The Centre for Internet and Society
http://editors.cis-india.org
These are the search results for the query, showing results 1 to 9.
List of Blocked 'Escort Service' Websites
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-blocked-escort-service-websites
<b>Here is the full list of URLs that Indian ISPs were asked to block on Monday, June 13, 2016.</b>
<p>On April 20, 2016, DNA carried a report on <a href="http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pil-seeks-police-action-against-website-ads-on-escort-services-2204362">a PIL seeking action against advertisements for prostitution in newspapers and on websites</a>. That report noted that the Mumbai Police had obtained an order from a magistrates court to block 174 objectionable websites, and had sent a list to the "Group Coordinator (Cyber Laws)" within the Department of Electronics and IT. On June 13, 2016, some news agencies carried reports about <a href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/govt-bans-240-websites-offering-escort-services-116061400561_1.html">the Ministry of Communications and IT having ordered ISPs to block 240 websites</a>.</p>
<p>As far as we know, the Mumbai Police has not proceeded against any of the people who run these websites, whose phone numbers are available, and whose names and addresses are also available in many cases through WHOIS queries on the domain names.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the government does not make available publicly the list of websites they have ordered ISPs to block. Given that knowledge of what is censored by the government is crucial in a democracy, we are publishing the entire list of blocked websites.</p>
<p>Those of these websites that use TLS (i.e., those with 'https'), still appear to be available on multiple Indian ISPs, and others can be accessed by using a proxy VPN from outside India or by using Tor.</p>
<p>Notes:</p>
<ul>
<li>The list circulated to ISPs has two sub-lists, numbered from 1-174 (but containing 175 entries, with a numbering mistake), and 1-64, for a total of 239 URLs.</li>
<li>4 URLs are repeated in the list ("www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php", "exmumbai.in", "www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal", "www.mumbaifunclubs.com")</li>
<li>For one website, both the domain name and a specific web page within it are listed (""www.mumbaiwali.in" and "www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php")</li>
<li>One URL is incomplete (No. 214: "www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..")</li>
<li>There are thus 235 unique URLs, targetting 234 websites and web pages.</li>
</ul>
<p><br />
<br />
<hr /></p>
<h2>Full List of Blocked URLs</h2>
<ol>
<li>www.sterlingbioscience.com</li>
<li>rawpoint.biz</li>
<li>www.onemillionbabes.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaihotcollection.in</li>
<li>simranoberoi.in</li>
<li>rubinakapoor.biz</li>
<li>talita.biz</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortsagency.net</li>
<li>www.mumbaifunclubs.com</li>
<li>www.alishajain.co.in</li>
<li>www.ankitatalwar.co.in</li>
<li>https://www.jennyarora.ind.in</li>
<li>www.riya-kapoor.com</li>
<li>shneha.in</li>
<li>missinimi.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiglamour.in</li>
<li>kalyn.in</li>
<li>www.saumyagiri.co.in/city/mumbai/</li>
<li>bookerotic.com</li>
<li>www.divyamalik.in</li>
<li>www.suhanisharma.co.in</li>
<li>www.ruhi.biz</li>
<li>umbaiqueens.in</li>
<li>www.aliyaghosh.com</li>
<li>priyasen.in</li>
<li>www.highprofilemumbaiescorts.co.in</li>
<li>charmingmumbai.com</li>
<li>www.poojamehata.in</li>
<li>kiiran.in/</li>
<li>mansikher.in</li>
<li>www.newmumbaiescorts.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaifunclubs.com</li>
<li>www.punarbas.in</li>
<li>www.discreetbabes.in</li>
<li>www.alisharoy.in</li>
<li>www.arpitarai.in</li>
<li>www.nidhipatel.in</li>
<li>navimumbailescort.com</li>
<li>www.zoyaescorts.com</li>
<li>www.juhioberoi.in</li>
<li>shoniya.in</li>
<li>panchibora.in</li>
<li>rehu.in</li>
<li>www.nehaanand.com</li>
<li>www.aditiray.co.in</li>
<li>www.rakhibajaj.in</li>
<li>www.alianoidaescorts.in</li>
<li>www.sobiya.in</li>
<li>www.alishaparul.in</li>
<li>mumbai-escorts.leathercurrency.com</li>
<li>ankita-ahuja.in</li>
<li>www.yamika.in</li>
<li>mumbailescort.co</li>
<li>www.ranjika.in</li>
<li>www.aditiray.com</li>
<li>www.alinamumbailescort.in</li>
<li>www.sonikaa.com/services/</li>
<li>riyamodel.in</li>
<li>mumbai-escorts.info</li>
<li>soonam.in</li>
<li>www.sejalthakkar.com</li>
<li>www.yomika-tandon.in</li>
<li>www.asika.in</li>
<li>www.siyasharma.org/</li>
<li>www.rubikamathur.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortslady.com</li>
<li>www.sexyshe.in</li>
<li>www.indepandentescorts.com</li>
<li>www.saanvichopra.co.in</li>
<li>www.goswamipatel.in</li>
<li>ojaloberoi.in</li>
<li>www.naincy.in</li>
<li>www.sonyamehra.com</li>
<li>www.pinkgrapes.in</li>
<li>anjalitomar.in/</li>
<li>www.nishakohli.com/</li>
<li>sagentia.co.in</li>
<li>mumbai.vivastreet.co.in/escort+mumbai</li>
<li>www.deseescortgirls.in</li>
<li>guides.wonobo.com/mumbai/mumbai-escorts-service/.4299</li>
<li>jasmineescorts.com</li>
<li>www.shalinisethi.com</li>
<li>www.highclassmumbailescort.com</li>
<li>www.vipescortsinmumbai.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescorts69.co.in</li>
<li>monikabas.co.in</li>
<li>www.riyasehgal.com</li>
<li>onlycelebrity.in</li>
<li>www.greatmumbaiescorts.com/escort-service-mumbai.html</li>
<li>www.aishamumbailescort.com</li>
<li>www.jennydsouzaescort.com</li>
<li>www.desifun.in</li>
<li>www.siyaescort.co.in</li>
<li>masti—escort.in</li>
<li>www.sofya.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php</li>
<li>www.mumbaiwali.in</li>
<li>www.calldaina.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortsservice.co.in</li>
<li>www.escortsgirlsinmumbai.com</li>
<li>www.passionmumbai.escorts.com</li>
<li>www.nehakapoor.in</li>
<li>meerakapoor.com</li>
<li>www.dianamumbaiescorts.net .in</li>
<li>www.allmumbailescort.in</li>
<li>www.rakhiarora.in</li>
<li>www.ritikasingh.com</li>
<li>www.rekhapatil.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaidolls.com</li>
<li>www.piapandey.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaicuteescorts.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortssevice.com</li>
<li>www.onlycelebrity.com</li>
<li>www.meetescortservice.com</li>
<li>onlyoneescorts.com</li>
<li>simirai.org</li>
<li>www.riyamumbaiescorts.in</li>
<li>www.neharana.in</li>
<li>www.tanyaroy.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaihiprofilegirls.in</li>
<li>www.sexyescortsmumbai.in</li>
<li>www.sexymumbai.escorts.com</li>
<li>www.four-seasons—escort.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortsgirl.com</li>
<li>www.vdreamescorts.com</li>
<li>www.passionatemumbaiescorts.in</li>
<li>www.payalmalhotra.in</li>
<li>www.shrutisinha.com</li>
<li>www.juliemumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>www.indiasexservices.com/mumbai.html</li>
<li>www.mumbai-escorts.co.in</li>
<li>www.aliyamumbaiescorts.net.in</li>
<li>shivaniarora.co.in/escort–service-mumbai.html</li>
<li>www.pinkisingh.com</li>
<li>soyam.in</li>
<li>www.arpitaray.com</li>
<li>www.localescorts.in</li>
<li>www.jennifermumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>www.yanaroy.com</li>
<li>escorts18.in/mumbai—escorts.html</li>
<li>www.tinamumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaijannatescorts.com</li>
<li>www.deepikaroy.com</li>
<li>www.nancy.co.in</li>
<li>www.pearlpatel.in</li>
<li>30minsmumbaiescorts.in</li>
<li>www.datinghopes.com</li>
<li>https://www.riyaroy.com/services.html</li>
<li>www.sonalikajain.com</li>
<li>www.zainakapoor.co.in</li>
<li>kavyajain.in</li>
<li>www.kinnu.co.in</li>
<li>exmumbai.in/</li>
<li>www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal</li>
<li>exmumbai.in</li>
<li>www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal</li>
<li>www.devikabatra.in</li>
<li>katlin.in</li>
<li>riyaverma.in</li>
<li>escortsinindia.co/</li>
<li>www.snehamumbaiescorts.in</li>
<li>shimi.in</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortsforu.com/about</li>
<li>www.chetnagaur.co.in/chetna-gaur.html</li>
<li>www.escortspoint.in</li>
<li>www.rupalikakkar.in</li>
<li>www.hemangisinha.co.in</li>
<li>1escorts.in/location/mumbai.html</li>
<li>www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent—escort-service.php</li>
<li>www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php</li>
<li>www.mumbaibella.in</li>
<li>mohitescortservicesmumbai.com</li>
<li>www.anchu.in</li>
<li>www.aliyaroy.co.in</li>
<li>jaanu.co.in/mumbai-escorts-service-call-girls.html</li>
<li>www.andyverma.com</li>
<li>dreams-come-true.biz</li>
<li>feel–better.biz</li>
<li>jellyroll.biz</li>
<li>dreamgirlmumbai.com</li>
<li>role-play.biz</li>
<li>mansi—mathur.com</li>
<li>www.zarinmumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>mymumbai.escortss.com</li>
<li>www.goldentouchescorts.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaipassion.biz</li>
<li>ishitamalhotra.com</li>
<li>happy-ending.biz</li>
<li>juicylips.biz</li>
<li>www.escortsmumbai.name</li>
<li>www.kirstygbasai.net</li>
<li>www.hiremumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>www.meeraescorts.com/mumbai-escorts.php</li>
<li>3–5–7star.biz</li>
<li>www.pranjaltiwari.com</li>
<li>www.richagupta.biz</li>
<li>way2heaven.biz</li>
<li>piya.co/</li>
<li>pinkflowers.info</li>
<li>www.beautifulmumbaiescorts.com</li>
<li>www.bestescortsinmumbai.com/charges-html</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescorts.me</li>
<li>www.tanikatondon.com</li>
<li>www.escortsinmumbai.biz</li>
<li>www.escortgirlmumbai.com</li>
<li>www.mumbaicallgrils.com</li>
<li>www.quickescort4u.com</li>
<li>www.mayamalhotra.com</li>
<li>www.legal-escort.com</li>
<li>escortsbaba.com/mumbai-escorts.html</li>
<li>rupa.biz</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescorts.agency/erotic-service-mumbai.html</li>
<li>www.escortscelebrity.com</li>
<li>www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..</li>
<li>garimachopra.com</li>
<li>kajalgupta.biz</li>
<li>lipkiss.site</li>
