The Centre for Internet and Society
http://editors.cis-india.org
These are the search results for the query, showing results 1 to 15.
Why should we care about takedown timeframes?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes
<b>The issue of content takedown timeframe - the time period an intermediary is allotted to respond to a legal takedown order - has received considerably less attention in conversations about intermediary liability. This article examines the importance of framing an appropriate timeframe towards ensuring that speech online is not over-censored, and frames recommendations towards the same.
</b>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>This article first <a class="external-link" href="https://cyberbrics.info/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes/">appeared</a> in the CyberBRICS website. It has since been <a class="external-link" href="https://www.medianama.com/2020/04/223-content-takedown-timeframes-cyberbrics/">cross-posted</a> to the Medianama.</em></p>
<p><em>The findings and opinions expressed in this article are derived from the larger research report 'A deep dive into content takedown timeframes', which can be accessed <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-frames">here</a>.</em></p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>Since the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) proposed the draft amendments to the intermediary liability guidelines in December of 2018, speculations regarding their potential effects have been numerous. These have included, <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2020/01/223-traceability-accountability-necessary-intermediary-liability/">mapping</a> the requirement of traceability of originators vis-a-vis chilling effect on free speech online, or <a class="external-link" href="http://cyberbrics.info/rethinking-the-intermediary-liability-regime-in-india/">critiquing</a> the proactive filtering requirement as potentially leading to censorship.</p>
<p>One aspect, however, that has received a lesser amount of attention is encoded within Rule 3(8) of the draft amendments. By the virtue of that rule, the time-limit given to the intermediaries to respond to a legal content takedown request (“turnaround time”) has been reduced from 36 hours (as it was in the older version of the rules) to 24 hours. In essence, intermediaries, when faced with a takedown order from the government or the court, would now have to remove the concerned piece of content within 24 hours of receipt of the notice.</p>
<p>Why is this important? Consider this: the <a class="external-link" href="http://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1999/3/A2000-21.pdf">definition</a> of an ‘intermediary’ within the Indian law encompasses a vast amount of entities – cyber cafes, online-marketplaces, internet service providers and more. Governance of any intermediary liability norms would accordingly require varying levels of regulation, each of which recognizes the different composition of these entities. In light of that, the content takedown requirement, and specifically the turnaround time becomes problematic. Let alone that the vast amount of entities under the definition of intermediaries would probably find it impossible to implement this obligation due to their technical architecture, this obligation also seems to erase the nuances existing within entities which would actually fall within its scope. </p>
<p>Each category of online content, and more importantly, each category of intermediary are different, and any content takedown requirement must appreciate these differences. A smaller intermediary may find it more difficult to adhere to a stricter, shorter timeframe, than an incumbent. A piece of ‘terrorist’ content may be required to be treated with more urgency than something that is defamatory. These contextual cues are critical, and must be accordingly incorporated in any law on content takedown.</p>
<p>While making our submissions to the draft amendments, we found that there was a lack of research from the government’s side justifying the shortened turnaround time, nor were there any literature which focussed on turnaround time-frames as a critical point of regulation of intermediary liability. Accordingly, I share some findings from our research in the subsequent sections, which throw light on certain nuances that must be considered before proposing any content takedown time-frame. It is important to note that our research has not yet found what should be an appropriate turnaround time in a given situation. However, the following findings would hopefully start a preliminary conversation which may ultimately lead us to a right answer.</p>
<p><strong>What to consider when regulating takedown time-frames?</strong></p>
<p>I classify the findings from our research into a chronological sequence: a) broad legal reforms, b) correct identification of scope and extent of the law, c) institution of proper procedural safeguards, and d) post-facto review of the time-frame for evidence based policy-making.</p>
<p><em>1. Broad legal reforms: Harmonize the law on content takedown.</em></p>
<p>The Indian law for content takedown is administered through two different provisions under the Information Technology (IT) Act, each with their own legal procedures and scope. While the 24-hour turnaround time would be applicable for the procedure under one of them, there would continue to <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009">exist</a> a completely different legal procedure under which the government could still effectuate content takedown. For the latter, intermediaries would be given a 48-hour timeframe to respond to a government request with clarifications (if any).</p>
<p>Such differing procedures contributes to the creation of a confusing legal ecosystem surrounding content takedown, leading to arbitrary ways in which Indian users experience internet censorship. Accordingly, it is important to harmonize the existing law in a manner that the procedures and safeguards are seamless, and the regulatory process of content takedown is streamlined.</p>
<p><em>2. Correct identification of scope and extent of the law: Design a liability framework on the basis of the differences in the intermediaries, and the content in question.</em></p>
<p>As I have highlighted before, regulation of illegal content online cannot be <a class="external-link" href="https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2018/07/11/sustainable-policy-solutions-for-illegal-content/">one-size-fits-all</a>. Accordingly, a good law on content takedown must account for the nuances existing in the way intermediaries operate and the diversity of speech online. More specifically, there are two levels of classification that are critical.</p>
<p><em>One</em>, the law must make a fundamental classification between the intermediaries within the scope of the law. An obligation to remove illegal content can be implemented only by those entities whose technical architecture allows them to. While a search engine would be able to delink websites that are declared ‘illegal’, it would be absurd to expect a cyber cafe to follow a similar route of responding to a legal takedown order within a specified timeframe.</p>
<p>Therefore, one basis of classification must incorporate this difference in the technical architecture of these intermediaries. Apart from this, the law must also design liability for intermediaries on the basis of their user-base, annual revenue generated, and the reach, scope and potential impact of the intermediary’s actions.</p>
<p><em>Two, </em>it is important that the law recognizes that certain types of content would require more urgent treatment than other types of content. Several regulations across jurisdiction, including the NetzDG and the EU Regulation on Preventing of Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, while problematic in their own counts, attempt to either limit their scope of application or frame liability based on the nature of content targeted.</p>
<p>The Indian law on the other hand, encompasses within its scope, a vast, varying array of content that is ‘illegal’, which includes on one hand, critical items like threatening ‘the sovereignty and integrity of India’ and on the other hand, more subjective speech elements like ‘decency or morality’. While an expedited time-frame may be permissible for the former category of speech, it is difficult to justify the same for the latter. More contextual judgments may be needed to assess the legality of content that is alleged to be defamatory or obscene, thereby making it problematic to have a shorter time-frame for the same.</p>
<p><em>3. Institution of proper procedural safeguards: Make notices mandatory and make sanctions gradated</em>.</p>
<p>Apart from the correct identification of scope and extent, it is important that there are sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the interests of the intermediaries and the users are not curtailed. While these may seem ancillary to the main point, how the law chooses to legislate on these issues (or does not), nevertheless has a direct bearing on the issue of content takedown and time-frames.</p>
<p>Firstly, while the Indian law mandates content takedown, it does not mandate a process through which a user is notified of such an action being taken. The mere fact that an incumbent intermediary is able to respond to removal notifications within a specified time-frame does not imply that its actions would not have ramifications on free speech. Ability to takedown content does not translate into accuracy of the action taken, and the Indian law fails to take this into account.</p>
<p>Therefore, additional obligations of informing users when their content has been taken down, institutes due process in the procedure. In the context of legal takedown, such notice mechanisms also <a class="external-link" href="http://www.eff.org/wp/who-has-your-back-2019">empower</a> users to draw attention to government censorship and targeting.</p>
<p>Secondly, a uniform time-frame of compliance, coupled with severe sanctions goes on to disrupt the competition against the smaller intermediaries. While the current law does not clearly elaborate upon the nature of sanctions that would be imposed, general principles of the doctrine of safe harbour dictate that upon failure to remove the content, the intermediary would be subject to the same level of liability as the person uploading the content. This threat of sanctions may have adverse effects on free speech online, resulting in potential <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf">over-censorship</a> of legitimate speech.</p>
<p>Accordingly, sanctions should be restricted to instances of systematic violations. For critical content, the contours of what constitutes systematic violation may differ. The regulator must accordingly take into account the nature of content which the intermediary failed to remove, while assessing their liability.</p>
<p><em>4. Post-facto review of the time-frame for evidence based policy-making: Mandate transparency reporting.</em></p>
<p>Transparency reporting, apart from ensuring accountability of intermediary action, is also a useful tool for understanding the impact of the law, specifically with relation to time period of response. The NetzDG, for all its criticism, has received <a class="external-link" href="https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/170901-Legal-Analysis-German-NetzDG-Act.pdfhttp://">support</a> for requiring intermediaries to produce bi-annual transparency reports. These reports provide us important insight into the efficacy of any proposed turnaround time, which in turn helps us to propose more nuanced reforms into the law.</p>
<p>However, to cull out the optimal amount of information from these reports, it is important that these reporting practices are standardized. There exists some international body of work which proposes a methodology for standardizing transparency reports, including the Santa Clara Principles and the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) ‘Who has your back?’ reports. We have also previously proposed a methodology that utilizes some of these pointers.</p>
<p>Additionally, due to the experimental nature of the provision, including a review provision in the law would ensure the efficacy of the exercise can also be periodically assessed. If the discussion in the preceding section is any indication, the issue of an appropriate turnaround time is currently in a regulatory flux, with no correct answer. In such a scenario, periodic assessments compel policymakers and stakeholders to discuss effectiveness of solutions, and the nature of the problems faced, leading to <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/svjUfdqWwbbeeVzRjFNkUK/Making-laws-with-sunset-clauses.html">evidence-based</a> policymaking.</p>
<p><strong>Why should we care?</strong></p>
<p>There is a lot at stake while regulating any aspect of intermediary liability, and the lack of smart policy-making may result in the dampening of the interests of any one of the stakeholder groups involved. As the submissions to the draft amendments by various civil societies and industry groups show, the updated turnaround time suffers from issues, which if not addressed, may lead to over-removal, and lack of due process in the content removal procedure.</p>
<p>Among others, these submissions pointed out that the shortened time-frame did not allow the intermediaries sufficient time to scrutinize a takedown request to ensure that all technical and legal requirements are adhered to. This in turn, may also prompt third-party action against user actions. Additionally, the significantly short time-frame also raised several implementational challenges. For smaller companies with fewer employees, such a timeframe can both be burdensome, from both a financial and capability point of view. This in turn, may result in over-censorship of speech online.</p>
<p>Failing to recognize and incorporate contextual nuances into any law on intermediary liability therefore, may critically alter the way we interact with online intermediaries, and in a larger scheme, with the internet.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<div> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes</a>
</p>
No publisherTorSharkContent takedownIntermediary LiabilityChilling Effect2020-04-10T04:58:56ZBlog EntryThe Internet Has a New Standard for Censorship
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-jyoti-panday-january-29-2016-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship
<b>The introduction of the new 451 HTTP Error Status Code for blocked websites is a big step forward in cataloguing online censorship, especially in a country like India where access to information is routinely restricted.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was published in the Wire on January 29, 2016. The original can be <a class="external-link" href="http://thewire.in/2016/01/29/the-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship-20386/">read here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ray Bradbury’s dystopian novel Fahrenheit 451 opens with the declaration, “It was a pleasure to burn.” The six unassuming words offer a glimpse into the mindset of the novel’s protagonist, ‘the fireman’ Guy Montag, who burns books. Montag occupies a world of totalitarian state control over the media where learning is suppressed and censorship prevails. The title alludes to the ‘temperature at which book paper catches fire and burns,’ an apt reference to the act of violence committed against citizens through the systematic destruction of literature. It is tempting to think about the novel solely as a story of censorship. It certainly is. But it is also a story about the value of intellectual freedom and the importance of information.<br /><br />Published in 1953, Bradbury’s story predates home computers, the Internet, Twitter and Facebook, and yet it anticipates the evolution of these technologies as tools for censorship. When the state seeks to censor speech, they use the most effective and easiest mechanisms available. In Bradbury’s dystopian world, burning books did the trick; in today’s world, governments achieve this by blocking access to information online. The majority of the world’s Internet users encounter censorship even if the contours of control vary depending on the country’s policies and infrastructure.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Online censorship in India</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In India, information access blockades have become commonplace and are increasingly enforced across the country for maintaining political stability, for economic </span><a href="http://www.indiantelevision.com/regulators/high-court/delhi-hc-restrains-200-websites-from-illegally-showing-balajis-kyaa-kool-hain-hum-3-160123" target="_blank"><span>reasons</span></a><span>, in defence of national security or preserving social values. Last week, the Maharashtra Anti-terror Squad </span><a href="http://www.abplive.in/india-news/maharashtra-ats-blocks-94-isis-websites-brainwashing-the-youth-280192"><span>blocked</span></a><span> 94 websites that were allegedly radicalising the youth to join the militant group ISIS. Memorably, in 2015 the NDA government’s ham-fisted </span><a href="http://thewire.in/2015/08/03/the-government-does-not-want-you-accessing-porn-on-the-internet-anymore-7782/"><span>attempts</span></a><span> at enforcing a ban on online pornography resulted in widespread public outrage. Instead of revoking the ban, the government issued yet another vaguely worded and in many senses astonishing order. As reported by </span><i><a href="http://www.medianama.com/2015/08/223-porn-india-ban/"><span>Medianama</span></a></i><span>, the revised order delegates the responsibility of determining whether banned websites should remain unavailable to private intermediaries. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The state’s shifting reasons for blocking access to information is reflective of its tendentious attitude towards speech and expression. Free speech in India is messily contested and normally, the role of the judiciary acts as a check on the executive’s proclivity for banning. For instance, in 2010 the Supreme Court </span><a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme-Court-lifts-ban-on-James-Laines-book-on-Shivaji/articleshow/6148410.cms"><span>upheld</span></a><span> the Maharashtra High Court’s decision to revoke the ban on the book on Shivaji by American author James Laine, which, according to the state government, contained material promoting social enmity. However, in the context of communications technology the traditional role of courts is increasingly being passed on to private intermediaries. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The delegation of authority is evident in the government notifying intermediaries to proactively filter content for ‘child pornography’ in the revised </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/dot-morality-block-order-2015-07-31/view"><span>order</span></a><span> issued to deal with websites blocked as result of its crackdown on pornography. Such screening and filtering requires intermediaries to make a determination on the legality of content in order to avoid direct liability. As international best practices such as the </span><a href="https://www.manilaprinciples.org/"><span>Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability</span></a> <span>point out, such screening is a slow process and costly and intermediaries are incentivised to simply limit access to information. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Blocking procedures and secrecy</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The constitutional validity of Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 which grants power to the executive to block access to information unchecked, and in secrecy was challenged in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. Curiously, the Supreme Court upheld S69A reasoning that the provisions were narrowly-drawn with adequate safeguards and noted that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Unfortunately as past instances of blocking under S69A reveal the provisions are littered with procedural deficiencies, amplified manifold by the authorities responsible for interpreting and implementing the orders.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Problematically, an </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure"><span>opaque</span></a><span> confidentiality criteria built into the blocking rules mandates secrecy in requests and recommendations for blocking and places written orders outside the purview of public scrutiny. As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders, the public has to rely on ISPs leaking orders, or media reports to understand the censorship regime in India. RTI applications requesting further information on the implementation of these safeguards have at best provided</span> <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-deity.clarifying-procedures-for-blocking.pdf"><span>incomplete</span></a><span> information. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Historically, the courts in India have </span><a href="http://www.livemint.com/Politics/hDIjjunGikWywOgSRiM7NP/SC-has-set-a-high-threshold-for-tolerance-Lawrence-Liang.html"><span>held</span></a><span> that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. Therefore, if a website is blocked citizens have a constitutional right to know the legal grounds on which access is being restricted. Just like the government announces and clarifies the grounds when banning a book, users have a right to know the grounds for restrictions on their speech online. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Unfortunately, under the</span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015"> <span>present</span></a><span> blocking regime in India there is no easy way for a service provider to comply with a blocking order while also notifying users that censorship has taken place. The ‘</span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009"><span>Blocking Rules</span></a><span>’ require notice “person </span><span>or</span><span> intermediary” thus implying that notice may be sent to either the originator or the intermediary. Further, the confidentiality clause </span><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act-judgment-and-secret-blocking/"><span>raises</span></a><span> the presumption that nobody beyond the intermediaries ought to know about a block. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Naturally, intermediaries interested in self-preservation and avoiding conflict with the government become complicit in maintaining secrecy in blocking orders. As a result, it is often difficult to determine why content is inaccessible and users often mistake censorship for technical problem in accessing content. Consequently, pursuing legal recourse or trying to hold the government accountable for their censorious activity becomes a challenge. In failing to consider the constitutional merits of the confidentiality clause, the Supreme Court has shied away from addressing the over-broad reach of the executive. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Secrecy in removing or blocking access is a global problem that places limits on the transparency expected from ISPs. Across </span><a href="https://books.google.co.in/books?id=s1LBBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA88&lpg=PA88&dq=transparency+and+blocking+orders&source=bl&ots=8kJ5LNJU5s&sig=gB9E01_gQ3QsjwFtnpa5KdIL8oA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirzr7ZlMzKAhXEt44KHdxkBxQQ6AEIOzAF#v=onepage&q=transparency%20and%20blocking%20orders&f=false"><span>many</span></a><span> jurisdictions intermediaries are legally </span><a href="https://books.google.co.in/books?id=s1LBBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA88&lpg=PA88&dq=transparency+and+blocking+orders&source=bl&ots=8kJ5LNJU5s&sig=gB9E01_gQ3QsjwFtnpa5KdIL8oA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirzr7ZlMzKAhXEt44KHdxkBxQQ6AEIOzAF#v=onepage&q=transparency%20and%20blocking%20orders&f=false"><span>prohibited</span></a><span> from publicising filtering orders as well as information relating to content or service restrictions. For example in United Kingdom, ISPs are prohibited from revealing blocking orders related to terrorism and surveillance. In South Korea, the </span><a href="http://www.singo.or.kr/eng/01_introduction/introduction.php"><span>Korean Communications Standards Commission</span></a><span> holds public meetings that are open to the public. However, the sheer v</span><a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/south-korea-only-thing-worse-online-censorship"><span>olume</span></a><span> of censorship (i.e. close to 10,000 URLs a month) makes it </span><a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/south-korea-only-thing-worse-online-censorship"><span>unwieldy</span></a><span> for public oversight. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As the Manila Principles </span><a href="https://www.eff.org/files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_background_paper.pdf"><span>note</span></a><span>, providing users with an explanation and reasons for placing restrictions on their speech and expression increases civic engagement. Transparency standards will empower citizens to demand that companies and governments they interact with are more accountable when it comes to content regulation. It is worth noting, for conduits as opposed to content hosts, it may not always be technically feasible for to provide a notice when content is unavailable due to filtering. A new standard helps improve transparency standards for network level intermediaries and for websites bound by confidentiality requirements. The recently introduced HTTP code for errors is a critical step forward in cataloguing censorship on the Internet. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>A standardised code for censorship</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On December 21, 2015, the Internet Engineering Standards Group (IESG) which is the organisation responsible for reviewing and updating the internet’s operating standards approved the publication of 451-’An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles’. The code provides intermediaries a standardised way to notify users know when a website is unavailable following a legal order. Publishing the code allows intermediaries to be transparent about their compliance with court and executive orders across jurisdictions and is a huge step forward for capturing online censorship. HTTP code 451 was introduced by software engineer Tim Bray and the code’s name is an homage to Bradbury’s novel Fahrenheit 451. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Bray began developing the code after being inspired by a blog post by Terence Eden calling for a censorship error code. The code’s official status comes after two years of discussions within the technical community and is a result of campaigning from transparency and civil society advocates who have been pushing for clearer labelling of internet censorship. Initially, the code received pushback from within the technical community for reasons enumerated by Mark Nottingham, Chair of the IETF HTTP Working Group in his </span><a href="https://www.mnot.net/blog/2015/12/18/451"><span>blog</span></a><span>. However, soon sites began using the code on an experimental and unsanctioned basis and faced with increasing demand for and feedback, the code was accepted. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The HTTP code 451 works as a machine-readable flag and has immense potential as a tool for organisations and users who want to quantify and understand censorship on the internet. Cataloguing online censorship is a challenging, time-consuming and expensive task. The HTTP code 451 circumvents confidentiality obligations built into blocking or licensing regimes and reduces the cost of accessing blocking orders. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The code creates a distinction between websites blocked following a court or an executive order, and when information is inaccessible due to technical errors. If implemented widely, Bray’s new code will help </span><a href="http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/21/10632678/http-status-code-451-censorship-tim-bray"><span>prevent</span></a><span> confusion around blocked sites. The code addresses the issue of the ISP’s misleading and inaccurate usage of </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_403"><span>Error 403</span></a><span> ‘Forbidden’ (to indicate that the server can be reached and understood the request, but refuses to take any further action) or 404 ‘</span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_404"><span>Not Found</span></a><span>’ (to indicate that the requested resource could not be found but may be available again in the future). </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Adoption of the new standard is optional, though at present there are no laws in India that prevent intermediaries doing so. Implementing a standardised machine-readable flag for censorship will go a long way in bolstering the accountability of ISPs that have in the </span><a href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/12/223-india-blocks-imgur/"><span>past</span></a><span> targeted an entire domain instead of the specified URL. Adoption of the standard by ISPs will also improve the understanding of the burden imposed on intermediaries for censoring and filtering content as presently, there is no clarity on what constitutes compliance. Of course, censorious governments may </span><a href="https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/12/23/welcome-to-http-error-code-451-unavailable-for-legal-reasons/"><span>prohibit</span></a><span> the use of the code, for example by issuing an order that specifies not only that a page be blocked, but also precisely which HTTP return code should be used. Though such sanctions should be </span><a href="https://cdt.org/blog/censorship-transparency-comes-to-the-web/"><span>viewed</span></a><span> as evidence of systematic rights violation and totalitarian regimes. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In India where access to software code repositories such as Github and Sourceforge are routinely </span><span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.pdf">restricted</a>,</span><span> the need for such code is obvious. The use of the code will improve confidence in blocking practices, allowing users to understand the grounds on which their right to information is being restricted. Improving transparency around censorship is the only way to build trust between the government and its citizens about the laws and policies applicable to internet content.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-jyoti-panday-january-29-2016-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-jyoti-panday-january-29-2016-internet-has-a-new-standard-for-censorship</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2016-01-30T09:17:54ZBlog EntryBan on pornography temporary, says government
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government
<b>The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government-115080301262_1.html">published in Business Standard</a> on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content"> The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content">The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.<br /> <br /> In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.<br /> <br /> Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.<br /> <br /> Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."<br /> <br /> Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.<br /> </span></p>
<hr />
