Centre for Internet and Society

The Design & Technology behind India’s Surveillance Programmes

udbhav — 2017-01-20T15:56:44Z

There has been an exponential growth in the pervasive presence of technology in the daily lives of an average Indian citizen over the past few years. While leading to manifold increase in convenience and connectivity, these technologies also allow for far greater potential for surveillance by state actors.

While the legal and policy avenues of state surveillance in India have been analysed by various organisations, there is very little available information about the technology and infrastructure used to carry out this surveillance. This appears to be largely, according to the government, due to reasons of national security and sovereignty.^[1] This blog post will attempt to paint a picture of the technological infrastructure being used to carry out state surveillance in India.

Background
The revelations by Edward Snowden about mass surveillance in mid-2013 led to an explosion of journalistic interest in surveillance and user privacy in India.^[2] The reports and coverage from this period, leading up to early 2015, serve as the main authority for the information presented in this blog post. The lack of information from official government sources as well as decreasing public spotlight on surveillance since that point of time generally have both led to little or no new information turning up about India’s surveillance regime since this period. However, given the long term nature of these programmes and the vast amounts of time it takes to set them up, it is fairly certain that the programmes detailed below are still the primary bedrock of state surveillance in the country, albeit having become operational and inter-connected only in the past 2 years.

The technology being used to carry out surveillance in India over the past 5 years is largely an upgraded, centralised and substantially more powerful version of the surveillance techniques followed in India since the advent of telegraph and telephone lines: the tapping & recording of information in transit.^[3] The fact that all the modern surveillance programmes detailed below have not required any new legislation, law, amendment or policy that was not already in force prior to 2008 is the most telling example of this fact. The legal and policy implication of the programmes illustrated below have been covered in previous articles by the Centre for Internet & Society which can be found here,^[4] here^[5] and here.^[6] Therefore, this post will solely concentrate on the technological design and infrastructure being used to carry out surveillance along with any new developments in this field that the three source mentioned would not have covered from a technological perspective.

The Technology Infrastructure behind State Surveillance in India

The programmes of the Indian Government (in public knowledge) that are being used to carry out state surveillance are broadly eight in number. These exclude specific surveillance technology being used by independent arms of the government, which will be covered in the next section of this post. Many of the programmes listed below have overlapping jurisdictions and in some instances are cross-linked with each other to provide greater coverage:

Central Monitoring System (CMS)
National Intelligence Grid (NAT-GRID)
Lawful Intercept And Monitoring Project (LIM)
Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS)
Network Traffic Analysis System (NETRA)
New Media Wing (Bureau of New and Concurrent Media)

The post will look at the technological underpinning of each of these programmes and their operational capabilities, both in theory and practice.

Central Monitoring System (CMS)

The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is the premier mass surveillance programme of the Indian Government, which has been in the planning stages since 2008^[7] Its primary goal is to replace the current on-demand availability of analog and digital data from service providers with a “central and direct” access which involves no third party between the captured information and the government authorities.^[8] While the system is currently operated by the Centre for Development of Telematics, the unreleased three-stage plan envisages a centralised location (physically and legally) to govern the programme. The CMS is primarily operated by Telecom Enforcement and Resource Monitoring Cell (TERM) within the Department of Telecom, which also has a larger mandate of ensuring radiation safety and spectrum compliance.

The technological infrastructure behind the CMS largely consists of Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in India being mandated to integrate Interception Store & Forward (ISF) servers with their Lawful Interception Systems required by their licences. Once these ISF servers are installed they are then connected to the Regional Monitoring Centres (RMC) of the CMS, setup according to geographical locations and population. Finally, Regional Monitoring Centre (RMC) in India is connected to the Central Monitoring System (CMS) itself, essentially allowing the collection, storage, access and analysis of data collected from all across the country in a centralised manner. The data collected by the CMS includes voice calls, SMS, MMS, fax communications on landlines, CDMA, video calls, GSM and even general, unencrypted data travelling across the internet using the standard IP/TCP Protocol.^[9]

With regard to the analysis of this data, Call Details Records (CDR) analysis, data mining, machine learning and predictive algorithms have been allegedly implemented in various degrees across this network.^[10] This allows state actors to pre-emptively gather and collect a vast amount of information from across the country, perform analysis on this data and then possibly even take action on the basis of this information by directly approaching the entity (currently the TERM under C-DOT) operating the system. ^[11] The system has reached full functionality in mid 2016, with over 22 Regional Monitoring Centres functional and the system itself being ‘switched on’ post trials in gradual phases.^[12]