<li>aanu.in</li>
<li>bombayescort.in</li>
<li>hotkiran.co.in</li>
<li>khushikapoor.in</li>
<li>joyapatel.in</li>
<li>rici.in</li>
<li>aaditi.in</li>
<li>andheriescorts.org.in</li>
<li>www.jiyapatel.in</li>
<li>spicymumbai.in</li>
<li>rimpyarora.in</li>
<li>lovemaking.co.in</li>
<li>riyadubey.co.in</li>
<li>escortservicesmumbai.in</li>
<li>mumbaiescorts.co.in</li>
<li>midnightprincess.in/</li>
<li>vashiescorts.co.in/</li>
<li>angee.in/</li>
<li>www.rozakhan.in/</li>
<li>www.mumbaiescortsvilla.in/</li>
<li>kylie.co.in/</li>
<li>escortservicemumbai.co.in</li>
</ol>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-blocked-escort-service-websites'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-blocked-escort-service-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and Expression69ABlockingCensorship2016-06-15T08:33:31ZBlog EntrySummary Report Internet Governance Forum 2015
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015
<b>Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) held at Poeta Ronaldo Cunha Lima Conference Center, Joao Pessoa in Brazil from 10 November 2015 to 13 November 2015. The theme of IGF 2015 was ‘Evolution of Internet Governance: Empowering Sustainable Development’. Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash & Jyoti Panday from CIS actively engaged and made substantive contributions to several key issues affecting internet governance at the IGF 2015. The issue-wise detail of their engagement is set out below. </b>
<p align="center" style="text-align: left;"><strong>INTERNET
GOVERNANCE</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
I. The
Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to the IGF organised a discussion on
<em><strong>Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and Internet Economy</strong></em><em>
</em>at
the Main Meeting Hall from 9:00 am to 12:30 pm on 11 November, 2015.
The
discussions at this session focused on the importance of Internet
Economy enabling policies and eco-system for the fulfilment of
different SDGs. Several concerns relating to internet
entrepreneurship, effective ICT capacity building, protection of
intellectual property within and across borders were availability of
local applications and content were addressed. The panel also
discussed the need to identify SDGs where internet based technologies
could make the most effective contribution. Sunil
Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue
of development and promotion of local content and applications. List
of speakers included:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Lenni
Montiel, Assistant-Secretary-General for Development, United Nations</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Helani
Galpaya, CEO LIRNEasia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sergio
Quiroga da Cunha, Head of Latin America, Ericsson</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Raúl
L. Katz, Adjunct Professor, Division of Finance and Economics,
Columbia Institute of Tele-information</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jimson
Olufuye, Chairman, Africa ICT Alliance (AfICTA)</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Lydia
Brito, Director of the Office in Montevideo, UNESCO</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
H.E.
Rudiantara, Minister of Communication & Information Technology,
Indonesia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Daniel
Sepulveda, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Coordinator for
International and Communications Policy at the U.S. Department of
State </p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Deputy
Minister Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services for
the republic of South Africa</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
H.E.
Junaid Ahmed Palak, Information and Communication Technology
Minister of Bangladesh</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jari
Arkko, Chairman, IETF</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Silvia
Rabello, President, Rio Film Trade Association</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gary
Fowlie, Head of Member State Relations & Intergovernmental
Organizations, ITU</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">igf</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">2015-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">main</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">sessions</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link Internet
economy and Sustainable Development here
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8</a></p>
<p align="justify"> II.
Public
Knowledge organised a workshop on <em><strong>The
Benefits and Challenges of the Free Flow of Data </strong></em>at
Workshop Room
5 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The discussions in
the workshop focused on the benefits and challenges of the free flow
of data and also the concerns relating to data flow restrictions
including ways to address
them. Sunil
Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue
of jurisdiction of data on the internet. The
panel for the workshop included the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Vint
Cerf, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Lawrence
Strickling, U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Richard
Leaning, European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3), Europol</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Marietje
Schaake, European Parliament</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nasser
Kettani, Microsoft</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS
India</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshops</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">list</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">of</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">published</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshop</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">proposals</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtjnHkOn7EQ</p>
<p align="justify"> III.
Article
19 and
Privacy International organised a workshop on <em><strong>Encryption
and Anonymity: Rights and Risks</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 1 from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on 12 November, 2015.
The
workshop fostered a discussion about the latest challenges to
protection of anonymity and encryption and ways in which law
enforcement demands could be met while ensuring that individuals
still enjoyed strong encryption and unfettered access to anonymity
tools. Pranesh
Prakash contributed to the panel discussions by addressing concerns
about existing south Asian regulatory framework on encryption and
anonymity and emphasizing the need for pervasive encryption. The
panel for this workshop included the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
David
Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Juan
Diego Castañeda, Fundación Karisma, Colombia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Edison
Lanza, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Ted
Hardie, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Elvana
Thaci, Council of Europe</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Professor
Chris Marsden, Oxford Internet Institute</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Alexandrine
Pirlot de Corbion, Privacy International</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify"><a name="_Hlt435412531"></a>
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">worksh</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">o</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">ps</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">list</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">of</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">published</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshop</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">proposals</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUrBP4PsfJo</p>
<p align="justify"> IV.
Chalmers
& Associates organised a session on <em><strong>A
Dialogue on Zero Rating and Network Neutrality</strong></em>
at the Main Meeting Hall from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm on 12 November,
2015. The Dialogue provided access to expert insight on zero-rating
and a full spectrum of diverse
views on this issue. The Dialogue also explored alternative
approaches to zero rating such as use of community networks. Pranesh
Prakash provided
a
detailed explanation of harms and benefits related to different
approaches to zero-rating. The
panellists for this session were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Jochai
Ben-Avie, Senior Global Policy Manager, Mozilla, USA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Igor
Vilas Boas de Freitas, Commissioner, ANATEL, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dušan
Caf, Chairman, Electronic Communications Council, Republic of
Slovenia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Silvia
Elaluf-Calderwood, Research Fellow, London School of Economics,
UK/Peru</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Belinda
Exelby, Director, Institutional Relations, GSMA, UK</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Helani
Galpaya, CEO, LIRNEasia, Sri Lanka</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Anka
Kovacs, Director, Internet Democracy Project, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Kevin
Martin, VP, Mobile and Global Access Policy, Facebook, USA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, Policy Director, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Steve
Song, Founder, Village Telco, South Africa/Canada</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dhanaraj
Thakur, Research Manager, Alliance for Affordable Internet, USA/West
Indies</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Christopher
Yoo, Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information
Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2</a></p>
<p align="justify"> V.
