeated to disable biometric lock.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-sanjay-kumar-singh-aadhaar-security-here-is-how-your-private-information-can-be-protected'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-sanjay-kumar-singh-aadhaar-security-here-is-how-your-private-information-can-be-protected</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T10:05:25ZNews ItemWatch: Aadhaar has become a whipping boy: Nandan Nilekani
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-may-13-2017-alnoor-peermohamed-and-raghu-krishnan-aadhaar-has-become-a-whipping-boy-nandan-nilekani
<b>India certainly needs a modern data privacy and protection law, Nilekani said in an interview.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Alnoor Peermohamed and Raghu Krishnan was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/aadhaar-has-become-a-whipping-boy-nandan-nilekani-117051201521_1.html">published in the Business Standard</a> on May 13, 2017.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As debate rages over <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>being a <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>and surveillance liability, its architect <b>Nandan Nilekani </b>says the unique identity programme has become a “whipping ward”. In an interview with <i>Alnoor Peermohamed </i>and <i>Raghu Krishnan</i>, he says we need a data protection and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>law with adequate judicial and parliamentary oversight. Edited excerpts:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>There is concern we are losing our <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>because of <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar.</a>..</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">Privacy </a>is an issue the whole world is facing, thanks to digitisation. The day you went from a feature phone to a smartphone the amount of digital footprint you left behind went up dramatically. The phone records your messages, it knows what you are saying, it has a GPS so it can tell anybody where you are, the towers can tell anybody where you are because they are constantly pinging the phone. There are accelerometers and gyroscopes in the phone that detect movement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Internet companies essentially make money from data. They use data to sell you things or advertisements. And that data is not even in India, it is in some country in some unaccountable server and accessible to the government of that foreign country, not ours.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Then increasingly there is the Internet of Things. Your car has so many sensors, wearables have sensors and all of them are recording data and beaming it to somebody else. Then there are CCTV cameras everywhere, and today they are all IP-enabled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>is a global issue, caused by digitisation. <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>is one small part of that. The system is designed not to collect information, because the first risk to <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>is if someone is collecting information. <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>is a passive ID system, it just sits there and when you go somewhere and invoke it, it authenticates your identity. By design itself, it is built for <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy.</a> I believe India needs a modern data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law.</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Why is <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>being used as a proxy for the <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>and data protection issues?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is a motivated campaign by people who are trying to find different ways to say something about it. <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">Privacy </a>is a much bigger issue. I have been talking about <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>much before anyone else. In 2010, when it was not such a big issue, I had written to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh saying we needed a data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law.</a> You could see what was happening, the iPhone came out on June 30, 2007, Android phones came around the time we started Aadhaar, so we could see the trend. I asked Rahul Matthan, a top intellectual property and data lawyer, to help and we worked with the government to come out with a draft law. And then there was the AP Shah Committee. The UIDAI’s DDG Ashok Pal Singh was a part of that committee, so we helped shape that policy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When a banking application uses Aadhaar, the system does not know what the bank does. It is deliberately designed so that data is kept away from the core system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I am all for a data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law </a>but we should look at it in context, look at the big picture. If people want to work together to create a data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>law then it is a great thing. But if they want to use it to just attack Aadhaar, then there is some other interest at work.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Now that the government is linking <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>to PAN and driver’s licences, will that not lead to <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>being used as a surveillance tool?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Surveillance is conducted through a 24x7 system that knows what you are doing, so from a technology perspective the best surveillance device is your phone. The phone is the device you should worry about.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>is not a 24x7 product. I buy one SIM card a year and do an e-KYC, the driver’s licence sits in my pocket and only sometimes someone asks for it. With the PAN card I file my returns only once a year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>But with all that data being linked, can the government not use it?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is a valid concern and has to be addressed through a legal and oversight process. <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>is just one technology. You do not attack the technology, you look at the overall picture.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The US has the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act under which special courts issue warrants to the FBI for surveillance. This is absolutely required and it should be a part of the data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law </a>(in India) which says under what circumstances the government can authorise surveillance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today mobile phones are being tapped by so many agencies. In the US, the FBI is under the oversight of the Senate. In India, Parliament does not have oversight of any intelligence agency. I remember (former Union minister) Manish Tewari had introduced a Bill six or seven years ago saying Intelligence agencies needed to be under the oversight of the Parliament, but nothing happened.