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

The National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) is a semi-functional^[13] integrated intelligence grid that links the stored records and databases of several government entities in order to collect data, decipher trends and provide real time (sometimes even predictive) analysis of data gathered across law enforcement, espionage and military agencies. The programme intends to provide 11 security agencies real-time access to 21 citizen data sources to track terror activities across the country. The citizen data sources include bank account details, telephone records, passport data and vehicle registration details, the National Population Register (NPR), the Immigration, Visa, Foreigners Registration and Tracking System (IVFRT), among other types of data, all of which are already present within various government records across the country.^[14]

Data mining and analytics are used to process the huge volumes of data generated from the 21 data sources so as to analyse events, match patterns and track suspects, with big data analytics^[15] being the primary tool to effectively utilise the project, which was founded to prevent another instance of the September, 2011 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The list of agencies that will have access to this data collection and analytics platform are the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Enforcement Directorate (ED), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), National Investigation Agency (NIA), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Military Intelligence of Assam , Jammu and Kashmir regions and finally the Home Ministry itself.^[16]

As of late 2015, the project has remained stuck because of bureaucratic red tape, with even the first phase of the four stage project not complete. The primary reason for this is the change of governments in 2014, along with apprehensions about breach of security and misuse of information from agencies such as the IB, R&AW, CBI, and CBDT, etc.^[17] However, the office of the NATGRID is now under construction in South Delhi and while the agency claims an exemption under the RTI Act as a Schedule II Organisation, its scope and operational reach have only increased with each passing year.

Lawful Intercept And Monitoring Project

Lawful Intercept and Monitoring (LIM), is a secret mass electronic surveillance program operated by the Government of India for monitoring Internet traffic, communications, web-browsing and all other forms of Internet data. It is primarily run by the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DoT) in the Ministry of Telecom since 2011.^[18]

The LIM Programme consists of installing interception, monitoring and storage programmes at international gateways, internet exchange hubs as well as ISP nodes across the country. This is done independent of ISPs, with the entire hardware and software apparatus being operated by the government. The hardware is installed between the Internet Edge Router (PE) and the core network, allowing for direct access to all traffic flowing through the ISP. It is the primary programme for internet traffic surveillance in India, allowing indiscriminate monitoring of all traffic passing through the ISP for as long as the government desires, without any oversight of courts and sometimes without the knowledge of ISPs.^[19] One of the most potent capabilities of the LIM Project are live, automated keyword searches which allow the government to track all the information passing through the internet pipe being surveilled for certain key phrases in both in text as well in audio. Once these key phrases are successfully matched to the data travelling through the pipe using advanced search algorithms developed uniquely for the project, the system has various automatic routines which range from targeted surveillance on the source of the data to raising an alarm with the appropriate authorities.

LIM systems are often also operated by the ISPs themselves, on behalf of the government. They operate the device, including hardware upkeep, only to provide direct access to government agencies upon requests. Reports have stated that the legal procedures laid down in law (including nodal officers and formal requests for information) are rarely followed^[20] in both these cases, allowing unfettered access to petabytes of user data on a daily basis through these programmes.

Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS)

The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & System (CCTNS) is a planned network that allows for the digital collection, storage, retrieval, analysis, transfer and sharing of information relating to crimes and criminals across India.^[21] It is supposed to primarily operate at two levels, one between police stations and the second being between the various governance structures around crime detection and solving around the country, with access also being provided to intelligence and national security agencies.^[22]

CCTNS aims to integrate all the necessary data and records surrounding a crime (including past records) into a Core Application Software (CAS) that has been developed by Wipro.^[23] The software includes the ability to digitise FIR registration, investigation and charge sheets along with the ability to set up a centralised citizen portal to interact with relevant information. This project aims to use this CAS interface across 15, 000 police stations in the country, with up to 5, 000 additional deployments. The project has been planned since 2009, with the first complete statewide implementation going live only in August 2016 in Maharashtra. ^[24]

While seemingly harmless at face value, the project’s true power lies in two main possible uses. The first being its ability to profile individuals using their past conduct, which now can include all stages of an investigation and not just a conviction by a court of law, which has massive privacy concerns. The second harm is the notion that the CCTNS database will not be an isolated one but will be connected to the NATGRID and other such databases operated by organisations such as the National Crime Records Bureau, which will allow the information present in the CCTNS to be leveraged into carrying out more invasive surveillance of the public at large.^[25]

Network Traffic Analysis System (NETRA)

NETRA (NEtwork TRaffic Analysis) is a real time surveillance software developed by the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) at the Defence Research and Development Organisation. (DRDO) The software has apparently been fully functional since early 2014 and is primarily used by Indian Spy agencies, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) with some capacity being reserved for domestic agencies under the Home Ministry.