The
Internet & Jurisdiction Project organised a workshop on
<em><strong>Transnational
Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation</strong></em>
at Workshop Room
4 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November, 2015. The
workshop discussion focused on the challenges in developing an
enforcement framework for the internet that guarantees transnational
due process and legal interoperability. The discussion also focused
on innovative approaches to multi-stakeholder cooperation such as
issue-based networks, inter-sessional work methods and transnational
policy standards. The panellists for this discussion were the
following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Anne
Carblanc Head of Division, Directorate for Science, Technology and
Industry, OECD</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Eileen
Donahoe Director Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Byron
Holland President and CEO, CIRA (Canadian ccTLD)</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Christopher
Painter Coordinator for Cyber Issues, US Department of State</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham Executive Director, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Alice
Munyua Lead dotAfrica Initiative and GAC representative, African
Union Commission</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Will
Hudsen Senior Advisor for International Policy, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dunja
Mijatovic Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Thomas
Fitschen Director for the United Nations, for International
Cooperation against Terrorism and for Cyber Foreign Policy, German
Federal Foreign Office</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Hartmut
Glaser Executive Secretary, Brazilian Internet Steering Committee</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Matt
Perault, Head of Policy Development Facebook</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link Transnational
Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0</a></p>
<p align="justify"> VI.
The Internet Governance Project organised a meeting of the
<em><strong>Dynamic
Coalition on Accountability of Internet Governance Venues</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 2 from 14:00
– 15:30 on
12 November, 2015. The coalition
brought together panelists to highlight the
challenges in developing an accountability
framework
for internet governance
venues that include setting up standards and developing a set of
concrete criteria. Jyoti Panday provided the perspective of civil
society on why acountability is necessary in internet governance
processes and organizations. The panelists for this workshop included
the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>
Robin
Gross, IP Justice</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jeanette
Hofmann, Director
<a href="http://www.internetundgesellschaft.de/">Alexander
von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society</a></p>
</li><li>
<p>
Farzaneh
Badiei,
Internet Governance Project</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Erika
Mann,
Managing
Director Public PolicyPolicy Facebook and Board of Directors
ICANN</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Paul
Wilson, APNIC</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Izumi
Okutani, Japan
Network Information Center (JPNIC)</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Keith
Drazek , Verisign</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jyoti
Panday,
CIS</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jorge
Cancio,
GAC representative</p>
</li></ol>
<p>
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no">http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no</a></p>
<p>
Video
link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIxyGhnch7w</p>
<p> VII.
Digital
Infrastructure
Netherlands Foundation organized an open forum at
Workshop Room 3
from 11:00
– 12:00
on
10
November, 2015. The open
forum discussed the increase
in government engagement with “the internet” to protect their
citizens against crime and abuse and to protect economic interests
and critical infrastructures. It
brought
together panelists topresent
ideas about an agenda for the international protection of ‘the
public core of the internet’ and to collect and discuss ideas for
the formulation of norms and principles and for the identification of
practical steps towards that goal.
Pranesh Prakash participated in the e open forum. Other speakers
included</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>
Bastiaan
Goslings AMS-IX, NL</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Pranesh
Prakash CIS, India</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Marilia
Maciel (FGV, Brasil</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Dennis
Broeders (NL Scientific Council for Government Policy)</p>
</li></ol>
<p>
Detailed
description of the open
forum is available here
<a href="http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf">http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf</a></p>
<p>
Video
link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ</a></p>
<p>
VIII.
UNESCO, Council of Europe, Oxford University, Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights, Google, Internet Society organised a
workshop on hate speech and youth radicalisation at Room 9 on
Thursday, November 12. UNESCO shared the initial outcome from its
commissioned research on online hate speech including practical
recommendations on combating against online hate speech through
understanding the challenges, mobilizing civil society, lobbying
private sectors and intermediaries and educating individuals with
media and information literacy. The workshop also discussed how to
help empower youth to address online radicalization and extremism,
and realize their aspirations to contribute to a more peaceful and
sustainable world. Sunil Abraham provided his inputs. Other speakers
include</p>
<p>
1.
Chaired by Ms Lidia Brito, Director for UNESCO Office in Montevideo</p>
<p>
2.Frank
La Rue, Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression</p>
<p>
3.
Lillian Nalwoga, President ISOC Uganda and rep CIPESA, Technical
community</p>
<p>
4.
Bridget O’Loughlin, CoE, IGO</p>
<p>
5.
Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19</p>
<p>
6.
Iyad Kallas, Radio Souriali</p>
<p>
7.
Sunil Abraham executive director of Center for Internet and Society,
Bangalore, India</p>
<p>
8.
Eve Salomon, global Chairman of the Regulatory Board of RICS</p>
<p>
9.
Javier Lesaca Esquiroz, University of Navarra</p>
<p>
10.
Representative GNI</p>
<p>
11.
Remote Moderator: Xianhong Hu, UNESCO</p>
<p>
12.
Rapporteur: Guilherme Canela De Souza Godoi, UNESCO</p>
<p>
Detailed
description of the workshop
is available here
<a href="http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no">http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no</a></p>
<p>
Video
link to the panel is available here
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0</a></p>
<p> <strong>INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
IX.
Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Centre for Internet Society India, Open Net
Korea and Article 19 collaborated to organize
a workshop on the <em><strong>Manila
Principles on Intermediary Liability</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 9 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November 2015. The
workshop elaborated on the Manila
Principles, a high level principle framework of best practices and
safeguards for content restriction practices and addressing liability
for intermediaries for third party content. The
workshop
saw particpants engaged in over lapping projects considering
restriction practices coming togetehr to give feedback and highlight
recent developments across liability regimes. Jyoti
Panday laid down the key details of the Manila Principles framework
in this session. The panelists for this workshop included the
following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Kelly
Kim Open Net Korea,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jyoti
Panday, CIS India,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gabrielle
Guillemin, Article 19,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Rebecca
McKinnon on behalf of UNESCO</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Giancarlo
Frosio, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nicolo
Zingales, Tilburg University</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Will
Hudson, Google</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs</a></p>
<p align="justify"> <strong>ACCESSIBILITY</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
X.
Dynamic
Coalition
on Accessibility and Disability and Global Initiative for Inclusive
ICTs organised a workshop on <em><strong>Empowering
the Next Billion by Improving Accessibility</strong></em><em>
</em>at
Workshop Room 6 from 9:00 am to 10:30 am on 13 November, 2015. The
discussion focused on
the need and ways to remove accessibility barriers which prevent over
one billion potential users to benefit from the Internet, including
for essential services. Sunil
Abraham specifically spoke about the lack of compliance of existing
ICT infrastructure with well established accessibility standards
specifically relating to accessibility barriers in the disaster
management process. He discussed the barriers faced by persons with
physical or psychosocial disabilities. The
panelists for this discussion were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Francesca
Cesa Bianchi, G3ICT</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Cid
Torquato, Government of Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Carlos
Lauria, Microsoft Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Derrick
L. Cogburn, Institute on Disability and Public Policy (IDPP) for the
ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Region</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Fernando
H. F. Botelho, F123 Consulting</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gunela
Astbrink, GSA InfoComm</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
Link Empowering
the next billion by improving accessibility <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs</a></p>
<p align="justify"> <strong>OPENNESS</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
XI.
