Centre for Internet and Society

Shashwati

praskrishna — 2012-02-03T02:52:56Z

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Shashi Tharoor 2

praskrishna — 2014-01-30T12:52:30Z

Shashi Tharoor 2

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shashi tharoor

praskrishna — 2011-12-07T05:11:03Z

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Shashi

praskrishna — 2014-01-30T12:50:49Z

Shashi Tharoor 1

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Sharath Chandra Ram

praskrishna — 2013-05-13T13:13:00Z

Sharath Chandra Ram

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Sharad Sharma's case shows how rampant troll culture has become under Modi

praskrishna — 2017-06-07T12:29:18Z

Sharad Sharma's case shows how rampant troll culture has become under Modi.

This was published by Catch News on May 25, 2017.

Noam Chomsky once said: “Propaganda is to a democracy what violence is to a dictatorship”.

This couldn't be more true than in the Indian context. Abusive right-wing trolls, in this sense, can be seen as stormtroopers of the Narendra Modi government.

They are no different from political goons, using every means at their disposal – intimidation, abuse, hacking attempts, sexual harassment – to silence voices that speak against the regime.

Try tweeting about human rights violations in Kashmir or police atrocities against in Bastar, invariably an anonymous troll will appear and call you “anti-national”. Even criticising government schemes or raising questions about industrial houses supposedly close to the government, can invite abuse.

Some of the trolls are paid, some are ideologically driven while many are just plain frustrated.

But what happens when you come to know that the anonymous troll calling you an ISI agent, is actually the high profile founder of a company working with the government?

Meet Sharad Sharma, co-founder of iSpirt, a think tank that closely worked with Aadhaar. Sharma has been exposed as the man behind the twitter-handle @confident_India- that used to troll all Aadhar critics on the micro-blogging website.

He has apologised from his original twitter account, calling it “a lapse of judgment” and that 'anonymity seemed easier than propriety'.

Through his anonymous twitter handle, Sharma constantly accused Center for Internet and Society (CIS), of being foreign-funded and violating the FCRA (Foreign Contribution Regulation Act) laws, without giving any proof.

In a recently published study, CIS had alleged that Aadhaar numbers of over 13 crore people and bank account details of about 10 crore people were leaked through government portals due to to poor security measures, putting them at risk of financial fraud and identity theft.

accepted the data breach in the Supreme Court." data-reactid="36">Later, the government accepted the data breach in the Supreme Court.

Given Sharma's proximity with the government, it is quite possible that he was aware of the leaks himself. Yet to defend the government on social media, he chose the FCRA card against CIS, providing a hint of what could be in store for the public advocacy group.

Kiran Jonnalagadda, founder of the Freedom Foundation, who first exposed that it was Sharad Sharma anonymously using the @Confident_ India handle, says that “FCRA threats are a way to stop people from questioning Aadhar".

FCRA seems to have been a useful tool for the NDA government against organisations that question government policies. In April this year, the government suspended registration of environmental advocacy NGO Greenpeace. While the government is well within its right to use the FCRA law against those who violate it, but if a law is used only against those who speak against the regime, questions are likely to be raised.

While Sharma has apologised for trolling the government's critics by accusing them of foreign exchange violations and being CIA stooges, there are several handles that go to the extent of giving giving rape and death threats to those who dare to speak against the establishment.

When PM follows trolls

Recently, Trinamool Congress MP, Derek O’Brien accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi of encouraging hatred by following people who run hate campaigns on social media.

“26 Twitter handles that give out rape threats, communal threats are followed by the Prime Minister (Narendra Modi),” O‘Brien said in the Rajya Sabha.

In a recently published book, “ I am a troll” journalist Swati Chaturvedi has given an account of a former BJP volunteer Sadhavi Khosla who alleged that the BJP's social media cell was responsible for putting pressure on e-commerce company Snapdeal to drop actor Aamir Khan as its brand ambassador after the latter made strong comments on the intolerance issue.

It would be wrong to say that only BJP and Modi have (mis)used social media trolls to harass their critics. Parties like AAP and Congress also have a significant presence of anonymous twitter handles as well. But pro-Modi trolls are unmatched in the kind of threats and abuse they indulge in.

Unfortunately, trolls aren't taken to task for their behaviour. Even Sharma, after being caught, received a pat on the back from none less than Nandan Nilekani, for coming clean.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/catch-news-may-25-2017-sharad-sharma-apos-case-shows-how-rampant-troll-culture-has-become-under-modi

Sharad Sharma Apologises for Trolling Aadhaar Critics; Unmasking Ispirit's Controversial Trolling Program

praskrishna — 2017-05-26T01:08:09Z

Last weekend I was at Aditi Mittal’s standup comedy show in Mumbai where she made a cheeky remark that stayed with me – “Do you guys know what India’s soft power is today? It is trolling!”

The blog post by Shweta Modgil was published by Inc 42 on May 23, 2017.

While she was poking fun at the Snapchat-Snapdeal-Evan Spiegel controversy, in a bizarre coincidence those words came back to haunt me three days later. That was when one of biometric authentication system Aadhaar’s most vocal critics, Kiran Jonnalagadda, co-founder of Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), an advocacy group, revealed in a series of tweets that @Confident_India, one of the anonymous accounts arguing in favour of Aadhaar and attacking its critics on Twitter, was being operated by none other than Sharad Sharma, the founder of software products think tank iSPIRT.

At the time, Sharad had completely denied that he was tweeting from an anonymous account. But today, on Twitter, Sharad apologised for the anonymous trolling on Twitter.

In a tweet, Sharad stated that “There was a lapse of judgement on my part. I condoned tweets with uncivil comments. So I’d like to unreservedly apologise to everybody who was hurt by them.”