The software is meant to monitor Internet traffic on a real time basis using both voice and textual forms of data communication, especially social media, communication services and web browsing. Each agency was initially allocated 1000 nodes running NETRA, with each node having a capacity to analyse 300GB of information per second, giving each agency a capacity of around 300 TB of information processing per second.^[26] This capacity is largely available only to agencies dealing with External threats, with domestic agencies being allocated far lower capacities, depending on demand. The software itself is mobile and in the presence of sufficient hardware capacity, nothing prevents the software from being used in the CMS, the NATGRID or LIM operations.

There has been a sharp and sudden absence of public domain information regarding the software since 2014, making any statements about its current form or evolution mere conjecture.

Analysis of the Collective Data

Independent of the capacity of such programmes, their real world operations work in a largely similar manner to mass surveillance programmes in the rest of the world, with a majority of the capacity being focused on decryption and storage of data with basic rudimentary data analytics.^[27] Keyword searches for hot words like 'attack', 'bomb', 'blast' or 'kill' in the various communication stream in real time are the only real capabilities of the system that have been discussed in the public domain,^[28] which along with the limited capacity of such programmes^[29] (300 TB) is indicative of basic level of analysis that is carried on captured data. Any additional details about the technical details about how India’s surveillance programmes use their captured data is absent from the public domain but they can presumed, at best, to operate with similar standards as global practices.^[30]

Capacitative Global Comparison

As can be seen from the post so far, India’s surveillance programmes have remarkably little information about them in the public domain, from a technical operation or infrastructure perspective. In fact, post late 2014, there is a stark lack of information about any developments in the mass surveillance field. All of the information that is available about the technical capabilities of the CMS, NATGRID or LIM is either antiquated (pre 2014) or is about (comparatively) mundane details like headquarter construction clearances.^[31] Whether this is a result of the general reduction in the attention towards mass surveillance by the public and the media^[32] or is the result of actions taken by the government under the “national security” grounds under as the Official Secrets Act, 1923^[33] can only be conjecture.

However, given the information available (mentioned previously in this article) a comparative points to the rather lopsided position in comparison to international mass surveillance performance. While the legal provisions in India regarding surveillance programmes are among the most wide ranging, discretionary and opaque in the world^[34] their technical capabilities seem to be anarchic in comparison to modern standards. The only real comparative that can be used is public reporting surrounding the DRDO NETRA project around 2012 and 2013. The government held a competition between the DRDO’s internally developed software “Netra” and NTRO’s “Vishwarupal” which was developed in collaboration with Paladion Networks.^[35] The winning software, NETRA, was said to have a capacity of 300 GB per node, with a total of 1000 sanctioned nodes.^[36] This capacity of 300 TB for the entire system, while seemingly powerful, is a miniscule fragment of 83 Petabytes traffic that is predicted to generated in India per day.^[37] In comparison, the PRISM programme run by the National Security Agency in 2013 (the same time that the NETRA was tested) has a capacity of over 5 trillion gigabytes of storage^[38], many magnitudes greater than the capacity of the DRDO software. Similar statistics can be seen from the various other programmes of NSA and the Five Eyes alliance,^[39] all of which operated at far greater capacities^[40] and were held to be minimally effective.^[41] The questions this poses of the effectiveness, reliance and proportionality of the Indian surveillance programme can never truly be answered due to the lack of information surrounding capacity and technology of the Indian surveillance programmes, as highlighted in the article. With regard to criminal databases used in surveillance, such as the NATGRID, equivalent systems both domestically (especially in the USA) and internationally (such as the one run by the Interpol)^[42] are impossible due to the NATGRID not even being fully operational yet.^[43]

Conclusion

Even if we were to ignore the issues in principle with mass surveillance, the pervasive, largely unregulated and mass scale surveillance being carried in India using the tools and technologies detailed above have various technical and policy failings. It is imperative that transparency, accountability and legal scrutiny be made an integral part of the security apparatus in India. The risks of security breaches, politically motivated actions and foreign state hacking only increase with the absence of public accountability mechanisms. Further, opening up the technologies used for these operations to regular security audits will also improve their resilience to such attacks.