A
workshop on <em><strong>FOSS
& a Free, Open Internet: Synergies for Development</strong></em>
was organized at Workshop Room 7 from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm on 13
November, 2015. The discussion was focused on the increasing risk to
openness of the internet and the ability of present & future
generations to use technology to improve their lives. The panel shred
different perspectives about the future co-development
of FOSS and a free, open Internet; the threats that are emerging; and
ways for communities to surmount these. Sunil
Abraham emphasised the importance of free software, open standards,
open access and access to knowledge and the lack of this mandate in
the draft outcome document for upcoming WSIS+10 review and called for
inclusion of the same. Pranesh Prakash further contributed to the
discussion by emphasizing the need for free open source software with
end‑to‑end encryption and traffic level encryption based
on open standards which are decentralized and work through federated
networks. The
panellists for this discussion were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Satish
Babu, Technical Community, Chair, ISOC-TRV, Kerala, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Judy
Okite, Civil Society, FOSS Foundation for Africa</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Mishi
Choudhary, Private Sector, Software Freedom Law Centre, New York</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Fernando
Botelho, Private Sector, heads F123 Systems, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS
India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, CIS
India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nnenna
Nwakanma- WWW.Foundation</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Yves
MIEZAN EZO, Open Source strategy consultant</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Corinto
Meffe, Advisor to the President and Directors, SERPRO, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Frank
Coelho de Alcantara, Professor, Universidade Positivo, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Caroline
Burle, Institutional and International Relations, W3C Brazil Office
and Center of Studies on Web Technologies</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs</a></p>
<p align="justify">
<br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiAccess to KnowledgeBig DataFreedom of Speech and ExpressionEncryptionInternet Governance ForumIntermediary LiabilityAccountabilityInternet GovernanceCensorshipCyber SecurityDigital GovernanceAnonymityCivil SocietyBlocking2015-11-30T10:47:13ZBlog EntryThe Legal Validity of Internet Bans: Part II
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii
<b>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in Indian states, for different reasons. The State governments have relied on Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to institute such bans. Despite a legal challenge, the Gujarat High Court found no infirmity in this exercise of power in a recent order. We argue that it is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000, and the Website Blocking Rules, which set out the legal provision and procedure empowering the State to block access to the Internet (if at all it is necessary), and not Section 144, CrPC.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As we saw earlier, the Gujarat High Court held that Section 144, CrPC empowers the State apparatus to order blocking of access to data services. According to the Court, Section 69A, IT Act can be used to block certain websites, while under Section 144, CrPC, the District Magistrate can direct telecom companies like Vodafone and Airtel, who</span><i> </i><span>extend the facility of Internet access. In effect, the High Court agreed with the State government’s argument that the scope of Section 69A, IT Act covers only blocking of </span><i>certain </i><span>websites, while Section 144, CrPC grants a wider power.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is what the Court said (para 9 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>):</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“<i>If the comparison of both the sections in the field of operations is made, barring certain minor overlapping more particularly for public order </i>[sic]<i>, one can say that the area of operation of Section 69A is not the same as that of Section 144 of the Code. <span>Section 69A may in a given case also be exercised for blocking certain websites</span>, whereas under <span>Section 144 of the Code, directions may be issued to certain persons who may be the source for extending the facility of internet access</span>. Under the circumstances, we do not find that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the resort to only Section 69A was available and exercise of power under Section 144 of the Code was unavailable, can be accepted.</i>” (emphases ours)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We submit that the High Court’s reasoning failed to examine the scope of Section 69A, IT Act thoroughly. Section 69A does, in fact, empower the government to order blocking of access to data services, and it is a special law. Importantly, it sets forth a procedure that State governments, union territories and the Central Governments must follow to order blocks on websites or data services.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">I. Special Law Prevails Over General Law</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IT Act, 2000 is a special law dealing with matters relating to the Internet, including offences and security measures. The CrPC is a general law of criminal procedure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When a special law and a general law cover the same subject, then the special law supersedes the general law. This is a settled legal principle. Several decisions of the Supreme Court attest to this fact. To take an example, in <a href="http://www.asianlii.org/in/cases/cen/INSC/2010/526.html"><i>Maya Mathew </i>v. <i>State of Kerala</i></a>, (2010) 3 SCR 16 (18 February 2010), when there was a contention between the Special Rules for Kerala State Homoeopathy Services and the general Rules governing state and subordinate services. The Supreme Court held that when a special law and a general law both govern a matter, the Court should try to interpret them harmoniously as far as possible. But if the intention of the legislature is that one law should prevail over another, and this intention is made clear expressly or impliedly, then the Court should give effect to this intention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the basis of this principle, let’s take a look at the IT Act, 2000. <a href="http://cybercrime.planetindia.net/ch13_2008.htm">Section 81, IT Act</a> expressly states that the provisions of the IT Act shall have overriding effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent with any other law in force. Moreover, in the <a href="http://cybercrime.planetindia.net/statement-objects-foritaa-2006.htm">Statement of Objects and Reasons</a> of the IT (Amendment) Bill, 2006, the legislature clearly notes that amendments inserting offences and security measures into the IT Act are necessary given the proliferation of the Internet and e-transactions, and the rising number of offences. These indicate expressly the legislature’s intention for the IT Act to prevail over general laws like the CrPC in matters relating to the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, we will examine whether the IT Act empowers the Central and State governments to carry out complete blocks on access to the Internet or data services, in the event of emergencies. If the IT Act does cover such a situation, then the CrPC should not be used to block data services. Instead, the IT Act and its Rules should be invoked.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>II. Section 69A, IT Act Allows Blocks on Internet Access</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A(1), IT Act says:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for <span>access</span> by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any<span> information </span>generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any <span>computer resource</span>.” (<i>emphasis ours</i>)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Essentially, Section 69A says that the government can block (or cause to be blocked) for access by the public, any information<i> </i>generated, transmitted, etc. in any computer resource, if the government is satisfied that such a measure is in the interests of public order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Does this section allow the government to institute bans on Internet access in Gujarat? To determine this, we will examine each underlined term from above.</span></p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Access</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1890726/">Section 2(1)(a)</a>, IT Act defines access as “...<i><span>gaining entry into</span></i>, instructing or communicating with… resources of a <i><span>computer</span></i>, <i><span>computer system</span></i> or <i><span>computer network</span></i>”.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Computer resource</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1768009/">Section 2(1)(k)</a>, IT Act defines computer resource as “computer, computer system, computer network...”</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Information</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/146402352/">Section 2(1)(v)</a>, IT Act defines information as “includes… data, message, text, images, sound, voice...”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So ‘blocking for access’ under Section 69A includes preventing gaining entry or communicating with the resources of a computer, computer system or computer network, and it includes blocking communication of data, message, text, images, sound, etc. Now two questions arise:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(1) Do 2G and 3G services, broadband and Wifi fall within the definition of ‘computer network’?</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Computer network</i></strong>: <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29924/">Section 2(1)(j)</a>, IT Act defines computer network as “inter-connection of one or more computers or computer systems <i><span>or communication device</span></i>…” by “...use of satellite, microwave, <i><span>terrestrial line, wire, wireless or other communication media</span></i>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(2) Do mobile phones that can connect to the Internet (we say smartphones for simplicity) qualify as fall within the definition of ‘computer resource’?</p>
<p style="padding-left: 90px; text-align: justify; "><strong><i>Communication device</i></strong><span>: </span><a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/59759075/">Section 2(1)(ha)</a><span>, IT Act defines communication device as “</span><i>cell phones</i><span>, personal digital assistance or combination of both or any other device </span><i>used to communicate, send or transmit any text, video, audio or image</i><span>”.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So a cell phone is a communication device. A computer network is an inter-connection of communication devices by wire or wireless connections. A computer network is a computer resource also. Blocking of access under Section 69A, IT Act includes, therefore, gaining entry into or communicating with the resources of a computer network, which is an interconnection of communication devices, including smartphones. Add to this, the fact that <i>any information</i> (data, message, text, images, sound, voice) can be blocked, and the conclusion seems clear.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The power to block access to Internet services (including data services) can be found within Section 69A, IT Act itself, the special law enacted to cover matters relating to the Internet. Not only this, the IT Act envisages emergency situations when blocking powers may need to be invoked.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">III. Section 69A Permits Blocking in Emergency Situations</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A, IT Act doesn’t act in isolation. The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (“<strong>Blocking Rules</strong>”) operate together with Section 69A(1).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Rule 9 of the Blocking Rules deals with blocking of information in cases of emergency. It says that in cases of emergency, when “<i>no delay is acceptable</i>”, the Designated Officer (DO) shall examine the request for blocking. If it is within the scope of Section 69A(1) (i.e., within the grounds of public order, etc.), then the DO can submit the request to the Secretary, Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY). If the Secretary is satisfied of the need to block during the emergency, then he may issue a reasoned order for blocking, in writing as an interim measure. The intermediaries do not need to be heard in such a situation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After a blocking order is issued during an urgent situation, the DO must bring the blocking request to the Committee for Examination of Request constituted under Rule 7, Blocking Rules. There is also a review process, by a Review Committee that meets every two months to evaluate whether blocking directions are in compliance with Section 69A(1) [Rule 14].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We submit, therefore, that the Gujarat High Court erred in holding that Section 144, CrPC is the correct legal provision to enable Internet bans. Not only does Section 69A, IT Act cover blocking of access to Internet services, but it also envisages blocking in emergency situations. As a special law for matters surrounding the Internet, Section 69A should prevail over the general law provision of Section 144, CrPC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Acknowledgements</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">: We would like to thank Pranesh Prakash, Japreet Grewal, Sahana Manjesh and Sindhu Manjesh for their invaluable inputs in clarifying arguments and niggling details for these two posts.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan is a Programme Officer with Centre for Internet & Society. Padmini Baruah is in her final year of law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NLSIU) and is an intern at CIS.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-internet-bans-part-ii</a>
