The Centre for Internet and Society
http://editors.cis-india.org
These are the search results for the query, showing results 1 to 4.
Deployment of Digital Health Policies and Technologies: During Covid-19
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deployment-of-digital-health-policies-and-technologies-during-covid-19
<b>In the last twenty years or so, the Indian government has adopted several digital mechanisms to deliver services to its citizens. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Digitisation of public services in India began with taxation, land record keeping, and passport details recording, but it was soon extended to cover most governmental services - with the latest being public health. The digitisation of healthcare system in India had begun prior to the pandemic. However, given the push digital health has received in recent years especially with an increase in the intensity of activity during the pandemic, we thought it is important to undertake a comprehensive study of India's digital health policies and implementation. The project report comprises a desk-based research review of the existing literature on digital health technologies in India and interviews with on-field healthcare professionals who are responsible for implementing technologies on the ground.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The report by Privacy International and the Centre for Internet & Society can be <a href="http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/deployment-of-digital-health-policies-and-technologies" class="internal-link"><strong>accessed here</strong></a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deployment-of-digital-health-policies-and-technologies-during-covid-19'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deployment-of-digital-health-policies-and-technologies-during-covid-19</a>
</p>
No publisherpallaviPrivacyDigitalisationDigital HealthDigital KnowledgeInternet GovernanceDigital MediaDigital TechnologiesDigitisation2022-07-21T14:49:56ZBlog EntryNothing to Kid About – Children's Data Under the New Data Protection Bill
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ijlt-shweta-mohandas-and-anamika-kundu-march-6-2022-nothing-to-kid-about-childrens-data-under-the-new-data-protection-bill
<b>The pandemic has forced policymakers to adapt their approach to people's changing practices, from looking at contactless ways of payment to the shifting of educational institutions online.</b>
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">The article was originally <a class="external-link" href="https://www.ijlt.in/post/nothing-to-kid-about-children-s-data-under-the-new-data-protection-bill">published in the Indian Journal of Law and Technology</a></p>
<hr />
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">For children, the internet has shifted from being a form of entertainment to a medium to connect with friends and seek knowledge and education. However, each time they access the internet, data about them and their choices are inadvertently recorded by companies and unknown third parties. The growth of EdTech apps in India has led to growing concerns regarding children's data privacy. This has led to the creation of a <a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/startups/edtech-firms-work-to-get-communication-right-with-the-asci/articleshow/89082308.cms" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">self-regulatory</a> body, the Indian EdTech Consortium. More recently, the <a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/startups/edtech-firms-work-to-get-communication-right-with-the-asci/articleshow/89082308.cms" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Advertising Standard Council of India</a><span class="_3zM-5"> has </span>also started looking at passing a draft regulation to keep a check on EdTech advertisements.</p>
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), tasked with drafting and revising the Data Protection Bill, had to consider the number of changes that had happened after the release of the 2019 version of the Bill. While the most significant change was the removal of the term “personal data” from the title of the Bill, in a move to create a comprehensive Data Protection Bill that includes both personal and non personal data. Certain other provisions of the Bill also featured additions and removals. The JPC, in its revised version of the Bill has removed an entire class of <a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-personal-data-protection-bill-2019#:~:text=Obligations%20of%20data%20fiduciary%3A%20A,specific%2C%20clear%20and%20lawful%20purpose" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">data fiduciaries</a> – guardian data fiduciary – which was tasked with greater responsibility for managing children's data. While the JPC justified the removal of the guardian data fiduciary stating that consent from the guardian of the child is enough to meet the end for which personal data of children are processed by the data fiduciary. While thought has been given to looking at how consent is given by the guardian on behalf of the child, there was no change in the age of children in the Bill. Keeping the age of consent under the Bill as the same as the age of majority to enter into a contract under the 1872 Indian Contract Act – 18 years – reveals the disconnect the law has with the ground reality of how children interact with the internet.</p>
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">In the current state of affairs where Indian children are navigating the digital world on their own there is a need to look deeply at the processing of children’s data as well as ways to ensure that children have information about consent and informational privacy. By placing the onus of granting consent on parents, the PDP Bill fails to look at how consent works in a privacy policy–based consent model and how this, in turn, harms children in the long run.</p>
<h3 class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d aujbK _3M0Fe _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw">1. Age of Consent</h3>