<p><span><span><b>TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN</b></span></span><br /> <br /> <b>2013</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Aug 2014</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content</li>
</ul>
<p><b>8 Jul 2015</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue</li>
<li> CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Jul 31</b></p>
<ul>
<li> DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites</li>
<li> Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children</li>
<li> Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content</li>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-09-13T08:46:24ZNews Item Indian Porn Ban is Partially Lifted But Sites Remain Blocked
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wall-street-journal-august-5-2015-sean-mclain-indian-porn-ban-is-partially-lifted-but-sites-remain-blocked
<b>The Indian government made a quick about-face on its order to block hundreds of pornography websites on Tuesday, partially lifting the ban after political backlash against the moral policing.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was published in <a class="external-link" href="http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/08/05/indian-porn-ban-is-partially-lifted-but-sites-remain-blocked/">Wall Street Journal</a> on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the websites remained blocked because Internet service providers were afraid of legal trouble.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The new order from the Department of Telecommunications said that Internet service providers could unblock any of the 857 websites, so long as they don’t contain child pornography. However, the websites remain blocked because service providers say they have no way of knowing whether they contain child porn, and no control over whether they will in the future.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ravi Shankar Prasad, the IT minister, said Tuesday night that the government would trim down the list of banned sites, to focus only on those that contain child porn.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“A new notification will be issued shortly. The ban will be partially withdrawn. Sites that do not promote child porn will be unbanned,” <a href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/porn-ban-to-be-lifted-partially-says-government/1/456229.html">said Mr. Prasad on the TV news channel</a> India Today.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The wording of the new order created confusion, because it appears to put the responsibility for policing the Internet for child pornography on service providers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“How can we go ahead? What if something comes up tomorrow [on one of these sites], which has child porn, or something else?,” said an executive at an Indian service provider who asked not to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“The onus cannot be put on the service providers. What the government is doing is inherently unfair, it is not what the law requires,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bangalore-based civil liberties advocacy group. It is the government’s job to determine what violates the law, not private companies, Mr. Prakash said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i> </i></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wall-street-journal-august-5-2015-sean-mclain-indian-porn-ban-is-partially-lifted-but-sites-remain-blocked'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-wall-street-journal-august-5-2015-sean-mclain-indian-porn-ban-is-partially-lifted-but-sites-remain-blocked</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-09-13T09:00:03ZNews ItemPorn block in India sparks outrage
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage
<b>
India’s government has triggered a storm of protest after blocking 857 alleged pornography websites, with privacy and internet freedom campaigners, as well as consumers, condemning the move as arbitrary and unlawful.
</b>
<div>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Amanda Hodge was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage/story-e6frg6so-1227470074078">Australian</a> on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The order, enforced since Sunday by the country’s main internet service providers, comes amid debate about the influence of pornography on sex crime in India, and as the Supreme Court considers a petition by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani to ban pornographic websites that harm children.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government has been forced to defend the move, saying it was taken in response to Supreme Court criticism at inaction against child pornography websites, although the Supreme Court itself has refused to impose any interim ban while it considers the petition. The websites — a fraction of the world’s millions of internet pornography sites — will remain blocked until the government figures out how to restrict access, a spokesman said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Critics have slammed the measure as unconstitutional and pointed out the list includes adult humour sites that contain no pornographic content. Others have suggested it is another intrusion into the private lives of ordinary Indians by an administration intent on pushing a puritanical Hindu agenda, citing the recent ban on beef in several states and an alleged “Hindu-isation” of school textbooks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">That prompted outrage from Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “I reject with contempt the charge that it is a Talibani government. Our government supports free media, respects communication on social media and has respected freedom of communication always,” he said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While India has no law preventing citizens accessing internet pornography, regulations do restrict the publishing of “obscene information in electronic form”. Centre for Internet and Society policy director Pranesh Prakash told <i>The Australian </i>yesterday that some elements of that act were welcome — such as prohibition of child pornography and the uploading of a person’s private parts without consent — but “the provisions relating to ‘sexually explicit materials’ are far too broad, with no exceptions made for art, architecture, education or literature”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr Prakash said the pornography ban amounted to an “abdication of the government’s duty”, given the list of sites blocked was provided on request to the government by one of the Vaswani petitioners. “The additional solicitor-general essentially asked one of the petitioners to provide a list of websites, which she passed on to the Department of Information Technology, which in turn passed to Department of Telecommunications asking for them to be blocked or disabled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“That is not acceptable in a democracy where it is not the government which has actually found any of these websites to be unlawful.” Mr Prakash also criticised the secrecy surrounding the order, which he said contravened Indian law requiring a public declaration of any intended ban so that it might be challenged. The bans were made under “Rule 12” of India’s IT Act, which empowers the government to force ISPs to block sites when it is “necessary or expedient”.</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T02:10:46ZNews ItemPorn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban
<b></b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Karthikeyan Hemalatha was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Porn-ban-People-will-soon-learn-to-circumvent-ISPs-and-govt-orders-expert-says/articleshow/48320914.cms">Times of India</a> on August 2. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government used other sections of the Act to circumvent this provision. Sources in the Department of Telecommunication, which comes under the ministry of communications and information technology, said a notification had been issued under Section 79 (b) of IT Act under which internet service providers could be penalized for not following government orders. "Though the section protects an internet service provider (ISP) from legal action for the content it may allow, it can be penalized for not following government orders to ban them," said Prakash.<br /> <br /> Last month, the Supreme Court declined to pass an interim order to block websites which have pornographic content. "Such interim orders cannot be passed by this court. Somebody may come to the court and say 'look I am above 18 and how can you stop me from watching it within the four walls of my room?' It is a violation of Article 21 [right to personal liberty]," said Chief Justice H L Dattu.<br /> <br /> The judge was reacting to a public interest litigation filed by advocate Kamlesh Vashwani who was seeking to block porn websites in the country. "The issue is definitely serious and some steps need to be taken. The Centre is expected to take a stand. Let us see what stand the Centre will take," the Chief Justice said and directed the Centre to reply within four weeks. Over the weekend, the stance became clear.<br /> <br /> Sources also say that Section 19 (2) of the Constitution was used for the ban. The section allows the government to impose "reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court."<br /> <br /> For netizens, the government could actually be providing crash courses on proxy sites. "This is the best way to teach people on how to circumvent ISPs and government orders," said Prakash, adding that real abusive porn sites might still be available.<br /> <br /> "There is no dynamic mechanism to block all sites with pornographic content. The government has to individually pick URLs (uniform resource locator) to ban websites. Right now, only popular websites have been banned and the little known abusive sites like those that propagate revenge porn or child porn," said Prakash. "No ban can be comprehensive," he added.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T01:47:52ZNews ItemNanny state rules porn bad for you
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-4-2015-anahita-mukherji-nanny-state-rules-porn-bad-for-you
<b></b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Anahita Mukherji was published in the Times of India on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span id="advenueINTEXT" style="float: left; ">Half a century ago, India banned the DH Lawrence classic, Lady Chatterley's Lover. The ban, though lambasted for its Victorian view of modesty and obscenity, was fair and square; the matter was debated in the Supreme Court, which upheld the ban. Over 50 years later, a diverse spectrum of civil society has slammed a much more insidious and far less transparent ban on internet pornography.<br /><br />For starters, the 857 sites that vanished from India's internet sphere haven't been officially banned, they just don't show up when you type the url. The order blocking them isn't public. For a list of the 857 sites, one must rely on leaked documents put out on Twitter by Pranesh Prakash, policy director, Centre for Internet and Society. "The ban on Lady Chatterley's Lover was public. As for the blocked websites, the government has gone out of its way to hide the list of sites pulled down. A secret order banning material violates all principles of transparency in a democracy," says Prakash.<br /> <br /> The document, with 'Restricted' written on it, is a letter from the department of telecom asking ISPs to disable 857 sites as they bear content related to "morality" and "decency," violating Article 19 (2).<br /> <br /> Strangely, the order's been issued under Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT Act dealing with intermediaries having to remove material used to commit unlawful acts. "Watching porn isn't illegal in India. Disseminating 'obscene' content can be illegal, but for that, the government must file a case against the sites, and they must be allowed a representation," says Prakash.<br /> <br /> "Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT act isn't the section under which governments can block sites. It should use Sec 69 that has a review process," says Nikhil Pahwa, a champion of internet freedom.<br /> <br /> The government drew up its list of 857 sites even as SC is in the process of hearing a petition to ban porn and is yet to pass an order. It includes playboy.com that, says Prakash, is a legitimate adult site. Pahwa points to the ban's "bizarrely moralistic undertones".<br /> <br /> "As society evolves, government and regulatory regime are stuck in medieval ages," he says, adding a ban on websites will be rendered ineffective, pushing users to VPNs, a black hole for government monitoring mechanisms.<br /> <br /> "A government that hasn't succeeded with Make in India is trying to prevent Make out in India," says venture capitalist Mahesh Murthy, who earlier backed net neutrality.<br /> <br /> "The government is blocking websites to keep Rightwing lunatic fringes happy after its unsuccessful bid to pass the land bill," says Murthy.<br /> <br /> "It isn't merely looking at blocking porn, but is trying to bring back Sec 66A (IT Act), ruled unconstitutional by the SC," he adds. "It's part of the bid to restrict individual freedom, create an artificial separation between Indian culture and anything erotic, driven by a diktat from Hindutva forces. It's ironic as Modi came to power as someone looking to activate individual agency. Now he's wary about where that leads to," says Subir Sinha, professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). Murthy and Sinha believe the issue stems from a refusal to accept Indian culture in totality. "Victorian morality is considered Hindu, Khajuraho isn't," says Murthy.<br /> <br /> "The government seems to be acting in a more high-handed manner than previous ones. The press and public opinion should wake up to this," says sociologist Andre Beteille.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-4-2015-anahita-mukherji-nanny-state-rules-porn-bad-for-you'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-4-2015-anahita-mukherji-nanny-state-rules-porn-bad-for-you</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T01:39:28ZNews ItemIndia blocks access to 857 porn sites
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites
<b>India has blocked free access to 857 porn sites in what it says is a move to prevent children from accessing them. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The story was published by BBC on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Adults will still be able to access the sites using virtual private networks (VPNs) or proxy servers. In July, the Supreme Court expressed its unhappiness over the government's inability to block sites, especially those featuring child pornography.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Telecom companies have said they will not be able to enforce the "ban" immediately.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"We have to block each site one by one and it will take a few days for all service providers to block all the sites," an unnamed telecom company executive told The Times of India newspaper.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A senior official, who preferred to remained unnamed, told the BBC Hindi that India's department of telecommunications had "advised" telecom operators and Internet service providers to "control free and open access" to <a class="story-body__link-external">857 porn sites</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"There is no total ban. This was done in the backdrop of Supreme Court's observation on children having free access to porn sites. The idea is also to protect India's cultural fabric. This will not prevent adults from visiting porn sites," the official said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In July, the top court had observed that it was not for the court to order a ban on porn sites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"It is an issue for the government to deal with. Can we pass an interim order directing blocking of all adult websites? And let us keep in mind the possible contention of a person who could ask what crime have I committed by browsing adult websites in private within the four walls of my house. Could he not argue about his right to freedom to do something within the four walls of his house without violating any law?," the court said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to <a class="story-body__link-external" href="http://www.pornhub.com/insights/2014-year-in-review">statistics released</a> by adult site Pornhub, India was its fourth largest source of traffic in 2014, behind the US, UK and Canada. Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore based Centre for Internet and Society said the directive to block the 857 sites was "the largest single order of its kind" in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"The government's reasoning that it is not a ban because adults can still access the porn sites is ridiculous," he told the BBC. The move has caused a great deal of comment on Indian social media networks, with many prominent personalities coming forward to condemn it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Popular author Chetan Bhagat, writer and commentator Nilanjana Roy, politician Milind Deora and director Ram Gopal Varma have all added their voices to the debate.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T01:31:32ZNews ItemProxies and VPNs: Why govt can't ban porn websites?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns
<b>The government's move to block more than 800 pornographic websites has led experts to question whether this latest attempt to police the internet is even feasible.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Siladitya Ray was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/technology-topstories/is-the-government-s-attempt-to-block-online-porn-futile/article1-1375866.aspx">published in the Hindustan Times</a> on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Internet service providers (ISPs) have confirmed they received letters from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on Saturday that directed them to block certain websites. But can the government stop users from visiting porn sites?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The answer seems to be no.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"It is extremely easy to circumvent these blocks, using virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxies that anonymise your traffic," said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A cursory Google search on how to unblock porn websites throws up millions of how-tos and guides on using proxies and VPNs to get around restrictions set by authorities. All these services anonymise users’ web traffic by routing them through foreign servers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to data from Pornhub, one of the world's biggest porn sites, India ranks fifth for the most daily visitors to the website. Pornhub saw a total of 78.9 billion video views globally in 2014.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government can try to keep up with proxies and block them too. But as proxies change on a daily basis and there are always dozens of functioning proxies to choose from across, blocking all of them will be a near impossible task.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Tor, an anonymity network, is also a popular way to surf blocked sites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But is it legal to circumvent blocks put in place by authorities by using VPNs and proxies?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is no law in India that prohibits viewing pornography, experts say. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act only deals with "publishing obscene information in electronic form".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This provision has been interpreted as a measure to criminalise the posting of pornographic content online. However, accessing "obscene" content privately – such as within the four walls of a person’s home – is not illegal, say experts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In July, while hearing a petition seeking the blocking of pornographic websites, Supreme Court Chief Justice HL Dattu wondered whether the court could restrain an adult from watching pornography within his home and described such a ban as a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which grants the right to personal liberty to its citizens.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But what about the legality of using VPNs and proxies? “There are no laws preventing the use of VPNs and proxies in India," said Prakash.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Are proxies and VPNs safe?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the use of proxies and VPNs is very simple, they do come with their own set of problems. These services have access to all your browsing data and may push adware and other forms of malware.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prakash advised that users should only choose services that are well known and have a good reputation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"Sites like TorrentFreak put out annual lists of the top VPNs available," he said. These can be used as a guide to determine what services are safe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-09-13T08:26:17ZNews ItemIndian government orders ISPs to block 857 porn websites
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites
<b>The Indian government has ordered a large number of porn websites to be blocked, creating an uproar among users and civil rights groups in the country.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The blog post by John Ribeiro was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/2955832/indian-government-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites.html">originally published by IDG News Service and mirrored on PC World website</a> on August 2, 2015.</p>
<p><section class="page">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Department of Telecommunications has issued orders for the blocking of 857 websites serving pornography, said two persons familiar with the matter, who declined to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69 (A) of India’s Information Technology Act allows the government to order blocking of public access to websites and other information through computer resources, though this section appears to be designed to be invoked when a threat is perceived to the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“The government cannot on its own block private access to pornography under current statutes,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore. “Parliament has not authorized the government to ban porn on its own.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“However, courts have in the past ordered specific websites to be blocked for specific offences such as defamation, though as far as I know not for obscenity,” Prakash added.</p>
<p>Viewing pornography privately is not a crime in the country, though its sale and distribution is an offense.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some porn websites were still accessible through certain Internet service providers on Monday, as some ISPs took some time to implement the order. “All the 857 websites will be blocked by all ISPs today,” said a source in the ISP industry, who requested anonymity. “As licensees we have to follow the orders.”</p>
<p>The government could not be immediately reached for comment.</p>
<aside class="desktop tablet smartphone nativo-promo"> </aside>
<p>Reports of the blocks created a furore among Internet users in the country, who criticized the move on <a href="http://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/3fdwhm/are_porn_sites_getting_blocked/">Reddit,</a> Twitter and other social media.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Supreme Court struck down in March as unconstitutional an Internet law that provided for the arrest of people sending online messages considered offensive or menacing. But it upheld Section 69 (A) in that same ruling, which it described as a “narrowly drawn provision” limited to a few subjects.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a public interest lawsuit <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cant-stop-an-adult-from-watching-porn-in-his-room-says-sc/article7400690.ece">on the blocking of pornography</a>, the Supreme Court last month declined to issue an interim order that would block porn websites at the request of the private litigant, according to a report.</p>
</section></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling Effect2015-09-13T08:18:33ZNews ItemRole of Intermediaries in Countering Online Abuse
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse
<b>The Internet can be a hostile space and protecting users from abuse without curtailing freedom of expression requires a balancing act on the part of online intermediaries.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This got published as two blog entries in the NALSAR Law Tech Blog. Part 1 can be accessed <a class="external-link" href="https://techlawforum.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/role-of-intermediaries-in-countering-online-abuse-still-a-work-in-progress-part-i/">here</a> and Part 2 <a class="external-link" href="https://techlawforum.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/role-of-intermediaries-in-countering-online-abuse-still-a-work-in-progress-part-ii/">here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As platforms and services coalesce around user-generated content (UGC) and entrench themselves in the digital publishing universe, they are increasingly taking on the duties and responsibilities of protecting rights including taking reasonable measures to restrict unlawful speech. Arguments around the role of intermediaries tackling unlawful content usually center around the issue of regulation—when is it feasible to regulate speech and how best should this regulation be enforced?</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Recently, Twitter found itself at the periphery of such questions when an anonymous user of the platform, @LutyensInsider, began posting slanderous and sexually explicit comments about Swati Chaturvedi, a Delhi-based journalist. The online spat which began in February last year, culminated into<a href="http://www.dailyo.in/politics/twitter-trolls-swati-chaturvedi-lutyensinsider-presstitutes-bazaru-media-delhi-police/story/1/4300.html"> Swati filing an FIR</a> against the anonymous user, last week. Within hours of the FIR, the anonymous user deleted the tweets and went silent. Predictably, Twitter users <a href="https://twitter.com/bainjal/status/609343547796426752">hailed this</a> as a much needed deterrence to online harassment. Swati’s personal victory is worth celebrating, it is an encouragement for the many women bullied daily on the Internet, where harassment is rampant. However, while Swati might be well within her legal rights to counter slander, the rights and liabilities of private companies in such circumstances are often not as clear cut.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Should platforms like Twitter take on the mantle of deciding what speech is permissible or not? When and how should the limits on speech be drawn? Does this amount to private censorship?The answers are not easy and as the recent Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)<a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635"> </a><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635">judgment in the case of</a> Delfi AS v. Estonia confirms, the role of UGC platforms in balancing the user rights, is an issue far from being settled. In its ruling, the ECtHR reasoned that because of their role in facilitating expression, online platforms have a requirement “<i>to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence was not ‘private censorship”.</i></p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">This is problematic because the decision moves the regime away from a framework that grants immunity from liability, as long as platforms meet certain criteria and procedures. In <a href="http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-3-2014/4091">other words</a> the ruling establishes strict liability for intermediaries in relation to manifestly illegal content, even if they may have no knowledge. The 'obligation' placed on the intermediary does not grant them safe harbour and is not proportionate to the monitoring and blocking capacity thus necessitated. Consequently, platforms might be incentivized to err on the side of caution and restrict comments or confine speech resulting in censorship. The ruling is especially worrying, as the standard of care placed on the intermediary does not recognize the different role played by intermediaries in detection and removal of unlawful content. Further, intermediary liability is its own legal regime and is at the same time, a subset of various legal issues that need an understanding of variation in scenarios, mediums and technology both globally and in India.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Law and Short of IT</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier this year, in a<a href="http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/4/7982099/twitter-ceo-sent-memo-taking-personal-responsibility-for-the"> leaked memo</a>, the Twitter CEO Dick Costolo took personal responsibility for his platform's chronic problem and failure to deal with harassment and abuse. In Swati's case, Twitter did not intervene or take steps to address harrassment. If it had to, Twitter (India), as all online intermediaries would be bound by the provisions established under Section 79 and accompanying Rules of the Information Technology Act. These legislations outline the obligations and conditions that intermediaries must fulfill to claim immunity from liability for third party content. Under the regime, upon receiving actual knowledge of unlawful information on their platform, the intermediary must comply with the notice and takedown (NTD) procedure for blocking and removal of content.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Private complainants could invoke the NTD procedure forcing intermediaries to act as adjudicators of an unlawful act—a role they are clearly ill-equipped to perform, especially when the content relates to political speech or alleged defamation or obscenity. The SC judgment in Shreya Singhal addressing this issue, read down the provision (Section 79 by holding that a takedown notice can only be effected if the complainant secures a court order to support her allegation. Further, it was held that the scope of restrictions under the mechanism is restricted to the specific categories identified under Article 19(2). Effectively, this means Twitter need not take down content in the absence of a court order.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Content Policy as Due Diligence</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Another provision, Rule 3(2) prescribes a content policy which, prior to the Shreya Singhal judgment was a criteria for administering takedown. This content policy includes an exhaustive list of types of restricted expressions, though worryingly, the terms included in it are not clearly defined and go beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned under Article 19(2). Terms such as “grossly harmful”, “objectionable”, “harassing”, “disparaging” and “hateful” are not defined anywhere in the Rules, are subjective and contestable as alternate interpretation and standard could be offered for the same term. Further, this content policy is not applicable to content created by the intermediary.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Prior to the SC verdict in Shreya Singhal, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sc-judgment-in-shreya-singhal-what-it-means-for-intermediary-liability">actual knowledge could have been interpreted</a> to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. While liability accrued from not complying with takedown requests under the content policy was clear, this is not the case anymore. By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2). Following the SC judgment intermediaries do not have to administer takedowns without a court order thereby rendering this content policy redundant. As it stands, the content policy is an obligation that intermediaries must fulfill in order to be exempted from liability for UGC and this due diligence is limited to publishing rules and regulations, terms and conditions or user agreement informing users of the restrictions on content. The penalties for not publishing this content policy should be clarified.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Further, having been informed of what is permissible users are agreeing to comply with the policy outlined, by signing up to and using these platforms and services. The requirement of publishing content policy as due diligence is unnecessary given that mandating such ‘standard’ terms of use negates the difference between different types of intermediaries which accrue different kinds of liability. This also places an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily stifle freedom of speech online. Such heavy handed regulation could make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.</p>