^[1] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-constitutionality-of-indian-surveillance-law

^[2] http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/how-surveillance-works-in-india/

^[3] https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/818

^[4] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/state-of-cyber-security-and-surveillance-in-india.pdf

^[5] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/security-surveillance-and-data-sharing.pdf

^[6] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/paper-thin-safeguards.pdf

^[7] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=54679 & http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/English%20annual%20report%202007-08_0.pdf

^[8] http://ijlt.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IJLT-Volume-10.41-62.pdf

^[9] http://www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/in-the-dark-about-indias-prism/article4817903.ece

^[10] http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-centralmonitoring-system-something-to-worry-about

^[11] https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/07/08/ind195494.e.pdf

^[12] http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/content-tracks/security-risk/indian-lawful-interception-data-centers-are-complete/94053.fullarticle

^[13] http://natgrid.attendance.gov.in/ [Attendace records at the NATGRID Office!]

^[14] http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-10/news/41938113_1_executive-order-nationalintelligence-grid-databases

^[15] http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/natgrid-to-use-big-data-analytics-to-track-suspects-1

^[16] http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SFLC-FINAL-SURVEILLANCE-REPORT.pdf

^[17] http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/natgrid-gets-green-nod-but-hurdles-remain/1/543087.html

^[18] http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-violates-privacy-safeguards-to-secretly-monitor-internet-traffic/article5107682.ece

^[19] ibid

^[20] http://www.thehoot.org/story_popup/no-escaping-the-surveillance-state-8742

^[21] http://ncrb.gov.in/BureauDivisions/CCTNS/cctns.htm

^[22] ibid

^[23] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/ncrb-to-connect-police-stations-and-crime-data-across-country-in-6-months/articleshow/45029398.cms

^[24] http://indiatoday.intoday.in/education/story/crime-criminal-tracking-network-system/1/744164.html

^[25] http://www.dailypioneer.com/nation/govt-cctns-to-be-operational-by-2017.html

^[26] http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-10/news/31143069_1_scanning-internet-monitoring-system-internet-data

^[27] Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951714541861

^[28] http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/article2978636.ece

^[29] See previous section in the article “NTRO”

^[30] Van Dijck, José. "Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology." Surveillance & Society 12.2 (2014): 197.

^[31] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3353230/Nat-Grid-knots-India-s-delayed-counter-terror-programme-gets-approval-green-body-red-tape-stall-further.html

^[32] http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2015/5/186025-privacy-behaviors-after-snowden/fulltext

^[33] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/india

^[34] http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2014/06/05/indias-snooping-and-snowden/

^[35] http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-10/news/31143069_1_scanning-internet-monitoring-system-internet-data

^[36] http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/government-to-launch-netra-for-internet-surveillance/articleshow/27438893.cms

^[37] http://trak.in/internet/indian-internet-traffic-8tbps-2017/

^[38] http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21579473-americas-national-security-agency-collects-more-information-most-people-thought-will

^[39] http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/07/the-fact-that-mass-surveillance-doesnt-keep-us-safe-goes-mainstream.html

^[40] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/

^[41] Supra Note 35

^[42] http://www.papillonfoundation.org/information/global-crime-database/

^[43] http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/Revive-NATGRID-with-safeguards/article13975243.ece

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-design-technology-behind-india2019s-surveillance-programmes

The Curious Case of Poor Security in the Indian Twitterverse

udbhav — 2016-12-17T00:28:05Z

What are the technical, legal and jurisdictional issues around the recent Twitter and email hacks claimed by the ‘Legion Crew’, and what can targeted entities do to better protect themselves?

The article was originally published in the Wire on December 15, 2016.

The term legion, an oft-referred identity in popular culture, has begun to attain recent notoriety in Indian cyberspace due to the spate of hacks being carried out by a group of hackers calling themselves ‘Legion Crew’. The group has compromised four Twitter and/or email accounts in the past two weeks, with confirmed hacks of Rahul Gandhi, Vijay Mallya, Barkha Dutt and Ravish Kumar. Lalit Modi, Apollo Hospitals and the parliament (sansad) have been singled out as future targets, with dire warnings of catastrophic data leaks if the group were to be investigated by the authorities. The ethical impression of the hacks have been divided, with some segments of the public supporting the supposedly hacktivist outlook of the group while others condemning their actions as reckless and invasive. In the meantime, no individuals or entities have been accused of the hacks by the police, with most reports claiming the foreign origin of the hacks being the biggest impediment to the investigations.