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">By setting the age of consent as 18 years under the Data Protection Bill, 2021, it brings all individuals under 18 years of age under one umbrella without making a distinction between the internet usage of a 5-year-old child and a 16-year-old teenager. There is a need to look at the current internet usage habits of children and assess whether requiring parental consent is reasonable or even practical. It is also pertinent to note that the law in the offline world does make the distinction between age and maturity. For example, it has been <a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/pallavi-bedi-and-shweta-mohandas-cis-comments-on-data-protection-bill" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">highlighted</a> that Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 83, states that any act by a child under the age of 12 years shall not be considered an offence, while the maturity of those aged between 12–18 years will be decided by the court (individuals between the age of 16–18 years can also be tried as adults for heinous crimes). Similarly, child labour laws in the country allow children above the age of 14 years to work in non-hazardous industries, which would qualify them to fall under Section 13 of the Bill, which deals with employee data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>A 2019 </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://reverieinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/IAMAI-Digital-in-India-2019-Round-2-Report.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">report</a><span> suggests that two-thirds of India’s internet users are in the 12–29 years age group, accounting for about 21.5% of the total internet usage in metro cities. With the emergence of cheaper phones equipped with faster processing and low internet data costs, children are no longer passive consumers of the internet. They have social media accounts and use several applications to interact with others and make purchases. There is a need to examine how children and teenagers interact with the internet as well as the practicality of requiring parental consent for the usage of applications.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Most applications that require age data request users to type in their date of birth; it is not difficult for a child to input a suitable date that would make it appear that they are </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/26/children-lie-age-facebook-asa" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">over 18</a><span>. In this case they are still children but the content that will be presented to them would be those that are meant for adults including content that might be disturbing or those involving use of </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/26/children-lie-age-facebook-asa" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">alcohol and gambling. </a><span>Additionally, in their privacy policies, applications sometimes state that they are not suited for and restricted from users under 18. Here, data fiduciaries avoid liability by placing the onus on the user to declare their age and properly read and understand the privacy policy.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Reservations about the age of consent under the Bill have also been highlighted by some members of the JPC through their dissenting opinions. </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Joint%20Committee%20on%20the%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Bill,%202019/17_Joint_Committee_on_the_Personal_Data_Protection_Bill_2019_1.pdf#page=221" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">MP Ritesh Pandey </a><span>suggested that the age of consent should be reduced to 14 years keeping the best interest of the children in mind as well as to support children in benefiting from technological advances. Similarly, </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="http://164.100.47.193/lsscommittee/Joint%20Committee%20on%20the%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Bill,%202019/17_Joint_Committee_on_the_Personal_Data_Protection_Bill_2019_1.pdf#page=221" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">MP Manish Tiwari </a><span>in his dissenting opinion suggested regulating data fiduciaries based on the type of content they provide or data they collect.</span></p>
<h3><span>2. How is the 2021 Bill Different from the 2019 Bill?</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/373_2019_LS_Eng.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">2019 </a><span>draft of the Bill consisted of a class of data fiduciaries called guardian data fiduciaries – entities that operate commercial websites or online services directed at children or which process large volumes of children’s personal data. This class of fiduciaries was barred from profiling, tracking, behavioural monitoring, and running targeted advertising directed at children and undertaking any other processing of personal data that can cause significant harm to the child. In the previous draft, such data fiduciaries were not allowed to engage in ‘profiling, tracking, behavioural monitoring of children, or direct targeted advertising at children’. There was also a prohibition on conducting any activities that might significantly harm the child. As per Chapter IV, any violation could attract a penalty of up to INR 15 crore of the worldwide turnover of the data fiduciary for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. However, this separate class of data fiduciaries do not have any additional responsibilities. It is also unclear as to whether a data fiduciary that does not by definition fall within such a category would be allowed to engage in activities that could cause ‘significant harm’ to children.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The new Bill also does not provide any mechanisms for age verification and only lays down considerations that verification processes should be undertaken. Furthermore, the JPC has suggested that consent options available to the child when they attain the age of majority i.e. 18 years should be included within the rule frame by the Data Protection Authority instead of being an amendment in the Bill.</span></p>