</p>
No publisherGeetha Hariharan and Padmini BaruahSocial MediaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Access69ASection 144Article 19(1)(a)Blocking2015-10-08T11:17:24ZBlog EntryThe Legal Validity of Internet Bans: Part I
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i
<b>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in Indian states, for different reasons. The State governments have relied on Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to institute such bans. Despite a legal challenge, the Gujarat High Court found no infirmity in this exercise of power in a recent order. We argue that it is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000, and the Website Blocking Rules, which set out the legal provision and procedure empowering the State to block access to the Internet (if at all it is necessary), and not Section 144, CrPC.</b>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: justify; "><span>In recent months, there has been a spree of bans on access to Internet services in India states, for different reasons. In Gujarat, the State government banned access to mobile Internet (data services) citing breach of peace during the </span><a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-rioting-reported-several-parts-ahmedabad-patel-rally-event-turns-violent-644192">Hardik Patel agitation</a><span>. In Godhra in Gujarat, mobile Internet was banned as a precautionary measure </span><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/gujarat/gujarat-internet-services-in-godhra-suspended-for-24-hours/">during Ganesh <i>visarjan</i></a><span>. In Kashmir, mobile Internet was banned for three days or more because the government feared that people would share pictures of </span><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jk-govt-plans-three-day-mobile-internet-ban-in-valley/">slaughter of animals during Eid</a><span> on social media, which would spark unrest across the state.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Can State or Central governments impose a ban on Internet access? If the State or its officials anticipate disorder or a disturbance of ‘public tranquility’, can Internet access through mobiles be banned? According to a <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">recent order of the Gujarat High Court</a>: Yes; <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/930621/">Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973</a> (<strong>“CrPC”</strong>) empowers the State government machinery to impose a temporary ban.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the Gujarat High Court’s order neglects the scope of Section 69A, IT Act, and wrongly finds that the State government can exercise blocking powers under Section 144, CrPC. In this post and the next, we argue that it is <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/10190353/">Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000</a> (“<strong>IT Act</strong>”) which is the legal provision empowering the State to block access to the Internet (including data services), and not Section 144, CrPC. Section 69A covers blocks to Internet access, and since it is a special law dealing with the Internet, it prevails over the general Code of Criminal Procedure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, the blocking powers must stay within constitutional boundaries prescribed in, <i>inter alia</i>, Article 19 of the Constitution. Blocking powers are, therefore, subject to the widely-accepted tests of legality (foresight and non-arbitrariness), legitimacy of the grounds for restriction of fundamental rights and proportionality, calling for narrowly tailored restrictions causing minimum disruptions and/or damage.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In </span><strong>Section I </strong><span>of this post, we set out a brief record of the events that preceded the blocking of access to data services (mobile Internet) in several parts of Gujarat. Then in </span><strong>Section II</strong><span>, we summarise the order of the Gujarat High Court, dismissing the petition challenging the State government’s Internet-blocking notification under Section 144, CrPC. In the next post, </span><span>we examine the scope of Section 69A, IT Act to determine whether it empowers the State and Central government agencies to carry out blocks on Internet access through mobile phones (i.e., data services such as 2G, 3G and 4G) under certain circumstances. We submit that Section 69A does, and that Section 144, CrPC cannot be invoked for this purpose. </span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">I. The Patidar Agitation in Gujarat:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This question arose in the wake of agitation in Gujarat in the Patel community. The Patels or Patidars are <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-who-are-gujarats-patidars-and-why-are-they-angry/">politically and economically influential</a> in Gujarat, with several members of the community holding top political, bureaucratic and industrial positions. In the last couple of months, the Patidars have been agitating, demanding to be granted status as Other Backward Classes (OBC). OBC status would make the community eligible for reservations and quotas in educational institutions and for government jobs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Towards this demand, the Patidars organised <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/demand-for-obc-status-patidars-stir-spreads-to-saurashtra/">multiple rallies</a> across Gujarat in August 2015. The largest rally, called the <i>Kranti Rally</i>, <a href="http://m.ibnlive.com/news/politics/turmoil-brewing-in-gujarat-as-patel-community-demands-obc-status-hardik-patel-begins-indefinite-hunger-strike-1051104.html">was held</a> in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s capital city, on August 25, 2015. Hardik Patel, a leader of the agitation, reportedly went on hunger strike seeking that the Patidars’ demands be met by the government, and was arrested as he did not have permission to stay on the rally grounds after the rally. While media reports vary, it is certain that <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-rioting-reported-several-parts-ahmedabad-patel-rally-event-turns-violent-644192">violence and agitation broke out</a> after the rally. <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Patidar-agitation-Uneasy-calm-in-violence-hit-Gujarat-death-toll-rises-to-10/articleshow/48699151.cms">Many were injured</a>, some lost their lives, property was destroyed, businesses suffered; the army was deployed and curfew imposed for a few days across the State.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to other security measures, the State government also imposed a ban on mobile Internet services across different parts of Gujarat. Reportedly, Hardik Patel had called for a state-wide <i>bandh </i>over Whatsapp. <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/after-clashes-over-hardik-patels-detention-no-whatsapp-in-gujarat-1211058?pfrom=home-lateststories">The police cited</a> “<i>concerns of rumour-mongering and crowd mobilisation through Whatsapp</i>” as a reason for the ban, which was instituted under <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/930621/">Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973</a> (<strong>“CrPC”</strong>). In most of Gujarat, the ban lasted six days, from August 25 to 31, 2015, <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.in/gujarat-patel-agitation-ban-mobile-internet-whatsapp-lifted-ahmedabad-644924">while it continued</a> in Ahmedabad and Surat for longer.<span> </span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">II. The Public Interest Litigation:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A public interest petition was filed before the Gujarat High Court, challenging the mobile Internet ban. Though the petition was dismissed at the preliminary stage by Acting Chief Justice Jayant Patel and Justice Anjaria by an <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">oral order</a> delivered on September 15, 2015, the legal issues surrounding the ban are important and the order calls for some reflection.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the PIL, the petitioner prayed that the Gujarat High Court declare that the notification under Section 144, CrPC, which blocked access to mobile Internet, is “void <i>ab initio</i>, <i>ultra vires </i>and unconstitutional” (para 1 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). The ban, argued the petitioner, violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution by being arbitrary and excessive, violating citizens’ right to free speech and causing businesses to suffer extensive economic damage. In any event, the power to block websites was specifically granted by Section 69A, IT Act, and so the government’s use of Section 144, CrPC to institute the mobile Internet block was legally impermissible. Not only this, but the government’s ban was excessive in that mobile Internet services were <i>completely blocked</i>; had the government’s concerns been about social media websites like Whatsapp or Facebook, the government could have suspended only those websites using Section 69A, IT Act. And so, the petitioner prayed that the Gujarat High Court issue a writ “<i>permanently restraining the State government from imposing a complete or partial ban on access to mobile Internet/broadband services</i>” in Gujarat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The State Government saw things differently, of course. At the outset, the government argued that there was “<i>sufficient valid ground for exercise of power</i>” under Section 144, CrPC, to institute a mobile Internet block (para 4 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). Had the blocking notification not been issued, “<i>peace could not have been restored with the other efforts made by the State for the maintenance of law and order</i>”. The government stressed that Section 144, CrPC notifications were generally issued as a “last resort”, and in any case, the Internet had not been shut down in Gujarat; broadband and WiFi services continued to be active throughout. Since the government was the competent authority to evaluate law-and-order situations and appropriate actions, the Court ought to dismiss the petition, the State prayed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Court agreed with the State government, and dismissed the petition without issuing notice (para 9 of the <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/29352399/">order</a>). The Court examined two issues in its order (very briefly):</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The scope and distinction between Section 144, CrPC and Section 69A, IT Act, and whether the invocation of Section 144, CrPC to block mobile Internet services constituted an arbitrary exercise of power;</li>
<li>The proportionality of the blocking notification (though the Court doesn’t use the term ‘proportionality’).</li>
</ol>
<p><span style="text-align: justify; ">We will examine the Court’s reading of Section 69A, IT Act and Section 144, CrPC, to see whether their fields of operation are in fact different.</span></p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong style="text-align: justify; ">Acknowledgements</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">: We would like to thank Pranesh Prakash, Japreet Grewal, Sahana Manjesh and Sindhu Manjesh for their invaluable inputs in clarifying arguments and niggling details for these two posts.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Geetha Hariharan is a Programme Officer with Centre for Internet & Society. Padmini Baruah is in her final year of law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NLSIU) and is an intern at CIS.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-legal-validity-of-bans-on-internet-part-i</a>
</p>
No publisherGeetha Hariharan and Padmini BaruahSocial MediaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Access69ASection 144Article 19(1)(a)Blocking2015-10-08T11:18:34ZBlog EntryCan Uber, Ola apps be blocked? Govt fighting cyber odds
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-siladitya-ray-june-4-can-uber-ola-apps-be-blocked
<b>The Delhi government is trying to block taxi hailing apps like Uber and Ola Cabs, but is it really possible?</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Siladitya Ray published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/technology-topstories/can-the-uber-ola-apps-be-blocked/article1-1354921.aspx">Hindustan Times</a> on June 4, 2015 quotes Sunil Abraham.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Taxi aggregators are in the firing line over passenger safety again after a 21-year-old Delhi woman alleged she was molested by a driver in an Uber cab near Gurgaon on Saturday morning.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The allegation came just six months after a 25-year-old financial analyst was allegedly raped in an Uber cab in Delhi, over which the victim took the cab aggregator's parent company to court in the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following an order from the Delhi government, the Department of Telecommunication had issued an order to Internet Service Providers to block the websites and apps of taxi hailing aggregators like Uber, TaxiForSure and Ola Cabs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But Internet Service Providers (ISP) have apparently expressed inability to block Uber, Ola as the web services feature strong end-to-end encryption.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>How ISPs block sites</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Often when an ISP blocks a website it severs your connection with the domain name. For example if ISPs want to block Google they simply block your access to <a href="http://www.google.com">www.google.com</a> (i.e. Google's domain name), pretty simple. But if you are using an app like Google Now there is no domain name involved here the app talks directly to the server through using some form of encryption.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If we were to use an analogy, think of the ISP as a bridge that connects you to the web. The sites can be thought of as cars and their domain names as license plates. If the ISP wants to block a car with a certain license plate from going through it can do so with ease. But if a car's number plates are obscured (encryption) then ISP cannot block the car from passing through.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Uber and Ola</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most users book cabs from Ola or Uber using the company's apps, which use strong encryption effectively making their data virtually undetectable to ISPs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"It's possible to block apps but it's much more difficult than before. Earlier you had to deal with a finite set of IP addresses but now these services are hosted on multiple cloud servers," said Sunil Abraham, the executive director of Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society. "The ISPs themselves don't want to go through the pain of blocking these apps so they are asking the government to give them a solution," he added.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government and the Department of Telecommunication are fighting near improbable odds in their endeavor to block these services on the web.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-siladitya-ray-june-4-can-uber-ola-apps-be-blocked'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-siladitya-ray-june-4-can-uber-ola-apps-be-blocked</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaInternet GovernanceBlockingCensorship2015-06-14T09:52:28ZNews ItemDeitY says 143 URLs have been Blocked in 2015; Procedure for Blocking Content Remains Opaque and in Urgent Need of Transparency Measures