<p class="Standard">Twitter may have complied with its duties by publishing the content policy, though the obligation does not seem to be an effective deterrence. Strong safe harbour provisions for intermediaries are a crucial element in the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression online. By absolving platforms of responsibility for UGC as long as they publish a content policy that is vague and subjective is the very reason why India’s IT Rules are in fact, in urgent need of improvement.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Size Matters</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">The standards for blocking, reporting and responding to abuse vary across different categories of platforms. For example, it may be easier to counter trolls and abuse on blogs or forums where the owner or an administrator is monitoring comments and UGC. Usually platforms outline monitoring and reporting policies and procedures including recourse available to victims and action to be taken against violators. However, these measures are not always effective in curbing abuse as it is possible for users to create new accounts under different usernames. For example, in Swati’s case the anonymous user behind @LutyensInsider account changed<a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/twitter-troll-lutyensinsider-changes-handle-after-delhi-journo-files-fir/article1-1357281.aspx"> </a><a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/twitter-troll-lutyensinsider-changes-handle-after-delhi-journo-files-fir/article1-1357281.aspx">their handle</a> to @gregoryzackim and @gzackim before deleting all tweets. In this case, perhaps the fear of criminal charges ahead was enough to silence the anonymous user, which may not always be the case.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Tackling the Trolls</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Most large intermediaries have privacy settings which restrict the audience for user posts as well as prevent strangers from contacting them as a general measure against online harassment. Platforms also publish<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/04/twitter_s_new_abuse_policy_if_it_can_t_stop_it_hide_it.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/04/twitter_s_new_abuse_policy_if_it_can_t_stop_it_hide_it.html">monitoring policy</a> outlining the procedure and mechanisms for users to<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/04/twitter_s_new_harassment_policy_not_transparent_not_engaged_with_users.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/04/twitter_s_new_harassment_policy_not_transparent_not_engaged_with_users.html">register their complaint</a> or<a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features"> </a><a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features">report abuse</a>. Often reporting and blocking mechanisms<a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features"> </a><a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features">rely on community standards</a> and users reporting unlawful content. Last week Twitter<a href="https://twittercommunity.com/t/removing-the-140-character-limit-from-direct-messages/41348"> </a><a href="https://twittercommunity.com/t/removing-the-140-character-limit-from-direct-messages/41348">announced a new feature</a> allowing lists of blocked users to be shared between users. An improvement on existing mechanism for blocking, the feature is aimed at making the service safer for people facing similar issues and while an improvement on standard policies defining permissible limits on content, such efforts may have their limitations.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">The mechanisms follow a one-size-fits-all policy. First, such community driven efforts do not address concerns of differences in opinion and subjectivity. Swati in defending her actions stressed the “<i>coarse discourse”</i> prevalent on social media, though as<a href="http://www.opindia.com/2015/06/foul-mouthed-twitter-user-files-fir-against-loud-mouthed-slanderer/"> </a><a href="http://www.opindia.com/2015/06/foul-mouthed-twitter-user-files-fir-against-loud-mouthed-slanderer/">this article points out</a> she might be assumed guilty of using offensive and abusive language. Subjectivity and many interpretations of the same opinion can pave the way for many taking offense online. Earlier this month, Nikhil Wagle’s tweets criticising Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “pervert” was interpreted as “abusive”, “offensive” and “spreading religious disharmony”. While platforms are within their rights to establish policies for dealing with issues faced by users, there is a real danger of them doing so for<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html">“</a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html">political reasons” and based on “popularity” measures</a> which may chill free speech. When many get behind a particular interpretation of an opinion, lawful speech may also be stifled as Sreemoyee Kundu <a href="http://www.dailyo.in/user/124/sreemoyeekundu">found out</a>. A victim of online abuse her account was blocked by Facebook owing to multiple reports from a “<i>faceless fanatical mob”. </i>Allowing the users to set standards of permissible speech is an improvement, though it runs the risk of mob justice and platforms need to be vigilant in applying such standards.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">While it may be in the interest of platforms to keep a hands off approach to community policies, certain kind of content may necessiate intervention by the intermediary. There has been an increase in private companies modifying their content policy to place reasonable restriction on certain hateful behaviour in order to protect vulnerable or marginalised voices. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/12/twitter-bans-revenge-porn-in-user-policy-sharpening">Twitter</a> and <a href="http://www.redditblog.com/2015/05/promote-ideas-protect-people.html">Reddit's</a> policy change in addressing revenge porn are reflective of a growing understanding amongst stakeholders that in order to promote free expression of ideas, recognition and protection of certain rights on the Internet may be necessary. However, any approach to regulate user content must assess the effect of policy decisions on user rights. Google's <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/22/revenge-porn-women-free-speech-abuse">stand on tackling revenge porn</a> may be laudable, though the <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141109/06211929087/googles-efforts-to-push-down-piracy-sites-may-lead-more-people-to-malware.shtml">decision to push down</a> 'piracy' sites in its search results could be seen to adversely impact the choice that users have. Terms of service implemented with subjectivity and lack of transparency can and does lead to private censorship.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">The Way Forward</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Harassment is damaging, because of the feeling of powerlessness that it invokes in the victims and online intermediaries represent new forms of power through which users' negotiate and manage their online identity. Content restriction policies and practices must address this power imbalance by adopting baseline safeguards and best practices. It is only fair that based on principles of equality and justice, intermediaries be held responsible for the damage caused to users due to wrongdoings of other users or when they fail to carry out their operations and services as prescribed by the law. However, in its present state, the intermediary liability regime in India is not sufficient to deal with online harassment and needs to evolve into a more nuanced form of governance.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Any liability framework must evolve bearing in mind the slippery slope of overbroad regulation and differing standards of community responsibility. Therefore, a balanced framework would need to include elements of both targeted regulation and soft forms of governance as liability regimes need to balance fundamental human rights and the interests of private companies. Often, achieving this balance is problematic given that these companies are expected to be adjudicators and may also be the target of the breach of rights, as is the case in Delfi v Estonia. Global frameworks such as the Manila Principles can be a way forward in developing effective mechanisms. The determination of content restriction practices should always adopt the least restrictive means of doing so, distinguishing between the classes of intermediary. They must evolve considering the proportionality of the harm, the nature of the content and the impact on affected users including the proximity of affected party to content uploader.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Further, intermediaries and governments should communicate a clear mechanism for review and appeal of restriction decisions. Content restriction policies should incorporate an effective right to be heard. In exceptional circumstances when this is not possible, a post facto review of the restricton order and its implementation must take place as soon as practicable. Further, unlawful content restricted for a limited duration or within a specific geography, must not extend beyond these limits and a periodic review should take place to ensure the validity of the restriction. Regular, systematic review of rules and guidelines guiding intermediary liability will go a long way in ensuring that such frameworks are not overly burdensome and remain effective.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiOnline HarassmentInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityChilling EffectOnline Abuse2015-08-02T16:38:36ZBlog EntryCriminal Defamation: The Urgent Cause That has United Rahul Gandhi, Arvind Kejriwal and Subramanian Swamy
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-july-16-2015-betwa-sharma-criminal-defamation-the-urgent-cause-that-has-united-rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejriwal-and-subramanian-swamy
<b>Three years ago when the then Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy accused Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi and his mother of misappropriation of funds while trying to revive the National Herald newspaper, the Nehru-Gandhi scion threatened to sue him. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Betwa Sharma was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/07/15/rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejri_n_7790386.html">published in Huffington Post</a> on July 15, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/Pics.png" alt="Arvind, Swamy and Rahul" class="image-inline" title="Arvind, Swamy and Rahul" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Swamy's response was characteristic: "<a href="http://profit.ndtv.com/news/politics/article-grow-up-sue-me-subramanian-swamys-advice-to-rahul-gandhi-312858" target="_hplink">Grow up and file a defamation case</a>".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a strange turn of events, the matter of criminal defamation has brought together an unlikely cast of characters in an ongoing petition in the Supreme Court--Swamy, Gandhi and Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal, who knows a thing or two about making allegations.<br /><br />They are petitioning the Apex Court to strike down penal provisions criminalising defamation, which they argue, has a "chilling effect" on the fundamental right to free speech. Opinion is divided around the world on whether or not defamation ought to be a criminal offence. Because some jurisdictions have stricter defamation laws, some indulge in a practise known as 'forum shopping', or suing in jurisdictions with harsher views on libel and slander.<br /><br />The three leaders have filed separate petitions that are now being jointly heard by the court. They are challenging the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code which make defamation a criminal offence punishable with up to two years in prison.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A verdict striking down the colonial-era S. 499, used by the British to suppress those opposing their rule, could prove to be a huge victory for free speech in India. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court struck down the draconian Section 66A of the Information Technology Act as "unconstitutional and void".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is cause for optimism. The Supreme Court has already said that the validity of criminal defamation laws must be tested against the free speech guarantees of the constitution. The bench comprising of Justices Dipak Misra and Prafulla C Pant have observed that <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/swamy-rahul-against-centre-on-criminal-defamation-in-supreme-court/" target="_hplink">political debates</a> maybe excluded as a criminal defamation offence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While Gandhi, Subramanian and Kejriwal have been slapped with defamation suits by political rivals, there have been long-standing concerns over the threat posed by these provisions to the media and those who use social media to express their opinions against the rich and the powerful.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government of the day is keen to maintain the status quo. In a recent submission, it has argued that S.499 is now the only provision to deal with defamation on social media and the only protection for reputation of citizens. But free speech activists say there is no evidence to show that a defamation law deters a person who is out to spread lies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The questionable utility of S.499, the scope for its abuse and the culture of self-censorship, they argue, removes it from the ambit of "reasonable restrictions" which the state can impose on free speech under article 19 (2) of the constitution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"Hardly a day goes by in India without some rich and powerful person initiating or threatening to initiate defamation suits against rivals or traditional media or ordinary citizens on social media," said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet & Society. "It is unclear how much self-censorship is going on because Indians fearing jail terms avoid speaking truth to power.