The Centre for Internet and Society
http://editors.cis-india.org
These are the search results for the query, showing results 11 to 23.
Design and Uses of Digital Identities - Research Plan
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digtial-identities-research-plan
<b>In our research project about uses and design of digital identity systems, we ask two core questions: a) What are appropriate uses of ID?, and b) How should we think about the technological design of ID? Towards the first research question, we have worked on first principles and will further develop definitions, legal tests and applications of these principles. Towards the second research question, we have first identified a set of existing and planned digital identity systems that represent a paradigm of how such a system can be envisioned and implemented, and will look to identify key design choices which are causing divergence in paradigm.</b>
<h4>Read the research plan <a class="external-link" href="https://digitalid.design/research-plan.html">here</a>.</h4>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digtial-identities-research-plan'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digtial-identities-research-plan</a>
</p>
No publisherAmber Sinha and Pooja SaxenaDigital IDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDDigital Identity2019-08-17T07:58:44ZBlog EntryHolding ID Issuers Accountable, What Works?
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/holding-id-issuers-accountable-what-works
<b></b>
<p>Together with the <a class="external-link" href="https://itsrio.org/pt/home/">Institute of Technology & Society</a> (ITS), Brazil, and the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.cipit.org/">Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law</a> (CIPIT), Kenya, CIS participated at a side event in <a class="external-link" href="https://www.rightscon.org/">RightsCon 2019</a> held in Tunisia, titled Holding ID Issuers Accountable, What Works?, organised by the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.omidyar.com/">Omidyar Network</a>. The event was attended by researchers and advocates from nearly 20 countries. Read the event report <a class="external-link" href="https://digitalid.design/rightscon-2019-report.html">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/holding-id-issuers-accountable-what-works'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/holding-id-issuers-accountable-what-works</a>
</p>
No publisherShruti Trikanad and Amber SinhaDigital IDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDDigital Identity2019-08-08T10:23:58ZBlog EntryThe Appropriate Use of Digital Identity
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-appropriate-use-of-digital-identity
<b></b>
<p>As governments across the globe implement new, foundational, digital identification systems (“Digital ID”), or modernize existing ID programs, there is dire need for greater research and discussion about appropriate uses of Digital ID systems. This significant momentum for creating Digital ID in several parts of the world has been accompanied with concerns about the privacy and exclusion harms of a state issued Digital ID system, resulting in campaigns and litigations in countries such as UK, India, Kenya, and Jamaica. Given the very large range of considerations required to evaluate Digital ID projects, it is necessary to think of evaluation frameworks that can be used for this purpose.</p>
<p>At RightsCon 2019 in Tunis, we presented <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/CISDigitalIDAppropriateUse">working drafts</a> on appropriate use of Digital ID by the partner organisations of this <a class="external-link" href="https://www.omidyar.com/blog/appropriate-use-digital-identity-why-we-invested-three-region-research%C2%A0alliance">three-region research alliance</a> - ITS from Brazil, CIPIT from Kenya, and CIS from India.</p>
<p>In the <a class="external-link" href="https://digitalid.design/evaluation-framework-01.html">draft by CIS</a>, we propose a set of principles against which Digital ID may be evaluated. We hope that these draft principles can evolve into a set of best practices that can be used by policymakers when they create and implement Digital ID systems, provide guidance to civil society examinations of Digital ID and highlight questions for further research on the subject. We have drawn from approaches used in documents such as the necessary and proportionate principles, the OECD privacy guidelines and scholarship on harms based approach.</p>
<p>Read and comment on CIS’s Draft framework <a class="external-link" href="https://digitalid.design/evaluation-framework-01.html">here</a>.</p>
<p>Download Working drafts by CIPIT, CIS, and ITS <a class="external-link" href="http://bit.ly/CISDigitalIDAppropriateUse">here</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-appropriate-use-of-digital-identity'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-appropriate-use-of-digital-identity</a>
</p>
No publisheramberDigital IDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDDigital Identity2019-08-08T10:24:40ZBlog EntryComments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-id4d-practitioners2019-guide
<b></b>
<p>This post presents our comments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide: Draft For Consultation released by ID4D in June, 2019. CIS has conducted research on issues related to digital identity since 2012. This submission is divided into three main parts. The first part (General Comments) contains the high-level comments on the Practitioners’ Guide, while the second part (Specific Comments) addresses individual sections in the Guide. The third and final part (Additional Comments) does not relate to particulars in the Practitioners' Guide but other documents that it relies upon. We submitted these comments to ID4D on August 5, 2019. Read our comments <a class="external-link" href="https://digitalid.design/comments-ID4D-practitioners-guide.html">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-id4d-practitioners2019-guide'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-id4d-practitioners2019-guide</a>
</p>
No publisherYesha Tshering Paul, Prakriti Singh, and Amber SinhaDigital IDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDDigital Identity2019-08-08T10:25:13ZBlog EntryDigital ID Forum 2019
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-id-forum-2019
<b>Sunil Abraham was one of the panelists at this event at Chulalongkorn University on July 3, 2019.</b>
<p><img src="http://editors.cis-india.org/home-images/DigitalID.png" alt="Digital ID" class="image-inline" title="Digital ID" /></p>
<p><span>Click to </span><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/digital-id-forum">view the agenda</a><span>. Also see </span><a class="external-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_Source">Wikipedia page</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-id-forum-2019'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-id-forum-2019</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminDigital IDPrivacyInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDDigital Identity2019-08-07T14:09:16ZNews ItemPicking ‘Wholes’ - Thinking in Systems Workshop
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/picking-2018wholes2019-thinking-in-systems-workshop