He added that “Anonymity seemed easier than propriety, and tired as I was by personal events and attacks on iSPIRT’s reputation, I slipped.” Furthermore, he stated that he would not be part of anything like this again or allow such behaviour to continue. He also revealed that an iSPIRT Guidelines and Compliance Committee (IGCC) has been set up to investigate the matter and recommend corrective action.

On Catching a Troll

On 17 May, Kiran tweeted out a revelation, which shook a lot of people – “Have we caught an Aadhaar troll?” Kiran used Twitter’s account reset option on Confident_India with Sharad Sharma’s number to see if it is was accepted. And, as per a screenshot posted by him, it did.

This was further corroborated by many other Twitter users. Medianama’s Nikhil Pahwa (and co-founder of IFF) also confirmed the same, tweeting that the troll account does link to Sharad Sharma.

In a detailed Medium post, Kiran then revealed how he investigated the rise of anonymous Twitter accounts and trolls responding to critics of Aadhaar. But what he revealed next was the shocking part – that at the 27th Fellows meeting of the think tank, a plan was hatched to respond to critics of India Stack which involved the use of trolls. A group called Sudham, created earlier, divided people who were broadcasting different views on Aadhaar, into different categories and then underlined various proposals on dealing with them. One of the groups called “archers” was entrusted to carry out the mainstream debate, while another group of “swordsmen” was entrusted to challenge people who were categorised as informed yet “trolling.” Swordsmen would do this by coordinating on WhatsApp with quick responses and in numbers.

Kiran got a hold of the presentation and also shared how one controversial slide also showed a detractor matrix.

It is this slide which Kiran uses to illustrate the fact that: “ iSPIRT has an officially sanctioned trolling program where the trolls coordinate on WhatsApp and attack together on Twitter, exactly the behaviour seen in all the tweets above—and I’ve only covered the leader’s tweets. There are at least a dozen known troll accounts that attack in packs.”

First Denial

Back when the information was first revealed, Sharad Sharma responded by denying that he was tweeting from the @Confident_India Twitter account.

He further added that he was in for a family emergency in the US. And that he was clueless as to why his number was linked with that account.

But, interestingly, what roused the investigator’s suspicions was that Sharad shared the same denial from another troll account @indiaforward2 – which was captured by another Twitter user before it was deleted.

The denial from Sharad’s true account came half an hour later. But the damage had been done and all fingers pointed in the direction of Sharad Sharma engaging in trolling from those accounts. Kiran then wrote another damning post on Sharad’s dubious denial.

As can be guessed, all the tweets related to this matter from Sharad’s and Indiaforward’s accounts have been deleted. The last tweet from Confident India’s account on 17 May professed that he is not Sharad Sharma.

Meanwhile, iSPIRT finally responded to Kiran’s revelations on Medium –“We want to categorically state that the allegations against iSPIRT coordinating and/or promoting any troll campaign are false and the evidence presented is a deliberate misreading of our intent to engage with those speaking against India Stack.”

The post further explained that in its Fellows meeting held in February and April 2017, it did address the issue of the chatter around India Stack. It says, “Our volunteer, Tanuj Bhojwani, led the discussion and we outlined our strategy for dealing with our detractors. The slide in question is clearly titled “Detractor Matrix.” The slide outlines how we classify those speaking against India Stack, and how we are engaging with them. We called one category of people “informed yet trolling (IYT),” a category of people deliberately misleading people, despite understanding the nuance behind the debate.”

The post admitted that the think tank encouraged volunteers to respond to these IYT Twitter handles directly from their own personal handles. However, at no point did it endorse or recommend anonymous trolling.

“We are aware that some volunteers and their friends have created an anonymous campaign to Support Aadhaar. This is not a troll campaign, but an informational one. It is also not an iSPIRT campaign.”

It concluded with: “Kiran’s motivated misrepresentation of the slides perhaps speaks to his biases against iSPIRT.” The post added that it plans to investigate the confusion around the alleged mobile number and account link and clarify all outstanding questions.

Meanwhile coming back to trolling from where we started. Though Sharad’s apology did not say directly whether he operated the two Twitter accounts — @Confident_ India and @Indiaforward2 — which he was suspected of using for trolling- he signs off by saying that he requests “those who I have disappointed to look at this as an exception.”

The Aadhaar Controversy

While the series of incidents raises many doubts over an esteemed organisation such as iSPIRT, the controversy over Aadhaar, India’s massive biometric identification programme, has been raging for many months now.

Over the last few months, it has come under fire for not addressing the privacy concerns of an individual and leaking individual data. Aadhaar critics have pointed out that it is more a mass surveillance tool, can lead to identity thefts, and linking basic services with it spells doom.

This month, a CIS (Centre for Internet and Society ) report revealed that Aadhaar numbers and personal information of as many as 135 million Indians could have been leaked from four government portals, due to lack of IT security practices. The report claimed that the absence of “proper controls” in populating the databases could have disastrous results as it may divulge sensitive information about individuals, including details about the address, photographs, and financial data. It also added that as many as 100 Mn bank account numbers could have been “leaked.”

However, on May 16, the CIS updated its report and clarified that although the term ‘leak’ was originally used 22 times in its report, it is at “best characterised as an illegal data disclosure or publication and not a breach or a leak.” It also claimed that some of its findings were “misunderstood or misinterpreted” by the media and that it never suggested that the biometric database had been breached.

Meanwhile, the Aadhaar-issuing authority UIDAI has asked CIS to explain its sensational claim that 13 crore Aadhaar numbers were “leaked” and provide details of servers where they are stored. The UIDAI also wants CIS to clarify what kind of “sensitive data” is still with the Centre or anyone else. The UIDAI has strongly denied any breach of its database and has asked CIS to provide details such as the servers where the downloaded “sensitive data” is stored.