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On the issue of protecting people's dignity, Abraham said there is no prima facie evidence in India that criminalising defamation in India has resulted in the protection of the reputations of citizens from falsehoods.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"On the the other hand every other national media house and quite of few investigative journalists have been and continue to be harassed by criminal suits filed by the powerful," he told HuffPost India. "The chilling effect on speech is a disproportionate price for citizenry to pay for what is only a personal harm."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under the leadership of Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa, the Tamil Nadu government filed <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/2004/09/18/stories/2004091803051300.htm" target="_hplink">125 defamation cases</a> against The Hindu and other publications between 2001 and 2004. On Tuesday, she filed a defamation suit against <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Jayalalithaa-slaps-defamation-case-against-online-portal-for-article-on-her-health/articleshow/48066109.cms" target="_hplink">news portal Rediff.com</a> for running two articles related to speculations about her health.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the United States, defamation claims by public officials and public figures were severely curtailed after its Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that the complainant needs to prove actual malice with "clear and convincing" evidence. Further, <a href="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/376/254.html" target="_hplink">truth is an absolute defence</a> against defamation in the U.S.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On Tuesday, Swamy and Gandhi also argued that truth should be defence in defamation suits. “Truth is not a complete defence in criminal defamation. <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/swamy-rahul-against-centre-on-criminal-defamation-in-supreme-court/2/#sthash.H4YZ4Izg.dpuf" target="_hplink">For a nation with a national motto of Satyameva Devata it is ironic," Swamy said.</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">BJP leader Swamy is of the view that defamation should only be subject to a civil suit which can be redressed by payment of monetary compensation. But the central government has argued that a defamer could be too poor to compensate the complainant.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"I am not saying there is no such thing as defamation. You can sue someone for defamation, but you cannot deprive someone of his liberty," he said in a <a href="http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/criminal-defamation-must-be-abolished" target="_hplink">recent interview with The Sunday Guardian</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Jayalalithaa filed a defamation suit against the senior BJP leader who alleged that most of the boats of Indian fishermen captured by Sri Lanka belong to the AIADMK chief, her close aide Sasikala and DMK leader TR Baalu.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The suit against the Congress Vice President was filed by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh for allegedly blaming the Hindu right-wing organisation for the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">BJP leader Nitin Gadkari sued Kejriwal after his name was included in AAP's list of "India's most corrupt."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"The accused is in the habit of making false and defamatory statements without any basis. The statements made by the accused and his party members have damaged and tarnished my image in the eyes of the people," <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Gadkari-sues-Kejriwal-for-listing-him-among-Indias-most-corrupt/articleshow/30647059.cms" target="_hplink">Gadkari told the court</a>, last year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Legal analysts also find it hard to predict just how far the Supreme Court will go to protect free speech. Its judgment against S.66A of the IT Act is regarded as one of the biggest victories for free speech in India. Justice Misra was on the bench that struck down the provision for being “open-ended and unconstitutionally vague," and not fit to be covered under Article 19 (2).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But last month, in a judgment regarded as a blow to free speech, it was Justices Misra and Pant who ruled that freedom of speech is <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/free-speech-is-not-an-absolute-right-says-supreme-court/article7206698.ece" target="_hplink">not an absolute right</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium had argued, "Freedom to offend is also a part of freedom of speech.”</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-july-16-2015-betwa-sharma-criminal-defamation-the-urgent-cause-that-has-united-rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejriwal-and-subramanian-swamy'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-july-16-2015-betwa-sharma-criminal-defamation-the-urgent-cause-that-has-united-rahul-gandhi-arvind-kejriwal-and-subramanian-swamy</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-07-16T13:45:04ZNews ItemFree Speech Policy in India: Community, Custom, Censorship, and the Future of Internet Regulation
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-in-india-community-custom-censorship-and-future-of-internet-regulation
<b>This note summarises my panel contribution to the conference on Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age at New Delhi on 21 April 2015, which was organised by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in collaboration with the Internet Policy Observatory of the Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania</b>
<p><a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-policy-in-india.pdf" class="internal-link"><b>Download the Note here</b></a> (PDF, 103 Kb)</p>
<hr />
<h3>Preliminary</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There has been legitimate happiness among many in India at the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Shreya Singhal case to strike down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ("IT Act") for unconstitutionally fettering the right to free speech on the Internet. The judgment is indeed welcome, and reaffirms the Supreme Court’s proud record of defending the freedom of speech, although it declined to interfere with the government’s stringent powers of website blocking. As the dust settles there are reports the government is re-grouping to introduce fresh law, allegedly stronger to secure easier convictions, to compensate the government’s defeat.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Case Law and Government Policy</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s constitutional courts have a varied history of negotiating the freedom of speech that justifiably demands study. But, in my opinion, inadequate attention is directed to the government’s history of free speech policy. It is possible to discern from the government’s actions over the last two centuries a relatively consistent narrative of governance that seeks to bend the individual’s right to speech to its will. The defining characteristics of this narrative – the government’s free speech policy – emerge from a study of executive and legislative decisions chiefly in relation to the press, that continue to shape policy regarding the freedom of expression on the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s corpus of free speech case law is not uniform nor can it be since, for instance, the foundational issues that attend hate speech are quite different from those that inform contempt of court. So too, Indian free speech policy has been varied, captive to political compulsions and disparate views regarding the interests of the community, governance and nation-building. There has been consistent tension between the individual and the community, as well as the role of the government in enforcing the expectations of the community when thwarted by law.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Dichotomy between Modern and Native Law</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To understand free speech policy, it is useful to go back to the early colonial period in India, when Governor-General Warren Hastings established a system of courts in Bengal’s hinterland to begin the long process of displacing traditional law to create a modern legal system. By most accounts, pre-modern Indian law was not prescriptive, Austinian, and uniform. Instead, there were several legal systems and a variety of competing and complementary legal sources that supported different interpretations of law within most legal systems. J. Duncan M. Derrett notes that the colonial expropriation of Indian law was marked by a significant tension caused by the repeatedly-stated objective of preserving some fields of native law to create a dichotomous legal structure. These efforts were assisted by orientalist jurists such as Henry Thomas Colebrook whose interpretation of the dharmasastras heralded a new stage in the evolution of Hindu law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this background, it is not surprising that Elijah Impey, a close associate of Hastings, simultaneously served as the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at Fort William while overseeing the Sadr Diwani Adalat, a civil court applying Anglo-Hindu law for Hindus, and the Sadr Faujdari Adalat, a criminal court applying Anglo-Islamic law to all natives. By the mid-nineteenth century, this dual system came under strain in the face of increasing colonial pressure to rationalise the legal system to ensure more effective governance, and native protest at the perceived insensitivity of the colonial government to local customs.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Criminal Law and Free Speech in the Colony</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 1837, Thomas Macaulay wrote the first draft of a new comprehensive criminal law to replace indigenous law and custom with statutory modern law. When it was enacted as the Indian Penal Code in 1860 ("IPC"), it represented the apogee of the new colonial effort to recreate the common law in India. The IPC’s enactment coincided with the growth and spread of both the press and popular protest in India. The statute contained the entire gamut of public-order and community-interest crimes to punish unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, wanton provocation, public nuisance, obscenity, defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, wounding religious feelings, and so on. It also criminalised private offences such as causing insult, annoyance, and intimidation. These crimes continue to be invoked in India today to silence individual opinion and free speech, including on the Internet. Section 66A of the IT Act utilised a very similar vocabulary of censorship.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Interestingly, Macaulay’s IPC did not feature the common law offences of sedition and blasphemy or the peculiar Indian crime of promoting inter-community enmity; these were added later. Sedition was criminalised by section 124A at the insistence of Barnes Peacock and applied successfully against Indian nationalist leaders including Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 1897 and 1909, and Mohandas Gandhi in 1922. In 1898, the IPC was amended again to incorporate section 153A to criminalise the promotion of enmity between different communities by words or deeds. And, in 1927, a more controversial amendment inserted section 295A into the IPC to criminalise blasphemy. All three offences have been recently used in India against writers, bloggers, professors, and ordinary citizens.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Loss of the Right to Offend</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The two amendments of 1898 and 1927, which together proscribed the promotion of inter-community enmity and blasphemy, represent the dismantling of the right to offend in India. But, oddly, they were defended by the colonial government in the interests of native sensibilities. The proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council reveal several members, including Indians, were enthusiastic about the amendments. For some, the amendments were a necessary corrective action to protect community honour from subversive speech. The 1920s were a period of foment in India as the freedom movement intensified and communal tension mounted. In this environment, it was easy to fuse the colonial interest in strong administration with a nationalist narrative that demanded the retrieval of Indian custom to protect native sensibilities from being offended by individual free speech, a right derived from modern European law. No authoritative jurist could be summoned to prove or refute the claim that native custom privileged community honour.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sadly the specific incident which galvanised the amendment of 1927, which established the crime of blasphemy in India, would not appear unfamiliar to a contemporary observer. Mahashay Rajpal, an Arya Samaj activist, published an offensive pamphlet of the Prophet Muhammad titled Rangeela Rasool, for which he was arrested and tried but acquitted in the absence of specific blasphemy provisions. With his speech being found legal, Rajpal was released and given police protection but Ilam Din, a Muslim youth, stabbed him to death. Instead of supporting its criminal law and strengthening its police forces to implement the decisions of its courts, the colonial administration surrendered to the threat of public disorder and enacted section 295A of the IPC.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Protest and Community Honour</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The amendment of 1927 marks an important point of rupture in the history of Indian free speech. It demonstrated the government’s policy intention of overturning the courts to restrict the individual’s right to speech when faced with public protest. In this way, the combination of public disorder and the newly-created crimes of promoting inter-community enmity and blasphemy opened the way for the criminal justice system to be used as a tool by natives to settle their socio-cultural disputes. Both these crimes address group offence; they do not redress individual grievances. In so far as they are designed to endorse group honour, these crimes signify the community’s attempt to suborn modern law and individual rights.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Almost a century later, the Rangeela Rasool affair has become the depressing template for illegal censorship in India: fringe groups take offence at permissible speech, crowds are marshalled to articulate an imagined grievance, and the government capitulates to the threat of violence. This formula has become so entrenched that governance has grown reflexively suppressive, quick to silence speech even before the perpetrators of lumpen violence can receive affront. This is especially true of online speech, where censorship is driven by the additional anxiety brought by the difficulty of Internet regulation. In this race to be offended the government plays the parochial referee, acting to protect indigenous sensibilities from subversive but legal speech.