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    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions">
    <title>DIDP Request #6: Revenues from gTLD auctions</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking information regarding revenues received from gTLD auctions. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS Request&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;12 January 2015&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Revenues from gTLD auctions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;It is our understanding that an auction for a Generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) is used as a last-resort mechanism in order to resolve string contention, i.e., when there are groups of applications for same or confusingly similar new gTLDs. As of now, the ICANN website only furnishes information of the winning applicant and the winning price, as regards each new gTLD auction.&lt;a href="#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; We have observed that information regarding the bids from all other applicants is not available. The revenue information provided to us&lt;a href="#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; does not include revenues from new gTLDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In this regard, we request you to provide us with the following information:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(i)    How many gTLDs have been sold &lt;i&gt;via&lt;/i&gt; the auction process, since its inception?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(ii)   What were the starting and winning bids in the ICANN auctions conducted?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(iii) What revenue has ICANN received from the gTLD auctions, since the first ICANN auction was conducted? Please also provide information about the winner (name, corporate information provided to/ available with ICANN).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(iv) How are proceeds from the gTLD auction process utilized?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;We believe that this information will give us a framework for understanding the gTLD auction process within ICANN. Furthermore, it will assist us in understanding the manner and purpose for which the proceeds from the auctioning process are utilized, in the broader structure of ICANN transparency and accountability.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Warm regards,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Lakshmi Venkataraman,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;IV Year, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;i&gt;for &lt;/i&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;W: &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org"&gt;http://cis-india.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN Response&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response to the above query is positive. ICANN states that all information surrounding the auctions is available on the New gTLDs microsite, and on the Auctions page: &lt;span&gt;http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions. The current status of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;auction proceeds and costs are available at &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; and auction results are at &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults. The utilization of proceeds from the auctions is yet to be decided by the ICANN Board:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; “[auction] proceeds will be reserved and earmarked until the Board determines a plan for the appropriate use of the funds through consultation with the community. Auction proceeds are net of any Auction costs. Auction costs may include initial set-up costs, auction management fees, and escrow fees.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-09feb15-en.pdf"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;found here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt; A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 6)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;Auction Results&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults"&gt;https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"&gt;http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-10T10:59:37Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1">
    <title>DIDP Request #5: The Ombudsman and ICANN's Misleading Response to Our Request</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of the complaints received and resolved, parties involved and the nature of complaints under the Ombudsman process. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. ICANN's response is misleading in its insistence on confidentiality of all Ombudsman complaints and resolutions.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;div class="page" title="Page 1"&gt;
&lt;div class="layoutArea"&gt;
&lt;div class="column"&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS Request&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;26 December 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class="layoutArea"&gt;
&lt;div class="column"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;To:&lt;br /&gt; Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Mr. Chris LaHatte, Ombudsman, ICANN &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Details regarding complaints submitted to the ICANN Ombudsman &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We are very pleased to note that ICANN’s transparency and accountability mechanisms include maintaining a free, fair and impartial ombudsman. It is our understanding that any person with a complaint against the ICANN Board, staff or organization, may do so to the designated ombudsman.[1]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We also understand that there are cases that the ICANN ombudsman does not have the authority to address. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In order to properly assess and study the efficiency and effectiveness of the ombudsman system, we request you to provide us with the following information: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;(i) A compilation of all the cases that have been decided by ICANN ombudsmen in the history of the organization. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;(ii) The details of the parties that are involved in the cases that have been decided by the ombudsmen. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;(iii)A description of the proceedings of the case, along with the party that won in each instance. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Further, we hope you could provide us with an answer as to why there have been no ombudsman reports since the year 2010, on the ICANN website.[2]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Additionally, we would like to bring to your notice that the link that provides the ombudsman report for the year 2010 does not work.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class="layoutArea"&gt;
&lt;div class="column"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In order to properly assess the mechanism that ICANN uses for grievance redressal, it would be necessary to examine the details of all the cases that ICANN ombudsmen have presided over in the past. In this regard, kindly provide us with the above information.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div class="page" title="Page 2"&gt;
&lt;div class="layoutArea"&gt;
&lt;div class="column"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We do hope that you will be able to furnish this information to us within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any doubts regarding our queries. Thank you so much. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yours sincerely,&lt;br /&gt; Lakshmi Venkataraman&lt;br /&gt; NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;br /&gt; W: http://cis-india.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;ICANN Response&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In its response, ICANN declines our request on grounds of confidentiality. It refers to the ICANN Bylaws on the office of the Ombudsman to argue that all matters brought before the Ombudsman "shall be treated as confidential" and the Ombudsman shall "&lt;span&gt;take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman". ICANN states that the Ombudsman publishes Annual Reports, in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;In sum, ICANN states that m&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;aking Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline our DIDP request. But it is important to investigate ICANN's reasons. The &lt;span&gt;ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman for 2 year terms, under &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V"&gt;Article V of ICANN’s Bylaws&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. As we note &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know"&gt;in an earlier post&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the Ombudsman’s principal function is to receive and dispose of &lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. He/she also &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en"&gt;Annual Reports&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;It is clear, therefore, that the Ombudsman receives and disposes of complaints under a procedure that is inadequately transparent. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;ICANN argues, however, that for reasons of confidentiality and integrity of the Ombudsman office, ICANN is unable to disclose details regarding Ombudsman complaints, the complainants/respondents and a description of the proceedings (including the decision/resolution). Indeed, ICANN states its&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; "Bylaws and &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf"&gt;the Ombudsman Framework&lt;/a&gt; obligates the Ombudsman to treat all matters brought before him as confidential and 'to take reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman'.” For this reason, ICANN considers that "D&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;isclosing details about the parties involved and the nature of the cases that have been decided by the Ombudsmen would not only compromise the confidentiality of the Ombudsman process but would also violate the ICANN Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework." &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;While the privacy of parties both involved and "not involved in the complaint" can be preserved (by redacting names, email addresses and other personal identification), h&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;ow valid is ICANN's dogged insistence on confidentiality and non-disclosure? Let's look at Article V of ICANN's Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework both.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Do ICANN Bylaws bind the Ombudsman to Confidentiality?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Under Article V, Section 1(2) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for a 2 year term (renewable). As noted earlier, the Ombudsman's principal function is to&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;“provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly” or inappropriately (Art. V, Section 2). The Ombudsman is not a judge; his conflict resolution tools are "&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;negotiation, facilitation, and 'shuttle diplomacy'. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;According to Art. V, Section 3(3), the Ombudsman has access to "all necessary information and records from staff and constituent bodies" to evaluate complaints in an informed manner. While the Ombudsman can &lt;i&gt;access&lt;/i&gt; these records, he may not "publish if otherwise confidential". When are these records confidential, then? Section 3(3) supplies the answer. The confidentiality obligations are as "imposed by the complainant or &lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN". For instance, the complainant can waive its confidentiality by publishing the text of its complaint &lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;and the Ombudsman's response to the same &lt;/span&gt;(such as the &lt;a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/ica-tells-icann-ombudsman-office-its-irt-report-tardy-nonresponsive-and-non-persuasive/"&gt;Internet Commerce Association's complaint&lt;/a&gt; regarding the Implementation Review Team under the new gTLD program), or a complaint may be publicly &lt;a href="http://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-discuss/2012-November/010974.html"&gt;available on a listserv&lt;/a&gt;. In any event, there is no blanket confidentiality obligation placed on the Ombudsman under ICANN's Bylaws.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Moreover, the Ombudsman also publishes Annual Reports,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt; in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". That is, the Ombudsman's Annual Report showcases a graph comparing the increase in the number of complaints, categories of complaints (i.e., whether the complaints fall within or outside of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction), and a brief description of the Ombudsman's scope of resolution and response. The Annual Reports indicate that the mandate of the Ombudsman's office is extremely narrow. In 2014, for instance, 75 out of 467 complaints were &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf"&gt;within Mr. LaHatte's jurisdiction&lt;/a&gt; (page 5), but he notes that his ability to intervene is limited to "failures in procedure". &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf"&gt;As an input to the ATRT2 Report noted&lt;/a&gt;, the Office of the Ombudsman “appears so restrained and contained” (page 53). As the ATRT2 noted, "&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;ICANN needs to reconsider the Ombudsman’s charter and the Office’s role as a symbol of good governance to be further incorporated in transparency processes"; the Office's transparency leaves much to be desired.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;But I digress.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Ombudsman is authorised to make reports on any complaint and its resolution (or lack thereof) to the ICANN Board, and unless the Ombudsman says so &lt;i&gt;in his sole discretion&lt;/i&gt;, his reports are to be posted on the website (Art. V, Section 4(4)). &lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Ombudsman can also report on individual requests, such as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://omblog.icann.org/index.html%3Fp=1015.html" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. LaHatte's response to a complaint regarding a DIDP denial&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt; (cached). &lt;/span&gt;Some reports are actually available on the Ombudsman page; the last published report dates back to 2012, though in 2013 and 2014, the Ombudsman dealt with more complaints within his jurisdiction than in 2012 or prior. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;So ICANN's argument that disclosing the information we ask for in our DIDP Request would violate ICANN Bylaws and the confidentiality of the Ombudsman is misleading. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Does the Ombudsman Framework Prohibit Public Reporting?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;So if ICANN Bylaws do not &lt;i&gt;ipso facto&lt;/i&gt; bind the Ombudsman's complaint and conflict resolution process to confidentiality, does the Ombudsman Framework do so?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Ombudsman does indeed have confidentiality obligations under &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;the Ombudsman Framework&lt;/a&gt; (page 4). All matters brought before the Ombudsman shall be treated as confidential, and the identities of parties not involved in the complaint are required to be protected. The Ombudsman may reveal the identity of the complainant to the ICANN Board or Staff only to further the resolution of a complaint (which seems fairly obvious); this obligation is extended to ICANN Board and Staff as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;As the Framework makes crystal clear, the &lt;i&gt;identity of complainants&lt;/i&gt; are to be kept confidential. Nothing whatsoever binds the Ombudsman from revealing the stakeholder group or affiliation of the complainants - and these are possibly of more importance. What stakeholders most often receive unfair or inappropriate treatment from ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies? Does business suffer more, or do non-commercial users, or indeed, governments? It is good to know &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf"&gt;what countries the complaints come from (page 4-5)&lt;/a&gt;, but given ICANN's insistence on its multi-stakeholder model as a gold standard, it is important to know what stakeholders suffer the most in the ICANN system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In fact, in the first page, the Ombudsman Framework says this: "&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Ombudsman may post complaints and resolutions to a dedicated portion of the ICANN website&lt;/strong&gt; (http://www.icann.org/ombudsman/): (i) &lt;strong&gt;in order to promote an understanding of the issues in the ICANN community&lt;/strong&gt;; (ii) to raise awareness of administrative fairness; and (iii) &lt;strong&gt;to allow the community to see the results of similar previous cases&lt;/strong&gt;. These postings will be done in a &lt;strong&gt;generic manner&lt;/strong&gt; to protect the confidentiality and privilege of communicating with the Office of Ombudsman." But the ICANN website does not, in fact, host records of any Ombudsman complaints or resolutions; it links you only to the Annual Reports and Publications. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;As I've written before, the Annual Reports provide no details regarding the nature of each complaint, their origins or resolution, and are useful if the only information we need is bare statistics of the &lt;i&gt;number of complaints received&lt;/i&gt;. That is useful, but it's not enough. Given that the Ombudsman Framework &lt;i&gt;does&lt;/i&gt; allow complaint/resolution reporting, it is baffling that ICANN's response to our DIDP request chooses to emphasise only the confidentiality obligations, while conveniently leaving out the parts enabling and encouring reporting. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Should ICANN Report the Ombudsman Complaints?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Of course it should. The Ombudsman is aimed at filling an integral gap in the ICANN system - he/she listens to complaints about treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies. As the discussions surrounding the appeal procedures in the CWG-Names show, and as the ATRT2 recommendations on Reconsideration and Independent Review show, conflict resolution mechanisms are crucial in any environment, not least a multi-stakeholder one. And in an organisation that leaves much desired by way of accountability and transparency, not reporting on complaints against the Board, staff or constituencies seems a tad irresponsible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;If there are privacy concerns regarding the identities of complainants, their personal identifying information can be redacted. Actually, &lt;a href="https://omb.icann.org/portal/complaint.php"&gt;in the complaint form&lt;/a&gt;, adding a waiver-of-confidentiality tick-box would solve the problem, allowing the complainant to choose whether to keep his/her complaint unreportable. But the details of the respondents ought to be reported; as the entity responsible and accountable, ICANN should disclose whom complaints have been made against.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-ombudsman-response-27jan15-en.pdf"&gt;&lt;b&gt;found here&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 5)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;[1] &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;i&gt;See&lt;/i&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;What the Ombudsman can do for you&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/contact- 2012-02-25-en&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;[2] &lt;i&gt;See&lt;/i&gt; Annual Reports &amp;amp; Publications, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012- 02-25-en.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-06T11:11:31Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles">