<h3><span>3. In the Absence of a Guardian Data Fiduciary</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The 2018 and 2019 drafts of the PDP Bill consider a child to be any person below the age of 18 years. For a child to access online services, the data fiduciary must first verify the age of the child and obtain consent from their guardian. The Bill does not provide an explicit process for age verification apart from stating that regulations shall be drafted in this regard. The 2019 Bill states that the Data Protection Authority shall specify codes of practice in this matter. Taking best practices into account, there is a need for ‘</span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://cuts-ccier.org/pdf/project-brief-highlighting-inclusive-and-practical-mechanisms-to-protect-childrens-data.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">user-friendly and privacy-protecting age verification techniques</a><span>’ to encourage safe navigation across the internet. This will require </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://cuts-ccier.org/pdf/bp-global-technological-developments-in-age-verification-and-age-estimation.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">looking at </a><span>technological developments and different standards worldwide. There is a need to hold companies </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/theres-a-better-way-to-protect-the-online-privacy-of-kids-11615306723478.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">accountable</a><span> for the protection of children’s online privacy and the harm that their algorithms cause children and to make sure that they are not continued.</span></p>
<p class="public-DraftStyleDefault-text-ltr fixed-tab-size public-DraftStyleDefault-block-depth0 iWv3d b+iTF _78FBa _1FoOD iWv3d _1j-51 mm8Nw" style="text-align: justify; ">The JPC in the 2021 version of the Bill removed provisions about guardian data fiduciaries, stating that there was no advantage in creating a different class of data fiduciary. As per the JPC, even those data fiduciaries that did not fall within the said classification would also need to comply with rules pertaining to the personal data of children i.e. with Section 16 of the Bill. Section 16 of the Bill requires the data fiduciary to verify the child’s age and obtain consent from the parent/guardian. The manner of age verification has also een spelt out. Furthermore, since ‘significant data fiduciaries’ is an existing class, there is still a need to comply with rules related to data processing. The JPC also removed the phrase “in the best interests of, the child” and “is in the best interests of, the child” under sub-clause 16(1), implying that the entire Bill concerned the rights of the data principal and the use of such terms dilutes the purpose of the legislation and could give way to manipulation by the data fiduciary.</p>
<h3><span>Conclusion</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Over the past two years, there has been a significant increase in applications that are targeted at children. There has been a proliferation of EduTech apps, which ideally should have more responsibility as they are processing children's data. We recommend that instead of creating a separate category, such fiduciaries collecting children's data or providing services to children be seen as ‘significant data fiduciaries’ that need to take up additional compliance measures.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Furthermore, any blanket prohibition on tracking children may obstruct safety measures that could be implemented by data fiduciaries. These fears are also increasing in other jurisdictions as there is a likelihood to restrict data fiduciaries from using software that looks out for such as </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-12/key-issues/online-child-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">Child Sexual Abuse Material</a><span> as well as online predatory behaviour. Additionally, concerning the age of consent under the Bill, the JPC could look at international best practices and come up with ways to make sure that children can use the internet and have rights over their data, which would enable them to grow up with more awareness about data protection and privacy. One such example to look at could be the Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA) in the US, where the rules apply to operators of websites and online services that collect personal information from kids </span><a class="_1lsz7 _3Bkfb" href="https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-compliance" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">under 13 </a><span>or provide services to children that are directed at a general audience, but have actual knowledge that they collect personal information from such children. A form of combination of this system and the significant data fiduciary classification could be one possible way to ensure that children’s data and privacy are preserved online.</span></p>
<hr />
<p>The authors are researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society and thank their colleague Arindrajit Basu for his inputs.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ijlt-shweta-mohandas-and-anamika-kundu-march-6-2022-nothing-to-kid-about-childrens-data-under-the-new-data-protection-bill'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ijlt-shweta-mohandas-and-anamika-kundu-march-6-2022-nothing-to-kid-about-childrens-data-under-the-new-data-protection-bill</a>
</p>
No publisherShweta Mohandas and Anamika KunduDigitalisationDigital KnowledgeInternet GovernanceData ProtectionData Management2022-03-10T13:19:52ZBlog EntryNotes for India as the digital trade juggernaut rolls on
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-arindrajit-basu-february-8-2022-notes-for-india-as-the-digital-trade-juggernaut-rolls-on