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Is there any way to stop <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>being used as a surveillance tool?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today a person can be identified with or without <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar.</a> US systems can identify a person in a few milliseconds using big data. All that is part of what we have to protect. <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>by itself is not going to add anything to that. What is important is that the infrastructure of surveillance comes under judicial oversight as well as parliamentary oversight.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Would the <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>narrative have been different if this were a Congress-led government?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I think most people making this noise are against the government, so it is a political argument and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>has become a convenient whipping ward. Lots of different agendas are at work here. But my understanding is this - whether it is data protection and privacy, surveillance or security, these are all broad issues that apply to technology in general and if you are serious about solving the issues you should fix it at the highest level and have a data protection and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>law which includes, mobile phones, CCTV cameras and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar.</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>A report by the Centre for Internet and Society says 130 million <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>identities have been leaked...</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is because of the transparency movement in the last 10 years. In 2006, we passed the RTI Act and MNREGA Act. Section 4 of the RTI Act says that data about benefits should be made public. At that time it was all about transparency. Since then, governments have been publishing lists of MNREGA beneficiaries and how much money is being put into their bank accounts. At that time it was applauded. Now the same thing is coming back as <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy </a>being affected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are not leaks; governments have been consciously putting out the data in the interest of transparency. The message from this is we have to strike a balance between transparency and <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Privacy" target="_blank">privacy.</a> And that is a difficult balance because Section 4 of the RTI Act says if a benefit is provided by the government it is public information, so the names of beneficiaries should be published because it is taxpayers’ money.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is something called personally identifiable information. You should strike a balance between transparency and not revealing personally identifiable information. That is a delicate balance, and people will have to figure this out. The risk you have now is governments will stop publishing data - look, you guys have made a big fuss about privacy, we will not publish. In fact, the transparency guys are now worried that all the gains are being lost.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>If <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>is voluntary, why is the government forcing it on to various schemes?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are two things, benefits and entitlements and government-issued documents. There the government has passed a law, the <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>Bill of 2016, which is signed by the President. In that, there is a clear protocol that the government can use <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>for benefits and what process they should follow.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second thing is <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>for government documents. There are three examples - PAN cards, driver’s licences and SIM cards.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government has modified the Finance Bill and made <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>mandatory for a PAN card. Why has it done that? Because India has a large number of duplicate PAN cards. India has something like over 250 million PAN cards and only 40 million taxpayers. Some of those may be people who have taken PAN cards just as ID but not for tax purposes, but frankly it is also because a lot of people have duplicate PAN cards. Why do people have duplicates? That is a way of tax evasion. The only way you can eliminate duplicate PAN cards is by having <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>as a way of establishing uniqueness.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second thing is mobile phones. Here the mobile phone requirement came from the Supreme Court, where somebody filed a PIL saying so many mobile phones are being given to terrorists and therefore you need to do an e-KYC when the SIM is cut and the government said they would use <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>and they have been asked to do it by 2018.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The third thing is driver’s licences. As (Union Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari has said, 30 per cent of all driver’s licences are fakes. Now why is this important? Because when you have fake driver’s licences or multiple drivers’ licences, even if you are caught, you can give your fake licence and continue to drive. Today India is the country with the largest number of deaths on highways. Lack of enforcement, fake licences are all a problem. So in the latest Motor Vehicle Bill which was passed the government said <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>was necessary to get a licence. So that you have just one driver’s licence, whether it is issued in Karnataka or Bihar, you have just one.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The government is also talking about using <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>for the mid-day meal scheme...</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If you talk to people on the ground, and I have spoken to people on the ground, a big part of the leakage is mid-day meals. It is not reaching children. So it is important that all this has to happen so children get what they need.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>You engaged with governments and civil servants when you initiated the <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>process. In hindsight, would you say you should have also engaged with civil society?