While the security of the above-mentioned Aadhaar data is still being debated, the government’s push towards making it compulsory across industries has become a major topic of debate in India.

From linking bank accounts, to PAN numbers, to obtaining free gas connections under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, to linking scholarships to linking Aadhaar numbers to social welfare schemes for electronically disbursing money to specific beneficiaries, or the Aadhaar-enabled Payment System (AEPS), the government has been pushing on with Aadhaar to make it a mandatory ID rather than the voluntary one it was envisaged to be originally. India still does not have a data protection and privacy law and making Aadhaar mandatory in such a country is not without risks.

Given the fact that the UIDAI cannot afford to carry out authentication-based rollouts across schemes in haste as the failure rate of AEPS can lead to denial of direct benefits, it makes more sense to retain Aadhaar as a voluntary authenticator, at least until the government solves on-ground issues around Aadhaar-based authentication. Because any failure can erode public faith in Aadhaar as the beneficiary would not get his rightful ration over authentication failure— and, to that extent, in the government itself. So, for beneficiaries who depend on public distribution systems (PDS) for rice, sugar, kerosene or oil, authentication failure is a serious problem.

It is to this effect that PILs (public interest litigation suits) have been filed in the Supreme Court stating that making Aadhaar compulsory is illegal and would virtually convert citizens into “slaves” as they would be under the government’s surveillance all the time. The Supreme Court had itself stated in August 2015 that Aadhaar cards will not be mandatory for availing benefits of government’s welfare schemes and had also barred authorities from sharing personal biometric data collected for enrollment under the scheme.

Last month too, it lambasted the Narendra Modi-led BJP government at the Centre for making Aadhaar card a mandatory prerequisite to avail government services. The court will examine all applications against Aadhaar on June 27 2017, while the government remains steadfast on not extending the deadline of June 30 by which various schemes such as the grant of scholarships, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and various other social welfare schemes were to seek mandatory Aadhaar number.

While the debate rages on, controversies keep on piling up. Recently, linking people living with HIV/ AIDS with Aadhaar cards has allegedly driven away patients from hospitals and antiretroviral therapy (ATR) centres in Madhya Pradesh. As per health department sources, the MP State AIDS Control Society made Aadhaar card number compulsory from February this year for those affected by the virus to get free medicines and treatment in accordance with the Central government’s policy making Aadhaar mandatory to avail benefits of any government scheme.

However, this led to negative fallout as many patients and suspected victims started avoiding ATR centres and district hospitals after the new rule came into effect. The patients feared that the compulsory submission of Aadhaar card to get free medicines and medical check-ups could lead to the disclosure of their identity, inviting social stigma.

While there is no denying the fact that, in a welfare state, technology can play a big role in enabling the state to hand out entitlements more efficiently and distribute public services at scale. But doing the same at the cost of an individual citizen’s privacy and resting it all on one mandatory number whose authentication is still not completely foolproof, is hardly the way a welfare state would like to operate.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/inc42-may-23-2017-shweta-modgil-sharad-sharma-aplogises-for-trolling-aadhaar-critics

Shanker Annaswamy

praskrishna — 2012-04-11T10:43:33Z

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Shankar.jpg

Shadow Search Project (SSP) in CIS

praskrishna — 2011-04-04T06:54:12Z

CIS hosts an interesting line-up on the 18th of April with the Shadow Search Project (SSP).

Last year, n.e.w.s. a collective online platform for the analysis and development of art-related activity organized an open call: Shadow Search, which was looking for a specific algorithm. In particular this search engine would allow prospectors in the world of information and databases to discover ‘shadow art activities’ that are partially hidden, off-the-radar, stealthy. Last year a jury gathered at CIS to evaluate the 5 entries and after much deliberation, a winner was chosen, 'Narcissus', by Phil Jones and Aharon Amir. This algorithm is now being launched at CIS on March 31, 2011.

The corpus of objects being tested by the Narcissus search engine is the data uploaded from the students from the Dutch Art Institute, Srishti School of Art, Design, Technology, Shantiniketan and CKP for 'Space: the final frontier'. The past three weeks the students have been indexing the shadow worlds of Bangalore with various art projects, which were physically exhibited at CKP on March 17th, 2011. The Shadow Search Project (SSP) will continue at the Center for Experimental Media Arts (CEMA) at the Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology this year as a full-time project, in which various aspects of art-related activities as well as their visibility, searchability and accessibility will be investigated by participants and visiting faculty.

Also included in the day's activities is a discussion encircling the concept of 'search' with local guests (Nishant Shah, Prayas Abhinav, Renée Ridgway, T B Dinesh, Ajai Narendran) and those from abroad via Skype (Geert Lovink, Stephen Wright, Marijn de Vries Hoogerwerff) This is a continuation of a series of Skype chats from the past year in Amsterdam (INC) and Bangalore at CIS in which 'search' as a larger concept is being rethought. Now more than ever, in an era where Google hegemony is being tested by Facebook linkage and alternative search models are surfacing, we need to keep the 'world's knowledge' open and not proprietary. Please join us!

Agenda

16:00	Discussion in Skype during European lunch break time
17:30	Launch of the Narcissus algorithm and how it works, Space the Final Frontier project
18:00	Shadow Search Platform: going further

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/events/shadow-search-in-cis

Sexual Rights, Openness and Regulatory Systems

praskrishna — 2011-04-05T03:59:22Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is co-organising a workshop on Sexual Rights, Openness and Regulatory Systems at the Internet Governance Forum on 14 September, 2010.