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015
<b>Across India on 30 December 2014, following an order issued by the Department of Telecom (DOT), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) blocked 32 websites including Vimeo, Dailymotion, GitHub and Pastebin.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In February 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) requested the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to provide information clarifying the procedures for blocking in India. We have received a response from DeitY which may be <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-deity.clarifying-procedures-for-blocking.pdf" class="external-link">seen here</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this post, I shall elaborate on this response from DeitY and highlight some of the accountability and transparency measures that the procedure needs. To stress the urgency of reform, I shall also touch upon two recent developments—the response from Ministry of Communication to questions raised in Parliament on the blocking procedures and the Supreme Court (SC) judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Section 69A and the Blocking Rules</h2>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (S69A hereinafter) grants powers to the central government to issue directions for blocking of access to any information through any computer resource. In other words, it allows the government to block any websites under certain grounds. The Government has notified rules laying down the procedure for blocking access online under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (Rules, 2009 hereinafter). CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (<a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/blocking-websites.pdf/at_download/file">download PDF</a>, 2.037MB).</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">There are <em>three key aspects</em> of the blocking rules that need to be kept under consideration:</p>
<h3 align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Officers and committees handling requests</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Designated Officer (DO)</strong> – Appointed by the Central government, officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary.<br /><strong>Nodal Officer (NO)</strong> – Appointed by organizations including Ministries or Departments of the State governments and Union Territories and any agency of the Central Government. <br /><strong>Intermediary contact</strong>–Appointed by every intermediary to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO.<br /><strong>Committee for Examination of Request (CER)</strong> – The request along with printed sample of alleged offending information is examined by the CER—committee with the DO serving as the Chairperson and representatives from Ministry of Law and Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representative from the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). The CER is responsible for examining each blocking request and makes recommendations including revoking blocking orders to the DO, which are taken into consideration for final approval of request for blocking by the Secretary, DOT. <br /><strong>Review Committee (RC) </strong>– Constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1951, the RC includes the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom). The RC is mandated to meet at least once in 2 months and record its findings and has to validate that directions issued are in compliance with S69A(1).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Provisions outlining the procedure for blocking</h3>
<p>Rules 6, 9 and 10 create three distinct blocking procedures, which must commence within 7 days of the DO receiving the request.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a) Rule 6 lays out the first procedure, under which any person may approach the NO and request blocking, alternatively, the NO may also raise a blocking request. After the NO of the approached Ministry or Department of the State governments and Union Territories and/or any agency of the Central Government, is satisfied of the validity of the request they forward it to the DO. Requests when not sent through the NO of any organization, must be approved by Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory or the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory, before being sent to the DO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The DO upon receiving the request places, must acknowledge receipt within 24 four hours and places the request along with printed copy of alleged information for validation by the CER. The DO also, must make reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary hosting the information, and having identified them issue a notice asking them to appear and submit their reply and clarifications before the committee at a specified date and time, within forty eight hours of the receipt of notice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed and the CER gives it recommendations after hearing from the intermediary or the person has clarified their position and even if there is no representation by the same and after examining if the request falls within the scope outlined under S69A(1). The blocking directions are issued by the Secretary (DeitY), after the DO forwards the request and the CER recommendations. If approval is granted the DO directs the relevant intermediary or person to block the alleged information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">b) Rule 9 outlines a procedure wherein, under emergency circumstances, and after the DO has established the necessity and expediency to block alleged information submits recommendations in writing to the Secretary, DeitY. The Secretary, upon being satisfied by the justification for, and necessity of, and expediency to block information may issue an blocking directions as an interim measure and must record the reasons for doing so in writing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">Under such circumstances, the intermediary and person hosting information is not given the opportunity of a hearing. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the request before the CER within forty eight hours of issuing of directions for interim blocking. Only upon receiving the final recommendations from the committee can the Secretary pass a final order approving the request. If the request for blocking is not approved then the interim order passed earlier is revoked, and the intermediary or identified person should be directed to unblock the information for public access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">c) Rule 10 outlines the process when an order is issued by the courts in India. The DO upon receipt of the court order for blocking of information submits it to the Secretary, DeitY and initiates action as directed by the courts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" class="western">Confidentiality clause</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rule 16 mandates confidentiality regarding all requests and actions taken thereof, which renders any requests received by the NO and the DO, recommendations made by the DO or the CER and any written reasons for blocking or revoking blocking requests outside the purview of public scrutiny. More detail on the officers and committees that enforce the blocking rules and procedure can be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure">here</a>.</p>
<h2>Response on blocking from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The response to our RTI from E-Security and Cyber Law Group is timely, given the recent clarification from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to a number of questions, raised by parliamentarian Shri Avinash Pande in the Rajya Sabha. The questions had been raised in reference to the Emergency blocking order under IT Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality. The Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University New Delhi have extracted a set of 6 questions and you can read the full article <a href="https://ccgnludelhi.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/governments-response-to-fundamental-questions-regarding-the-internet-in-india/">here</a>.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">The governments response as quoted by CCG, clarifies under rule 9—the Government has issued directions for emergency blocking of <em>a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date </em>and that <em>a total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015)</em> under S69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the directions of the competent courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively. The government also clarified that the CER, had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1<sup>st</sup><sup> </sup>January 2014 upto till date and so far, two orders have been issued to revoke 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date. Besides, CERT-In received requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, and these were forwarded to the concerned websites for appropriate action, however the response did not specify the number of requests.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">We have prepared a table explaining the information released by the government and to highlight the inconsistency in their response.</p>
<table class="grid listing">
<colgroup> <col width="331"> <col width="90"> <col width="91"> <col width="119"> </colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">
<p align="LEFT"><strong>Applicable rule and procedure outlined under the Blocking Rules</strong></p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p align="CENTER"><strong>Number of websites</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>2014</em></p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>2015</em></p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>Total</em></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 6 - Blocking requests from NO and others</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">255</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">None</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">255</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 9 - Blocking under emergency circumstances</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">216</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 10 - Blocking orders from Court</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">2091</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">143</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">2234</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Requests from individuals and orgs forwarded to CERT-In</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Recommendations to not block by CER</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">19</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Number of blocking requests revoked</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">251</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>In a <a href="http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reveal-more/">response </a>to an RTI filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, DeitY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014.</p>