<b>Sitting out trade negotiations could result in the country losing out on opportunities to shape the rules.</b>
<p>The article by Arindrajit Basu was <a class="external-link" href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/notes-for-india-as-the-digital-trade-juggernaut-rolls-on/article38393921.ece">published in the Hindu</a> on February 8, 2022</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite the cancellation of the Twelfth Ministerial Conference (MC12) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) late last year (scheduled date, November 30, 2021-December 3, 2021) due to COVID-19, digital trade negotiations continue their ambitious march forward. On December 14, Australia, Japan, and Singapore, co-convenors of the plurilateral Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on e-commerce, welcomed the ‘substantial progress’ made at the talks over the past three years and stated that they expected a convergence on more issues by the end of 2022.</p>
<h3>Holding out</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But therein lies the rub: even though JSI members account for over 90% of global trade, and the initiative welcomes newer entrants, over half of WTO members (largely from the developing world) continue to opt out of these negotiations. They fear being arm-twisted into accepting global rules that could etiolate domestic policymaking and economic growth. India and South Africa have led the resistance and been the JSI’s most vocal critics. India has thus far resisted pressures from the developed world to jump onto the JSI bandwagon, largely through coherent legal argumentation against the JSI and a long-term developmental vision. Yet, given the increasingly fragmented global trading landscape and the rising importance of the global digital economy, can India tailor its engagement with the WTO to better accommodate its economic and geopolitical interests?</p>
<h3><strong>Global rules on digital trade</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The WTO emerged in a largely analogue world in 1994. It was only at the Second Ministerial Conference (1998) that members agreed on core rules for e-commerce regulation. A temporary moratorium was imposed on customs duties relating to the electronic transmission of goods and services. This moratorium has been renewed continuously, to consistent opposition from India and South Africa. They argue that the moratorium imposes significant costs on developing countries as they are unable to benefit from the revenue customs duties would bring.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The members also agreed to set up a work programme on e-commerce across four issue areas at the General Council: goods, services, intellectual property, and development. Frustrated by a lack of progress in the two decades that followed, 70 members brokered the JSI in December 2017 to initiate exploratory work on the trade-related aspects of e-commerce. Several countries, including developing countries, signed up in 2019 despite holding contrary views to most JSI members on key issues. Surprise entrants, China and Indonesia, argued that they sought to shape the rules from within the initiative rather than sitting on the sidelines.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India and South Africa have rightly pointed out that the JSI contravenes the WTO’s consensus-based framework, where every member has a voice and vote regardless of economic standing. Unlike the General Council Work Programme, which India and South Africa have attempted to revitalise in the past year, the JSI does not include all WTO members. For the process to be legally valid, the initiative must either build consensus or negotiate a plurilateral agreement outside the aegis of the WTO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India and South Africa’s positioning strikes a chord at the heart of the global trading regime: how to balance the sovereign right of states to shape domestic policy with international obligations that would enable them to reap the benefits of a global trading system.</p>
<h3><strong>A contested regime</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are several issues upon which the developed and developing worlds disagree. One such issue concerns international rules relating to the free flow of data across borders. Several countries, both within and outside the JSI, have imposed data localisation mandates that compel corporations to store and process data within territorial borders. This is a key policy priority for India. Several payment card companies, including Mastercard and American Express, were prohibited from issuing new cards for failure to comply with a 2018 financial data localisation directive from the Reserve Bank of India. The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) on data protection has recommended stringent localisation measures for sensitive personal data and critical personal data in India’s data protection legislation. However, for nations and industries in the developed world looking to access new digital markets, these restrictions impose unnecessary compliance costs, thus arguably hampering innovation and supposedly amounting to unfair protectionism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is a similar disagreement regarding domestic laws that mandate the disclosure of source codes. Developed countries believe that this hampers innovation, whereas developing countries believe it is essential for algorithmic transparency and fairness — which was another key recommendation of the JPC report in December 2021.</p>