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I do not think there is any other programme in history which reached out to every stakeholder in the country. When we started <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>we met governments, regulators and even parliamentarians. I gave a talk in Parliament and we engaged deeply with civil society. In fact, we had one volunteer only to engage with civil society.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>You said you were engaged with the previous government about the data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law.</a> Are you engaging with the current one too?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I am not really engaging. I know that people are working on it and recently the attorney-general has made a statement in the Supreme Court that the government will bring in a data <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Protection+Law" target="_blank">protection law </a>by Diwali.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>We have heard of several instances of people not being able to get their biometric authentication done. Is there a problem with <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar?</a></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The seeding of data in the <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>database has to be done properly and that is a process. Authentication has been proven at scale in Andhra Pradesh. Millions of people receive food with <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>authentication in 29,000 PDS outlets. In fact, now they have portability -- a person from Guntur can go to Vijayawada and get his rations. It is empowering. We keep forgetting about the empowering value.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What has the Andhra Pradesh government done? They have used fingerprints, but they also have used iris scans, OTP on phone, and they have a village revenue officer if none of the above works. When you design the system, you have to design it in a way that 100 per cent of the beneficiaries genuinely get the benefit. Andhra Pradesh has shown it can be done.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government needs to package the learning and best practices of Andhra Pradesh and take it to every other state. It is an execution issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Activists have raised concerns over the centralised <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>database...</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">How else would you establish uniqueness? If you are going to give a billion people a number, how else would you do it? Is there any other way of doing it? Every cloud is centralised, then we should not have cloud systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>How do you ensure security standards and software are updated?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are very good people there. The CEO is very good. There is a three-member executive board with chairman Satyanarayana and two members, Anand Deshpande and Rajesh Jain. I have no doubt that they will continue to improve things.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On security, you keep improving. It is a constant race everywhere in the world. They are now coming out with registered devices that will make it more difficult to spoof.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But without a centralised database, how do you establish that an identity is not two people? If you look at the team that designed this, cumulatively they have a few hundred years of experience of designing large systems around the world. Every design decision has been taken consciously looking at the pros and cons. Why did we have both fingerprints and iris scans? There are two reasons. One is to ensure uniqueness. The second is inclusion. We knew that fingerprints in India do not work all the time because of age and manual labour. So we included iris scans. I can give you a document from 2009 that says all of this. All of these things were thought through.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>If you are given a chance to design <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar </a>today what would you do differently?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I would do exactly the same thing. Go back and look at the design document. Every design has been articulated, the pros and cons are written down, published on our website, and it is a highly transparent exercise. It is the appropriate design for the problem we are trying to solve. We are forgetting about the huge benefits people are getting. Crores of people are getting direct benefit transfer without hassle. They can go to a village business correspondent and withdraw money using <a class="storyTags" href="http://www.business-standard.com/search?type=news&q=Aadhaar" target="_blank">Aadhaar.</a> They can get their SIM card and open a bank account using e-KYC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">You are also forgetting that people are getting empowered. That portability has ensured the bargaining power has shifted from the PDS shop owner to the individual. If a PDS guy treats him badly, the individual can choose another shop, earlier he could not do that. The empowerment of millions of people to buy rations at the shop of their choice is extraordinary.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-may-13-2017-alnoor-peermohamed-and-raghu-krishnan-aadhaar-has-become-a-whipping-boy-nandan-nilekani'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-may-13-2017-alnoor-peermohamed-and-raghu-krishnan-aadhaar-has-become-a-whipping-boy-nandan-nilekani</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T09:54:52ZNews ItemUIDAI puts posers to CIS over Aadhaar data leak claim
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-may-19-2017-pti-uidai-puts-posers-to-cis-over-aadhaar-data-leak-claim
<b>Aadhaar-issuing authority UIDAI has asked research firm Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) to explain its sensational claim that 13 crore Aadhaar numbers were "leaked" and provide details of servers where they are stored.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article originally published by PTI was also <a class="external-link" href="http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/uidai-puts-posers-to-cis-over-aadhaar-data-leak-claim/675814/">published by the Financial Express</a> on May 19, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Aadhaar-issuing authority UIDAI has asked research firm Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) to explain its sensational claim that 13 crore Aadhaar numbers were “leaked” and provide details of servers where they are stored. In a precursor to initiating a probe into the matter, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) also wants CIS to clarify just how much of such “sensitive data” are still with it or anyone else. The UIDAI — which has vehemently denied any breach of its database — shot off a letter to CIS yesterday asking for the details, including the servers where the downloaded “sensitive data” are residing and information about usage or sharing of such data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Underscoring