<h2>Shreya Singhal v. Union of India</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its recent judgment, the SC of India upheld the constitutionality of 69A, stating that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards. The constitutional challenge on behalf of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) considered the manner in which the blocking is done and the arguments focused on the secrecy present in blocking.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The rules may indicate that there is a requirement to identify and contact the originator of information, though as an expert <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/but-what-about-section-69a/">has pointed out</a>, there is no evidence of this in practice. The court has stressed the importance of a written order so that writ petitions may be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In doing so, the court seems to have assumed that the originator or intermediary is informed, and therefore held the view that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions. However, this recourse is rendered ineffective not only due to procedural constraints, but also because of the confidentiality clause. The opaqueness through rule 16 severely reigns in the recourse that may be given to the originator and the intermediary. While the court notes that rule 16 requiring confidentality was argued to be unconstitutional, it does not state its opinion on this question in the judgment. One expert, holds the <a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act-judgment-and-secret-blocking/">view</a> that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. However, such a reading down of rule 16 is yet to be tested.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further, Sunil Abraham has <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a">pointed</a> out, “block orders are unevenly implemented by ISPs making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.” As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders through which they are blocked exists, the public has to rely on media reports and filing RTI requests to understand the censorship regime in India. CIS has previously <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-riots-communalism">analysed</a> the leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests which have revealed that the block orders are full of errors and blocking of entire platforms and not just specific links has taken place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the state has the power of blocking content, doing so in secrecy and without judical scrutiny, mark deficiencies that remain in the procedure outlined under the provisions of the blocking rules . The Court could read down rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions, and in not doing so, perhaps has overlooked the opportunities for reform in the existing system. The blocking of 32 websites, is an example of the opaqueness of the system of blocking orders, and where the safeguards assumed by the SC are often not observed such as there being no access to the recommendations that were made by the CER, or towards the revocation of the blocking orders subsequently. CIS filed the RTI to try and understand the grounds for blocking and related procedures and the response has thrown up some issues that must need urgent attention.</p>
<h2>Response to RTI filed by CIS</h2>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Our first question sought clarification on the websites blocked on 30<sup>th</sup><sup> </sup>December 2014 and the response received from DeitY, E-Security and Cyber Law Group reveals that the websites had been blocked as “they were being used to post information related to ISIS using the resources provided by these websites”. The response also clarifies that the directions to block were issued on <em>18-12-2014 and as of 09-01-2015</em>, after obtaining an undertaking from website owners, stating their compliance with the Government and Indian laws, the sites were unblocked.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">It is not clear if ATS, Mumbai had been intercepting communication or if someone reported these websites. If the ATS was indeed intercepting communication, then as per the rules, the RC should be informed and their recommendations sought. It is unclear, if this was the case and the response evokes the confidentiality clause under rule 16 for not divulging further details. Based on our reading of the rules, court orders should be accessible to the public and without copies of requests and complaints received and knowledge of which organization raised them, there can be no appeal or recourse available to the intermediary or even the general public.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">We also asked for a list of all requests for blocking of information that had been received by the DO between January 2013 and January 2015, including the copies of all files that had accepted or rejected. We also specifically, asked for a list of requests under rule 9. The response from DeitY stated that since January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015 directions to block 143 URLs had been issued based on court orders. The response completely overlooks our request for information, covering the 2 year time period. It also does not cover all types of blocking orders under rule 6 and rule 9, nor the requests that are forwarded to CERT-In, as we have gauged from the ministry's response to the Parliament. Contrary to the SC's assumption of contacting the orginator of information, it is also clear from DeitY's response that only the websites had been contacted and the letter states that the “websites replied only after blocking of objectionable content”. </p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Further, seeking clarification on the functioning of the CER, we asked for the recent composition of members and the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings including copies of the recommendations made by them. The response merely quotes rule 7 as the reference for the composition and does not provide any names or other details. We ascertain that as per the DeitY website Shri B.J. Srinath, Scientist-G/GC is the appointed Designated Officer, however this needs confirmation. While we are already aware of the structure of the CER which representatives and appointed public officers are guiding the examination of requests remains unclear. Presently, there are 3 Joint Secretaries appointed under the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Home Ministry has appointed 19, while 3 are appointed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Further, it is not clear which grade of scientist would be appointed to this committee from CERT-In as the rules do not specify this. While the government has clarified in their answer to Parliament that the committee had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1st January 2014 to till date, it is remains unclear who is taking these decisions to block and revoke blocked URLs. The response from DeitY specifies that the CER has met six times between 2014 and March 2015, however stops short on sharing any further information or copies of files on complaints and recommendations of the CER, citing rule 16.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Finally, answering our question on the composition of the RC the letter merely highlights the provision providing for the composition under 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. The response clarifies that so far, the RC has met once on 7th December, 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Department of Legal Affaits and Secretary, DOT. Our request for minutes of meetings and copies of orders and findings of the RC is denied by simply stating that “minutes are not available”. Under 419A, any directions for interception of any message or class of messages under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 issued by the competent authority shall contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such order shall be forwarded to the concerned RC within a period of seven working days. Given that the RC has met just once since 2013, it is unclear if the RC is not functioning or if the interception of messages is being guided through other procedures. Further, we do not yet know details or have any records of revocation orders or notices sent to intermediary contacts. This restricts the citizens’ right to receive information and DeitY should work to make these available for the public.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Given the response to our RTI, the Ministry's response to Parliament and the SC judgment we recommend the following steps be taken by the DeitY to ensure that we create a procedure that is just, accountable and follows the rule of law.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">The revocation of rule 16 needs urgent clarification for two reasons:</p>
<ol>
<li>Under Section 22 of the RTI Act provisions thereof, override all conflicting provisions in any other legislation.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">In upholding the constitutionality of S69A the SC cites the requirement of reasons behind blocking orders to be recorded in writing, so that they may be challenged by means of writ petitions filed under <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1712542/">A</a><a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1712542/">rticle 226</a> of the Constitution of India.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If the blocking orders or the meetings of the CER and RC that consider the reasons in the orders are to remain shrouded in secrecy and unavailable through RTI requests, filing writ petitions challenging these decisions will not be possible, rendering this very important safeguard for the protection of online free speech and expression infructuous. In summation, the need for comprehensive legislative reform remains in the blocking procedures and the government should act to address the pressing need for transparency and accountability. Not only does opacity curtial the strengths of democracy it also impedes good governance. We have filed an RTI seeking a comprehensive account of the blocking procedure, functioning of committees from 2009-2015 and we shall publish any information that we may receive.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionRTIIntermediary LiabilityAccountabilityFeatured69AInternet GovernanceChilling EffectTransparencyHomepageBlocking2015-04-30T07:37:40ZBlog EntryNo more 66A!
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/no-more-66a
<b>In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court has struck down Section 66A. Today was a great day for freedom of speech on the Internet! When Section 66A was in operation, if you made a statement that led to offence, you could be prosecuted. We are an offence-friendly nation, judging by media reports in the last year. It was a year of book-bans, website blocking and takedown requests. Facebook’s Transparency Report showed that next to the US, India made the most requests for information about user accounts. A complaint under Section 66A would be a ground for such requests.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 66A hung like a sword in the middle: Shaheen Dhada was arrested in Maharashtra for observing that Bal Thackeray’s funeral shut down the city, Devu Chodankar in Goa and Syed Waqar in Karnataka were arrested for making posts about Narendra Modi, and a Puducherry man was arrested for criticizing P. Chidambaram’s son. The law was vague and so widely worded that it was prone to misuse, and was in fact being misused.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A in its judgment on a <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact">set of petitions</a> heard together last year and earlier this year. Stating that the law is vague, the bench comprising Chelameshwar and Nariman, JJ. held that while restrictions on free speech are constitutional insofar as they are in line with Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Section 66A, they held, does not meet this test: The central protection of free speech is the freedom to make statements that “offend, shock or disturb”, and Section 66A is an unconstitutional curtailment of these freedoms. To cross the threshold of constitutional limitation, the impugned speech must be of such a nature that it incites violence or is an exhortation to violence. Section 66A, by being extremely vague and broad, does not meet this threshold. These are, of course, drawn from news reports of the judgment; the judgment is not available yet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reports also say that Section 79(3)(b) has been read down. Previously, any private individual or entity, and the government and its departments could request intermediaries to take down a website, without a court order. If the intermediaries did not comply, they would lose immunity under Section 79. The Supreme Court judgment states that both in Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines and in Section 79(3)(b), the "actual knowledge of the court order or government notification" is necessary before website takedowns can be effected. In effect, this mean that intermediaries <i>need not</i> act upon private notices under Section 79, while they can act upon them if they choose. This stops intermediaries from standing judge over what constitutes an unlawful act. If they choose not to take down content after receiving a private notice, they will not lose immunity under Section 79.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A, the website blocking procedure, has been left intact by the Court, despite infirmities such as a lack of judicial review and non-transparent operation. More updates when the judgment is made available.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/no-more-66a'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/no-more-66a</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionHomepageIntermediary LiabilityFeaturedChilling EffectSection 66AArticle 19(1)(a)Blocking2015-03-26T02:01:31ZBlog EntryOverview of the Constitutional Challenges to the IT Act
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact
<b>There are currently ten cases before the Supreme Court challenging various provisions of the Information Technology Act, the rules made under that, and other laws, that are being heard jointly. Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan who's arguing Anoop M.K. v. Union of India has put together this chart that helps you track what's being challenged in each case.</b>
<br />
<br />
<br />
<table class="tg" style="undefined;table-layout: fixed; border=">
<tr>
<th class="tg-s6z2">PENDING MATTERS</th>
<th class="tg-s6z2">CASE NUMBER</th>
<th class="tg-0ord">PROVISIONS CHALLENGED</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Shreya Singhal v. Union of India</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 167/2012</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Common Cause & Anr. v. Union of India</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 21/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A, 69A & 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Rajeev Chandrasekhar v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(C) NO. 23/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A & Rules 3(2), 3(3), 3(4) & 3(7) of the Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Dilip Kumar Tulsidas Shah v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 97/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 199/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A, 69A, Intermediaries Rules 2011 (s.79(2) Rules) & Blocking of Access of Information by Public Rules 2009 (s.69A Rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Mouthshut.Com (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 217/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A & Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Taslima Nasrin v. State of U.P & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 222/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Manoj Oswal v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 225/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A & 499/500 Indian Penal Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Internet and Mobile Ass'n of India & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(C) NO. 758/2014</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">79(3) & Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Anoop M.K. v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 196/2014</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A, 69A, 80 & S.118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCourt CaseFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIntermediary LiabilityConstitutional LawCensorshipSection 66AArticle 19(1)(a)Blocking2014-12-19T09:01:50ZBlog EntryIs India’s website-blocking law constitutional? – I. Law & procedure