    <title>DIDP Request #4: ICANN and the NETmundial Principles</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of ICANN's implementation of the NETmundial Principles that it has endorsed widely and publicly. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS Request&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;27 December 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Details of implementation by and within ICANN of the NETmundial Outcome Document (April ‘14)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We express our appreciation at ICANN’s prompt acknowledgement of our previous DIDP request, and await the information. We would, in the meanwhile, request information regarding ICANN’s internal measures to implement the NETmundial Outcome Document.&lt;a href="#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In a post titled &lt;i&gt;Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial,&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; Mr. Chehade emphasized the imperative to carry forward the NETmundial principles to fruition. In nearly every public statement, Mr. Chehade and other ICANN representatives have spoken in praise and support of NETmundial and its Outcome Document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;But in the absence of binding value to them, self-regulation and organizational initiatives pave the way to adopt them. There must be concrete action to implement the Principles. In this regard, we request information about mechanisms or any other changes afoot within ICANN, implemented internally in recognition of the NETmundial Principles.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;At the IGF in Istanbul, when CIS’ Sunil Abraham raised this query,&lt;a href="#_ftn3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; Mr. Chehade responded that mechanisms ought to and will be undertaken jointly and in collaboration with other organisations. However, institutional improvements are intra-organisational as well, and require changes &lt;i&gt;within &lt;/i&gt;ICANN. An example would be the suggestions to strengthen the IGF, increase its term, and provide financial support (some of which are being achieved, though ICANN’s financial contribution to IGFSA is incongruous in comparison to its financial involvement in the NETmundial Initiative).&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;From ICANN, we have seen consistent championing of the controversial NETmundial Initiative,&lt;a href="#_ftn4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; and contribution to the IGF Support Association.&lt;a href="#_ftn5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; There are also mechanisms instituted for IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability,&lt;a href="#_ftn6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; as responses to the NTIA’s announcement to not renew the IANA functions contract and related concerns of accountability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In addition to the above, we would like to know what ICANN has done to implement the NETmundial Principles, internally and proactively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Warm regards,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Geetha Hariharan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;W: &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org"&gt;http://cis-india.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN Response&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response to the above request disappointingly linked to the very same blogpost we note in our request, &lt;i&gt;Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial&lt;/i&gt;. Following this, ICANN points us to their involvement in the NETmundial Initiative. On the question of internal implementation, ICANN's response is defensive, to say the least. "ICANN is not the home for the implementation of the NETmundial Principles", they say. In any event, ICANN defends that it already implements the NETmundial Principles in its functioning, a response that comes as a surprise to us. "&lt;span&gt;Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;work of any entity – particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;framework", notes ICANN's response. Needless to say, ICANN's response falls short of responding to our queries. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Finally, ICANN notes that our request is beyond the scope of the DIDP, as it does not relate to ICANN's operational activities. Notwithstanding that our query does in fact seek ICANN's operationalisation of the NETmundial Principles, we are now confused as to where to go to seek this information from ICANN. If the DIDP is not the effective transparency tool it is aimed to be, who in ICANN can provide answers to these questions?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;ICANN's response may be &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-netmundial-response-27jan15-en.pdf"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;found here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 4)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;NETmundial Multi-stakeholder Statement&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf"&gt;http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; See Chehade, &lt;i&gt;Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/turning-talk-into-action-after-netmundial/"&gt;http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/turning-talk-into-action-after-netmundial/&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN Open Forum&lt;/i&gt;, 9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; IGF 2014 (Istanbul, Turkey), &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A"&gt;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; See McCarthy, &lt;i&gt;I’m Begging You To Join&lt;/i&gt;, The Register (12 December 2014), &lt;a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/im_begging_you_to_join_netmundial_initiative_gets_desperate/"&gt;http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/im_begging_you_to_join_netmundial_initiative_gets_desperate/&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN Donates $50k to Internet Governance Forum Support Association&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2014-12-18-en"&gt;https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2014-12-18-en&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;NTIA IANA Functions’ Stewardship Transition &amp;amp; Enhancing ICANN Accountability Processes&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/stewardship-accountability"&gt;https://www.icann.org/stewardship-accountability&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-05T08:28:44Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann">
    <title>DIDP Request #3: Cyber-attacks on ICANN</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of cyber-attacks on ICANN, and ICANN's internal and external responses to the same. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS Request&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;24 December 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Geoff Bickers, Team Lead, ICANN Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) &amp;amp; Director of Security Operations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. John Crain, Chief Security, Stability and Resiliency Officer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Members of the ICANN-CIRT &amp;amp; ICANN Security Team&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Details of cyber-attacks on ICANN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We understand that ICANN recently suffered a spear-phishing attack that compromised contact details of several ICANN staff, including their email addresses; these credentials were used to gain access to ICANN’s Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS).&lt;a href="#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; We are glad to note that ICANN’s critical functions and IANA-related systems were not affected.&lt;a href="#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The incident has, however, raised concerns of the security of ICANN’s systems. In order to understand when, in the past, ICANN has suffered similar security breaches, we request details of all cyber-attacks suffered or thought/suspected to have been suffered by ICANN (and for which, therefore, investigation was carried out within and outside ICANN), from 1999 till date. This includes, naturally, the recent spear-phishing attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We request information regarding, &lt;i&gt;inter alia&lt;/i&gt;,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(1)  the date and nature of all attacks, as well as which ICANN systems were compromised,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(2)   actions taken internally by ICANN upon being notified of the attacks,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(3)  what departments or members of staff are responsible for security and their role in the event of cyber-attacks,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(4)  the role and responsibility of the ICANN-CIRT in responding to cyber-attacks (and when policies or manuals exist for the same; if so, please share them),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(5)   what entities external to ICANN are involved in the identification and investigation of cyber-attacks on ICANN (for instance, are the police in the jurisdiction notified and do they investigate? If so, we request copies of complaints or information reports),&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(6)  whether and when culprits behind the ICANN cyber-attacks were identified, and&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;(7)  what actions were subsequently taken by ICANN (ex: liability of ICANN staff for security breaches should such a finding be made, lawsuits or complaints against perpetrators of attacks, etc.).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Finally, we also request information on the role of the ICANN Board and/or community in the event of such cyber-attacks on ICANN. Also, when was the ICANN-CIRT set up and how many incidents has it handled since its existence? Do there exist contingency procedures in the event of compromise of IANA systems (and if so, what)?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Warm regards,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Geetha Hariharan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;W: &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org"&gt;http://cis-india.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN Response&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN responded to our request by noting that it is vague and broad in both time and scope. In response, ICANN has provided information regarding certain cyber-incidents already in the public domain, while noting that the term "cyber-attack" is both wide and vague. While the information provided is undoubtedly useful, it is anecdotal at best, and does not provide a complete picture of ICANN's history of vulnerability to cyber-attacks or cyber-incidents, or the manner of its internal response to such incidents, or of the involvement of external law enforcement agencies or CIRTs in combating cyber-incidents on ICANN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response may be &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-23jan15-en.pdf"&gt;&lt;b&gt;found here&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. A short summary our request and ICANN's response may be found &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;&lt;b&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 3)&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; See&lt;i&gt; ICANN targeted in spear-phishing attack&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en"&gt;https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;IANA Systems not compromised&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-19-en"&gt;https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-12-19-en&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-05T08:16:26Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2">
    <title>DIDP Request #2: Granular Revenue/Income Statements from ICANN</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking current and historical details of ICANN's income/revenue from its various sources. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS Request&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;22 December 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Request for granular income/revenue statements of ICANN from 1999-2014&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Earlier this month, on 3 December 2014, Mr. Samiran Gupta presented CIS with detailed and granular information regarding ICANN’s domain names income and revenues for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014. This was in response to several requests made over a few months. The information we received is available on our website.&lt;a href="#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The information mentioned above was, &lt;i&gt;inter alia&lt;/i&gt;, extremely helpful in triangulating ICANN’s reported revenues, despite and in addition to certain inconsistencies between the Annual Report (FY14) and the information provided to us.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We recognize that ICANN makes public its current and historical financial information to a certain extent. Specifically, its Operating Plan and Budget, Audited Financial Statements, Annual Reports, Federal and State Tax Filings, Board Compensation Report and ccTLD Contributions Report are available on the website.&lt;a href="#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;However, a detailed report of ICANN’s income or revenue statement, listing all vendors and customers, is not available on ICANN’s website. Our research on accountability and transparency mechanisms in Internet governance, specifically of ICANN, requires information in such granularity. &lt;strong&gt;We request, therefore, historical data re: income and revenue from domain names (1999-2014), in a manner as detailed and granular as the information referenced in FN[1]&lt;/strong&gt;. We would appreciate if such a report lists all legal entities and individuals who contribute to ICANN’s domain names income/ revenue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We look forward to the receipt of this information within the stipulated period of 30 days. Please feel free to contact us in the event of any doubts regarding our queries.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Warm regards,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Geetha Hariharan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;W: &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org"&gt;http://cis-india.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN Response&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's response to CIS's request can be &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;found here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 2)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"&gt;http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;Historical Financial Information for ICANN&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/historical-2012-02-25-en"&gt;https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/historical-2012-02-25-en&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-05T08:07:02Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings">