<b>A System's Thinking masterclass was conducted by Dinesh Korjan on 27th and 28th May in the CIS Delhi office.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was organised as part of the Digital Identity project to explore the use of system’s thinking approach in a digital identity system, and addressing questions of policy choices and uses, while creating such a system. The workshop was attended by Amber Sinha, Ambika Tandon, Anubha Sinha, Pooja Saxena, Radhika Radhakrishnan, Saumyaa Naidu, Shruti Trikanad, Shyam Ponappa, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Sunil Abraham, Swati Gautam, and Yesha Paul.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dinesh Korjan is a proponent of the strategic use of design for the larger good. He is a product designer and co-founder of Studio Korjan in Ahmedabad. He complements his practice with active engagement in academics and teaches at many leading design schools including NID, Ahmedabad, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Gandhinagar, Srishti School of Art Design & Technology, Bangalore, and CEPT University, Ahmedabad.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The masterclass was aimed at learning to address complex problems using systems thinking approach. It involved experiential and collaborative learning through discussions, and doing and making activities. The workshop began with identifying different actors, processes, institutions, and other entities involved in a complex problem. The method of role-playing was introduced to learn to detail out and map the problem. Concepts such as synergy/ emergence, relationships, and flows were introduced through examples and case studies. These concepts were applied while mapping complex problems to find insights such as patterns, purposes, feedback loops, and finally a leverage. The workshop also introduced the idea of ephemeralization. Participants were prompted to find solutions that require least input but have greatest impact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For further reading <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/picking-wholes">click here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/picking-2018wholes2019-thinking-in-systems-workshop'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/picking-2018wholes2019-thinking-in-systems-workshop</a>
</p>
No publishersaumyaaInternet GovernanceDigital IDDigital Identity2019-06-05T14:35:35ZBlog EntryAnnouncement of a Three-Region Research Alliance on the Appropriate Use of Digital Identity
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/appropriate-use-of-digital-identity-alliance-announcement
<b>Omidyar Network has recently announced its decision to invest in establishment of a three-region research alliance — to be co-led by the Institute for Technology & Society (ITS), Brazil, the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) , Kenya, and the CIS, India — on the Appropriate Use of Digital Identity. As part of this Alliance, we at the CIS will look at the policy objectives of digital identity projects, how technological policy choices can be thought through to meet the objectives, and how legitimate uses of a digital identity framework may be evaluated.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>As governments across the globe are implementing new, digital foundational identification systems or modernizing existing ID programs, there is a dire need for greater research and discussion about appropriate design choices for a digital identity framework. There is significant momentum on digital ID, especially after the adoption of UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9, which calls for legal identity for all by 2030. Given the importance of this subject, its implications for both the development agenda as well its impact on civil, social and economic rights, there is a need for more focused research that can enable policymakers to take better decisions, guide civil society in different jurisdictions to comment on and raise questions about digital identity schemes, and provide actionable material to the industry to create identity solutions that are privacy enhancing and inclusive.</p>
<p> </p>
<h4>Excerpt from the <a href="https://www.omidyar.com/blog/appropriate-use-digital-identity-why-we-invested-three-region-research%C2%A0alliance" target="_blank">blog post by Subhashish Bhadra</a> announcing this new research alliance</h4>
<p>...In the absence of any widely-accepted thinking on this issue, we run the risk of digital identity systems suffering from mission creep, that is being made mandatory or being used for an ever-expanding set of services. We believe this creates several risks. First, people may be excluded from services if they do not have a digital identity or because it malfunctions. Second, this approach creates a wider digital footprint that can be used to create a profile of an individual, sometimes without consent. This can increase privacy risk. Third, this approach increases the power of institutions versus individuals and can be used as rationale to intentionally deny services, especially to vulnerable or persecuted groups.</p>
<p>Three exceptional research groups have undertaken the effort of answering this complex and important question. Over the next six months, these think tanks will conduct independent research, as well as involve experts from across the globe. Based in South America, Africa, and Asia, these institutions represent the collective wisdom and experiences of three very distinct geographies in emerging markets. While drawing on their local context, this research effort is globally oriented. The think tanks will create a set of recommendations and tools that can be used by stakeholders to engage with digital identity systems in any part of the world...</p>
<p>This research will use a collaborative and iterative process. The researchers will put out some ideas every few weeks, with the objective of seeking thoughts, questions, and feedback from various stakeholders. They will participate in several digital rights and identity events across the globe over the next several months. They will also organize webinars to seek input from and present their interim findings to interested communities from across the globe. Each of these provide an opportunity for you to provide your thoughts and help this research program provide an independent, rigorous, transparent, and holistic answer to the question of when it’s appropriate for digital identity to be used. We need a diversity of viewpoints and collaborative dissent to help solve the most pressing issues of our times.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/appropriate-use-of-digital-identity-alliance-announcement'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/appropriate-use-of-digital-identity-alliance-announcement</a>
</p>
No publisheramberDigital IDInternet GovernanceAppropriate Use of Digital IDFeaturedDigital IdentityHomepage2019-05-13T09:06:23ZBlog EntryProgramme Officer - Digital Identity
http://editors.cis-india.org/jobs/programme-officer-digital-identity-2019
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is seeking applications for the position of Programme Officer, to be associated with a two year long research project on digital identity. We may hire up to three Programme Officers as part of this project. The position is full time and will be based in the Delhi office of CIS. </b>
<p> </p>
<h4>To apply for this position please write to amber@cis-india.org along with a CV, two writing samples and contact details of two references. Interested candidates are invited to send their applications at the earliest - latest by April 15th.</h4>
<hr />
<h3>Organisation Profile</h3>
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa. Through its diverse initiatives, CIS explores, intervenes in, and advances contemporary discourse and practices around internet, technology and society in India, and elsewhere.</p>
<h3>About Digital Identity Project</h3>
<p>We are embarking on a two year research project on digital identity. As governments across the globe are implementing new, digital foundational identification systems or modernizing existing ID programs, there is a dire need for greater research and discussion about appropriate design choices for a digital identity framework. There is significant momentum on digital ID, especially after the adoption of UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.9, which calls for legal identity for all by 2030. Instances of emerging new digital identity schemes include national projects in Algeria, Belgium (mobile ID), Cameroon, Ecuador, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Italy, Iran, Japan, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, major announcements in Afghanistan, Denmark, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, the Maldives, Norway, Liberia, Poland, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Zambia and a pilot scheme in Myanmar.</p>