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Censorious Post-colony</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Independence marked an opportunity to remake Indian governance in a freer image. The Constituent Assembly had resolved not to curb the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution on account of public order. In two cases from opposite ends of the country where right-wing and left-wing speech were punished by local governments on public order grounds, the Supreme Court acted on the Constituent Assembly’s vision and struck down the laws in question. Free speech, it appeared, would survive administrative concerns, thanks to the guarantee of a new constitution and an independent judiciary. Instead Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his cabinet responded with the First Amendment in 1951, merely a year after the Constitution was enacted, to create three new grounds of censorship, including public order. In 1963, a year before he demitted office, the Sixteenth Amendment added an additional restriction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Nehru did not stop at amending the Constitution, he followed shortly after with a concerted attempt to stage-manage the press by de-legitimising certain kinds of permissible speech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under Justice G. S. Rajadhyaksha, the government constituted the First Press Commission which attacked yellow journalism, seemingly a sincere concern, but included permissible albeit condemnable speech that was directed at communities, indecent or vulgar, and biased. Significantly, the Commission expected the press to only publish speech that conformed to the developmental and social objectives of the government. In other words, Nehru wanted the press to support his vision of India and used the imperative of nation-building to achieve this goal. So, the individual right to offend communities was taken away by law and policy, and speech that dissented from the government’s socio-economic and political agenda was discouraged by policy. Coupled with the new constitutional ground of censorship on account of public order, the career of free speech in independent India began uncertainly.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How to regulate permissible speech?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite the many restrictions imposed by law on free speech, Indian free speech policy has long been engaged with the question of how to regulate the permissible speech that survives constitutional scrutiny. This was significantly easier in colonial India. In 1799, Governor-General Richard Wellesley, the brother of the famous Duke of Wellington who defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, instituted a pre-censorship system to create what Rajeev Dhavan calls a “press by permission” marked by licensed publications, prior restraint, subsequent censorship, and harsh penalties. A new colonial regime for strict control over the publication of free speech was enacted in the form of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the preamble of which recognises that “the literature of a country is…an index of…the condition of [its] people”. The 1867 Act was diluted after independence but still remains alive in the form of the Registrar of Newspapers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After surviving Indira Gandhi’s demand for a committed press and the depredations of her regime during the Emergency, India’s press underwent the examination of the Second Press Commission. This was appointed in 1978 under the chairmanship of Justice P. K. Goswami, a year after the Janata government released the famous White Paper on Misuse of Mass Media. When Gandhi returned to power, Justice Goswami resigned and the Commission was reconstituted under Justice K. K. Mathew. In 1982, the Commission’s report endorsed the earlier First Press Commission’s call for conformist speech, but went further by proposing the appointment of a press regulator invested with inspection powers; criminalising attacks on the government; re-interpreting defamation law to encompass democratic criticism of public servants; retaining stringent official secrecy law; and more. It was quickly acted upon by Rajiv Gandhi through his infamous Defamation Bill.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The contours of future Internet regulation</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The juggernaut of Indian free speech policy has received temporary setbacks, mostly inflicted by the Supreme Court. Past experience shows us that governments with strong majorities – whether Jawaharlal Nehru’s following independence or Indira Gandhi’s in the 1970s – act on their administrative impulses to impede free speech by government policy. The Internet is a recent and uncontrollable medium of speech that attracts disproportionately heavy regulatory attention. Section 66A of the IT Act may be dead but several other provisions remain to harass and punish online free speech. Far from relaxing its grip on divergent opinions, the government appears poised for more incisive invasions of personal freedoms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I do not believe the contours of future speech regulation on the Internet need to be guessed at, they can be derived from the last two centuries of India’s free speech policy. When section 66A is replaced – and it will be, whether overtly by fresh statutory provisions or stealthily by policy and non-justiciable committees and commissions – it will be through a regime that obeys the mandate of the First Press Commission to discourage dissenting and divergent speech while adopting the regulatory structures of the Second Press Commission to permit a limited inspector raj and forbid attacks on personalities. The interests of the community, howsoever improperly articulated, will seek precedence over individual freedoms and the accompanying threat of violence will give new meaning to Bhimrao Ambedkar’s warning of the “grammar of anarchy”.<br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-in-india-community-custom-censorship-and-future-of-internet-regulation'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-in-india-community-custom-censorship-and-future-of-internet-regulation</a>
</p>
No publisherbhairavIT ActCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling Effect2015-08-23T10:12:16ZBlog EntryDesiSec: Cybersecurity and Civil Society in India
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/desi-sec-cybersecurity-and-civil-society-in-india
<b>As part of its project on mapping cyber security actors in South Asia and South East Asia, the Centre for Internet & Society conducted a series of interviews with cyber security actors. The interviews were compiled and edited into one documentary. The film produced by Purba Sarkar, edited by Aaron Joseph, and directed by Oxblood Ruffin features Malavika Jayaram, Nitin Pai, Namita Malhotra, Saikat Datta, Nishant Shah, Lawrence Liang, Anja Kovacs, Sikyong Lobsang Sangay and, Ravi Sharada Prasad.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Originally the idea was to do 24 interviews with an array of international experts: Technical, political, policy, legal, and activist. The project was initiated at the University of Toronto and over time a possibility emerged. Why not shape these interviews into a documentary about cybersecurity and civil society? And why not focus on the world’s largest democracy, India? Whether in India or the rest of the world there are several issues that are fundamental to life online: Privacy, surveillance, anonymity and, free speech. DesiSec includes all of these, and it examines the legal frameworks that shape how India deals with these challenges.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From the time it was shot till the final edit there has only been one change in the juridical topography: the dreaded 66A of the IT Act has been struck down. Otherwise, all else is in tact. DesiSec was produced by Purba Sarkar, shot and edited by Aaron Joseph, and directed by Oxblood Ruffin. It took our team from Bangalore to Delhi and, Dharamsala. We had the honour of interviewing: Malavika Jayaram, Nitin Pai, Namita Malhotra, Saikat Datta, Nishant Shah, Lawrence Liang, Anja Kovacs, Sikyong Lobsang Sangay and, Ravi Sharada Prasad. Everyone brought something special to the discussion and we are grateful for their insights. Also, we are particularly pleased to include the music of Charanjit Singh for the intro/outro of DesiSec. Mr. Singh is the inventor of acid house music, predating the Wikipedia entry for that category by five years. Someone should correct that.</p>
<p>DesiSec is released under the Creative Commons License Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC by 3.0). You can watch it on Vimeo: <a href="https://vimeo.com/123722680" target="_blank">https://vimeo.com/123722680</a> or download it legally and free of charge via torrent. Feel free to show, remix, and share with your friends. And let us know what you think!</p>
<hr />
<h2>Video</h2>
<p><iframe frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8N3JUqRRvys" width="560"></iframe></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/desi-sec-cybersecurity-and-civil-society-in-india'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/desi-sec-cybersecurity-and-civil-society-in-india</a>
</p>
No publisherLaird BrownCensorshipPrivacyFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceCyber Security FilmFeaturedChilling EffectCyber SecurityHomepageCyber Security Interview2015-06-29T16:25:43ZBlog EntryDeitY says 143 URLs have been Blocked in 2015; Procedure for Blocking Content Remains Opaque and in Urgent Need of Transparency Measures
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015
<b>Across India on 30 December 2014, following an order issued by the Department of Telecom (DOT), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) blocked 32 websites including Vimeo, Dailymotion, GitHub and Pastebin.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In February 2015, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) requested the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to provide information clarifying the procedures for blocking in India. We have received a response from DeitY which may be <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-deity.clarifying-procedures-for-blocking.pdf" class="external-link">seen here</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this post, I shall elaborate on this response from DeitY and highlight some of the accountability and transparency measures that the procedure needs. To stress the urgency of reform, I shall also touch upon two recent developments—the response from Ministry of Communication to questions raised in Parliament on the blocking procedures and the Supreme Court (SC) judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify;">Section 69A and the Blocking Rules</h2>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2008 (S69A hereinafter) grants powers to the central government to issue directions for blocking of access to any information through any computer resource. In other words, it allows the government to block any websites under certain grounds. The Government has notified rules laying down the procedure for blocking access online under the Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public Rules, 2009 (Rules, 2009 hereinafter). CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (<a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/blocking-websites.pdf/at_download/file">download PDF</a>, 2.037MB).</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">There are <em>three key aspects</em> of the blocking rules that need to be kept under consideration:</p>
<h3 align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Officers and committees handling requests</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Designated Officer (DO)</strong> – Appointed by the Central government, officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary.<br /><strong>Nodal Officer (NO)</strong> – Appointed by organizations including Ministries or Departments of the State governments and Union Territories and any agency of the Central Government. <br /><strong>Intermediary contact</strong>–Appointed by every intermediary to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO.<br /><strong>Committee for Examination of Request (CER)</strong> – The request along with printed sample of alleged offending information is examined by the CER—committee with the DO serving as the Chairperson and representatives from Ministry of Law and Justice; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representative from the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). The CER is responsible for examining each blocking request and makes recommendations including revoking blocking orders to the DO, which are taken into consideration for final approval of request for blocking by the Secretary, DOT. <br /><strong>Review Committee (RC) </strong>– Constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1951, the RC includes the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom). The RC is mandated to meet at least once in 2 months and record its findings and has to validate that directions issued are in compliance with S69A(1).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Provisions outlining the procedure for blocking</h3>
<p>Rules 6, 9 and 10 create three distinct blocking procedures, which must commence within 7 days of the DO receiving the request.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">a) Rule 6 lays out the first procedure, under which any person may approach the NO and request blocking, alternatively, the NO may also raise a blocking request. After the NO of the approached Ministry or Department of the State governments and Union Territories and/or any agency of the Central Government, is satisfied of the validity of the request they forward it to the DO. Requests when not sent through the NO of any organization, must be approved by Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory or the Advisor to the Administrator of the Union Territory, before being sent to the DO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The DO upon receiving the request places, must acknowledge receipt within 24 four hours and places the request along with printed copy of alleged information for validation by the CER. The DO also, must make reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary hosting the information, and having identified them issue a notice asking them to appear and submit their reply and clarifications before the committee at a specified date and time, within forty eight hours of the receipt of notice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed and the CER gives it recommendations after hearing from the intermediary or the person has clarified their position and even if there is no representation by the same and after examining if the request falls within the scope outlined under S69A(1). The blocking directions are issued by the Secretary (DeitY), after the DO forwards the request and the CER recommendations. If approval is granted the DO directs the relevant intermediary or person to block the alleged information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">b) Rule 9 outlines a procedure wherein, under emergency circumstances, and after the DO has established the necessity and expediency to block alleged information submits recommendations in writing to the Secretary, DeitY. The Secretary, upon being satisfied by the justification for, and necessity of, and expediency to block information may issue an blocking directions as an interim measure and must record the reasons for doing so in writing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">Under such circumstances, the intermediary and person hosting information is not given the opportunity of a hearing. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the request before the CER within forty eight hours of issuing of directions for interim blocking. Only upon receiving the final recommendations from the committee can the Secretary pass a final order approving the request. If the request for blocking is not approved then the interim order passed earlier is revoked, and the intermediary or identified person should be directed to unblock the information for public access.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="western">c) Rule 10 outlines the process when an order is issued by the courts in India. The DO upon receipt of the court order for blocking of information submits it to the Secretary, DeitY and initiates action as directed by the courts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;" class="western">Confidentiality clause</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Rule 16 mandates confidentiality regarding all requests and actions taken thereof, which renders any requests received by the NO and the DO, recommendations made by the DO or the CER and any written reasons for blocking or revoking blocking requests outside the purview of public scrutiny. More detail on the officers and committees that enforce the blocking rules and procedure can be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure">here</a>.</p>