    <title>DIDP Request #1: ICANN's Expenditures on "Travel &amp; Meetings"</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of expenditure by ICANN at its Meetings. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. &lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS' Request&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;18 December 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: center; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sub: Request for itemized details of expenditure by ICANN at its Meetings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We would like to thank Mr. Calvez and Mr. Gupta for providing information regarding ICANN’s domain name revenues for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014.&lt;a href="#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; We would like to request further information through the DIDP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In the Audited Financial Statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, the “statements of activities” provides Total Expenses (for ICANN and New gTLD) as USD 124,400,000.&lt;a href="#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2013, the Total Expenses (ICANN and New gTLD) noted is USD 150,362,000.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;According to the statement, this covers expenses for Personnel, Travel and meetings, Professional services and Administration. Quarterly Reports note that the head “Travel and meetings” includes community support requests.&lt;a href="#_ftn3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; In addition to these heads, Quarterly Reports include “Bad debt expenses” and “Depreciation expenses”. The manner of accounting for these is explained in &lt;span&gt;Note 2&lt;/span&gt; to the Notes to Financial Statements.&lt;a href="#_ftn4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; Note 2 explains that the expenses statement is prepared by “functional allocation of expenses” to identifiable programs or support services, or otherwise by methods determined by the management.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;For the purposes of our research into normative and practised transparency and accountability in Internet governance, we request, to begin with, &lt;i&gt;current and historical&lt;/i&gt; information regarding itemized, detailed expenses under the head “Travel and meetings”. We request this information from 1999 till 2014. We request that such information be categorized and sub-categorised as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Total and Individual Expenses for each meeting (categorised by meeting and year):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;1. Total and individual expenses for ICANN staff (differentiated by department and name of each individual attending the event, including dates/duration of attendance);&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Also broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each ICANN staff member who attended the event to be named.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;2. &lt;span&gt;Total and individual expenses for members of ICANN Board (listed by each Board member and dates/duration of attendance);&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each Board member to be named.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;3. Total and individual expenses for members of ICANN constituencies (ALAC, ATRT, ccNSO, GAC, GNSO, etc.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;4. Total and individual expenses for ICANN fellows&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their region and stakeholder affiliation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;5. &lt;span&gt;Total and individual expenses incurred for any other ICANN affiliate or liaison (ISOC, IETF, IAB, etc.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their affiliation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;6. &lt;span&gt;Total and individual expenses incurred for any other person, whether or not directly affiliated with ICANN&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;-    Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their affiliation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Please note that we request the above-detailed information for ICANN meetings, and also other meetings for which ICANN may provide financial support (for instance, CWG-Stewardship or CWG-Accountability). We request, as a preliminary matter, a list of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;all meetings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; to which ICANN provides and has, in the past, provided financial support (1999-2014).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We note that some information of this nature is available in the Travel Support Reports.&lt;a href="#_ftn5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; However, the Travel Support Reports are available only from 2008 (Cairo meeting), and are not available for ICANN48 to ICANN51. Further, the Travel Support Reports do not exhibit the level of granularity necessary for research and scrutiny. As explained above, we request granular information for all meetings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In our view, providing such information will not violate any individual or corporate rights of ICANN, its Staff, Board, Affiliates/Liaisons or any other individual. Public corporations and even private organisations performing public functions may be subjected to or accept an increased level of transparency and accountability. We believe this is of especial importance to ICANN, as it is involved in a process to enhance its accountability, intrinsically related to IANA Stewardship Transition. We expressed similar views in our initial comment to “Enhancing ICANN Accountability”.&lt;a href="#_ftn6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; Increased transparency from ICANN may also address accountability concerns present across stakeholder-groups both within and outside ICANN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Thank you very much.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Warm regards,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Geetha Hariharan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Centre for Internet &amp;amp; Society&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;W: &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org"&gt;http://cis-india.org&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;ICANN's Response&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ICANN responded to the above request for information within the stipulated time of 30 days. &lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-17jan15-en.pdf"&gt;ICANN’s response is here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;. A short summary of CIS's request and ICANN's response can be found &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;in this table (Request S. no. 1)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"&gt;http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; See &lt;i&gt;ICANN Financial Statements As of and For the years ended June 30, 2014 and 2013&lt;/i&gt;, pages 7, 19-20, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf"&gt;https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; For instance, see &lt;i&gt;ICANN FY14 Financial Package: For the nine months ending March 2014&lt;/i&gt;, pages 2-5, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/package-fy14-31mar14-en.pdf"&gt;https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/package-fy14-31mar14-en.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;Supra&lt;/i&gt; note 1, page 14.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; See Community Travel Support, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/travel-support-2012-02-25-en#reports"&gt;https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/travel-support-2012-02-25-en#reports&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; See CIS Comments on Enhancing ICANN Accountability, &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability"&gt;http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-05T08:00:36Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests">
    <title>Table of CIS DIDP Requests</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN, and we received responses for 9 of them. As this table shows, the majority of ICANN's responses are negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides no new information apart from what CIS had already identified in the Requests. &lt;/b&gt;
        
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>


   <dc:date>2015-03-05T06:42:25Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>File</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/preliminary-submission-on-internet-governance-issues-to-assocham">
    <title>Preliminary Submission on "Internet Governance Issues" to the Associated Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry of India </title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/preliminary-submission-on-internet-governance-issues-to-assocham</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;On January 30, 2015, Associated Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) held a consultation on Internet governance. A committee was set up to draft a report on Internet governance, with a focus on issues relevant to India. The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is represented on the committee, and has provided its preliminary comments to ASSOCHAM.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ASSOCHAM convened a meeting of its members and other stakeholders, at which CIS was represented. At this meeting, inputs were sought on Internet governance issues relevant for India, on which the industry body proposed to make comments to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Such a discussion, proposing to consolidate the views of ASSOCHAM members in consultation with other stakeholders, is a commendable move. This submission presents preliminary comments from the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in light of ASSOCHAM's consultation on Internet governance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;I. &lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt;About CIS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;1. &lt;/b&gt; CIS is a non-profit research organization that works, &lt;i&gt;inter alia&lt;/i&gt;, on issues relating to privacy, freedom of expression, intermediary liability and 	internet governance, access to knowledge, open data and open standards, intellectual property law, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and engages 	in academic research on the budding Indian disciplines of digital natives and digital humanities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;2. &lt;/b&gt; CIS engages in international and domestic forums for Internet governance. We are a Sector-D member of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),&lt;a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; and participated in the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012 (Dubai)	&lt;a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; and the Plenipotentiary Conference, 2014 (Busan).&lt;a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; We 	have also participated in the WSIS+10 Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP)&lt;a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; and the WSIS+10 High 	Level Event, organized by the ITU.&lt;a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;3. &lt;/b&gt; CIS is also a member of the Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) at ICANN. Pranesh Prakash, our Policy Director, held a position on the NCUC Executive 	Committee from December 2013 to November 2014.&lt;a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;4. &lt;/b&gt; CIS has been engaging at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) since 2008, and has organized and participated in over 60 panels to date.&lt;a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"&gt;[7]&lt;/a&gt; We have also organized panels at the Asia-Pacific Regional IGF (APrIGF).	&lt;a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"&gt;[8]&lt;/a&gt; Our Executive Director Sunil Abraham is a member of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) for the 	India-IGF, and has attended in its meetings.&lt;a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"&gt;[9]&lt;/a&gt; We are also in the process of developing international principles for intermediary liability, in collaboration with international civil society organisations like EFF and Article19.	&lt;a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"&gt;[10]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;II. &lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Structure of Submission&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;5. &lt;/b&gt; In this submission, we identify issues in Internet governance where engagement from and within India is necessary. In particular, brief descriptions of 	issues such as freedom of expression and privacy online, cyber-security, critical Internet resources and ICANN, multistakeholderism and net neutrality are 	provided.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;III. &lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Internet Governance Issues&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;6. &lt;/b&gt; The history of the Internet is unique, in that it is not exclusively government-regulated. Though governments regulate the Internet in many ways (for 	instance, by ordering website blocking or filtering, licensing of ISPs, encryption controls, investment caps, etc.), the running of the Internet is largely 	in the hands of private businesses, technical organisations and end-users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;7. &lt;/b&gt; International processes like the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), and forums such as ICANN, the ITU, the IGF and the UN are involved in 	governing in the Internet in many ways. Regional organisations like the OECD, APEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are also involved (for 	instance, in cyber-security matters).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;8. &lt;/b&gt; The issues surrounding Internet governance are many, and range from telecom infrastructure and technical coordination to human rights and access to 	information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Rights Online&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;9. &lt;/b&gt; The status of 'human rights online' has come under discussion, with the	&lt;a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf"&gt;NETmundial Outcome Document&lt;/a&gt; affirming that offline 	rights must also be protected online. These issues are important in the context of, among others, the large scale violations of privacy in light of the 	Snowden Revelations,&lt;a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"&gt;[11]&lt;/a&gt; and increased instances of website blocking and takedowns in different parts of 	the world.&lt;a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"&gt;[12]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;10. &lt;/b&gt; Internationally, issues of freedom of speech, privacy and access or the digital divide (though it is debatable that the latter is a human right) are discussed at the UN Human Rights Council, such as the	&lt;a href="http://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/07/05/internet-resolution/"&gt;resolution on human rights and the Internet&lt;/a&gt;, and the UN Human Rights Commissioner's	&lt;a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf"&gt;report on the right to privacy in the digital age&lt;/a&gt; , which discusses the need for checks and balances on digital mass surveillance. During the Universal Periodic Review of India in 2012, India noted a 	&lt;a href="http://www.upr-info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&amp;amp;f_SUR=77&amp;amp;f_SMR=All&amp;amp;order=&amp;amp;orderDir=ASC&amp;amp;orderP=true&amp;amp;f_Issue=All&amp;amp;searchReco=&amp;amp;resultMax=100&amp;amp;response=&amp;amp;action_type=&amp;amp;session=&amp;amp;SuRRgrp=&amp;amp;SuROrg=&amp;amp;SMRRgrp=&amp;amp;SMROrg=&amp;amp;pledges=RecoOnly"&gt; recommendation from Sweden &lt;/a&gt; to " 	&lt;i&gt; ensure that measures limiting freedom of expression on the internet is based on clearly defined criteria in accordance with international human rights 		standard &lt;/i&gt; ".&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;11. &lt;/b&gt; Freedom of speech and privacy are also relevant for discussion at the ITU.&lt;a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"&gt;[13]&lt;/a&gt; For instance, at the Plenipotentiary meeting in 2014 (Busan), India proposed a resolution that sought, among other things, complete traceability of all Internet communications.	&lt;a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"&gt;[14]&lt;/a&gt; This has implications for privacy that are not yet addressed by our domestic laws. A Privacy Bill and 	such other protections are only in the pipeline in India.&lt;a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"&gt;[15]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;12. &lt;/b&gt; At ICANN as well, the &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_root_zone"&gt;root zone management&lt;/a&gt; function may affect freedom of expression. If, for 	instance, a top level domain (TLD) such as &lt;b&gt;.com &lt;/b&gt;is erased from the root zone file, hundreds of thousands of websites and their content can 	be wiped from the World Wide Web. A TLD can be erased by Verisign if a request to that effect is raised or accepted by ICANN, and signed off on by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US government. Similarly,&lt;a href="http://whois.icann.org/en/about-whois"&gt;the WHOIS database&lt;/a&gt;, which contains information about the holders of domain names and IP addresses, has	&lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_privacy"&gt;implications for privacy and anonymity&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;13. &lt;/b&gt; In India, the judiciary is currently adjudicating the constitutionality of several provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008), 	including S. 66A, S. 69A and S. 79. A series of writ petitions filed, among others, by the Internet Service Providers Association of India (ISPAI) and Mouthshut.com, relate to the constitutionality of the nature of content controls on the Internet, as well as intermediary liability.	&lt;a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"&gt;[16]&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;14. &lt;/b&gt; A judgment on the constitutionality of Ss. 66A, 69A and 79 are crucial for end-users and citizens, as well as companies in the Internet ecosystem. For 	instance, an uncertain intermediary liability regime with penalties for intermediaries - S. 79, IT Act and Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 - disincentivises ISPs, online news websites and other content providers like Blogger, Youtube, etc. from allowing free speech to flourish online.	&lt;a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"&gt;[17]&lt;/a&gt; The ongoing cases of &lt;i&gt;Kamlesh Vaswani &lt;/i&gt;v. &lt;i&gt;UOI &lt;/i&gt;and &lt;i&gt;Sabu George &lt;/i&gt;v. &lt;i&gt;UOI&lt;/i&gt; also have consequences for ISPs and search engines, as well as for fundamental rights.&lt;a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"&gt;[18]&lt;/a&gt; International and domestic engagement is desirable, including in consultations with the Law Commission of India (for instance, the	&lt;a href="http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/views/Consultation%20paper%20on%20media%20law.doc"&gt;consultation on media laws&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Critical Internet Resources&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;15. &lt;/b&gt; Critical Internet Resources form the backbone of the Internet, and include management of IP addresses, the domain name system (DNS) and the root zone.	