<p>The nature of choices made towards the creation of a digital identity system have significant consequences for privacy, security, inclusivity, scalability, fraud-detection capabilities and implementation costs of the framework. These choices exist in the context of a complex set of political, legal, technological, economic, and societal factors. In this project we will be looking at technical policy options and appropriate uses of a digital identity ecosystem.</p>
<h3>The Role</h3>
<p>Your role will require you to work closely with our team on research and policy analysis, and to engage with external researchers from whom we will commission research. Doing so will involve the following activities.</p>
<ul>
<li>Interdisciplinary research and analysis: Literature review, policy design, detailed analysis on topics including technology design options and appropriate uses of digital identity systems;</li>
<li>Policy dissemination and stakeholder engagement: Supporting the Project Manager in the dissemination of research findings in innovative formats, as well as attending, planning, and executing events;</li>
<li>Writing op-eds, short notes, policy briefs and longer form academic writing for a range of audiences;</li>
<li>Presentations and formal discussions: Preparing and delivering presentations to various audiences;</li>
<li>Helping manage communications with stakeholders including international experts, regulators and policy makers;</li>
<li>Knowledge management: Staying up-to-date on developments of interest to the Initiative, and sharing and debating these with the team;</li>
<li>Contributing to documentary and knowledge management processes; and</li>
<li>Managing interns and team: Managing work outputs with our interns, and coordinating research with team members and the Project Manager.</li></ul>
<h3>Qualifications and Skills</h3>
<p>We are looking for up to three professionals who may come from the following backgrounds: law, regulatory theory, public policy, economics, ethics, technology and development studies.</p>
<p>We are looking for candidates who can exhibit constructive problem-solving skills, sound analytical and critical thinking skills, with the ability to analyse issues from first principles and develop solutions.</p>
<p>This is a full-time position based out of Delhi. The position is for a duration of two years. Salary will be commensurate with qualifications and experience.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/jobs/programme-officer-digital-identity-2019'>http://editors.cis-india.org/jobs/programme-officer-digital-identity-2019</a>
</p>
No publisheramberJobsDigital ID2019-03-29T11:02:42ZBlog Entry(Updated) Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensitive personal financial information
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1
<b>Since its inception in 2009, the Aadhaar project has been shrouded in controversy due to various questions raised about privacy, technological issues, welfare exclusion, and security concerns. In this study, we document numerous instances of publicly available Aadhaar Numbers along with other personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals on government websites. This report highlights four government projects run by various government departments that have made sensitive personal financial information and Aadhaar numbers public on the project websites.
</b>
<p> </p>
<h4>Read the updated report: <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof/" target="_blank">Download</a> (pdf)</h4>
<h4>Read the first statement of clarification (May 16, 2017): <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/clarification-on-information-security-practices-of-the-aadhaar-report/" target="_blank">Download</a> (pdf)</h4>
<h4>Read the second statement of clarification (November 05, 2018): <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/clarification-on-the-information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-report" target="_blank">Link to page</a> (html)</h4>
<hr />
<p><em>We are grateful to Yesha Paul and VG Shreeram for research support.</em></p>
<hr />
<p>In the last month, there have been various reports pointing out instances of the public disclosure of Aadhaar number through various databases, accessible easily on Twitter under the hashtag #AadhaarLeaks. Most of these public disclosures reported contain personally identifiable information of beneficiaries or subjects of the non UIDAI databases containing Aadhaar numbers of individuals along with other personal identifiers. All of these public disclosures are symptomatic of a significant and potentially irreversible privacy harm, however we wanted to point out another large fallout of such events, those that create a ripe opportunity for financial fraud. For this purpose, we identified benefits disbursement schemes which would require its databases to store financial information about its subjects. During our research, we encountered numerous instances of publicly available Aadhaar Numbers along with other PII of individuals on government websites. In this paper, we highlight four government projects run by various government departments with publicly available financial data and Aadhaar numbers. Our research is focussed largely on the data published by or pertaining to where Aadhaar data is linked with banking information. We chose major government programmes using Aadhaar for payments and banking transactions. We found sensitive and personal data and information very easily accessible on these portals.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1</a>
</p>
No publisherAmber Sinha and Srinivas KodaliDigital IDPrivacyNDSAPData ProtectionAccountabilityFeaturedData GovernanceAadhaarDigitisationHomepageInternet GovernanceData Management2019-03-13T00:29:01ZBlog EntrySeminar on Understanding Financial Technology, Cashless India, and Forced Digitalisation (Delhi, January 24)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/seminar-on-understanding-financial-technology-cashless-india-and-forced-digitalisation-delhi-jan-24-2017
<b>The Centre for Financial Accountability is organising a seminar on "Understanding Financial Technology, Cashless India, and Forced Digitalisation" on Tuesday, January 24, at YWCA, Ashoka Road, New Delhi. Sumandro Chattapadhyay will participate in the seminar and speak on the emerging architecture of FinTech in India, as being developed and deployed by UIDAI and NPCI.</b>
<p> </p>
<p><em>Cross-posted from <a href="https://letstalkfinancialaccountability.wordpress.com/2017/01/20/understanding-financial-technology-cashless-india-forced-digitalisation/">Centre for Financial Accountability</a>.</em></p>
<hr />
<h2>Programme Schedule</h2>
<h4>09.30 - Registration</h4>
<h4>10:00 - Introduction to the Seminar & Setting the Context</h4>
<p>Madhuresh Kumar, National Alliance of People’s Movements</p>
<h4>10:15–11:30 - Session 1 - Understanding the Political Context of FinTech</h4>
<p>B P Mathur, Former Dy CAG</p>
<p>Prabir Purkayastha, Free Software Movement of India and Knowledge Commons</p>
<p>C P Chandrasekhar, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, JNU</p>
<h4>11:30-11:45 – Tea / Coffee break</h4>
<h4>11:45-13:15 - Session 2 - How will FinTech Impact the Poor, and Labour and Banking Sector?</h4>
<p>Ashim Roy, New Trade Union of India</p>
<p>Nikhil Dey, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan</p>
<p>Ravinder Gupta, General Secretary, State Bank of India Officers Association</p>
<h4>13:15-14:00 – Lunch</h4>