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure
<b>Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with its corresponding Rules, set out the procedure for blocking of websites in India. Over two posts, Geetha Hariharan examines the constitutional validity of Section 69A and the Blocking Rules. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Introduction</span>:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Information Technology Act, 2000 (“<strong>IT Act</strong>”) is no stranger to litigation or controversy. Since its enactment in 2000, the IT Act has come under stringent criticism, both for the alleged Constitutional infirmities of its provisions and Rules, as well as for the way it is implemented. In recent years, Sections 66A (re: criminal liability for offensive, annoying or inconveniencing online communications), 67A (re: obscene 69A (re: website-blocking) and 79 (re: intermediary liability) have all come under attack for these reasons.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Today, these Sections and several others have been challenged before the Supreme Court. A total of ten cases, challenging various Sections of the IT Act, are being heard together by the Supreme Court. This is a welcome occasion, for the IT Act desperately needs judicial review. Nikhil Pahwa over at Medianama provides an </span><a href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/12/223-if-a-law-requires-a-person-to-be-careful-it-is-not-violative-of-free-speech-notes-from-the-supreme-court/">update and the list of cases</a><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Among the challenged provisions are Section 66A, Section 79 and Section 69A. Section 66A was and continues to be used wantonly by the State and police. A student was <a href="http://m.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/andhra-pradesh-law-student-arrested-for-facebook-comment-on-cyclone-hudhud/article6544417.ece/">recently arrested</a> for a Twitter comment regarding Cyclone Hudhud, while anti-Modi comments led to several arrests earlier in the year (see <a href="http://m.firstpost.com/politics/goa-facebook-user-faces-jail-term-for-anti-modi-comments-1538499.html">here</a>, <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/aap-activist-arrested-for-allegedly-forwarding-anti-modi-mms-in-karnataka/article1-1222788.aspx">here</a> and <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/modi-on-negative-faces-list-principal-6-others-booked/">here</a>). At CIS, we have previously subjected Section 66A to constitutional analyses. <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act">Pranesh Prakash traced</a> the genealogy of the Section and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A">its import</a> in targeting offensive, annoying and inconveniencing communications and spam, while <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/two-arguments-against-the-constitutionality-of-section-66a">Gautam Bhatia examined</a> the Section’s overbreadth and vagueness. The casual wording and potential for misuse of Section 79 and the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/constitutional-analysis-of-intermediaries-guidelines-rules">led Ujwala Uppaluri</a> to offer strong arguments regarding their violation of Part III of the Constitution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similar infirmities also handicap Section 69A and its Rules. This provision empowers the Central government and officers authorised by it to order the blocking of websites or webpages. Website-blocking is permissible for reasons enumerated in Section 69A, and in accordance with the process laid out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public (sic)) Rules, 2009 (“<strong>Blocking Rules</strong>”). In our view, Section 69A and the Blocking Rules are also unconstitutional, and liable to be declared as such by the Supreme Court. We provide our analysis in this post and the next.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Section 69A, IT Act</span><span>:</span></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A and the Blocking Rules provide for website-blocking in accordance with enumerated reasons and process. The Section reads as follows:</p>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>69A.</strong> <i>Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource.- </i></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><i> </i><span>(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span><span>(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out shall be such as may be prescribed. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span><span>(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.</span></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As you will notice, the Central government may block any information that is “<i>generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted</i>” in any computer. This will extend, clearly, to any webpage available and/or hosted in India. The Government can order website-blocks if it is satisfied of the necessity or expedience for this on the basis of (any of) six reasons. These reasons are:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Sovereignty and integrity of India,</li>
<li>Defense of India,</li>
<li>Security of the State,</li>
<li>Friendly relations with foreign states,</li>
<li>Public order,</li>
<li>Preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>If the Central government is convinced it has a valid reason, then it must follow the blocking procedure set out in the </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009">Blocking Rules</a><span>, which were notified on 27 October 2009. Before entering into an analysis of the Blocking Rules, let us understand the blocking procedure.</span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Blocking Procedure</span><span>:</span></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I will explain the blocking procedure in 4 steps: (1) Relevant designations and committees; (2) Procedure to make and examine a blocking request, and issue blocking direction; (3) Blocking in special circumstances; and (4) Review of blocking directions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>(1) Relevant designations and committees:</span></h3>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Designated Officer (“<strong>DO</strong>”)</span></strong>: The Central government notifies an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary as the Designated Officer, who will issue the blocking direction ot the relevant intermediary or agency [Rule 3]. By a <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Gazette1_20082010(1).pdf">notification dated 20 January 2010</a>, the DO is the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division, Department of Information Technology (DIT). Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/people-and-offices">on the website</a> of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY, the name to which DIT was renamed in 2012). I am also unable to find a notification updating the designation of the DO. Presumably, Dr. Gulshan Rai, Director General (Cyberlaws & E-security), DeitY, continues to be the DO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Nodal Officer (“<strong><strong>NO</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: Every organization designates one of its officers as a Nodal Officer, who will receive blocking requests and forward them to the DO [Rule 4]. ‘Organisation’ is defined in Rule 2(g) as Ministries or Departments of the Government of India, State governments and Union Territories, and any Agency of the Central government notified in the Official Gazette. I am unable to find <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/notifications">on the DeitY website</a> a notification explaining which government Agencies are ‘organisations’ under Rule 2(g).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Intermediary Contact</span></strong></span>: Every intermediary also designates one person to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO [Rule 13].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Committee for Examination of Request (“<strong><strong>CER</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: The 5-membered CER comprises the DO as Chairman, along with officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary from the Ministries of Law & Justice, Home Affairs, Information & Broadcasting and <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/indian-computer-emergency-response-team-cert-dpl-rtoi">CERT-In</a> [Rule 7]. The CER examines each blocking request, before issuing recommendations to the DO to block or not to block. Regrettably, I am unable to identify the current membership of the CER, as no document is available that gives this information. However, the CER’s composition in 2010 <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking">may be gleaned</a> (see Annexure III).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Review Committee (“<strong><strong>RC</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: Rule 2(i) defines the RC as the body set up under Rule 419A, Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. <a href="http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/358%20GI-2014%20dated%208.2.2014_6.pdf">As per Rule 419A(16)</a>, the Central RC is constituted by the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(2) </strong><strong>Blocking procedure</strong><span>:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Blocking Rules stipulate that the entire blocking procedure, from examining a blocking request to issuing a blocking direction, must be carried out within 7 days from the date on which the DO receives the blocking request from the NO [Rule 11].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(a) Making a blocking request</span></strong>: Any person may send a request for a website-block to an NO of any ‘organisation’ (“<strong>outside request</strong>”). Alternatively, the NO may himself raise a blocking request. The organization has to examine each outside request and be satisfied that it meets the requirements of Section 69A(1), IT Act. Once it is satisfied, the NO forwards the blocking request to the DO. Outside requests must be approved by the Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory, before they are sent to the DO. [See Rule 6 for this procedure]</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(b) Examining a blocking request</span></strong>: Once the DO receives a blocking request, he/she places it before the CER. The DO tries to identify the person/intermediary hosting the troubling information, and if identified, issues a notice seeking their representation before the CER. Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed over fax/email. The person/intermediary has 48 hours from the date of receiving the DO’s notice to make its representation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After this, the CER will examine the blocking request. It will “consider whether the request is covered within the scope of Section 69A(1)”, and whether it is justifiable to block [Rule 8(4)].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(c) Blocking direction</span></strong>: The DO then places the CER’s recommendation to block or not to block before the Secretary (DeitY) for his/her approval. If and once approval is granted, the DO directs the relevant Agency or intermediary to block the website/page.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(3) </strong><strong>Blocking in special circumstances</strong>:</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(a) Emergencies [Rule 9]</span></strong>: In an emergency “when no delay is acceptable”, the DO passes over the blocking procedure described above. With written recommendations, the DO directly approaches the Secretary (DeitY) for approval of blocking request. If satisfied, the Secretary (DeitY) issues the blocking direction as an <i>interim measure</i>. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the blocking request before the CER at the earliest opportunity (in any case, not later than 48 hours after blocking direction).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(b) Court orders [Rule 10]</span></strong>: If a court has ordered a website-block, the DO follows a procedure similar to an Emergency situation. He/she submits the certified copy of order to the Secretary (DeitY), and then initiates action as ordered by the court.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(4) </strong><strong>Review of blocking directions</strong>:</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The RC is to meet once in 2 months to evaluate whether blocking directions issued under the Blocking Rules are in compliance with Section 69A(1) [Rule 14]. No other review or appeal mechanism is provided under the Blocking Rules. Nor are aggrieved parties afforded any further opportunities to be heard. Also note that Rule 16 mandates that all requests and complaints received under the Blocking Rules are to the kept strictly confidential.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the next post, I will subject Section 69A and the Blocking Rules to a constitutional analysis.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Blocking procedure poster</span>:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (<a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/blocking-websites.pdf/at_download/file">download PDF</a>, 2.037MB).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIT ActBlocking2014-12-11T11:02:01ZBlog Entry