<h3><strong>India’s choices</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s global position is reinforced through narrative building by political and industrial leaders alike. Data sovereignty is championed as a means of resisting ‘data colonialism’, the exploitative economic practices and intensive lobbying of Silicon Valley companies. Policymaking for India’s digital economy is at a critical juncture. Surveillance reform, personal data protection, algorithmic governance, and non-personal data regulation must be galvanised through evidenced insights,and work for individuals, communities, and aspiring local businesses — not just established larger players.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Hastily signing trading obligations could reduce the space available to frame appropriate policy. But sitting out trade negotiations will mean that the digital trade juggernaut will continue unchecked, through mega-regional trading agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). India could risk becoming an unwitting standard-taker in an already fragmented trading regime and lose out on opportunities to shape these rules instead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Alternatives exist; negotiations need not mean compromise. For example, exceptions to digital trade rules, such as ‘legitimate public policy objective’ or ‘essential security interests’, could be negotiated to preserve policymaking where needed while still acquiescing to the larger agreement. Further, any outcome need not be an all-or-nothing arrangement. Taking a cue from the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand, India can push for a framework where countries can pick and choose modules with which they wish to comply. These combinations can be amassed incrementally as emerging economies such as India work through domestic regulations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite its failings, the WTO plays a critical role in global governance and is vital to India’s strategic interests. Negotiating without surrendering domestic policy-making holds the key to India’s digital future.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Arindrajit Basu is Research Lead at the Centre for Internet and Society, India. The views expressed are personal. The author would like to thank The Clean Copy for edits on a draft of this article.</i></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-arindrajit-basu-february-8-2022-notes-for-india-as-the-digital-trade-juggernaut-rolls-on'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-arindrajit-basu-february-8-2022-notes-for-india-as-the-digital-trade-juggernaut-rolls-on</a>
</p>
No publisherbasuDigitalisationDigital KnowledgeInternet GovernanceE-CommerceDigital India2022-02-09T15:04:36ZBlog EntryTechno-solutionist Responses to COVID-19
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-july-17-2021-amber-sinha-pallavi-bedi-aman-nair-techno-solutionist-responses-to-covid-19
<b>The Indian state has increasingly adopted a digital approach to service delivery over the past decade, with vaccination being the latest area to be subsumed by this strategy. In the context of the need for universal vaccination, the limitations of the government’s vaccination platform Co-WIN need to be analysed.</b>
<p><span style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Amber Sinha, Pallavi Bedi, and Aman Nair was published in the </span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.epw.in/journal/2021/29/commentary/techno-solutionist-responses-covid-19.html" style="text-align: justify; ">Economic & Political Weekly</a><span style="text-align: justify; ">, Vol. 56, Issue No. 29, 17 Jul, 2021.</span></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Over the last two decades, slowly but steadily, the governance agenda of the Indian state has moved to the digital realm. In 2006, the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP) was approved by the Indian state wherein a massive infrastructure was developed to reach the remotest corners and facilitate easy access of government services efficiently at affordable costs. The first set of NeGP projects focused on digitalising governance schemes that dealt with taxation, regulation of corporate entities, issuance of passports, and pensions. Over a period of time, they have come to include most interactions between the state and citizens from healthcare to education, transportation to employment, and policing to housing. Upon the launch of the Digital India Mission by the union government, the NeGP was subsumed under the e-Gov and e-Kranti components of the project. The original press release by the central government reporting the approval by the cabinet of ministers of the Digital India programme speaks of “cradle to grave” digital identity as one of its vision areas. This identity was always intended to be “unique, lifelong, online and authenticable.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Since the inception of the Digital India campaign by the current government, there have been various concerns raised about the privacy issues posed by this project. The initiative includes over 50 “mission mode projects” in various stages of implementation. All of these projects entail collection of vast quantities of personally identifiable information of the citizens. However, most of these initiatives do not have clearly laid down privacy policies. There is also a lack of properly articulated access control mechanism and doubts exist over important issues such as data ownership owing to most projects involving public–private partnership which involves a private organisation collecting, processing and retaining large amounts of data. Most importantly, they have continued to exist and prosper in a state of regulatory vacuum with no data protection legislation to govern them. Further, the state of digital divide and digital literacy in India should automatically underscore the need to not rely solely on digital solutions.</p>
<hr />
<p><span>Click to </span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.epw.in/journal/2021/29/commentary/techno-solutionist-responses-covid-19.html">read the full article here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-july-17-2021-amber-sinha-pallavi-bedi-aman-nair-techno-solutionist-responses-to-covid-19'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-july-17-2021-amber-sinha-pallavi-bedi-aman-nair-techno-solutionist-responses-to-covid-19</a>
</p>
No publisherAmber Sinha, Pallavi Bedi and Aman NairDigital GovernancePrivacyDigitalisationCo-WINCovid19Digital TechnologiesInternet GovernanceTechnologyE-Governance2021-08-10T15:34:06ZBlog Entry