<h4>14:00-15:30 - Session 3 - Understanding the Economic Context of FinTech</h4>
<p>Indira Rajaraman, Former Director, RBI</p>
<p>Tony Joseph, Sr. Journalist</p>
<h4>15:30-17:00 - Session 4 - Understanding the Architecture of FinTech: Linkages to Aadhaar, IndiaStack etc</h4>
<p>Sumandro Chattapadhyay, the Centre for Internet and Society</p>
<p>Gopal Krishna, ToxicsWatch</p>
<h4>17:00 – Tea</h4>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/seminar-on-understanding-financial-technology-cashless-india-and-forced-digitalisation-delhi-jan-24-2017'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/seminar-on-understanding-financial-technology-cashless-india-and-forced-digitalisation-delhi-jan-24-2017</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroUnified Payments InterfaceFinancial TechnologyDigital IDBig DataDigital EconomyUIDInternet GovernanceDigital IndiaAadhaarFinancial InclusionBiometricsDigital Payment2017-01-23T13:17:19ZBlog EntryComments on the Report of the Committee on Digital Payments (December 2016)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-digital-payments-dec-2016
<b>The Committee on Digital Payments constituted by the Ministry of Finance and chaired by Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, submitted its report on the "Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen Digital Payments Ecosystem" on December 09, 2016. The report was made public on December 27, and comments were sought from the general public. Here are the comments submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society.</b>
<p> </p>
<h3><strong>1. Preliminary</strong></h3>
<p><strong>1.1.</strong> This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) <strong>[1]</strong> in response to the report of the Committee on Digital Payments, chaired by Mr. Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, and constituted by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India (“the report”) <strong>[2]</strong>.</p>
<h3><strong>2. The Centre for Internet and Society</strong></h3>
<p><strong>2.1.</strong> The Centre for Internet and Society, CIS, is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, and open access), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security.</p>
<p><strong>2.2.</strong> CIS is not an expert organisation in the domain of banking in general and payments in particular. Our expertise is in matters of internet and communication governance, data privacy and security, and technology regulation. We deeply appreciate and are most inspired by the Ministry of Finance’s decision to invite entities from both the sectors of finance and information technology. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved, especially the citizens and the users. CIS is thankful to the Ministry of Finance for this opportunity to provide a general response on the report.</p>
<h3><strong>3. Comments</strong></h3>
<p><strong>3.1.</strong> CIS observes that the decision by the Government of India to withdraw the legal tender character of the old high denomination banknotes (that is, Rs. 500 Rs. 1,000 notes), declared on November 08, 2016 <strong>[3]</strong>, have generated <strong>unprecedented data about the user base and transaction patterns of digital payments systems in India, when pushed to its extreme use due to the circumstances</strong>. The majority of this data is available with the National Payments Corporation of India and the Reserve Bank of India. CIS requests the authorities concerned to consider <strong>opening up this data for analysis and discussion by public at large and experts in particular, before any specific policy and regulatory decisions are taken</strong> towards advancing digital payments proliferation in India. This is a crucial opportunity for the Ministry of Finance to embrace (open) data-driven regulation and policy-making.</p>
<p><strong>3.2.</strong> While the report makes a reference to the European General Data Protection Directive, it does not make a reference to any substantive provisions in the Directive which may be relevant to digital payments. Aside from the recommendation that privacy protections around the purpose limitation principle be relaxed to ensure that payment service providers be allowed to process data to improve fraud monitoring and anti-money laundering services, the report is silent on significant privacy and data protection concerns posed by digital payments services. <strong>CIS strongly warns that the existing data protection and security regulations under Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information), Rules are woefully inadequate in their scope and application to effectively deal with potential privacy concerns posed by digital payments applications and services.</strong> Some key privacy issues that must be addressed either under a comprehensive data protection legislation or a sector specific financial regulation are listed below. The process of obtaining consent must be specific, informed and unambiguous and through a clear affirmative action by the data subject based upon a genuine choice provided along with an option to opt out at any stage. The data subjects should have clear and easily enforceable right to access and correct their data. Further, data subjects should have the right to restrict the usage of their data in circumstances such as inaccuracy of data, unlawful purpose and data no longer required in order to fulfill the original purpose.</p>
<p><strong>3.3.</strong> The initial recommendation of the report is to “[m]ake regulation of payments independent from the function of central banking” (page 22). This involves a fundamental transformation of the payment and settlement system in India and its regulation. <strong>We submit that a decision regarding transformation of such scale and implications is taken after a more comprehensive policy discussion, especially involving a wider range of stakeholders</strong>. The report itself notes that “[d]igital payments also have the potential of becoming a gateway to other financial services such as credit facilities for small businesses and low-income households” (page 32). Thus, a clear functional, and hence regulatory, separation between the (digital) payments industry and the lending/borrowing industry may be either effective or desirable. Global experience tells us that digital transactions data, along with other alternative data, are fast becoming the basis of provision of financial and other services, by both banking and non-banking (payments) companies. We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to adopt a comprehensive and concerted approach to regulating, enabling competition, and upholding consumers’ rights in the banking sector at large.</p>
<p><strong>3.4.</strong> The report recognises “banking as an activity is separate from payments, which is more of a technology business” (page 154). Contemporary banking and payment businesses are both are primarily technology businesses where information technology particularly is deployed intimately to extract, process, and drive asset management decisions using financial transaction data. Further, with payment businesses (such as, pre-paid instruments) offering return on deposited money via other means (such as, cashbacks), and potentially competing and/or collaborating with established banks to use financial transaction data to drive lending decisions, including but not limited to micro-loans, it appears unproductive to create a separation between banking as an activity and payments as an activity merely in terms of the respective technology intensity of these sectors. <strong>CIS firmly recommends that regulation of these financial services and activities be undertaken in a technology-agnostic manner, and similar regulatory regimes be deployed on those entities offering similar services irrespective of their technology intensity or choice</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.5.