&lt;a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"&gt;[19]&lt;/a&gt; ICANN, a global non-profit entity incorporated in California, manages the IANA functions (Internet 	Assigned Numbers Authority) for the global Internet. These functions include allocating the global pool of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to Regional 	Internet Registries (RIRs), administering the domain name system and maintaining a protocol registry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;16. &lt;/b&gt; At present, the IANA functions are performed under a &lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order"&gt;contract with the NTIA&lt;/a&gt;. On March 14, 2014, the	&lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"&gt;NTIA announced&lt;/a&gt; its intention 	to transition oversight of the IANA functions to an as-yet-undetermined "global multi-stakeholder body". The deadline for this transition is September 30, 2015, though the NTIA has	&lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-strickling-state-net-conference-1272015"&gt;expressed its willingness&lt;/a&gt; to renew the IANA contract and extend the deadline. ICANN was charged with convening the transition process, and set up the	&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/stewardship/coordination-group"&gt;IANA Coordination Group&lt;/a&gt; (ICG), a team of 30 individuals who will consolidate community input to create a transition proposal. At the moment, the&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-naming-transition-01dec14-en.pdf"&gt;names (CWG-Names)&lt;/a&gt;,&lt;a href="https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ICG-RFP-Number-Resource-Proposal.pdf"&gt;numbers (CRISP)&lt;/a&gt; and	&lt;a href="http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response/"&gt;protocols (IETF)&lt;/a&gt; communities are debating existing draft proposals. A 	number of new entities with which ICANN will have contractual arrangements have been proposed. At ICANN's meetings in Singapore (February 7-12, 2015) and 	Buenos Aires (June 2015), these proposals will be discussed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;17. &lt;/b&gt; At the same time, a parallel track to examine ICANN's own transparency and accountability has been introduced. The	&lt;a href="https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability"&gt;CCWG-Accountability&lt;/a&gt; is considering ICANN's 	accountability in two Workstreams: first, in light of the IANA transition and second, a revision of ICANN's policies and by-laws to strengthen 	accountability. ICANN's accountability and transparency are crucial to its continued role in Internet governance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;18. &lt;/b&gt; Several issues arise here: Should ICANN continue to remain in the US? Should the IANA Functions Department be moved into a separate entity from ICANN? 	Ought ICANN's by-laws be amended to create oversight over the Board of Directors, which is now seen to have consolidated power? Ought ICANN be more 	transparent in its financial and operational matters, proactively and reactively?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;19. &lt;/b&gt; It is, for instance, beneficial to the stability of the Internet and to India if the IANA department is separate from ICANN - this will ensure a&lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions"&gt;separation of powers&lt;/a&gt;. Second,	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability"&gt;stronger transparency and accountability mechanisms&lt;/a&gt; are necessary for ICANN; it is a growing corporate entity performing a globally Internet function. As such,	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"&gt;granular information&lt;/a&gt; about ICANN's revenues and expenses should be made public. See, for ex.,&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-request-18dec14-en.pdf"&gt;CIS' request&lt;/a&gt; for ICANN's expenses for travel and meetings, and	&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-17jan15-en.pdf"&gt;ICANN's response&lt;/a&gt; to the same.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;20. &lt;/b&gt; The most ideal forum to engage in this is ICANN, and within India, working groups on Internet governance at the Ministry level. As such, ASSOCHAM may seek 	open, transparent and inclusive consultations with the relevant departments of the Government (the Ministry of External Affairs, DeitY, Department of 	Telecommunications). At ICANN, industry bodies can find representation in the Business Constituency or the Commercial Stakeholders Group. Additionally, 	comments and proposals can be made to the ICG and the CCWG-Accountability by anyone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Cyber-security &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;21. &lt;/b&gt; Cyber-security is often used as an umbrella-term, covering issues ranging from network security (DNSSEC and the ICANN domain), cyber-crime, and 	cyber-incidents such as the 	&lt;a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/it-services/How-to-fight-cyber-war-Estonia-shows-the-way/articleshow/24274994.cms"&gt; Distributed Denial of Service attacks &lt;/a&gt; on Estonian public institutions and the &lt;a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet"&gt;Stuxnet virus&lt;/a&gt; that attacked Iran's nuclear programme. Within the ITU, spam and child safety online are also assessed as security issues (See	&lt;a href="http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/groups/Pages/sg17.aspx"&gt;Study Group 17 under ITU-T&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;22. &lt;/b&gt; At the international level, the UN Group of Governmental Experts has	&lt;a href="http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/"&gt;published three reports&lt;/a&gt; to date, arguing also that in cyber-security incidents, 	international humanitarian law will apply. International humanitarian law applies during armed attacks on states, when special rules apply to the treatment 	of civilians, civilian and military buildings, hospitals, wounded soldiers, etc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;23. &lt;/b&gt; The ITU also launched a &lt;a href="http://www.itu.int/en/action/cybersecurity/Pages/gca.aspx"&gt;Global Cybersecurity Agenda&lt;/a&gt; in 2007, aiming at international cooperation. Such cooperative methods are also being employed at the OSCE, APEC and the SCO, which have developed drafts of	&lt;a href="http://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true"&gt;Confidence Building Measures&lt;/a&gt;. The Global Conferences on Cyberspace (London 2011, Budapest 2012, Seoul 2013, The Hague 2015) resulted in, &lt;i&gt;inter alia&lt;/i&gt;, the	&lt;a href="http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm"&gt;Budapest Convention on Cybercrime&lt;/a&gt;. India has not ratified the Convention, and 	remains tight-lipped about its security concerns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;24. &lt;/b&gt; Surveillance and monitoring of online communications is a crucial issue in this regard. In India, the surveillance power finds its source in S. 5, Telegraph Act, 1888, and the	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/rule-419-a-indian-telegraph-rules-1951"&gt;Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951&lt;/a&gt;. Further, S. 	69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the 	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/it-procedure-and-safeguards-for-interception-monitoring-and-decryption-of-information-rules-2009"&gt; Interception Rules, 2009 &lt;/a&gt; enable the government and authorized officers to intercept and monitor Internet traffic on certain grounds. Information regarding the implementation of 	these Rules is scant.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;25. &lt;/b&gt; In any event, the applicability of targeted surveillance should be	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/nytimes-july-10-2013-pranesh-prakash-how-surveillance-works-in-india"&gt;subject to judicial review&lt;/a&gt; , and a balance should be struck between fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and privacy and the needs of security. An	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uk-interception-of-communications-commissioner-a-model-of-accountability"&gt;accountability model&lt;/a&gt; such as that present in the UK for the Interception of Communications Commissioner may provide valuable insight.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;26. &lt;/b&gt; In India, the government does not make public information regarding its policies in cyber-security and cybercrime. This would be welcome, as well as 	consultations with relevant stakeholders.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Models of Internet Governance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;27. &lt;/b&gt; Multi-stakeholderism has emerged as one of the catchphrases in Internet governance. With the display of a multi-stakeholder model at NETmundial (April 	2014), controversies and opinions regarding the meaning, substance and benefits of multi-stakeholderism have deepened.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;28. &lt;/b&gt; The debates surrounding stakeholder-roles in Internet governance began with ¶49 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles and ¶35 of the	&lt;a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html"&gt;Tunis Agenda&lt;/a&gt;, which delineated clear roles and responsibilities. It created a 	'contributory' multi-stakeholder model, where states held sovereign authority over public policy issues, while business and civil society were contributed 	to 'important roles' at the 'technical and economic fields' and the 'community level', respectively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;29. &lt;/b&gt; As the WGEC meeting (April 30-May 2, 2014) demonstrated, there is as yet no consensus on stakeholder-roles. Certain governments remain strongly opposed to 	equal roles of other stakeholders, emphasizing their lack of accountability and responsibility. Civil society is similarly splintered, with a majority 	opposing the Tunis Agenda delineation of stakeholder-roles, while others remain dubious of permitting the private sector an equal footing in public 	policy-making.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;30. &lt;/b&gt; The positions in India are similarly divided. While there is appears to be high-level acceptance of "multi-stakeholder models" across industry, academia 	and civil society, there exists no clarity as to what this means. In simple terms, does a multi-stakeholder model mean that the government should consult industry, civil society, academia and the technical community? Or should decision-making power be split among stakeholders? In fact, the debate is	&lt;a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354377"&gt;more specific&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;31. &lt;/b&gt; In India, the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) for the India-IGF was established in February 2014, and some meetings were held. Unfortunately, neither 	the minutes of the meetings nor action points (if any) are publicly available.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;32. &lt;/b&gt; The Indian government's position is more complex. At the 68&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; UN General Assembly session in 2011, India argued for a (multilateral) 50-member 	UN &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-statement-un-cirp"&gt;Committee on Internet-related Policies (CIRP)&lt;/a&gt;. However, the Ministry 	for Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has, over the years, presented differing views at the IGF and ITU through its two departments: DeitY and DoT. Further, at the meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC), India has presented	&lt;a href="http://unctad.org/Sections/un_cstd/docs/WGEC_IndiaMission.pdf"&gt;more nuanced views&lt;/a&gt;, suggesting that certain issues remain within the 	governmental domain (such as cyber-security and child online protection). At the 9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; IGF (Istanbul, September 2014), Mr. R.S. Sharma of the 	DeitY &lt;a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/174-igf-2014/transcripts/1977-2014-09-04-ms-evolution-of-the-ig-main-room"&gt;echoed such a view&lt;/a&gt; of 	delineated roles for stakeholders.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;33. &lt;/b&gt; A clear message from the Indian government, on whether it favours multistakeholderism or governmental policy authority for specific issues, would be 	invaluable in shaping opinion and domestic processes. In any event, a transparent consultative procedure to take into account the views of all stakeholders 	is desirable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Emerging Issues&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Net Neutrality&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;34. &lt;/b&gt; In simple terms, net neutrality concerns differential treatment of packets of data by carriers such as ISPs, etc. over networks. The issue has gained international attention following the U.S. FCC's regulatory stance, and the U.S. Court of Appeal's 2014 decision in	&lt;a href="http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/3AF8B4D938CDEEA685257C6000532062/$file/11-1355-1474943.pdf"&gt;Verizon v. FCC&lt;/a&gt;. Though this decision turned on the interpretation of 'broadband providers' under the Communications Act, 1934, net neutrality has since been debated in the US, both	&lt;a href="http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/09/fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-defends-his-net-neutrality-proposal/"&gt;by the FCC&lt;/a&gt; and other stakeholders. There is no international consensus in sight; the NETmundial Outcome Document	&lt;a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf"&gt;recognized&lt;/a&gt; net neutrality as an emerging issue (page 	11, no. IV).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;35. &lt;/b&gt; In India, a TRAI consultation on Over-The-Top Services on August 5, 2014 brought concerns of telecom and cellular operators to light. OTTs were seen as 	hijacking a portion of telcos' revenues, and as lacking consumer protection and privacy safeguards. While these concerns are legitimate, net neutrality regulation is not yet the norm in India. In any event, any such regulation must	&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/otts-eating-into-our-revenue-telcos-in-india"&gt;take into account&lt;/a&gt; the consequences of regulation on 	innovation, competition, and consumer choice, as well as on the freedom of the medium (which may have detrimental impacts freedom of expression).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;36. &lt;/b&gt; Though net neutrality regulation is being mooted, there is as yet an&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/collection-of-net-neutrality-definitions"&gt;array of definitions&lt;/a&gt; of 'net neutrality'. The	&lt;a href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/11/223-net-neutrality-telcos-india/"&gt;views of telcos themselves differ&lt;/a&gt; in India. Further study on the methods of 	identifying and/or circumventing net neutrality is necessary before a policy position can be taken.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;IV. &lt;/b&gt; &lt;b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Conclusions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;37. &lt;/b&gt; CIS welcomes ASSOCHAM's initiative to study and develop industry-wide positions on Internet governance. This note provides brief descriptions of several 	issues in Internet governance where policy windows are open internationally and domestically. These issues include freedom of expression and privacy under 	Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court's hearing of a set of cases alleging unconstitutionality of Ss. 66A, 69, 69A 	and 79 (among others) of the IT Act, 2000, as well as consultations on issues such as pornography by the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Committee and media laws 	by the Law Commission of India are important in this regard.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;38. &lt;/b&gt; International and domestic engagement is necessary in the transition of stewardship of the IANA functions, as well as ICANN's own accountability and 	transparency measures. Similarly, in the area of cyber-security, though several initiatives are afoot internationally, India's engagement has been cursory 	until now. A concrete position from India's stakeholders, including the government, on these and the question of multi-stakeholderism in Internet 	governance would be of immense assistance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;b&gt;39. &lt;/b&gt; Finally, net neutrality is an emerging issue of importance to industry's revenues and business models, and to users' rights such as access to information 	and freedom of expression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div style="text-align: justify; "&gt;