Content regulation remains remains a critical area where competing rights and interests are played out. Within this, sexuality and sexual rights lie at the centre of the debate. Protection from the "harm" of pornography and other sexually related content are often the principal reason forwarded for regulating content. At the same time, the internet is a critical space for the exercise and realisation of sexual rights, especially by people who have less access to power and resources, such as migrants, sex workers, differently abled communities, young women etc. In recent years, internet content regulation has increasingly become more of a norm than an exception. Despite the slippery definitions of 'obscene', 'illegal' and 'harmful' content, governments, the private sector and civil society are shaping and implementing regulatory mechanisms, sometimes in partnership with each other.

To what extent has it worked to protect the rights of all users, particularly those that such regulations assert their protection over, such as internet users, young people and women? What can be some of the indicators to monitor and measure to what extent the internet is 'open', especially in relation to sexual rights? What happens when regulation works to instead compromise or infringe on users' sexual rights, including the right to access information, communicate, share knowledge, build communities, exercise control over their personal data, embodiment and spaces? What are some of the mechanisms of redress - both formal and informal - within existing regulatory systems, and how far are they able to respond to these issues? What is needed to ensure that transparency, accountability and a rights-based framework - principles that last year's IGF workshop participants agreed were key - are built into them?

Drawing from current research initiatives in this area, this workshop aims to facilitate an open dialogue and exchange of ideas, knowledge and best practices to respond to some of the questions above. Research papers will also be commissioned to investigate some of the key questions raised above to initiate debate and discussion prior to IGF, which will be shared at the workshop.

Which of the five broad IGF Themes or the Cross-Cutting Priorities does your workshop fall under?
Security, Openness and Privacy

Have you organized an IGF workshop before? Yes
If so, please provide the link to the report:
http://www.intgovforum.org/Athens_workshops/Content_Regulation.pdf (2006);
http://intgovforum.org/Rio_event_report.php?mem=19 (2007);
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/index.php/component/chronocontact/?
chronoformname=Workshopsreports2009View&curr=1&wr=93 (2

Provide the names and affiliations of the panellists you are planning to invite:

Nadine Moawad, Founder, Take Back The Tech Arabia; Project Leader, EROTICS - Lebanon
Dorothy Atwood, Vice President - Public Policy, and the Chief Privacy Officer of the telecommunications company AT&T, USA
Joy Liddicoat, human rights lawyer and Commissioner with the New Zealand Human Rights Commission.
Clarissa Smith, Member of the Onscenity Research Network; Programme Leader, MA Media and Cultural Studies and MA Film & Cultural Studies, University of Sunderland, UK.

Biographies:
There are no panelists biographies associated to this workshop at the moment.

Provide the name of the organizer(s) of the workshop and their affiliation to various stakeholder groups:
Association for Progressive Communications, Women's Networking Support Programme
Co-organisers:
Centre for Internet and Society
Alternative Law Forum

Organization:Association for Progressive Communications, Women's Networking Support Programme

Contact Person: Jac sm Kee

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/events/sexual-rights-openness-regulatory-systems

Sex on-the-go

praskrishna — 2013-06-05T09:08:05Z

After a freak fire in 2011 reduced the cubbyholes trading in electronic goods inside a Crawford Market shopping plaza to ashes, Junaid has gone alfresco.

The article by Anand Holla was published in Mumbai Mirror on May 4, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted in it.

He sits on a stool by a chock-full street tinkering with mobile phones while three teenage staffers hover around him. A laptop receives favourable treatment; it sits at the centre of the makeshift stall scattered with card readers. The imaginary wall of hostility he carefully builds over several seconds crashes when he realises we are genuine customers. "This is not your regular movie...it will cost you Rs 250 for 4 GB," he mutters, dodging eye contact. Some bargaining later, he hurriedly transfers 200 short pornographic clips from the laptop on to a memory card for Rs 150. Most are the fall-out of crosscountry MMS scandals, the flavour of the season. "Everyone does it, no one talks about it. A raid means we lose our equipment and pay a hefty fine," he says in staccato metre, handing us back the card. Seconds later, head down, he's back to reviving a dead smartphone.

The rates vary at a booth a few metres down. It's Rs 400 for 16GB - the same price as that for loading your phone with the latest Bollywood and Hollywood films - of a "collection" that includes foreign porn, and bestiality videos.

It's hardly a secret that several of the city's cell phone repair shops and SIM card kiosks that flaunt a computer, stock smut in secret folders marked by gibberish names. "We get some women, too," one owner says. "They say, "Zara woh waale movies daal dena'."

Which brings you to the rules of the mobile-porn-off-the-street universe.

A blunt demand for a blue film clip will send shopkeepers into a shell. Some may even express mock disgust at your request. Blame it on random raids by the State Anti-Piracy Cell. Around South Mumbai's markets, for instance, code words 'Daal gosht' or 'Pelampaal' put the Flashing-Loading-Repairing stall owners at ease. But for tongue-tied first-timers, body language is the marker. A local cell phone accessories distributor says, "The more desperate you look and sound, the easier it is for you to pass off as a bona fide purchaser. If you are well-dressed, they'll deny they stock it. There's no fixed rate. Sab grahak dekhke poodi baandhte hain. Considering how it's a simple copy-paste job, it's free money anyway."

Regular customers frequently leave their phones with their trusted 'service' providers for loading apps, games, the latest films, and porn too. It's a package deal. "If you know how to ask for it, there's hardly a corner in Mumbai where you can't buy pocket porn," says a shopkeeper from Mulund.

In fact, pornography is not high on the authorities' agenda, says Vijay Mukhi, former member of the High Court/State Government Committee on Pornography and Cyber Laws. "Unless the Anti-Piracy Cell sends a dummy customer to lay a trap, it's near impossible to prosecute the shopkeepers because watching porn is not a crime; only producing, publishing or distributing it is," he clarifies.