<h2>Response on blocking from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The response to our RTI from E-Security and Cyber Law Group is timely, given the recent clarification from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology to a number of questions, raised by parliamentarian Shri Avinash Pande in the Rajya Sabha. The questions had been raised in reference to the Emergency blocking order under IT Act, the current status of the Central Monitoring System, Data Privacy law and Net Neutrality. The Centre for Communication Governance (CCG), National Law University New Delhi have extracted a set of 6 questions and you can read the full article <a href="https://ccgnludelhi.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/governments-response-to-fundamental-questions-regarding-the-internet-in-india/">here</a>.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">The governments response as quoted by CCG, clarifies under rule 9—the Government has issued directions for emergency blocking of <em>a total number of 216 URLs from 1st January, 2014 till date </em>and that <em>a total of 255 URLs were blocked in 2014 and no URLs has been blocked in 2015 (till 31 March 2015)</em> under S69A through the Committee constituted under the rules therein. Further, a total of 2091 URLs and 143 URLs were blocked in order to comply with the directions of the competent courts of India in 2014 and 2015 (till 31 March 2015) respectively. The government also clarified that the CER, had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1<sup>st</sup><sup> </sup>January 2014 upto till date and so far, two orders have been issued to revoke 251 blocked URLs from 1st January 2014 till date. Besides, CERT-In received requests for blocking of objectionable content from individuals and organisations, and these were forwarded to the concerned websites for appropriate action, however the response did not specify the number of requests.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">We have prepared a table explaining the information released by the government and to highlight the inconsistency in their response.</p>
<table class="grid listing">
<colgroup> <col width="331"> <col width="90"> <col width="91"> <col width="119"> </colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">
<p align="LEFT"><strong>Applicable rule and procedure outlined under the Blocking Rules</strong></p>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<p align="CENTER"><strong>Number of websites</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>2014</em></p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>2015</em></p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER"><em>Total</em></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 6 - Blocking requests from NO and others</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">255</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">None</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">255</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 9 - Blocking under emergency circumstances</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">216</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Rule 10 - Blocking orders from Court</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">2091</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">143</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">2234</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Requests from individuals and orgs forwarded to CERT-In</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Recommendations to not block by CER</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">19</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="LEFT">Number of blocking requests revoked</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">-</p>
</td>
<td>
<p align="CENTER">251</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>In a <a href="http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reveal-more/">response </a>to an RTI filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, DeitY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014.</p>
<h2>Shreya Singhal v. Union of India</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In its recent judgment, the SC of India upheld the constitutionality of 69A, stating that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards. The constitutional challenge on behalf of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) considered the manner in which the blocking is done and the arguments focused on the secrecy present in blocking.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The rules may indicate that there is a requirement to identify and contact the originator of information, though as an expert <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/but-what-about-section-69a/">has pointed out</a>, there is no evidence of this in practice. The court has stressed the importance of a written order so that writ petitions may be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. In doing so, the court seems to have assumed that the originator or intermediary is informed, and therefore held the view that any procedural inconsistencies may be challenged through writ petitions. However, this recourse is rendered ineffective not only due to procedural constraints, but also because of the confidentiality clause. The opaqueness through rule 16 severely reigns in the recourse that may be given to the originator and the intermediary. While the court notes that rule 16 requiring confidentality was argued to be unconstitutional, it does not state its opinion on this question in the judgment. One expert, holds the <a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act-judgment-and-secret-blocking/">view</a> that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. However, such a reading down of rule 16 is yet to be tested.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further, Sunil Abraham has <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a">pointed</a> out, “block orders are unevenly implemented by ISPs making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.” As there are no comprehensive list of blocked websites or of the legal orders through which they are blocked exists, the public has to rely on media reports and filing RTI requests to understand the censorship regime in India. CIS has previously <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-riots-communalism">analysed</a> the leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests which have revealed that the block orders are full of errors and blocking of entire platforms and not just specific links has taken place.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the state has the power of blocking content, doing so in secrecy and without judical scrutiny, mark deficiencies that remain in the procedure outlined under the provisions of the blocking rules . The Court could read down rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions, and in not doing so, perhaps has overlooked the opportunities for reform in the existing system. The blocking of 32 websites, is an example of the opaqueness of the system of blocking orders, and where the safeguards assumed by the SC are often not observed such as there being no access to the recommendations that were made by the CER, or towards the revocation of the blocking orders subsequently. CIS filed the RTI to try and understand the grounds for blocking and related procedures and the response has thrown up some issues that must need urgent attention.</p>
<h2>Response to RTI filed by CIS</h2>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Our first question sought clarification on the websites blocked on 30<sup>th</sup><sup> </sup>December 2014 and the response received from DeitY, E-Security and Cyber Law Group reveals that the websites had been blocked as “they were being used to post information related to ISIS using the resources provided by these websites”. The response also clarifies that the directions to block were issued on <em>18-12-2014 and as of 09-01-2015</em>, after obtaining an undertaking from website owners, stating their compliance with the Government and Indian laws, the sites were unblocked.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">It is not clear if ATS, Mumbai had been intercepting communication or if someone reported these websites. If the ATS was indeed intercepting communication, then as per the rules, the RC should be informed and their recommendations sought. It is unclear, if this was the case and the response evokes the confidentiality clause under rule 16 for not divulging further details. Based on our reading of the rules, court orders should be accessible to the public and without copies of requests and complaints received and knowledge of which organization raised them, there can be no appeal or recourse available to the intermediary or even the general public.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">We also asked for a list of all requests for blocking of information that had been received by the DO between January 2013 and January 2015, including the copies of all files that had accepted or rejected. We also specifically, asked for a list of requests under rule 9. The response from DeitY stated that since January 1, 2015 to March 31, 2015 directions to block 143 URLs had been issued based on court orders. The response completely overlooks our request for information, covering the 2 year time period. It also does not cover all types of blocking orders under rule 6 and rule 9, nor the requests that are forwarded to CERT-In, as we have gauged from the ministry's response to the Parliament. Contrary to the SC's assumption of contacting the orginator of information, it is also clear from DeitY's response that only the websites had been contacted and the letter states that the “websites replied only after blocking of objectionable content”. </p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Further, seeking clarification on the functioning of the CER, we asked for the recent composition of members and the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings including copies of the recommendations made by them. The response merely quotes rule 7 as the reference for the composition and does not provide any names or other details. We ascertain that as per the DeitY website Shri B.J. Srinath, Scientist-G/GC is the appointed Designated Officer, however this needs confirmation. While we are already aware of the structure of the CER which representatives and appointed public officers are guiding the examination of requests remains unclear. Presently, there are 3 Joint Secretaries appointed under the Ministry of Law and Justice, the Home Ministry has appointed 19, while 3 are appointed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Further, it is not clear which grade of scientist would be appointed to this committee from CERT-In as the rules do not specify this. While the government has clarified in their answer to Parliament that the committee had recommended not to block 19 URLs in the meetings held between 1st January 2014 to till date, it is remains unclear who is taking these decisions to block and revoke blocked URLs. The response from DeitY specifies that the CER has met six times between 2014 and March 2015, however stops short on sharing any further information or copies of files on complaints and recommendations of the CER, citing rule 16.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Finally, answering our question on the composition of the RC the letter merely highlights the provision providing for the composition under 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. The response clarifies that so far, the RC has met once on 7th December, 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Department of Legal Affaits and Secretary, DOT. Our request for minutes of meetings and copies of orders and findings of the RC is denied by simply stating that “minutes are not available”. Under 419A, any directions for interception of any message or class of messages under sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 issued by the competent authority shall contain reasons for such direction and a copy of such order shall be forwarded to the concerned RC within a period of seven working days. Given that the RC has met just once since 2013, it is unclear if the RC is not functioning or if the interception of messages is being guided through other procedures. Further, we do not yet know details or have any records of revocation orders or notices sent to intermediary contacts. This restricts the citizens’ right to receive information and DeitY should work to make these available for the public.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">Given the response to our RTI, the Ministry's response to Parliament and the SC judgment we recommend the following steps be taken by the DeitY to ensure that we create a procedure that is just, accountable and follows the rule of law.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY" class="western">The revocation of rule 16 needs urgent clarification for two reasons:</p>
<ol>
<li>Under Section 22 of the RTI Act provisions thereof, override all conflicting provisions in any other legislation.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">In upholding the constitutionality of S69A the SC cites the requirement of reasons behind blocking orders to be recorded in writing, so that they may be challenged by means of writ petitions filed under <a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1712542/">A</a><a href="http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1712542/">rticle 226</a> of the Constitution of India.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If the blocking orders or the meetings of the CER and RC that consider the reasons in the orders are to remain shrouded in secrecy and unavailable through RTI requests, filing writ petitions challenging these decisions will not be possible, rendering this very important safeguard for the protection of online free speech and expression infructuous. In summation, the need for comprehensive legislative reform remains in the blocking procedures and the government should act to address the pressing need for transparency and accountability. Not only does opacity curtial the strengths of democracy it also impedes good governance. We have filed an RTI seeking a comprehensive account of the blocking procedure, functioning of committees from 2009-2015 and we shall publish any information that we may receive.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deity-says-143-urls-blocked-in-2015</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionRTIIntermediary LiabilityAccountabilityFeatured69AInternet GovernanceChilling EffectTransparencyHomepageBlocking2015-04-30T07:37:40ZBlog Entry