</strong> The report highlights two major shortcomings of the current regulatory regime for payments. Firstly “the law does not impose any obligation on the regulator to promote competition and innovation in the payments market” (page 153). It appears to us that the regulator’s role should not be to promote market expansion and innovation but to ensure and oversee competition. <strong>We believe that the current regulator should focus on regulating the existing market, and the work of the expansion of the digital payments market in particular and the digital financial services market in general be carried out by another government agency, as it creates conflict of interest for the regulator otherwise.</strong> Secondly, the report mentions that Payment and Settlement Systems Act does not “focus the regulatory attention on the need for consumer protection in digital payments” and then it notes that a “provision was inserted to protect funds collected from customers” in 2015 (page 153). <strong>This indicates that the regulator already has the responsibility to ensure consumer protection in digital payments. The purview and modalities of how this function of course needs discussion and changes with the growth in digital payments</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.6.</strong> The report identifies the high cost of cash as a key reason for the government’s policy push towards digital payments. Further, it mentions that a “sample survey conducted in 2014 across urban and rural neighbourhoods in Delhi and Meerut, shows that despite being keenly aware of the costs associated with transacting in cash, most consumers see three main benefits of cash, viz. freedom of negotiations, faster settlements, and ensuring exact payments” (page 30). It further notes that “[d]igital payments have significant dependencies upon power and telecommunications infrastructure. Therefore, the roll out of robust and user friendly digital payments solutions to unelectrified areas/areas without telecommunications network coverage, remains a challenge.” <strong>CIS much appreciates the discussion of the barriers to universal adoption and rollout of digital payments in the report, and appeals to the Ministry of Finance to undertake a more comprehensive study of the key investments required by the Government of India to ensure that digital payments become ubiquitously viable as well as satisfy the demands of a vast range of consumers that India has</strong>. The estimates about investment required to create a robust digital payment infrastructure, cited in the report, provide a great basis for undertaking studies such as these.</p>
<p><strong>3.7.</strong> CIS is very encouraged to see the report highlighting that “[w]ith the rising number of users of digital payment services, it is absolutely necessary to develop consumer confidence on digital payments. Therefore, it is essential to have legislative safeguards to protect such consumers in-built into the primary law.” <strong>We second this recommendation and would like to add further that financial transaction data is governed under a common data protection and privacy regime, without making any differences between data collected by banking and non-banking entities</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.8.</strong> We are, however, very discouraged to see the overtly incorrect use of the word “Open Access” in this report in the context of a payment system disallowing service when the client wants to transact money with a specific entity <strong>[4]</strong>. This is not an uncommon anti-competitive measure adopted by various platform players and services providers so as to disallow users from using competing products (such as, not allowing competing apps in the app store controlled by one software company). <strong>The term “Open Access” is not only the appropriate word to describe the negation of such anti-competitive behaviour, its usage in this context undermines its accepted meaning and creates confusion regarding the recommendation being proposed by the report.</strong> The closest analogy to the recommendation of the report would perhaps be with the principle of “network neutrality” that stands for the network provider not discriminating between data packets being processed by them, either in terms of price or speed.</p>
<p><strong>3.9.</strong> A major recommendation by the report involves creation of “a fund from savings generated from cash-less transactions … by the Central Government,” which will use “the trinity of JAM (Jan Dhan, Adhaar, Mobile) [to] link financial inclusion with social protection, contributing to improved Social and Financial Security and Inclusion of vulnerable groups/ communities” (page 160-161). <strong>This amounts to making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for financial inclusion of citizens, especially the marginal and vulnerable ones, and is in direct contradiction to the government’s statements regarding the optional nature of the Aadhaar ID, as well as the orders by the Supreme Court on this topic</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.10.</strong> The report recommends that “Aadhaar should be made the primary identification for KYC with the option of using other IDs for people who have not yet obtained Aadhaar” (page 163) and further that “Aadhaar eKYC and eSign should be a replacement for paper based, costly, and shared central KYC registries” (page 162). <strong>Not only these measures would imply making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for undertaking any legal activity in the country, they assume that the UIDAI has verified and audited the personal documents submitted by Aadhaar number holders during enrollment.</strong> A mandate for <em>replacement</em> of the paper-based central KYC agencies will only remove a much needed redundancy in the the identity verification infrastructure of the government.</p>
<p><strong>3.11.</strong> The report suggests that “[t]ransactions which are permitted in cash without KYC should also be permitted on prepaid wallets without KYC” (page 164-165). This seems to negate the reality that physical verification of a person remains one of the most authoritative identity verification process for a natural person, apart from DNA testing perhaps. <strong>Thus, establishing full equivalency of procedure between a presence-less transaction and one involving a physically present person making the payment will only amount to removal of relatively greater security precautions for the former, and will lead to possibilities of fraud</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.12.</strong> In continuation with the previous point, the report recommends promotion of “Aadhaar based KYC where PAN has not been obtained” and making of “quoting Aadhaar compulsory in income tax return for natural persons” (page 163). Both these measures imply a replacement of the PAN by Aadhaar in the long term, and a sharp reduction in growth of new PAN holders in the short term. <strong>We appeal for this recommendation to be reconsidered as integration of all functionally separate national critical information infrastructures (such as PAN and Aadhaar) into a single unified and centralised system (such as Aadhaar) engenders massive national and personal security threats</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.13.</strong> The report suggest the establishment of “a ranking and reward framework” to recognise and encourage for the best performing state/district/agency in the proliferation of digital payments. <strong>It appears to us that creation of such a framework will only lead to making of an environment of competition among these entities concerned, which apart from its benefits may also have its costs. For example, the incentivisation of quick rollout of digital payment avenues by state government and various government agencies may lead to implementation without sufficient planning, coordination with stakeholders, and precautions regarding data security and privacy</strong>. The provision of central support for digital payments should be carried out in an environment of cooperation and not competition.</p>