Shafqat Usmani, President of the Mobile Dealers Welfare Association of Mumbai, says, the paltry 2.5 per cent margin on products makes the city's 50,000 mobile phone retailers render additional services, including repairing. Is loading porn part of the survival mechanism? "The low margin is no excuse to indulge in disgusting activities," he says.

Hand-held and hi-res
The cell phone boom - both, cheap Chinese models that allow the not-so-privileged access to technology and the arrival of high-res display screens that offer the affluent a viewing experience superior to television - has worked towards making porn consumption mainstream. Local train commuters will tell you of the passenger on the corner seat watching smutty clips, as if it were an impassive pastime. It's even found favour as a 'stress reliever'. "My friends and I buy phone porn to watch whenever the workload at office gets out of hand," says a Mankhurd resident.

While watching porn on laptops, either straight off the net or via DVDs, means you could get busted by family and friends, the handheld experience - with a phone password to boot - allows complete privacy.

What would you like?
Depending on which neighbourhood market you access, the popular offering varies. In Kurla, says a cell phone mechanic, foreign porn has no takers. "They (customers) say everything happens too soon and easy. The demand is for morphed celebrity sex videos, South Indian porn and of course, MMS clips." Some of these are what the industry refers to as 'kaand' videos. They resemble MMS scandal clips but are staged. It's the lure of these grainy, sloppily shot videos that landed Karnataka BJP ministers Lakshman Savdi and CC Patil in a soup last February. The two were caught watching a clip during assembly. Amid a storm of criticism, they and Mangalore minister Krishna Palemar, who was accused of transferring the video to Savdi's phone, resigned.

On Ahmedabad's Relief Road, a row of kiosks that sport the 'Downloading' sign, like the one run by Karimmuddin, offer hi-definition (HD) foreign porn to affluent students who walk in with large-screen 3G phones demanding virus-free content. It's Rs 100 for 2GB worth of mp4 clips of 720p resolution, and Rs 50 for 2GB worth low-quality clips, says 21-year-old Moin. Smaller, dirt cheap deals are available too. A single HD clip at Rs 5.50, a low-res one for Rs 2, and the 'lightest' clip for Rs 21 paise.

"My customers are youngsters from middle and upper middle class families," says 30-year-old Rocky, a shop owner in Navrangpura, while catering to Vikas, a collegian waiting for a Rs 100 download. "We are a group of six friends, including girls. For Rs 100, I'm going away with more than 20 HD video clips," he says straight-faced, adding that his group of friends, girls included, get together during the holidays for collective viewing. A relationship of trust between regulars like Vikas and shopkeepers means he will share a clip with the mobile store owner, in case he doesn't have it in stock.

It's a business of 100 per cent profits, they admit, and raids are easy to dodge since the police usually come looking for duplicate cell phones. They'd make half their monthly earnings if they relied on selling SIM cards, mobile accessories and software loading alone, says Ramesh, a 23-year-old staffer at a cell phone shop in Odhav that gets walk-ins from rickshawallahs and college students.

The rise of mobile porn has turned into a thorn in the flesh for pirated DVD sellers. Ajju, who runs a CD/DVD stand near Panchwati Crossroads, remembers a time when customers crowded him for 'tragda' or XXX CDs. "Older women would arrive in cars, roll down the window and ask for adult movies. I'd notice how they'd chuck the explicit cover and plonk the CD in an unsuspecting plastic bag." Mobile porn has hit his profits, bringing it down by 20 per cent.

Southward bound
Surprisingly, in Bengaluru, the erotic DVD trend is experiencing freak survival. Two years ago, the youth scoured Majestic and SP Road for downloaded porn. But with affordable mobile phone data plans and pirated DVD sellers ratting on their competitors, mobile repair shop owners have had to stick to doing just that - fiddle with hardware.

It's the tier II and III cities across India that are waking up to the potential of porn-on-phone. Earlier this year, Mysore-based moral awareness group Rescue conducted a survey across 964 junior college students from Mysore, Chamarajanagar and Bengaluru. More than 75 per cent watched porn regularly, and most watched six times more porn on their phones than on any other device, said the findings.

Mangalore, Belgaum, Dharwad and Mysore, all educational centres, support a thriving porn-lending library system. A student from Moodabidri says, "Most hostel students venture out to these shops once a week, and pay Rs 50 for a porn-loaded memory card. They return it a week later in exchange for fresh content."

Mangalore leads the pack in the sleaze game. It's believed that the clip that got the Karnataka ministers into trouble was called Fasila, and was a hit in Mangalore and neighbouring Kasargod two years ago. Six years ago, a seven-minute MMS sex clip was converted into a half-hour CD named Mangalooru Mungaru Male and sold widely. In 2000, before mobiles became the rage they are now, sex CDs flew off the shelves. The famous 40-minute clip, Mysore Mallige (known as MM CD) that featured a girl from Puttur, was sold for as much as Rs 1,000.

A mobile accessories shop owner in Puttur says the porn viewing audience has grown to include blue collar workers, who aren't tech-savvy to figure their own Internet downloads. "All they want is clarity of clips,' he says.

Watch, don't act
His customers then, are not very different from 22-year-old Manoj Sah and his 19-year-old companion Pradeep Kumar, who admitted to investigators probing the rape of a five-year-old girl in East Delhi last month, that they were drinking and watching porn on their mobile phone before they lured the girl into Sah's house with a chocolate.

While the nation erupted in protest, the confession drew attention to the possible fallout of easy access to pornographic content. The Delhi case isn't isolated. In January, Mumbai cringed when 70-year-old Niyaz Raza was arrested in the Govandi rape case involving a 13-year-old girl. His SIM was found loaded with sex clips, including one where he had filmed the girl performing oral sex on him.