A technical and legal perspective

The hacks first began against the politician Gandhi, whose Twitter account was hacked almost two weeks ago, with various demeaning tweets being posted for a few hours before access to the account was restored to the rightful owner. The same hacks were then carried out on business tycoon Mallya’s Twitter account last Friday but this time around, his bank details (apparently obtained from his compromised email accounts) were also leaked to the public via Twitter. Similar hacks targeting both the Twitter and email accounts of Dutt and Kumar were also carried out the past weekend. Sensitive details and data dumps (around 1.5 GB in size) of the journalists were released to the public, along with escalating warnings about future attacks. The data dumps released by the hackers seemed to be indicative that the hackers obtained far more information than they had disclosed via the Twitter hacks and were willing to leverage this data as ransom. Twitter, via both their Indian policy representatives and their international office, has denied any compromise to their systems and has claimed that all accounts were legitimately accessed with valid credentials at the time of the hacks. This leads to three main questions: How were the Twitter and email accounts hacked? What is the recourse, especially in terms of investigation, available to the afflicted parties and the authorities? What can potential targets do to secure their online presence from such attacks?

Regarding their technical nature, all of these hacks were sustained compromises that lasted for a few hours each (a long time in cyberspace) and seemed to be reflective of only a fragment of the power the hackers held over the individual’s online presence. Considering Twitter’s denial that the attacks were due to a security flaw on their end as well as the fact that legitimate login details were used to gain access to the accounts, a rather simple investigation can show that the most likely attack vector used by the Legion Crew for these hacks was a DNS Hijacking attack in combination with a Man in the Middle (MITM) attack. These methods abuse the rather simple and (by default) insecure DNS system that is responsible for directing the world’s Internet traffic including email. While the use of DNS to map websites to the IP address of the systems where they are physically hosted (for instance, www.thewire.in maps to 52.76.81.135 at the time of writing this article) is fairly well known, the DNS system also directs most of the world’s email. Similar to DNS A and AAA name records regarding websites, DNS MX records direct email sent to domain names to the correct email servers where they are processed for storage or forwarding, as required. If these MX records are compromised, then hackers can easily redirect emails sent to legitimate email address of the domain name (for instance, xyz@thewire.in) to whatever system they want, including other compromised email addresses.

The original operator of the email account is unaware of any email that is redirected in such a way and has no way of knowing the account has been hacked until they notice they are not consistently receiving emails sent to them, which in well planned hacks can be as for many weeks or even months. These attacks can also be further augmented if the hackers also decide to implement an MITM. In an MITM attack, hackers can redirect all traffic attempting to reach an email account via the MX records to a system they operate by changing the MX records on the domain name server to a malicious system. They can access and store all these emails (along with attachments) via the malicious system and also manipulate the information contained in these emails. Then, either in bulk or selectively, they can re-send the emails to the original email accounts they were intended for from their own servers. The owner will then receive the emails in their inboxes with the apparent impression they are private and being received for the first time. This entire MITM process can be setup in a manner that the emails are rerouted to compromised servers by MX records changes, stored for future analysis and then forwarded to the original recipient account in a matter of seconds.

Given the reliance placed by most websites on email IDs being a primary form of identity authentication, compromising an email ID can give access to most of the social networking, entertainment and even banking websites’ login details of the owner to any individual who has the login details of the account. This is because of the password reset or forgotten password feature available in most services that use only email IDs by default as a form of authenticating account ownership and allowing the user to reset their passwords by setting a reset email to their registered email accounts. Once they gain access to the compromised accounts, hackers can perform these resets with impunity, granting them unrestricted access to the online presence of the owner. In fact, hackers can use these attacks to perform password resets on the email accounts themselves, allowing them unlimited access to past conversation, records and login details that may be stored in the email accounts.