<p><strong>3.14.</strong> CIS welcomes the recommendation by the report to generate greater awareness about cost of cash, including by ensuring that “large merchants including government agencies should account and disclose the cost of cash collection and cash payments incurred by them periodically” (page 164). It, however, is not clear to whom such periodic disclosures should be made. <strong>We would like to add here that the awareness building must simultaneously focus on making public how different entities shoulder these costs. Further, for reasons of comparison and evidence-driven policy making, it is necessary that data for equivalent variables are also made open for digital payments - the total and disaggregate cost, and what proportion of these costs are shouldered by which entities</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>3.15.</strong> The report acknowledges that “[t]oday, most merchants do not accept digital payments” and it goes on to recommend “that the Government should seize the initiative and require all government agencies and merchants where contracts are awarded by the government to provide at-least one suitable digital payment option to its consumers and vendors” (page 165). This requirement for offering digital payment option will only introduce an additional economic barrier for merchants bidding for government contracts. <strong>We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to reconsider this approach of raising the costs of non-digital payments to incentivise proliferation of digital payments, and instead lower the existing economic and other barriers to digital payments that keep the merchants away</strong>. The adoption of digital payments must not lead to increasing costs for merchants and end-users, but must decrease the same instead.</p>
<p><strong>3.16.</strong> As the report was submitted on December 09, 2016, and was made public only on December 27, 2016, <strong>it would have been much appreciated if at least a month-long window was provided to study and comment on the report, instead of fifteen days</strong>. This is especially crucial as the recently implemented demonetisation and the subsequent banking and fiscal policy decisions taken by the government have rapidly transformed the state and dynamics of the payments system landscape in India in general, and digital payments in particular.</p>
<h3><strong>Endnotes</strong></h3>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/">http://cis-india.org/</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[2]</strong> See: <a href="http://finmin.nic.in/reports/Note-watal-report.pdf">http://finmin.nic.in/reports/Note-watal-report.pdf</a> and <a href="http://finmin.nic.in/reports/watal_report271216.pdf">http://finmin.nic.in/reports/watal_report271216.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[3]</strong> See: <a href="http://finmin.nic.in/cancellation_high_denomination_notes.pdf">http://finmin.nic.in/cancellation_high_denomination_notes.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[4]</strong> Open Access refers to “free and unrestricted online availability” of scientific and non-scientific literature. See: <a href="http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read">http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read</a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-digital-payments-dec-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-digital-payments-dec-2016</a>
</p>
No publisherSumandro Chattapadhyay and Amber SinhaUIDDigital IDBig DataDigital EconomyDigital AccessPrivacyDigital SecurityData RevolutionDigital PaymentInternet GovernanceDigital IndiaData ProtectionDemonetisationHomepageFeaturedAadhaar2017-01-12T12:32:22ZBlog EntryWorkshop Report - UIDAI and Welfare Services: Exclusion and Countermeasures
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/workshop-report-uidai-and-welfare-services-august-27-2016
<b>This report presents summarised notes from a workshop organised by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) on Saturday, August 27, 2016, to discuss, raise awareness of, and devise countermeasures to exclusion due to implementation of UID-based verification for and distribution of welfare services.</b>
<p> </p>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society organised a workshop on "UIDAI and Welfare Services: Exclusion and Countermeasures" at the Institution of Agricultural on Technologists on August 27 in Bangalore to discuss, raise awareness of, and devise countermeasures to exclusion due to implementation of UID-based verification for and distribution of welfare services <strong>[1]</strong>. This was a follow-up to the workshop held in Delhi on “Understanding Aadhaar and its New Challenges” at the Centre for Studies in Science Policy, JNU on May 26th and 27th 2016 <strong>[2]</strong>. In this report we summarise the key concerns raised and the case studies presented by the participants at the workshop held on August 27, 2016.</p>
<h2>Implementation of the UID Project</h2>
<p><strong>Question of Consent:</strong> The Aadhaar Act <strong>[3]</strong> states that the consent of the individual must be taken at the time of enrollment and authentication and it must be informed to him/her the purpose for which the data would be used. However, the Act does not provide for an opt-out mechanism and an individual is compelled to give consent to continue with the enrollment process or to complete an authentication.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of Adherence to Court Orders:</strong> Despite of several orders by Supreme Court stating that use of Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for the purpose of availing benefits and services, multiple state governments and departments have made it mandatory for a wide range of purposes like booking railway tickets <strong>[4]</strong>, linking below the poverty line ration cards with Aadhaar <strong>[5]</strong>, school examinations <strong>[6]</strong>, food security, pension and scholarship <strong>[7]</strong>, to name a few.</p>
<p><strong>Misleading Advertisements:</strong> A concern was raised that individuals are being mislead in the necessity and purpose for enrollment into the project. For example, people have been asked to enrol by telling them that they might get excluded from the system and cannot get services like passports, banks, NREGA, salaries for government employees, denial of vaccinations, etc. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ordered Aadhaar not be mandatory, yet people are being told that documentation or record keeping cannot be done without UID number.</p>
<p><strong>Hybrid Governance:</strong> The participants pointed out that with the Aadhaar (Targeted delivery of financial and other subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as Aadhaar Act, 2016 ) being partially enforced, multiple examples of exclusion as reported in the news are demonstrating how the Aadhaar project is creating a case of hybrid governance i.e private corporations playing a significant role in Governance. This can be seen in case of Aadhaar where we see many entities from private sector being involved in its implementation, as well as many software and hardware companies.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of Transparency around Sharing of Biometric Data:</strong> The fact how and why the Government is relying on biometrics for welfare schemes is unclear and not known. Also, there is no information on how biometric data that is collected through the project is being used and its ability as an authenticating device. Along with that, there is very little information on companies that have been enlisted to hold and manage data and perform authentication.</p>