&lt;hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" /&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn1"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; CIS gets ITU-D Sector Membership, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/PBGKWt"&gt;goo.gl/PBGKWt&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn2"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; Letter for Civil Society Involvement in WCIT, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/gXpYQD"&gt;goo.gl/gXpYQD&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn3"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"&gt;[3]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., Hariharan, &lt;i&gt;What India's ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/hpWaZn"&gt;goo.gl/hpWaZn&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 			Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn4"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"&gt;[4]&lt;/a&gt; Panday, &lt;i&gt;WSIS +10 High Level Event: Open Consultation Process MPP: Phase Six: Fifth Physical Meeting&lt;/i&gt;,			&lt;a href="http://goo.gl/3XR24X"&gt;goo.gl/3XR24X&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn5"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"&gt;[5]&lt;/a&gt; Hariharan, &lt;i&gt;WSIS+10 High Level Event: A Bird's Eye Report&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/8XkwyJ"&gt;goo.gl/8XkwyJ&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn6"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"&gt;[6]&lt;/a&gt; Pranesh Prakash elected as Asia-Pacific Representative to the Executive Committee of NonCommercial Users Constituency,			&lt;a href="http://goo.gl/iJM7C0"&gt;goo.gl/iJM7C0&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn7"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"&gt;[7]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., &lt;i&gt;CIS@IGF 2014&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/Werdiz"&gt;goo.gl/Werdiz&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn8"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"&gt;[8]&lt;/a&gt; &lt;i&gt;Multi-stakeholder Internet Governance: The Way Ahead&lt;/i&gt; , &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/NuktNi"&gt;goo.gl/NuktNi&lt;/a&gt;; &lt;i&gt;Minimising legal risks of online Intermediaries while protecting user rights,&lt;/i&gt; &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/mjQyww"&gt;goo.gl/mjQyww&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn9"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"&gt;[9]&lt;/a&gt; First Meeting of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group for India Internet Governance Forum, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/NCmKRp"&gt;goo.gl/NCmKRp&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 			Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn10"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"&gt;[10]&lt;/a&gt; See Zero Draft of Content Removal Best Practices White Paper, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/RnAel8"&gt;goo.gl/RnAel8&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 8 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn11"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"&gt;[11]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., &lt;i&gt;UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful 'for seven years'&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/vG8W7i"&gt;goo.gl/vG8W7i&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn12"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"&gt;[12]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., &lt;i&gt;Twitter: Turkey tops countries demanding content removal&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/ALyO3B"&gt;goo.gl/ALyO3B&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn13"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"&gt;[13]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., &lt;i&gt;The ITU convenes a programme on Child Online Protection&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/qJ4Es7"&gt;goo.gl/qJ4Es7&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn14"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"&gt;[14]&lt;/a&gt; Hariharan, &lt;i&gt;Why India's Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/Sxh5K8"&gt;goo.gl/Sxh5K8&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 			Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn15"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"&gt;[15]&lt;/a&gt; Hickok, &lt;i&gt;Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy vs. The Leaked 2014 Privacy Bill&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/454qA6"&gt;goo.gl/454qA6&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 			9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn16"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"&gt;[16]&lt;/a&gt; See, &lt;i&gt;Supreme Court Of India To Hear Eight IT Act Related Cases On 11th April 2014 - SFLC&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/XLWsSq"&gt;goo.gl/XLWsSq&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn17"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"&gt;[17]&lt;/a&gt; See, Dara, &lt;i&gt;Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet&lt;/i&gt;,			&lt;a href="http://goo.gl/bwBT0x"&gt;goo.gl/bwBT0x&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn18"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"&gt;[18]&lt;/a&gt; See, ex., Arun, &lt;i&gt;Blocking online porn: who should make Constitutional decisions about freedom of speech?&lt;/i&gt;,&lt;a href="http://goo.gl/NPdZcK"&gt;goo.gl/NPdZcK&lt;/a&gt;; Hariharan &amp;amp; Subramanian,			&lt;i&gt;Search Engine and Prenatal Sex Determination: Walking the Tight Rope of the Law&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/xMj4Zw"&gt;goo.gl/xMj4Zw&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 			Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;div id="ftn19"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"&gt;[19]&lt;/a&gt; CSTD, &lt;i&gt;The mapping of international Internet public policy issues&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://goo.gl/zUWdI1"&gt;goo.gl/zUWdI1&lt;/a&gt; (l.a. 9 Feb. 2015).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/preliminary-submission-on-internet-governance-issues-to-assocham'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/preliminary-submission-on-internet-governance-issues-to-assocham&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>Featured</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Internet Governance</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-02-12T14:52:04Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know">
    <title>Where Does ICANN’s Money Come From?  We Asked; They Don’t Know</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond. &lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Why Is ICANN Here?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (&lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann.org"&gt;ICANN&lt;/a&gt;) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;As a result of &lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order"&gt;an agreement&lt;/a&gt; with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-factsheet-24mar14-en.pdf"&gt;IANA functions&lt;/a&gt;, which include making changes to the &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_root_zone"&gt;root zone file&lt;/a&gt; (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite"&gt;the TCP/IP suite&lt;/a&gt;. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN is the &lt;i&gt;de facto&lt;/i&gt; policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en"&gt;the UDRP&lt;/a&gt; for domain name disputes), maintaining the &lt;a href="http://whois.icann.org/"&gt;WHOIS database&lt;/a&gt;, etc. for domain names.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/bharti/bharti-agmt-pdf-09jan14-en.pdf"&gt;the &lt;strong&gt;.bharti &lt;/strong&gt;Registry Agreement&lt;/a&gt;, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, &lt;strong&gt;.bharti&lt;/strong&gt;) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals &lt;span&gt;X&lt;/span&gt; US $0.25). &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-en"&gt;TLD Registries&lt;/a&gt; “own” TLDs like &lt;strong&gt;.com&lt;/strong&gt;, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-agreements-en"&gt;816 such Registry Agreements&lt;/a&gt;, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [&lt;i&gt;see &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf"&gt;page 7&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like &lt;a href="https://in.godaddy.com/"&gt;Go Daddy&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.bigrock.in/"&gt;Big Rock&lt;/a&gt;, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en#raa"&gt;yearly accreditation fee&lt;/a&gt; of US $4000 to ICANN (see &lt;span&gt;Clause 3.9&lt;/span&gt;). Each Registrar also &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/financials-55-2012-02-25-en"&gt;pays to ICANN&lt;/a&gt; fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html"&gt;over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars&lt;/a&gt;, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [&lt;i&gt;see &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf"&gt;page 7&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (&lt;a href="http://www.nixi.in/en/contact-us/103-irinn"&gt;NIXI as IRINN&lt;/a&gt;), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [&lt;i&gt;see, ex.&lt;/i&gt;:&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun09-en.pdf"&gt;FY09 Financial Statements, page 3&lt;/a&gt;].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;And this isn’t all of it! With its &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/"&gt;new gTLD program&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20141129_icann_new_gtld_auction_proceeds_approaching_30_million/"&gt;as high as US $6 million&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;At  CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in  the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its  CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial,  and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the  NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal  interests in furthering &lt;i&gt;status quo &lt;/i&gt;(for instance, both the names  and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to  remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this  makes for a dangerous combination.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions"&gt;As we have written before&lt;/a&gt;, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf"&gt;Budget FY15, page 17&lt;/a&gt;).  It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings  alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf"&gt;Budget FY15, page 11&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;To its credit, ICANN &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en"&gt;makes public&lt;/a&gt; its financial statements (current and historic), and community  discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably  complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even  ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of  where ICANN’s money comes from.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;So one  is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how  many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments  received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new  gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and  auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay  ICANN and what for, if &lt;a href="https://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#six41"&gt;IP addresses are not property to be sold&lt;/a&gt;? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. &lt;span&gt;To  put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today  something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for  domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is  without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the  NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en"&gt;Documentary Information Disclosure Policy&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (DIDP), &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en"&gt;Ombudsman&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review"&gt;Reconsideration and Independent Review&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf"&gt;Accountability and Transparency Review&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but  this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully  defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled  their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be  filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under  ICANN’s By-laws (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV"&gt;Article IV, Section 2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;),  it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members,  that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the  principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s  own cause (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;nemo debet esse judex in propria causa&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Moreover,  ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of  contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other  sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet  governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the  NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support  Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so,  a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the &lt;a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A"&gt;ICANN Open Forum&lt;/a&gt; in Istanbul (IGF 2014).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Finally,  despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is  evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around  small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with  other I-Star organisations. For instance, a &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door"&gt;revolving door study&lt;/a&gt; by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG  members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This  surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s  decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome  inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;But ICANN is &lt;i&gt;intended &lt;/i&gt;to  serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient  running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially  so during the IANA transition phase. &lt;a href="http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/sun-iana-stewardship-accountability"&gt;As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52&lt;/a&gt;,  what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to  whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The  CCWG-Accountability is &lt;a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/564269949237985280"&gt;still asking that question&lt;/a&gt;. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS &lt;a href="http://openup2014.org/privacy-vs-transparency-attempt-resolving-dichotomy/"&gt;has advocated&lt;/a&gt; transparency as a check-and-balance for power.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The  DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it  suffice as a transparency mechanism?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. &lt;b&gt;We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"&gt;please go here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the &lt;b&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-netmundial-2015-01-28-en"&gt;NETmundial Request&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they &lt;i&gt;already implement&lt;/i&gt; the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that &lt;i&gt;permeate through the work of any entity &lt;/i&gt;– particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the &lt;b&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en"&gt;Ombudsman Request&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V"&gt;Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws&lt;/a&gt;. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en"&gt;Annual Reports&lt;/a&gt;; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr style="text-align: justify; " /&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;i&gt;CIS' Annual Reports are &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/about/reports"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. &lt;i&gt;Pranav Bidare (&lt;i style="text-align: justify; "&gt;3rd year)&lt;/i&gt; of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>IANA Transition</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>DIDP</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-03-05T07:43:45Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions">
    <title>ICANN accountability, IANA transition and open questions</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;On February 3, 2015, the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) hosted a pre-event briefing in light of ICANN52 (Singapore, February 7-12, 2015). Geetha Hariharan attended the event.&lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;At a briefing on ICANN52 organized by the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) on 3 February, 2015 (‘CCG Briefing Event’), consensus was seen on two broad things: ICANN’s processes on IANA transition and accountability are crucial for Internet governance this year, and India’s participation (both municipal and international) is wanting. The meeting, which saw discussion following the Chatham House rules, was attended by members from industry associations, government and civil society. A light parsing of the current proposals from the CWG-Names and CRISP (the names and numbers communities) for IANA transition brought the composition of the transition proposals under scrutiny.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CRISP and the proposed Service Level Agreements:&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The &lt;a href="https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ICG-RFP-Number-Resource-Proposal-1_IO20150119.txt"&gt;proposal from the numbers community&lt;/a&gt;, the CRISP, suggests that ICANN and the five RIRs enter into Service Level Agreements. Under the proposal, existing accountability, oversight and policy development mechanisms remain unchanged, with ICANN agreeing to perform IANA functions to meet requisite service levels. If it fails to meet such standards, the RIRs may terminate the contract or refuse to renew it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The CRISP proposal does not look beyond ICANN for an IANA functions operator, and places its faith entirely in ICANN’s past performance of numbering IANA functions. As so many have said before, the CRISP proposal is blithe in its lack of review mechanism or safeguards, having even fewer safeguards than the CWG-Names proposal. Doubtless, a cause for concern.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CWG-Names and the Four New Entities:&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-naming-transition-01dec14-en.pdf"&gt;CWG-Names proposal&lt;/a&gt; suggests that four new entities be created to replace the NTIA’s role under the IANA Functions Contract. Under the proposal, ICANN will continue to be the IANA Functions Operator for the present. It will enter into an IANA Functions Contract with &lt;strong&gt;“Contract Co.”&lt;/strong&gt;, a new shell entity which will replace NTIA as the contracting party. Contract Co. is to be a lightweight entity, with few staff or administrative capabilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;At present, the NTIA performs what it considers a &lt;a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/16/this_is_how_the_us_government_runs_the_internet/"&gt;“clerical role”&lt;/a&gt; in its oversight of the DNS. However, the IANA Functions Contract also includes review functions, such as the rebidding and renewal process to determine whether ICANN (or some other entity) ought to continue as the IANA functions operator. Under the CWG-Names proposal, these review functions, which also include budget reviews, reporting, etc. are to be carried out by a &lt;strong&gt;“Multi-stakeholder Review Team (MRT)”&lt;/strong&gt;, the terms of whose composition are as yet undecided.