Keeping this background in mind, the most likely methodology behind the hacks is quite simple to explain. The Legion Crew most likely first compromised the email systems of these celebrities by changing the DNS MX records of the email IDs which were registered with Twitter as login IDs for these accounts. This allowed them to redirect emails sent to these email IDs to an alternative system of their choosing. They then used the password reset feature of Twitter, which is similar to those provided by most social networking services, to reset the password of these accounts. However, due to the compromise of the MX records of the domain names used by these celebrities, instead of reaching the inboxes of the entities operating the accounts, the password reset emails were sent to the alternative systems set up by the hackers solely for receiving such emails. After receiving this email, it was a simple matter of resetting the account credentials by clicking on the password reset link on the email and changing the passwords of these accounts to unique passwords only known to the hackers.

The hackers then would (and did) have complete control of the account until the service provider itself intervened and provided an emergency reset along with recommending rectifying the MX records from the malicious one’s inserted by the hackers. The only question left to be answered in the methodology followed by the hackers is how they gained access to the MX records, as DNS records can only be changed using the dashboard of the domain name provider, which in turn is protected by a login password. Allegations have arisen that most (if not all) of the compromised accounts used ‘Net4india’ as their domain name provider. Therefore, it is very possible either that it is a vulnerability on the Net4india systems, an internal compromise of the personnel Net4india and so on leading to access detail to domain name accounts from being compromised. Such security and personnel breaches could have been responsible for providing access to the domain name management dashboard of the hacked celebrities email IDs, after which the attack would have followed the methodology described above by changing the MX records to a malicious system.

Jurisdictional issues

The legal avenues available to the affected parties are fairly clear within the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Indian Penal Code, 1862. Section 66 and Section 66C of the IT Act, which govern hacking and misuse of passwords respectively, would apply along with possible application of the provisions concerning mischief (Section 425), cheating (Section 420) and extortion (Section 383) of the IPC. However, recent investigations have already begun to show that the various jurisdictional symptoms that plague cybercrimes investigations are also hindering investigations for these hacks. The global nature of the internet ensures that the operating servers, attackers, compromised users and unwitting intermediaries are more often than not all located in different jurisdictions, each with their own set of protections, vulnerabilities and laws. For example, investigations by the Delhi police into IP addresses that accessed Gandhi’s Twitter account during the hack have shown that in the period of few hours the account was accessed from the US, Sweden, Canada, Thailand and Romania. Of course, given the pervasive availability of IP spoofing tools, none of these countries is indicative of the actual location of the hacker. Gaining information from these different servers, in order to trace a route of the hacker’s digital geographical journey, is a bureaucratic and legal nightmare with long delays, unanswered Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty requests and unresponsive service providers being the norm. Like in most cybercrime investigation, if the hackers take certain basic steps to mask their identities and geographical location, their odds being caught by traditional law enforcement are negligible. Investigations that have successfully managed to catch such hacker groups, such as the Project Safe Childhood by the FBI against child pornography on the Tor web, take millions of dollars, months of efforts and a high level of skill. Whether these Twitter hacks will generate the sustained, multijurisdictional effort across law enforcement agencies in India required to catch such crimes remains to be seen. Until then, the questions of attribution, liability and justice will remain unanswered like in a majority of large scale cyber hacks.

Possible measures

Given that various other targets have already been singled out by the hacker group, the need for vigilance and improved security is greater than ever. One basic measure, easily available within Twitter and most other services, that should be carried out is enabling two factor authentication (2FA) on both email and social media accounts. 2FA ensures that the user has to input a One Time Password (OTP) generated on a separate device (such as a mobile phone) at the time of logging in or resetting the password for the account. This would mean that even if the hackers obtain the password or compromise the emails being sent to an account, they will be unable to login into an account without also being in physical possession of the device with the OTP generation application. If this option, which is already available within Twitter, was enabled for the four accounts that were hacked, for example, they would have remained protected despite the email account compromise. Further, domain name service providers should also implement Domain Name System Security Extensions and Domain Keys Identified Mail to prevent DNS and email hijacking, as was carried out on Net4India servers in these Twitter attacks. Using HTTPS on all pages on websites will also go a long way in preventing spoofing and securing user information in transit. Finally, nothing can replace customer education and awareness as the most effective tool to combat the growing cyber threats faced by the average netizen. The weakest link in a digital system is often the end user. A core set of security measures that can be percolated into common practice will serve as the first and best line of defence against such attacks in the future, for both the common man and celebrities alike.

For more details visit http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-udbhav-tiwari-december-15-2016-curious-case-of-poor-security-in-indian-twitterverse