the importance of bringing to justice those involved in “hacking such sensitive information”, the UIDAI sought CIS’ “assistance” in this regard and has given it time till May 30 to revert on the issue. “Your report mentions 13 crore people’s data have been leaked. Please specify how much (of) this data have been downloaded by you or are in your possession, or in the possession of any other persons that you know,” the UIDAI said in its communication to CIS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Interestingly, in what market watchers described as an apparent flip-flop, CIS has now clarified that there was no leak’ or ‘breach’ of Aadhaar numbers, but rather ‘public disclosure’. Meanwhile, the UIDAI has quoted sections of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Aadhaar Act to emphasise that violation of the clauses are punishable with rigorous imprisonment of up to 10 years. “While your report suggests that there is a need to strengthen IT security of the government websites, it is also important that persons involved in hacking such sensitive information are brought to justice for which your assistance is required under the law,” it said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The UIDAI has also sought technical details on how access was gained for the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) site — one of the four portals where the alleged leak happened. When contacted, UIDAI CEO Ajay Bhushan Pandey said, “We do not comment on individual matters.” The UIDAI has also asked for details of systems that were involved in downloading and storing of the sensitive data so that forensic examination of such machines can be conducted to assess the quantum and extent of damage to privacy of data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The UIDAI letter comes after a CIS’ report early this month which claimed that Aadhaar numbers and personal information of as many as 135 million Indians could have been leaked from four government portals due to lack of IT security practices. “Based on the numbers available on the websites looked at, estimated number of Aadhaar numbers leaked through these four portals could be around 130-135 million,” the report had said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in a apparent course correction on May 16, a day before the UIDAI’s letter went out — CIS updated its report and clarified that although the term ‘leak’ was originally used 22 times in its report, it is “best characterised as an illegal data disclosure or publication and not a breach or a leak”. CIS has also claimed that some of its findings were “misunderstood or misinterpreted” by the media, and that it never suggested that the biometric database had been breached. “We completely agree with both Dr Pandey (UIDAI CEO) and Sharma (Trai Chairman R S Sharma) that CIDR (Aadhaar central repository) has not been breached, nor is it suggested anywhere in the report,” CIS said in its latest update.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-may-19-2017-pti-uidai-puts-posers-to-cis-over-aadhaar-data-leak-claim'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-may-19-2017-pti-uidai-puts-posers-to-cis-over-aadhaar-data-leak-claim</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaUIDAIAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-05-19T09:28:33ZNews ItemUIDAI asks Centre for Internet & Society to provide hacker details
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-18-2017-mahendra-singh-uidai-asks-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-provide-hacker-details
<b>The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the regulatory authority for Aadhaar, has written to a Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), seeking details about a suspected hack attack on government websites that led to the leak of information about 13 crore users.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Mahendra Singh was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/technology/uidai-asks-centre-for-internet-society-to-provide-hacker-details/58731336">Times of India</a> on May 18, 2017.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), the regulatory authority for Aadhaar, has written to a Bengaluru-based research organisation, Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), seeking details about a suspected hack attack on government websites that led to the leak of information about 13 crore users.<br /><br />In a recent report, CIS had highlighted that websites run by various government departments, owing to a poor security framework, had publicly displayed sensitive personal financial information and Aadhaar numbers of beneficiaries of certainprojects.<br /><br />In its letter, UIDAI argued that the data downloaded from one of the websites could not have been accessed unless the website was hacked. As hacking is a grave offence under the law, the UIDAI has asked CIS to provide details of the persons involved in the data theft.<br /><br />According to a source, the UIDAI said that access to data on the website for the 'National Social Assistance Program' was only possible for someone in possession of authorised login details, or if the site (http://nsap.nic.in) was hacked or breached. The UIDAI said in its letter that such illegal access was against the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and the IT Act, 2000, and that the persons involved had committed a grave offence.<br /><br />Asking the CIS to reply before May 30, the UIDAI also said, "Aadhaar system is a protected system under Section 70 of the IT Act, 2000, the violation of which is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a period up to 10 years." It added that the penalty clauses for violations are also provided in Section 36, Section 38 and Section 39 of the Aadhaar Act.<br />The UIDAI, however, maintained that even if the Aadhaar details were known to someone it did not pose a real threat to the people whose information was publicly available because the Aadhaar number could not be misused without biometrics.<br /><br />The UIDAI letter said, "While, as your report suggests, there is a need to strengthen IT security of government websites, it is also important that the persons involved in hacking such sensitive information are brought to justice for which your assistance is required under the law."<br /><br />"Your report mentions 13 crore people's data has been 'leaked'. Please specify how much of this data had been downloaded by you or are in your possession or in the possession of any other persons that you know. Please provide the details," the UIDAI added in its letter. The UIDAI also urged CIS to provide the details of the persons/organisations with whom it shared the data, if it did.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-18-2017-mahendra-singh-uidai-asks-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-provide-hacker-details'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-18-2017-mahendra-singh-uidai-asks-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-provide-hacker-details</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaAadhaarInternet GovernancePrivacy2017-06-07T12:21:47ZNews Item