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The composition of the MRT is crucial to an independent and representative oversight of IANA. At the CCG Briefing Event, concerns were raised as to the representation of ccTLDs on the MRT. Not all ccTLDs are represented in the ICANN ecosystem, in the ccNSO; 152 ccTLDs are &lt;a href="http://ccnso.icann.org/about/members.htm"&gt;members&lt;/a&gt; of the ccNSO. Of course, one may argue that this concern exists under the present IANA functions contract as well. But the devil is in the details, or lack thereof. We don’t know, for instance, who will populate the MRT, whether they will enjoy immunities normally reserved for diplomatic or consular agents, or most importantly, what relationship the MRT will enjoy with ICANN. Will there be a contract with ICANN, or a memorandum of understanding that sets out ICANN’s responsibilities, failing which the IANA contract may be terminated?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The third new creation of the CWG-Names proposal is the &lt;strong&gt;“Customer Standing Committee (CSC)”&lt;/strong&gt;. While the CSC’s composition is also nebulous, its functions are to work with the MRT to establish Service Levels and Performance Indicators for the naming functions, and to receive performance reports from the IANA operator (ICANN). Clause C.2.8 of the present IANA functions contract requires that the IANA operator (ICANN) develop performance standards for all enumerated IANA functions (see Clause C.2.9.1 to C.2.9.4), and also to report on them (Clause C.4). Presumably, the CSC will fill the role of the NTIA’s Contracting Officer’s Representative in receiving these performance reports.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The fourth and final new entity is the &lt;strong&gt;“Independent Appeals Panel (IAP)”&lt;/strong&gt;, the composition of which is also undecided. The IAP is intended to hear and adjudicate all actions related to the root zone or root zone WHOIS, and under the present proposal, the CWG-Names suggests it should be constituted from time to time in the manner of a binding arbitration process. However, it should be noted that the CWG-Names proposal is unclear whether the IAP decisions are binding on or advisory to the ICANN Board. Concerns of the IAP’s composition aside, dangers of making its decisions only advisory to the ICANN Board loom large and real, and the CCG Briefing Event reflected this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Already, the ICANN Board wields extensive power with regard to policy decisions. For instance, policies developed under the global policy development process by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) &lt;a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/review-procedures-2012-02-25-en"&gt;may be rejected&lt;/a&gt; by the ICANN Board by a 2/3rds majority vote. Such a rejection may result in a mediation process according to agreed procedure. Another instance is the change in the ICANN Board’s treatment of GAC advice. Prior to the amendment to ICANN’s Bye-laws, the Board was not required to provide reasons for its rejection of GAC advice. In its present form, Article XI, Section 2(1) of ICANN’s Bye-laws make such reasons mandatory. How ought IAP decisions be treated, as binding or advisory? If they are to be binding, ICANN or any other IANA functions operator will have to enter into a legal arrangement (by contract or MoU, or in the best case, an amendment to ICANN Bye-laws).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Dodging the real issues: ICANN incumbency, IANA separation and where will all the money come from?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Both the CWG-Names and CRISP proposals skim past certain issues relating to ICANN’s incumbency in the IANA role. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;first concern&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-align: justify; "&gt;, of course, is whether ICANN should continue to be the IANA functions operator. Both proposals accept ICANN’s role, suggesting no change. While there are compelling reasons for ICANN’s continued role as IANA functions operator, unquestioning incumbency is equal to lack of accountability. And as neither proposal sets out a review process (the CWG-Names proposal only mentions that the MRT shall have this function), it is a concern.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Perhaps the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability"&gt;CCWG-Accountability&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, convened under the Enhancing ICANN Accountability process, is better equipped to provide suggestions. However, the CCWG-Accountability is hard-pressed for time. Its two Workstreams, dealing with IANA transition related accountability mechanisms and ICANN’s internal accountability, are unlikely to see desired progress before the transition deadline of September 2015. For instance, within the CCWG-Accountability, a debate is ongoing as to ICANN’s composition. At the time of its incorporation, a suggestion that ICANN ought to have statutory members was floated, but turned down. The suggestion has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/12/19/icann-accountability-a-coup-or-a-contract/"&gt;reared its head again&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in the CCWG-Accountability, to consider checks and balances on the ICANN Board.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;second concern&lt;/strong&gt; relates to IANA’s continued existence within ICANN, without separation of policy and implementation. This concern has been clamouring for attention for many months. Milton Mueller, for instance, has recommended &lt;a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/03/03/a-roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/"&gt;structural separation&lt;/a&gt; of IANA and ICANN, as did I and others during the course of the face-to-face meetings of the CWG-Names (I attended remotely).&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;A structural separation is beneficial for many reasons. It enforces a simple separation of powers. “When”, as Montesquieu stated, “the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may rise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner”. Tyranny is speaking in terms too extreme for ICANN, perhaps, it is undeniable that ICANN has grown larger in scope and size from its original incorporation. It was incorporated, as Professor DeNardis has noted [&lt;i&gt;Protocol Politics&lt;/i&gt;, 161], to perform technical coordination of the global DNS and other functions performed originally by Jon Postel as IANA.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Today, in addition to technical coordination and policy-setting for names and numbers (through the gPDP), ICANN is a major player in the Internet governance institutional space; its involvement in and aggressive marketing of the NETmundial Initiative is but an example. For instance, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (FY2015). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone (FY2015). Separating IANA from ICANN will, as others have suggested, protect it from political or other influences within ICANN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In any event, once the NTIA terminates the IANA functions contract, IANA is not strictly required to be within the US. At the moment, Clause C.2.1 of the IANA functions contract requires that the IANA functions operator be “a wholly U.S. owned and operated firm or fully accredited United States University or College operating in one of the 50 states of the United States or District of Columbia; b) incorporated within one of the fifty (50) states of the United States or District of Columbia; and c) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or District of Columbia”.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Were structural separation to be achieved, IANA could be incorporated in another, neutral jurisdiction. Not only would be assuage optical considerations and ensure separation of powers, but as our experience with filtering on the Internet shows (see, for instance, the Open Net Initiative’s &lt;a href="https://opennet.net/"&gt;research&lt;/a&gt;), unilateral controls are much harder to enforce when the apparatus is decentralized.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;third concern&lt;/strong&gt; raised at the CCG Briefing Event concerned the funding of the new entities proposed by the CWG-Names. Would these entities be self-financing, or perhaps ICANN would support them? While some participants felt ICANN could also provide financial support, this would, in my view, bring ICANN too close to its oversight entities, and increase chances of influence.&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>IANA Transition</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2015-02-06T11:39:21Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/search-engine-and-prenatal-sex-determination">
    <title>Search Engine and Prenatal Sex Determination: Walking the Tight Rope of the Law</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/search-engine-and-prenatal-sex-determination</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;In Sabu George v. Union of India, the Supreme Court is looking at the constitutionality of sex-selection ads appearing on search engines, either as search results or ads placed on the search pages. Balaji Subramanian and Geetha Hariharan analyse the relevant provision of the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 1994. &lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Supreme Court, in Sabu George v. Union of India and Ors. (WP (C) 341/2008), is looking into the presence of material regarding pre-natal sex determination on search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo!. The petitioner alleges that search engines have been displaying content that falls foul of §22 of the &lt;a href="http://www.ncpcr.gov.in/view_file.php?fid=434"&gt;Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 1994&lt;/a&gt;, as amended in 2002 (“the Act”).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The relevant parts of §22 that search engines are alleged to have violated are as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;“&lt;strong&gt;22. Prohibition of advertisement relating to pre-natal determination of sex and punishment for contravention.-&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol style="text-align: justify; "&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;No person, organization&lt;/span&gt;, Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic, including clinic, laboratory or centre having ultrasound machine or imaging machine or scanner or any other technology capable of undertaking determination of sex of foetus or sex selection &lt;span&gt;shall issue&lt;/span&gt;, publish, distribute, communicate or cause to be issued, published, distributed or communicated &lt;span&gt;any advertisement, in any form, including internet, regarding facilities of pre-natal determination of sex&lt;/span&gt; or sex selection before conception available at such centre, laboratory, clinic or at any other place.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;No person or organization&lt;/span&gt; including Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic &lt;span&gt;shall issue&lt;/span&gt;, publish, distribute, communicate or cause to be issued, published, distributed or communicated &lt;span&gt;any advertisement&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;in any manner regarding pre-natal determination or preconception selection of sex by any means whatsoever&lt;/span&gt;, scientific or otherwise” (emphasis supplied)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, ‘advertisement’ includes any notice, circular, label, wrapper or any other document including advertisement through internet or any other media in electronic or print form and also includes any visible representation made by means of any hoarding, wall-painting, signal, light, sound, smoke or gas.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;From a cursory reading, it would appear that the section serves as a clear and unequivocal ban on advertisements for clinics or other laboratories that perform pre-natal sex determination. However, the Supreme Court seems to have landed itself into a mess by muddling the distinction between web/online advertisements (in the sense that the word has been used in the quoted provision) and organic search results. The court has received little assistance from the words of the statute, since the Act contains no exhaustive definition of ‘advertisement’. The closest thing to such a definition is the &lt;a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/155998732/"&gt;explanation to §22&lt;/a&gt;, which only specifies that the term is inclusive of some common forms of adverts – label wrappers, audiovisual representations, etc. This is not a definition, and does not expand the meaning of the word to include organic search results, which are commonly understood not to be advertisements (see &lt;a href="https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1722080?hl=en"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.google.com/honestresults.html"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, for example). This distinction was pointed out to the court in the submission of the Group Coordinator, Cyber Laws Formulation and Enforcement Division, Department of Information Technology, as noted by the bench in its &lt;a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/249151692/Sabu-Mathew-George-v-Union-of-India-Ors"&gt;order dated the 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; of December 2014&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;It is our view that this distinction is of vital importance to the entire debate surrounding the PNDT Act, and therefore we have clearly differentiated between organic search results and “sponsored links”, or advertisements, wherever required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In order to examine whether search engines were in compliance with the law, we systematically searched for terms most likely to trigger advertisements that would violate §22 of the Act. Further, we selected search engines across the market spectrum, from high-revenue organisations likely to have performed comprehensive due diligence (Google, Bing, etc.) to relatively low-revenue operators who did not have offices in India, or dedicated service offerings specific to India, and were therefore unlikely to have taken special measures to comply with the provisions of the PNDT Act (Yandex, DuckDuckGo, etc.). Further, where search engines had India-specific websites, we checked to see whether there was any difference in the advertising outputs of the India site and the US site.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Since the advertising systems work on a bidding mechanism, where the same keywords were likely to trigger different ads based on the rates selected by advertisers, our methodology also included making multiple (five, in most cases) iterations of searches that yielded advertisements, even if the ads displayed were not violative of the Act.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Online Advertisements&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The results of this analysis (tabulated below) are surprising, to say the least. First, we found that major search engines such as Google, Yahoo and Bing (constituents of the advertising alliance, &lt;a href="http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-gives-yahoo-name-top-billing-in-microsoft-advertising-rebrand/"&gt;the Yahoo! Bing Network&lt;/a&gt;) did not display incriminating ads for many of the searches we attempted [see Table 1 below]. In searches for “sex selective abortion”, for example, Google even provided sponsored links to NGOs attempting to generate awareness against the practice. Nor were any non-compliant ads present on their US sites. No violative ads were observed on Yandex. DuckDuckGo did display a questionable advertisement for the term “prenatal sex determination”, but we shall discuss this in detail later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/SearchEngine.png" alt="SearchEngine" class="image-inline" title="SearchEngine" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;However, there &lt;i&gt;were&lt;/i&gt; some advertisements of questionable legal status. In Google, for instance, our searches for “Dubai indian pregnancy centre” and a litany of similar searches showed searches that featured international services. These services for sex-selection would, presumably, extend to India [see Table 2 below].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Table 1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table class="listing"&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Search Engine&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"UAE pregnancy gender"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Dubai Indian pregnancy gender"&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Pregnancy gender determination"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Prenatal ultrasound India"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Dubai India sex ultrasound"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Google (.com, .co.in)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Advertisements of fertility centres in the Middle East, that conduct sex determination tests. Some prominently feature assistance to international patients.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Advertisements of UK Laboratory that sells Prenatal Gender Test Kits. Prominently featured International shipping.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Offers Pre-natal Ultrasound scans, does not conduct sex determination test.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Does not mention explicit sex determination or International Services.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yahoo&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Advertisements of Ultrasound Laboratory in the USA that conducts sex determination tests.