Last month, Indore advocate Kamlesh Vaswani filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court seeking a change in Internet laws that would make watching pornography a nonbailable offence. It estimates that the number of such clips accessible to Indians is more than 200 million. The petition states: "The sexual content that kids are accessing today is far more graphic, violent, brutal, deviant, and destructive (than before), and has put the entire society in danger." It also finds the increasing "severity and gravity" of these visuals a concern, and accuses accessible pornography of "fuelling" most of the offences committed against women and children.

So, more than porn, it's the exposure of a larger audience to its extreme forms - bondage, bestiality, even paedophila - that's spurred a debate. To sum up the sentiment in the words of award-winning writer Robin Morgan: "Pornography is the theory, rape is the practice."

There are enough and more voices refuting Vaswani's claim. Pranesh Prakash is one of them. The policy director with Bengaluru-based Centre for Internet and Society, says, "There is no data to establish a direct co-relation between porn and sexual crimes. To be alarmed over the widespread availability of porn through mobile phone loading alone is a classist reaction; those who are well-to-do have had easy digital access anyway."

Way before those accused of rape were introduced to porn, they were exposed to a culture of misogyny that says women must be controlled, and their bodies are free to loot.

- With Hemington James and Yogesh Avasthi in Ahmedabad, Rakesh Prakash in Bengaluru and Deepthi Shridhar in Mangalore (Some names been changed to protect identity)

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/news/mumbai-mirror-anand-holla-may-4-2013-sex-on-the-go

Several Indian Twitter users' accounts suspended due to tech glitch

praskrishna — 2014-12-05T00:17:15Z

Twitter denies conspiracy theory, blames technical glitch for account suspensions

The blog entry by Silky Malhotra was published on digit on November 3, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The accounts of several Twitter users were suspended for unknown reasons, setting off conspiracy theories that only the accounts of right-wing supporters had been targeted. However, Twitter has denied these rumors and instead blamed technical issues for the glitch.

Although Twitter blamed a technical glitch for the account suspension, several Twitter users responded by stating that there was a pattern to the suspension because 'suspended users' were asked to change their behavior to be able to continue using the micro-blogging site.

A message sent out to a Twitter user whose account was suspended read, "Twitter has automated systems that find and remove multiple automated spam accounts in bulk".

Twitter officials have denied blocking of accounts deliberately and added that the incident was an accident as part of spam cleaning process.

Twitter also apologized for the inconvenience but added, "Unfortunately, your account got caught in one of these spam groups by mistake. It is possible your account posted an update that appeared to be spam, so please be careful what you tweet... You will need to change your behavior to continue using Twitter. Repeat violations of the Twitter rules may result in the permanent suspension of your account."

However this statement has triggered outrage among users who called it Internet policing. Several users responded with humor, and one posted, "In the Twitter canteen you never get chicken wings in pairs because the right wing is blocked."

Pranesh Prakash, policy director, Centre for Internet and Society, stated that though there have been instances of 'privatisation of censorship' in the past, this incident may not have been that. "It doesn't look deliberate especially because even accounts such as eBay India were suspended."

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digit-november-3-2014-silky-malhotra-several-indian-twitter-users-accounts-suspended-due-to-tech-glitch

Seventh Open Letter to the Finance Committee: A Note on the Deduplication of Unique Identifiers

praskrishna — 2011-11-22T07:28:11Z

Sahana Sarkar on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) had sent in a Right to Information application on 30 June 2011 to Ashish Kumar, Central Public Information Officer, UIDAI. The UIDAI sent in its reply. Through the seventh open letter, Hans attempts to characterize in an abstract way the replies that CIS managed to elicit and makes some elementary observations. The UIDAI records one or more biometric signatures of those individuals to whom it assigns its unique identity or identifier ; and for convenience let us call this the process of registering an applicant. In the normal course of registration the signatures of an applicant will be compared to those already recorded; and the outcomes of this exercise of comparing suites of biometric signatures — fingerprints and iris-scans, say — may be regarded as the values of a binary variable:

With more than one signature, we have Y = 1 only when those of the applicant match the signatures in some other suite of such item by item; and Y = 0 then if at least one of his or her signatures fails to match any already recorded one.

Though the circumstance should be unlikely, a person who has already been registered may apply again to be registered: with fraudulent intent maybe: or simply because he or she has lost the document – some identity card, perhaps – which bears the identifier assigned to him or her by the UIDAI. And the possibilities here may be regarded as the values of a binary variable:

Though we are regarding X and Y as variables equally, and taking them for jointly distributed ones, there is an evident asymmetry between them. The exercise of trying to match a given suite of signatures to some set of other suites can be performed so long as the signatures remain available; but for a given applicant the values of X refer to events already past. Faced with an applicant of whom they may suppose no more than what he or she may disclose, the personnel of the UIDAI cannot directly estimate either of the two quantities:

We have p[X = 0] + p[X = 1] = 1 here, needless to say, so there is only one quantity that needs estimating. But it is worth emphasizing that even when an applicant declares himself to have been registered already— and has come, say, to have a lost card newly issued — the personnel of the UIDAI are obliged to remain agnostic about p[X = 1] : no matter how ready they are to believe him.[1]

That no individual should be assigned more than one identifier is an entirely evident desideratum: so the process of comparing the signatures of a fresh applicant to those already recorded must be a strict one. But the process of comparison should also make it very likely that, when a match of signatures does occur, the applicant is someone who has in fact been registered already. The chance that a genuinely new applicant’s signatures will match some already recorded suite should be very small: the proportion of such mistaken matches, among all matches, should be as low as possible. This proportion is usually denoted by p[X = 0 | Y = 1] : the conditional probability that X = 0 given that Y = 1 : the chance that, despite a match of signatures, the applicant has not in fact been registered already. The defining formula:

relates this conditional probability to the ‘absolute’ or ‘raw’ probabilities of the events [Y = 1] and [X = 0 and Y = 1] ; the second of which is sometimes said to be contained in the first.