<p><strong>Possibility of Surveillance:</strong> Multiple petitions and ongoing cases have raised concerns regarding the possibility of surveillance, tracking, profiling, convergence of data, and the opaque involvement of private companies involved in the project.</p>
<p><strong>Denial of Information:</strong> In an RTI filed by one of the participant requesting to share the key contract for the project, it was refused on the grounds under section 8(1) (d) of the RTI Act, 2005. However, it was claimed that the provision would not be applicable since the contract was already awarded and any information disclosed to the Parliament should be disclosed to the citizens. The Central Information Commission issued a letter stating that the contractual obligation is over and a copy of the said agreement can be duly shared. However, it was discovered by the said participant that certain pages of the same were missing , which contained confidential information. When this issue went before appeal before the Information Commissioner, the IC gave an order to the IC in Delhi to comply with the previous order. However, it was communicated that limited financial information may be given, but not missing pages. Also, it was revealed that the UIDAI was supposed to share biometric data with NPR (by way of a MoU), but it has refused to give information since the intention was to discontinue NPR and wanted only UIDAI to collect data.</p>
<h2>Concerns Arising from the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) on Implementation of PAHAL (DBTL) Scheme</h2>
<p>A presentation on the CAG compliance audit report of PAHAL on LPG <strong>[8]</strong> revealed how the society was made to believe that UID will help deal with the issue of duplication and collection as well as use of biometric data will help. The report also revealed that multiple LPG connections have the same Aadhaar number or same bank account number in the consumer database maintained by the OMCs, the bank account number of consumers were also not accurately recorded, scrutiny of the database revealed improper capture of Aadhaar numbers, and there was incorrect seeding of IFSC codes in consumer database. The participants felt that this was an example of how schemes that are being introduced for social welfare do not necessarily benefit the society, and on the contrary, has led to exclusion by design. For example, in the year 2011, by was of the The Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Amendment Order, 2011 <strong>[9]</strong>, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas made the Unique Identification Number (UID) under the Aadhaar project a must for availing LPG refills. This received a lot of public pushback, which led to non-implementation of the order. In October 2012, despite the UIDAI stating that the number was voluntary, a number of services began requiring the provision of an Aadhaar number for accessing benefits. In September 2013, when the first order on Aadhaar was passed by court <strong>[10]</strong>, oil marketing companies and UIDAI approached the Supreme Court to change the same and allow them to make it mandatory, which was refused by the Court. Later in the year 2014, use of Aadhaar for subsidies was made mandatory. The participants further criticised the CAG report for revealing the manner in which linking Aadhaar with welfare schemes has allowed duplication and led to ghost beneficiaries where there is no information about who these people are who are receiving the benefits of the subsidies. For example, in Rajasthan, people are being denied their pension as they are being declared dead due to absence of information from the Aadhaar database.</p>
<p>It was said that the statistics of duplication mentioned in the report show how UIDAI (as it claims to ensure de-duplication of beneficiaries) is not required for this purpose and can be done without Aadhaar as well. Also, due to incorrect seeding of Aadhaar number many are being denied subsidy where there is no information regarding the number of people who have been denied the subsidy because of this. Considering these important facts from the audit report, the discussants concluded how the statistics reflect inflated claims by UIDAI and how the problems which are said to be addressed by using Aadhaar can be dealt without it. In this context, it is important to understand how the data in the aadhaar database maybe wrong and in case of e-governance the citizens suffer. Also, the fact that loss of subsidy-not in cash, but in use of LPG cylinder - only for cooking, is ignored. In addition to that, there is no data or way to check if the cylinder is being used for commercial purposes or not as RTI from oil companies says that no ghost identities have been detected.</p>
<h2>UID-linked Welfare Delivery in Rajasthan</h2>
<p>One speaker presented findings on people's experiences with UID-linked welfare services in Rajasthan, collected through a 100 days trip organised to speak to people across the state on problems related to welfare governance. This visit revealed that people who need the benefits and access to subsidies most are often excluded from actual services. It was highlighted that the paperless system is proving to be highly dangerous. Some of the cases discussed included that of a disabled labourer, who was asked to get an aadhaar card, but during enrollment asked the person standing next to him to put all his 5 fingers for biometric data collection. Due to this incorrect data, he is devoid of all subsidies since the authentication fails every time he goes to avail it. He stopped receiving his entitlements. Though problems were anticipated, the misery of the people revealed the extent of the problems arising from the project. In another case, an elderly woman living alone, since she could not go for Aadhaar authentication, had not been receiving the ration she is entitled to receive for the past 8 months. When the ration shop was approached to represent her case, the dealers said that they cannot provide her ration since they would require her thumb print for authentication. Later, they found out that on persuading the dealer to provide her with ration since Aadhaar is not mandatory, they found out that in their records they had actually mentioned that she was being given the ration, which was not the case. So the lack of awareness and the fact that people are entitled to receive the benefits irrespective of Aadhaar is something that is being misused by dealers. This shows how this system has become a barrier for the people, where they are also unaware about the grievance redressal mechanism.</p>
<h2>Aadhaar and e-KYC</h2>
<p>In this session, the use of Aadhaar for e-KYC verification was discussed The UID strategy document describes how the idea is to link UIDAI with money enabled Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) to the beneficiaries without any reason or justification for the same. It was highlighted by one of the participants how the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) believed that making Aadhaar compulsory for e-KYC and several other banking services was a violation of the Money Laundering Act as well as its own rules and standards, however, later relaxed the rules to link Aadhaar with bank accounts and accepted its for e-KyC with great reluctance as the Department of Revenue thought otherwise. It was mentioned how allowing opening of bank accounts remotely using Aadhaar, without physically being present, was touted as a dangerous idea. However, the restrictions placed by RBI were suddenly done away with and opening bank accounts remotely was enabled via e-KYC.</p>
<p>A speaker emphasised that with emerging FinTech services in India being tied with Aadhaar via India Stack, the following concerns are becoming critical:</p>
<ol><li>With RBI enabling creation of bank accounts remotely, it becomes difficult to to track who did e-KYC and which bank did it and hold the same accountable.<br /><br /></li>