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bing&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Advertisements within Search Results&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;We also examined the search results themselves to check whether the links led to advertisements. On the basis of our &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/file-1.ods" class="external-link"&gt;searches&lt;/a&gt; we found that there &lt;i&gt;are &lt;/i&gt;instances both in Google and Yahoo!, where, when we clicked on the search result, we were directed to advertisements. Bing and Rediff, in these searches, did not lead to any prohibited links. Our findings are tabulated below:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table class="listing"&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Search Engine&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Indian pregnancy gender"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Foetal sex determination"&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Ultrasound pregnancy"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Ultrasound screening"&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Is my baby boy or girl"&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Baby boy or girl"&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;"Pregnancy gender determination"&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Google (.com, .co.in)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes. Gender Predictor Kit (baby2see.com/gender/study_ultrasound.html).&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes. Gender Scan (ultrasound-direct.com/babybond-pregnancy-scans/gender-scan/).&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yahoo&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Potentially violative. Intelligender Gender Prediction Test (intelligender.com/gender-myths.html).&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes. Gender Predictor Kit (baby2see.com/gender/study_ultrasound.html).&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Potential violation. Gender Predictor (mybabyboyorgirl.com).&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bing&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes several results&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Rediff&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No ads.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Given that some search results do indeed seem to violate §22, we then examined the advertising policies of those search engines alleged to display prohibited advertisements in &lt;i&gt;Sabu George&lt;/i&gt; – Google, Yahoo! and Bing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Advertising Policies of Search Engines&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Yahoo! Bing Network&lt;/strong&gt;, in its advertising guidelines, has an entire section dedicated to ads for &lt;a href="http://advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/editorial-pharmacy-prescription-medicine-guidelines"&gt;pharmacy and health care products and services&lt;/a&gt;. In it, there exists a comprehensive list of advertisements prohibited specifically due to the existence of Indian law – such as, for example, ads for miracle cures. Further, under the ‘Family Planning’ category on the same page, the Network acknowledges the existence of regulatory restrictions against advertisements for abortion services, paternity tests, and pre-natal sex determination in India. The consequences of non-compliance with the guidelines are laid out clearly on the same page – they include ad disapprovals, domain blocks, and account suspensions. Despite this, a search for “pregnancy gender determination” displayed an advertisement of an ultrasound lab in the United States that conducts sex determination tests [Table 2].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Google’s Adwords&lt;/strong&gt; service has a similar &lt;a href="https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6023676?hl=en"&gt;policy statement&lt;/a&gt;, titled ‘Legal requirements &amp;amp; serving limitations’ for advertisements on its network. At the outset, Google asserts that the advertiser is responsible for the legality of the ad’s contents:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;i&gt;“As an advertiser, you're always responsible for ensuring that you comply with all applicable laws and regulations, in addition to Google's advertising policies, for all of the locations where your ads are showing. The guidelines below are intended to help highlight some areas where we've seen advertisers violate legal requirements in the past. However, this is not an exhaustive list of legal issues that you may need to consider, so we urge you to do your own research regarding appropriate advertising practices for the place where your business operates, as well as any other places where your ads are showing.”&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Further, in its list of local legal requirements, under the head of ‘Regulated Products &amp;amp; Services’, Google clearly acknowledges that existing legal prohibitions shall be enforced against advertisements for, &lt;i&gt;inter alia&lt;/i&gt;, infant food products and gender determination in India. Advertisements for infant food products are prohibited under §3(a) of the &lt;a href="http://www.bpni.org/docments/IMS-act.pdf"&gt;Infant Milk Substitutes Act, 2003&lt;/a&gt;. As with the Yahoo! Bing Network, the consequences for violating the advertising guidelines include disapproval of the ad, disabling of the domain from the ad network, and suspension of accounts. Despite these precautions, Google did show display some advertisements that would fall foul of §22, such as those we found in Table 2.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;But it seems, at least, that in the case of major search engines, there exist concrete policies to back the relative lack of advertisements violating §22 of the PNDT Act. However, it is possible that these policies were evolved after the Writ Petition in &lt;i&gt;Sabu George&lt;/i&gt; was filed in 2008.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Sources connected to the case indicate that the petitioner has alleged the presence of violative ads, and we have no data regarding 2008 advertising policies at either of these search engines. The Yahoo! Bing Network, however, does have an &lt;a href="http://advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/editorial-guidelines-change-log"&gt;Editorial guidelines change log&lt;/a&gt;, stretching back all the way to the Network’s inception in 2012. The log does not detail any changes to the policy against ads for sex determination in India, so it follows that the Yahoo! Bing Network policy has existed at least from September 2012.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Interestingly, &lt;strong&gt;Yandex, the Russian search provider&lt;/strong&gt;, appears to have prevented ads relating to pre-natal sex determination for different reasons. In its &lt;a href="http://legal.yandex.ru/adv_rules/?lang=en"&gt;Advertising Requirements&lt;/a&gt;, Yandex mandates several restrictions on advertisements relating to medicines, medical products and medical services, which require licenses, registrations with Russian federal authorities, etc. to be produced to Yandex before an ad can be placed. Yandex has placed these restrictions in pursuance of Russian federal laws, but it appears that they have had the unintended consequence of keeping the site clear of advertisements that violate §22 of the PNDT Act, as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Finally, we come to the case of &lt;strong&gt;DuckDuckGo&lt;/strong&gt;, which displayed questionable content in response to the term “prenatal sex determination” – an ad for ultrasound imaging services provided in the US. A similar ad was seen on Yahoo, as noted earlier. Even this, however, would not be a violation of the Act, since the service was located outside India, and the ad was placed by a foreign citizen residing in a foreign jurisdiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;It is well-known that India is one of the few countries that has a ban on pre-natal sex determination, and it is a documented practice for couples to travel abroad and undergo diagnostic tests that enable them to discern the sex of the foetus – Thailand has been a destination of choice, if &lt;a href="http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/exclusive-india-s-missing-daughters-81240"&gt;news reports&lt;/a&gt; are to be believed. Further, such non-Indian advertisements were seen on Google around 2009, and the &lt;a href="http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&amp;amp;Source=Page&amp;amp;Skin=TOINEW&amp;amp;BaseHref=TOIBG%2F2009%2F12%2F04&amp;amp;ViewMode=HTML&amp;amp;GZ=T&amp;amp;PageLabel=23&amp;amp;EntityId=Ar02302&amp;amp;AppName=1"&gt;argument&lt;/a&gt; made by Google’s counsel then stands today – that the situation was akin to an Indian library buying Thai magazines containing sex determination-related advertisements and making them available to the Indian public. Those ads are not targeted at Indians; the magazines were not meant for India. If the ad included invitations to foreigners (“Internationally famous for sex selection!”; “Sex of babies from around the world determined!”), and was published knowing that Indians would read it, then there is a greater likelihood that §22 of the Act stands violated. For instance, Google’s results for “UAE pregnancy gender” showed advertisements of fertility centres in the Middle East, some of which advertise for international patients.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In any event, since there exists no ban against the advertiser in his own jurisdiction, it would lead to an absurd result for search engines to be prosecuted for showing such ads to the Indian public, especially when the advertised service is not meant for or available in India. Displaying such a result would be especially detrimental to low-revenue search engines such as DuckDuckGo, who would be unable to conduct adequate due diligence to protect themselves from similar provisions in other Indian laws.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Organic Search Results&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Having dealt with the issue of advertising against the provisions of §22, we now shift our focus to organic search results. At the outset, we must acknowledge the fact that the words of the statute specify “advertisement”, and it remains to be seen whether organic search results can be treated as advertisements if they are aimed at selling a product or service to prospective consumers for a price. If organic search results are to be treated as advertisements under §22, then it would amount to imposing an unnaturally high burden on search engines.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;As intermediaries, search engines will be given the responsibility to scrutinise and curate the content that they display. Such a model is problematic on several levels. If intermediaries (search engines, in this case) were charged with the responsibility of policing their search results, a &lt;a href="https://www.eff.org/press/releases/fifteen-years-dmca-abuse"&gt;chilling effect&lt;/a&gt; will, in all likehood, befall online content – search engines, being profit-driven business institutions, will naturally choose to ‘err on the side of caution’, and would rather see some legitimate content taken down rather than risk the possibility of expensive, time-consuming litigation or penalties. In fact, when given the responsibility to take down data and curate organic search results, &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expression-on-internet"&gt;intermediaries &lt;i&gt;are&lt;/i&gt; ham-handed&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Such an approach would necessitate the creation of large and complex structures, much like the means used by the DMCA in the US. Only large, reasonably high-revenue search engines will be able to put in place such mechanisms, so the law creates an undesriable entry barrier. Also, curating search results for content violative of §22 would be even more arduous than curating results for DMCA violations, since under DMCA, there is concrete private incentive for rights-holders to report DMCA violations to search engines. There exists no such incentive for individuals to petition search engines to remove §22 violations, and this affects its effectiveness. For these reasons, it is problematic to read organic search results within the ambit of §22.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Of course, the government can and should expect that online advertisements for sex selection services, inviting people to learn the sex of their foetus, are prohibited. It may do this for reasons of public health and safety, and in order to reduce female-selective abortions. But search results, unlike advertisements, contain medical information, links to anti-sex-selection campaigns and information about female foeticide. It would be unfortunate for the government to expect search providers to actively curate the content of a dynamic ecosystem such as the internet, while at the same time ensuring that legitimate content is preserved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sabu George and What Can Be Done&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Lamentably, the Supreme Court does not appear to have entered this debate at all. In the latest arguments in &lt;i&gt;Sabu George&lt;/i&gt;, the Solicitor General of India Mr. Ranjit Kumar offered the government’s hand in filtering and blocking sex-selection advertisements. Mr. Kumar stated that, “&lt;i&gt;if the URL and the I.P. addresses are given along with other information by the respondents&lt;/i&gt;”, and also listing keywords, the Union of India can order website blocking under §69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended). The Union’s stance, it would seem, is that either the search engines should block offending ads by themselves, or block on the basis of directions issued by the government.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In its order of 28&lt;sup&gt; &lt;/sup&gt;January 2015, the Supreme Court has directed that, as an interim measure, “&lt;i&gt;Google, yahoo and Micro Soft [sic] shall not advertise or sponsor any advertisement which would violate Section 22 of the PCPNDT Act, 1994. If any advertise [sic] is there on any search engine, the same shall be withdrawn forthwith by the respondents&lt;/i&gt;”. The Court plans to hear arguments on the “total blocking of items that have been suggested by the Union of India” on the next hearing date, February 11, 2015.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Instead of hearing arguments on the feasibility of total blocking of offending online ads, the Supreme Court should ask whether organic search results constitute advertisements. These results are those that appear as the product of the search algorithm, and would take much time and expense to curate. It would also amount to time-consuming and disproportionate content inspection by the search engines. In any event, it seems that the major search engines do comply in large part with §22 of the PNDT Act. Where offending ads are found (like we did during our searches), the notice-and-takedown procedure under §79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 can be put to intelligent use.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The second option noted by the Court, filtering or blocking on the basis of URLs or IP addresses, also stand the danger of overbreadth or overblocking. Such overblocking is routine across filtering regimes in many jurisdictions; for ex., see the Open Net Initiative’s &lt;a href="https://opennet.net/about-filtering"&gt;note on filtering&lt;/a&gt; (“Filtering’s Inherent Flaws”). It is a danger better averted. In any event, a filtering regime would not affect organic search results, and so the doubt as to the scope of §22 remains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Pranesh Prakash provided invaluable feedback. Balaji Subramanian and Pranav Bidare performed the searches on different engines. Balaji Subramanian is at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, and is in his 2nd year of law. Pranav Bidare is in his 3rd year of law at the National Law School, Bangalore.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/search-engine-and-prenatal-sex-determination'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/search-engine-and-prenatal-sex-determination&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>


   <dc:date>2015-02-12T06:05:24Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure">