Suppose that there have been N applicants thus far. It is usual to say N trials of X and Y have occurred; but only the outcomes for Y are known. Suppose that matches have been found some m times out of these N ; then N − m applicants will have been registered. With regard to these trials, set

Note that these numbers are not individually known; but as the specified events exhaust the possibilities, we have c 00 +c 01 +c 10 +c 11 = N ; and we do know that

The ratio m/N would be a reasonable estimate of p[Y = 1] ; and (N − m)/N a reasonable estimate of p[Y = 0] = 1 − p[Y = 1] likewise. The quantity we are seeking is p[X = 0 | Y = 1] however: of which the ratio c 01/m would be a natural estimate. But unless we have some sense of the relative magnitudes of c 01 and c 11 the quantity

could be anything between 0 and 1 now. To estimate the relative magnitudes of c 01 and c 11 in any direct way would be difficult, because one has no purchase on how likely the events [X = 0 & Y = 1] or [X = 1 & Y = 1] are. So p[X = 0 | Y = 1] must be estimated directly, it would seem; and we shall come back to the question.

The reply we have received from the UIDAI indicates that 2.59 × 107 registrations — or successful ‘enrolments’, as they have put it — had been effected by 17.08.2011;while the ‘enrolments rejected’ came to 2.005 × 103 they say. Enrolments were rejected when ‘residents were duplicates’: if we take this to mean that an applicant was refused registry on account of his signatures matching some suite of signatures already recorded, then we may suppose that

The False Positive Identification Rate, or FPIR, is defined in that reply as the ratio of the number of the number of false positive identification decisions to the total number of enrolment transactions by unenrolled individuals : if by “unenrolled individual” we understand an applicant of whom [X = 0] actually obtains, then in our notation we have

rather: which would be a natural estimate of p[X = 0 & Y = 1] now, and since

the ‘false postive identification rate’ thus construed could be bound, at least, if p[X = 0 | Y = 1] itself could be. At any rate, this latter proportion seems to be the most pertinent one here: p[X = 0 | Y = 1] is the conditional probability, of mistaken matches, that the UIDAI must strive to keep as low as possible.

The reply from the UIDAI defines a false negative identification as an incorrect decision of a biometric system that an applicant for a UID, making no attempt to avoid recognition, has not been previously enrolled in the system, when in fact they have. One is at a loss to understand how the personnel of the UIDAI are to determine when an applicant is making no attempt to avoid recognition. Putting that aside, the False Negative Identification Rate or FNIR would now appear to be p[X = 1 | Y = 0] : the probability that, despite his or her signatures not matching any already recorded suite, an applicant has in fact already been registered: and with our notation

now. But c 10 cannot be reliably estimated, again, because one has no purchase on how likely [X = 1 & Y = 0] is; and the conditional probability p[X = 1 | Y = 0] will have to be estimated or bound in some direct way as well.

The preceding paragraphs have asserted that, in order to estimate or effectively bound the identification rates being sought by the UIDAI, the conditional probabilities p[X = 0 | Y = 1] and p[X = 1 | Y = 0] will have to be addressed in some direct way: without any attempt to estimate the likelihoods of [X = 0 & Y = 1] and [X = 1 & Y = 0] by themselves, that is to say. There might be ways of reliably estimating these conditional probabilities; and the manufacturers of the devices that produce the signatures may have provided tight bounds on what they would be — when the devices are working properly, at least. But let us now consider how the UIDAI has elaborated on these rates.

Their reply to our second question states that the biometric service providers have to meet the following accuracy SLA’s for FPIR and FNIR:

The condition of ‘non-duplication’ in the requirement (P) implies that the FPIR is being understood now as the formula in (†) above computes it: as an estimate of the conditional probability p[Y = 1 |X = 0]: since one already knows that [X = 0] for each enrolment here. Such an estimate could be made if one had obtained a sample of suites of signatures from distinct individuals — where no two suites in the sample could have come from the same individual — and compared each suite to every other: the proportion of matches found would be an estimate of p[Y = 1 |X = 0] now.[2]

The ‘biometric service providers’ the UIDAI has contracted with are presumably able to perform such experiments accurately. But an estimate of p[Y = 1 |X = 0] will not, as we shall momentarily see, by itself readily yield a usable bound on p[X = 0 | Y = 1] : on the crucial likelihood that, despite his or her suite of signatures matching a suite already recorded, an applicant has not in fact been registered.

The condition “ONLY duplicate enrolments” in the requirement (N) implies that the FNIR is being understood as an estimate of the conditional probability p[Y = 0 |X = 1] now: as one already knows that [X = 1] for each enrolment here. The biometric service providers should be able to estimate this probability as well. The FNIR as (‡) construes it is an estimate of p[X = 1 | Y = 0] rather; but a usable bound for this likelihood is readily got from p[Y = 0 |X = 1] now, for we may surely expect p[X = 1] < p[Y = 0].

