NETmundial and Suggestions for IANA Administration

This post maps the discussion across the NETmundial submissions and presents six emerging evolution scenarios related to the IANA functions:

1. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body
2. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body
3. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body
4. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body
5. Multiplication of TLD registries and root servers
6. Maintenance of status quo

I. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

The proposal under this category demands for the separation of IANA function from technical policy making, and suggests that the IANA function be transferred to an intergovernmental body.

Such proposal is listed below:

This proposal by Global Geneva seeks the establishment of an intergovernmental organisation called World Internet Organisation (WIO), under which IANA (which is understood to be essentially technical and concerning safety and security of the Internet would be located. WIO would additionally have a special link/status/contract with IANA to avoid unwanted interference from governments. A 75% majority at WIO would be requested to act/modify/contest an IANA decision, making it difficult for governments to go beyond reasonable and consensual demands. WIO would act in concert with World Internet Forum, under which ICANN would be located, whereby it would make policy decisions regarding gTLDs apart from its other present functions.

II. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

There are certain proposals whereby it is proposed that IANA function should be separated from technical policy making, or ICANN, and IANA function, which is perceived to be a purely administrative one in such submissions, should be handed over to some sort of non-multilateral organisation, which take different forms in each proposal.

Most such submissions have emerged from the civil society or the technical community.

The Internet Governance Project submission envisions the creation of a DNS Authority under whose umbrella IANA would function. The DNS Authority would be separate from ICANN. This proposal has been endorsed by the submissions of InternetNZ as well as Article 19 and Best Bits. Avri Doria’s submission, along with the submission of APC, envisions the establishment of an independent IANA, separate from the technical policy function. Such independence is sought to be preceded by a transition period by a body called IANA Stewardship Group which would be constituted mostly by members from the technical community. IANA is sought to be governed via MoUs with all stakeholders, on the same lines as the MoU between ICANN and the IETF, as described in RFC2860, RFC6220. The focus of these MoUs would not be policy but will be on performance and adherence to service level agreements.

These submissions are listed below:

III. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

These submissions propose that the IANA function should come under a multilateral body. However they do not suggest the separation of IANA function from policymaking, or from ICANN; or they are at least silent on this latter issue. 2 such proposals come from the civil society and 2 from the government.

A list of these submissions is provided below:

IV. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

These submissions do not consider the issue of separation of IANA function from policymaking, or ICANN, or at least do not state an opinion on the separation of IANA function from ICANN. However, they do suggest that the control of IANA should be held by a non-multilateral body, and not the US Government.

Many of these submissions also suggest that the oversight of ICANN should be done by a non-multilateral body, therefore it makes sense that the IANA function is administered by a non-multilateral body, without its removal from the ICANN umbrella.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

V. Multiplication of TLD registries and Root Servers

These submissions are based on the assumption that reform in the current ICANN/IANA administrative structure is impossible as the US government is unlikely to give up its oversight role over both. Instead, these submissions suggest that multiple TLD registries and root servers should be created as alternatives to today’s IANA/ICANN so that a healthy market competition can be fostered in this area, rather than fostering monopoly of IANA.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

VI. Maintenance of status quo

These submissions are based on the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” principle, and are of the opinion that there is no need to change the administration of IANA function as it functions efficiently in the current system.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

Read more on ICANN/IANA: Role and Structural Considerations (PDF Document, 1215 Kb)