    <title>Is India’s website-blocking law constitutional? – I. Law &amp; procedure</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with its corresponding Rules, set out the procedure for blocking of websites in India. Over two posts, Geetha Hariharan examines the constitutional validity of Section 69A and the Blocking Rules. &lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Introduction&lt;/span&gt;:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Information Technology Act, 2000 (“&lt;strong&gt;IT Act&lt;/strong&gt;”) is no stranger to litigation or controversy. Since its enactment in 2000, the IT Act has come under stringent criticism, both for the alleged Constitutional infirmities of its provisions and Rules, as well as for the way it is implemented. In recent years, Sections 66A (re: criminal liability for offensive, annoying or inconveniencing online communications), 67A (re: obscene 69A (re: website-blocking) and 79 (re: intermediary liability) have all come under attack for these reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Today, these Sections and several others have been challenged before the Supreme Court. A total of ten cases, challenging various Sections of the IT Act, are being heard together by the Supreme Court. This is a welcome occasion, for the IT Act desperately needs judicial review. Nikhil Pahwa over at Medianama provides an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/12/223-if-a-law-requires-a-person-to-be-careful-it-is-not-violative-of-free-speech-notes-from-the-supreme-court/"&gt;update and the list of cases&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Among the challenged provisions are Section 66A, Section 79 and Section 69A. Section 66A was and continues to be used wantonly by the State and police. A student was &lt;a href="http://m.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/andhra-pradesh-law-student-arrested-for-facebook-comment-on-cyclone-hudhud/article6544417.ece/"&gt;recently arrested&lt;/a&gt; for a Twitter comment regarding Cyclone Hudhud, while anti-Modi comments led to several arrests earlier in the year (see &lt;a href="http://m.firstpost.com/politics/goa-facebook-user-faces-jail-term-for-anti-modi-comments-1538499.html"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/aap-activist-arrested-for-allegedly-forwarding-anti-modi-mms-in-karnataka/article1-1222788.aspx"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/modi-on-negative-faces-list-principal-6-others-booked/"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;). At CIS, we have previously subjected Section 66A to constitutional analyses. &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act"&gt;Pranesh Prakash traced&lt;/a&gt; the genealogy of the Section and &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A"&gt;its import&lt;/a&gt; in targeting offensive, annoying and inconveniencing communications and spam, while &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/two-arguments-against-the-constitutionality-of-section-66a"&gt;Gautam Bhatia examined&lt;/a&gt; the Section’s overbreadth and vagueness. The casual wording and potential for misuse of Section 79 and the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/constitutional-analysis-of-intermediaries-guidelines-rules"&gt;led Ujwala Uppaluri&lt;/a&gt; to offer strong arguments regarding their violation of Part III of the Constitution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Similar infirmities also handicap Section 69A and its Rules. This provision empowers the Central government and officers authorised by it to order the blocking of websites or webpages. Website-blocking is permissible for reasons enumerated in Section 69A, and in accordance with the process laid out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public (sic)) Rules, 2009 (“&lt;strong&gt;Blocking Rules&lt;/strong&gt;”). In our view, Section 69A and the Blocking Rules are also unconstitutional, and liable to be declared as such by the Supreme Court. We provide our analysis in this post and the next.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 69A, IT Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Section 69A and the Blocking Rules provide for website-blocking in accordance with enumerated reasons and process. The Section reads as follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;69A.&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;i&gt;Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource.- &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;i&gt; &lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out shall be such as may be prescribed. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;As you will notice, the Central government may block any information that is “&lt;i&gt;generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted&lt;/i&gt;” in any computer. This will extend, clearly, to any webpage available and/or hosted in India. The Government can order website-blocks if it is satisfied of the necessity or expedience for this on the basis of (any of) six reasons. These reasons are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol style="text-align: justify; "&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Sovereignty and integrity      of India,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Defense of India,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Security of the State,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Friendly relations with      foreign states,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Public order,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Preventing incitement to      the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;If the Central government is convinced it has a valid reason, then it must follow the blocking procedure set out in the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009"&gt;Blocking Rules&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which were notified on 27 October 2009. Before entering into an analysis of the Blocking Rules, let us understand the blocking procedure.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Blocking Procedure&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;I will explain the blocking procedure in 4 steps: (1) Relevant designations and committees; (2) Procedure to make and examine a blocking request, and issue blocking direction; (3) Blocking in special circumstances; and (4) Review of blocking directions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;(1) Relevant designations and committees:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;Designated Officer (“&lt;strong&gt;DO&lt;/strong&gt;”)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: The Central government notifies an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary as the Designated Officer, who will issue the blocking direction ot the relevant intermediary or agency [Rule 3]. By a &lt;a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Gazette1_20082010(1).pdf"&gt;notification dated 20 January 2010&lt;/a&gt;, the DO is the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division, Department of Information Technology (DIT). Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division &lt;a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/people-and-offices"&gt;on the website&lt;/a&gt; of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY, the name to which DIT was renamed in 2012). I am also unable to find a notification updating the designation of the DO. Presumably, Dr. Gulshan Rai, Director General (Cyberlaws &amp;amp; E-security), DeitY, continues to be the DO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;Nodal Officer (“&lt;strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;NO&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;”)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;: Every organization designates one of its officers as a Nodal Officer, who will receive blocking requests and forward them to the DO [Rule 4]. ‘Organisation’ is defined in Rule 2(g) as Ministries or Departments of the Government of India, State governments and Union Territories, and any Agency of the Central government notified in the Official Gazette. I am unable to find &lt;a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/notifications"&gt;on the DeitY website&lt;/a&gt; a notification explaining which government Agencies are ‘organisations’ under Rule 2(g).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;Intermediary Contact&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;: Every intermediary also designates one person to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO [Rule 13].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;Committee for Examination of Request (“&lt;strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CER&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;”)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;: The 5-membered CER comprises the DO as Chairman, along with officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary from the Ministries of Law &amp;amp; Justice, Home Affairs, Information &amp;amp; Broadcasting and &lt;a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/indian-computer-emergency-response-team-cert-dpl-rtoi"&gt;CERT-In&lt;/a&gt; [Rule 7]. The CER examines each blocking request, before issuing recommendations to the DO to block or not to block. Regrettably, I am unable to identify the current membership of the CER, as no document is available that gives this information. However, the CER’s composition in 2010 &lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking"&gt;may be gleaned&lt;/a&gt; (see Annexure III).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;Review Committee (“&lt;strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;RC&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;”)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;: Rule 2(i) defines the RC as the body set up under Rule 419A, Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. &lt;a href="http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/358%20GI-2014%20dated%208.2.2014_6.pdf"&gt;As per Rule 419A(16)&lt;/a&gt;, the Central RC is constituted by the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;(2) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Blocking procedure&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The Blocking Rules stipulate that the entire blocking procedure, from examining a blocking request to issuing a blocking direction, must be carried out within 7 days from the date on which the DO receives the blocking request from the NO [Rule 11].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;(a) Making a blocking request&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: Any person may send a request for a website-block to an NO of any ‘organisation’ (“&lt;strong&gt;outside request&lt;/strong&gt;”). Alternatively, the NO may himself raise a blocking request. The organization has to examine each outside request and be satisfied that it meets the requirements of Section 69A(1), IT Act. Once it is satisfied, the NO forwards the blocking request to the DO. Outside requests must be approved by the Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory, before they are sent to the DO. [See Rule 6 for this procedure]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;(b) Examining a blocking request&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: Once the DO receives a blocking request, he/she places it before the CER. The DO tries to identify the person/intermediary hosting the troubling information, and if identified, issues a notice seeking their representation before the CER. Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed over fax/email. The person/intermediary has 48 hours from the date of receiving the DO’s notice to make its representation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;After this, the CER will examine the blocking request. It will “consider whether the request is covered within the scope of Section 69A(1)”, and whether it is justifiable to block [Rule 8(4)].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;(c) Blocking direction&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: The DO then places the CER’s recommendation to block or not to block before the Secretary (DeitY) for his/her approval. If and once approval is granted, the DO directs the relevant Agency or intermediary to block the website/page.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;(3) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Blocking in special circumstances&lt;/strong&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;(a) Emergencies [Rule 9]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: In an emergency “when no delay is acceptable”, the DO passes over the blocking procedure described above. With written recommendations, the DO directly approaches the Secretary (DeitY) for approval of blocking request. If satisfied, the Secretary (DeitY) issues the blocking direction as an &lt;i&gt;interim measure&lt;/i&gt;. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the blocking request before the CER at the earliest opportunity (in any case, not later than 48 hours after blocking direction).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt;(b) Court orders [Rule 10]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;: If a court has ordered a website-block, the DO follows a procedure similar to an Emergency situation. He/she submits the certified copy of order to the Secretary (DeitY), and then initiates action as ordered by the court.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;(4) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Review of blocking directions&lt;/strong&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The RC is to meet once in 2 months to evaluate whether blocking directions issued under the Blocking Rules are in compliance with Section 69A(1) [Rule 14]. No other review or appeal mechanism is provided under the Blocking Rules. Nor are aggrieved parties afforded any further opportunities to be heard. Also note that Rule 16 mandates that all requests and complaints received under the Blocking Rules are to the kept strictly confidential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In the next post, I will subject Section 69A and the Blocking Rules to a constitutional analysis.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Blocking procedure poster&lt;/span&gt;:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (&lt;a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/blocking-websites.pdf/at_download/file"&gt;download PDF&lt;/a&gt;, 2.037MB).&lt;/p&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>Freedom of Speech and Expression</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>IT Act</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Blocking</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2014-12-11T11:02:01Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014">
    <title>ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;Following requests from CIS, ICANN has shared a detailed list of its revenues from domain names for the fiscal year ending June 2014. Such level of detail has, until now, been unavailable. Historical data is still to be made available. &lt;/b&gt;
        &lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Five days ago, CIS received a &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version/at_download/file"&gt;detailed list of ICANN’s revenues&lt;/a&gt; from domain name sales and renewals for the fiscal year ending June 2014. The document, sent to us by ICANN’s India head Mr. Samiran Gupta, lists payments received by ICANN from registrars, registries, sponsors and other entities such as the NRO and Country Code TLD administrators. Such granular information is not available at the moment on ICANN’s website as part of its financial transparency disclosures. A &lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary/at_download/file"&gt;summary&lt;/a&gt; has also been provided by ICANN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;This revenue disclosure from ICANN comes on the heels of public and email correspondence between CIS and ICANN staff. At the &lt;a href="http://2014.rigf.asia/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/0805APRIGF-Plenary.doc"&gt;Asia Pacific Regional IGF&lt;/a&gt; (August 3-6, 2014), CIS’ Sunil Abraham sought granular data – both current and historical – on ICANN’s revenues from the domain name industry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;Again, &lt;a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/174-igf-2014/transcripts/1986-2014-09-04-open-forum-icann-room-4"&gt;at the ICANN Open Forum at IGF&lt;/a&gt; (4 September 2014), Sunil sought “&lt;i&gt;details of a list of legal entities that give money to ICANN and how much money they give to ICANN every year&lt;/i&gt;”. In emails to Kuek Yu-Chuang (ICANN’s Asia Pacific head) and Xavier Calvez (ICANN CFO), CIS had asked for historical data as well.&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;The global domain name industry is a &lt;a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/domain_industry_4_billion_2010/"&gt;multi-billion dollar industry&lt;/a&gt;, and ICANN sits at the centre of the web. ICANN is responsible for the policy-making and introduction of new Top Level Domains (TLDs), and it also performs technical coordination and maintenance of the Internet’s unique identifiers (domain names and IP addresses). For each domain name that is registered or renewed, ICANN receives payment through a complex contractual network of registries and registrars. The domain name industry is ICANN’s single largest revenue source.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;&lt;span&gt;Given the impending IANA transition and accountability debates at ICANN, and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/marketwire/1162596.htm"&gt;rapid growth&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of the global domain name industry, one would imagine that ICANN is held up to the same standard of accountability as laid down in the right to information mechanisms of many countries. At the ICANN Open Forum (IGF Istanbul), &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/174-igf-2014/transcripts/1986-2014-09-04-open-forum-icann-room-4"&gt;Sunil raised&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; this very point. Had a Public Information Officer in India failed to respond to a request for information for a month (as ICANN had to CIS’ request for granular revenue data), the officer would have been fined and reprimanded. Since there are no sufficiently effective accountability or reactive transparency measures at ICANN, such penalties are not in place.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;In any event, CIS received the list of ICANN’s current domain name revenues after continual email exchanges with ICANN staff. This is undoubtedly heartening, as ICANN has shown itself responsive to repeated requests for transparency. But it remains that ICANN has shared revenue data &lt;i&gt;only&lt;/i&gt; for the fiscal year ending June 2014, and historical revenue data is still not publicly available. Neither is a detailed list (current and historical) of ICANN’s expenditures publicly available. Perhaps ICANN could provide the necessary information during its regular Quarterly Stakeholder Reports, as well as on its website. This would go a long way in ascertaining and improving ICANN’s accountability and transparency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p style="text-align: justify; "&gt;**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The documents:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version/at_download/file"&gt;ICANN’s domain name revenues in FY14&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary/at_download/file"&gt;Summary of revenue information&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>

    
        <dc:subject>ICANN</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Transparency</dc:subject>
    
    
        <dc:subject>Accountability</dc:subject>
    

   <dc:date>2014-12-12T05:08:02Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>Blog Entry</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary">
    <title>FY14 Customer Payments summary</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;ICANN's FY14 domain name revenue summary&lt;/b&gt;
        
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-summary&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>


   <dc:date>2014-12-08T05:48:18Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>File</dc:type>
   </item>


    <item rdf:about="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version">
    <title>FY14 Customer Payments final version</title>
    <link>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version</link>
    <description>
        &lt;b&gt;ICANN's detailed list of revenues from domain names&lt;/b&gt;
        
        &lt;p&gt;
        For more details visit &lt;a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version'&gt;http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fy14-customer-payments-final-version&lt;/a&gt;
        &lt;/p&gt;
    </description>
    <dc:publisher>No publisher</dc:publisher>
    <dc:creator>geetha</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights></dc:rights>


   <dc:date>2014-12-08T05:46:58Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>File</dc:type>
   </item>




</rdf:RDF>