Let us see if the requirement (P) will yield any usable upper bound on the crucial likelihood p[X = 0 | Y = 1]: which, to note it again, is what the UIDAI must seek to minimise. Consider the consequences when the FPIR is understood as (P) envisages. Taken together with formula (1) above we have

If we are not willing to wager on any upper limit appreciably less than 1 for p[X = 0] , we obtain

now.[3] Unless one can reasonably suppose that the event [Y = 1] never occurs, one must grant that p[Y = 1] > 0 . We have

But this inequality yields a usable upper bound only when K < 3: only when K is 1 or 2 that is. In either case, only by supposing that p[Y = 1] > 10−2 will the accuracy mandated for the FPIR by the UIDAI yield a usable upper bound on p[X = 0 | Y = 1] . Since the UIDAI expects that p[Y = 1] < 10−2 surely, we must conclude now that the requirements it has imposed on its ‘biometric service providers’ will not help its personnel estimate an upper limit for the crucial likelihood that, despite his or her suite signatures matching some already recorded suite, an applicant for a UID has not in fact been registered already: which likelihood, to insist again, is what the UIDAI must seek to minimise.

The argument just made will seem perverse: but the calculation is perfectly general. Suppose an FPIR limit of 10−J is mandated; then, unless one is willing to wager an upper limit on p[X = 0] , one cannot get a usable upper bound on p[X = 0 | Y = 1] from this limit on the FPIR, used all by itself, unless one supposes that p[Y = 1] > 10−J+1.

To save writing, denote by L01 the crucial likelihood p[X = 0 | Y = 1] ; and suppose that is some desired upper bound on L01 now. Assume that the FPIR achieved by a service provider is an accurate estimate of p[Y = 1 |X = 0] ; then from (1) we get

Now [X = 0] should not be a rare event at all, and, conversely, [Y = 1] should be a rare event.[4] So one should be able to set some reasonable upper limit to the ratio p[Y = 1]/ p[X = 0] : but without attempting any precise estimate, at all, of either individual probability. One may reasonably expect, for instance, that no more than one in a thousand applicants for a uid will already have been registered; and when p[X = 1] < 10−3 we will have

from (3) above. This calculation can be repeated with any number m in place of 3 here, of course, provided p[X = 1] < 10−m and p[Y = 1] < 10−m are both likely; and it seems entirely reasonable, now, for the UIDAI to insist that its biometric service providers meet the requirement.

for some appropriate upper bound X on L01 . The considerations leading to (4) make it reasonable to insist on m _ 3 now; and recalling what L01 is — the crucial likelihood that, despite his or her signatures matching some already recorded suite of signatures, an applicant has not in fact been registered — the UIDAI will have to insist on some quite small bound X: for it would not want, too often, to refuse anyone a UID on account of a mistaken match of biometric signatures.[6]

It would be foolish to speculate on what the authorities regard as acceptable error here; but if the UIDAI is of a mind that such mistakes should happen less than one in a thousand times say, then, taking the minimal value of 3 for m in the suggested requirement (R), it should demand an FPIR less than 10−6 : a ‘false positive identification rate’ a thousand-fold less than the limit currently imposed.

[1]Should it seem entirely odd to talk of probability when one of the events in question — either [X = 0] or [X = 1] — will already have occurred, we may regard the probabilities we assign them as measures of our uncertainty only: but no practical question hinges on probabilities being understood ‘subjectively’ rather than ‘objectively’.

[2]It might be well to note, however, that the size of the sample must be manageable: for a sample of size K a total of K • (K − 1)/2 comparisons will have to be performed.

[3]Wagering an upper limit on p[X = 0] would require one to reasonably estimate the probability of finding already-registered individuals among applicants.

[4]The event [Y = 1] must be just as rare, one supposes, as [X = 0] is frequent.

[5]We are supposing, that is to say, that matches of biometic signatures are very rarely mistaken matches.

[6]A small _ is consistent with supposing that p[X = 1] and p[Y = 1] are commensurate probabilites. If p[X = 0 | Y = 1] < 10−3 for instance, then p[X = 1 | Y = 1] _ (103 − 1)/103 ; one may suppose, that is, that [X = 1] will be the case 999 out of a 1000 times that [Y = 1] obtains; and, of course, to suppose that [X = 1] will be appreciably more frquent than [Y = 1] is to grant that biometric signatures will fail appreciably often to distinguish individuals.

See the RTI application of 30/06/2011 [PDF, 15 kb].

Download the Seventh Open Letter here

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/de-duplication-of-unique-identifiers

Seventh Open Letter to the Finance Committee

praskrishna — 2011-10-12T11:23:53Z

In the following I attempt, first, to characterize in an abstract way the situation being addressed by the questions that were asked by us of the UIDAI, in our RTI application of 30/06/2011. I try to make sense, then, of the replies we managed to elicit; and conclude with some elementary observations.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/seventh-open-letter.pdf

Seventh Meeting of the Group of Experts on Privacy Issues under the Chairmanship of Justice AP Shah

praskrishna — 2012-09-11T06:20:53Z

The seventh meeting of the Group of Experts on Privacy Issues under the Chairmanship of Justice A.P. Shah, former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court is scheduled to be held on September 18, 2012 at 10.30 a.m. in the Committee Room No. 228, Yojana Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi - 110001.

The agenda of the meeting is to discuss and finalize the draft report prepared on the basis of the recommendations of the two Sub-Groups of the Expert Group.

The meeting notice was sent by S. Bose, Deputy Secretary (CIT&I) to the following individuals:

Justice A.P. Shah, Chairman
Shri R. S. Sharma, D.G., UIDAI
Shri R. Ragupathi,Additional Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs
Dr. Gulshan Rai, D.G. CERT-In, DeITy
Shri Manoj Joshi, J.S. DOPT
Shri Som Mittal, Nasscom
Ms. Barkha Dutt, NDTV
Ms. Usha Ramanathan
Shri Sunil Abraham, CIS
Dr. Kamlesh Bajaj
Ms. Mala Dutt
Shri R.K. Gupta

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/news/seventh-meeting-of-group-of-experts-sept-18-2012-under-chairmanship-of-justice-shah