<li>The Aadhaar Act 2016 states that UIDAI will not track the queries made and will only keep a record of Yes/No for authentication. For example, the e-KYC to open a bank account can now be done with the help of an Aadhaar number and biometric authentication. However, this request does not get recorded and at the time of authentication, an individual is simply told whether the request has been matched or not by way of a Yes/No <strong>[11]</strong>. Though UIDAI will maintain the authentication record, this may act as an obstacle since in case the information from the aadhaar database does not match, the person would not be able to open a bank account and would only receive a yes/no as a response to the request.<br /><br /></li>
<li>Further, there is a concern that the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System being implemented by the National Payment Corporation of India (NCPI) would allow effectively hiding of source and destination of money flow, leading to money laundering and cases of bribery. This possible as NCPI maintains a mapper where each bank account is linked (only the latest one). However, Aadhaar number can be linked with multiple bank accounts of an individual. So when a transaction is made, the mapper records the transaction only from that 1 account. But if another transaction takes place with another bank account, that record is not maintained by the mapper at NCPI since it records only transactions of the latest account seeded in that. This makes money laundering easy as the money moves from aadhaar number to aadhaar number now rather than bank account to bank account.</li></ol>
<h2>Endnotes</h2>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/uidai-and-welfare-services-exclusion-and-countermeasures-aug-27">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/uidai-and-welfare-services-exclusion-and-countermeasures-aug-27</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[2]</strong> See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-understanding-aadhaar-and-its-new-challenges">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-understanding-aadhaar-and-its-new-challenges</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[3]</strong> See: <a href="https://uidai.gov.in/beta/images/the_aadhaar_act_2016.pdf">https://uidai.gov.in/beta/images/the_aadhaar_act_2016.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[4]</strong> See: <a href="http://scroll.in/latest/816343/aadhaar-numbers-may-soon-be-compulsory-to-book-railway-tickets">http://scroll.in/latest/816343/aadhaar-numbers-may-soon-be-compulsory-to-book-railway-tickets</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[5]</strong> See: <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/linking-bpl-ration-card-with-aadhaar-made-mandatory/article9094935.ece">http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/linking-bpl-ration-card-with-aadhaar-made-mandatory/article9094935.ece</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[6]</strong> See: <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-scam-Bihar-to-link-exams-to-Aadhaar/articleshow/54000108.cms">http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/After-scam-Bihar-to-link-exams-to-Aadhaar/articleshow/54000108.cms</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[7]</strong> See: <a href="http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/cs-calls-for-early-steps-to-link-aadhaar-to-ac.html">http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/cs-calls-for-early-steps-to-link-aadhaar-to-ac.html</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[8]</strong> See: <a href="http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Commercial_Compliance_Full_Report_25_2016_English.pdf">http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Commercial_Compliance_Full_Report_25_2016_English.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[9]</strong> See: <a href="http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/lpg/LPG%20Control%20Order%20GSR%20718%20dated%2026.09.2011.pdf">http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/lpg/LPG%20Control%20Order%20GSR%20718%20dated%2026.09.2011.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[10]</strong> See: <a href="http://judis.nic.in/temp/494201232392013p.txt">http://judis.nic.in/temp/494201232392013p.txt</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[11]</strong> Section 8(4) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 states that "The Authority shall respond to an authentication query with a positive, negative or any other appropriate response sharing such identity information excluding any core biometric information."</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/workshop-report-uidai-and-welfare-services-august-27-2016'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/workshop-report-uidai-and-welfare-services-august-27-2016</a>
</p>
No publishervanyaDigital PaymentData SystemsResearchers at WorkUIDInternet GovernanceSurveillanceBig DataAadhaarWelfare GovernanceBig Data for DevelopmentDigital ID2019-03-16T04:34:11ZBlog EntryWorkshop on Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age (Delhi, November 14-15)
http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/workshop-on-democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-delhi-november-14-15
<b>IT for Change, along with Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF), Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), is organising a two day workshop on ‘Democratic Accountability in the Digital Age’. The workshop will focus on evolving a comprehensive policy approach to data based governance and digital democracy, grounded in a rights and social justice framework. It will be held at the United Service Institution of India, Delhi, during November 14-15, 2016. The CIS team to participate in the workshop includes Sumandro Chattapadhyay (speaker), Amber Sinha (speaker), Vanya Rakesh (participant), and Himadri Chatterjee (participant).</b>
<p> </p>
<p>The workshop aims to:</p>
<ul><li>
<p>Discuss the institutional norms, rules and practices appropriate to the rise of ‘governance by networks’ and ‘rule by data’ that can guarantee democratic accountability and citizen participation, and</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Articulate the steps to claim the civic-public value of digital technologies so that data and the new possibilities for networking are harnessed for a vibrant grassroots democracy.</p>
</li></ul>
<p>We hope the workshop can create a civil society coalition that can build effective strategies for legal and policy reform to further participatory democracy in the digital age. On the first day, the workshop will set the context through knowledge sharing and thematic presentations and discussions. On the second day, we aim to concretize strategies for collective action to further democratic accountability in the digital age.</p>
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<h4><a href="http://itforchange.net/mavc/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Workshop-Agenda-Democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-14-to-15-Nov-2016-2.pdf">Workshop Agenda</a> (PDF)</h4>
<h4><a href="http://itforchange.net/mavc/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Background-note-for-workshop-on-Democracy-in-Digital-Age-Sep21.odt">Background Note</a> (ODT)</h4>
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For more details visit <a href='http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/workshop-on-democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-delhi-november-14-15'>http://editors.cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/workshop-on-democratic-accountability-in-the-digital-age-delhi-november-14-15</a>
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No publishersumandroDigital IDDigital GovernancePrivacyUIDInternet GovernanceAccountabilityDigital IndiaAadhaarWelfare GovernanceE-GovernanceDigital Rights2016-12-15T09:27:22ZEvent